Created: 11/24/1970

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Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack

NIE II Ii 70


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The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate!

Th. Central IrtcQigonca Agency ond the intelligent*of m8 Oepart-mpnti of State and Oelenie, the Af C, and th* MSA,


The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

The Director of Inftlllgence and Reveoreh. D. portf State Iho Director. Deftni*goney Iho Director. National Security Agency

Tho Aiiiitanl General Manager, Atom* energy Ccenmi.iion Abstaining:

The AtuitaM lo the Director. Federal tvteav of Instigation, tho wbj.ct being outiida ot hu jurisdiction.

nvatoriol containi infer within the meaning ol the

Notiono Drrir

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m any manner to an unauthorized


ted Stales the tram.

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(NOTE: Pages throughf this NIE were released inor convenience we haveopy of the earlier release with this package. The pages of the previous release at <m* included in the total page count for7 release.]

orces for Intercontinental Attack






The Yean of Strategic12

The Peat-Cuban Re-examinatioa ofH

The Preiect Strategic neUbonihlp14

Overall Magnitude and Corts of theIS







The Earlier Va1 and24

. Toe Basic Problem ofSS


The Range29

The Mod 3

nolcj and Missions of (be35

V. THE SS-11





Future Systems

Outlook for the Longer




Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine Force levels44

Patrol Activity

Roles and Missions of Ballistic Missile



C-Clasi Submarines





Operational Training49



Evidence in the Near and Long

IooUreet Approaches to Longer Term

Bask Aims of Soviet Policy

Soviet Strategic Policy

Economic Capabilities and

The Dynamism of Research and

Internal Politics and Military Decision-Making60


A Strategic Arms Limitation Agiecneot62

Possible Forces in the Absence of an Agreeoseot

Soviet Perception of the64

Multiple Re-entry Vehicles and66



^ 5 <-



Alternative Force

Uluilratlvo Force Model A: Minimum

IUurtrativc Force Model D: Muimurn

Dlurtrallve Force Model B: Maintenance of Parity without Arms

Illuitrau'vc Force Model C: Counterforce Against Mmuternan

Likely Soviet Counts of
















To awes (he strength and capabilities of Soviet forces for tatercon-Rental attack lo estimate their size and composition throughod to forecast general trends thereafter.



A, The intercontinental attack forces considered in this par>erbaUistic missilesubmarine-Lunched bailee missilesnd heavy bombers. In the courseTthe pastears the Soviets have engagedigorous aod costly buildup pi these demerits of their military establishment While all defense spending increased during the period, the estimated share allocated to these forces doubled, going fromercent0 to more thancnt in the laterhe decade.9illion rubles (the equivalent6as more than three times as high as0 level For the decadehole spending on intercontinental attack forces accumulated to about 18

o purchuc md operate Che Sovietto Ov; US.


billion rublesillion) with ICBMs accounting for aboutercent of tliij amount. Theso flguics do oof include tho cost of research and developmenthich rose faster duringhan any other componeot of Soviet defense spending, and which wo estimate has now surpassed that of the US.

B. esult of this effort, the Soviets had0 anperational ICBM launchers at operational ICBM complexes, and they will have anaunchersbyo this number may ben estimated0 byelieved to be deployed atballistic missileEM) and medium-range ballistic missile (MKBM) complexes and possibly intended for use against Eurasian taigcts, which are nevertheless capable of reaching theomeaunchers which we believe are located at test or train -ing sites. Of.CBMs-estimated to be at operational com-' lexes byrobably will be of the laigeypehe smallerhe remainder will consist of olderndissiles, plus an estimatedf tbe small, solidpropellant.

C. While these ICBM programs were under way. the Sovietsenergetically developing nuclear-powered,Of these the most notable islass. which, likePolaris, hasubes for launching missiles. The missileby tin's class has an estimated range ofielda system Circular Error Probable

(CEP)submarines are now being produced

at the estimated rateear; we believe thatre nowand thatthers are in various stages of fining out and sea trials. Anotherrre believed to be in various stages of assembly. Besideslass there are submarines of earlier design which could contribute to tbe intercontinental attack mission.

D. The USSR has not, in recent years, shown equal interest In manned bombers of inter continental capability. At preseat thereeavy bombers and tankers operational, all of them of the Bison and Bear types, whose designs date from. We believerototype now existsew aircraft.Q

It might be used in an intercontinental role, and the force may be built up begimiing4



Tho Principal Types of ICBMi

E. TLey far tho most numerous of Soviet ICBMs, IstoEPa yield Q_

Tit iseapon best suited for use againstluiii ial installations, and some military targets. It can reach all ports of the US, but has also been tested to ranges as shortndicating much flexibility in its possible uses.9 testing beganodified version. Analysis of these tests has not yeta full understanding of their implications; we remain confident nevertheless that the inodifiedill stilloft-target weapon, designed to improve the ability to penetrate antibalUstfc missileDeployment of the SS-J1 may have ceased at ICBM complexes, and appears to be tapering off at IRBM and MRBM complexes.

F. Theow exists in four .variants: Modhicli'carries avehicle (RV) weighingounds;hose RV-

weighs0 pounds; Modhich has been tested bothepressed trajectory ICBM (DICBM) andractional orbitsystemnd Modhich carries three RVs. Leavingside for tho time being, our analysis of evidence on theof,urns up some perplexing problems. C. There is general agreement that theas developed, early

in, lo provide better accuracyarger payload than the

resumably for use against hardthe US Minuterrian

system. Theppears reasonably well adapted for this purpose.

owever, the Soviets began to test the Modhich with its

heavier payload was estimated toield of (_

These tests were pursued with great vigor, and the Mod

2 was actually deployed before the Mod

3But Mod 2 nevcr in its numerous flight tests actually demonstrated enough range to

reachern an complexes. We believe that its demonstrated

range could be increased sufficiently to cover most or all of them (there

are differences on tliis point) by using up more of the available pro-

pellant, removing telemetry packages, etc. Yet it remains curious that



Ihe Modlone among ICBMs except theas never been tested to what we would presume to be its intended operational range.

H. The Idll probabilityissile against bard targets is more sensitive to accuracy than to yield. The accuracy of theannot bo ascertained from observations. It must be deduced

Jin the Intelligence Community, opinions as to theangeow.igh, with thefigures being either OS. Small as they may appear,significance of these differences ist is generallyin' actual operational employment, 'accuracies in the force aswould be somewhat

X. In sum, with respect to the capability of thegainst Minuteman. we have estimated that it can have sufficient range to reach most or all targets even though such range has not been demonstrated in tests. We see no reason to doubt that in the event of general war (he Soviets would use it for whatever it could accomplish against the Minuteman system. But, the Soviets would have to deploy several times the present number .ofnd Modith tbeir present capabilities, beforeorce which woulderious threat to the Minuteman forcehole. This brings usonsideration of tlie Mod 4.

J. Inhe Soviets began testing thearrying three RVs. Byhey had carried outests, about the usual numberissile before it goes into operationalIn these tests, the three RVs^

Jwere not independently targetable. andas tested wasultiple independently targetablepre-

sume that theas not been operationally deployed, though it could be at any time.

SIe, oJ diffawci lofcJd.

cia historical review program



K. Inests resumed, andovember there had been four more. One of these was like the earlier tests; oneailure. The two others exhibited [J

^ JoneIRV, though itifferent method from thatthe US. Data arc still scanty, and analysis far fromthe Soviets decide toIRV system based onthey could probably begin to do so Ensing theguidance system. This guidance system would give eachCEP no better than that of theingle RV. Theeach of. the three RVs is estimated to

as sufficient range to reach Minuteman

L. Returning now to theods observed above it has been tested bothICBM andOBS. In neither form does it have sufficient accuracy to attack hard targets effectively; itsfunction would he lo attack soft strategic laigets, avoiding early detection by the US Ballistic Missile Early Warning System. (New US warning systems give promise of reducing or eliminating thisThere is some difference of opinion as to the capability of this vehicle operatingOBS. It is agreed, however, that theas been deployed onlyery limited extent, and that its futurewill also be limited.


M. The broader reasons for the USSR's energelic buildup ofattack forces are neither comptexnor obscure. In thehe Soviet leaders, politically and ideologically hostile to the US. and thinking and behaving as rulersreat! power, perceived that in this particular respect their military forces were conspicuously inferior lo those of their most dangerous rival, (he US. Consequently, they set themselves to rectify theachieve at aa relation ol rough parity. Parity in this sense cannot bemeasured; it istate of mind. Such evidence as we have, much of it from the strategic arms limiiation talks, indicates




thul (lio Soviet leaders titink that they have now achieved thisor are about to achieve it, at least ia respect to weapons of intercontinental range.

N. Many aspects of the present force structure are also susceptible to simple and probably correct explanation. The Sovietsrge number of ICBMs in order tonow toof US ICBMs, and also to increase the probability that many would survive an initial US attack. They built rjiissile-Iaunching-submaiincs which are virtually invulnerable to attack when deployed, and theyanned bomber force as yet anotherhe intercontinental attack force is obviously capable of being used in war. but there is no reason to believe that the Soviet leaders intendeliberately to make nuclear war. The force is an attribute of-power, an mstrumcnt toeterrent'to the US.

O. Looking to the future, it seems clear that the Soviet leaders intend to main faininimum such forces as wdl continue to givetheir ownsense"of "equal security" with the US. One method of doing so might be through an arms limitationthey appear seriously Interested in this possibility. We do not know whether an agreement will be reached, or on what terms. If it were indeed concluded, the development of Soviet intercontinental attack forces would be subject to its terms, but in Uiis Estimate we confine ourselves mainlyonsideration of the situation in the absence of agreement

P. With the general attitudes and policies of the USSR being what they are. it might seem obvious to infer that the Soviet leaders will strive to achieve marked superiority over the US in strategic weaponry. We do not doubt that they would like to attainosition. Tlie question is whether they considereasibleihey believe the chances of success good enough to justify allocation of the necessary resources, adjustment to the political 'implication of an all-out arms race, and acceptance of the risk that instead of sur-

Coo ftorUr TriinUIcDa. tbet Sl.H. tr.ftlrf&w. USAF. dot* oot belitx Sowtrubrunoet wc virtual* iowlecfibtc lo truck. Dual oa rfco diKuxkon of Soviet luVmaiine patrol activityewe

deployed at any oneS? rnnalralawlncnblr ioft-Ui(iti la pert, la rtetr of

S effort! id ASW opciitiow he further believe* (hit tome portion ot the deplored tut* would alto bo vuloc/abls and tint vutBrnUAr wfllSW Irchnolop' uppiune.



passing ihe US they might fall behind, especially in ihe technological competition. They might, in any case, think it feasible totrategic posture that, while falling short of marked superiority, makes clear that the Soviets have advantages over the US in certain specific areas. For example, they can now claim an advantage in numbers of ICBM launchers. While this might not be significant militarily, it would help to diamatizc the strategic power of the Soviet Union.

Q. But even if Soviet intentions go no further than maintenance of "equalheir arms programs are bound to be vigorous and demanding. This is in part because Soviet leaders muit have an eye not to what forces the US has at present, but to what it can have, or may have, in future years. In this respect they arc likely to beoverestimate ralher than underestimate the US threat. Moreoverv.the weapons competition nowadays .isace; each side is impelled to press forwardest it be lefteapons programs also lend toomentum of ihcir own; tho immense appaialus of organizations,lia Hons,vested interests, and so on, tends to proceed in its endeavors unless checked by some decisive political authority.

R. On the other hand, there are constraints upon Soviet armsThe most obvious is economic; resources arc not unbounded; the civilian economy demands its share; one weapon system competes with another for allocations; and intercontinental attack forcesete with strategic defense and general purpose forces. The various bureaucracies wilh interests in one or another area compete partly with rational argument and partly in sheer political infighting. Soviet leaders musl also consider how far they may wish to press their own programs lesl they provoke countervailing programs in the US. And they must assess not only the present and future US threat, but also that from China, and elsewhere.

S. While the foregoing consideration| probably govern the nature of Soviet decisions as to future weapons programs, they provide us with little or no basis on which to estimate in detail what thesewill be. Wc have never had solid evidence ou the problem, and there is no reason to expect that we shall have such evidence in die future. Moreover, in the present era the rapidity of technological advance tends to produce especially vigorous action and reaction bc-



tween niilitary programs of the USSR and (ho US, and it has made the strategic relationsltfp moro susceptible to change than ever before.

T. Yet the possibilities are not unlimited, certainly in the next five years or so. For one thing, intercontinental weapons systems are of such complexity that their development, testing, and deploymentong time. We can observe the testing phase, and thus project potential deployments. It usually takes about two years from the tunc wc observe the first flight testew ICBM until that system becomes operational in the field. The interval for SLBMs is about the same or longer, and for bombers it Is much longer. Wc canestimate with much confidence that the kinds of weaponsdeployed by the Soviets during the next two years or so will be those already in operation or in the late stages of development Even -fa the period from two to five years from now tho force will be corn-posed largely of existing kindselivery vehicles, though towards the end of the period some new ones may come into operational status, and some older ones be retired.*

U. Because of (he lead times involved in coDStruction andwe can also be highly confident of the number of launchers of intercontineolal weapons which will be operational up to about two years from now. Beyond two years uncertainty increases as the fcw period of projection increases. Some reasonable limits to this Hcertainty can nevertheless be derived from'our knowledge of past employment rates, especially those obtainingime when theappeared to bearticularly vigorous effort

V. But it is not in .new types of weapon systems or in gross num-krs of launchers that the most significant developments io Sovietfor intercontinental attack will probably lie during the next several years. Rather it is in qualitative improvements to presentand of these the most important are in accuracy of missiles andre-entry vehicles for them.

ccuracy. On technical grounds, wc believe (hat thewithout going to new guidance concepts but mainly bythe components of the present guidance systems and changing (he configuration of their RVs, could in two years achieve CEPs of. for their ICBMs, and begin to iotroduce these improvements into the force. Hitherto, the Soviets have dcrn-




onslrairil no urgent disposition to achieve high accuracies. But they are likely to doleast for thethe next few years, primarily because of ihe great increase in capability against hard targets which tliis development would afford them, and because, if for no other reason, the necessary technical developments are sure to occur in the normal course of product improvements.

Independently. Targetable Re-entry expect the Soviets to develop MIRVs capable ofhard targets such as Minuteman. These could proceedrogram, orifferent concept suchrepresented by the "bus" system the US. Withorder of accuracy desiredhard target MIRV, we tlirnk

that neither could be operational before2 at theIRV with no more accuracy than the presentould eventuate from the currentrogram byL

ICBMt. The Soviets will probablyon these, but it remains to be seen how extensively theythem. There are many difficulties of maintenance,and the like which cause us to believe thatmight have doubts about the practicability of such aIn any event we would not expect it to

W. With respect to submarines, the Soviets will almost certainly continue to increaselass fleet at the rate of about eight per year, for some time to come.ew missile, theas been undergoing flight testseliberate pace since Junets range is indicated to beubstantialover the'missile presently carried bylass. Aaspect, however. Is that theppears too large to be fitted intolass. Moreover, we have no evidenceewclass designed to carry this missile. We think it likely that,inimum, theill bo deployed onodifiedlass units. Evidence is insufficient, however, for us toonfident estimate as to the nature or extent of any further deployment: By5 Soviet submarines could have aussiles equipped with multiple warheads or penetration aids; the system CEP would probably be about. or worse.



X. The fleet of toteiwnunental manned bombers willIn numbers gradually until athen tliebegin to enter operational units. We believe thatbest suited for peripheral operations, but that It hasfor mtercontincntal attack. All but the Air Forceour knowledge of this aircraft is still too (united to justly ajudgment of its capabilities and future employment. Thebelieves that the capabilities ofnow assessed,

oviet intent to employ the aircraft in both intercontinental and peripheral operations.


Y. The various uncertainties summarized above make it evident tbat no exact estimate of the future Soviet force, structure, at least after about the endould be. defended. We baVo therefore constructed, in Section XII of this Estimate, several illustrative models to depict various possibilities. The first, called Force A, represents tittle moreompletion of programs presently under way; it seems highly unlikely thai the Soviets would stop at this. Another model. Force D.ample of what we believe would be aeffort short of convertingartime basis; this also appears highly unlikely. Force C, without going as far as Force D, represents something the Soviets might undertake if they were to place top priority on the early acquisitionapability to knock out virtually all of the US ICBM force; we also think this unlikely.4

Z. Between these outer limits of reasonable force structures we have set forth three others designated respectivelyhese differ primarily in the rapidity with which the Soviets, either for technological or other reasons, deploy MIRVs, and they reflect also some differences in general force structure which would seem likely to obtain because of such differences in MIRV development. Our estimate is that Soviet intercontinental attack forces are most likely lo fall somewhere in the area depicted byode!s. but we wish to emphasize that these and the other models are strictly illustrative, and not lo be regarded as confident estimates or as pro-

On. BocklyAuirtiM CW ot Suit.USAF. iaa rot agree with il* judpneaU In (JiltFor hlino lih (ooIpcKc lo Secuaa



ext twoor





The Years of Strategicorld War II marked the beginning of Soviet elforts.toapability, foregic offensiveeveral devdop-menu converged to impel the USSR in thii direction. The nature of warfare had been profoundly altered by the extensive urc of strategic bombardment. Breakthroughs inIn nudear weapons, missiles, andeven more dramatic change for theAnd, although (he Soviets in any case would have moved to exploit ;bo newthe drastically altered political and military balance that emerged from the war provided an urgent incentive. The USSR emerged from the war secood only to the USieat power. Its interests andbrought It into direct conflict with the opposing power of the US. and Soviet military planners were forced for the first

time to think in Intercontinental as well as continentil terms.

he Soviets pushed research) in every field of strategic weaponry. We know that5 theiiweapon.program was well under way. Late In the war they overran the German missile center of Feenemunde, whichthem tbe technological bate for an intensive effort in this field; by the fallhe Soviets had built the ballistictest center at Kapustin Yar and badseveral lest firings of. Work was also under way on strategicIn additiontrong native design effort, Soviet technicians were copying theew of which bad fallen Into Soviet hands late fn the war. At the dose of, the USSR hid tested Its firstweapon and had fidded its firstdelivery system, theistonbomber, which was lo be deployed in huge numbers. But although the Soviets had



Uio US strategic/nuclear monopoly, they had not ovexooroo tho US lead.

he buildup of Soviet strategic force* ocean wilh those for Eurasianhat it did was probably In largeunction of the learning curve. The USSH wasew technology (Indeednewnd it was easier to meet suafegic requirement! In Eurasia than to develop capabilities for intercontinentalBeginning in the mid-lQSOs, the Soviets undertook the replacement of theilh the TU-lfl |et medium bomber (thend commenced the deployment of medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) end. In the, Intermediate-rangeissileseveral facton probably account for the massiveness of the strategic forces that were eventually arrayed against Europe; the traditional Soviet concernurope reinforced by the heavy losses of World War II. the Soviet penchaut for over-insurance, and the new threat which theperceived in (he foimation of NATO. Finally, and perhaps most Important, theprobably hoped that strategic forces which bald Europe hoslagc would deter the US until they could develop strong forces for intercontinental attack.

y the, (he Soviets were workingariety of weapon systems for deployment against the US: ballistic missile submarines, heavy bombers, andballistic miuucj (ICBMsJ. In terms of actual deployment, Ihe first resultsew of Ihe first nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarinetass. were pioduced. There is somethat the Soviets had planned tothe new heavy bombers, the Bison and Ihe Bear, in larger numbers, but several factors combined lo limit deployment:wiih theiren gilt en ing of US air defenses, aod, most important, the

first successful test of tho SS4 unsuitable for large-scale, deploy-

ment, but it came along shortly aftera missile enthusiast, had ccniolidi ted bis power. Khrushchev soughtring the maximum political effect out of this

S. The developmenttrategic weapon against which the US bad no defense would in any case have been of great ligulfieance. But to Khrushchev, itatershed La internationallipping of thebalance which he tried to exploit before it had in fact occurred. His extravagant,ould not at. that time be disproved by .US foteftgence, and be sought to turn thestimates of Soviet strength to his advantage in his demandsettlement of the Berlin problem.owever, we realized that the Soviet ICBM force was both highly vulnerable and much smaller than had been believed. Meanwhile, the US. alarmed by the Soviet ICBM threat, hadassive and rapid buildup of its ownmissile forces.

t was to this situation that kltrushchev. earlyecided to deploy ballisticiles lo Cuba. The solution to the problem was typical of the man. Ituick fir, similar to his "virgin lands' pokey. At one stroke, he would Improve the USSR'sgia position and increase its bargain ing power at negotiations on,Berlin (which be had thoughtfully suggested should beuntil after the US electionst was, of course. Khrushchev's major miscalculation, and one thatto his fall from power; be had assumed that ihe move would go undetected until it was completed, be had underestimated the will of bis adversary, and he bad not taken account of the overwhelming conventional superiority of the US in its own backyard



end result was mi ignominious Soviet retreat. But the episode had Important effects on Soviet programs to build forces forattack.

