Created: 6/1/1971

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible


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Membershipand Recruitment

The Ago . 9

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;The Ingraoif.



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if Conxms of thej.


eographic Variation1 in Vote 9

heExtraparty Vote 1


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ommuniitsin Regional Government

j Conwuniats in the National Government


;ontingencies that WouldCTCibinetRok

Trie PCIoalition Government .

: ;on PCI Cabinet Preferencesi




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Appendix A:PCI Leaders Reached tlie Topjjihe Bureaucratic Channels of Soviei-PCI Connections



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Much has changed since ihehen the US hid to take seriously the possibilityommunist coup In Italy or an outright election victory of the Italian Communist Partyodiy the definition of the party's present and future impact on American interests in Inlymore complicated.

In one of the fairly gradual changes. Italians have come to accept the PCI more and moreormal political party. The Vatican's ownof the durability of Communal regimes and its consequent pragmatic view of its relations with Communist-controlled countries encourage theItalian

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Moreover, the long-standing hope of Italy's non-Communist reformers that the Pa would decline is dying. They had expected theolitical strength to erode as social and economic Justice for the poor improved in Italy. But. in fact, despite substantia! and steady gains in these fields, the PCI's role in practical politics is rising.

Rome itself has grown Increasingly independent of Washington. Italy, as much as any European country and more than most, has experienced economic recovery and gone on to unprecedented prosperity to that total economic dependence on the UShing of the past. The concomitant political dependence on thr US of the early postwarow beginning to

At the same time, the political relations between Washington and Moscow havehe brink-of-war atmosphere, engenderedarly by crises over Berlin, has given wayntrolled rivalry that permits such civilized exercUes as the SALT talks.

he old picture of the PCIovement likely to lead to violent revolution is seemingly out of date. On the other haihe conception or the party as an instrument antagonistic lo the US has not been invalidated.

Although Ihe PCI seems far less inclined toward violence than in the early postwar yean,s interested as ever In power. In domestic politics the party is already playing an important role-dominant at lowerjevelsovernment in some areas and influential at the national level. Through democratic procedures and an increasing role In the interplay or Italian

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political parties, the PCI now seems to be movingositionin Italian


; As for the1 PCI's vaunted and much-discussed "Italian road towhich has often been interpreted to mean virtual independenceboth the history of the party and the attitudes of itsindicate that the PCI finds it essential to be part of anand, in fact, is neither able nor likely to break with theThe Soviets, for their part, seem willing to concedeto the PCI in its domestic policy. They demand, however, thatto Soviet views on foreign policy questions where thein Ttaly is heavily concentrated. It is clear therefore thatto Soviit influence will be exploited in ways thatili'll

! This paper examines the largest Communist Party in the Westits present status and prospects in Italian Society.jTo form ajudgment; it describes how the party is set up, how: it resemblesparty, what the characteristics of its members are, how theConsensus and to what degree factionalism is neverthelessthe PCI to the Soviet Union is examined because itthtsrelationship that]US problems with the PCI are most likely todescription of thesources of electoral strength has beenparticular consideration has been given to the nonparty vote for themany observers believed was contingent on the PCI's role asparty and describedrotest vote. Lastly thethe impact the PCI's strength in government is likely to have inwhich have aroused various kinds of American oppositionij jl j .i

I'll The conclusions of the paper are thef;ll j

do so.

;'; I; I. The PCI has taken on many of the aspectsj'g |, 1

he PC3 has not cut its tics with the Soviet Union and is unlikely to

he PCJ'a activity In local government is going well and isht PCI Iienlarging its role In national legislation. Hi!



PCI is doing well politically within Italy and hu disarmeditsij :

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It is highly unlikely that the PCI will gain control or the Italian Government within the foreseeable future.

The PCI may, however, achieve membershipational coalition, either with the Christian Democrats slone or with the Christian Democrats

In domestic rjoUcy, agreement between Italy's Communists and nonCommunists on the priority of economic development is likely toasisonsiderable period of cooperation and consolidation of

he' main problems that PCI membershipational coalition government would pose for the US would center on Communist efforts, under: Soviet pressure, to reorient Italian foreign policy away from its traditional close ties with the US and its active membcrrJiip in NATO.


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The PCI ii In many respects an ordinary polilical party. Itsbackground, for example, is similar to that of some other kft-of-center parties in Weslem Europe. It. like Ihe Social Democratic Party in West Germany and the Labor Party in Britain,elatively large share of poor voters with Utile education. But unlike the situation in these two foreign democratic parties the poor who belong to the PCI divideity and countryside as they do in the Italian Socialist Patty.

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Italian polilical parties typically have some strength in everyregion of Italy. The PCI is normal in this respecl. When Ihe partyfreely in the immediate postwar period, the areas cf them northern and central Italy conttibuted the bulk of party recruits, buta substantial membership has developed in the islands of Sicilyas woll as in the peninsular:i : .

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In organization, too. the PCI has over the past ten years moved closer

to its non-Communist competitors. Like the Christian Democratic Party, tbc

PCI is organized for the most part on the basis of provincial divisions with

subsidiary units, known as sections, whicheographic rather than ar.

occupational base. The partyey characteristic of the Leninist

concept of Communist party organization, has decreased steadily in number

and importance since theespite repeated proposals on the

national level for rcinvigorating this unit of organization. In Naples, in fact.

no cell meeting has been held in years, according to Communist Federal

Deputy Macclocchl.Throughout the country, cells and sections are now

h evidmdy scarce In the factories and almost nonexistent in other plaou of

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The normalarty in Italy, as elsewhere in Western Europe, has relatively older leadership than, for example, the polilical panics in Africa or Latin America. PCI leaders were once characterized by their extreme youth, but now they are approximately the same age as those of the Christian Democratic Party, and the PCI, like the government parties, hasroblems with the juveniles It would like to indoctrinate Leadershipappears to operate in fairly normal fashion, with incumbents exerting great influence on the choice of future leaders.

Like the other Italian poUtical parties of consequence, the PCIajor source of jobs for Its adherents. Although the PCI cannot compete

with the Christian Democrats and Socialists in providing jobs in theit doesubstantial number of jobs in municipalgovernments: The party itself alsoonsiderable numberofficials. In addition, PCI business enterpriseside varietyon all levels of


The party hasonsiderable decline in its officially claimed membership from its peak'he number of members inscribed in the PCI on9 and0 amountedespectively, slight increases over8 figures. Communist partyes are more meaningful in Italy than in most non-Communist countries because all party members must beannually. However, the PCI may have Inflated the figures90 by permitting Issuance of party cards for both current and following years to new recruits who signed up during the month of December. If this practice-unknown in prior years-had not been followed, it seems probable that90 membership figures would haveoss insteadain. This is soonsiderable extent because of the PCI's difficulties in recruiting young adults.

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party's youth organization has shown an even more sharplytrend than the parent organization as is discussed in subsectionhe At' Question. The organization decreased0 toSee Graphic No. I)

The socio economic composition of the party (See: Graphiceviates from the stereotype for Communist parties principally In thesmall segment occupied by urban workers. This group, which is traditionally given credit for the great bulk of party membership, In fact has made up lesa than half of the total over the past rw? decades. Aboit.ercent of Ihe Italian Communist Party membership are urban "orkers, someercent are agricultural workers or sharecroppers,ercent are small farmers, artisans, or white collar workers, only one percent are

students or professjonob, and the remaining fourth of the party Is made up

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largely of "housewivu" or those retired on social security. According to Communist Federal Deputy Mariarge number of those listed as housewives are employed full time at home on nonunion piece work such as glove-stitching.

Over the past two decades, the principal changes in party composition have been the drop in rural members and the substantial increase inThe decrease in the agricultural segment reflects generaltrends in Italy morehange In Ihe party's appeal. The increase in pensioners combines with the sharp drop in the pirty'i youth organization membership (See Graphic Nc. I) toonsiderable aging of party membership.

