Created: 6/1/1971

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Intelligence Report


Annex To CAESAR XXXIX (Andrey Kirilenko and tbe Soviet Political Succession)

(Reference Title: CAESAR XL)


Copy NO 16




This Annex to CAESAR XXXIXraces the riseough apparatchik, Andrey Kirilenko,op position within the Soviet system. Although the Annex is published especially for those interested in the Soviet leadership question in some depth, the general reader will find profit in the patternsof leadership style, policy, and protegeswhich continue to produce more Stalins than Khrushchevs.

The analysis and judgments of this Annex are consistent with those of CAESAR XXXIX, and havemet general agreement among Soviet specialists within the Central Intelligence Agency. Comments on this Annex are welcome, I







the Ropes: In the Ukraine

the Fray: The Sverdlovsk Years


Khrushchev's Service: The RSFSR Bureau


C In Brezhnev's Service: The RSFSR Bureau



Power with Brezhnev's0

"Second in Command". 56

the Five-Year

h Party. 79



the case of CAESAR XXXIX (Andrey viet Politicalhere I

s very

leaders and groups of leaders, and occasional

illuminate certain important

Soviet leadership.

t power, policy, and life-style within the top



The attitudes, prejudices, and working style of senior Politburo and Secretariat member Andrey Kirilenko are fairly representative of the neo-Staliniso that has come to mark the Soviet leadership system sinceouster. This has its deepest roots in the ground of terror prepared by Stalin in the, when he sought to consolidate his dictatorship through the methodical elimination of real or imagined opponents. Those purges took an especially heavy toll among the Party elite, and :r. thekraine the sweep vas

almost all of the leading

vmuinia -serving -Aine7 had been replaced, by the endy previously obscure persons. This was the "new generation" of loyal Coniminists, many of them previously technicians rather than politicians, whom Stalin and his lieutenants recruited to fill the many vacuums they were creating in the Party's elite corps.

In8 Khrushchev arrived in the Ukraine as Stalin's viceroy to wind up the purge and to oversee the Party recruitment campaign. His political experience set him off sharply against the neo-Stallnist initiates whom he recruited that year. Khrushchev had joined the Communist Partynd although not technically an Old Bolshevik, he had much in common with the older generation of Party leaders who were directly associated with the October Revolution. He had observed and to some extent participated in the early Leninist regime, with its degree of tolerance for dissident political views and factions and its unifying spirit of enthusiasm for the Communist cause. Khrushchev was also familiar with

its more conspiratorial aspects, which were to loom especiallyecade later as Stalin tightened his grip on the Party.

By contrast, the new elite which Khrushchev formed in the Ukraine8 comprised young Communists who, variously, were sincere in their devotion to Stalin, or intimidated by his terror, or at least aware of how to survive in the system. In any case, they appliedto advancing the Stalinist cause, Stalin's name having become synomynous with the ideal of world communism. Because of this awesome baptism into the Party's service, and of their relative inexperience of the greaterdiversity Khrushchev and others had known in, this "new generation" of leaders acquired many of the political characteristics of Stalin and, in fact, became neo-Stalinists.

This distinction between Khrushchev and his younger Ukrainian hirelings was to set the stage for conflict in the post-Stalin period, after Khrushchev as the new Party boss had brought many of these leaders to Moscow forsupport. Although they aided him in his fight agaihst ultraconservatives, especially in, these neo-Stalinistsajor force in the coalition of leaders who dumped Khrushchevpposing him in large part for his unorthodox, (that is, un-Stalinist) ideas and methods. There is some evidence to suggest that not all of them had endorsed Khrushchev's use of de-Stalinization for his own political purposes, and some of them may even have been surprised and dismayed when he launched the famous attack on Stalin in the "Secret Speech" ath Party Congress In any event, most of them deplored the erosion of political and social discipline under Khrushchev, and many probably hoped for and workedevival of more orthodox Soviet rule.

In short, the neo-Stalinists of todayand they include such men as Brezhnev, Podgornyy, Shelest, and Kirilenko, all of whom got their start in the Ukraine


during the last years of the great purges, as well as the slightly more "old-line" Stalinist Suslovtendroup toward authoritarian methods of rule. In political and social spheres they promote orthodoxy and conformity, allowing little or no room for experiment and dissent. For neo-stalinists discipline is the watchword, and liberalizing ideas are anathema. In economic affairs they generally favor strict centralization of management for purposes of control,ertain pragmatism often is visible in attempts to achieve more with limited means. They call themselves Leninists, but they aretotally committed to Stalinist methods, except for the general and outright use of terror as an instrument of rulend the abandonment of terror apparently has been replaced in recent years by an increasing reliance on the labor-camp system, which had been greatly reduced under Khrushchev.

Kirilenko's careerood subject for inquiry into the nao-Stalinism of the present Soviet leadership, in that it illuminates fairly typical salientof the generation of Party leaders who have become the Kremlin policymakers of today. His formative years in Stalin's political machine were marked, especially during the purge period of, by an atmosphere of conspiracy in which political protectioninimum requisite for survival and advance. His ups and downs during the Khrushchev years, when he aligned himself with the "Ukrainianeasure of thewhich waxed within the Party at that time and which continues,esser degree, to impair the smoothof the regime. And, Kirilenko's career ofin the Ukraine, of national prominence in the Russian Federation (PSFSRJ, and finally at the pinnacle of Party service in the central Secretariat demonstrates the unique closeness of hia assocation during all these years with the present regime's leading neo-Stalinlst, General Secretary Brezhnev.

Kirilenko's activities also give glimpses into how decisions are made within the framework of the


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oligarchic leadership in the Brezhnev era, his success in pursuit of political powerauge of the extent of neo-Stalinist influence on present policies. In addition, Kirilenko's entire careerhisas an apparatchik, his performance as aand technocratic administrator, and his emergence as Brezhnev's possible successorreveals the style, personality, and political outlookan who is nowrimary role in shaping the Soviet course and the Soviet leadership of the future.



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When ho arrived at his first professional Party post in Khrushchev'8 Ukraineirilenko hadhim relatively scant experience in political work. In fact, hia history as revealed in official thoughSoviet biographies suggests thatouth he was anything but political in outlook. arge factor in his enrollment into the ranks of Party administrators probably was his technical ability, combined with his availability at the right tinethe end of the great purge of the Party elite.

Kirilenko's official biographic data include the facts of his birth6 in the family of an artisanillage of present-day Voronezh Oblast. (Earlier it was territorially part of Belgorod Oblast, which borders on the eastern Ukraine.) Thus was heussian, despite his Ukrainian sounding narao anddescant from Ukrainian stock, and his biographies list his nationality as Russian. After completing aschoolour-year period of workachinist and electrician, part of the time in Voronezh enterprises, and partine in the Donbass. He could conceivably have come in contact with Khrushchev in the Donbass, in that the lattor had been active there several years priororking first in the mines and then in the Donetsk Party apparatus.

Kirilenko appears to have decided or been encouraged9 to enter political work and to prepare for higher education. He served the next two years in variousand government organizations whilo studying in his spare time. On completing his preparatory coursese enrolled in the Rybinsk Aviation Institute in Yaroslavl' Oblast (in the RSFSR). His student years were, by all



-top nururx

appearances, distinguished only by his joining theParty at the age ofe graduated only* Kirilenko then moved to the Ukraine to take up the profession of design engineeraporozh'ye aircraft plant. He held this job for two yearsthe worst period of the Stalinist terror and purgesuntil Khrushchev's arrival to rebuild the Ukrainian Party

A. Learning the Ropes: Tn tho Ukraine

year old Kirilenko began his professional Party service8 as the second secretaryayon (district) committee in Zaporozh'ye oblast. He advanced rapidly,9ecretary and then second secretary of the Zaporozh'ye Oblast Party Committee. How much of Kirilenko's promotion was due to Khrushchev's direct influence is unknown; assisting the Ukrainian Party boss in cadres and organizational matters then. Burmistenko, who reportedly had worked in the secret police innd later had been closely associated with Stalin's personal secretariat.** In any event,continued1 to serve as second secretary, presumably overseeing organizational and personnel matters

* Coincidentally, another future leader was graduating6 in Rybinsk, although from the Water Transport Technical School: Xuriy Andropov, presently KGB ohief. It is not known if the two young engineers were aoquainted at that time. Andropov went into Komsomol work in Yaroslavl' Oblast after graduation, and his path is not knoun to have crossed Kirilenko's again until much later.

'* Robert Conquest, The Great error.


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in the predominantly heavy-industrial and metallurgical area of Zaporozh'ye, while Stalin and the Kremlin planners began to accelerate their preparationsossible conflict with Hitler's Germany.

Kirilenko had meanwhile the opportunity to make contactumber of Party officials who would later assume powerful positions in the regime, especially after Stalin's death. Some of these leaders appear to have been instrumental in assisting Kirilenko's advance. The

most important of these wasyoung engineer named Leonid Brezhnev, who had been promoted8 from agovernment post to theof secretary of theDnepropetrovsk Oblast Party Committee. In view of the geographic and economicof Zaporozh'ye andit would not have been

for Kirilenko and Brezhnev to have had some contact at that time. Both of them, in turn, presumably had some politicalwith Aleksey Kirichenko, who served as chief of the Ukrainian Central Committee's Transportation Department

Torm :

nd who became Khrushchev's Ukrainian Party Secretary for industry before the German attack on the Soviet Union Kirichenko was to play an even nore important role after the war and after Stalin's death in both Ukrainian and national Party affairs. In fact, his influence may have been as great as Khrushchev's or Brezhnev's was in promoting Kirilenko in.

At the start of the warany of theUkrainian Party cadres entered military service as political commissars. Khrushchev and Kirichenko functioned as such on the Southwestern Front, for example. Kirilenkoember of the military council ofh Army of tho Southern Front. Brezhnev, too, was with the Southern Front at that tine, as deputy chief of the Political In fact, Brezhnev also served, presumably simultaneously, as chief ofh Army Politicaland an article which Kirilenko authored in6 suggested that he and Brezhnev had worked in the same area at the front during this period. However,soon left the military serviceprobably in April



plant as

usi^jwepresentative of the Soviet Defense Committee. He returned, reportedlyo his former Ukrainian post of second secretary for Zaporozh'ye oblast.