The Post-Cuban Re-examination of Policy

ven before the Cuban missile crisis ofhere was evidence that the Soviet ICBM program was tho subject of ie examination and revision. For example, tho deployment of thendever reached the levels which we believe were originally intended. The Soviets bad evidently concluded that these systems wereto meet their stralegic requirements.

n the aftermath of the Cuban crisis, the.

leaders must have seen the buildingore impressive deterrent as the immediate requirement. This meant large, suxvivable forces that couldevastating attack in retaliation. The second major requirement was political In origin, but no less pressing: to emerge from the position of strategicthat the USSR had occupied for nearlyears. Thus,4 the Soviets launched

. the massive buildup of strategic missile forces for inlercontinentaf attack that is still in progress.

his buildup hasustained, high-priority effort for much of the past decade. It has involved the extensiveof three weapon systems that were under development In Ihe: the relatively smallCBM, which now makes up the bulk of tbe force; thehe largest and most powerful Soviet ICBM; and thelass ballistic misslle'sub-marine, the Soviet counterpart to Polaris.of theob'd-propellant ICBM has been limited. In terms of new group starts the Soviet ICBM buildup probablyeak; until recentlyairly high and constant level, but

there Is now somo evidencelowdown. Wo believe that production of biUtrUoew high In tho put year.

Tho Present Strategic Relationship

the past several yeanramatic Improvement Inposition relative lo tbe US.o, the Soviets almostthe USlearase point of view, they wouldto reckon that their ICBMs andhighly vulnerableS surprisoand lhal their small missilewas by Itself Inadequate, foralthough licking.aa biterforce' comparable lb' that ol thehave surpassed the US in numberslaunchers and within the next few

- years could overtake the US ins well. They have not onlyormidable deterrent but they haveosition that they evidently regard as one of strategic equality with the US.

has been evident for some timeimportant Soviet objective hasosition ofparity with the US. Sovietof strategic arms limitation talksintended in part to secure USthis parity. But Soviet interestar with the US extendsthe SALT context: the USSR'sto establish its equality with Ihe US aspower on the world scene.

li. Thereuestion as to how the Soviets define equality. like the US, tbeapparently measure theariety of ways. We have no evidence that the Soviets have sought to meas-

Umlwn w4 In UiU pipfl, ti mranl to fe'ri onl/ to rubmiruwimics.




RF,FASt AS SmsUi/.ti.

uro relative strengths of the US and USSR using tcrrni such as (oUl throw weight, mcge-

in determining relative force capabilities. Such analysis is comprehensive and takes into consideration quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the forces and poteobaJas well as the defensive capabilities of tho enemy. On the other hand,

itasy men still fend to think as though they were counting "lifles and csannoru" and pay imuffiacQl' attention to quabtative factors when looking at strategic forces.

n any event, equality, for all practical purposes, has been substantially acbieveeL While Ihe USSR has not attempted to match Ihe US in numbers of heavy bomben. it has compensated by building an ICDM forcelarger than that of ihe US and isetermined effort lo catch up with the US in SLBMs.umber of qualitative Improvements are being tested which will improve the capabilities of Soviet strategic attack forces coDsiderably.

Overall Magnitude ond Cosli of the Pro-


M. One overall representation of theand pace of the buildup of strategic intercontinental attack forces is the partem of expenditures for deployrneot andof these forces. (Seen thehe initial expansion In spending mainly reflected deployment of Dear and Bison bombers. During the period from theo theotal strategic attack spending was concentrated on the peripheral attackbombers and MRBM and IRBM systems.

In lieoviet expenditures for tot croon tlnental attack foices accelerated rapidly as the USSR began to deploy ICBMi. Therogram in particulareakpending declined4seployment ended, then rose sharply again67 as thondhua submarine programs hit their stride- From then on It consistently surpassed spending on peripheral forces. Outlays for intercontinentalew high7 and havoat about that level since.

lthough total defense spending grew during. outlay* for Intercontinental attack- forces grew foster, than the total so that tlie share doubled fromercent0 to more thanercent In the.9 level ofrubles (the equivalent ofalmost four times as high as0 level. For the decadoholeaccumulated to aboutillion6CBMs account foe aboutercent ol this amount.

hree weapon syttems deployed during Ihe latter half ofndlassduring, accounting for nearly half the total for intercontinental attack forces. The estimated outlays to data for thendrograms are roughly equal-approaching 3V4 billioo rubles for each (morehough about three SS-lIs have been deployed for eachoreover, iiass programevel of aboutubmarines, its total costs would be about the same as for thendrograms

be fastest rising component of Soviet defenso speeding duringas been oudays for military research, development, test and evaluation (RDT6E)or military space programs. Theseincreased from aboutercent of the total0 to about ooe-thirdwe are unable to separate out with confidence theosts of particular weapon systems, it seems clear thatrograms for int'.-continental attack have been an Important contributing factor to this notary rising trend Inxpenditures, and thus to the overall growth of military costs over the decado. Anby-productof these expenditures, on building' up in letttack forces duringas been the creation of large RfitD facilities, such as theest center, which are capable of supporting continued expansion of Soviet Intarcootfnental attack capabilities.



be Soviet ICBM forceperational systems, deployed atperational ICBM complexes. We believe that thes wul be discussed below. Is also deployed at one MRBM and one 1RBMWe believe that construction of launch facilities is continuing atomplexes,f theegular SS?ll complexes as well as at the MRBM and IRBM complexes men-Honed, and at the ringic*SS-ia complex.ndoastiucubn endedhere are also ICBM launchers at Ihe teat ranges at Tyuralam andSee Table on

bdfcvehe ICBM IToehk

.eUYiUe.onjer ^ot ibem u. Ulotoul (out




0 the Soviets had maperational ICBMs atICBM complexes. (See Figure ii.)are deployed In groups of six launchers,odn groups ofaunchers. Assuming no phaseout of older systems, the Soviets willotalegulaily deployed operational ICBMs when groups under construction are completed, probably by

WecsSimate that the Soviets also have aboutaunchers, the majority of them located at the test ranges and the remainder at the regularS-U. andhich are used for training launchAll of these presuxnably have an emer

geocy OperatioDal capability against the US. In addition, there probably are at the test ranges which might be so employod.

ccount must also bo taken of thoSS-lli which wc believe are being deployed at two complexes in the southwest Ukraine originally devotod only to MRBMs/niBMs.thatere opaaUooal0 aod that an additionalill boby

There Is complete agreement that these SS-lIi can attack other peripheral targets or targets in ihe US. There is dispute, however, as lo which is the priouuy mission of these


I ti

CIA. DIA. and JVSA believe- the evi-denon fx sufficiently convincingermit the conclusion that pe/ipberal attack ii themlssvoa. Nevertheless, sinceapability to reach targets In most of the US. they would have to bo included in any calculations of mi rim urn Soviet capabili-ties lo attack thofor arms coabol purposes. Stole, Army, Nooy, end Air Force do not consider the evidenceconvincing to permit the couclusioa that peripheral attack Is the primary mission for these. Since the US remains the most powerful stmlegic oppoacnt of the USSH and Is the only nation that could inflict se-vero damage upoa the Sovietsuclear exchange, they prudent to assume that the Soviets would elect to have weaponsystems with intercontinental capabilitiesprimarily against the US with theto change to peripheral target areas should the contingency arise. They therefore consider them part of the ICBM force.

The total number of ICBMs which could be targeted against the US. both now and when the cocutrycfSoo wo believe Is now under way Is completed, is rummuixedhe following tabic. It ihould be noted that these totalsgross capabilities rather than an estimate of the numbers which are in fact likely to be targeted against the US at any given time. As Indicated above, thereifference of opinion as to whether the SS-lls deployed at the two complexes In tboUkraine are Intended for this purposo. In any case, all of the missiles nOfntnailycould not or would not be used to an initial salvo against the. US. For example, tho .

long-it rinding emphasis of Soviet militaryon maintenance of substantial reservesuggests that Soviet planners would

wish to withhold some portion of their ICBM forces from an Initial attack in order to take care of coDtingeiicie*.



IQrtoUr ig7Q MtJ-mi


SS-7 UuncW.

About SO


About IS

Total ft?






SS 41






espite (he diversity of *ys-lems in the Soviet ICBM force (seeertain generalizations are possible about tho forcehole.

ayloadtotal throwhigh compared lo thai of tlie US force, primarily because of the large size of theut also because of the continued presence of significant numbers of relatively largeand SS-Ss in the force. The total megatonnage that can be delivered by theforce is also considerably greater than that of the US. The nuclear performance of Soviet warheads of one megaton andheir yield-to-weight ratio, is believed to be generally at about the level of technology demonstrated in the final Soviet series oftests


he Soviet approach to system design has been quile different from that of the US. emphasizing simple subsystems and tbe use of off-the-shelf components of proven olderlassic example of thisconcept is the relatively simple guidance technique used on all Uquid-propeuantThis method features throtdcableallowing thrust lo be varied so tlie vehicle canreprogrammed trajectory.echnique reduces the number ofcomputations required nnd eliminates the need for the large capacity digitalused in US guidance systems. The net effect of this Soviet design philosophy has

been the development of very reliable liquid-(NopelUnt ICBMs

lie Soviets have lagged behind the US in such qualitative impiovemcnU asrc-cnlry vehicles, penetration aids, and very high accuracy. Also, (heir re-entry(RVs) haveifferentwith respect to ballistic coefficientshe bluntness and correspondingly lever betas of Soviet RVs make themurate than US systems, and their largerross-sections and tlowcr atmospheric descent times make them more vulnerable to detection and interception by an antiballistic missile (ABM) system. But their shapethe design of compatible nuclear weap ons,em more adaptable to hardening against tlie effect of radiation, and renders them less susceptible to being thrown off course by the effects of prior nuclear bursts in the impact area. The Soviets initially tested high beta RVs on both (hendystems, and actually deployed the one on theollowing the nuclear testsowever, the ballistic coefficients of new RVs for both thendere reduced drastically, either in order to accommodato the newly tested warheads or in order to benefit from the other advantages of blunter RVs noted above. Until recendy the ballistic coefficient of most Soviet RVs remained quite low compared to similar US vehicles.

c do not know to what extent, if any. the Soviets have hardened their RVs orsystems against the effects of nuclear radiation. As noted, tho blunt shapes of Soviet RVs makes them more adaptable to hardening than US RVs. Similarly, Soviet guidancewould be inherently easier to harden against nuclear radiation because of the lack of on-board computers and the use of simple electronic circuitry.

"See. Ami A. Im delmition oi ballutar ctwlfk-ient.




Comparison of Soviet ICBMs


Maximum Operationa! Range (NREJ

Warhead Yield

Accuracy (CEP)

Deployment. Mode

soft pads or triple silos

m 5 nm

soft pads or triple silos


soft pads or lr iple silos




im Soviet! haveontinuing interest in inducing ihe time it takes to bring Ihcir ICBM force to fulloviet general reportedly stated in0 that considerable progiess ha* been made in litis area, indicating that Soviel ICBMs could be readied for launch in several minutes. This agrees with our technical assessment that thean be readiedinutes, thoinutes, and the SSn lesshese times assume,that the gyrostabUized platform in the missile guidance system is continuallyIf il is not. it probably would take up toinutes lo prepare missiles for firing. In ihe US. gyros normally are operated contimi-ously; this practice involves more frequent ireah'btabon or replacement of the gyros.

ost of the Soviet ICBM force isin hardened and dispersed single silos, althoughnd SS-Ss are still on soft pads or in groups of three hard launchers each. Because of Inch nf data, past estimates of the hardness of Soviet silos were stated in terms of design overpressure,he level ol overpressure they were designed to withstand and remain completely operable. No valid estimate could bo made as to how much overpressure would be required to assure specified levels of damage lo the force.

Xiring the last two years, major new studies of hardened launch and control site vulnerability have been undertaken under the separata auspices of CIA, DIA. and theorce in an attempt lo provide the additional information on hardness. Of particularto targeting is the point ropiescnting tho overpressure that would render inoperableercent of the targets. Despite gaps in the data and the differing methodologies used In the various studies, the differences in the re

"Br companion, tha US Trtin II cm bein threeie Minul*idbbetondi.

suits are very small and there are agreed values as shown in the following table:


iii.ii pernjMn inch]T f

Launch Conuol


SS-11 Liimch Conuol



SS-13 Uuach

Comer |


t is emphasized that the above hard-ness figures are for silos and launch control centers only, and for these structures cortsid-eied in isolation; Ilie figures do not reflect Ihe vulnerability of the various missile systemshole. Other components could make the systems more vulnerable than are the silo alone or the launch control center alone.much of the data required for making additional studies is not available. We do not knew, for example, how theaw mounted in thcii silos; in not know whether or how well they are shock mounted. The CIA study does indicate that il theissile'is not shock mounted, the required peak overpressure^

jcould be as low 3'or ,ne stlo-missile combination^

Studies so far have concentrated on silos ano^ launch control centers. Further studies are planned on the misule-silo combinations for


those missileshehere ihedata promise lo yield al least some useful information.

IV, THEntroduction

hearrants special attention in any consideration of Soviel foices forattack. Il is the only weapon now in Ihe Soviet arsenal which could have the tw-essary combination of yield and accuracy tohreat to US land-based missiles and other hard targets. Estimates ofhar-actcrislics and capabilities have consequentlynique importance, compared to those of other Soviet weapon systems, in their impact on US defense planning and on US thinking about requirements for an agreement limiting strategic arms.

heroduct of the same design team that was responsible for devclojnng tlieCBM, and itirect outgrowth of that program Feasibility studies and prelim inery design probably begant has been operational6 and was first displayed publicly in7 Moscow parade- It has been given the code name Scarp by NATO.

heonsists of two tandem stor-able-Iiquid bipiopellant stagese-entry system. Doth stages have thrust control and piopetlant utilization systems. The basic two-Stage vehicle is essentially the same for all four variants of thend, indeed,pace booster version, the SL-II, as well. Tlie primary differences among the variants he in their payioads.

nes unique among Soviet ICBMs in that it has gone through four dutiiici weapon development programs. (Seeho first two variants, tbeingle RV and theeavier single RV, are already deployed. Development of the Modhas been tested both as aoibit bombardment system (FOBS) andepressed trajectory ICBMappears to have ended, and two or three gioups have probably been deployed.of theod i, whichVs, has not yet been completed, andil hasew test may be under way on stillvariant.

lieas obviously designed to have gieater accuracy and payload than its ptede cessor. theresumption that al least one of its major purposes was toa capability to attack hard targets. On




Moo" 2

y Onea

eni in*

cm ;





,hcthe variety of modes in which it hai been tested over the roughlyean "nw il first reached the drawing board raise questions about what additional mission or missions iheay have acquired and as to whether its missions have changed or are changing over time. The probl ems of'lierogram are compounded by uncertainties about the missiles perform-ancc characteristics and by the need to rely on judgments or assumptions lo resolve them.

etailed review of the evidence and analysis underlying present assessments of the SS-Os characteristics and capabilities isbelow. In this review specialocused on four basic and contentious issues:

The accuracy of the system, which affeeti its potential for use against hard targets.onsideration of signifi-caoce for all variants except the Modhose trajectory significantly lessensand which is clearlyard target weapon.

rang* of the heavier version,its capability tocomplexes in the US.

capabilities and likely missionModarticularly in the FOBS mode.

capabilities and likely missionMod*

ever, of any slowdown in the construction of SS-fl launch sites aturing the slowdown in test flights

he second version of thehe Modeavier RV thanounds compared0 pounds for the Modhere is evidence of some urgency in the development program in comparison with that of the Modn /net. its timing suggests that the priority given to theaused the standdown inlight testing, although thead already been tested to operational range First flown inuring the lull in Mod 1noted above(_

A fuither indication of the importance the Soviets attach to thesP


Earliernd 2

he original version of thehe Modas first test flown fa3 andypical test program until5 Between January ando tesi firings of theod 1.

^Tberc Is no indication, how-


"Th- Sov-ets hid pie-iouily High) idledwith triebur lie rcJiUonihip ollo.d. id theUUiil.ed





iat llftarget and launch point locations in relation to each other and in predicting gravity conditions in between).

The Basic Problem ofbe two most Important elcmcnti in determining the capabilityissileagainst hard targets are the accuracy (CEP)f Ihe system and tlie yield of the warhead. Of these, the more important is the CEP. In the case of theoreduction in CEP of.reater improvement in kill probability lhan does doubling the yield of the warhead. It is impoitant, therefore, that the basis for de-tiving accuracy figures for thee clearly delineated, including the uncertainties and requisite assumptions. The methods used to estimateccuracy are summarized

he accuracy of theannot be measured directly, as was possible with the earlierndystems^

"^System CEP. tlierefoie.calculated by measuring orvarious factors that could reducesubsequently combining these errorstatistically. The primaly factorsare Inaccuracies in missilecontrol, deflections of the re-enteringdue to atmospheric conditions, andlesseranderrors, inaccuracies in detcnnin-

" Circular Eiror Piolmble. See Clotinry, pageor definition





be expressed


b. DM. Anmj and Navy Position; Therc assessed toEP. This assessment is based on:

n the light of the uncertaintieswith the evidence and the assumptions to ba used in analyzing system accuracy,differences of judgment among the USIB agencies continue. The various(aQ/assumingnominal ICBM rangere as follows:

a. CIA and Al' Forcet would be misleading to quoteingle num bcr for the accuracy nf theumt>cr of assumptions must be made and because the resulting CEP values can vaiy lignih jantly. IheEP should therefore


*OP OCCtte*.

