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SSO/71
CENTPAL IHTELLIG ENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence1
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
ANDREY KIRILENKO AND THE SOVIET POLITICAL SUCCESSION
Xndrey Kirilonko has many of the requisites to become the Soviet Union'sumberreplacing Leonid Breznnev in the post of Party General Secretary upon the latter's retirement, fall, or demise, should any of these occur. For one thing, as Brezhnev's senior cadres secretary, Kirilenko directly controls theof Party personnel to thr highest posts in the refine, and thus is better placed than his colleagues to build tho necessary political support for such an advance. more important ia the steady increase in his real power and authority in the top Party leadership over the past reveral years. With Brezhnev's support, h* appears to have gained an edge over the other senior secretary serving as the General Secretary's deputy, flikhiil Suslov Thcro nay well be, therefore, some formalization of Kirl-lenxo's de facto position as Brezhnev'sommand at thearty Congress; which is scheduled to convene
in late March.
Tho possibility cf Kirilenko's actually succeeding Brezhnev in the top Percy post sometime in the future dependsecisive degree, of course, on his hiving developed and maintained suiflcient support among the regime's leading oligarchs: the members of tiip Pirty Politburo who make all major policy decisions and. who will settle tho Issue ol the political succession. These leaders have tended since Khrushchev's ouster to fall roughly into three categories! 1) the "Ukrainianthose officials, not necessarily Ukrainian by nationality or birth, who served under Khrushchev in the Ukraine),
'?riaae prepared, the
of Inteilise>ieat ana
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the Directorate.
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which is generally aligned wiih Brezhnev inf 21 thef the
periodically to make trouble for itrezhnev, andeading example is trade union chief Aleksandr Shelepin; andhe two outstandingosygin andho* havo sufficient seniority and prestige to avoidactional conutcents in the Party's internal power*
Kirilenko's relations with the central figure
rora ilone
the Ukrainian group, Brezhnev, are fairiy noodew differences ol emphasis in their policy views Their apparent personal closeness is likely to have evolved from their long association in heavy-industrial supervision in the Parcy during their Ukrainian period and later, and is reinforced by the general similarity of their policy views- .Tha General Secretary seens to haveomfortable understanding with his cadresarty-organizational questions. Brezhnev has proceeded with relative freedom in removinglients fr< key positions but ha* left ir.ost other personnelirilenko nay conceivably have favoredoderatethan Brezhnev would have preferred for sone ofeposed supporters, but invent tie apparently has avoided offending Brezhnov through excessivu favoritism and personal patronage in hisilling of routine vacancies
The strength of Kirilenko's political ties with other individuals in the Ukrainian group is as varied as fieir bureaucratic positions and interests are nixed Sovietkolaycrong rival to Drezhnev but now without nucharty power base, seens close to Kirilenko in policy outlook. Ir. fact appears to have preserved many of his politicalwith him and the rest oi tho Ukrainianherefore, assuai.ig hin to be politically active when the succession is decided, Podgornyy probably would givehis vote of confidence, at loast over conpetitors from outsido the Ukrainian group,
Firstr'Deputy premier triy PolyansKiy, whose connections with the Ukrainian Party organization arc real but less obvious than those of Bro2hnov or Podgornyy. roue through the ranks roughly parallel with Kirilenko until
the- The emergence of Frol Kozlov at that tine as Khrushchev's hair-designate resultedemporary setback for Kirilenko (andut did not adversely affect Polyanskiy's lor Podgornyy si ca_-ecr Despite his apparent rolitical connections with Kozlov, Polyanskiy managed to hold his position when the Ukrainians regained the ascendancy3 Inherent in the Polyanskiy-Kin-lenko relationship, however, is tho potential forarising from tholr differing bureaucratic interests Indeed. Polyanskiy's vested interest in rapid agricultural development seems at times to have clashed withtrong commitmentol.cy of increased laborand efficiency and his apparent desire to channel some agricultural funds elsewhere
Ukrainian Party boss Petr Shelest, wVo rose under the ao?is of Podgornyy andistory of rivalry with some cf the Ukrainian associates of Brezhnev and rfirilenko coudd(ploy an important part in the political succession Shelest, in addition to controlling the Ukrainian Party organization^ may hove assumed leadership of the forces which TiKlgornyy onco marshaled on the national level Shelest may in fact be trying to undermine Brezhnev's influence in the Ukrainian group, and thisosition
Kirilenko apparently has tr.ed to keep open his lines to the regimes younger non-Ukrainian leaders despite their critical attitudes toward Brezhnev Shelepin. the leading "outsider" among Politburo members, and Kirilenko seen toor.*on approach to many policy problems, for example, they both have an evident distrust of detente with the West, and particularly with the united States Brezhnev's naneuvorings6 brought them into rivalry in the Secretariat, however, and the transfer of Shelnpm to the trade union post7 appeared eventually to separate him fron Kirilenko. who was drawn closer to Brezhnev But while Kirilenko has not visibly sought to hinderi.r. hiso downgradeupporters the weicht oi thesuggests that Brezhnev has not yet succeeded fully in disrupting the relationship between thu two
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First Deputy Premier Kirlll Mazurov is another "outsider" with whom Kirilenko could become alliede political sjccession The 'we men have worked togothor sincein the sphere of industrial management. Kirilenko on the Party side and Mazurov, in the government They appear to have similar views in this area, as well as in foreign policy Differences With Drezhnev and rivalry with Polyanskiy complicate Kazurov's own future, but so far they do not seem to have significantly worsened his
relations with Kirilenko
A thirdSFSR'Premier Gennadiy Voronov,ong history of rivalry with Kirilenko in terms of both power interests and policy views Severalr gains which Kirilenko made in consolidating his hold on the Party cadres apparatus in the RSFS't2 were at theofnfluence' in this sphere- in thepolitical spectrum Voronov ha3 the reputationmoderate" who apparently lavors concessions in economic policy that conflict withore orthodox approach in most economic areas
Premier Aleksey Kosygin one of the twoof tho Politburo whose place in the topcrucial to the succession issue nay haveirilenko Tho main riva' ry betweenand Council of Ministers centers onKosygin, andosition in thisto shift with the issues More importantly, onof domestic and foreicr. policy questionsKosygin appear to hold opposite viows, althoughapparently arrivedonsensus of'sorts inindustrial management and planning Brezhnev'sfavored sometimes Kosygin, sometimes Kirilenko, ,
The presence of the otherarts-Secretary Mikhail Suslov. seriously complicateschances in the succession -'Kith more thanears' continuoushe Secretariat. Suslov has enormous prestige and considerable power in sDite of his having specialized almost exclusively in ideology and foreign Communist relations. The limited evidence suggests that Suslov and Kirilenko are in fact
engagedtruggle for position and power,cessari2; being in opposition on matters of policy In makingl appointments, Kirilenko has *hown his hand in the provinces,arge number of technocrats have risen to the post c' Party boss, but Suslovoderating influence on Kirilenko'sadres ir. the centtal posts,ajority of appointees have been .Dparent compromises
Several ren t present lesser lights, at tha level of alternate member of the Politburo and member of tno Secretariat, could become important in the political succession Arvid Pel'she, chairman of the Party Contml Cc:Jiissionull member of the Politburo at ageppears destined for retirement soon; however, as long as he remains active he probably would side with Suslov (his patron and reported brothcr-in-lawi rather fan Kirilenko Among the Politburo alternate members possible Kirilenko supporters in a crisis include Party Secretary Dmitriy Ustinov uasi-"independent" who oversees all Soviet defense-delated industry; and KGB Chairman Yuriy Andropov, wliose past political connections with Suslov and others have not prevented rhe development of ties to Kirilenko Larger question marks among tha other potentially important figures in the succession picture are Party secretaries Ivan Kapitonov ind Potr Demichev ponsible for supervising respectively the cadres sector and the propaganda machine Kapitonov has worked for Kirilenko in the cadres apparatus$ tut haa not clearly revealed his political aympatnies Demichev seems most closely allied with sheiepia and apparently has had little contact with Kinlenfco
On the basis of the foregoing. Kirilenko swithin the leadership can be summarized as generally quite strong when compared with that of his closest His firmest support comes from the Ukrainian group but he apparently has seme political contact with the youngernd could well enter into an alliance with them in tha succession There arc however, any number of imponde-ables affectinghances to become the "number one" pan in the Party, the first being Brezhnevs healtholitical and otherwise The most likely prospect is for DrcThnev'sandate ath Party Congress
to continuo as Tarty boss forear term Kirilenko's bost opportunity (or taking command himself would soem to be the General Secretary's physical incapacitation or early doath. econd important consider* tion is Kirilenko s Brezhnev actually isfew nonths younger than Kirilenko (th-ugh apparently less healthyi Should Brezhnev seem likely to remain Goncrai Secretarvew more ycnrs, Kirilenko could decide to bid instead for the prcmicrsmp with the support of the Party boss
What kind of successor might Kirilenko be? His policy views may be summarized as nco-Stalinist for the most part Ilir. foreign policy views reveal the nindairly orthodox Harxist-Lctunist who is highly suspicious of the West Kirilenko has thus far had relatively few dealings with Western statesmen, in contrast with Brezhnev for example, who had some such contacts under Khrushchevhree-year term as Soviet President. autious lip serviceolicy of detente is infreauent and carries tough conditions which appear almost to rule out its application to the US and ho has been in thoof those leaders who champion the "Brezhnev Doctrine" of limited sovereignty and of dofense of 'socialist gams In his public statements Kirilenko has come as close as any other top Soviet leader co explicit advocacvorward policy Ho has termed the rendering of Soviet aid to the viecnamose and Arabs not only a "revolutionary duty' butcjuirenent of soviet security He aUo has been very critical incidentally, of the Corvnunist Chinese leadership and has defended the Soviet policv of attacking Peking's political and ideological oositions and buildingsecure defense' against any {ehac is. Chinese) encroachments; ho has however, remained within the general framewsrJipzhnev's policy of not shuttina the door on hopeeconciliation with China in the long run
Tho militancy Kirilenko reveals in foreign policy statements has itsomestic policies in the cultural and social spheres Althouoh he ao-parently has accepted the rationale behind increased consumer-goods production in recent years Kirilenko has argued against immediate aid to agriculture andhe allocation of resources Ho long has favored the use
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of exhortation and persuasion over tho application of rsatanal incentives co production; in addition, he har. failed to endorse the najor wane gains of recentich JJrerhnev, tor one, has defended
Kirilenko has revealed something of an undogiratic, technocratic bias, f'^^vcr. in nis views on economc management His speeches on this thone ovor tho years have consistently prorotod pragratic solutions to the 'ong-standing managerial probicrs of the Soviet econory Significantly the itor him rare mention ot Stalin duritvg theKhrushchev of course, had numerous public supporters ol xis de-Stalinization canpaign thenas in the context of criticisn of the dictator'she stereotypes and rigid policies which,to Kirilenko. prevented honest appraisals of tho economy and hampered science and technology In line with his ecororjc pragmatism. Kirilenko has boon one of the few Soviet loaders to associate hir.solf publicly with the creationusiness raanager-ent school alone 'bourgeois lines
As in the case with Soviet leaders inI. little 1ft known aboutoal views onnd strategic questions- elthougn something of hiscan be inferred frcn the domestic and foreign policy positions oesTribcd above Mis enly oufclic stattnont an SALT co datetrictly oro torn* assertion in0 that the talks can produce results "if the Cm ted States nakes an honest acteriot to solve zhs problec at hand and not try to achieve one-sided gains * This cautious remark is consistent with Kirilenko's generally cyncal attitude toward the CS which has been to the effort that the CS government is two* faced in wanting good relations withSoviet Union whila waging war against another socialist country" iJftrth Vietnam ws no doubt underlieepeatedly expressed opinion pn the need to increase Soviet defenseities indangerous* mternat onal situation
It would appear that in most of these questions Kirilenko's hard*nosad views are fairly close to Bt'ozhnev s
conservative position and indeed probably havotronger impact than those of =ost othor Politburo nen-bero ori the thinking ol the basically cautious General Secretary in relation to tho otherilitancy toward the US and the rest of the ^imperialistic* west is not quite as student as that of Suslov or fholepin- but it appears in sharp rdliet against Prenier Kosygin's more moderate position If thcr^foro. Suslov and Kosygin fairly represent the ends of the spectrum on the question of Soviet-L'S relations, with Brerhnev somewhere near tho mcdie. then Kirilenko evidently would fall close to Brezhnev, but onide.
Against this background Kirilenko would appear to be little more imaginative in the post of General Secretaryrezhnev has been Kirilenko in the post of Preoier probably would be perceptibl/ less open to lorcign-policy negotiation than Kosygin has seamed to be In either the Party or the government post Kirilenko night be inclined to sanction soracwhat gretter risks than the post-Khrushchev leadership has taken especially in its dealings with the US in international probleri areas, and to endorse an even more repressive policy at home It is. ol course* possible that the greater responsibi litiosigher office and increased contact with Western representatives night induceo moderate sonewnat his present views One factor arguing against any very serious such modification in Kirilenko's views however, is his apparent disincline -tion to yield to opportunistic considerations, as reflected in his unusually consistent position on policy issues over the years
A lii:ely general featureirilenko regime: therefore, would doubtless be its continuation andof the nai^ policies of the present leadership Kirilenko *ould probably be not at all inclined to slow the momentum of the present trend away from the relative laxity of the Khrcahchev years but on the contrary would be likely to press Iven harder than he has pushed until now to tightenc and social discipline The task of counteringtrong trend could be undertaker- only by someone 'less closely identified with the post-Khrushchev
Original document.
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