Kirilenko's postwar career was marked by unspectacular but regular advances, behind whichumber of Ukrainian Party leaders. The central figure, of course, was Khrushchev, who had returned to the Ukraineor three years, untilhrushchev ruled the Ukrainesingle-handedly. During this immediate postwar period


"for oixiulx

Khrushchev combined the posts of Ukrainian first secretary, Ukrainian Premier, and Party boss of both the city and the oblast committees of Kiev. He was indefatigably active, and all important personnel actions during this period had to have his approval. His decisive influence in shaping the Ukrainian cadres corps in the postwar period ofwas manifested later in the support hisassociates, including Kirilenko, gave him in hisstruggles against such formidable rivals as Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, and Kozlov.

Several circumstances suggest, nevertheless, that Brezhnev and others in Khrushchev's Ukrainian cohortore direct interest and involvement in promotingto higher posts than had the Party boss himself. For example, Brezhnev's first assignment on returning to the Ukraine from his political work in the military in6 was to the post of Party boss in Zaporozh'ye, replacing the first secretary for whom Kirilenko had worked3 and even before the war. Brezhnev'sas Party boss over the head of Kirilenko does not argue strongly that Khrushchev had yet acquired an interest in furthering the career of the second secretary. How-evor, Brezhnev and Kirilenko did not work together very long, for the letter's fortunes soon improved: he was promoted in7 to the post of Party boss in Nikolayevlack Sea port and machine-building area. It seems plausible, especially in view of Brezhnev's probable prewar and wartime association with Kirilenko, that this sudden change in Kirilenko's fortunes was in large part duerezhnev recommendation.*

4The promotion was, however,mail chapter in the story of high-level maneuvering for control over cadres in the Ukraine, Beloruseia, and Moldavia. In6 Georgiy Malenkov, by then one of the moet powerful Kremlinpparently hadetback at the hands of hie rivals in the center and lost direct control over

(footnote continued on


In Dnepropetrovsk

Brezhnev's involvement appeared likely again in the transfer of Kirilenko in0 to the moreposition of Dnepropetrovsk Party boss. Brezhnev had held the post from7 untilhen he followed Khrushchev from the Ukraine toespite their physical absence from the Ukraine, both Khrushchev and Brezhnev undoubtedly continued to exert

(footnote continued from

the eadree eeotor. As one consequence, the handling of cadree affaire in the Ukraine was criticisedentral Committee decree and, more importantly, Alekeey Yepishev was released from political work in the armed forces in July to become Khrushchev's "oadres secretary." Theof Yepishev, who had served Khrushchev before the war as Khar'kov Party boss, undercut the growing power of Second Secretary Dem'yan Korotahenko,aganovich client who had succeeded in getting direct control over personnel assignments in Julyith the exile of the then oadres secretary, Kiriahenko, to the post of first secretary of Odessa Oblast. Yepishev continued to serve as cadree secretaryhen he wenteriod of political decline. Bowever,nder the aegis of first Khrushchev and then Brezhnev, Yepishev has held the important position of chief of the MainAdministration of the Soviet Army and Navy, which oarries political rank and power equivalent to thatentral Committee department ohief.

* Khrushchev went to Moscow in9 to join the central Secretariat. Brezhnev left Dnepropetrovsk the following April to work in the Central Committee and then, in July, was installed as Moldavian Party first secretary.

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their influence in the Ukraine. In particular, Brezhnev probably would haveecisive say in the matter of selecting Kirilenko as his successor. Of course,transfer would have had at least the formal approval of the new Ukrainian first and second secretaries, Leonid Mel'nikov and Aleksey Kirichenko.*

Kirilenko's Dnepropetrovsk assignment was to last fivealf years, until the end Hegained further valuable experience free administering the large Party organization in this important industrial area, but he did not appear to be involved much in the political battles that were being fought in the last years of Stalin's reign. He was not elected to the Centralor Central Auditing Commission ath Party

'Mel'nikov had been -installed in the Ukrainianduringonth stint ae Party boss7hat is, when Khrushchev had been temporarily removed from all poets but that of Ukrainian premier, when Khrushahev regained the post of Party firstin the Ukraine, his former second secretary and rival Xorotohenko became premier, and Mel'nikov became second secretary. It is unclear whether Khrushchevarranged these transfers or the subsequent elevation of Mel'nikov to first secretary; he may more plausibly have proposed or sanctioned Kiriahenko'e return from his Odessa exile to replace Mel'nikov as second secretary. Mel'nikov was to be removed ae Ukrainian Party boee eoon after Stalin's deathnd the evidence suggests that Khrushchev sacrificed him in collusion with Beriya in order to inetall Kirichenko in his place. Mel'nikov reappearediplomatic post after Beriya's removal but neverosition of power. $ he has been chairman of the State Committee for Supervision of Industrial and Mining Safety, presumably enjoying the patronage of Brezhnev and Kirilenko in this einsoure. Korotohenko was relegated in4 to the honorific but relatively powerless post of Ukrainiann which he remained until his death

Congress inespite the fact that Khrushchevajor role at the congress in organizational matters and Brezhnev was elected to the central Secretariat and made an alternate member of the enlarged Partyas the Politburo was called then and* In fact, the periodas one of apparentfor most "oldor" Ukrainian Party officials as the turnover of personnel increased in the republic. The change in membership of the Ukrainian Central Committee between republic Party congresses in9 and2asualty rate ofercent among leading cadres. Kirilenko was one of those older leaders whose political connections (and, perhaps,talents) held them in good stead.

The death of Stalin and the consolidation ofposition3 brought increased politicalin the Ukraine as elsewhere, but Kirilenko did notareer break for more than two years. Meanwhile, he had an opportunity to strengthen political ties that would prove useful in the future. His fast-risingKirichenko moved up from Ukrainian secondto replace the demoted Mel'nikov as Ukrainian Party boss soon after Khrushchev took over the Party. Nikolay Podgornyy, who had served three years as Khar'kov Party first secretary and was therefore one of Kirilenko's peers

he other hand, the Dnepropetrovsk poet apparently did noteat on either the Central Committee or the Central Auding Commission at that time. Vladimir Shcherbitskiy, the oblast first secretary after Kirilenko, wasember of the Central Auditing Commission at the next congressut Kirilenko's advance had already made him eligible for full membership in the Central Committee.



in the Ukrainian hierarchy, became second secretary in Kirichenko's vacated place in*

Within Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, where he hadBrezhnev's political base, Kirilenko developed additional contacts which probably did not significantly contribute to his subsequent advance but which may now,edound to his political advantage. Theseabove all, Vladimir Shcherbi.fcskiy and Aleksey vat-chenko. Shcherbitskiy made regular advances in his career after Kirilenko's arrival from hisof second secretary of Dneprodzerzhinsk City, he rose in2 to city first secretary and moved up in4 to become second secretary to Kirilenko in the oblast Party committee. Kirilenko may havewith the top Ukrainian*leadershipthe first and second secretaries were still Kirichenko and Podgornyyin the latter promotion, as well as in the selection of shcherbitskiy to become Dnepropetrovsk Party boss when Kirilenko left the Ukraine Shcherbitskiy subsequently rose to the position of Ukrainian Premier and CPSU Presidium alternate member. Vatchenko also rose from the ranks in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast duringand Shcherbitskiy's reign: 4 he advanced

'Khrushchev and Kirichenko may have preferred Podgornyy over Kirilenko and other poeeible contendere for the"second in command" because of hie more extensive Podgornyy had the advantage of havings the Ukrainian "permanent representative" in Moscow, in effect as Khrushchev's liaison with the regime's central apparatus. Another possible factor in Podgornyy'e selection was his earlier background in the food industry, which coincided with Khrushchev's special interest in agriculture and complemented Kirichenko's industrial experience. Nevertheless, it seems difficult to escape the conclusion that Khrushchev preferred more actively political types than Kirilenko appeared to be.

from the post of chief of en unidentified department to secretary of the oblast Party committee, probablywith Shcherbitskiy'* arrival as second vatchenko, who has been Dnepropetrovsk Party boss sincectually appears more closely associated with Shcherbitskiy than with Kirilenko, to judge by the circumstances of their later careers, but Kirilenkocan count on Vatchenko's support.*

The rather extended length of Kirilenko's tour in Dnepropetrovsk probably was connected with Brezhnev's temporary setback immediately after Stalin's death. In one of several high-level changes, Khrushchev's political opponents forced Brezhnev to leave his high Party posts in the Secretariat and Presidium and to serveommissar" in the armed forces. As Khrushchev made gains, however, so Brezhnev advanced again to higher posts in the Party, becoming Kazakh second secretary in Soon thereafter he moved up to the post of Kazakh

wn second. Chebrikov, for example, transferred to Moscow?igh post in the secret police: he was identified in9 as KGB deputy chairman. The little that is known of Chebrikoo's career suggests that he is also closelywith Shcherbitskiy.

"At the sameumber of important changesboth in the central apparatus and in thencluding in Kirilenko's Dnepropetrovsk secretariat. the most important of the changes in the centralwas the reorganisation of the Department of Party, Trade Union, and Komsomol Organsepartment of Party Organs,ranch for the RSFSR under theof Viktor Churayev. This washrushchev move to break up the dynasty which Malenkov had built over the years andoreshadowing of the creation of the Bureau for the RSFSR two years later. Churayev had

(footnote continued on

Party boss. By5 Brezhnev had recouped hisstrength and was preparing to reenter theSecretariat and Party Presidium ath

In view oi this, it appears probable that Brezhnev

was largely responsible for the5 transfer of Kirilenko from the Ukraine to the position of Sverdlovsk Party boss, which resulted not only in his election two months later ath congress to full membership in the Central Committee, but also in his becoming exharter member*of the newly formed Central Committee Bureau for the RSFSR.