The party claims to represent the proletariat, and, in fact, most Italian Communists are poor. Most Italian poor nevertheless are not Communist. The party dominates neither the jrban nor the rural3 surrey showedercent of agricultural workers preferring the Communist Party whilendercent respectively) preferred the Socialists or Christian Democrats. Among urban manual workers,ercent preferred the Communists andndercent respectively) preferred the Socialists or Christian Democrats, The party is only slightly, if at all, more successful among the less educated urban workers, attractingercent of those with less than five years of schooling according to Sydney Tarrow.* i

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New member enrollmentajor preoccupation for the PCI. whichontinuation of the drop in membership figures of the pastears. Several misconceptions prevail concerning recruitment of PCI members. Since the end of the Second World War, recruitment Into the PCI has been repeatedly described as heaviest in the industrial cities, such as Turin and MiUn. Il has been explained as resulting from party help for migrants from southern Italy to the north, in fact, party membership in the industrial triangle formed by Turin. MiUn and Genoa has declined, as has membership in big cities both north and south (Seehe reasons for the consistent decline in the party's city membership are not entirely clear, but may be rcUted to the fact that Italy's extraordinary postwar economic growth has been more beiiefical to this segment of Its population than to any other. While some workers winning substantial economic gains in the Central regions, or Red Belt, may remain Communist in order to benefit

keep Communist workers In the PCI in the big industrial cities farther north, where centeNeft governments are common.

Potential recruits in tho north appear to become familiar with the party primarily through labor activity, but actual recruitment has had very little success there over the past two decades. The backbone of stabl" new recruitment to the party takes place in the Red Belt of Italy, so-called because of its long tradition of left-wing political sympathy. This areaercent of Italy's Communisu62CI aid to migrantsrominent factor here. One acute political observer reports, "One of the most politically profitableoperations in which PCI <on-trolled organizations engage has been the guiding and assistance of urban immigrants whose steady flow (from both nearby countryside and the south) has increased the Bologna population by half in the lastears. These immigrants are warmly received by CCIL* or party-sponsored welcoming committees and assisted in finding work and housing. They are quickly integrated into neighborhood social dubs or workers' organizations and made to feel secure and, eventually, at home ln their new surroundings.*'

The concept of party appeal only to antiestablijhment elements is also somewhat shaky.ertain extent the PCI in the Red Belt attracts fundamentally conservative people who have come to regard Communist rule as the norm. Italian women, for example, tend to oppose the PCI in areas dominated by Christian Democrats and Socialists, but to support it in the Red Belt. Outside the Red Belt the PCI has had increasing difficulty over the last decade in getting and holding recruits, thushadow over the theory that attributes the PCI's appeal primarily to its opposition role. Other objections to this theory are outlined in Chapter 4.

The belief that the PCI has been unable lo find members in the South is without foundation. There, success in recruitment in early postwar yearsreat deal lo the party's strong position favoring Und reform. More recently, recruitment has been helpoa by the party's tendency to have club-like headquarters in southern Italy with publicly available television. Political activity and electoral campaigns are important in recruit men' in the south, but turnover of membership is considerably greater there than In other areas of thehac- becauseeruin de-emphasis of Ideology.,The party haa not substantially increased Its membership fn the South in the pastut ll has come closer to holding lis own gains of the first postwar decade there than in the northern regions.

'Iiahtm General Confrdrrerloi of Labor


thousand persona

The (Bason* tor consistent docline tn tho Parly's efly mam bat snip aro not entiretyut may bo rotated to trio loot tnat haly's extraordinary postwar economic growth haa boon moro beneficial to thia segment of Italy'a copulation than to any other. Whilo aomo wnrker* winning aubttentiel economic gains in lha Rod Boil may remain Communist In order to benefit from Ihe partisan preference o' localls. similar reasoning dose not keep Communistn tho PCI in tho big industrial cllko whore center-left governments common.

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Rcvruiimeni lakes place noi so much during labor strikes as during the annual membership drive when old members are expected and urged to repurchase party cards an.', new members are t. rolled. Many party sections sponsor partie< of various kinds-picnics, social gatherum with games or chance, elc.-and In Ihe course of Ihe festivities recrullment lakes place. The drive begins in November and is mosl intense during Ihc first three months of the following year.


The Age Question

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. Critics have charged that the party hu gone sule with an aging leadership and that it has lost its sen* of purpose. They oaim that the party'a deterioration is evident in an increasing failure to attracl youns people to iu ranks. In fact, the PCI has serious problems in this respect, although no greater than those of the other major Italian parties.

The party'a youth organization has been outflanked on the left in recent yean by both the Student Movement and various self-styled pro-Chinese groups. The party insisted that its younger adherents should fentr-ally stay out of ihe violent encounten with the pobec in which youth groups of Ihe extreme left have taken part. PCI youth hat been held to peaceful demonstrations against NATO, visiting US officials, and deUys in university reform, while its peera have been advocating violent action.

The existence of the frictions between the PCI and potential young rccruiu has been emphasized by critics both inside and outside the party, and the problem is confirmed in Ihe membership decline of aboutercent in thef Communist Youth over the past two decades (See Graphic

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Among worken, both in the dty and the county, the percentage supporting the party increases with age, according to SvdneyThe age composition cf the party is now much the same at that of Ihe general adult popublion of the country. Aboutercent of the partyalf is betweeundercent of the party fs

Critics have charged that one reason for the party's failure to attract youth is that the PCI leadership is agingnwilling to take younger men into its ranks. The average age of the party leadership,ot ruing now. as it was in the immediate postwar period. The average age in

Set BUJLotrmptiy

t had risen6 tout It was stillGeneral Berlinguer himselfany of the foundingLuigi Longo had stayedeadership since the party began inthey were in theireveral of these men are now gone.five Communists had an average age ofwo years oldertop five Christian Democrats, but the removal of Longo, who iseliminateljl?

Thus, despite the much advertised disillusionment of Italian youth with the PCI, the party is not at an age disadvantage compared to Its Christian Democratic and Socialist rivals.

Party Debate; j';h!

Communist local leaden display an extraordinary reluctance toparty matters openly. Certain topics, they believe, areontv with other PCI members. While PCI leaders readilyrequests for opinions and statistics, outsiders are almostpermission to attend problem discussions at CommunistThe party goes to great lengths, moreover, to ensure anparty harmony rather than free-swinging debate at such public eventsparty's national

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Left-wing PCI leader Pictro Ingrao commented on party debate in tlie fouowing terms: "Our party seeks to resolve differences insofar as possible not through the counting of votes but through the questnitary position which takes discussion intoe said that in many cases, when the resolution of conflicting positions appears particularly arduous, the Central Committee prefers to postpone decisions until resr>ectrve positions can be given further study. "As far backan remember,'" he said, "the Central Committee has always avoided pushing matters to the breaking point" Ingrao went on: "It goes without sayingnanimity of votes does not necessarily mean that all dissension has ended and that everybody agrees onule it meansiven view has been endorsedajority and that those comrades who still have objections prefer to stress the unity of party action rather than the public expression ofIngrao went on to say that the PCI did not want u, be like Social Democrats and discuss things so long that no time was left for action. ;

he most revealing and accurate descriptions of interral PCI activity come from high-level Communists now suspended from tne party "on an indefinite basis, who over the past iwo years have been publishing their TJews. Considerable party time is spent on general bureaucratic activity, they

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' ij report, and Utile on substantive discussion. An article in the dissidents'. ; I; monthlyanifesto said: "Despite the many efforts which have beenf the party sections have never succeeded in placing at the center ofactivity the problems of the factories or of the schools in their territory,; henceeal movement. In great part, they arc involvedoutine work on membership, fund-raising, or press circulation. In Ihecenters, especially in the Red zones, there is also the work of directingepresentatives in the local municipality; in the largeertainmount of debate with the non-Communists must be undertaken.attern of work is interrupted by the election campaign! (which, however, ; ave necessarily lost .the character of total mobilization which they had in) and also by the great political events (Czechslovakia, the question of whether Communist rulers should permit non-Communistarties, the French events of. whicn arouse, right at the rank-and-file level, heated.discussions which are precisely discussions 'onvents which happen' more than on the 'events to be made to happen.'"

