v
HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN?
61
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Khrushchev on Vietnam
In Chapterf his rominisconces, Khrushchev argues that the Chinese have been and are likely to continueood deal more influence in Hanoi than do the Soviets and that this not only is inimical to Soviet interests, but is unhealthy for the Vietnamese Communist effort in Indochina. He accuses Peking of waffling in its support to the Viet Minn in the crucial days4 and of falling to cooperate with Moscow in trying to hammerommon approach to Indochina during0 World Communist Conference. At tho latter meeting,says that Ho Chi Hinh urged tho Soviets to yield on some points to the Chineseupture develop that would benefit no one, and least of all, Hanoi. Following the Moscow-Peking break, Khrushchev asserts, China began to load the Vietnamese Communists "aroundalter" and used its considerable infJncnce among the many "pro-Chinese" in thouimcse Party to sour Hanoi's relations with Mosccv. This hostility persisted, he laments, despite continued Soviot aid to tho Vietnamese. Khrushchev advances the proposition, albeit cautiously, that Hanoi in the wake of Ho's death is likely to be under Peking's sway even more and that Moscow's relations with the Vietnamese are likely to worsen further.
whatever tho merits and authenticity of the rest of Khrushchev's memoirs, wc think that hisin this chapter is particularly solf-serving and, in tho main, rests on an over simplified view of tho facts of life in Hanoi and on dubious inter-
CONrlDEIfriAL
pretations of some not-so-solid evidence. his lineuspiciously familiar ring to it; it is very much like the line that the Soviets long havo pushed with US interlocutors about how they and the Chinese get on with Hanoi. Presumably in these cases the Soviets are trying to persuade the US to "do something" to strengthen the Soviet hand in Hanoi, but Khrushchev's statements suggest that Moscow's sensitivity to real or imagined slights from Hanoi is genuine and deep-seated.
We doubt that pro-Chinese or pro-anything tendencies weigh overwhelmingly in Hanoi. What does count is the war and,oreign policyHanoi's perception of how Soviet or Chinese policies mesh with its own. It is true, for instance, that Hanoi edged closer to Peking and away from Moscow in thes, but mainly becausehimself turned his back on the North Vietnamese effort in the South, which was then greatly expanding and required outside assistance. The most telling example of this, of course, was his reaction to US retaliatory raids after the Gulf of Tonkin incident in All that Khrushchev provided was propaganda support, and it was rather mild at that. Mao, on the other hand, immediately sent the Northquadron of MlGs. It was only after Khrushchev was ousted that Moscow became involvedig way. Even when the Soviets were on the sidelines, however. North Vietnam washinese Communist lackey.
To support his contention that Moscow's relations with Hanoi are likely to sour oven more, Khrushchev cites, among other things. Ho Chi Minh's will and "the famous speech by Le Duan" (the latter could be either Duan's funeral oration or the long treatise published last February). He makes much of the Omission from Ho's will of any expression of gratitude for Soviet wartime aid to Hanoiassistance which he asserts has been indispensable to the Vietnamese wai effort and irreplaceable from any quarter including China. In fact, those documents provide no basis for
conclusions on how Hanoi might lean; indeed, neither even directly addrosses the issue- Ho's testament comes closest when itather explicit plea for an end to the Sino-Soviet rift; but it does soeutral way. It thanks no one by name for aid, only 'the fraternal countries of the socialist camp, and friendly countries in the whole world."
Khrushchev obviously was impressed byindeed most Westerners wore. Even Ho, however, was allegedly viewed with suspicion when he tried to follow what we wouldonpartisan policyis tho Soviets and the Chinese. Nonparti-sanship in Hanoi without Ho would naturally be the object of even greater suspicion. We think, in other words, that Khrushchev's perception of North Vietnam's attitude toward Moscow was warpedumber of subjective factors: the naturaloutlookan deeply embroiled in tho Sino-Soviet disputo; and perhaps also the distrust ono mightkrainian peasant to have for inscrutible Orientals, whether in Hanoi or in Peking. Even more to tho point, however, is the indication in his memoirs that Khrushchev could not, or would not, admit that Hanoi's antipathy toward his stewardship, was occasioned largoly by hiB own reluctance to give the North Vietnamese strong support.
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: