THE 24TH PARTY CONGRESS AND SALT

Created: 2/1/1971

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

Intelligence Memorandum

TH PARTY CONGRESS AND SALT

Seetefr

1 February1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of

MC K iMO SANDU M

h Party Congress and SALT

Summary

h Party Congress will convene only two weeks after the start of the Vienna round of SALT, but it is unlikely that the Congress will interfere with the Soviet-OS talks. Any decisions to beat the Congress will almost certainly have been made before SALT reconvenes onarch. economic issues that will be discussed at the Congress will bear on Moscow's position toward SALT, they will not force the Soviets into anychanges in their negotiating position. The chances are good that the Soviets plan tothe Vienna round with much the same position that they had elaborated by the end of the last Helsinki phase, as they probably would have even if no Party Congress were imminent.

The Party;Congress

"highest body" of the Sovietthe Party Congress, will conveneeeks after the start of the Vienna roundandostponement of one year. the Congress isally of theit isignificant platformnew policies and goals, modifyingand'programs, and occasionallyin the top party command. The Congressa Central Committee, which discusses andpolicies formulated in the Politburo, andAuditing Commission, which checks onof the party.

Central Committee is nominallythe election of the top party On two occasions, the vote of theCommittee was important, first into maintain his post as headnd later in sanctioning With these precedents in mind,embers of the Politburo must behis support in the Central Committee andchanges that take place in that body.

Issues Facingh Party Congress

are very serious andconfronting the leadership, and, evenissues do not surface at the Congress,certainly occupy the leaders for the next The Five-Year Plan will be uppermostminds;of Soviet policymakers, in approvingof the Plan to be presented to thethe leadership will have to establishfor the various sectors of the economy. them to direct their attention to theof resource allocation, modernization,and reform.

political speeches from lastSoviet elections providedewthe ultimate decisions on these difficult issues.

Although there appeared to be strong agreement on the need for increased investment in agriculture, the speeches were less precise on the priority to be given other sectors of the economy. Themembers seemed to be following Brezhnev's line that it would be "prenviture" to discuss "concrete figures and assignments." This suggests that major problems may still be unresolved and that no Soviet policymaker ia prepared to speak out until ahas been shaped. The backing and filling that has taken place regarding the date for conveni the Congress also points to the lackommon position. <

5. The leadership appears to be gropingew program to move the economy forward, but the approach isautious one. Althoughleaders recognize that the economy is in need of reform, they arc not prepared to sacrifice thecentral control over economic matters for the sake of economic progress. Like the problem ofof resources, the issue of economic reform la tied to personal careers. Even Premier Kosygin, who was partly responsible for the reform programppeared to be in retreat0 on this subject- The dearth of statements on reform is an example of the general policy impasse in the Soviet Union on important matters.

6. The recent speeches by key Soviet leaders have been similarly evasive on the solutions to those policy questions, which suggests that awithin the Politburo still exists. So long as this stalemate continues, major policy innovations are unlikely. Noverthuless, we would notknow if one element within the leadership were willing to .risk breaking the current deadlock and trying toifferent balance. Given the secrecy surrounding Soviet politics, the possibility of some such eruption cannot be excluded, though it is more likely thath Party Congress will be similar tod Congress heldell disciplined and almost routine affair. The more controversial issues probably will be avoided, or at least treated with careful neutrality.

any event, the individual membersPolitburo are sure to concentrate ontheir followers are represented on theto the fullest extent possible. Theremandatory retirement age for the Centralbut old age could certainly be aneason, to replace additional members. the membership could bring onto the Centrala different representation for theof the economy, as wellifferentin the support of the top leaders.

The- Corj^ro::s and SALT

level of defense spending is, ofsignificant factor in the eyes of the leadership

ih formulating economic decisions. The issues raised at the Congress, moreover, could boar on the pace of the SALT negotiations and induce the Soviets to revise their approach toward an agreement in the near term. If the Soviets were to decide, forto ease the strategic arras burden in order to redistribute investment funds and skilledthey might also decide to be more forthcoming in their discussion of limitations on strategicweapons than they have been in previous SALT rounds. An arms agreement of the type currently under discussion is not likely toignificant reduction in the level of military spending in the next year or two, but it could relax the need for further expansion of expenditures for strategic forces and might Lead to sizable reductions over the long term.

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the economic issues facingare not so grave or urgent that theyto impinge significantly on the Sovietin the next round of SALT. Indeed, theat this particular moment, appears inthan.in recent years to support Moscow'sposture. Over-all economic growth ina good recovery from the poor performanceand for thc first time in several years ainvestment activity has occurred. The Soviet

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economy could support even higher levels of arms spending than now prevail, and expenditures for advanced weapons and apacetor and dove lopnent--is growing faster than total defense outlays.

the Soviets have no strongto revise their course at the nexto< their tablingeparate ABMat Helsinki, moreover, the Soviets maytho US must take the initiative in Vienna.

The US did not categorically reject the Sovietat Helsinki, and there is evidence in the US press that pressures may be building up in favor of an ABM-only limitation. If the Soviets believe that there is reason to hope for some US "give" on the issue of forward-basedis to "take them intowould have an additional reason to pursue at the Vienna round the position they unveiled at Helsinki.

Party Congress may cause someto the SALT talks, however. Althoughthe Soviet delegatesembor of theDeputy Foreign Minister SemenovGeneral Ogarkov are candidate memberswill attend some or all of thethe Congress, which will last at least oneis also possible that some of theirbe among the several thousandho will attend the Congress.

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K-GRICr

Original document.

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