Statu and NSA Position; There are major uncertainties in determining what lite actual Soviet accuracy is (or the operational version of theEP of aboutm. if the bevt obtainable, but (lie actualwould, in general, be somewhat ^poorer for onally- deployed SS-Os.

for thes estimated as U5.

xcept in the case of Slate and NSA, the agency positions noted above do not take account ot* operational degradation. Ina missile is expected to be somewhat less accurate when fired operationally by the troops than when launchedest rangeiersonnel. Continued handling of the missile and operation of the guidance components canegradation, andcrews are usually less experienced al maintaining calibration of the systemprocedures and practices for minimizing these potential error sources under deployed conditions ate unknown, however, and we cannot judge their effect on operational CF.P.


stimates of the yields of the differentarheads are based almost entirely on the estimated weight of the RV and theyield-to-weight ratio of Soviet devices as derived from analysis of debris fromtests. By analogy with US techniques of designing suchercent of the Soviet RV weight is allocated to the nuclear system^

he effect of these differing estimates of accuracy and yields on the overallofapabilities can be determined from Ihe following table, which summarizes in percentage terms the likelihood of disabling Minwteman launch silos and launch control centers with waiheads of varying accuracy at yields compatibleeapon system such as thehe table is based on the susceptibility of Minuteman launch facilities solely to airblast and ground shock with doors closed. It docs not consider the effocls of tlicrmal and nuclear radiation, or ofpuke."

n,nl. CEP.Q



" Sec footnoteby Mij. Ceo. Bodily Triantafcllii. theChief of Staff. Intelligence, USAF. lo table on page 2fl.





it could be expected that someercent theodhat the Soviets were able to target against Minuteman silos would knock out theirf the CEPowevcr.f-


ly about missiles


would accomplish their missions. If the CEP were no belter

missiles likely to accomplish their missions would be aboutoercent1*

imilar calculations can be made foron launch control centersissiles would be required to achieve similar kill probabilities and thesefall off more sharply as estimated ac-curacy declines.EP ofi^ _^

" Seeyen. Roekly Triantafellii, the Assistant Chief ot Staff. Intelligence, USAF. to

* Mai. Cen. RedelyJrianiafdlu. the Aisistant Chief of Staff,SAF, believer that paragraphs SZ,be mirleadinc regarding Minuteman vulnerability to (he

number olndof accuracies theyerious ducat to the Mlnuleiiian forcebole.




. "pcMation would

be that someopercent of the LCCs hat the Sovietswcrc able to target would be Knocked out.


the proportion to be knocked

out would be aboutoercent6 nm CEP and aboutoercent for

ua. CEP."

Ihe Rongo Problem

heoundV ha* been flight tested from Tyuratamangemnough to reach targets anywhere in Ihe US from any of theaunch complexes. Theayload of0 pounds. Becauso it uses the same lint two stages as the Modt cannot fly as far. The difference in range isagnitude sufficient to raise questions about its capabUily and role. These questions have been the subject ofdiscussion and analysis and arc taken up below.


on two occasions demonstrated the capaouily to deliver theayload.

- Seeycn BocUy TrUnUfellu.

the Arxislant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF. to

table oo pef* 28

"The actual range of these firingsD,

bul Included effccU of the earth'i rotation which In

ihu case added an increment of. Ranger quoted herein, therefore, ate eipreired In lemVi of non-rotating eaith (NRE) diitanevi. Ran for achlave-

in operational faring* ivxcV-ud lo the US from the USSR aic in nunc cnaei increased, In wme eases dec reared,eiull of the caiuYi rotation,n the ipactfic launch pointi and target directum Involved.

JlThis range is

sufficient lo reach only the extremeportion of the US from the area where we believe the closesteployment <umplex is located.

o attack major US targets, andthe Minuteman complexes, theust obviously be capable of attaining greater range than has been deinonstrated. Analysts have therefore searchedways thatge of theould be increased beyond that actually demonstrated in flight test.



isagreement as to how much weight can be saved by removing tenand as lo how far the Soviets wouldit safe to go in tnintmi?lng propellant residuals results in substantial differences over theodaximum range. In sum. the positions ate as follows:

a. CM. NSA. Stole. Army, and Navy To-


_Jit is estimated that the maximum range capability of this variant is. (minimum energy,his range would probably be adequate forfinuteman wings from at least someomplexes.



DIA and AirSS-9

s assessedave arange ofun. Thiswas clearly developed to provide the greatest lethality (highest waihead yield and lowest CEP combination) of any Soviet strategic missile. It is difficult lo rationalize an Intentional Soviet design of their best hard target system which would preclude reaching all Minuleman Wing v. f"

isvariation in assessment of theoperational range of the system.


nhe Soviets test ftredthird variant of thereviously called thend now designated Ihe Mndheas been successfully testwo modes. In one, the RV is eleboostedow earth orbit into an impact area on the Kapusrjn Yar test range after less than one revolution (the FOBSn the other, it is fired into an ICRM tra|ectoryery low apogee and deboosttd hist prior to re-entry into Ihe Kamchatka impact area or the central Pacific (the DICBM mode).of the low trajectory, anyaunched northward toward the US would be detected much later by the Ballistic Missile Eaily Warning System (BMEWS) lhan would an ICBMonventional trajectory, and the warning timehe US would be cut from about IS minutes toinutes or less,on the location of the target. Alaunch inlo oibit wilh deboost over Ihe US would be coming from the wrongto be detected by BMEWS However. US sensors nearing deployment promise toearly detection of launches regardless of their firing direction.

arge amount of data is available on th"rom the tt filings of ihe system lo date. It is quite clear from the evidence available that Ihe basicCBM configuiation is used for theith some minor modifications^

he total pay-load weight isounds, near that ofO pound Modut the RV is Lbs than half as0he deboost propulsion stage accounting for the bulk of the throw weight. The deboost stageelocity ofeet per second lo the RV, which resultse-orbit in the FOBS modeteeper re-entrv angle for the


he same type of error analysis as that performed on thendCBMs indicates that theEPohen firedICBM orortherly cliiecfion to (he US. The CEPoutherly-launched FOBS would increase to ISecause of the longer flight time. These levels of accuracy make thencapable of attacking hard targets with any reasonable probability of success. On the other hand, the trajectory shapeesire to deliver an attack with less time for the enemy to icacc These factors insuggest strongly that theasto attack strategic time-urgent softsuch as SAC bomber bases and command and control facilities.

here have been certain pu ill ingof therogram.^







s in the case of theange capability, USIB agencies are divided in their assessments of therogram/^"


a. Slate and CIA Position: Tlies tested does nol have sufficient energy to allow its uje against the USOBS.







provide coverage of the entire COITUSouth-launched FOBS mode.^

OBS capability only agaimt the eastern seaboard. The Soviets would nolystem with such an extremely limited capability.oes have ihe capability to beICBM to attack the US from the north on atrajectory that would reduce US early warning time, and it is probablyin that mode. Deployment willbe limited.

b. NSA. Army, Naoy and Air Fore*Theual capability for use asICBM or


would permit

coverage of the eastern seaboardOBS. Thus it could be usedICBM for CONUS attack from the north orOBS for attack from the south against targets located on the eastern seaboard. The system probably will not be extensively deployed and additional BAD firings are not expected.

c DM Position: Thesto be capable of first-pass attack on the entire CONUS in either the south-launched FOBS or the north-launched DICBM modes. The north-launched DICBM capability has been demonstrated. The south-launched FOBS capability is open to greater uncertainty.Q



It is nol expected that theill be extensively deployed.

Ihe Mod 4

s the latest inariants to be tested. Betweenwhen the teat program began,irings of the system werewhich at leastndhis phase of the lest programlaunches both to Kamchatka andrange in the Pacific.

three RVsQ

^impact pattern approximates antriangle, the base ol which is roughly perpendicular lo the missile ground trace and is aboutide at operational ranges-It is quite clear that during this phase of the program the impact pattern did not varywhich would be required fortargeting of the RVs. and thai the Mods tested, wasultiplelarger*Nr re-entry vehicle (MIRV) system. Furthermore, it is evident that the guidimystem employed oa then




lime a* that on thendcould not provide the three RVs with the accuracy required toigh kill probability against hardened targets such as Minuteman inultiple re-entry vehicle (MBV) or MIBV role. Both theof the flight test program and the number of flight tests were consistent wilh completeestprograms.[_

^we presume that it has not beendeployed, though II could be at any time.

ix-month hiatus, testing of thearrying three RVs was resumednd four tests were condnctederiod of less than fom weeks

One of

these wasest similar to the firstirings of the Modnd another failed in flight. On the other ,wo

would be

necessary if the system were to have anydegree of attack flcxibility.f"


e have not yet been able to determine whether the Soviets arc attempting toguidance accuracy in the latest tests. If they decide loIHV system of the type suggested hy these tests, using the presentuidance system, they couldbegin deployment innder these conditions, the CEP of each of tho three RVs could be essentially tlie same as for theingle RV. but could not be better.ew guidance system is underdeployment of the system couldnot begin before2 at the earliest

The data on both these tests have not hem completely analyzed, but it appears that the Soviets areIRV.

ystem of the type implied by these tests would have the capability to attackthree separate targets. The down-range spread can probably be varied^

JThe cross-tange spread can also be varied, bul the variation it limited to no more thanilesQ


variations within this cross-range limitation

3 Wethat the payload weighs somewhatthe order ofless than theod 2of throe RVseparationEach RV is estimated to weighpounds and toarhead withyield

heith the payload described above has been flight testedangem. NREQ

^Itiis range would allow it to cover targets only in theportion ol the US.Q



would be a

maximum range capability of. NRE for the Modufficient to ct of the likely targets in the

J because of

the-Icsscr payload of the Modt is much easier than in the case of theo come up wiili ways in which the rangeduring flight tests can be lengthened to cover most of the US.

Roles and Missions of theC. As we bave seen, insufficient orevidence on the performance of the missile has led to considerable disagreement about the capabilities of theissileThe questions of accuracy and range are of major concern since they bear moston tlie missions for which the variousodifications are intended. Do diendave sufficient accuracy tohard targetsigh probability of kill? In what way, if at all. do range limitations affect the use of thegainst US targets? With such questions unresolved, it is difficult to arrive at firm judgments on the roles and missions of the SS-9.

hend Modhere is general agreement that theas initially developed to providearger payload than theresumably for use against hard targets. Moreover, it seems highly unlikely that the Soviets would develop andeapon as uniquely powerful and expensive as theeach costs roughly three times as much as anf it were not to beission for which smaller

missiles arc less suitable. Such evidence as we have suggests thateast initially, mostad US ICBM complexes as their primary

is possible that the Sovietstheorce against USas earlyhe Sovietsknew of US plans to establish antrnand post.eport!

^indicates tEat the Sovietsended toapability to attack individual silos. It states that the Sovietwho had not believed that the US would deploy Minuteman in the numbers it did, were forced to recognize the impracticability of attacking silos when satellite photographyevealed the extent of USAt any rate, according

therehift in Soviet targeting strategyt states thatoncluded thai they slvould plan to attack US economic and administrativerather than rocket bases."

do not know whether such afact occurred. Some subsequentin therogram can beevidence that it did.hea guidance system whichradio corrections in favor of ansystem. On the other hand,in all-ineriial guidance may haveunnecessary toadio-incrtial systemexpensive, more vulnerable toand less flexible7 Marshal Krylov, commanderStrategic Rocket Forces, stated thatfor his forces included theof strategic nuclear attack.


iOI1 Gggfigf-

noted earlier, Uioro arc various views about the range of the Modhere isagreement, however, that theas the potential to reach more US targets than it has demonstrated In flight tests: theconcern how many. It is difficult tothat the Soviets would so modify their rnost formidable ICBM that it could not be used against the USSR's principal nuclearthe US. Moreover, there Is noreason to earmark it for peripheral attack-Europe would appear to he more thancovered by other missile systems. As to China, it is true thatew MRBMs/ IRBMs at most can reach Chinese targets-It would be surprising, therefore, if someof the ICBM force were not available for use against China, but it seems unlikely thai thes earmarked for this mission.

We cannot determine with confidence the niissions of thend Modhich we believe make up virtually the entire present operationalorce. On the whole, however, it appears likely that the Soviets regard theeapon for use against strategic military targets and that at least some, and perhaps the bulk, of the weapons now deployed are aimed at US ICBMThis Is the most likely explanation we can now put forward for Sovietin recent yearsonsiderable number of weapons having tho combination ofand yield of thend Mod 2.

Even if much of theorce is in fact diiected against US ICBMs. the Soviets have not yet deployed then sufficient numbers to provide any assurance ol disabling moreortion of the US bunch facilities and may never do so. Such targeting would probably still make sense, however, from the Soviet military planners' point of view. It is often argued that in view of the immense dc-stxuclivc power of nuclear weapons, the ol capabilities for attacking the

-T6 IWSSj-

enemy's strategic forces is pointless in modem war unless his forces can be overwhelmedirst strike. Wc believe that the Sovietplanner would regard this as an unduly passive, all-or-nothing approach. Given the unprecedented uncertainties of the nuclear battlefield, he would hope that suchmight significantly contribute to national strike, he would piobably seek to reduce the weight of enemy attack as much as practicable withouteliminating all of it. Even in asecond strike, he might see need for some targeting against the enemy's strategic forces so as lo deny his adversary the opportunity to undertake follow-up strikes, to repair weapons that failed to get off because of technical problems, or to continue use of facilities such as bomber and submarine bases.

Theodhere is general agreement that thesedICBM can cover all US targets; there arc differences of view as lo whether and to what extent it could do soOBS. In either role, however, it appears to be intended to degrade or circumvent the US rnissilc warning system. In dasigning this system, the Soviets accepted reduced payload and accuracy in order to gain the advantageeduction in warning time. It was probably developed for use against soft, strategic, tirrnvttrgent targets,

Theodhe mission of thes al this time unclear. Additional test data will lye required befon; we canonfident judgment.

V. THE SS-11

he most widelyICBM, has been operationalmall, two-stage ICBM usingpropellants and an all-incrtialOnly one version (Mod I) ofhas been deployed to date, but testing



tified vehicle (Modegan in9 and is continuing.

he SSas been lest finedange ofN'REnhere were test* to rangesresumably to establish the capability olor peripheral attack. TheV which probablyomplex flared shape, and weighsounds The yield of the warhead is estimated to be


ofccuracy place the CEP at about


herogram is apparentlydeveloped to enhance the penetrationof thegainst ABM defense of mbari/usdustrial and soft military targets. There are significant gaps In ourof this program, however. The flight tests can be separated into two distinct groups callednd Type-B. One. Type-A, probably represents development of esoaCnos-pheric penetrationnd the other, Type-B. development of either endoatmos-pheric decoys or multiple warheads,

bjects in both groups apparently are intended to have in-line patterns with nocross-range dispersion. The tankage remains near the train of objects^


" For the purposes of rhU piper we defineto Include only devices which may beinpayload pidageubile syiterr,prior to or during re-enuy in order tothem from KfcnU/y.

ing any BV, cany in*r to wturate defe met beyond (heir capacity.

ertain aspects of (he modificationare common to both thendirings. Bothhrow weight ofounds compared toounds associated with theV. Propel, lanl has been added to the first stage of then both cases to compensate for the loss of range that would have resulted from the increased weight of theayloads. and indeed increases the operational range. No identifiable change has been made to bitstage. With the increased capability cf Ac first stage, thean deliver either therayloadange ofm.

s far as theayloads aremost ol the available data are related to theroup of firings. Even here, however, the objects identified as probable penetration aids have not been clearlyThey apparently function during the eioatmospherie or early re-entry phase of the flight. In the one test for which re-entry radar data are available, the le-entry trajectories of the probable penetration aids becamedifferent from that of the RVeet, and they probably burned up prior to impact I

3Altbough the objects which appear to be penetration aids can lie distinguished from the RV in the terminalsophisticated radars atdo sufficientlygenuine RVsefense to be forced to take them seriously. Moreover, the ballistic coefficient ol theype-A

suits in an increased speed of travel through the atmosphere andequirement on an eodoatmospheric defense system to react very



Thoeight it comparable to or slightly beavirr thanound RV ol the

nalysis of theroup of firings is very preliminary Two firings of this type also were recently conducted to extended range.

^The ballistic coefficients of these three objects are higher than those of theV and in the same class as that of tbeV. However, it bat not yet been determined if all three objects are RVsarryingr whether one or more are decoys. It appears virtually cer-tain, however, that therogram IsI to aid in the penetration of endoatinos-pheric ABM defenses.

s indicated earlier, the highercoefficients of thee-entry vchE-cile(s) results in faster travel through the atmosphere, thereby reducing the reaction timo available to anonus effect is the reduction of tbe re-entry contribution to systemQ


Jthooft target weapon, and extreme accuracy is evidentlyesign goal.

heas been testedimes sincehirteen of the firings involved theayload. andhe Type-B.ost recent tests, two ot each type, were to. (NRE) Pacific impact area. In the past, extended rangein tho Pacific have usually presaged the end ofest firing program. Thus, tlie modifiedould lie ready fordeployment late this year or early next year.

hree HAD tests, twond one Type-B, were to reduced ranges of. These short-range firings aretests of the capability of theoeripheral attack role as well as to perform at full ICBM range. Since there are no ABM defenses present or con-tcmplatsd in Europe, this suggests that the Soviets may be oonsidering use of theual role at tbe peripheral complexes,rimary mission against Europe butecondary capability to hit targets in tbe US which may be defended by ABMs. On the other hand, they may merely have decided to lest all the capabilities of theat tbe outset and have no plans for early deployment of thet their peripheral complexes.

it is uncertain howeployment will take place.would presumably wish to deployin Ihe face of extensive US ABMof populated areas, but might decideoff until theyetter Idea ofABM deployment will actuallyin the US.


he most recentthe Soviet ICBM force, reachedlight test program begun InIthree-stage solid-propellaHtlarger thanUS Muiuteman.prototype, designated Savage byIntelligence Community, wasin Moscow ineveralthe flight test programseapon systemto attack only soft targets, less isits operational and technicalthan any other deployed Soviet ICBM.





"^These data

Indicate (liat the RV weighsounds and is quite blunt,allistic coefficient

This last value is lower than that of any other Soviet vehicle and again demonstrates thepenchant for RVs with low ballisticThe yield of the warhead associated with this veliicle is estimated atP

l'c guidance system appears toelf-contained all inertial system, but little else




that an estimated CEP of. is probably representative of the true value.