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t the Federation;level too, the organization's administrative work isquite absorbing. "Minute and laborious checking of theactivity and of the press campaign takes the energy of many peopleany months of the year. In addition to this, there are the often compli-| cated questions of job assignments and the miserable task of balancing the books. The time and energy which remain are mostly devoted to direction of Communist policy in the local administrations, the frequent electionthe problems of the key positions for the mass organizations,inally thef the active members with regard to theolitical matters. If we analyze the calendarederation Committee orn executive organ, we find that the activity of working out the program of struggle, of constructing the movement, and of tactical direction of it proves actually ;to be marginal arid is delegated instead, with the 'supervision' (ofteneneral kind) of the party, to the trade union

Selection of leaders* ; j '

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I Expenence in, party organization appears Io be the mainor reaching the top In the PCI. Prolonged residence or training in thes rarely found in the background of the top Italian Communists. Many, i; however, were active In the party's youth organisations,osition Inarty press has helped Others climb to the top. Labor activityieldhus far has notarticular help to Italian Communists in achieving

'See Appendix A

the higher reaches of party direction. Activity in the political field is more of an asset. Eight of nine members of the PCI Politburo are federal deputies. Aboutercent of the Communist members of parliament are on the Central Committee, where they constitute about one third of the total-percentages that have remained nearly constant for the past IS years.

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The pro forma aspects of the selection process were illustrated some years ago when Ugoho hadame for himself and had (ained friends at the top through PCI youth activities, was first appointed regional secretary in Turin. Party regulations specify that the Federalthe Control Commission, and the Provincial Council act jointly toew provincial secretary. Pecehiou's appointment, however, was officially announced in the; press some ten days before these groups met. This appointment illustrates the party hierarchy's tendency to minimize the importanceabor background. Labor criticized the appointment of Pecchiou, saying that he was the man least fitted for the job in industrial Turin because he had never workedactory and had no history of being involvedj-

; Communist dissident! commented accurately tn their monthly maraslnefartifesto on the Party's method of telexting leaden as follows: In tht sXl. the fundamental mechanism for choosing leaden Is coop ration, the mechanism of ij selection or electionroup by voir of its own membm. What sustains this methodet of unwritten laws and habits tuch as, for example, the purely formal election of the election committees, which art in reality composed of the preceding dlrecHng groupt; iht holding of lhe elections almost alwaysj of dosed states: the tnttntntion of the higher bodies fn iht selection of thefficials oflhe lower ones'the power oflhe executive organs over thott aired by direct election; and the large number of Important functions (press.entral machinery, study centtn) whichxisc itetutory framework andwhich are subordinate io Iht central directing groupirect and unlimited

Nevertheless, this method, mitigated onlyolerant end open procedure, has try serious limitations In the long run.

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Thefint limitation comes from the fact thatevery militant finds himselfdepend-big, when he assent himself, more on the Judgment of them who outrank him than on the fudgmenl of hlt.pem, and th err fort he Is led not only toolitical dtsagrremenr with those tn the higher ranks but also to avoid Initiatives

'Sectlariat member, see chart p. 19

susceptible of error or failure, which are more perilous men carrying out ha assigned dutiesenous and humble manner. The mllilanielative potttteel freedom only hy acquiring membership in the national directing group or by having personal claim to distinction tn rocttty. Consequently tht paradox arises of greater poltiicoortanttartonat Imagtna mentis and creatMty at iht center than on tht periphery, and the high-ierti leader, with all tht nsponsiblllttet which he bears, shows himself mon daringoung federation secretary. Another limitation, even more serious. Is connected with tht rrte lively small sue of the real (national) directing group, which has ihe effect thatarge number of officials, tht prospect of advancement is not Identified withirecting past ir. tht party but ratherltt In social standing culminating at election to parliament

In fact, the so-called social promotionsarliamentaryhenomenon contributing to the PCI's evolution toward quasi-normalparty status. The member of parliamentertain local autonomy on the basis of his careeregislator. As in the democratic panics, personal and electoral considerations then sometimes prevail over the course of action dictatedtrict construction of the parly line.

The Secretaries General i

Achieving the pott of PCI Secretary General has thus far required Soviet approval as welluccessful party career. As incumbents, however, the Italians have tended to show greater independence of the Soviet Party than they did at aspirants for the post.:

The Italian Communist Pany came Into being1ro-Moscow splinter of the Socialist Pany, which had applied for membership in the Communist International but then split over accepting all the conditions imposed by the SovieU. Amedeo Bordiga sided with Moscow in the schism and became the first head of the Italian Communist Party. The first major shift in the party's top leadership, which camebo reflected the interests of Ihe Soviets. Donald BUckmer of MIT. commenting on (his period, says, "When the USSR, having for the time-being abandoned hope of revolution in Europe,actic of united action with the Socialist, the new line was only grudgingly accepted by Bordiga, the PCI's InsurTCC-tion-mlnded leader. Antonio Gramsci won Ihc leadership job from Bordiga by demonstrating not only his adherence to the substance of Soviet policy bo' hb acceptance of ihe basic principle that the Comintem'i authority was to be unconditionally recognized."

Blackmer further comments that Palmiro Togliatti seemed in theore loyal to the USSR than Gramsci, whom he succeeded de facto after the PCI chiefs arrest6 and de jure after Gramsci's death in prisonIn replyorried letter from Gramsci, who was disturbed by Stalin's evident willingness to wreck the unity of the Bolshevik party by imposing stiff disciplinary measures against Trotsky and other oppositionists, Togliatti brusquely dismissed the complaint. Insisting on the ^possibility of meddling in Soviet affairs and on the need for absolute trust in the actions of the Soviet leadership."

Once in power, Togliatti, like Gramsci and Bordiga before him, seemedbe less blindly loyal to Moscow than when he wasa mere aspirant for power. Ignazio Silone, the Italian writer whorewar member of the party, says that in this period the Italian Communists believed that they could defend their own organization and policies from invalid criticism if they stayed together. Silone notes that Togliatti seemed sincerely committed to this, and in private meetings even insisted strongly that they were protected only when agreement was unanimous. When some membersTogliatti pointed to the experience of the Spanish Communist partyhe majority of the members of the PCE had opposed certain arbitrary Muscovite demands, Togliatti said, whereupon the party had been dissolved and some young menro-Moscowad beento re-establish it.inority capable ofod from Moscow to bring Its own country's party to heel existed in Italianas well, according to Togliatti, and Silone notes, "it was represented even then by (later Secretary General) Longo and (Pietro) Secchia."

: Togliattinto fairly serious difficulties with thetime to time during his long tenure as Secretary General and by thehis career had come to be regarded as an apostle of relativelypaths

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he power transition in the PCI following Togliatti's death4 apparently occurred smoothly and rapidly, but only because the succession problem had been fought out ahead of time. Old-line Communist Pietro Secchia, for example, was at onerincipal contender for Togliatti's job but had been dropped from the secretariatS in what some saworld-wide purge of, the! followers of the former Soviet police chief Lavrentiy Beria. Umberto Terracini, wholaimharter member and dose associate of Gramsci, did not qualify for the post of Secretaryart because he hadeputation ln the early postwar periodeader of the. PCI nationalist group. Lulgi Longo, on the other

hand,istory of consistent support of Moscow although he was often at odds withccording to polemics in the PCI press in recent years, Longo even backed Moscow in thehen Stalin made an abortive attempt to move Togliatti from active leadership of the PCI to an international Communist post requiring residence In thefter Togliatti's death in the Crimea, Longo succeeded withoutquestiontotheipostofsecretarygeneral.