U. Joining the Fray; The Sverdlovsk Years

Kirilenko's assignment to the Sverdlovsk post wasurely political move but followed logically upon his previous experience in heavy-industrial areas. The location of Sverdlovsk in the heart of the strategically important Urals industrial complex required someone like Kirilenko whose technical competence had been demonstrated. Several circumstances, however, in addition to theofh Party Congress, indicated that thewas far from routine. First, the plenum of theParty organization which installed Kirilenko as its chief was held in the presenceop Kremlin leader: Averkiy Aristov, whoew months earlier, after a

(footnote continued from page

served in the Xhar'kov Party organization both before and after the war^4 through most0 ae oblast first secretary. Subsequently Churayev worked in the central cadres apparatus and presumably was instrumental in assisting Khrushchev's rise to power.


two-year period of political eclipse, had returned to the central Secretariat to oversee the cadres sector for Khrushchev. Second, the press account of the plenumthat the former Party first. Kutyrev, and the incumbent executive committee. Nikolayev, were "sharply" criticized for leadership failings. Againstackground, the arrivalkrainian official to head the oblast Party organization probably fostered resentment and rivalry within it.*

The apparent political motive in Kirilenko'sto Sverdlovsk at this particular time was reinforced with the formation of the Bureau for the RSFSRthe mini-secretariat which Khrushchev created ath Party Congress to improve his control over the Central Committee apparatus. Bureau members included, into representatives of the RSFSR apparatus, the Party first secretaries of Moscow, Leningrad, Gor'kiy, and Sverdlovsk oblastsll under the supervision ofand one other member of the Central Secretariat. Thus Kirilenko was drawn more closely into the service of Khrushchev on the eve of the gathering storm of ultra-conservative opposition to the Party boss.

When the moment of truth arrived, Kirilenkodecided that his own political future was tied to

S, nikolayev had thai red the executive oommittee8 and thue had been into aaoede to the top Party post. He didattain this position, but only after Kirilenko left That no love had been lost between the two leaders was suggested inime of intense political struggle between Khrushchev and Kozlov which involved, among other things, several indications of an attempt to undermine Kirilenko's positionhen nikolayev published an article in Pravda whichwipe at the handling of construction affairs in Sverdlovsk during Kirilenko's tenure as Party boss.

T If ill


Khrushchev's fate, and so he took the offensive inthe Party'boss against the coalition that had format to oust him.

at th*

/ uentrai fjomrairxee plenum wnicn Mirusnchev had insisted his Presidium opponents convene to resolve the leadership issue, Kirilenko took the floor at the outset to demand that the Central Committee reject Molotov's requestiscussion of wavering among the Bloc countries. As Kirilenko undoubtedly understood, the request wasactical device used to approach the real issue of Khrushchev's continuing in power, with Molotov and others intent on attacking Khrushchev for the ill effects of his de-Stalinization policies. Kirilenko countered with the suggestion that the plenum discuss instead the wavering within the ranks of the Soviet Party. esult, Khrushchev got the green light to proceed with the attack against his oppositionharge of "anti-Party" activity. Clearly Khrushchev and Kirilenko had plannedactic in advance, and the risk that the ploy might fail was perhaps not very great.* Nevertheless, Kirilenko was repaid for his help by being made an alternate member of the Party Presidium at the plenum, even though his Sverdlovsk post did not rateigh rank.

Kirilenko clearly was on his way up with thisfor the sake of which he gave up membership on the RSFSR Bureau. It seems likely that he was being groomed for eventual membership on the central Secretariat or for deputy chairmanship of the RSFSR Bureau. Meanwhile, Kirilenko continued to devote most of his attention to his Sverdlovsk duties. After8 these included his membership on the military council of the Ural district

"The mililary, behind Marshal Zhukov, ensured thai Khrushchev's supporters were flown to Moscow so ae to outnumber his opponents in the quorum of the Central Committee which met in the plenary session.

(okrug)entral Committee decision assignedole to the Party bosses in all the centers of theokrugsut there is little evidence that this function was much more than nominal.

, however, for reasons which remain obscure, the fortunes of the "Ukrainian clique"urn for the worse, and Kirilenko's position sufferedesult. Frol Kozlov, the Leningrad-based first deputy premier, suddenly arose as Khrushchev's heir-designate. The ascendacy of Kozlov,ew-generationas facilitated by the departure of most of the old-linelike Molotov; it marked the beginningew stage ofstruggle, pitting neo-Stalinists against each other. Aleksey Kirichenko, who since7 hadember of the central Secretariat andheir apparent, wasin0 to Rostov Party first secretary (and several months later was to lose even that remnant of his power). In May that year, Kozlov joined the Secretariat and gave up his first deputy premier position to another Leningrader, Aleksey Kosygin. With Kozlov's arrival in theumber of Khrushchev's allies were forced to depart: Brezhnev was kicked upstairs to the largely honorific post of Sovietnd Aristov was compelled to give up his secretarial position, otsensibly to concentrate on his duties as deputy chairman of the RSFSR Bureau.

Although Kirilenko continued to perform routine functions there were signs that Kozlov's drive for increased power began to affect Kirilenko's


position Kozlov's attention may have beenwhen the Sverdlovsk first secretaryarge official delegation to Warsaw in latepparently on an industrial mission.* In any case,showed signs of slipping after Kozlov increased his influence in the RSFSR Bureau in1 with the transfer of Aristov to the ambassadorial post in Warsaw and the appointment of Gennadiy voronov as the bureau's deputy chairman. For example, the delegation to Hungary which Kirilenko headed in April was small and included no one of significance. In June,ew months beforearty Congress, Kirilenko was forced to publish in Pravda an admission of economic shortcomings in Finally, at the congress in October, Kirilenko was dropped as an alternate member of the Presidium and reverted to histatusere member of the RSFSR Bureau.

. Rudakov, chief of the Central Committeeof Heavy Industryember of Khrushchev's "Ukrainian as the leading functionary Kirilenko.

Kirilenko's public prominence dropped sharply after that congress, reflecting his political downgrading. After appearingverdlovsk Party meeting in early November to discuss the outcome ofongress,disappeared generally from public view. His name, together with that- of Sverdlovsk executive committeeNikolayev, appearedro forma "letter" toin Pravda which announced fulfillment of the oblast's annual plan at the year's end, but he failed to appear in any meaningful political activity. This changereflected the great influence which allies of Kozlov had gained in the RSFSR Bureau. The bureau's two deputy chairmen at the close ofongress were the holdover Voronov and the newcomer Petr Lomakothe latter an

l1 JLMilllo:

industralist associated with the Leningraders Kosygin and Kozlov.' The degree to which the new leadership situation in the RSFSR Bureau undermined Kirilenko's position was illustrated in mid-December, when he conspicuously failed to appear at two conferences held in Sverdlovskthe first on agriculture which Voronov and the thon RSFSR Premier Dmitriy Polyanskiy conducted, and the second on economic management at which Lomako presided. It appeared at that stage to bo merely a

matter of time before Kirilenko's complete political demise.

C. In Khrushchev's Service: The RSFSR

Kirilenko dramatically regained and added to his former political power infter almost six months of obscurity. The circumstances surrounding his sudden recovery were extraordinary and suggested hanky-panky: he returned to the Party Presidium, not as before with the rank of alternate member but nowull memberote on policy matters, and his installationnotegularly scheduled Central Committee plenum but "in the back room." Kirilenko's co-optation

'Lomako had been identified ao deputy chairman on the eve of the congress. Be probabiy already had been chosen to replace Viktorember of the "Ukrainian clique" who had been appointed deputy chairman just two weeks after Voronov'6 replacement of Arietoo in Kozlov's victory over the Ukrainians at thewas registered in the demotion of Churayev to bureau member, the retention of Lomako as deputy chairman for industrial affairs, and the promotion of Voronov from alternate to full member of the Presidium and to the newly created position of bureau first deputy chairman, together with Kirilenko's downgrading from Presidium alternate membership to Churayev's level of bureau member.


into the Party Presidium was revealedpril session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. ommunique announcingentral Committee plenum had been held "during the first session" of the Supreme Soviet and had confirmed Kirilenko's co-optation was notpril. This plenum apparently had had no other business than the elevation of Kirilenko and theof Kozlov's protege Spiridonov, discussed below. The irregularity of this procedure* and the presumedto the action were such that the extraordinary plenum, which supposedly confirmed Kirilenko in thestatus he holds today, has not been recognized inParty histories and handbooks.

Personnel actions which accompanied Kirilenko's irregular co-optation indicated that it was one move in Khrushchev's maneuvering against the forces led by Kozlov, whose power and ambition had grown so that theyerious threat to the First Secretary. Thus, Kirilenko was confirmed at the same time in the post of first deputy chairman of the RSFSR Bureau, thereby matching Voronov in rank and position. In addition, Kozlov's successor in Leningrad, Ivan Spirdonov, who had moved into the central Secretariat just six months earlier atartynow was demoted to chairman of the Supreme Soviet's Council of the Union; his fall to the powerless post neatly balanced the sudden reversal of fortunes for Kirilenko, who had lost out at the congress. Spiridonov's transfer entailed his dismissal from the Secretariat and from the post of Leningrad Party boss, thus effectively removing

"Ivanuslov associate and Ambassadorat the time,

he had been unable to attend the plenum oecausead been called too precipitately to permit him to reach Moscow in time.


himource of resistance to Kirilenko and of support for Kozlov in the Party's highest executive bodies.*

Kirilenko's elevation to the post of first deputy chairman of the RSFSR Bureau had the effect ofthe Kozlov-led forces from monopolizing control over the appointment of cadres in the RSFSR. In March, one month prior to Kirilenko'sajorof the Soviet farmrelude to the Party'salf year laterhad given Voronov controlevised and expanded "nomenklatura* for agricultural cadres in the republic.** It seems likely that Lomako, the deputy chairman for industry, had been in line toimilar nomenklatura for RSFSR industrial cadres and possibly to receive ato first deputy chairman, but Kirilenko's sudden arrival blocked that opportunity. Lomakoeputy chairman after April but presumably had little say in appointments.

Kirilenko's activities2 added to these -indications that he was instrumental in supportingstruggle against Kozlov, For example, in August Kirilenko supervised the installation of Viktor Skryabin, his close associate from Zaporozh'ye, as Rostov Party

*If* as seems likely* Kirilenko was beings Brezhnev's understudy and Das in theof rivaling Kozlov during the next two years* then Spiridonov apparently had replaced him at ongress as the only provincial Party boss with some nationalin the sphere of industry* serving in effect as Koslov's second* However* with his demotion the following April Spiridonov failed even tolace on the RSFSR Bureau.