OS. To date theas been tested toemonstratedsufficient to reach only the extreme northeastern portion of the US from the one complex where it is believed to be deployed.


increase its range with the same payload to- (NRE),to cover targets northinefrom southern Oregon to Raleigh, North Carolina.

"Ithc maximum range capabll.



ity of thes unknown. If

^Jthe range would be


rogram has beenan enigma. There is little doubt thatplanned large-scale deploymentmissiles. They began aprogram for theirin thend are believedcontinuing to modernize thosahey began flight testingnd the two-stageTherogram hasa very slow pace, with no deploymentmore than five years after thetest

It appears most likely that theas in competition with then the early development phases and that it was the loser. This was probably because of problems the Soviets encountered in applyingtechnology to large missiles. Flight testingodifiedhich began early0 indicates, however, that the Soviets consider that continuation of the program will have some value as an investment in the application of solid-propellant technology to strategic missiles.

It appears that an operational variant of theay be under development Flight testing began early this year,irings completedix of the flight tests were from Plesetsk to the Kamchatka impact areaP

^The seventh and eighth were short-range firings ofrobably to an impact area near Norilsk.^

ew RVhigher ballistic



^jTlie limited data available alio tenuously suggest possible modifications to tbe upper stages.


hehe oldest system inal ICBM inventory, has beensincetwo-stagevehicle that uses storable-liquidand employs an aU-inertia] guidanceSeveral classes of RV weights haveover the years, and it is believedof these weightdeployed. Tltc maximum(NRE) of the two RV variantsoth ol whichto reach targets throughout theestimated accuracy of tbe system. (CEP) at ICBMlevel of accuracy, given theof its associated warheads, renderssuitable for employment Only against

Tho SS-8

Sehich reached operational status in IVtS,wo-stage tandem vehicleadio-incrtial guidance system: It uses non-slorable liquid propellants, awhich, combinedoor flight test record, probably constituted the basis for the decision to limit its deployment. Theas been tested to ranges sulficicnt to cover targets throughout the US, carrying Q

eapon. The estimated system CEP isimiting its employment lo uiban areas and other soft targets.

Re'ire Copabiliry

believe that the Soviets plan lofrom soft sites. We estimate that twoarc available for each launcher, andwould take two to four hours after theto get off the second missile.


past year has been onectivity at Soviet ICBMinvolving some9his compares withonths.

10G. It is now evident that during the past few years tho Soviets have beenon testing variants of ICBM systems which are already deployed and operational, rather than on competitive now ICBMerns requiring deployment of completely new launch facilities. We have seen no morethat Ose Soviets may bearge follow-on missile, orew small ICBM is planned. Nor is there any conclusive evidence of the development of mobile ICBMs, although the Soviet SALT reprcsentativei have opposed any provisions excluding mobileThe Soviets have developed mobile strategic systems of lesser range, one ofSS-Kthe upper two stages of theCBM. There has been no indication, however, of any attempt toa mobile version of the

he one mobile missile program which has been suggested asotentialppears to be in limbo or to haveo stage inissttcf

Jis probably the missile carried by the tracked transporter-erect or-launcher displayed

iliJiOftlCAL REVIEW Rnji

top scam



Moscow parades and designated Che Scrooge system. Theas been flight tested eight times. Tlie pace of these tests has been erratic, and no flights have been detectedheoperational range of this miiiilc is still ur>certaia. If^

"^and the trajectory were optimized, the missile couldangemhe loosest distance it has flown, however,These data do notirm basis for judging the intent of the program. It is generally agreed that tho small number of tests observed and the lack of any flights over the past yearthe likelihood that thes tested, will ever be deployed.

uch of theffortto be aimed al developing systems for penetrating US ABM defenses. This is adevelopment. Tho only puwiling aspect is an apparent desire to have such systems ready for deployment by the end of this year, long before any US ABM could achieve IOC One possible explanationesire to have the necessary hardware developed well inol any SALT agreement.

wo new RVs with significantly higher ballistic coefficients are beingapparent reversal of the trendRVs with low betas. In the case of theodhe change was apparentlyto shorten flight timeerminal ABM environment and hence make the RV harder to intercept. The reason fortheV. with its highercoefficient, is not yet apparent from available data. In bothesult of the change is to decrease the degree lo which variations in atmospheric conditions during the reentry phase reduce accuracy. To achieve significantly higher accuracies,would require new, greatly improved guidance systems as wolL

Future Systems

s noted above, there has been no activity which we can relate lo a new ICBM (except the special case of thever ihe past two years. In light of this, it Is highly unlikely that the Soviets could bring any wholly new ICBM systems to operational status for at least theears. Based on our view of developmcnlx at the lest ranges and of the probable Soviet view of their own needs, we believe that the USSR will concentrate in the near term on efforts to improve the quality of its present systems, in such areas as penetration aids, hardening of RVs, accuracy and MIRVs. In addition, however, they will probablyal least exploratory research on land mobile ICBMs.

enetration Aids. Present test activity designed to improve ihe capability of theo penetrate ABM defenses willbe completed late this year. Subsequent work may include efforts to develop more sophisticated penetration aids for tlie Soviet ICBM force. Since the Soviets probably understand the way the Safeguard system as Intended lo operate, they may seek tosome form of erkdoatinosphericaid system, possibly including terminal decoys; theay be for this purpose.

of RVt. If ihey havedone so. the Soviets willsteps to provide some degree of hardenof their RVs against the effects ofradiation from ABM weapons.




improvements LO

guidance accuracy ami other qualitativewill almost certainly takeesult ol the normal advancement ol the state-of-the-art. and reduction in CeVC errors will also accrue from on-goingIn earlier programs, the Soviets flew HVs havinp ballistic coefficientswith high accuracy, and by now the packaging of suitable warheads in higher beta RVg should be within the Soviet slate olIn the finalecision to equip ICBMs with high accuracy guidance systems will depend on future Soviel targetingand particularly on how much stress they wish to place on improvingabilities against laud-based US ICBMs.

lflVj. The Soviets almost certainly have strong incentives, political as well as military, to develop MIRV capabilitiesto those of the US. There have been * various indications, some quite explicit, that they consider this to be an important area of strategic weaponry in which they ncod to catch up- For example, N. S. Klshilov, the secretary-general of the Soviet delegation to SALT,ember of the US delegation that ft was surely understandable why the USSR was not prepared toan oo flight testing MIRVs; the US had completed its essential tests, while the USSR had not. In military terms the Soviets could envisage three possible missions for such weapons: to attack hard targets, to enhance theiro penetrate ABM defense, and to piovidc greater assurance of retaining an assured retaliatory capacity in the (aceossible tJurat to their land-based missile force.on their targeting doctrine, they might considerimple soft-target MIRV capabiu'ty could serve their needs. If they wished to develop MIRVs for use against hard targets, they would require very high accuracy toigh kill probability, and

ore sophisticated systemonger development program. They might develop hard target MIRVs simply because it was technically feasible or because the US had done so.

US. As Indicated earlier, it now appears that the Soviets may intend to use the rneeh-anizataon system of theoIRV. The full extent of Soviel intentions with respect to MIRVs, however, is not yet evident The possibilities are as follows:

MIRV based on the Mod 4could prol>ably reach IOC bybut one reaching IOC thisbe no mote accurate thanhereby limiting itshard targets.

attain the high orderard target MIRV, thehave toastlysystem for theaunchand new RVs. Development ofnew guidance system would requireyears of testing. Thus, if theseeking lood 4improved accuracy {say,t could not be availablebefore2 at the earliesL

c The Soviets mightIRV basedifferent concept, such as thatby the "bus" system used by the US. concurrently with an improvementEP of. If so. they could accomplish both in about two years of testing or by the end2 at the earliest.

obile ICBMi. The Soviets willcontinue work on land-mobile systems. In fact, they have indicated such an intent in current SALTnd-mobde ICBMs would provide an alternative lo the SI.BMeans of improving the surviv-




ol retaliatory forces and Iheyan area of weapon development in which the Soviets may leel they have an edge on ihe US. Il still remains to be seen, however, whetlier they would wish to make eaten vivo use of land-mobile systems. There aredifficulties in deploying andthe large and complicated pieces of equipment which would be required. Secur-ity considerations might serve to limitin heavily populated areas.-elsewhere mightindered by poor transportation fadlities through much of the less populated part of the country and. in some areas, by permafrost.

Outlook for the Longer Term

e foresee no major shift from tlie patterns outlined above during the. That is, we think that the Soviets,builtarge force of ICBM launchers, will cootinue to concentrate on improvements in existing systems rather than on tlieof entirely new ICBM systemsentirely new launch facilities. They will probably seek such qualitativeas improved capabilities forABM defenses, larger numbers of RVs. and improvements in accuracy.

They probably believe that all three ICBM systems still being deployed havegrowth potential. And even if they considered that development of essentially new missiles was desirable, ihey would have strong incentives to make them compatible with existing launch facilities, in view ol the large numbers and the heavy investment

Entirely new systems may appear, however. The survivability of their land-based ICBM force will probably be ofconcern to the Soviets over the longer term. The principal effect might well

be to stimulate interest in new SLBMs and land mobile systems, since an effort tosignificantly harder silos and launch control centers would be very expensive. There are also more limited steps to increase survivability and force reliability which the Soviets could and probably would undertake, such as increasing the redundancy andof their command and control systems.




he rnainstay of the Soviet ballistic missile fleet is thelass submarines. Like US Polaris submarines,lass hasaunch tubes, but in most other respects it is different.lasseet long8ouble ratheringle hulL Indeed, in terms ofp la cement,lass is the largest submarine in the world. It is Q

"probably capable of speeds of aboutnots-f"


lass can probably operate at a

ne majoris that while not as noisy as older classes of Soviet ballistic missile submarines, it is still not "quiet" by US standards.

heissile carried oningle-stage storablesystem givingaximum. With litis missile.positioned along the coastlineUS as muchiles offshoretargets virtually anywhere in theThes equipped with aclass RVudear yielda CEP of


-TOP -SrCftFr-

Submarine navigational inaccurades would probably resultystem CEP of. even under favorable launch conditions, making the systemoft target weapon. We Itclievc thatlass submarine normally launches its missiles while moving submerged at speeds ofnots. We estimate that the salvo time for theissiles would be upinutes.

e estimateais submarines are being produced at the rate ofnits per year and that production will soon8 per year. We believe thatre now operational and that five others are

surface-launchedbey replaced. The ninth unit, designatedIi. has been extensively lemodcled to provide it with six instead of its original three launch tubes and evidently began sea trials in June, It probably will be usedlatform for sea tests of theissile now under development

Nuclear-Powered Ballistic MissileForcehe following table shows thenumber and status of Soviet nudear-powered ballistic missile submarines asThe number of missile launch tubes is in parenthesis.)

3 )




OM It* Ttuau



run stetus olot known but we do not consider tt to be operational at this

various stages of fitting out and sea trials. Anotherrre believed Co be in various stages oftin northwest USSRt Kom-somolsk tn the Far East

estimatelassSeverodvinsknits per year,Komsomol'sk two units per year; theincreasenits per year.


thelass nudearbuilt8 andhave been converted to carryissiles, which are notwhile the submarine ishave more than double the range of tlie

e estimate thatlass submarines will be operational by the fallf production continues at thecurrentwe see noindication of aY-dass force will reachnits (comparable in size to the US Po'orfs fleet) in4 and could haveuits byow largeass force grows will depend on aof variable factors, induding the SALT negotiations.

Patrol Activity

e estimate thatlassare presently operational in the Northern Fleet. In earlyome of these submarines began to condurt pa-



al regular intervals, lastingCO days. Sincelass submarines from tho Northern Fleet have performedatrols.n the western Atlantic. (The other three were in connection with tlie large-scale Soviet naval exercise OKF.AN in)ass patrols, with the possible exception of the first, have been conducted in areas between Bermuda and the Azores.

The Soviets have established their first patrollass submarine in the Pacific, We expect the number and frequency ofwill increase as the numberlass submarines assigned to tho Pacific fleet grows.

In the meantime, patrol activity of thelass submarines in the Far East has increased. Sincehey have conducted four patrols In the eastern Pacific in the vicinity of the US coast. One of these came briefly within missile range of California, but the others stayed one to two daystime away. There have beenl patrols in the Atlantic in the pastonths, none of which was detected within missile range of the US.

rior tooviet ballistic missile submarines rarely patrolled withinrange of thelass units remained as much as one to two days sailing lime away from potential bunch points. This practice may be in the process of changing. So far this yeai, five and possibly eight of thelasswhich have patrolled in thentic operated at some time during their patrols withinngen) of USInlass patrolling southeast of Bermuda came within range for lesseek. In August, for the first time,lass were simultaneously on patrol within range of thefor about two weeks, the other forays. One of thelass units on

patrol in the Atlantic in November waswithin missile range of the US. The

single patrol so far conducted in the Pacific has been within missile range.

t is not clear yet, because of the fluctuating partem of patrols, what portion of their SSBN force tlie Soviets intend toon station. They could decide, on tbe one hand, to placeew on patrol, keeping the rest in home waters. In this case, essentially allercent of thebe sent to sea ir time of emergency or tension. It is more likely,that asLiss units become operational, tlie Soviets will choose to deploy SSBNs routinely in greater numbers. But,of the lack of forward bases and tlielimitations of the force, Uiey probably could maintain no more thanercent of their SSBNs continuously on station within missile range of the US. This number could be increased toercent: in crisis periods, but probably for no longer than aboutays. -

he Soviets could keep more thanercent continuously on station if thoy had access to support facilities in areas nearer to the US than are the borne potts from which they now oparote. Having increased the tempo of their out of area operations In recent years, the Soviets undoubtedly see advantages in having such fadlities. Recent evidencehotography and collateral sourcesthat the Soviets may be establishingupport fadlity at Cienfuegos, Cuba. If Cienfucgos were to be used to supportmissile submarines, it would enable the Soviets to inciease appreciably their time on

Roles ond Missions of Ballistic Missile

. Wc have no direct evidence as to the roles and missions of Soviet SSBNs. In tlie



vidently was to strike industrial and population centers, presumably in part because tic SSBN force was not Urge enough tocontinuous patrols in substantial numbers within missile range of the US, which would have enabled them to attack strategic military targets on short notice. Byizeable fleetlass submarines, however, theare developing the capability to handle both types of targets.lass units which have come within missile range of the US this year were within rangeumber ofinstallations, including SAC bomber basesolaris base, which the Soviets probably would wish to targetatter of urgencyre-emptive attack, but might also attack as partetaliatory strike

G-CI ass Submarines "

he Soviet ballistic missile submarine fleet also includeslass units which were built80 of these submarines areto have been convertedI units, each fitted withissiles in place of.ith which they were originally equipped. We believe that there is one unit now undergoing the same conversion which will probably be completelass units have onlass submarinesatrol area in the Pacific between Hawaii and the US In the Atlantic, almost alllass deployments which we have detected have been in ocean areas almost equally distant from targets in the US and Europe and several days transit time away from possible launch areas against cither

lole aod Mahii ol use--.

ballwlkhe further rftioAied

InSonet Fchcti for Oprtrtiam in"

e have long believed that oncenuclear-powered submarines became available,lass would be used primarily against peripheral targets (including Hawaii and overseas US bases) and not against targets ia the continental US. This is consistent with the line initially taken by the Soviets in SALT discrxssiont.ormal Statement inhe Soviet chief delegate said that "Wefrom (he fact that diesel submarines do not meet modem reijuirements and cannothreat to thehe point was that submarines such aslass did not need to be covered in an agreement.tatementowever, he formally declared that all ballistic missile submarines should be taken into account under an

his shift in tho Soviet position mayta led to some change in the Soviet plans foi tliose oflass submarines which wehave not yet been converted to carry theissile. There arc several of these submarines wliich have not been operationally active for some time, suggesting that they may be undergoing some form of moosfieation that is piobably more extensive than that required for conversion to theeanwhile, wc havethe testingew naval mis-.ile (see the following section) having an estimated tangewhose estimated sire makes it incompatible wilhlass submarine. Wc think it unlikely that thewould begin still another conversionforlass submarines lo equip themew missile and it is equally unlikely that they wouldonversion program forlass so soon after that class has become operational. Theould fit intolats after certain modifications had been made lo the submarine. We believe



lass submarines am bciiiK moHilkil loehey will be fitted wilh in launch tubes as in the case ofII class.

o be sure,lass submarines are2 years old, but they still haveyears of operational life left. Theprobably now under way could, ifenough, extend their useful life oven longer Although diesel powered, they could, if equippedissileange of thed to augment the threat tu the US;issilem. range, they could stay on station for extendedwell outside the range of US detection systems and still be within missile range of many US targets We think thatf the remaininglassthose in the Northernbeto carry thehe evidence is still insufficient, however, to establish this conclusively.

Future Systems

One new naval ballistic missile, theas been undergoing flight tests since9 Eight flights have beenthe last two in Septemberespectively. Three of these tests were failures.

Our analysis indicates that theomparatively large missile, several feet longer and somewhat larger in diameter than the

^ Flight testsa range ofm. Radarhave detectedingle RV. There is no evidence of testing of penetration aids or depressed trajectories. Thes apparently about the size of the Sawfly, a

naval ballistic missile displayedn Moscow military parades, but there Is no other present evidences relationship. The weight of the RV is not known. If then fact the sire of Ihe Sasvfly. the RV could be in the SvSOO.pound class.

mssile of the extended range of theould obviously add significantly to the flexibility and survivability of the Soviet SLBM force, but we have continuingabout the status and likely pace of the program. Testing of the missile has been carried forwardlow pace, which couldack ol urgency in the program. Although development could be completed some time1 if the program werethe missile would probably not reach IOC2 at the present pace. Meanwhile, the Soviets are continuing aD-out production oflass submarine, which lacks the depth of hull required toissile as long as theppears to be and hence could probably not be readilyto that system.

s indicated inbove, wo now believe that theill be flight tested from theIT nudear submarine and thatlass diesel units not previously converted to carry the much shorter rangeill be converted to carry sixissiles each. This would provide anorce of up toissile launchers In the likely event thatII is retained in operational status after testing is complete. If the missile is ready in time, thelass submarine under conversion could teachstatus with they about the endnd allflass units cited above could be operational with SSissiles by the ende still lack conclusive evidence, however, that the Soviets arc following (his course.


There aro oven greater uncertainties about what other plant (he Soviets may have for deploying thes indicated, theppears to be too long to beintolavi submarine withoutship modifications which would degrade the speed and diving capability of theThelass submarines other than the singleII have |ustan extensive conversion to carry the SS-NS. making another conversion to carry theuestionable. It also appears questionable that tho Soviets wouldecond retrofit ofI diesclto carry thespecially since faciuties to carry outrogram would probably not be available until the.