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i'! i, The apparent smoothness of the power transition from Togliatti to Longo4 could not hide for long the divisions among other PCI figures

and the beginning of the inevitable power struggle for succession to Longo.

! Conflict centered on two diverse and conflicting strategies advocatediorgio Amendola and Pietro Ingrao for Communist achievement of national

i governmentmendola's proposal wasnified workers' party,

and Ingrao's wasiulogue with the Catholics. As each group has.triedin over its opponents as well as the centrists of Longo and Enrico

Berlinguer, the differences between the two positions have tended to become obscure.owever, Amendola seems more inclined toolitical strength through an enlarging system of ad hoc alliances, while Ingrao seems more inclined to lookommon cause in some area of economic or social justice.

! jjil The concept of the Unified Workers' Party was raised by Amendola less than two months after Togliatti's deathiscussion of future PCI strategy in the party's theoretical journal Rinascita. Amendola began with what hecriticalamely that "neither of the two solutions '1 proposed to the; working classes of the capitalist countries of Western Europe ;over the pastears (the Social Democratic and the Communist solutions) jj has proved itself able, as of today, toocialist transformationhange in theolitical organization which has not reached its objectives inentury, with the cooperation of three generations ofust seek the reasons for tiiis, failure and must .know how to transformence the necessity for the creationunified party of the workinghich would encompass all the forcesrom the PCI to the Christian Democratic left wingers, and which "mustewapable ofew strategyewolicy of the struggle for socialism in ourmendola amplified hishoughts wilh the heretical statement that the new party could not be builtither- in Social Democratic or on Communist positions, for in either case ii the result would be not unification but the absorption of one into the other.

Ingrao's,"Dialogue with thes it has emergedonsiderable period of time in his speeches and writings, starts from his own "critical determination" that the "Catholic masses" are becomingngly aware that in order to extricate the Italian system from crisis,ust "goeeting with theence his proposali! joint Commurust-Catholic assault on the system itself at all levels-economic,

social and political. Although Ingrao doescessarily excludeialogue can be carried on with tho Christbn Democratic partywhole, he has repeatedlyreference for dealing withDemocratic left wingers and with the less definedIn essence, Ingrao proposes to work outside the system ofpolitical forces. Only thus, he believes, can the revolutionarythe PCI be preserved and its goal of the overthrow of the present!,

;:Neither Amendola's nor Ingrao's strategy was openly welcomed by the non-Communist political parties, and, within the PCI, the two strategics continued to clash. In the first several months after Togliatti's death, Ingrao seemed to be winning, but in December Longo switched toward Amendolaest of strength in the Presidential electionngrao had advocated support for Christian Democrat Amintore Fanfari. Amendola, on the other hand, foughtommon effort with all the parties of the non-Communist left in support of the candidacy of Social Democrat Giuseppe Saragat. The Ingrao-Amendola struggle went onumber of fruitless rounds of balloting during which the Communists, unable toecision, cast their votes for one of their own. Finally, the stalemate was broken when Amendola prevailed and the party threw its backing to Saragat. thus ensuring his victory. J! !=

I'Three major factions* now characterize the party: the so-called right wing of Giorgiohe so-called left wing of Pictro Ingrao, and the center of Enrico Berlinguer. Berlinguer seems at the moment to be in the strongest positiontrong challenge from Amendola, whoonsiderable number of supporters. Ingrao is clearlyeaker position than the other two leaders, but perhaps only temporarily. In addition, there are two important minor factions, the old Stalinists and the Manifesto group with incipient Maoist sympathies. Factors drawing support to an individual faction leader may include his willingness to accommodate to views of the party base, his past role in the party, his geographic origin, and his ideology and attitude toward Moscow. His personality is of less importance.

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The Amendola Faction

Key politburo member Giorgio Amendola derives considerable party support from the! fact that since Czechoslovakia he hasublic

'Factions are not clearly organised and delineated ht the PO as they are bt mostparties. Factionalism as it is understood bi American potitkal Hfetn the PO. >i; It; ill '

position of greater loyalty to the Soviet Union than either Berlinguer or Ingrao. In this way Amendola has strengthened his position with the party rank and file. Most of the ordinary party members did not like the PCI's condemnation of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. They tended to rationalize the Soviet action as justified by Tacts unknown to the Italians. They suggested that the Soviets rightly maintained secrecy on matters important to the security of the international Communist movement andelief that questioning Moscow's actions was likely to harm the solidarity of the Communist movement.

Amendola's pro-Soviet stance also nettedertain amount of support from the Oldroup holding about five percent of the seata on the Central Committee. This group is probably more important than its number; indicate since its members, who are mostly in their sixties, have ties of long ending in Moscow. Members of this grojp were somewhat more sympathetic to Ingrao's hard line than to Amendola's reformism in the penod immediately foUowing Togliatu's death, but have been reluctant to countenance the continuing critical attitude of Berlinguer and Ingrao toward Soviet guidance over the past two years.

Amendola is the party's principal leader in Naples andumber of years has had close ties with the PCI in the South. He undoubtedly gains some strength from this fact, but the area is far from an Amendola preserve. Half the PCI federations in both Rome and Naples are reported to be strongly sympathetic to some of Amendola's enemies.

Amendola has strength in the Red Belt Guido Fanti, 'he top-ranking Communist in the region of Emilia Romagna-wherehird of all PCI members live-is consistently describedendoliano. Elio Gabbuggiani. the principal Communist official in Tuscany, isember of thb faction.

The Ingrao Faction | j

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Pietro Ingrao's strength lies In th; fact that hb ideological position is closer to the traditional idea of Communism. Much of hisarming in his relations with Soviet party leaders would probably resultwirc to Ingrao within the PCI because hisasically attractiveumber of first-line leaden.;

J Ingrao is particularly closely associated with Umbria, the third of the Red Belt regions. The PCI leader there, Pieron Ingrao man. He b

also one of the few PCI leaders withlabor background. The comparative record of Ingrao's Umbria and Amendola's Emilia Romagna and Tuscany over the next year or so is likely to-Influence the outcome of the factional struggle within the party. The relative poverty of Ingrao's territoryeem to stack the cards against him, but greater labor loyalty, if it should materialize, wouldonsiderable asset.

ff !

1 Ingrao is by far the most attractive of the top leaders to the dissident

: Manifesto group. These dissidents include five federal deputies, although the total formal membership is estimated. The Manifesto group has

number of sympathizers who have remained within the party, however, including Neapolitan Deputy Maria Antoniettaho was one of three PC3 members to re-establish party contact with Peking in late October

The Berilnguer Faction j:

1 'i'iBi'iPJ Ml

eputy Secretary General Enrico Berlmguer, of course, has the strength joi" possession or near rjosscssion of the levers of power. Since Secretary General Longo's strokeerlinguer more often than not has played the role of chief of the party.

Berlinguer is disliked by the old Stalinists for his criticism of the Soviets, He is disliked by the Manifesto dissidents for supporting the national government's austerity measures as the best way in the long run to achieve worker benefits. He is disliked by Amendola and Ingrao bcciuse they want his job. The Soviets seem not to havearm relationship with the deputy secretary general in recent years.

! Berlinguer comes from Sardinia, which is not much of an asset InHe was,rotege" first or Togliatti and then of Longo.his greatest strengths may lie in the desire of many Italianfor continuity. While Ingrao would push for an alliance withand Amendolaew alliance with the Socialists,the impression that he would keep the partyhe partyopposition, moving It gradually along its path toward anrole as the party of constructive opposition.