**The nomenklaturaist of designated Party and state posts overigher echelon of the Party has full jurisdiction in making appointments.



first secretary in place of Aleksandr Basov, who had beeniplomatic assignment. The actionlear swipe at Kozlov's authority: Basov had gone to Rostov only weeks after Kozlov's arrival in the Secretariat lno replace the already severely downgraded Aleksey Kirichenko. Also, Kozlov had been in Rostov in Juneis, only two months before skraybin's arrivalto meet with the Party leadership after riots had broken out in nearby Novocherkassk, but he had taken no action against Basov; he may, in fact, have been attempting to protect him. The Skryabin appointment probably was alsoto Party Secretary Mikhail Suslov, who haspecial interest in his former Rostov bailiwick and who presumably was instrumental in getting Basov apost.*

Policy support which Kirilenko gave2 to Vasiliy Tolstikov, Spiridonov's successor in Leningrad, appeared to reflect Khrushchev's intent to break up the Kozlov-Kosygin "dynasty" there. Tolstikov had risen through the ranks of the Leningrad Party organization but not clearlyozlov protege: Khrushchev himself had taken the highly unusual step of presiding over his installation as Leningrad Party boss, apparently to underline hisof him (and possibly also to put down dissent among Kozlov allies who may have been opposed to the junior Tolstikov).

Against this background, Kirilenko's public supporteninigrad proposal on industrial management at a

"Under the circumstanoes, however, Basov's diplomatic assignment wae dangerous and thankless: he showed up as an "economic counsellor" at the Soviet Embassy in Havana onugust, just weeks before the Cuban missile crisis reached its peak. The posting had the political effect of removing him from Party politico and portending loss of membership on the Central Committee.


Central Committee conference in late July assumedsignificance. In his otherwise routine report on Party management of industry, Kirilenko said that the Leningraders1 proposal for merging affiliated enterprises into production complexes, or industrialwas of great interest, and he instructed the leaders in other RSFSR provinces to draft similar proposals. He also referred favorably to Khrushchev's support for theof the Leningrad Party organization inwo-shift schedule in the machine-building industry."

Kirilenko's general political position receivedboost in Novemberesult of Khrushchev'sbifurcation of tha Party into industrial and rural organizations. The reorganization involvedchanges in the leadership of the RSFSR Bureau which virtually eliminated Kozlov's influence in it. First, Voronov was appointed RSFSR Premier and, althougha full member of the Party Presidium, thereby wasto beingember of the RSFSR Bureau; that is, he became nominally Kirilenko's subordinate in the RSFSR Party hierarchy. Second, Leonid Yefremov, anBrezhnev ally who hadureau member by virtue of his position as Gor'kiy Party first secretary, replaced Voronov as first deputy chairman with agriculturaland became an alternate member of the Party Presidium. Finally, Lomako was dropped as deputyand transferred out of the RSFSR Party apparatusapparently under the aegis of Kosygin and Kozlov,

'It waa also about this time, inhat Kirilenko wa* first noted in contact with Petroung Leningrad Party official who roee rapidly under Toletikov before transferring in8 to his present position in the central Party apparatus as deputy chief of the Party-Organisational Work Department. The information on Anieimov's activities stronglythat heirilenko olient.


he wentewly created central planning post.took up whatever slack resulted from Lomako's*

Kirilenko's increased power after2 brought increased opposition from the Kozlov faction, reflecting the heightened intensity of their general struggle against Khrushchev and the Ukrainians. Signs of sniping at Kirilenko picked up markedly in March and His named appeared out of Cyrillic alphabetical order, following Kozlov's and Kosygin's,ist of the top leadership in Pravda on bothndarch. The annual edition of Spravochnik Partiynogo Rabotnika (Party Official'shich was signed to the press onarch, conspicuously failed to publish the communique of the2 plenum at which Kirilenko wasresidium member. pril, Pravda published the earlier discussed article by Sverdlovsk Party boss Nikolayev implicitly critical of Kirilenko's performance inwork. Finally, onndpril, Izvestiyaew other newspapers (notably the Leningrad Party paper) again slighted Kirilenko by placing his name afterin an otherwise alphabetical list of the Presidium members at an RSFSR Party conferenceand thisajor conference which heard andirilenko report on industrial management! Absent from the list was Kozlov, who hadaralyzing stroke several days earlier and was never to return to active political life.

*The division of responsibilities between Kirilenko and Yefremov was formalised with the creation of two smaller RSPSR bureausor rural management and for industrial managementithin the older RSFSR Bureau. It is unclear hcu this arrangement affected Voronov, uhoember of the older bureau but had no dearly defined responsibility for one or another economic sector. In any case, Kirilenko outranked Yefremov in the Party Presidium even though they held nominally equal positions in the RSFSR Bureau.


But with Kozlov sidelined, Kirilenko came into his own as Khrushchev's main spokosman for industrial affairs. The roport which he delivered to the April conferencetrong pragmatic approach toreater willingness than he had shown in the past to touch on controversial questions. arefrom his neo-Stalinist position, Kirilenko claimed that stereotypes and rigid policieshing of the past, thanks to the renunciation of Stalin's personality cult, and he lauded the2 bifurcation of the Party as an outstanding contribution to improving Party leadership of the national economy. He complained,thatew Party and economic leaders still were held captive by the former "traditions andhile he said that the organizational experience which the Party had accumulated over many years should not behe warned of the "great danger" in transferring outworn methods to the new Party and economic organs.

Kirilenko's Economic Views

This forward-looking attitude probably was intonded toackdrop for Kirilenko's more practicalfor reorganizing production. In particular, he strongly reiterated the support he had given in2 to the Leningrad proposal on merging enterprises into industrial firms, or production associations, as they were now being called. Several times in his reporttermed theseprogressive" form of production organization, and he asked for its bolder use in all branches of industry. Asserting that associations had proved their economic soundness, he neverthelessthe existence of some controversy over the scheme when claiming that associations were capable of carryingnified technical policy without infringing on the interests of sovnarkhozes (the national-economic councils, or regional government organs of planning andn fact, the regional sovnarkhozes had already lost some powers, precisely in control over technical policy, to

-ret* OECRBX

central state committees which were set up primarily for defense industries during the bifurcation of the Party along economic lines in November. Kirilenko thus seemedto objections which regional Party leadershad raised that the production associations might furtherrend toward state-administrativeharmful to their interests. Although his statement was equivocal, Kirilenko's pragmatic approach appeared to envision the organization of associationstrictly regional basis.*

*The report alsoouple of euggeetione of Kirilenko'a interest in somewhat orthodox directions. Be mentioned favorably, for example, the need tocomputer technology into management. At the same time, he saidproduction-technical association" was being set up within the BSPSR Sovnarkhoz that would produce computer equipment, evidently for managerial use in the sovnarkhoz. Kirilenko's main interest in all this seemed to be to strengthen the sovnarkhoz apparatus, rather than the centralised planning agencies. This wouldallow greater Party control in management at the regional level. In addition, Kirilenko dwelt onmeans of influencing production, such as "socialisthe "movement for Communistnd propaganda of "advanced experience"all of whichhie preference for exhortation over theof material incentives.

*'Kirilenko presumably felt less fettered when working with the Ukrainians Brezhnev and Podgornyy, who had been brought into the central Secretariat as successors to Kozlov in

That Kirilenko held no brief for the centraland administrators became more evident as time went on. His speech to another important industrial conference in4 was especially hard-hitting in this respect, perhaps reflecting increased confidence as Kozlov'sremoval from politics became manifest.** In his speech.

top irn<rnTT

Kirilenko repeated his callurther "bold advance" in forming production associations. He coupled this, however,arning that their formation should not be an end in itself but promote better organization of production. This admonition reflected awareness of the resistance of the central planning agencies, because he went on to ridicule their indiscriminate issuance of general directives to industrial enterprises alreadywithin associations:

General direativee {from central agencies] often are addressed to those enterprises which joined associations long ago and are not independent economic units. This is what we call habit. People do notlife, but it is changing, it does not remain static; small enterprises arebut they continue to receive We feel like telling the comrades who write [ouch instructions]: 'Do not make people laugh. '

In addition, Kirilenkoeemingly gratuitiouson Stalinism in economic management which appeared aimed again at the resistance of conservative:

Stalin's dogmas, divorced from life, did not makeober assessment of thetaking place in the economy. They drove economic thoughtlind alley andpirit of conservatism in technical policy. The bureaucratic approach to planning detracted from the role of plana themselves, resulted in majorand hampered scientific andthought. The liquidation of the cult

of made it possible to put

economic work on strictly scientific

Except for the earlier mentioned remarks on the stereotypes and rigid policies which held sway under Stalin, this unusual deviation from Kirilenko's standard line marked the only observed public reference he had made or was to make to the person of the late dictator.*

*In thia connection, ignificant measure ofreserve on the Stalin issue was his avoidingof the late dictator by name in hie speech at thearty Congress, where many other leaders werethe chorus behind Khrushchev in attacking Stalin's person. Kirilenko restricted himself to affirming the correctness ofh Party Congress decisions,for their condemning the "personality cult"henomenon divorced, it would seem, from the person of Stalin), exposing its harmful effects and reestablishing collective leadershipelatively innocuousof de-Stalinization.