One possibility is that the Soviets would not deploy thexcept in the1 andlass units discussed above. If so. however, they would probably take other steps to provide themselves with extended range naval ballistic missiles. They mightew missile of extended rangem. or greater) which could be used in thelasswith few or no ship modifications. The firstlass unit couldnot be operational

possibility is that theintend fiullier deployment of thea new class of sumarine designed tobut that they have delayedthis new class in order to concentrateuplass force as rapidlyIf the Soviets do in fact deploynew submarine for thehepmbably could nott the ear best,tlie present commitment offacilities tolass and the longinvolved


Soviet heavy bomber forceup of two types ofandype Bison, the onlybelieved torimaryintercontinentalhis force isat five Long llangc Aviation

four-engine turboprop Bearlaigest element ol the heavyre equippedilesurface missilehe AS-3Anotherre conventionalan additional five or six are usedand do not have acapability. Only aboutfwith an ASM can be refueledBecause of its greater range, thea better capability than the Bisonattacks and for takingto targets- In addition, the Bearcould launch its missile far fromto avoid terminal defenses.the strategic attack versions of theended. Limited production of specialhas continued, but they have beenof the Soviet Navy.

"Although Soviet medium bomber formimited ratability >'* intercontinental attack, (hoy irend trained primarily far operations in Karaite. NIF.iU dtscuu (heir role ta Do*In


MaJItocUr Tiiinuieilu. lie Aulitant ChW of Suit. Intelligence, USAF, believes (hat continued Soviet Arctic training and new ASMl Indicate that Soviet"ill retainoption toarge number of the Bidforce under con tin-gerciei designed to muimlM an ali-ool nuclei! assaultorth America Foe rui-pk in tadeliable touirc reportedrobable new type ASMadger living over the BarenU Saa. For these iraaoiu, he believe! (hit the Soviets Intend lo maintain the proficiency of their nadger/Blinder force tor peilpUcral orinleiconnnentil operation!

Historical review ?zw?j&

cciicr RELEASE AS7

TOP occncr-

Tho Air force believes Ihal additional variants of llie Bear could make theirin LRA during die period of thisAlthough the most recent variantsapparently have beenaval role, the long-standing and continued interest in Bear modifications sugggests that thelife of the strike versions (A, B.odels) could be extended with another variant. In view of Soviet interest in standoff weapons and cantmuing ASMew Bear wilh an Improved ASM couldavailable by tho.

M-Type Bison

ho four-jet engine Bison serves eitheronventional bomber or as the aerial tanker for the heavy rxraber force and the Bears assigned to the navy. Bison bombers are not equipped with an ASM. At present aboutf theisons are believed to be serving as tankers. Production of

Force Size



I4'J. The equipment and composition of the heavy bomber force have been relativelyin recent years. The following table summarizes the current strength of the heavy bomber force: (Figures arc rounded to the nearest five).



Free-fall Bombers .. 30

Aerial Tinkere





Operational. Overall training activity of the heavy bomber force continues to emphasizemissions and to sustain the trend of the past several years toward more realistic

and complex exercises. Several nights over the sea approaches to Alaska0 have comeiles of the shore, but there have been no heavy bomber sorties off the eastern coasts of North America since

ver the years Bear ASM-carricrs have occasionally participated In naval exercises, suggesting that the Soviets intend to use theuisile against naval surface forces.of naval operations has. among other flings, longecondaiy mission of So-vlt LRA.

o our knowledge the Soviets have never employed heavy bombers as an airborne alert force, nor are there indications that bombers are maintained on the grounduick rrsaction posture comparable to the USimnute alert.

New Bomber

n lateualified source reported righting what appears to beew bomber at the Soviet airframe plant at Kazan. We have designated thisthe Kaz-A. We judge that the aircraft has probably now reached the flight test stage and could be ready for operational use ineriod. The aircraft was described asong slender fuselage and swept wingsonsiderably smaller sweep angle for ihe outboard section than for the inboard section, suggesting that itariable-geometry wing type. The change inoint about halfway out on the wing The inboard section appeared toweep of no more thanegrees. The outer sectionweep angle something less thanegrees. The aft part of the fuselage was wider llian the forward part, suggesting that the engines were located there. The nose of the aircraft was quite pointed, much more than


top srcafei-


linder patked nearby. Theof tho aircraft and its comparison tolinder hai enabled us to size it hi general terms but many of the characteristics critical to an evaluation of an aircraft are missing. Hence, we do not have the same degree of confidence in our assessment of this aircraft that we have in the case of the Bison and Bear on which weonsiderable amount of photography, taken both while the aircraft were on tho ground mid while they werein military fly-by*.

ur estimate of the performance capabdibes of thes deri.-ed from an engineering design analysis of the .ibservcd configuration. The analysis utilizes suchon physical characteristics as is available. Where such information is notwe have made estimates, based on our knowledge of the Soviet state-of-the-art, or, where necessary, what seem I" be appropriate assumptions. We have assumed that theis fitted with engines bke those used in the Soviet supersonic transport. Weti-

Figure 5

the size and locations of fuel cells based on standard engineering practices,into account the design characteristics of the aircraft, and on tlie assumption that the outer wing panels contain fuel cells.such as gross weight and fuelare estimatedasis of Soviet technology and demonstrated trends in Soviet aircraft design. Using the estimatedwhich we liavc then arrived at, we liavc postulated various mission profiles which Iheould fly.

o maximize range, the aircraft could cruise subsonieally. with wings fully extended, at high altitudes aB the way to the target. Id this profile,ound bomb load carried internally, it'couldombat radius of. without inflight refueling. If, instead of bombs, itOO-pound ASM partially buried in the fuselage, the aircraft couldombat radius o!ot including the range of the ASM. under the same flight conditions. The high altitude profile is the




desirable lor an aircraft penetrating defended areas, li ihe aircraft wilh ASMow-level approachun. to the laiget at high subsonic speed, wilh wings swept back, the combat radius would be. We believe that this type of rnission profile is the one most likely Intended for the Kaz-A. principally because it takes advantage of the aircraft's variable-geometry wing design and is the one which offers the highest probability of survival whendefense systems. Theould also be capable of speeds on the order oft high altitudes. Such speeds would be advantageous for penetrating areasby subsonic or tronssooic fighters, but would provide only limited security over areas defended by SAMs or supersonic fighters.

Although we have no evidence of any ASM association with the Kaz-A. we would not expect to see such evidence at this early stage of therogram. The pianowill be equipped to carry an ASM,onventions! bomber variant is also possible and could appear first.

The capabilities of theould appear to be greatly superior to those of the Badger and Blinder medium bombers foragainst Eurasian targets, particularly those deep in China, whose growing strategic importance for the Soviets could havetrong stimulus to the development of the new bomber. Against the OS on unrcfueled two-way missions, the Kaz-A's capabilitiesto be marginal; from Arctic bases, the combat ladius of the aircraft would take it over less than half of the USighprofile. Refueled, the aircraft could reach virtually all of the US on two-way missions from Arctic basesighprofile. Wc estimate that theill lie capable ol aerial refueling but we

have notoviet program toa new Unket to be used with the Kaz-A. It is not likely that the Soviets would rely on the aging Bison toew bomber force, there is al least one type of Soviet jet transport (thehat could be converted to thu purpose by the time theould become operational

DIA, State. NSA. Army,Position: We cannot be certainilago how the Soviets will employIt appears from the presenttheest suited forbut that it has capabilities forattack. Theouldcapabilities roughly comparable lo(though not thohe Kaz-Aconsiderable growth potential,the Soviets were to develop highengines, for example, its rangefocroascd by as much performance are notappear in deployed aircraft before the

Force Position: Thes an excellent ctample of howtechnology can influence aircraftto makeuitable for manyKaz-A's variable-geometry wing andengine make il suited for use inor intercontinental operations-operations, low altitude andpenetrations can be achieved wilhin the swept-back position. As abomber,boutercentthe Bison "heavy borriber" but hasrange/radius capabilities. Formissions, efficient cruise wouldwith the wing in theAs its performance is nowvarious flight profilesas the capability to reachCONUS target areas




balance. Ihe USAF believe! theapabilities which make it suitable for peripheral and intcicoutincntvil opeialions andange of attack options no Soviet planner would overlook. In view of illgrowth potentialariants of theould eventually satisfy tlie strategic mission requirements currently fulltllcd by all the strategic bomlnsrs now in the LRA inventory.


Evidence in the Near and long Term

e almost never have direct andevidence on Soviet planning lor theof their forces for intercontinental attack. We have never had such evidence ongoals. In its absence, we rely most heavily, for the near future, on anof obseivcd activity. This is possiblemodem collection systems provide us with good information on testing andand because of the long lead timesin developing and deploying weapon systems. Decisions involving the next two years or so (and sometimes longer) havealready been made, and activity is under way which we can detect and identify. For periods beyond this, there isgreater uncertainty, as the evidencescantier and less reliable, andknowablo becomes the

he Next Two Years. Soviet forces for intercontinental attack over the next two years or so can be determined with considerxlJe confidence. We can be quite certain about tlie hind of weapon systems which will beIt usually takes about two years from the time we observe the first flight testew ICBM until that system becomesin the field. This is tlie interval re-

quired to construct tlie deployed launchand to carry out the flight testhusystem is not nowlight testing it will probably not becomeuntil at least two yean from now. The interval for SLBMs is about the .same or longer, and for bombers it Is much longer. In short, the weapons systems deployed over the next two years or so will be those already in operation ot in the late stages of develop ment. Major improvements lo existinghowever, could be carried out in less than two years.

e can also with some confidence estimate the number of weapons which will he operational in the short term. Construction of an SSBN is estimated to take about two years. We believe that construction of launch groups for theakes aboutonths and thatroups normallyonths. It is also usually possible to establish reasonable production rates for bombers.

n the Mid-Term. Soviet forces forattack in theean ahead are less easily determined, hut we can still speak about them with some confidence. They wilt still be composed largely of exist ing delivery vehicles, deployed as at present Nevertheless, some older delivery vehicles may have been phased out, additionalfor current systems may be brought Into the force, and some new weapon systems presently being flight tested may beToward the end of Ibo period, some new weapon systems of which we have as yet no evidence may enter service.

e usually detect the initiation of the flight tell programew ICBM system about two years prior to its IOC. When mod-dicatiom to an existing missile system arethe warning time will vary depending

ormaltest projramaunche-r



ihe extent of modification, but in most cases we would expect the test program to take about as long as thatew system. Ihe developmentew submarine-launched ballistic missileears after we first become aware of tho program. For new bombers the period is upears. The lead time is longer than for an ICBM because of the complexity of modem bomber aircraft and tlie variety of integrated systems that must be thoroughly proven. Thus, whileew bomber we have not seen is unlikely in theears in theintroduction of new ICBM or SLBM systems is possible toward the end of the period.ew ICBMew SLBM, however, is likely to be deployed in substantial numbers by that time.

Our evidence on deployment andactivitiesasis forthe kinds of weapons systems aoail-able to the Soviets for theears hence, but it provides little if any basis for estimating Soviet intentions concerning the size and mix of their future forces. Lead times continue to restrict the options open to Soviet planners in determining theof their forces, but they havemore latitude In detenninlng their size and in setting priorities within them.

In Ihe Longer Term. It is difficult to say anything very precise about Soviet forces for intercontinental attack beyond the next five years. For one thing, much about the subject matter is inherently unknotoable. The Soviets have almost certainly not themselves made any firm decisions for even five years hence, much less for theo the extent that present planning anticipates such decisions, information about it is virtually impossible to come by.

hereurther difficulty, at once obvious and subtle. Many Soviet decisions

about the future arc bound to be tentative at first, subject to revision as ciicumstances change- For example, what the Soviets do will be determined in large measure by what the US does and by what the Soviets estimate (be US is likelyo in the future. As time goes on. however, the Soviet perception may turn out to have been wrong, or the USmay change. US decisions in turn are affected by what the Soviets do or areto do, and are subject to the sameMoreover, force developmentfrom decisions worked out year by year on an incremental basis: the choices thatappropriate this year may looknext year. It is impossible to estimate with confidence and precision the end result of this process of mutual adjustment over theoears.

Indirect Approaches lo Longer Term Estimates

eparting from "harder" evidence underlying near-term estimates, wc can. for the long term, make some use of broader and more general considerations: premises and factors which will form the context within which Soviet decisions about alternativeforce postures will be made. For example, we can ask: What effect will the basio aims and approach of the USSR in world politics have? Do relevant Soviet words and actsthat force decisions will be guided by some consciously articulated doctrinalon strategic relationships? Do economic capabilities and constraints as we canthem indicate any very precise limits within which program choices will be made? What does our knowledge of the Sovietbase and tlie likely scope andolffort tell us? How will the play of internal politics in the Soviet system affect the decision-making process? While we do have some information on these



lascenci r,-r.


it is often incomplete, unclear, or even contradictory; inference, deduction, even speculation inevitablyarge role. None-thelcu. this kind of indirect approach docs help in thinking about (lie problem, ond does serve to set at least rough bounds on what (he Soviets might do. The balance of thesection discusses the above questionsiew to determining what light the possible answers may throw on future Soviet decisions affectingack forcett.

Box Aims of Sonet Policy

here is no question that Soviet policy remains committed to the spread of the Soviel system, is hostile to the US in particular, and proceeds from the premise that corifUct in one form or another will dcteirnine legations between the super)lowers for the indefinite future Any notion that fundamental arc attainable which would make peaceful cooperation the dominant motif in Soviel-American relations is precluded by the USSR's continuing commitment to theoutlook which has governedowever frayed by history and its contradictions litis ideology may seem, it appears still to provide the essential framework within which Soviet leaders sec Ihe issues of world politics, and in any case remains an indispensable prop of the regime internally.

ll this being given, it might seem obvious to infer that the Soviel "intentions" implied in this outlook will lead the USSR invariably to seek maximum possibleover the US in strategic power. And il would follow thai estimates of future Soviet programs should be guided by thisBut this is too simple. Even ifoal to the Soviets, it provides no answer to questions about capability andto achieve it. or about how the Soviets would view the cost and risks of the attempt

And il is Ihese issues which must still be studied if one wishes to arnve at ai estimate of what the Soviets are up to and whatwhat characteristics, inhatSoviets wdl have.

oreover, it is not quite so self-evident as it might appear that tho Soviets believe that their policies and intentions can beonly by striving for the maximumadvantage in strategic weaponry. They have, of course, shown by their effort over the last five yean or so. that they are unwilling lo remainosition of marked uaferiority, and that they consider their larger policy aims to be prejudiced byosition. They have now largely closed the gap and have stated eipbcitly thai they will not accept less than 'equalut so far It is not clearly evident that they believe thai their political

goals in the worldreat deal more than that.

l is possible, though as yet alsothat the Soviets believe thatnear the present strategicserve their purposes equally well They could think this if they believed that (he primary form of conflict with the US inod beyond will be local politico-military confrontations in which superiority in conventional forces, characterized byand long reach, will bring gains forpolicy. In this case, Soviet strategic forces large and sophisticated enough merely to "check" the opponent, and to take strategic forces out of the play, might be thought to bo "enough".

n one way. this line of thought would be plausible for the Soviets lo follow. They liave always been keenly aware (hat power has varied ingiedients aad docs not arise from large and imposing weaponry alone Factors of will, skillful political operations, and of other forms of military strength also confer


power in their view. Nevertheless, the Soviets surely recognize that an evident advantage iu modem stralegic weapons can be one of the principal ingredients of powersychological sense. We can be sure, tliereforc, that they will want at least equality in this field, and perhaps something more, depending on bow they calculate the advantages and costs. But they could take this view regardless of their ideologically-inspired approach to power and conflict, simplythe USSRreat state with global aspirationseep concern for its own and its allies' security.

sum, an examination of livepolicy aims, including thethem, does not carry one veryestimating future programs forThe Soviets' stated aims andwith power and conflict dothat they aspire to supremacy overindefined. The thruststrategic weapons programs insuggests that they would like anover the US in this aspect of poweris not established, however, that theythis objective is feasible, or thatno alternative to trying for it. Thusfrom the USSR's basic aims anddoes not lead to confident long-termof particular weapons developmentsposture.

Soviet Stieftcie relief

Wririrg. If one descendsfrom the broad policy aimsto the strategic doctrines servingthe paucity of information Is whatstriking Tlie overt and secretare available reveal no particularor imagination in exploring thenf missile-nuclear weapons.appear, largely from discussions in

SALT, that there alsoore refined and sophistiealed body of strategic thinking The strong interest shown by tho Soviets in recent years insystematic intellectual effort in the US toodem strategicsuggests that the Soviets are attempting to improve the standards of their ownBut what is now known of Sovietdoctrine is of little or no help Infuture Soviet strategic force programs.

/mpiicolumr of Current SovietOne way of getting at Soviet force goals might be lo discover from the evidence on development and deployment what Idndtrategic rationale underlies the design offorces. This could have predictive value. Nothing veiy sophisticated or precise is meant by tho term "strategict refers to the rough categories and concepts commonly utilized in strategic analysis; parity, mutual deterrent, counterforce strategy, and the like. The effort can be made in two directions: by seeingtrategic rationale can be deduced from tbe actual development and deployment of strategic forces, or by trying to establish whether tbe latter are consistent with arationale set forth on other grounds.