-Byower within the PCI appeared to be shifting from BerUnguer and the ailiig Longo to Amendolr. Longo wai rtlU In effective


control, however, and in early fall0 puteorganization ofparty, which seemed to give something to every faction but most to Berlinguer. Berlinguer has retained his job as acting secretary general as well as his positions on the politburo and secretariat, although he wasere ordinary memberew international affairs commission headed by pro-Soviet Giancario Fajetta. Simultaneously, moreover, the chief targetoviet criticism in recent months, Carlo GaDuzzi, was promoted to the PCIumber of other transfers and new appointments of somewhat contradictory tendencies were also made. The prospect remains one of periodic strain but no break inies.

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PCI relations with Moscow"onstant consideration in the party's policy positions as well as in its top personnel choices. The Italian party has long been the most independent major Communist party in the free world.s nevertheless strongly influenced by the CPSU. The Italian party'stoward autonomy, whichrisk pace at the time of the Intervention in Czechoslovakia, has since faltered.

[;liH' jii

In6 during the furor over de-Stalinization, the Italianthough torn by internal dissension, nevertheless maintained itsMoscow. Latehe crisis over the Soviet invasion ofnot only the ordinary party members but the PCI leadership asit was only further developments-Suez, primarily, andfrom the Warsaw Pact-that enabled the Italianwhich supported the Soviet action asrievous necessity,"I Ijj.iH

1 ;ulIii ! t I

espite considerable party talk duringf possibleSoviet political positions, the PCI again failed to show independencedispute over the Arab-Israeli conflicthere werewithii' the party, with Giorgio Amendola, who has takenposition in the past two years, opposing the strong Sovietthe Arabs. Pietro Ingrao, who has been strongly critical of the Sovietsendorsed; Moscow's position in this case. In nodid the Communist press or the party leadership publiclySoviets. Although at first the party lagged behind the Sovietsew weeks the PCI line was fully inHjl{ ': fij';:

The major test and the high point thus far of Italian Communist independence from Moscow was, of course, the Czechoslovak crisishe Italian Communists believed that the decentralization of theCommunist movement as exemplified in Prague's experiment was important to:their domestic political success. As the Czechoslovak crisis developed, the Italian Communist leaders sought both publicly and privately to dissuade the Soviets from violent action. The intervention, when it came, shocked the party, and the leaders decided on immediate censure.

ihe week after the censure, all Communhl fedorah rough -

. out Italy ratified theIhe

, federation level, however, local iviuuumParticularly among older Communists, then; was some tendency lo trust the m

l '1 )Xi-

After the intervention, the PCItrong effort to rallyCommunist opposition to the Soviet action. The Italians wanted to protect the Dubcek government, if possible, but in any case to distinguish the Italian Communist position clearly and unmistakably from thai of the Soviets. The PCIpecial point of working wilh Its Frenchand held consultations with other West European parties, including Ihe British, Ihe Austrians, and the Spanish.

The Italian Party's stand against Soviet intervention in ClechodovakUew degree of independence. The PCI was for some months unequivocal and persistent in criticizing the Soviet action. It was in the forefront of efforts to strengthen opposition to the Soviets in Communist parties throughout the free world. In addition, during the first few months after the intervention, the Italian Communist leadership gave every sign of an unusual degree of cohesion, and Secretary General Luigi Longo'a position seemed strengthened.

Fhe Soviets have since made unremitting and partly successful efforts to bring the PCI back into tine. In such efforts, they use financial and personal pressures and stress the need for conformity to CPSU views in foreign policy positions more than in domestic political affairs. The PCI muted its criticism but has never recanted Its condemnation of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia,

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Financial RebttawK| I '

Tha PCI has decreased its financial dependence on the Soviets over the noat IS years but has never managed without substantial Soviet funds and would find it difficult to do ao, at least for the present and immediate future. In the wake of the Czechoslovak crisis, from the fall8 to the springhe PCI worried aboul-and sought to p. pare for-the possibility that the Soviets might suddenly reduce or even eliminate their direct cash subsidy to the Italian party. More recently, CPSU-PCI relations nave become warmer, andesult Italian Communists haveore relaxed attitude toward party expenses.

: in thehe annual budget for the PCI itself and its subsidies to various organizations amounted to. Of this0 came from foreign Communist parties or countries, primarily the USSR. |

At present the PCI budget seems to be running at least as highannually, with the direct cash subsidy fromestimatedhe party's income from Italian tradeSoviets, which is carried out by import and export companiesthe PCI, probably does notther partyCommunist countries comes from trade with Romania, whichin9 and was scheduled to net thea similar commercial deal with Yugoslavia. Nevertheless,party appears to have movedositionrovidinghalf of its ownjii Ijj.j

! The differing' Soviet and Italian attitudes toward Dubcckonflict of considerable intensity between the two parties. The Soviets believed Initially that they could impose their will on the Italians by tightening the purse strings. In8 President Podgomy criticized the Italian Party as revblonbt and as bavins declinedocial democratic position, butsaid the price of election to i0 or IS parliamentary seats would bring it and other Western Communbt parties into line, i


hroughout the winter, PCI circles were rife with reports of an impending reduction and/or suspension of Soviet financial aid.arlyhe PCI hadommittee, chaired by Alessandro Cossutta, to workrogram of rigid economy in preparation for the Soviet cut. The plan calledercent reduction Inpersonnel and the party press and an austerity regime across the board. The party also Initiated studies of ways to increase.

! y early April9 the party apparently believed that it couldufficient budget cut to be substantiallyf Soviet funds.Italian Communbt leaders repeatedly referred to French Communistto the Soviet Union and to the French Party's financial dependence

j on the.CPSU, which Inthe Italian view had enforced French obedience.

' By the time of the international Communbt party conference ofhe Czech crisis had receded considerably. Both Italian and Soviet Communist leaders put 'considerable effort into burying their differences andeis'Ively United front to the world. Subsequently the threat of



more acceptable party members apparently arc given greater access to such classified material as Soviet! Embassy briefings on the state of Sino-Soviet

, relations. The Soviets make insistent suggestions for the demotion of the least acceptable party members. The effectiveness of Soviet pressure over the

j pastears of the party's life gives considerable weight within the PCI to

i even the mildest Soviet representation.

Concerns of the

l! The most severe strains in Soviet relations with the PCI have allwith'critical Italian Communist attitudes toward SovietItaly: the denuac-f'i of Stalin, the intervention;in Hungary,Middle East crises7nd the Czechoslovakia invasion.statement of Soviet priorities in this regard canle during the visitformerf the, CPSU Central Committee's InternationalWhen Aleksey Stepanovich Belyakov came to Italy in the fall ofsharply told PCI leaders that they had implcmuttedew ofInternationa! Communist Conference decisions, such asNorth Vietnamese, and were lax on vital points such as Germanch ism and the Middle East situation. The PCI position on theBelyakovppears to be one only of principle, not an active one,CPSU would prefer. And as for China, the CPSU cannot tolerateinterference by other Communist parties. He characterized theon foreign matters as dictated not by political reality butand said the PCI must be more attentive to theof the Moscow party conference, especially on the'


i!On domesticelyakov was less critical. He seemed mostin the PCI role in current Italian affairs and stressed the need for the

. PCI to work for unity of action with all leftist forces in the country. Catholics included, and to avoid at all costsivisive force, Belyakov placed considerable' emphasis on the need for the PCI to develop ties with the Italian Proletarian Socialists, the Italian Socialists^ and the Unitary Socialists and expressed an interest in having maximum publicity given to these efforts in< .Li

: The Soviets have Intervened in PCI personnel matters occasionally, but their motivation appears to be largely that of curbing Italian Communist criticism of the USSR and its policies. Thus the head of theriendship: society was replaced at Soviet instigation because hc"had been hostile to the Soviets over the Czechoslovakumber of prominent Communists were "suspended indefinitely" because of their backing of the


Ton] PCI voting strength has Increased in every nationsl election since the Second World War but is unevenly distributed throughout the country. The rising vote occurs despite falling party membership. This phenomenon can be attributed to an extraparty vote accruing to the party for varying reasons: traditional, pragmatic, and political.