The speech was notable also for Kirilenko's first observed public reference to the use of materialcarefully labeled for the purpose of "technical progress." He appeared to blame the state planningfor failing to come to grips with the "complicated" but unavoidable problems of applying "material rewards for good results, for increased efficiency and product longevity. The bulk of the speech, however, revealed an unchanged general attitude in favor of administrative and "moral" means of improving production efficiency.

that Kirilenko expected to duuittve increasaay augmenting the staffewly created Central Committee department, which would achieve closer supervision of the chemical industry through Party cadres assigned as deputy chairmen for chemistry in the appropriate sovnarkhozes. It seems probable that this activity reflected the formation of the RSFSRof Chemical Industry, which was first publicly iden-tified in

Apparently convinced of the efficacy of hisin his speech laid out the organization ofcampaign for developingforms

of economic work. According to Kirilenko, economichad been organizednterprises in the RSFSR, the post of chief economist (functioningeputy) director for economic matters) had been introduced in moreajor industrial enterprises, and economic laboratories and economic-analysis departments had been formed in the sovnarkhozesall of which appeared to be legitimate economic work. He also indicated, however,ersons were engaged in the work of more0 "public" bureaus and groups of economic analysis in enterprises throughout the republic

this "public" activity inblast industrial Partyandity and rayon Party committeesthe RSFSR- He cited approvingly the experience of the Volgograd Oblast Industrial Party Committee, which used economic councils and "commissions for promoting technical


within the committee's industrial departments, to find ways to cut production costs. Kirilenko lauded this new. Party-directed efforteans of bringing large numbers of workers and engineering-technical personnel into economic administration.

this activitywas restricted to the chemical industry in the RSFSR and did notarge part of the national economy, some professional governmentand planners in thePremier Kosygin for exampleundoubtedlyuch less sanguine attitudeKirilenko's campaign. The emphasis on the Party'sin economic work, which, according to Kirilenko, would mean improving economic training even in the Party educationprobably also raised the hackles of Suslov and other more orthodox Party ideologues who were concerned that suchwas detracting fromstudies and leading to the neglect of political work in the Party.** It was clear, therefore, that Kirilenko

*Kirilenko said that economic departments had been formed in "Marxist-Leninist universities" within city Partyat which0 persons were studying, but he felt that the quality of this work left much to be desired.

e ideologue'& viewpoint probably was expressed most, clearly in an article which V. Stepanov published in Pravda onay 1SBS, attacking the practice under Khrushchev of the Party's immersion in economic management to theof ideological and propaganda interests.

"IUI MA.Kfrf4

had committed himself to supporting Khrushchev's schemes for broad chemicalization and Party management of the economy when the coalition of leaders, including Kosygin and Suslov, finally formed around Brezhnev to oustfrom political office in

D. In Brezhnev's Service; The RSFSR

During the politically unsettled period immediately after Khrushchev's ouster and for most5 Kirilenkoow profile, engaging in few public activities while presumably concentrating on securing his organizational base. Actually Kirilenko was somewhat on the periphery of the main battlefield, which was the central Secretariat. Here Podgornyy, who was "second in command" to Brezhnev by virtue of his responsibility for supervising Party-organizational matters, seemed actually the near equal of the Party boss in the first several months of the new econdary arena was in the field of competition between the Secretariat and the Council of Ministersthat is, between Brezhnev and Kosygin. Thus the RSFSR Bureauinor area for skirmishes in the largermaneuvers in this period.

The regime's first major change, reversingParty bifurcation scheme,lightfor Kirilenko and others who had profited politically from bifurcation. At the November plenum which made the decision to return to the organizational structure of the Party that existed before bifurcation, Podgornyy delivered the report recommending this action, while Brezhnev played no visible role. ense, therefore, Podgornyy was identifiedecision which was not clearly ininterest.

The decision to reorganize the Party along old lines led to the reinstatement, for the most part, of all the Party bosses in the republics and lower levels who had given up some of their power However, several


"Terr oixiiLui.

personnel changes in the RSFSR had some effect on Kirilenko's position, the overall result of which was in his favor. In December Leonid Yefremov was transferred from the post of first deputy chairman of the RSFSR Bureau to become Party boss in Stavropol' Kray. This manifest demotion, which portended the loss of Yefremov's position on the Party Presidium, left Kirilenko the sole deputy chairman of the bureau under Brezhnev's strictly nominal Voronov may have wanted to reclaim the vacatedof deputy chairman for agriculture, but he remainedember of the bureau.* In effect, therefore,became de facto Party boss for the entire RSFSR.

At the same time, another change at the provinqial level indicated that Kirilenko was not immune from attack in his own area. ecember, Suslov presided over the installation of Mikhail Solomentsev in the post of Rostov Rural Party chief in place of Kirilenko's former Zaporozh'ye associate Viktor Skryabin, who was "placed at the disposal of the Central Committee." Three weeks later Solomentsev became Rostov Party first secretary of the reunified organizationthe position which Skryabin had held prior to2 bifurcation; Skryabin disappeared from public view and was not relected to the Centralatarty Congress in Thus Suslov

'Possibly Brezhnev decided to monopolize control over the agricultural sphere on the Party side, sharingfor this sector only with Deputy Premier Polyanskiy on the government side. Tending to confirm thiswas the appointment of Fedor Kulakov sometime in Hovember to the post of chief of the Central Committee's Agricultural Department but not to the position offor agriculture, from which Vasiliy Polyakov was ousted at that time. Kulakov did not attain thatforear; meanwhile, Brezhnev emerged as the regime's agricultural spokesman inS when heajor program for agricultural development.

struck back for Kirilenko's earlier intrusion in Rostov Party politico (see. Her/ever, Suslov's sally caneKirilenko had consolidated hin position on the RSFSR Bureau, and similar incursions in the republic's Partysubsequently were not observed.

Probably the mostmoverovincial Party official in December was the return of Ivan Kapitonov from political exile to the post of chief of the reunifiedCommittee Department of RSFSR Party Organs. Kapitonov had been demoted9 from 'loscow City first secretary to the position of Party boss in Ivanovo Oblast. His return to the center in4 probably had the backing of Brezhnev and Suslov aa well as Kirilenko. Kapitonov's two deputies in the new department were the former chiefs of the bifurcated departments for RSFSR Party organsNikolay Voronov-skiynd Mikhail Polekhin (rural). Both Kapitonov and Voronovskiy were toan Brezhnev and Kirilenko consolidated theirs well as again

One of the intermediate noves in the strengthening of Kirilenko's influence in the cadres sector, althoughe effects were not immediately apparent, was the5 demotion of Vitaliy Titov from the centralto Kazakhstan to fill the vacancy of republic second secretary which had resulted from Solomentsev's transfer to Rostov. krainian associate of Podgornyy, had been the junior secretary in charge of Party-organizational


matters and cadres appointments* The demotionwo-fold significance. First, iterious blow to his patron Podgornyy, whose dominance in the cadres sector it weakened. Second, Titov's removal coincided with the conferring of new titles and, apparently, of changed roles upon the union-republic and RSFSRof Party organs. Public identifications in Maythat the union-republic department carried theDepartment of Party-Organizational Work; the RSFSR department underwent the same transformation,the Department of Party-Organizational Work for the RSFSR. The full significance of these titular changes was unclear, but they suggested at least the abolition of Titov's Commission on Party-Organizational Work.

Kirilenko continued to maintain his low publicduring the spring and summerhile Brezhnev became increasingly involved in maneuvering againstand senior Party Secretary Aleksandr Shelepin. By late September, Brezhnev had seriously weakened Podgornyy's influence in the cadres sector and apparently had puthallenge from Shelepin for control of the top Party post. Brezhnev also had asserted himself strongly in competition with Kosyginentral Committee plenum whicheform of industrial planning and management.

As Brezhnev grew in stature, so Kirilenko began to be more politically active. Oneptember, the lead editorial of Sovetskaya Rossiya carried the gist of an

'Titov had been chief of the Department of Party Organs for Union Republics sincee becameember of the Secretariat and chairman of the Commission on Party-Organisational Questions in Arlmost nothing is known of the function of hie commission, but conceivably it was created in part to arbitratedisputes and other conflicts arising between the newly bifurcated Party organisations.

RSFSR Bureau decree which criticized the Rostov Partyfor allowing an overemphasis on the production of heavy-industrial goods to the detriment of the food sector and light industryan obvious swipe at Rostov Party boss Solomentsev, The following month Kirilenkooviet Party delegation to the Chilean Party Congress, which was his first travel in such capacityoreign Communist Party congress. The assignment may not have pleased or had the whole-hearted approval of Suslov, the senior secretary responsible for relations within the Communist movement, if only because of Kirilenko's strictly provincial position in the RSFSR.

This increased political activity and strength for Brezhnev and Kirilenko in the fall5 was followedignificant shift in the power balance in December. Podgornyy was transferred to the less powerful position of Soviet "President" in place of Anastas Mikoyan, whoand Shelepin gained the key responsibility for Party-organizational matters. The gain for Shelepinhowever, some losses as well: he was forced to give up his USSR deputy premiership with the abolition of the Party-State Control Committee, of which he was In addition, Brezhnev and Kirilenko presumablysucceeded inheck on Shelepin'spowers in the person of Kapitonov, whoember of the Secretariat and took charge of the union-republic Party-Organizational Work Department. In filling the vacancies which Titov's departure in April had created, Kapitonov apparently ceased to head the RSFSR department. However, the entire question of the existence of the RSFSR Bureau may have become moot by that time, for it was to be abolished several months later atarty Congress.*

*An additionai indication of the strength of Brezhnev and Kirilenko in December was the reinstatement of their former associate Shcherbitskiy as an alternate member of the Party Presidium. For slightly more than two years Shcherbitskiy had been reduced in rank and placed in

(footnote continued on page

The Fight Over the Goryachev Proposal

The decision to abolish the RSFSR Bureau under the circumstancesonsolidation of Kirilenko'sand paved the wayeassignment of responsibiliti* within the Secretariat atarty Congress. The cadre apparatus was the subjectighly controversial though muted debate which arose at the beginning of the congress when these responsibilities were in flux. The evidence doos not permit firm conclusions, but the debate appeared to reflect maneuvering by Brezhnev and Kirilenko to prevent Sholopin from consolidating his hold over the cadres sector. In any case, by the end of the congress Shelepin was to yield the cadres portfolio to Kirilenko, who had meanwhileull-fledged member of the Secretariat.

The debate, which revolved around the question of tho concentration of functions within the central Party apparatus, suggested important differences in principle between Shelapin and Kirilenko on Party-organizationalbut it also touchad indirectlyumber ofissues affecting the position of other leaders. It began on the second day of the congress,arch, when Novosibirsk Party chief Goryachev raised tho sensitiveof Party-organizational work in the central apparatus. Goryachev's proposal, which he introduced in the context of criticism of young leaders of oblast, city, .and rayon Party committees who were "specialists of various branches of the economy but who do not have sufficient Marxist-Leninistaseturntalinist

ifootnote continued from page

political limbo in Dnepropetrovsk, where he had eervedKirilenko as second secretary. Sow, however, he regainec hie former position of Ukrainian Premier and the Presidium rank of alternate member which normally goes with that post.

tot uluuo.

organizational formthe Cadres Directorate. In place of the arrangement which had existedentral department <or departments) of Party organsthe diverse aspects of cadres work with all the economic and other functional departments of the Central Committee concerned, Goryachev argued the need to "create cadres directorates and departments in local Party organs and the Party Central Committee, concentrating in one place the recruitment, assignment, and training ofroposal, if accepted, meant inadical diminution of the powers, or even the complete elimination, of the Central Committee's functional departmentsoncentration of enormous power in the person controlling the Cadres Directorate.