For this land of analysis, theof Soviet forces can be more revealing than their size. Forase can be made that current Soviet deploymentweapons which serve the purposestrategy of deterrence rather than of counter-force. The argument is that of the strategic missiles now deployed against tho US. only theay have the combination of payload and accuracy to be suitable for uso against hard targets Similarity, most currentprograms, such as those for thend theodre seen as efforts to improve survivability and the Soviet ability to penetrate US defenses, and thus todeterrence ratherounterforce


capability. Wilh respect to tlie eventual slxe ol tbe entire force, there Is some evidence that the program for deployingt ICBM compleiei may be drawinglose, and some indicationilowdown inioup starts. But these are tentative rather thanindications, and they permit no firm conclusions al this time.

n obvious difficulty with this method of analysis is that however much it may yield correct answers for the present, it does not necessarily do so for the future. There ore other problems. The concepts and categories mentioned above, such as parity, are notof precise definition. To the extent that this is so, their predictive value Is reduced Similarly, even if the Soviets were to opt, say, for strategic parity, it is unlikely that evidence from deployment would conclusivelythe fact. The Soviet view of the size and mix of weapons that constituted parity would probably differ from tlie US view. Moreover, the true Soviet intent could he obscured by asymmetries in forces arising from differences in geography, history, tradition, and the like.

ven' if one couldikely strategic rationale, there is no simplebetween it and an estimate of futureforces. The conceptual and definitional problems discussed in the previous paragraph would apply. Moreover, many force decisions, when measured against the strategic concept, arc bound to be irrational and essentiallySheer inertia may produce Soviet programs lacking any reasonable relationshiptrategic concept: budgetary consideration or bureaucratic infighting can do tlie same.

uch problem* notwithstanding ittrue that Soviet intercontinental systems are deployed to meet, at least roughly, some Soviet concept of nuclear strategy. Thus, ithighly useful analytically to try and ascertain what that strategy might be through

an elimination of deployment patterns or otherwise. The predictive value of thehowever, is limited by thediscussed above; it does not permit any very precise forecast of the site andof Soviet forces in the future.

mplications of SALT. At Helsinki and Vienna the Soviets for the first time engagederious discussion of strategic issues. Theyumber of statements concerning the USSR's policy toward its strategic forces, lis view of the Soviet-US strategic relationship, and its strategic aims. These statements have largely omitted the propaganda and bombast that frequently characterize Soviet public statements on these subjects They have been couched in much tho same terminology used in the US; thus, apparently at least, the US and Soviet negotiators are using the same wave lengtheries of fairly frank exchanges on strategic questions. We cannot, of course, be certain that the views expressed by thenegotiators reflect in every instance the Due position of their government.

oviet spokesmen have repeatedly stated that the USSR's basic aim in SALT is toondition of 'equal security for themselves in relation to tho US. They haveertain sympathy with thethat an increase in ainumeats does not necessarily increase security and may even lessen il for both sides. They recognize that differences in geography, doctrine,and the like have led to asymmetries between US and Soviet forces, but if there is an agreement, such asymmetries, they say. must not be allowed to give cither side aadvantage

ince Ihe Soviets say that they see the present relationship as one of rough parity and are seeking "equal security" at SALT. It is possible that the broad criterion whichSoviet strategic programs, and would do




even in the absence ol an aims conlrol agreement, ii in fact something like rough parity. Though, for reasons discussed above, they would doubtless like toargin of advantage in tome form, they may appreciate that any great enough to be of political orsignificance would be likely toS response, and thus be self-defeating. If so, they would have assumed Urge additional economic costs and strains without in the end havingelative gain in strategic power.

or the present, however, Iheof the exchangesALT arcas to Soviet strategic policy and objectives. It remains possible that the Soviet approach Is exploratory or designed merely to slow die pace of the strategic arms race- The most that can be drawn from SALT so far Is somethat the Soviets may be willing lotabilized strategic relationship based on "equal security" for both sides. Whether or not this is what their policy alms at willmore clear only as they spell out thcir concretc positions in future rounds of SALT.

Chinaactor in Soviet Strategic Policy. The massive deployment of theater forces to the Sino-Soviel border area over the last several yearseasure of Sovietwith the Chinese threat. This concern, however, lias thus far had littlo or noeffect upon Soviet strategic forces. It is likely that plans for future deployments of Soviet strategic forces will be affected by (lie potential Chinese threat.

ar with China, the Soviets would undoubtedly attack China's strategic nuclear forces. Soviet targeting doctrine, however,lo call alio for attacks on administrative centers and urban/industrial areas. These exist in largo numbers; thus it seems likely thai forces designed for intercontinental attack would be used to supplement peripheral forcestrategic attack on China

ver the next five years, the Chinese ran piobably deploy IRBMs equipped with warheads in the megaton range, andew ICBMs as well. The threat from such weapons will surely become of increasing concern to the Soviets. If they feel that they must have forces specifically designated to counterhreat, Ihey could deployforces suitable for peripheral attack, such as MRBMv and IRBMs, and they could augment their strategic defenses. It is also possible, however, ihat they would bringweapons into play. If so, rather than deploy additional weapons for thethey could give some of their existing intercontinentalualagainst China and against targets in the US and Europe. Alternatively, they could putweapons into place which they would not have deployed in the absence of (he Chinese threat. Thus, the question of how the Soviets respondhinese introduces additional uncertainties concerning strategic policy and. of course the tire and disposition of Soviet strategic attack forces innd beyond.

Economic Copobililioi ond Const rolnts

e cannot place any precise limit on what the Soviets could spend on their forces for intercom mentalthey wereto make the requisite sacrifices in other areas. For (he most part, physical capacity does notonstraint, the existing plant capacity of Soviet Industry appears to be adequate toubstantialin defense output. Important exceptions to this generalisation are the submarineand nuclear materials facilities, at piescnt these aie working al about capacity, though their enlargement would not be an immense burden

his is not to say thai economicJo notuide, if only a




one. to (he defense burden which (he Soviets could or would be willing to assume. Wc have detailed estimates o( defensein various categories lor (he lastears which reveal how rapidly (he Soviets havepriority weapons programs and total defense spending. Past growth rates provide useful yardsticks for putting bounds on the likely pace and magnitude of future weapons programs. We believe it unlikely, forthat the Soviets would bo able tospending for Intercontinental attack much beyond the rate of growth of tho past five years without affecting other programs.

he desire toew round of increasing militaryarticularly those which might lie requited to counter the US deployment of new and moresystems, is thought to be one of the principal elements influent ing the Soviets to enter into SALT. Also, the increasingcomplexity of the military forces,with the growth of military RAD and space programs, hasapid increase in requirements for highly trained technicians and managers and the most advancedand materials. The military's first claim On these scarce resources has contributed to the difficulties that the Soviets havein introducing new technology into the civilian economy and, to some extent,he resulting decline in the productivity of new investment.

he perennial problem of resourceis likely toajor issue in debberations on Soviet national policy in the next lev- yens. Given the great size of the economy, 'however, even relatively low growth rates would increase available re-sotuccs considerably. Although increases in military spending might slow future growth and modernization, it seems unlikely (hat the USSR would, for purely economic reasons, be obliged to forego any military programs its

leaders saw as essential. Thus an analysis of the present Soviet economic situation does not provide any very precise guide to what will be possible or not possible in theattack forces.

Thef ReMorch and Dnielopmenl

n ihe present era. the rapidity ofadvance tends to produce especially vigorous action and reaction between theprograms of the USSR and the US, and il has made the strategic relationship more susceptible to change than ever before. Moreover, every important new strategic weapons system or significant improvement to an existing system is extremelyextremely expensive, andong lead time from its inception to itsoperational deployment Thecontest between the USSR and the US is one of invention, development, testing,and intelligence, and above all one of anticipation: each side most provide not so much against what its adversary has at the moment, but against what it will have or what it mayoears ahead. Technological rivalry takesife of its own; there ispressure to give high priorityigorous development effort.

e estimate that Soviet expenditures fnrave now surpassed those of Ihe US, and we expect this growth to continue into. This scale ofdoes not mean that (he Soviets arc at the same level as the US in technology but It does mean that they are well aware of the importance of qualitative Improvements in their forces, are willing toarger share of their resouices lo the development of new technology lhan is the US. and are pushing hard to dose (he technological gap between (he US and the USSR if they can.



The) main result oiffort will be to increase the technical options open to the Soviets in the future, which will in turn enable them better to anticipate or to react toS forces. Theare certainly aware that, although they have 'caught up" in intercontinental attack dehvery vehicles, their forces oY not have tbe flexibility and capability of the US forces. Over the nert decade they will seek ways not only to counter US forces, but also to develop new capabilities of their own.

19S. Hut while tlie range of options open to the Soviet planners will undoubtedlyit is unlikely that all the technical possibilities opened up by RAD will beSome lines of investigation may be pursuededge against possible USbut not carried through todeployment. Moreover, as strategic sveapon systems become ever moreand costly, the Soviets will he forced to choose from among the moreecessity that will be reinforced by thoof the economy and other military claimants. Thus, at the present stage,and interactionfforts greatly increase uncertainty in estimates of deployed intercontinental attackonger period

Inlcrnoi Politics ond Military

oviet military policy is in part aof Kremlin politics which, like politics everywhere, involves questions of power and priorities. Today, the Soviet Union operatesollective leadership. We have ample evidence that nothing of consequence isuntil it has been collectively scrutinized and weighed against tbe individual views and interests of the principal political leaders. While tlus method often produces decisions which represent only the least commonIl also gives some scope to the interplay of conflicting bureaucratic interest*.

including the military interest. The military influence on decisions is bound to bo great, partly because tbe resources given to defense are large and because decisions affectingare so complex. In these circumstances, the claims of national defense and the voice of the Soviet military estabhshrnent can be expected to have considerable weight in the deliberations of the leadership. The situation of iho military lias changed since it suffered public abuse from Khrushchev, and was driven into frightened silence by Stalin.

he influence of the military isexercised in ways not entirely different from those In any other state with amilitary establishment. Although nomilitary man sits on tbe Politburo, the Soviet military clearly exert pressures and urge reasons lor continuing arms programs and undertaking new ones, together with the scientific and Industrial groups which support them. As elsewhere, the military are notof one mind. There is ample evidence of disagreement on questions of greatto militaryhe relative cmphaiis to be placed on strategic and con ventional forces. Such disagreements enhance the control of the political leadership, whichroader range of concerns, especially economic, than the military. The newlaw introducedor example, better serves civilian economic interests than II does professional military

n the main, howev.ii, political and military leaders seem to share the same basic outlook on svorld affairs, and on Sovietneeds. The party leadership's accom-raodation of the military in the costlyof recent years appears to have been largely willing. There is no visible basis for anticipating critical differences between them on future Issues of defense policy. In any event, political controls over the military, which run from lop to bottom of Ihe military

.in riiSTGftlCAt REVIEW PROSRA top sccrct RELEASE AS7

tistablishmenl are evidently as effective us (hey have ever been, although the military may occasionally chain at (hue controls, they do not seriously question them and would not beosition to challenge (hem.

hile we know something, therefore, about (he process of reaching decisions on military policy, we know little or nothing about the actual interplay of poiitical forces within thehat interests arc represented by whom, and how powerful tliese interests are. Thus, an analysis of polil-iral dynamics in the Soviel Union is notlo contribute directly to the task of estimating future forceshole, let alone (he particular segment discussed in this paper. It can only be said that military policy is made as the resultolitical processdebate, hard bargaining, andinfighting, in which theubstantial role.

he various indirect approaches to longer term estimates discussed above are suggestive and useful. Each by itselfsomething to such estimates; taken together, they contribute more. Theytho context and (he broad limits within which choices will be made and some of the factors which will bear on those choices. They also furnish some insight into the kinds of choices that the Soviets might thinkfor their intercontinental forces, and help to rule out others.

or purposes of the next section, which deals with possible future Soviet forces, the methods discussed have serious shortcomings Although they help to establish what isand not reasonable, they do not point clearlyotcearticular size and composition. They do not help to reachas to when (he Soviets mayard-target MIRV, or whether they will em-

phasize survivability of (heir forces bymobile ICBMs or building moresystems, and so on. Tlie approach utilized in the neat section takes account of these deficienciei. as well as of the lack of direct evidence which prompted lecourse to indued approaches in (ho first place.


aving gained notrediMnbut also recognition as substantially equal lo the US in overall strategic power, the Soviets are now confronted wilh the possi-

"aj Cea- Boekly TiuMafeBv. the Assistant Chief of Stall. Intelligence,. dissents to Fait XJI and Us Appendu. Specific leuoru (or his diue.ot laaMai

a. He BMci Out many illoKreuoni in Part Ml and iudfmenli cliewliere in use document appear tosome fame analysis erf Jimoed war scenarios. He brtlevea UV assumrMmm and iftethodotocies undm-lyine. such analysis liavc not been nillicienllytbe document doer not reveal the statistical and inalrlkal disciplines [fail normallymiHE of contemporary nuclear foreei and which are required toK about scenarios, targe tins and kill capabilities This istrue retard,assessments of Soviet UnjetSnf doeUine. Hethese aitessmenU tend to rely (no heavily on the ludprent lhal Soviel force! would be tiuut almost eeelturvely (of the paafeaa el MMtnlirlnf bad-bawd slraleiic loseei without regard lo see-based ititleBic

b. In bto view, (he Force Modeli have leveral featureslend So make ahem ^balanced lEus-(ratlve forces

(I) Ite nous thatorce Models art con-udciad underheacUna, 'ruirstcaancc ol parityerins control" But he believes some quantitative and qualitative weapons mUes withinorce Models could represent "parity" or "lopeiiocltv" de-pendinjumber o( variables which ere not taken into account. For example, the II Force Mudeli do not dearly iHa the Inspect en iliaaefKforces thatieeni, ARM drlenses and ASW capabilities would have in the lotal US-USSII power balance These IK essential consider)-Xkna not foliy cUcussed in thbootnote continued at lop ol noil page.



*qu sscftgr-

The Faice Model-constructed toto imply thai given otic pail of lite Soviet "triad" ofLBMs, and fewnfcera, the oUS" two parts muit also be associated wilh it as illustrated. Although the Force Models are described as ilhuQaUve. ho fceb dial (hey imply hauls on Soviel force planningwhich. In hUiobably do not erisl. lie would note, foi eiainple, that nx ICBM models are astotiilod with but (our SLBM and three bomber

c. He agree* dut die illustrative forces in Put XII and Ihereinnier,ointed out innd in. In his view, ihii failure to provide an erri-mala (encompassins; the noimale'cenl probability range) will hamper any force planner tn guessing future Soviet forces and wdl lead to mitintcrpieta-tiom of (hit document.

2 In his view, io (he ibieovcrms limitation agreement, Soviet force goalsS andore likely tu fall within the following

A force ofDOis likely lo consist mainlyd ofcapable SS-tbIRVs andwith unproved acxuiacWt, pern Ids, andMIHVs. The addition of mobile ICBMt isImprovement! In CEPi arc cipected;CEP they are likely to seek atwould be on the orderm, Eventola began soon, he consideis It unlikely thatcould have significant numbers of suchtho operational ICBM force

A force of someS nuclearsubmarine* equipped with theand up loiesel powered modifiedequipped with theissileew submarine equipped withmtssde will probably be introduced Intoinventory5 In his view, missilecould be improved, but an operationalbetter (banm. is unlikely.

BOMBERS; Since thesei ems We syttcms provide Soviet plannersflexible options in response to conventionalwar contingencies, the currentfleet wJI molt lile'y be upgraded withofompatible tankernew variants of the Ben andare alio e'peeled to enter service. In hisBear/Bison force will remain ateginning. betweenof these strategic aircraft could also

bilily of falling behind the US in the latter part ofesult of improvements iu US strategic forces. Many courses of action are theoretically open to (hem, but they can be usefully categorized under severalThey could allow their relative position to deteriorate somewhat and stillredible deterrent They couldosition of rough parity with the US, either through an arms control agreement or by making appropriate changes in their forces in the absence of an agreement Or they could attempt lo improve iheir position by trying to outrun the US in an arms race. Within each of these gcnetalarge number of alternative force packages would meet in varying degrees the aims of Soviet policy. The balance of the paper considers the shape that future Soviel forces for intercontinental attack might take.

A Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement

The Soviets, in Ihe context of SALT, seem to beard look at the option oftabilized strategic relationship. An agreement would hold out to the Soviets the possibility ofosition of rough equality withoutew round of expenditures on strategica period in which demands on Soviet resources in other areas, military as well as civilian, will probably be heavy. It is possible, moreover, that the Soviets would sec advantage inthe power competition inherent fn the Soviet-American relationship On (he basistabilized strategic situation such as might emerge from SALT.

We recognize that the strategic arms limitations talks could have several possible outcomes', with varying effects on Soviet forces. Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to assume, considering the course of thethus far, (hat an agreement would have something like the following general fca-


There wouldimitation on inter-continental delivery vehicles in the neighbor-hoodwith freedom to mil subject to agreed limitations) andublimit on large missiles ABMs would be limited to the defense of Ihe national capitals, or possibly banned entirely. There would be littleif any.r on qualitativeto the force.

ecause the Soviets under armswould still be seeking at least to keep paceIhe US. the composition of their forces foi intercontinental attack and Iheof Ihelr effort in this field wouldheavily on US actions. Tho US forces which the Soviets could anticipate5 under the agreement would undoubtedlyto be formidable and require some action on their part. The Soviets would facerogressive buildup of Mlnuteman IH and Poseidon, both equipped with accurate MIRVs. which they would probably regard as eventuallyountcrforce threat to the fined Soviel ICBM force. They wouldseek to counter improvements to US forces thai threaten ihe Soviet deterrent.

n this situation, we believe that the Soviets would give major emphasis toond improving their retaliatoryand the survivability of their force-Some of their new weapons syslemt wouldhave improved oounlerforce capabilities as well. We would eapect lo see the vigorous Soviet RAD effort continue, and there would be strong incentives to increase it. Despite itsffort mightelatively inexpensive means of keeping pace with the US. It wouldumber of options from which the Soviets could select to counter particular developments on the US side;the Soviets might consider thatof these options wouldestraining

inlluence on US actions. Furthermore, It wouldedge against the possibility that the agreement would be abrogated

An arms control agreement of the type assumed would probably lead to newin. The limitation on ABM defenses would reduce the need foraids and MRVs, to which the Soviets have devoted much development effort in recent years. The incentive lo develop MIRVs,would remain great; the Soviets would wish lo do to If only to keep pace with the US and to preserve or improve their retaliatory capability. Soft target MIRVs would answer the latter purpose, but hard target MIRVs would piobably be developed as well, if only in the normal course of product Improvement The desire to improve the survivability of their forces might lead to developmentobile ICBM, ifevelopment Is permitted under an agreement, and possiblymphasis on seaborne systems.

How far ihe Soviets would go indeploying the products of theirrograms is problematical. So long as they believed Ihal the strategic balance was in fact remainingif eitheror tacit arrangements emerged toUS MIRVincentives to press ahead with expensive newprograms would be reduced. On the other band, there would almost certainlyto be strong pressures to have new or improved systems brought into the inventory as they became available. If the Soviets came to believe that the US was pressing its oppor-tunities to upgrade itsost notably through improving its counter (or ceSoviets could have strongto respond with MIRVsargeof theorce. Other likely responses would be to develop soft-target MIRVs for




widely deployedand perhaps other riussues) to improve the retaliatory capabilities ol those weapons surviving an initial USor to exercise what options werelor slutting to more suivivable SLllMs or land mobile ICBM forces.

onsiderations that might lead theto improve their intercontinental bomtier force include the availability of improvedservice interests, the capabilities offor varying the attack, and the desire to complicate (and male more costly) the US problem of defense. Under the assumed agreement, however, it seems more likely that the Soviets would decide to concentrate on less vulnerable ballistic missiles against which the US could provide no extensive defense rather than to replace their aging heavy bombers witb new aircraft.

espite tho possibilities mentioned above, there arc many uncertainties affecting the composition and development of Soviet forcesALT agreement. An intense competitiveness, channeled by the agreement into the areand qualitativemight he the principal determinant of Soviet force decisions. It is also possible, though perhaps less likely, that the agreement itself might change the climate of Soviet-American relations inay that, for the short tenr. a? least, competif'on for gains within the agreetivnt would seem lessThus, many variations affecting paiticular decisions for Soviel forces under SALT are conceivable, especially wilh respect lo the timing of certain developments

Possible Forces in Iho Absence of an Agreement

or the reasons discussed in Section XI, our evidence provides little basison-

fident rstimale of the sire and comporitiOn of Soviet forces beyond the next lew years.we present here not one but several examples of possible Soviet force* in the absence of an arms control agreement. The first two discussed are limiting cases; they represent an attempt to establish the lower and upper limits within which the Soviet forces are likely lo fall The other forces fall between Ihese two limit*.

roadly speaking, the forces reflect differences in:

objectives relative to theof the US threat.

pace of Soviet technological

resources which tbc Sovietsto apply.