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Geographic Variation as Vote

One basic cause of geographic variation in Communist strength is the difference in the historical role played by the clergy, In the "White" provinces the clergy are remembered as defenders of Italian nationalunder the Austrian occupation of the area during the centuries of emerging nationabsm priorhe "Red" provinces, on the other hand, have much the same territory as the former Papal States andong tradition or anuctericalism.

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A second historical factor in the geographic variation ofb the difference between the roles played by the PCI In thein the south ineriod. With the fail of Mussolinind the conclusioneparate armistice between Italy and thecountry was divided into two zones, with the central and northernunder German occupation and the southern areas under AlliedIn the south,eriod of indecision, the PCI underlo cooperate wilh all groups, includin- the largely discreditedin order lo fight thehile, inand northern Italy, Luigi Longo,fi'dopleader in the Spanish Civil War,rganize guerrillaarmed Resistance against the Germanshe Italian puppetthe autumn3 to the general uprising of5 was notthinercent of

the partisans wereCI'a achievements in

the Resistance gave the party great prestige in these areas with theat large. Furthermore, its control over thousands of men and women in partisan units gave the party an opportunity to carry on politicalIn an emotionally charged atmosphere and to recruit party members.

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.Thr difference between the Communbt role ln northern and southern Italy5 largely explains the difference between the two areas in the Communbt voteumber of explanations, hone totallyhave been offered for the sharp Increase In the PCI vote in the South and

Islands6ut lhe most convincing probably is the party's close association wilh land reform. In any case, the gain evidently occurred primarily at the expense of lhe Liberal party, which0 percent in the ^oulh6 andercenthe Liberals, who in earlier years had stood for reform, in the postwar period have come to be regarded as the conservative voice of big business.

he Communist Party has gained in voting strength in all sections of the couniry. The PCI's approacholid two fifths of the votein the Redroviding the party wilh increasing experience inal, provincial, and now regional government. The Communists are doing almost as well In the South (where Giorgio Amendola has hiss inndustrial Triangle, which is more closely associated with Lulgi Longo. In the parliamentary electionsnly the Islands (Sicily and Sardinia)rop comparedThe dropn Sicily rather than in Enrico Bcrlinguer's home island of Sardinia.)

The Extnparty Vote

ffhy the Communist vote stays high and even increases despite 'he decline in Communist Party membership has never been clear beyondand is not so today. The explanation most often given is lhat the Communist votearge protesthat the Italian voterote for the Communists is the clearest way for him to protest against the incumbent government's inefficiency, corruption, reactionary nature, bureaucratic excesses, and/or failure to cany out social reforms.


in ai sense, any voteongovernment partyrotest against the govemmenL The term "protest vole" in interpretations of Italian elections, however, means that the voter would not vote Communist if he thought the Communists might win, that he votes Communist onlyignal to the government parties to mend their ways. That there is some validity to the concept of the protest vote is suggestedurrey reported by Tarrow showing thatercent of Communist voters would vole for the Chi is bin Democratic Party if lhat party and the PCI were lhe only parties in Italy. To explain the vote for the PCI whollyrotest of this nature is,erious exaggeration.'

'Son if other segments of PCI electoral support con be categorized as the ancestral tendency vote; the conservative vote In Red regions, the can't-oeat-some truiig-with^iothing vote and, according to Indications from theDOXA survey organization, the vote of those who believe inideals but are not members of the party.

i The Ancestral Tendencyumber of commentators have made the point that Italians tend to vote as their fathers voted before them. In truth, it would be very difficult, perhaps impossible, to explain the stability of Italian voting pattems-in contrast, for example, to those in the United States-on any other


Robert Evans- hvilights the consistent patterns in Bologna. There,

anticlerical voting tendencies have persisted foregacy of

centuries of poor administration of the Papal Slates. In recentodus

vjvendi has been worked out between the Cardinal and the administration,

but latent antickricalbm remains.

Republicanism as an underlyingt least as strong.hen Italians generally rejoiced over Rome's inclusion in the kingdom of Italy, the Bolognese played hymns to Garibaldi and booed the Royal March. The local administration voted that funds allotted for celebrating the King's birthday be canceled.he first move of the Bologna administration after taking part in voting out the monarchy was to remove Victorstatue from the center of the main square. Still today theParty is conspicuously unpopular wilh Bologna's voters,

Socialism alsoong tradition in Bologna. At the turn or the century, Socialists; were in the local government coalition and twothe area in the national parliament.he Socialists wonfeats on the Municipal Council, Bologna's Socialists further increased their strength in national elections9 and in municipal elections0 before the disappearance of normal political life under Fascism2n the early postwar perkommunists and Socialists were allied, thus enabling the PCI to benefit from the whole tradition of Bolognese

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The Conservative Vote in the Redbusinessmen in the Red Belt vote Liberal ot Christian Democratic for national government officials but Communist in local elections because they do not want to disturb the status quo. Other PO supporters who have conservativecan be found working in the intricate net of Communist-ownedand other business activities throughout the Red Belt, but particularly in Emilia Romagna. Commentators on6 election in Bologna reported the absence of radicalism abo, and noted lhat the forward-looking reform candidate was badly defeated by the Communbt whotand-pat idonservative bias to the PCI vote in the Red Belt is further suggested by the fact that an estimatedercent of the Communist vote in Bologna comet from women, who tend in Italy to vote for the party in


eai-Son*rihmg-Wiih-Noihing Vole-The PCI wins many votes through behavior lhal any American politician would regard as just good politics in the tradition ofhe party pays attention to choosing attractive candidates, some of whom campaign hardoor-to-door basis. The partyear-rounda large number of dedicated and disciplined campaign workers, and probably more money for campaigns than any other Italian party except the Christian Democrats. Perhaps above all, many PCI candidates run aswho have long been doing favors for their constituents both in parliament and out.

Idealistic or Sympathetic Vote-There is no reliable way to measure this component of the Communist vote. Italians themselves considerarge contributor, accordingOXA survey

Question-Many ask how the PCI, which hasouple of million (sic) members, wins so many more votes in the elections (for example,ere are some of the explanations which are given when one asks this question.

Please say, for each explanation, whether you think it correcti I!

A Many vottrs really accept Cornmurult Ideah, but do not believe It necessary to takearty card.



Those voters, even when nonCommunht, who wantchange, understand lhat only tbe PCI has Ihean force tohange.

Many *oten, having lost faith In all Ihe other parties, vote 5 : ptt protesta" in favor of PCI.

ven voters opposed lo CorranunUra rote PCI to forot the ; ther parties lo doi

B. Many voten think thai Pa Uadm art nor* honest

j tberepreteolaumof the other parts**.

P. Thota who IWI vlcthnbed by the pmrat system

stand that the -bosses" (car only the PCI. andor tha

thai those tn lha category 0va their voU lo thai

G. Many tote (or the Pa out of hoatiliiy lo (h* ilia 4JJ


The long-standing cliche that no Communist party can come to power far from Soviet or Chinese borders has been largely demolished by the Cuban and then the Chilean example. Now the question as to Italian Communist capabilities for government no longer seems far-fetched. It is possible that PCI experience to date in local and regional government and in theegislature will shed some u'ght on the ways in which the future may answer.

Communists in Local Government

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Communist participation in local government has been constructive and popular and is one of the most effective arguments among Italians for accepting Communists into national government. The outstandingocal Communist government In Italy is in Bologna, the largest cityon-Communist country to have had uninterrupted Communist rule for the past quarter century. j:

The principal characteristics of the local administration during the firstrears after the Communists came to power5ober financial policy, municipaliration, and popular day-to-day administration. So far as financial policy is concerned, the Bolognese Communists for mostheir tenure have been orthodox In the sense that revenues have covered expenditures. This record in local finance enabled the Communist Party throughout Italy to point to Bolognaodel of local administration.