Shelepin was senior cadres secretary at the start of the congress, and it thus seems plausible that Goryachev was speaking on his behalf. This inference is strengthened by two facts. First, Goryachev'sthat the newwould place greater emphasis on "Marxist-Leninist"in the training of economic cadres appeared in consonance with the ideologicalhad acquired during long years in the Komsomol andatchdog over the secret police.'


Shelepin, with whom he was personalLy acquaxntea, f "firm" leadership and ideological continuity. he said, believed that the economy should be subject to

(footnote continued on page

1 ol1ig

top dccrex.

(footnote continued from

strict Party control and directed by an elite ofreliable and highly trained specialists, whoamong other things the purification and renewalin order to "make it the program of theand to repress material egoism in all socialgroups. This program would aimarty that washighest degree idealistic, egalitarian, informed, contrasted Shelepin'e program, in-

cidentally, to its opposite "extreme" in Soviet economia thinkingosygin's platform of reliance on economic methods such as material incentives and expansion of the market mechanism,ertain devolution of decision-making on the enterpriee, ystem of industrial agencies freed from Party control. It should be noted that the economic views which Kirilenko expressed in closely resembled the Shelepin program.

iUI 4-

The development of controversy over Goryachev's proposal was suggested by the fact that although the idea received applause at the time

no subsegTrerrrt^speaxer explicitly

enaorseaon the day after Goryachev, Primor-skiy Kray Party boss Chernyshev implied his general supporttatement on the need to "improve work in theassignment, and training of cadres." Hisbut favorable attitude may have reflected his divided allegiance,ias toward the more ideologicallyforces. Like Kirilenko, chernyshev had trained as an aviation engineer and even had served under Kirilenko's supervision in the RSFSR industrial sector in Primorskiy Kray, but his main political allegiance and ideological bent probably were formed during the years of his affiliation with the wartime partisan movement and the Party organization in Belorussia, where he worked directly with Mazurov. In sum, his statement favoring some change in the cadres policy appeared to place him with thesupporters of Shelepin.

Opposition to the ideaingle Cadreswas revealed finallypril in the speech ofParty bossotoriously independent andleaderackground suggesting Suslov's Kebin rejected Goryachev's proposaltrongof the style of cadres work which was predominant in tho post-Stalin period. In his opinion, "leading cadres should be recruited and trained first of all by thatand that organ which is responsibleiven sector of work, and notpecial cadres department" (emphasis added). In other words, he advocated continuing the practiceumber of functional departments of the Central Committeewhich are accountable to several secretarieseneral diffusion ofajor


say in deciding who among the officials of lower Party committees should be best qualified for recruitment and training.*

Two days after Kebin's speech, during the windup of discussion on Brezhnev's report, two speakers from the RSFSR spoke as if the issue had been tilted, but theapparently remained undecided. The speakers, Perm' Party chief Galanshin and Kemerovo Party boss Yeshtokin, mav have taken their pup from yi lonb. I

"GSlanshTn, who had worked in Perm' in the Urals

for many yearseighbor to Kirilenko, expressed the view that it would be "expedient" totrongfor improving the production skills of managerial cadres. His statement thus changed the direction of the debate away from the ideological slant of the Goryachev proposala more pragmatic approach to the training of economic On the otherailure toonsensus

'There were several hinte in Kebin's remarks on Party-organizational questions that he was allied with Kosygin and/or Suslov in rejecting Goryachev'sosthe was highly critical of the past "passion for creating various contrived and often duplicative non-staff Party commissions and councils without consideration of their expediency"airly clear allusion to the eoonomio councils for economy, technical progreee,hichhad promoted and which Kosygin and Suslov probably opposed in

on the question was registered very late during theof Brezhnev's report, in the remarks of Yeshtokin, who had served for four years as Kirilenko's second secretary in Sverdlovsk. Yeshtokin indicated that "subjectivist arbitrariness and contrived forms'" still existed in Party-organizational and ideological work, but he failed toa remedy. Instead he suggested that these problems should be airedroad scale within the Party, "perhaps" eveniscussionentral Committee plenum.*

Thus, the proposalevival of the Cadres Directorate and other Stalinist forms of organizing Party workuiet death at the congress, and Shelepin, the presumed inspirer of the idea, relinquished his control over the cadres sector to Kirilenko.


had ignored. Hie remark suggested that he favored greater centralised Party oontrol than Kebin would have approved. Thus, Galanehin taid he presumed that the bureau'swould leadtrengthening rathereakening of ties between the center and the provinoee. Hie proposalystem of managerial training, therefore, probablyarge role for the central Party apparatus despite its apparent link with Kosygin's economic reform program.

*In the event, however, no such broad Party discussion or plenum has been noted.

"TMl1 I1 I | [_

II, kirilenko's career as deputy gekerat, secretary

Examination of the general lines of authority in the Secretariatramework for analyzing Kirilenko's further career in greater detail. The activities of the top Party leadership during this period indicate that each senior secretary has served roughlyareputy to the General Secretary, at least untilhen Kirilenko's stock seemed to rise. The over-all evidence suggests that any of them can deputize fully for Brezhnev during the Party chief's absence, although they mostly have restricted theiractivities to their own assigned areas of

The new assignments within the Secretariatesult of the RSFSR Bureau's abolition atongress were primarily to Brezhnev's advantage, of course, but they were greatly to the political benefit of Kirilenko as well. In addition to his gaining full control over the cadres sector, Kirilenko continued to supervise the important industrial and construction sectors of tlie economyhis bailiwick now extended beyond the RSFSR and embraced the entire countrywhile Brezhnev gave up whatever formal secretarial responsibility he may have had in this sphere prior to the congress. Shelepin lost not only the cadres sector but also his control over the Administrative Organs Department, which fell underpersonal purview. Shelepin was left to supervise the work of Party organs in light industry and thesector. Suslov's long-standing formal responsibility for Communist theory and propaganda remained intact, his position apparently being the only/one unaffected by the changes during the congress.*

*Suslov apparently took up the responsibility for light industry and consumer goods when Shetepin left theinnduties remained

top oegkex

The lines of secretarial authority in the field of foreign Communist relations were not clearly drawn, however. Brezhnev as Party boss obviouslyirect personal interest in these relations and involvedin the most important problems. Inattern seemed to take shape. Brezhnev appeared toreater interest in liaison with ruling parties and to be more active in overseeing the work of the Bloc Department. Kirilenko alsoarge role in this business, especially on matters pertaining to economic relations within the Council for Economic Mutual Assistanceeanwhile, Suslov dealt most often with non-ruling parties and supervised the daily work of the Central Committee's International Department. The International Department's role, however, goes beyond liaison with non-ruling Parties and encompasses general responsibility for the coordination of most aspects of foreign policy, so that Suslov has an important say in all foreign questions.

The none too preciseamong the General Secretary's deputies were clearly manifest in several cases ofin Kirilenko's andpublic activities. , approximately two thirds of Kirilenko's significantcontacts with foreign (receiving ambassadors and official delegations in Moscow, attending foreign embassyheading Soviet Partyabroad, and othernot involving another senior secretary) were within the Bloc of rulingull third of his contacts, therefore,

were with non-rulingM. A.

Similarly, almost half of Suslov's

public contacts during the same period were with Bloc Party officials. .In fact, their share of the responsibility in trips abroad was just about equal: SuslovPSU

ill L

delegation to Finland in6 and went (with Premier Kosygin) to Romania inirilenkoarty delegation to Italy in8 and officially represented the CPSU at the French Party Congress

Seme of the crossing over in relations with foreign Communist Parties nay have been due to Suslov's inability to attend certain functions because of chronic ill health, although he appeared toormal work load Also, responsibility for certain parties seemed topecial connection or knowledge, such as has been evident in the case of Kirilenko's continued dealings5 with tho Chilean Communist Party. However, in many if not most cases the choice of oither Kirilenko or Suslov as the leading Soviet representative appeared to depend on tho nature of the business to be conducted in the given instance, Kirilenko being involved most often in economic discussions (and therefore logically more often with the Eastern Europeans in the CEHAand Suslov playing the major role in theoretical matters and general guidance.

The apparent confusion of senior secretarial was even greater in the sphere ofquestions, where the overt association of any Politburo member with personnel placement was very rare and usually misleading. For example, the Soviet press revealed that Suslov alone among the other Politburo members was present at the7 installation ofaa trade union chief, f


nn.mjigiiumw*Committee which two weeks earlier "decided" to elect tha than trade union chief, Viktor Grishin, as its first secretary in place of Nikolay Yegorychev, the "Young Turk" critic of Brezhnev's handling of the Arab-Israeli problem. Suslov also presided over the installation of Grigoriy Romanov as Party boss in Leningrad in place of the transferred Vasiliy Tolstikov in The reason for Suslov's publicin the cadres sector on these occasions is unclear

but seems to haveonnection with the power politics behind the moves. It is quite likely that Brezhnev assigned Suslov the task of presiding over the above changes so as to avoid tooemonstration of his own personal involvementower struggle against Shelepin, who was the loser in each case.

A. Sharing Power with Brezhnev's Rivals

For several weeks afterarty Congress, Kirilenko was preoccupied with the business of merging the RSFSR Bureau staff with the union-republic components of the Central Committee apparatus and was, therefore, not yet involved in significant administrative ormatters. Presumably he decided to tread easily in his relations with Suslov and Shelepin, who had built strong followings in the apparatus, for most of the chiefs of former RSFSR departments became merely deputy chiefs of the consolidated departments. The fact that there was no wholesale takeover by the former RSFSR apparatchiks.