We discuss the condition under which the Soviets might adopt each force and what thoy might achieve vis-ar vis the US by deploying It

he subsections which immediately follow attempt to lay the groundwork for thisey cover In order;

Soviet perception of the US throat;

developments with respectand improvements in accuracy;

developments in theof particular weapons systems.

Tho last two subsections present and discuss the alternative forces.

Soviet Perception of the. Soviet force planners are well inlormed about current US strategic forces and possible changes in them over the next few years, oa the bant of the open literature, testimony

-*OP StXKfcf-




congressional committees, and extensive public discussion of strategic weepooscuietnent. There is ample evidence (hat Soviel analysts and officials follow developments in the US closely and are well aware both of the programs up for consideration and of tbe public debale about them. They surely know from past experience lhat not all proposed weapons programs are adopted, and probably think in termsange ol postllJe USforce postures. In the prdoess, it is likely that the Soviets make generous assumptions about US capabilities, partially Io be On the safe side, partially because of their view of Ihe US as dominatedmilitary-industrial complex."

c do not know, of course, exactly how Ihe Soviets would project the threat likely to be posed by the US strategic forces during.robable, however, that they would begin with present forces and presently programmed additions and im-proverrtentt. To this they would add some further major additions ami improvements talked about in the technical press. The range of possible major changes in US strategic forces might took like the following to the Soviets:

s the Soviets might view the iiostu-latcd US forces, they would have lourin common:

a. They would provide large numbers of accurate MIKVs. which would give the US the capability, within five years, to bunch thousands of warheads against the Soviet Union. Regardless of what the US might say publicly about their intended use, the MIRVs would have, or would probably be assumed to have, yields and accuracies of an order sufficient toignificant pad n! the Soviet fbrco. Soviet planners would be aware that they do not now hove, and are not likely soon lo have, an ADM defense against these missiles.

b. They would include si/eable numbers of ABMs. requiring multiple Soviet RVs or penetration aids to overcome them.

r. Two-thirds or more of tho missile RVs would be deployed on submarines which would be relatively invulnerable to attack.

d. Although some effects of theof new US systems would be felt in the, tlie full impact would not occur until the, especially in the case of forces augmented beyond tbe currenUy programmed foices.

Ma JO*IhXtUiWn m

AvetrrwrtD rone* I

Same leducuon inall liii

Minuteman lit retrofitted loIII retrofitted lo tbe

lull* the MinutemaoMinuteman force.


Safefuaid Phase II. prcridmxSafeguarddefense of Ot*i defense ofpic set.

odncu iHci.irotD in .ucwrwrH) Ponce II

Retain ill.

etrofitted to lb* eotue Manoccraaa force.

Poseldrm retrofitted^

Still mom Safeguard deployment.






VV. do not know what estimate the Soviets might make of the probability that the US would deploy one or another ol the postulated forces. Although (he Soviet*recognize that some presently projected programs might be delayed or curtailed, they would almost certainly foci compelled to lake account of ot least the programmed US forces in their own force planning. They rrtightit prudent toevel of effort

something like US Augmented Force I. and they might look upon something like Aug-

men ted Force IIworst case" possibility.

Multiple Re-entry Vehicles and Accuracy

n the face of potential developments in US forces, the Soviet planners willinsist uponigh level of RorD so as to increase the options open to lhem. Some of these options we can now discern with varying degrees of confidence; others we oan only postulate on the basis of Soviet requirements as wc see (hem. and their general level of weapons technology. Perhaps the major RccD problem for the Soviets over the neat decade is that of RV development for their ICBMt and SLBMs, and related developments which determine the number, characteristies, and potentialof RVs against US targets. Thisproblem may best be analyzed in lerms of alternative developments in relatedfor MIRVs and for accuracy.

Multiple Re-enlry Vehlde*

onsidering thai theyechnical capability and an incentive (sooe continue to estimate thai theill develop and deploy hard target MIRVs capable of attacking Minuteman. The timing of this development is open to quits-lion The Soviets could by the end1IRV utiliring the guidance system employed on thend with about tho

same accuracy as they (he end2 they couldIRVEP of. Given our understanding of the technology Involved, we sec no reason why MIRVs should be delayed more than three years beyond the dates cited above. Thus, MIRVsEP of. would tie available by the end5 at the latest. This judgment is based upon ourof the Soviet "state-of-the-art."

e assume that the Soviets willMIRVs initially for thesing the three-RVecharUiation (ase the case)ifferent system such as that represented by the "hut" concept used by the US. orew system could have as few as three RVi, as wilh theechanization, but sir RVs, each wilh about tho yield of anodould probably fit well on theoreover, it should be no more difficult technologically lo develop six RVs than three. In making our projections we have postulated either three MIRVs or six MIRVs on systems entering the force as early3 and six MIRVs on systems entering (ha force6 or later. For projection purposes we have assumedV system with tha accuracy of (ho presentndnd using the Modechaniration could be available for deployment in1 at theIRV systemore sophisticatedand with accuracy ofm. CKP could be available one year later. This system would carry three or six RVs.

oviet technology could probablyrapidly enough to permit5 ofIRVs on theIRVs on thend on SLBMs.




^ Although our information it frag-mentary, wc believe lhal the Soviets could have developed such weapons Q

ith warhead weights like those which would be used on the MIHVjabove. In any case, we have postulated that such warheads could be availablend that they would be used then or laterhree-MIRVhrec-MIRV SLBM. We have notMJRVn the force protections, in part

|because it does not improve hard taiget kill capabilities. We cannot exclude the possibility, however, that tliey willM1RV system, simply because they can do so. or because of the advantages that it would offer in assured destruction andflexibility.

ms Ii Accuracy

e can generally ascertain theof RVs being testedoviet missile, and whether they are individually targeted. Wo are confident that we would deteel and identify efforts to increase accuracy, although we have no such certainty about determining tho precise accuracylight test program incorporating both significantin guidance techniquesew RV or RVs with higher ballistic coefficients would constitute convincing evidence that, developmentystem with markedly improved accuracy was under way. Sufficient accuracy would give eachigh probability of renderinginuteman silo or other hard target

onsidering the warheads available to them and the type of hard targets they might wish loKP ofm.

represents, in our view, the kind of accuracy the Soviets would require toard taiget capability with MIRVs We believe that they couldEP of about. with their present guidance modes This would be achieved by improvements incomponents,ccelerometers and gyroscopes, resulting eitherpecific effort or. in time, from the normal product improvement activity carried on by Soviet re-seaich laboialodis. New RVs with ballistic coefficientsounds per square fcot would also be lequired.greater accuracy would, of course, bo advantageous but, in our judgment, would require going well beyond the current state-of-the-art in guidanceo stellar oc terminal guidance, and we think it unlikely that the Soviets will do this during. Tbe above judgments are based on our un-dci standing of the Soviet slateof-theari as derived from fragmentary information and from an appreciation of the relationship of Soviet technology to that of die US.

est program to achieve an accuracy of aboutm. would require about two yean, and we have seen no evidence of one. Based on our understanding of the Soviet state-of-the-art, it could begin as early as this year, with deployment commencing ins In the cose of MIRV technology, we have no reason to think its start wouldith deploymentin5e have projected this improved accuracy on all new Soviet fixed ICBM systems or variants with an IOC6 or later, and in the case of some (orces as early

Weapons Systems

uture Soviet foices svill be affected not only by the very important potential de-vcloptnents in MIRVs and in miisile accuracy discussed above, but also by decisions regard-




the deployment ol this ot (list system and Iho phasing; out ol older systems This section sets forth the estimates and assumptions with rcsiwct to various weapons system* that we have used in constructing the alternate forces. The principal assumptions used in protecting the Illustrative forces are derived fromof capability expressed earlier In the estimate and are summarized below. Where necessary, additional assumptions arein ihe descriptions of specific forces.


e estimated earlier thatpercent of theilos nowfor Morind that the remainderIs exceptof

Mod 3s. Wc have somewhat arbitrarilydeployment of thoo three group* in all of the projected forces. In all but the lower limiting force, it is assumed that all other SS-Os that will become operationalMIRVs are available will bo Mod 2s. De-ploymcTtt of thes an MRV is depicted only in the lower limiting force, on the assumptionIRV is not deployedirect outcome of the new phase ofesting. We assume that, on the basis of past performance, the Soviets could sustain future deployment of theate of up to nine group starts per year.

e assume that all presently operational SS-lls aie equipped with the Modut that both versions of thehat the Soviets are now testing on thoould begin entering the force by the ende have included then all of the projected forces, although we do not altempl to decide what the mix will be between thend the Type B. There is no apparent technical constraint on the dc-vcsorirncntodifiedith anof. T

have included these systems in locoes which place heavy emphasis oa gaining substantial counter Ience capalxbty.

eripheralor purposes of Ihe projections, it is assumed that theaunchers located at MRBMDM sites arcrimary mission of peripheral athese launchers therefore are not included in these projections. To the extent that they arc available for use against the US. they should be considered additive lo the several illustrative forces.

s notedheeapon system may be more mrvivable than other Soviet ICBMs. andood second strike weapon. In the absence of more evidence on theodowever, and in the light of the extensive deployment of thee have nvsumed that this advantage alone would not induce the Soviets to increase the slow pace ofeployment or the proportion ofn the force. We do not foresee the Soviets attempting to give Iheagainst hard targets.

nd SSA In all cases, we have assumed that considerations of age. highcosts, ami relative vulnerability would lead the Soviets to phase out the softnd all SS-Ss5 and the hardy the.

Mobile Systems. We have assumednd-rnobile. ICBM would nol reach IOC5 at the earliest, and would

Mr. Leonardoe the Director oland Research, Department of Stale, dees nol agree with lliii assumption. Col. John D. Foulfc, for the Assistant Chief of Stall lo. Intelligence, Dcoart-menl ofy; Capt. William N. Hatch, for the Ahuuuii Chief of Naval Operationsepaitmenl of the Navy; and Maj. On. Roddy Tiiantafellu, the Asiislant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. USAF. .he do not acree wilh tliu assumption.



payload capabilities equivalent to those of tirec have projected deployment of mobile ICBMs only in forces where high survivability is an overriding requirement and in tlie upper limiting force.

Ballistic Missile Submarines

We project continuedof nuclear-powered ballistic mis-

.sile submarines at the rate ofet year until they haveorce.

We assume Kurt thiswill be operational bylass submarines will beto cany itubes perhere designate the platform theliavc notetrofit of thehas already undergonelass submarine hasmodified, apparently to carry thethe other eight of these submarinesrecently been through oneand there is doubt that theyanother so soon. Accordingly, weincluded deployment of the SS-NX-8inlass submarines in theforces.

n order to take account of probable Soviet interest inidely deployed follow-on missUe of greater range than theow carried onlass submarine, we have postulated two possible ways of meetingequirement:

alternative assumes thai thedevelop an entirely new missileangem. or more, compatible with the widelylassIt assumesingle RV version ofissile could be available as early4V MIHV version could be avarlablef given sufficient priority, and in any eventor projection pur-

poses wc have postulated deployment of this new missile in all but the lower lunitinj; force.

alternative assumes that thedeploy theow submarine reaching IOC ineriod. For projection purposes wc have deployed then this fashion only in the upper limiting force,V MIRVed version.

We haveIRV systems on SLBMs in most of the illustrative forces. In three forces wc have introduced them5 on theith no improvements in current system accuracy. In the upperforce these reach IOC as early4 on Useith Improved systemIn all four of these forces we haveew missile forIRVs and improved accuracy

H-II Class Submarines. For most of the illustrative forces we have assumed thatI class submarines arc transferred from the intercontinental attack forces to theattack forces as the numberlass submarines reach


We have postulated that theould begin to enter operational unitseasonable annual productionwould provide aboutircraft0 aircraftnd7 andycats.orcen all-out program might provide SO aircraft per year beginningesultingorce

It was concluded earlier that thes best suited for peripheral operations, but (hat it has capabilities for inlcrcontinenlalIt was noted that theay have considerable growth potential. In the present



ol out knowledge, and In 'he absenceuitable tankei, it is uncertain whether the Soviets intend to use the Kaz-A. as an intex-continental bomber. An arbitrary decision has been made to include the aircraft in tbe Tables with this reservation in mind, in part because of the possibilityersion with improved range may appear in the.

have postulated rates ofolder Soviet aircraft ranging from aof the force to about half itsbyo maintenance of theuntil thes deployed InSince the capabilities of theclosely approach that of the Bisonpresent heavy bombers, we assumewould replace the bomber version ofthat the latter would be retired.

Alternative Force Developments "

great variety* offorces can reasonably be postulatedSoviets in. Wc think thatcan be set in terms oldeployment capability,of resources. These are byhard and fail, however, and evenlimits there are many options.we haveumber of otherinfluence Soviet strategic policy,the Soviet perception of the threat,requirements, and Internalbureaucratic considerations. Anddevelopment is an empiricalout year by year on antlie choices that appear toto be appropriate this year maynext year, and will almostmodified or changed many times befoielo

H Alternative illustrative (ores models are diicuned in the (ollowinr;ableB and com. panne the force models as olt found on

The alternative force developmentsin this section represent possiblethat Soviet strategic policy could take in the absence of an arms control agreement. As will be seen, we consider some of them more likely than others. It should behowever, that we consider no one of them an estimate that Soviet intercontinental attack forces will be composed of theweapon systems in the precise numbers listed. They arc intended to be illustrative of possible uends and differing emphases, and as such arc nol suitable for military planning purposes. For Defense planning purposes the reader should consult the las incomingIntelligence Projections for Planning

The alternative forces differ in theemphasis given to retaliatory vs. counter-foico capabilities. Ibis emphasisunction both of Soviet Intentions and SovietIn some cases, for eramplo, we have assumed that the Soviets will choose not to press aheads fast as possible; in others, that achievement of technical goals is delayed despite their efforts; and in others, that technological advances occur at the earliest possible date. The forces with the earliest counterforce capabilities are those which reflect the most rapid pace ofchange.

alternative forest necessarilycommon features. Regardless ofSoviel objectives,.continuedadvance seems inevitable. All of theare keyed in one way or another tostrategic threat. And while there arein the perception of the threatresponses to that threat, all theasictrong

n the piojeetioni which follow, we have postulated Iwo limiting cases. Force A,



Pasture, projects no more than the completion o! existing ICBM construction. Ihe start of aboutlass submarines.ome qualitative improvements. Forco D. Maximum Posture,uildup ofattack forces across the board at the highest rates consistent with pastand expected technical capabilities.

etween these limiting cases we have projected models of courses of action which the .Soviets might deem desirable, and have explained the nature of the forces and the conditions under which we think the Soviets might adopt them It is worth repeating that many other models could be postulated, and in any one modelarticular strategic approach and level of technicalmany other force levels could bein general or in detail. But we think the models chosen are representative ofcourses of action. Wo have selected for presentation three possible courses of action without,oviet strategic goal of maintaining rough parity with US forces; the alternatives represent different levels of tech nical advance. All of theso models wouldor improve the survivability of theforces and incorporate penetration aids against US ABM defenses. They svould have some couiitcrforcc capabilities, depending on tho level of technology. We have also selected for presentation an Alternative C, whichonscious Soviet effort to gain significant countorfcece capabilities against US ICBM forces; it does not, however, go as far in this direction as the limiting Force D. which involves greater SLBM and bomber forces, larger strategic defense forces, and high levels of technical advance

n the following discussion offorces, summary tables show the status of diose forces as ofhe5 represents Ihe end of the near-term period of

five years for which, as noted in Section XI above, wc are dble to pioject with someIn modeling these forces, however, we have further extended the prelections8 and have briefly summarized theseprojections and their rationales in thehe principal reason for so doing is thai the size and capabilities of present US and Soviet strategic forces and the length of tune required to develop and deploy new weapons systems are such that neither side can effect any sigrtificant change in thebalance ovci the ncxl foiu oi five years.

he potential for change in the US-USSR strategic relationshipincreases rapidly and this is reflected in the illustrative forces. In most cases, the major qualitative improvements that arcaccurate MIRVs, Kaz-A. follow-ondo not enter service until theod aic not available in significant numbers until the- Moreover, theurther numerical buildup, and in some cases thereonsiderable increase in the number of deliverable weapon*

Illuiitaiiv* Fore* Model A, Minimum.s illustrativeecision on tho part of the Soviet leaders to go with what they have plus the- minimum necessary toredible deterrent against USforces. Our analysis indicates thatould provide the Sovietstrong retaliatory capability againstUS forces throughout the decade. Butf the US were to deploy some other proposed forces (more extensive ABM. complete changeover to Mmutcmtn HI, for

" Th* Appendli lo Section XII contain! table)niVn of delivery vef ides in each initiativeheTB



oviet; foices would have to bemuch mote rapidly than inn order totrong ictaliatory



Durvrar Vnocuj RVs








4 (MRV) .

- )



Mod 2









As lite table indicates. Force Aonly modest teddvance,of most of the old ICBM launchers,alt in iCBM deployment after current construe" ion is completed. Projected forcewould have the purpose ofretaliatory capabilities in the face of planned US MIRV and ABM programs.would be enhanced by thedeploymentass SSBNsorce of somenits4 and byof some mobile ICBMt stallingenetration capabilities would be improved

by equipping thetill underwith MRVs and by replacing theith the Modetrofit of theIRV payload with an accuracy of. beginning7 would improve counterforce as well as retaliatory capabilities.

A was deliberatelyough lower limitangeSoviet forces might fall. Itswould involve voluntary Sovietof some deterioration of theirstrategic capabilities relative to USforces. Nevertheless, theconceivably follow this course ifconvinced that US forces were notto developace more rapidforces, and if they felt thecut back substantially theirforces for intercontinental attack.ofould result inthe order ofillion rubles aSIS billion) compared withfor intercontinental attack forces, or aboutercent.

Illustroiive For to Model Oi Atoximtim Posture

D roughly illustrates whatwouldaximum Sovietof convertingartime basis.the simultaneous deploymentat the highest sustained rateby each in the past. It wouldtwice as much per year as recentexpenditures for the intercontinentalIt assumes parallel developmentsdefense programs that would alsola nti ally more than the current highexpenditures for strategic defenses. Wethat this illustrative force representsresource allocation the Sovietsin peacetime.





Mod 1

Mod 3

e Minv


Mod ]

Mod 8



New3 MIRV) .