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n the matter of tax levies, the PCIelatively progressive position

by Italian standards. The local administration with considerable success

;raduated income tax (known as the "family tax" and exempting

about half the population)ajor segment of the city's revenue.

B'ii'hHhl1!. {iil'j! si

econd important point of local administration policy isenterprise. All public utilities are controlled by the town hall, including the transportation' system. In these enterprises, town hall policy has been marked by efforts at modernization. Examples include the total mechanization of garbage collection and disposal and the progressiveof the transport system from tramways to trolley and standard buses. Caution in both finance and innovation has been the focus-for many

: of the attacks leveled against the PCI administration as too conservative.

A possibly unique characteristic of Bologna is the municipalizedwhich the town hall established in order to provide medicine to people of limited means at reasonable cost. Previously medicine wasin private stores, which were then reimbursed by the town hall. From the one outlet which opened9 in the town hall, the municipalized pharmacy has expanded until it blankets the entire town, despite the strong proton of the pharmacists'lobby.

I'felili' :i

' So far as normalolicy is concerned, the Communist government has provided public works, street and building maintenance, lighting, and expansion of services generally satisfying the demands of the town. Considerable was also done in the housing field; the town hall directly or indirectly financed someercent of all construction in the period prior to the adoption of town planning.

Although town services such as road maintenance were considerably better around election time, by and large what had to be done in the way of municipal service was done. Town planning, however, was not undertaken during tho first decade of Communist rule.

In the electoral campaignhe Christian Democrats advocated modernization of services, more planning, the adoption of sociological methods to survey the town's needs, and the creationodem center for statisticalepeated theme of the campaign was thato-nothing, standstill policy. The Communists were the victors in the campaign, In part, according to Evans, because the voters feared that election of the Christian Democrat mayoral candidate might mean radical change. Subsequently, however, the Bolognese PCI bit by bit adopted the program on which Ibe Christian Democrats had campaigned.

A pioneer among Italian towns in working out its plan, Bolognainto fourteen sectors or neighborhoods andouncilpresided overelegate of the mayor. This system4 and has provided effective decentralization. The cityagreed that the positions should be filled in approximate proportionown compos'ion. therefore,oteworthy demonstration ofbetween Communists and nonCoamurusts, several of"assi'tant mayors" are Christian Democrats and severalSocialists, 'i'i li; J

In the housing field, the Town Hall purchasedquare meters of land for the osnstaiction of low-cost housing, resellingow





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price under utilization controls. This action stimulated building andandspecuhttioa. jij filjj! !"

Cchool-construction policy put Bologna in the forefrontItalian towns in this field. The plan that was adopted sought to increaseof buildings and to decentralize as well,ostillionAt the same time the University was assignedfor scientificas allocated to afaculty of political science, and0 was budgetedaid. Other major projects in the city's first plan were aBologna and substantial airporti>i i't *i .il"

hanging Communist concepts of local administration have been influ-enced by the party's general status. During the period5evolutionary take-over of the country appeared possible and when the rigid Stalinist approach was mandatory, local administration was seen simplyca,is of seizing power and of retaining control of the unions. Since Secretary General Togliatti made clear in thehat the PCI would seek power through pailiamentary means, control of the local adrairt-istration has beeneans of coming to power legally rather than extralegally. It is also seenay of proving that the party has the right to share in the national decision-making processes and thus can avoid being isolated. PCI leader Giorgio Amendola has used these adrrunistrations as one of the bases for his repeated claims that the PCI isovernment

pp^tb?P h'l liliil "i'i1

Communbta In

jj- j; Fear of Communist dominance in the Red Belt until recently delayed the establishment ofew regional governments that were called for in the constitutionlections for these regional governments were finally held ins expected, Communist-dominated governments were chosen and have since been installed in the three central Italian regions of Emilia Romagna, Tuscany and Umbria. The effective delimitation of regional governmental powers will be resolved only over the next year or so, but It is clear that regional government willubstantial voice at least in economicield of particular interest to thei

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A Communist leader in Tuscany last spring stated his view of thehree broad objectives in regional government The regionalof the PQ should be models of good government to enhancehe PCI should seek to work with the several parties

of the center toward angle mutually desired goals to make the concept of center-Communist cooperation more familiar and acceptable; and. third, the party should seek to use its regional power to exert influence on national policies in Rome.

. From an administrative standpoint, tho PCI is likely to govern the Red Belt well. The Communists* reputation for effective local governmentaccounts for much of their continuing electoral success in the area, particularly among fringe elements who are unattracted by and who perhaps even dissent from traditional Marxist Ideology. Regional governmentupon such pooular issues as schools, hospitals, low-cost housing, and the like were promised before the election. Presumably in those few impor-

Tuscany, which have until now remained out of Communist hands there willoncerted effort to demonstrate the beneficence of the regional PCI government. As inCI regional administration may be expected to deal with and, to an extent, cater to business interests, rather than to alienate them or otherwise discourage further investment in the region. Meanwhile, the established net of cooperatives, social and recreation clubs, and other party-controlled activities will continue lo "look after" everybody who can be attracted to their ranks. All in all. not much will change in the life of the average inhabitant of the area, which is already largely governed by local PCI administrabonL

Securets own pre-eminence in the three Red regions, the PCIclear it will welcome participation by any of the democraticCommunists' final target is, of course, the Christian Democrats,would supply precedent for similar participation byother regioni where the Christian Democrats have the upper hand,in national government. This willingness torequently being expressed in language reminiscent of thecooperation in wartime resistance. Bologna'a ex-Mayor Guido Fantisome months before the June elections that If the regions are todecisive function in the process of democraticheshould "not presume to express in themselves the whole of socialtruth, but ahould function as the political and idealisticof trueore specifically. PCI ProvincialCaletU has declared: "We believe lhat whether on theor national plane, leadership ihould not pertain to any one partyno matter how strong. We areollaboration amongof democratic orientation. Let us not place emphasis uponupon problems, upon things toihliig. :'iH"

NoUonoJ considerations and pressures plus grass-roots opposition will probably contain these of the local Chrisliin Democratic leader who might be tempted toormal alliance with the PCI. Nevertheless, there will probably be common programs on specific Issues and much informalparticularly at the committee level in the Regional Assembly. Ample precedent for both exists in the multiparty Regional Planning Commission, which although nominally apolitical has in fact brought togetherof all the prominent parties in remarkable harmony and even unanimity. Such regional cooperation will probably start slowly and increase gradually, it will be carefully justified at each step by public need and delineated by realTirmatians of continuing opposition on matters of "politics" as distinct fromhis in effect would beontinuation of what has been happening increasingly in local government of this area over the last ten years.

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Speaking of regional influence on national policy in an interview

published by the influential newspaper La Stamps Communist leader Eho

Gabbuegiani said,ill give you an example. The economy of Tuscany is

tied to the foreign market. Our trade is great. It is logical that Tuscany

should want to have relations with all the countries in the world, lhat it

shouldolicy ofolicy of overcoming blocs, Tuscany

therefore should make itself heard by the national government on this

La Stampa comments lhat the example cited by Gabbuggiani suggests howressure instrument on Rome the regions can be, especially those governed by the opposition. Gabbuggiani reportedly smiled as he talked and said, "II is not that we want to make foreign policy. Butebate in Parliament on foreign trade, for example, it will be right that we Tuscans put forth our point of view. How? With proposals of law to the Chamber (the Regions can do this) or with orders of the day."