This move, although

even in the industrial departments which were fully under Kirilenko's control in the new setup, suggested some self-restraint. However, Voronovskiy and Petrovichev of the RSFSR cadres apparatus were identified after theas deputies to Kapitonov in the consolidated Party-Organizational Work Department,irtualin this sphere.* Neither was identified at first in the post of first deputy chief of the department, but they appeared to outrank Alcksey Skvortsov, the only remaining deputy from the former union-republic department. InMikhail Khaldeyev transferred during the congress from the RSFSR Agitprop Department (where he had worked in the bifurcation years in Kirilenko's industrial sector as department chief) to the post of editor-in-chief of the important Central Committee journal Partlynaya Zhizn'.

doubtedly was also quite acceptable to Shelepin, who had raised Khaldeyevosition of prominence in the Komsomol organization during the.

'See foldout

top oecp.ct

between Brezhnev and Shelepin but also involving Kirilenko. The confirmation, probably in early August, of voronovskiy as first deputy chief of the Party-Organizational Work Department clearlyain for Kirilenko. Then in September, Nikoiay Shchelokov, whose main ties were to Brezhnev but who also had been associated to some degree with Kirilenko and Podgornyy in the Ukrainian Partybecame chief of tho uniformed police (militia, now known as MVD) which had been headedhelepin ally, Vadim Tikunov.* At the same time, Shelepin seemed to benefit most among the senior secretaries from tho September appointment of Boris Horalev to the vacancy of deputy chief of the Party-Organizational Work Department which Voronovskiy's promotion created. Jockeying by Suslov was clearly demonstrated in November when Mikhail Solomentsev left Rostov to become chief of the Central Committeeof Heavy industryan appointment which led to his joining the Secretariat the next month. Against the background of Kirilenko's apparent opposition to Solomentsev (see , his appointment, together with Moralcv's, creatod the impression that Brozhnev's rivals had tho intent and ability to circumscribe the power of the cadres secretary.

*Kirilenko was caught in the middle here, having worked several years himself with Tikunov.

In view of these indications of sharpening conflict in the leadership, it is perhaps not surprising thattook the opportunityublic speech in6 to demonstrate his loyalty to Brezhnev. Speaking in Novorossiyskommemorative occasion, Kirilenko recalled Brezhnev's wartime serviceanner which exceeded the bounds of collegiality: referring to Brezhnev's political work withh Army in Novorossiysk, Kirilenko cited the "indefatigable activity of Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev, his porsonal bravery and steadfastness, and his profound ideological conviction, which served as models of Party spirit and military valor." Such fulsome praise, which

was reminiscent of the public adulation of Khrushchev in theand Kirilenko was among the most vocal public supporters of the Party boss then asay have been intended to remind Brezhnev that he had cause to protect Kirilenko and to give him preference overand Shelepinore reliable deputy.

The following spring there were signs of increased activity on Kirilenko's part that registered Brezhnev's trust and possiblyelegation of greater authority to the cadres secretary, r" * I

Kirilenko, althoughnot playing the decisive role, must have been involved in Brezhnev's swinging the appointment of Marshal Grechko as Minister of Defense, also in April, against evident opposition from some quarters. Clearly, he and otherof the "Ukrainian group" had greater influence over

Deputy: P. F. PigaSo* Deputy; N. A, Belukha

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Chief: IV. Kapitonov

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was identified in7eputy chief of the department. Possibly Kirilenko intended him as afor Voronovskiy, who vacated the post of first deputy chief and became Party first secretary in Chuvash oblast at about that time. The person who eventually wasin8 as Voronovskiy's successor, howevor, was his close associate from the RSFSR cadres apparatus, Petrovichev, whose experience was broader than Razumov's and whose contacts extended beyond Kirilenko to include, in particular, Voronov and Domichev as well as Shelepin. If, therefore, Kirilenko had planned on making Razumov Kapitonov's first deputy, the opposition toove was sufficient to prevent his doing so despite hisauthority in the cadres sector. In any case, the net gain was in Kirilenko's favor.

Meanwhile, inirilenko's hand was again visible in the appearance of another new deputy chief of Kapitonov's department in the person of Pavel Anisimov. Rising from the ranks of the Leningrad Party organization, Anisimov had established public ties with Kirilenko exclusively among the top leadershipe apparently replaced the one holdover from the union-republic department of the Podgornyy-Shelepin era, Aleksey Skvortsov, who retired in the same month. In addition, in tho wake of Petrovichev's move upward, Nikolay Perun was released from hia post of secretary of the Donetsk Party organization in the Ukraine to become deputy chief of the department. Although Perun appears moat beholden to Ukrainian Party chief Shelest, biographic information on him is too thin toirm judgment on hisconnections within the "Ukrainian group." He could, for example, be allied with Shelest's rival, Ukrainian Premier Shcherbitskiy, whose influence appears to have increasedhe same year that Perun emergedong period of political oblivion to take up his dutioa in Donetsk.

Kirilenko's increased power and authority in the Secretariat was reflected also in heightened publicgiving rise to speculation in some quarters that he


had "replaced" Suslov as tho "number two man" in the Party. For example, Kirilenko rather than Suslov accompanied Brezhnev and others to Dresden in late Marcheeting of Party and Government leaders from the Eastern European countries, where political upheaval in Czechoslovakia was the main subject of discussion.* ew days later Kirilenko was named chairmanommission for the funeral of Soviet cosmonaut Gagarintho same function Suslov had performed the preceding year on the death of cosmonaut Komarov. The speculation increased in June, when Kirilenko and Ustinoveception for participantsentral Committee conference of officials involved in the work of(security-related) organs: Suslov had had an analogous role with regardimilar conference in

while it seems improbable that Kirilenko hadormally designated "number two" position at this time, he did become more active in the field of international Communist relations, in which Suslov always had been Kirilenko appeared to be especially activen pushing for the early convening of theCommunist Conference, which was from theet project of Brezhnev, as well aa of Suslov. Reports of his talks with foreign Communists in this perioda picture of Kirilenko's insisting on holding the conference in order to "restore unity" and on recognizing the leading role of the Soviet Party so as to prevent further fragmentation of the Communist "movement". Kirilenkocomplained that positions of "non-alignment"e was especially upset over the Romanian positionmade progress toward the conference difficult. Although his attitude in talks with foreign Communists was one of sweet reasonableness, Kirilenko reputedly was among the

"However, Kiri lenko 'e presence might be explained ae relating to economic questions, as the inclusion of Gosplan Chairman Nikolay Baybakov in the Soviet delegation

most dogmatic advocatesilitary solution to theproblem of Czechoslovak democratization Suslov, on the other hand, was widely reported to have been in the minority whicholitical solution to the Czechoslovak heresy; if so, it was possibly because heigher priority than Brezhnev and Kirilenko on convening the often postponed international conference according to schedule in In any case, reporting consistently placed Kirilenko among those leaders whose pressure finally brought Brezhnev around to the decision to go ahead in August with the intervention in Czechoslovakia.

greater involvement in foreign Communist relations naturally intensified his rivalry with Suslov. Indications of this competitionin the appointment of Party officials to work with the Bloc The roost important of these was the unexpected promotion in8 of Konstantin Katushev, previously Party boss in Gork'iyrofessional auto designer with almost noin foreign affairs, to theSecretariat with the primary responsibility of supervising the Bloc Department. This advancement of an official who had risen through the ranks in Gor'kiy under Kirilenko's aegis and who had received personal attention from Brezhnev5 had all the appearancesower play to prevent the assignment of the Secretariat post to Konstantin Rusakov, an associate of Kosygin and Suslov whose public identification as chief of the Bloc Department just two weeks earlier had suggested that he would enter the Secretariat.*

'Pusakov's predecessor in the department, Andropov, had combined ihe Sobs of department chief and member of the Secretariat.

Further possible indications of Suslov's displeasure with the Kirilenko-Brezhnev push in Bloc liaison matters occurred after the intervention in Czechoslovakia, during the period of "normalization" and renewed preparation for the International Communist Conference (now scheduled for One sign of sniping9 December Pravda identification of Katushevecretary "attachedhe Centralighly unusual formulation whichower status than the full-fledged and proper "secretary of the Central Committee." Then, inix-up in identifying the Soviet participantsEHA summit conference, initially omitting Kirilenko's name and then misrepresenting his status on the delegation,to reflect an attempt to downgrade his role in it.*

Lett to Right. KsrwAev, A. P.V. Kosygin. and LIInternational Communist Conference,9

1 April an official announcement, basedentral Committee and government decision, listed only Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Katushev among the top leaders on the delegation.

(footnote continued on

Tor nixing-

Tor niTTrTX

C. Outlining the Five-Year Plan'

Inith the International Communistout of the way, Kirilenko turned his main attention

(footnote continued from

A TASS bulletin, reporting on the opening eeeeion onpril, revealed that Kirilenko uae "aleo preeent" with the delegation. Finally, onpril, the central preoo Hated Kirilenkoull-fledged member of the delegation.

*See pp. f CAESAR XXXIX.


away from relations with foreign communist parties and began to work intensively onational-economic plan. As senior secretary responsible for industrial production, Kirilenko obviouslyirect interest in long-term plans. It is even possible that he has the formalfor overseeing the work of the Central Committee Department of Planning and Finance organs, although the evidence is too sparse toirm -judgment on this.


The absence of significant activity involvingstaff in economic affairs between0 suggests that the basic directiveslong-range plan, at least for industry, had takenthe late October Politburo discussions. entralplenum in mid-Decemberthe annual occasionof the next year's plan and budgetbecamefor airing, ln addition, the basic features of the

subsequent propaganda on the Docember plenum also held hints that Kirilenko hadajor force behind the important speech which Brezhnev delivered to it* The press accounts indicated that the unpublished speech had focused on "fundamental" questions of economicravda editorial on0 elaborated that the plenum had considered "major problems which arise in ccw-piling plans for the future, and in particular theear plan." The main theme of the post-plenum propagandaabor productivity and economic efficiency, rather than increased rates of growth in capital investment, as the foremost criteriaappeared consistent with the thrust of Kirilenko's critique. One additional question which could

ajor problem in drawing up the plan was whether to adopt production associations as the basic economic unit and, if so,etwork of associations would fit into the ministerial structure. The December plenum apparently addressed itself to this problem,entral Committee decree on associations (still unpublished) was adopted in February,onference was held especially to discuss the future of them.*

It is unclear what additional work on thethe December plenum decisions may have causedand the plan commission. The "majorwere said to have arisen in compilingearhave included delays in defining the basicagricultural development,'

Whatever the reason, Kirilenko's plan commission seems to have presented its final recommendations tardily

* Forttitudes on associations, see+ The associations were to feature prominently in the published directives ofear plansee ahead p.