Beer ASM

Beat Bombs*















would be reached unless thewere making an all-out effort.

ould provide the USSRigh retaliatory capability throughgainst cither US programmed forces, or the poslulated US augmented forces. Moreover6 Ihe accurate weapons in the Soviet ICBM force would be theoretically capable of destroying someercent of US land-based missilesounterforce preemptive strike. Tlie MIRVs in the submarine force would enable the Soviets toargeof soft US military installations In anwith Ihe US, tbe Soviets could still capoct to receive eatremely high levels ofevenre-emptive strike

ounterfoicc capabilities would beprimarily by deploymentardIRV payload on the SS-9late2 and endingQ

3 Retaliatory capabilities would be improved by the buildup of SS-lls and. by deplcyment of theodyew submarine as well as byY-class construction, andobile ICBM. The old ICBM launchers would be deactivatedomber strength would be increased overlevels by deployment of the

he Soviets might undertakeuild up if the US were toassive build up of its own strategic forces, dear effort to upset tlie present balance. They might

ept where ihendicates ollien-iw, the term 'haidrefer,VTH of about t. nm. Thirough and ready deiiRnatioo; Ihe hard ta(Cetl,ruenris ono us* hardness of tbeas -elleoararv.


alio do SO in ail effortchieve tome mcas urn of reoogiuVable superiority over the US. They would piobably ice both political and military utility in achievement of such aalthough they would also see considerable economic disadvantage. Moreover, they would bo unlikely to embark onouisc unless they judged that the US would not react inay as to offset the Soviet effort.

Illustrative Force Model IV Ma-wenooc* of Polity without Armi Control

.llustrate three allernative ways the Soviets might react if they assumed that the US force inould bo on the order of the Programmed Force or Augmented Force I. The capabilities provided byoiccs would retain for theosition of rough strategic parity. Annual outlays would be about the same as those on intercontinental attack forces during the;ould cost somewhat lessomewhat more. Our analysis indicatesorce likeorces would enable the Soviets to maintain strong retaliatory capabilities throughout the decade, even against Augmented Force II. Counter-

force capabilities would be improved by the deployment of accurate MIRVs.

heorces vary primarily with respect to the time that MIRVs arc introduced;

. Begins retrofit of theIRV payload3 followedIRVegins toIRV payload on an SLBMfrovides the earliest hard target MIRV capability.

. Begins deployment of IheIRV payloadEP about the same as the presentollowedIRV pay-loadostulate the same SLBM MIRV package and have the same number of delivery vehicles.

. Deploys no MIRVs ineriod;IRV payload is introduced only on theompensates for this slow MIRVprimarily by deploying additional ICBMs andore SSBNs;onsequence, it gives tlioore favorable strategic postureis the US in thehan either







Mod 1

Mad 2

Mod 3


Mod 1







Y/New Miiiflc. .


Bear ASM

Bar Bomber Bean Bomber Boon



Seeor another possibleTills MIRVBT5 nm. in

Some hive three MIRVi




ej e> *


. in.

The tlireeorces are structured on the assumption that the Soviets, under the conditions postulated, would con cen irate on qualitative improvements, and coo tinue to deploy ICBMs only if the appearance of MIRVs were delayed As noted earlier, these and the other foices discussed in this section represent possible licnds and different em-

phasis, and none is an estimate that Sovietattack forces will be composed of the particular weapons systems in tbenumbers listed. In the case ofariants, it is useful lo point out anotherthe Soviets would wish tosome further deployment of ICBMs evenIHV became available as early2

cia Historical review program^



f such were Ihe case, wc would postulate an additional two years deployment of then both. and would show aboutore SShan now appear in the tables.

allorces there is anenhance counterforce capabilities butemphasis is given to improvementcapabilities. This is apparent inprogram to replace theith SS II Mod 2s. in the largeand for, inobile ICBM. In all three cases,the old ICBM launchers areinI classtransferred to the forces for peripheralThe bomber force is maintained atlevels by the introduction of

tlluslroTive forceownlerfoer*ulemon

C represents the kind ofSoviets might undertake if they weretop priority On the early acquisitioncapability to knock out virtually all ofICBM force. It assumes rapidand deployment of accurate ICBMsMIRVs. This efforthe theoretical capabilityercent of the USreemptive surprise attack. Ascase of Force D. however, thehave to anticipate extremely highdamage even aftertrike

impressiveesults primarilyeployment and from the fittingthe entireorce svith apayload, which would begin inbe completedhisbe augmented by the introductionin the last hall4 of an accurate

.5 retaliatoryofould be comparable to those oforces: SLBM and bomberwould be about the same, and more than half of theCBMs would be Mod 2s.



Detrvmy vancua RVs




.. CEP)


Y/New Missile




Some have three MIRVs.

f the Sowfs should conclude that tbe US wasountcilo'rce against their land-baited missiles, they might respond with something likeo counter the US effort. They might seek to buildorce in any event in an effort lo improve their relative strategic position. This wouldinvolve the assumption, as with Force D. that ihe US would not read inay as to offset the Soviet effort.

toW ' Ul




Number of Delivery Vehicles



i to 4

H T '


Mod 1



































Bear Bomber










This MIRVb CEP. innd. inEPm.

ihreo MIRVs.

bave llirce MIRVs.


Soviel Courses of. Wo <lo not consider either of thelimiting cases toikely Soviet course of action, li seems improbable that if the US went ahead with something like its programmed forces, the Soviets would accept the deterioiation in their strategic positionin Force A. It may be. of course, that ifUS built forces rapidly enough, the Soviets would have to settle, at least temporarily, for reduced retaliatory capabilities, but we do not trunk they would do soatter of choice They would almost certainly not limit tlieir forces to the levels of Force A. We also believe that the pace of Soviet technical advance will lead their forces well beyond tho limited nd-vanccs iny the. And finally, although the Soviets have beento hold down mlUlary spending, we believe that they are unlikely to fed compelled to reduce expenditures foi intercontinental forces appreciably below current levels.

n the other band, we consider IIthe Soviets will come anywhere dose to the levels of effort illustrated by Force D, except possibly in responseS forcewell beyond that depicted above asbVely Soviet perceptions of the tlireat Wc trunk Ihe Soviets would consider the costs to be too heavy and the requisite disruption of other programs too great, ihe benefits limited in comparison to those of lesser forces against foreseen US developments, and the ckehhood -of stimulating US counteraction greatthe current pace of Soviet advance intechnology and deployment does notthe sense of urgency that would be apparent if the Soviets were in fact now plan-ruiig the development of

o also think something likeould be unlikely Itecent Soviel efforts have been directed primarily at developing systems lo penetrate USefenses and give no iodiutioti that development of hard target

ciipabilitiet is to be given Increased emphasis'. Moreover, we doubt that Ihe Soviets would pursue anything like die single-minded effort to build up counter force capabilities as rapidly as iUustrated in Forcethe high cost it wouldunless they fell they could cope more adequately with the US Polaris and bomber threat than appears likely, at least for some lime in the future. They would also have to be concerned that the US would reactuildup with large, new programs of its own to insure Ihe survivability of adequate retaliatory forces and perhaps to increase US counierfbfce capabilities as well.

arring an arms control agreementignificant slowing in projected US strategic programs, wc believe that the most likelycourse nf action would be of ihe level of effort represented byroup of forces. Each of Ihese forces has been modeled so as to preserve strong retaliatory capabilities against US forces at levels of expenditure comparable to current levels. By and large these forces represent rough comparability with the US. In actuality, the Soviets could achieveless or something more than this,on who is doing tho viewing, on what kindype force the Soviets deploy, and on the crlent to which the US departs from programmed forces In either direction. Themay opt for the introduction of accurateEP) as early as possible lo matdi some ol tho counterforce capabilities inherent in programmed US forces. Thisis best met by, whichaccurate MIRVs at tint earliest estimated feasible date. Either the guidance or the MIRV development programs could, of course, slip. If the Soviets get an early MIRV but arcin attaining Ugnificant improvement in accuracy, they might go in direction of. deploying the MIRV when it becomes available and ictiolitting when improvedbecome available.s also rcp-



of the kind of force that themight deploy u* ihey tie less concerned wfiJi matching the improvements in counter-force capabilities inherent in programmed US forces If it should take tbe Soviets until as late5 to finish llieir flight testing of adelay which we consider much less likely than tbe delay in attaining unprovedbelieve the Soviets would probably attempt to compensate by continuing to build nvir: launchersIRV becomes available. In this case, the Soviet (orces inight look more like

ut these projections are necessarily illustrative at best. There are various reasons why the Soviets might be willing to settle at least temporarily fot rates ol force buildup

below (hose illustrated byorces. Their lead in numbers of ICBMs piesent andfor cample, might lead them tothey had some extra leeway. On the other hand, some Soviet loaders wouldseek larger forces, cither because of tbeir comrrutments to particsdar weapon programs or because they perceived opportunities tothe USSIVs overall strategic position and bargaining poweris the US. In any case, the Soviets are almost certain in the course ol theoears to embark on some strategic programs ol which wehave little or no inkling. As in tlie past, the Soviets wdl doubtless make strategicdocisiom which we will find hard to explain in terms of clear cut military orgoals.









The alternative force developments presented in this Appendix representdirections that Soviet intercontinental attack forces could take in the absence of an arms control agreement. It should bo emphasized that we consider no one of them an estimate that Soviet intercom mental attack forces will be composed of the particular weapon systems in the precise numbers listed. They are intended only to be illustrative models of possible trends and differins emphases, and as such are not suitable for military planning purposes. For Defense planningthe reader should consult the forthcoming Defense Intelligence Projections for Planning

- Mai Cen. Roddy TiWdlu. the Assistant Chief of Staff. iMdhgencc. USAF, Assents tn Sccnconil thisee page til lo. reasons far his dUrenL







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An ICBM system launchedrajectoryuch lower apogee than one launchedormal ICBM trajectory. The only Soviet DICBM. theods relrofired (see definition below) just prior to re-entry to increase the re-entry angle and deboost the re-entry vehicle (RV) onto the desired target.


A FOBS is placed into orbit and deorbitcd on tho target prior to completion of the first revolution. Its operational and controlarc like those for ant is deployed on the ground, targeted prior to launch, and launched with intent to attack. This concept is contrastedultiple orbit bombardment system (MOBSJ which could be deployed in space, launched into orbit wilh no immediate commitment totargeted alter launch, or retargeted as necessary.


A guidance system that is completelywithin the missile and has no Linkround station after launch.

device (hat measures the missile's accelerationiven direction.

Three accclerometcrs mounted at right angles to each other can measure the entireprofileissiles powered flight.

device that measures devia-tion of the missile awayeference direction. Three gyroscopes mounted at right angles to each other can measure anyof the missile during powered flight


Alertpercentage of the opera-tional missile force thai is maintainedondition of readiness.

Circular Error Probableindex of accuracy defined as the radiusircle centered on the intendedithin whichercent of the arriving missile warheads are expected to fall. The

other SO percent of successfully arriving war.

heads are expected to detonate within

CEPs of the target.

Initial Operational CapabilityDate Ihe firil operational unit is equippedew missiles and launchers capable of carrying out an attack.

Maximum Operational RangeAir-to-Surfacerange be-tween the launching aircraft and the target at the time of missile launch.




acc-to-Surf acetang* under operational conditions wilh war-head waghi indicated. In the case of ballistic missiles ihe maximum range figures disregard the effect of the earth's rotation.

F-obabilUy of KM (PK)-Thc bkelihoodarget will receive in an attack the combined effects deemed necessary lo render it useless. In the case of missiles. PKunction of the hardness of the target, the yield of the attacking warhead, and theof the dolivery system.

Reactiontime required to bunchiven readiness condition. The time requiredunction of the type ofthe mode of deploymentard ornd the check-out procedures used.

Re/irelime required toecond missile Iiom the same launcher.


Reentry Vehiclepartissile- which carries the warhead and isto survive rc-enlry into the earth'sand detonate on target.

Multiple flVior more RVsingle misvilc payload package. Tin;RVs are dispersed but notJy-iai gel cd or maneuvered

M ultiple argeted RVswo orVsingle mis jile payload package, with each RV capable of being directedeparate aiming point.

Maneuverable RVRV which has the capability to maneuver during free flight or le-entry.

technique whereby the RV is dcoibitcd or is deboosted outormal ballistic trajectory

Ballistic; CoefticuntRVwhovc valueunction of the RV

weight andnd is defined as the weight of the RV divided by its drag coefficient and area. The speed with which an RV passes through the atmosphere increases as the bal-UttJo coefficient increases. An RVigher ballistic coefficient is less susceptible to the effects of wind and density in theaird the re-entry error induced byffects is reduced. Re-entry vehicles with lower ballistic coefficients are lessto the effects induced by priorbursts In the impact area, are more adaptable to hardening against the radiation effect* of attacking ABMs. and facilitate Ihe design and packaging of nuclear weapons.

Weiheedweight of thedevice and its safing. aiming, luring, and firing mechanism.

RVweight of the warhead phis necessary shielding and structure, of any internal penetration aids that may be present, and of any other necessary or desiredof the RV including hardening.

Throwweight of that part of the missile above the last booster stage. In the case of MIRVs or MRVs. for example, throw weight would include the weight of the MIRV or MRV release mechanism as well as lliat of the RVs.


Forcepercentage of the operational missile force that, in the absence of countermcasuics. will successfully detonatethe target area.he product of Alert Rale and Weapon System reliability.

Weapon Systemof the alert missiles that will successfully detonate withinEPs of their targets This Is the product of launch, in-flight,arhead rcliahililics.




















I !

i ii;

i il





- IQQl





Single-stage bnllioik. itorfible liquid.



ang* (NREype ond propulsion .

vshicle weight (poaada)

Waibead -eight (pound*)*

Syilom CEP.

Missile CEP (nm)



Alert rate



Salvo Time (minutes)*



Time to Fir* '

Fwm normal readi-ies* From peak-Ee'C tin* (peak readlne**)

tnge belliiUc, 2nd stage iwraW* liquid.


PosaiblyvHibly.bout 0J. Submerged.


At thi procnt (Bio uf flight luting, theissile would probobly not reach IOCut weaponOC would depend upon tbe availabilityaunch

' Ba-td vn analogy with USiyatenrt. these warhead weight*ercent of ite saidpulot of the rangefiown for RVad an rounded. Tfci* spread reflect* our uncertainly aa to bo* mateoviet RV package ii devotedeat


CEP Include*l* error* andpotUlon-location error*.

only to tubmorino* on patrol.

' Tint from Uucch of tintuntil all mtulle* ar* launched.

' Tiast rteruirtd lo preeeed frojoadl*Joc lo laeact, aflar receipt of order to fir*.

m 33

o o






Patrol Charaetarlsiiei


Normal imaied

Clew Duration Number Typo Ace-May

IS* am



Palrul duration li defined as (he normal length of timeubmarine Bill remain at Ha without replenishment uader combat condlUoaa. It ii estimated on the baati el craw eadurues. general hobi; liability, and lenaamptloa ol food, spare parta, and otharIncluding fuel. Extended patrols will exceed toll length ol litre

laie ha* been noted to me an average apeed ol eight knot* while transiting straits, choke polcta and tbeKknol speed Ii expected lor the remainder of the tra&alL

<as is usuallyo shiftode ol propulsion and slow tonot* during tranilla ol restrictedetlscu*slon of the SS-NX-8.


m iO

co en

m jz*

3 to ^

cr> LP





m Bear/1


^yarhcad weight


Carrier aircraft/number of miesUe*.

o PS







Ikae'jl/Altituil* (feel)

:: -,


(nm) *

(peroeat) *

Target or ASM Laeneb




1 -


range and radius figure* given In tbii table are nuloiohey are applicable to tbe meat up to data mcccli ofircraft, -lying optimum eiuica profile*.

reliability rate* may be high,tba offect* of Soviet operational concept*roop training atar.derdi arc at leaat a* in>ru as terhnleal tharacEeriaUc* In drterir.hst.Uoa of tyttorr. reliability, and we bare do reliable basis for tall ma ling tbeaehe**

iea aroon the folio wing non-eornbat attrition0 percent of tba aircraft aealgned to bom* baa* would be in eomiala-*lun0 day atanddown prior to Initial operallone, and would beeomo airborne at launch4 percent of the alreiMl airborne would reach the bomb relcaie line directly from homo base or from elaglriR6 percent ofircraft which deploy from homeo ilaging basts will tuc cm (fully launch fromhe reliability rate* alio auum* additionalfur tbeae requiring itvfiight refueling to aecoraptiib theiraercent reliability t* applied lo aircraft equipped with probe and5 percentpplied tocp'eyiagto wing-tip refueling. Tbe low side of the range given aaiumea all aircraft are staged and refused la flight; tha blgb aide aarumr* no aircraft are itaged or refueled In flight.


Free-fall bombs ASM-carrier..

lujdo {foot)


Over Target/ Over ASM Launch


Oreaoiit (poundi)

Combat Catling (hit)


Payloadotnba or Mlu Ilea



(aaa)(Uc-efutled) High Altltuao Subsonic

radiui and range figure) are the maximum obtainable by cruising tubsonicalty with wing* fully ax tended at high altitude ell the way to the target. We have not computed the refueledi/range capabilitiesanker for theaa not been Identified. Oca similar in aiie to theould In create taslus/range or. the order ofercent.

peSElrat:rgaresj defended only by lubaenlc er trameoriie tighten, the free-fell boaibcr variant would aor* likely cnitittabaonlcally ul Mgb altitude (wlnga fully extended) andigh altitude aupersonia) dash (wingt awept). Into the target.



' Tbe air-to-tarfact aaiattle to be carried by theanettained for analvata.

ikely relation profile for the ASM-oarrier wouldigh altitude, aubtonic erulae (winga fully extended) lo withinSM launch pointigh hubioiyIo (Maeb OSS) low-oliitude approach (wingt twept) from there to the ASM launch(One ASM) Radiue/Rnngoera.

tO OO "A.



o o






bcW wo. db.emina.ed br ihe Control Agency. Thiso. ,heemd oW of .ho recipient ond of penon. not, hi.ood-so-knowissemination moy bo oo.hori.od by .he follow-mawehln mcir respective department

of fnleUigence ond Re.earch, for ihe Department ot State

Defense Intelligent Agency, for .ho Olffce of ihe Sectary of

Oeferoc ond Iho organliation of ihe Joint Chief, of Sloff

Chief of Sloff fo, Indigence,f .ho Army, for iho

Deportment of Ihe Army

d.Chief of Nerval Option,or the Deportment of .he Navy

Orel of Sloff,F, for iho Deportment of ihe Ak


of Iwolllgonee, AEC( for .he Atomic Energy Commbtion

Director, FN, for Iho Federalf In.-Mliga.ion

of NSA for Iho NeOionol Security Agency

of Cenirol Rcfo.ence Service. OA. fo,o, Depanmen. or

2 This documoM moy bo retained, or destroyed by bu.ning in accordancescantyr lo lhe Control In.eUigcnco Agencywith iho Central Reference Service, '

hen Ihituseminatedhe oversea, recipient, may, iteriod no. Inol onet the end ol this period, tho daemon! should .ilher bo destroyed, retu.ncd to Ihogency, or per-

OBBfley 10 "in

4 Ihe line of Ihii document when wd saporatoly from ihoihould beit.ed:


While) Hooso

National Security Council

Oepaitmont ol Stole

Department of Do-feme

Atomic toorgy Commbiion

Federal Bureau of Invotttgatlon

Original document.

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