I
i
I
I
i
based personnel7
the ryabov case
of interest, however, is one case whichhad no ci ramifications, and which was aof the path soviet oporations were toecade and more in tho future. thisoviet political officer with tho rank of major and thename of vasiliy nikolayevich ryabov, and his german girl friend.* ryabov had been wounded5 during the soviet capture of berlin and had been brought back to healtherman nurse, who lator became his girl friond. 7 ryabov was stationed ln dresden. his girl friond resided in west berlin, where information on her attachment to tho soviet major came to the attention of captain alexander sogolow,fficer in liaison with cia's berlin base. george belle of tbe berlin base was thereupon put in contact
data on this case derive primarily from personal interviews with case officers who were directly the writer was unablo to verify whether ryabov was the major's truo name, nor was he able to establish the nii'-so's identity. horough soarch of various cs document repositories failed to unearth operational files, personality dossiers, or other vital data on this case. neitherid/cryptic reference, nor ci staff was able to provide meaningful information. ile allegedly associatedn fact refersorson who has no con-
nection with the case.
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with Ryabov and the nurse, and from7 to9 Ryabov acted as the principal agent in tho CARAVAN operation, whichime also carried the designation DODGE. 8 the case was taken over in Berlin by Boleslav A. Holtsman. The German girl acted as courier between the major in Dresden and the Americans in West Berlin. Ryabov had immediate family members in Moscow, and he was unwilling to opt for an outright defection because of the penalties his relatives would undergo if he fled. His reporting on Soviet order of battle and on Soviet intentions during the height of the Berlin BlockadeS was judged of outstanding value. Operational planning included tho staging of an accident completeorpse from the Berlin morgue provided with documents alleging that the body was that of Major Ryabov. CIA operational capabilities in the Soviet Zone of Germany werehowever, and in9 Ryabov wastoour of duty with the Soviet Ministry of Defease. Prior to his departure, Ryabov was briefed on plans to aid in his future exfiltration via Finland or Iran. Although CIA obtained word of his safe arrival in Moscow, the Agency was unable to
3. Recruitment
The recruitment of
xgents of Soviot nation-
almost always was based on their ideologicolto the Bolshevik dictatorship. In the case of Soviet minority nationals such as tbe Ukrainians, Baits, and Armenians, the ideological motivating factor was that of opposition to Soviet Russian imperialism and the possible liberation of their homelands. remuneration played tho dominant role only with strictly mercenary agents who undertook to perform a
lission in returnixed fee. The border-
crossing missions undertaken on CIA's behalf by certain
^Jiatlonala are an example of tho strictly cash-for-sorvlcos-rendered arrangement. Financialwere also the primary motivations of the
crews who undertook
Upon-completion of the assessment package and receipt of appropriate operational security clearance, tho recruitment "ceremony" usually included tho signingecrecy agreementontractual obligation on the part of the Agency toavings fund in which the agent's salary and any bonuses would be held ln escrow pending tho completion of bis mission. The Agency's name was never used in the recrultmont of
xgents. Agreements were usually made with the US Government, tho Department of Defense, or the US Army. Undoubtedly, however, many agents guessed or deduced that they were dealing with CIA.
"lagents provided by the anti-
In cases of
Soviet emlgro groups, recruitment for ponotration missions was done by the emigre group concerned and a
* Ironically, these mercenaries were virtually the only on to survive their missions. See Att. B.
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Original document.
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