? irriTTiTJ

inhat is, somewhat exceeding its In fact, some of the delay may have beenroutirte tidvino up of loose

There were signs in Apriletailed outline ofear plan, presumably based on the commission's recommendations, was near completion in draft form. revealedid-april speech in Yerevan- that Gosplan had been working onraft with other governmentand departments and with republic governments and that it would be debated "soon" in the Politburo and the govern-merit. (Council ol Ministers

The Reversal on Agriculture

At the same time, decisions on the agriculturalwere in the offing which apparently would requireof some of Kirilenko's work on plan priorities, rhe day before Kirilenko gave his speech in Yerevan, Brezhnev had spoken in Khar'kov in some detail on economic questions.

Saying that the December plenum had also discussedproblems, Brezhnev had implied that investment in this sector would be increased only gradually. Similar statements from the Party boss onpril suggested that other perenially neglected areas of the economy, such as consumer-goods production and housing, might also be slighted in theear plan, in both cases, he stressed that the necessary development of these sectors would take time, implying that resources were needed more urgently elsewhere.

Brezhnev soon was to turn these statements on their head, however. The apparent vehicle for this turnabout was the memorandum "On the Agriculturalhich Brezhnev presented for the Politburo's attention andon* The main lines of Brezhnev's memo were made public onlyuly in his reportentral Committee plenum, but its impact on theear plan was immediate. At the end of May, Brezhnev spokeession of the DSSR Council of Ministers, which had heard Kosygin report on the basic directions of the national economy. According to the press account, the councilGosplan to do "additional work" in findinga blatant suggestion that Brezhnev's intrusion in this government affairejection of Gosplan's draft plan, and, implicitly, of Kirilenko's guidelines. Brezhnev immediately repeated his performanceession of the RSFSR Council of Ministersune.** Brezhnev

**The press aaoount, which indicated that thelan for the RSFSR was discussed, failed to list RSFSR Premier Voronov or anyone else as havingeport. The inference from Brezhnev's unprecedented forays in these two government bodieswith which, technically, he has no associationis that the changes in projected investment which his agricultural memorandum necessitated were so extensive as to upset the carefully weighedof the draft plan and to require appropriateand justification.

hinted at the shift in projected investment priorities in hisune speech to his Moscow election district, saying now that time was the main factor in developing agriculture. He optedconsiderable acceleration" of the program of material assistance to agriculture, rather than allowing it to drag on forears, which suggested that certain "comradoe" hadimetable in mind.

Brezhnev used similar language in justifying the program of increased investment in agriculture, including in machirfe building for agriculture, which he finallyinuly report to the Central Committee. Again, he seemed to imply the existence of opposition by admitting that "Ofertain period of time is needed to resolve fully the task of technically reeguipping Ha went on to argue, however, the need to ensure that this period not be prolonged. In line with this, Brezbnev indicated thatule" all branches ofwould be required to assist tha agricultural sector with production of machinery and equipment;ingle plant, said Brezhnev, should remain outside "this great and noblo cause." He umber of dafense-reloted ministries which had supplied estimates of what each could contribute without reducing its basic output. In effect, Brezhnev seemed to be saying that for the immediate futurethat is,industrial growth should remain roughly at its present rate, while excess capital should be used for manufacturing agricultural equipment.

llow drastically the decisions on agriculturalmay have affected Kirilenko's original proposals on economic priorities and the timetable for approval oflan outline is unclear. According to one report, Gosplan officials in mid-April had expected to be busy through June putting the draft plan directives in order, one official even declaring it essential that it be ready in July. However, in June Soviet officials' activity and remarks indicated their recognition that the plan would be delayed, possibly until aa late as tho end of the year. (In fact, preparation of the plan directives would take until) The failure ofuly Central

Tor occma:

Committee plenum to scheduleh Party Congress, which would be required inter alia to approve formallyear plan directives, and the eventual decision to delay the congress untilhich was announced at another plenum convened unexpectedly several days later, reinforced these indications of disarray and confusion in planning. In later explaining the delay in finishing the drafting of theosplan deputy chairmanesternthat the draft plan had been rejected and returned to the plannersto be reworkedn April (presumably after Brezhnev's speeches in the Ukraine). In sum, it would appear that the shift in projectedpriorities which Brezhnev revealed at the early July plenumource of delay in the completion of the draft plan outline and in the convocation of the congress.

These changes in the draft plan in any case seemed toartial rejection of Kirilenko's earlieron industrial goals. At the same time, Kirilenko presumably would have agreedrogram of massivein machine building for agriculture, such as _Brezh-nev indicated in his July plenum report was planned.

Brezhnev stressed, for example, tho Imperative need to createhortranch of machine building for the production of equipment for the dairy and fodder industries, as well as to develop machine building for land melioration and agricultural transport. Brezhnev argued thatertain time is needed to do all this work, but theneeds machinery now." Although Polyanskiy would not

oppose investment in agricultural machine-building in prin-:iple, he might feel, as he didhat the money


could be put to better use toward other programs forgiven the actual low level of agronomics in the countryside. Thus Brezhnev appeared to recognize Kirilenko's view on the immediate channeling of agricultural fundsachine base. At the same time, Brezhnev's reportthe justification of continued high rates of investment in the agricultural sector andonsensus, in particular, on the "expediency" of increasing materialin the dairy industry an apparent bow to the Polyanskiy view.

a deer tersist of

probably served as the basis ae or me central Committee and Council of Minis-improving the use of technology in agriculture,

which appeared inugust issue of Sovetskaya Rossiyathe newspaper most closely associated with The decreeumber of ministries slated to assist in the production of machinery and equipment for the agricultural sector in theear period. Notably, however, the list did not include several which

n iii

Brezhnev had named at the July plenum as potentialin the voluntary program: the ministries of aviation, machine-building industry, shipbuilding, and defense industry.

On the day of the decree's publication, Kirilenko and Kulakovonference in the Central Committee with officials of the Ministry of Tractor and Agricultural Machine Building, evidently to assign them tasks inout the decree. Theyimilaronth later,eptember, on the manufacture of harvesters and spare parts, with officials of the same ministry. Thus, Kirilenko publicly identified himself with atart of the program for technical assistance to agriculture which Brezhnev presented at the July Central Committee plenum.

D. Towardh Party Congress

The decision to convene the congress inhich was made sometime between the Central Committee plenumsndas accompanied by an apparentof the scope of Kirilenko's administrative functions in the Secretariat, which suggested that Brezhnev hadsome of his powers to him.* It is not clear if the

*See CAESAR XXXIX, pp. . An especially suggestive episode was the early0 Pravda photograph which showed Kirilenko and Polganskiy in the second rank behind Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin at an airport ceremony, notably omitting to show Suslov and other ranking leaders who were present. Only Sovetskaua Rossiua and Sel rskaya Zhizn'j which are considered politically responsive to Kirilenko and Polyanskiy on most issues, among the other central press dailies also printed the TASS photo. This seemed to underscore the political sensitivity of their editorial boards to Brezhnev's personal interests and toindicate that Kirilenko and Polyanskiy were then the General Secretary rs preferences for succeeding eventually to the top Party and government posts.

purpose was to free Brezhnev to devote his mainpreparing for the congress or if, as seems morearrangement was intended to suggest that KirilenkoGeneral Secretary's personal choiceseconda status to be formalized in some way at the


with Brezhnev's approving signature. The publishedin fact, contained for the. first time in Sovietection on "improving management andhichreen light to the formation of production associationsystematic basis, thus tending to confirm that Kirilenkoecisive say in drafting them, until Brezhnev signed his name to the directives, he himself had not mentioned the associations or in any other way been publicly connected with them.



The proceedings and protocol of the congressa slight improvement in Kirilenko's position in the leadership but failed to reflect the heightened authority he apparently held in the Secretariat after last July. Suslov retained exactly the same positions he had held atongress in Brezhnev's listing of theand Secretariat, and his prominence in presiding over several sessions of the congress suggests that he will continue to bo an obstacle to Kirilenko's further advance. Kirilenko's improved position in protocalat the congress was due to the downgrading of Voronov in the Politburo and the removal of Shelepin from the Secretariat: Kirilenko moved up to the fifth place on the Politburo (after Brezhnev, Podgornyy, Kosygin, and Suslov) and the third place on the Secretariat {after Brezhnev and Suslov). If indeed it is Brezhnev's plan to achieve public recognition of Kirilenko as "second inuslov's continued presence in the leadership appears toajor obstacle to its fulfillment.

The election of four additional full members of the Politburo probably was intended to provide for the eventual replacement of some of the aging members of that body, including Suslov. The over-all effect ofonsolidation of Brezhnev's power, butalso made appreciable gains in his position. Two of the new members, Ukrainian Premier shcherbitskiy and Moscow City Party boss Grishin, appear to be more closelywith Kirilenko than with Brezhnev. Kazakh Party first secretary Kunayev has been the most vocal ofpublic supporters and probably owes his present position entirely to the General Secretary's patronage, but his views on economic matters seem quite close to those of Kirilenko.* The fourth addition. Party Secretary

'See especially Kunayev'e report to the Kazakh Central Committee plenum in

Kulakov, has worked closely with Brezhnev and Polyanskiy on agricultural questions5 and has no obvious political connections with Kirilenko {although he was associated with Kirilenko after the0 planum in the area of agricultural machine building). Kulakov's promotion to the level of senior secretary, where he joins Kirilenko and Susloveputy to Brezhnev, may entail some slight changes in secretarial assignmentshe may, for example, continue to supervise agricultural matters while taking on the responsibility for overseeing the consumer sector and light Industrybut probably will not essentially alter the existing division of labor in the Secretariat, at least for the immediate future.

These and other personnel changes at the congress, as well ae the inclusionumber of Kirilenko's managerial ideas in Brezhnev's report, suggest that the two leaders are now closer than ever before. Thiswould seem to improve Kirilenko's chances as asuccessor to the General Secretary in most It might also make for heightened conflict with Suslov, Kosygin, and other top leaders who ara relatively independent of the Party boss. The outlook, therefore, isontinuation and perhaps intensification of the main lines of rivalry which have have been observed


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