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Communists in the National Government

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The PCI Is the second largest party In both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, with more than one fourth of the reats In each house. Throughout the postwar period, Italian governments have maintained their independence of Communist voting strength. Each government has insisted that majorcould be passed onlyajority consisting of non-Communistommunists have thus been unable to us* tiieir parliamentary voting trades on major legislation. Communist


i voting strength has Io date had two major outlets. First, Communist votes land evidently Communist amendments are accepted in committee where minor legislation is passed. Second, Communist votes are not only accepted but warmly sought for the election of president of Ihc republic, This is an indirect election, taking place in Parliament, and the candidates tend to be men who split the vote of the Christian Democrats. When this happens, the candidate who wins the Communist bloc, as Giuseppe Saragat didins the presidency. Italy's next presidential election takes placend leading candidates have already begun to maneuver for Communistui'1' !'

Under the incumbent government of Emilio Colombo the PCI is playing an increasingly important part in the passage of major legislation. Party support was indispensable lo passage of Italy's first divorce legislation. The Christian Democrats, who opposed the bill, agreed that cnactmenl of this legislation over their party's opposition would be accepted by Christian Democrat Prime Minister Colombo and would not be consideredrepudiation of his government. The divorce legislation issignificantymbol of Italian independence of the Vatican. The PCI also1 sought to play, an essential role in passageajor economic and financial decree law, which is central to the "Colombo government's program.

ther Communist gains on the level of the national government seem to stem from the influence on Christian Democrats of the Vatican'sof its attitude toward Communist countries, ln the fallor example, right-wing Christian Democrat Andreotti teamed up with then an open Chamber votemendment.

|Theitalian Communist Party bids fair to increase its respectability and its governmental role over the next few years. Catholic-Communist hostility with ils obvious political repercussions will probably coniinuc the decline shown in the follo-ving poll bj the respected Italian polling organization

: "Can oneood Communistood Catholic at the same time?"


Don't Know

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Nevertheless, no one of the four members of thet-nei Usernow in the cabinet nor the Republicans who have belonged tocenter-left governments-is now prepared to bring the PC3 intoAll four are ready to concede the theoretical possibility lhat theevolve politically to the point of being acceptable io the otherdifferences among the four center-left parties and their variousin the attitudes toward Ihe PCI which they advocate for thethat is, from now until that future time when the PCIemocratic

i iiFll 'iTillT '' ! i"""f the four parties, the most friendly to the CommurJsts is the Socialist Party and the least friendly is Ihe Italian Social Democrauc Party, with the Christian Democrats and the Republicans generally taxing positions between the two Socialist groups.

The Socialists and the left-wing Christian Democrats generally believe that the democratic parties should work with the Communists whenever feasible so as to encourage the Communist Party's independence and its evolution toward the status of an Italian democratic party. The Social Democrats, the Republicans, and the more conurvative Christian Democrats believe that the Communists ihould show independence of Moscow and respect for democratic processes first and that they should onlybe accepted in the political arena.

I A'number of possible political developments may bring about sufficient change in the center-left parties to permit the PCI's entrance into the government Some of the developments most often considered concern I) the presidential electionplit in the Christian Democratic partyplit in the PO,ncontrolled labor trouble, andubstantial far left gains In the elections

!he Italianimt parliamentary aeaasonj?/hichegional delegates alao participate, rather than by

direct vote of the electorate. The leading candidate! come from the center-left parties, and In fact this year both are Christian Democrats. The vote is secret, the center4eft vote divides among the various candidates, and the Italian Communist Party, which rotesisciplined unit, is expected to be as decisive in the choke of Italy's next president as It was in the choice of incumbent President Saragat. The successfulmay well have made some under-the-table concessionshe Communists in return for the winning vote, but thetems are most unlikely to be big enough to bring theists Into the national cabinet

plit ln the Christian Democratic and/or the Communistften positedogical preliminary to Communist entrance into the cabinet. Predictions of such splits haveadeumber of occasions in the past, but both parties, in fact, appear to have strong inner cohesiveness. Closesuggests that neither party is likely to divide.


labor trouble isore likely preludeentrance Into the cabinet than the other

hypotheses. Both political and labor leaders have beenby the wildcat strikes of the pastonths. These

. strikes, whkh have begun almost spontaneouslyesultlimate of unrest rather than from specific grievances, are contagious. Over the past year organized labor has been forced

: to participate in strikes which began as small wildcat efforts. It

I: is: conceivable lhat one day such strikes will get totally out of hand and lhat the Christian Democrats and Communists would

; then joinind of grand coalition to impose indication, however, thatevelopment is infor the immediate

observers suggest that the far left may makein the parliamentary elections3 andinvited into tbe government.rrdiction Iks inof fantasy. The stability of Italian voting patternsrules out the possibility of this development. Thepanics, whkh until thencluded theand now include the Proletarian Socialists, have polled

;hird of the electorate in all tlie postwargain of two percent for the PCI, or the far left generally, in the

lections would be regardedubstantial gain and in fact as alarminglyain of this size would be Impressive and helpful to the Party's prestige, but it would not be nearly enough to give cabinet posts to the PCI.

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JAmendola has expressed the opinion that the PCI is already aparty. Thereood oeal of merit to his position. As has been explained in the three preceding sections on Reds in Government, the PCI is already exercising authority at various levels and in various areas. With the establishment of regional governments and the center-left's greaterto accept Communist votes on amendments of national legislation, PCI Influence is clearly growing. It Is probably more useful to consider the actual and potential impact of the PCI in various policy areas lhan to concentrateossible date for PCI entrance into the national cabinet.






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i VI. SPECULATION ON RED POWER IN ROMEontingencies thst wouldCI Cabinet Role


In the longhe evolution in the PCI's position withinwill figure in an Important way in the party's power positionThe PCI's essential problem is one of retaining its ties withCommunist movement and at the same time moving towardidentification with Italian national aims. This last, if achieved,to soften the opposition of the other political parties toin the|!"

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or Italian Communists, the internationalism of their movement isurely Italian party, even though Marxist in ideology, wouldatisfy PCI members; many would resign. Some of the aspects of the present feeling of membershipowerful international movement could probably be retained if the PCI became dominantegional European grouping of Communist parties; This would be true even if the group became more distant from the: Soviet Union. The group would necessarily include the French party since it is the largest Communist party in Western Europe after the PCI, and it would probably also take in some or the East Europeans including Yugoslavia. In then embryo of such an organization held three regional Communist and left-wing meetings on Mediterranean problems. .'ii!;

egional European Communist association mightther groups of Communist parties. Soviet, Chinese andin orientation. The four could makeore looselymovement. In this way the PCI might diminish itson Soviet influence and thus increase its acceptability to theparties. At the same time it would retain that identity as part ofinternational Communist movement which is so essential to Its image forpart of its membersi::

ill' ill'.'j.jjrofound effect on the PCTt prospects for gaining scatsational cabinet inight also arise from the progress of detente. Whatever fpolitical developments take place over the next few years-such as perhaps the signingALT treaty-the Europeans arc going to feel more and more that the Soviet political systemelatively permanent feature of the landscape. This trend is already evident; it is demonstrated, for example, in less hostilettitudes toward the Communist countries.-Greater Italian acceptance of the USSRormal nation state will be conducive to greater acceptance ofa cabinet role for the PQ. - ;i- i.


I In addition, dcvelopmvnts in Yugoslavia over the next few yeart mayarked effect on theprospects in Itcly. Should thecf federal power to the republics, the growth of independent labor influence, the increase in press and student freedom, and the development of more democratic parliamentary proceedings be maintained in the post-Tito period, the PCI's prospects for acceptance on relatively equal terms In Italy would be improved. If the Yugoslav experiment brings about national disintegration, however,eimposition of direct Soviet domination, the PCI's prospects in Italy would be correspondingly restricted.

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The Paoalition Government

If Italy's CommunaUovernment coalition rote, the imiact is likely to be more on foreign than on domestic policy.n-Communist parties and the influential pressure groups share with theonviction lhat economic growth should be given priority. In its relations wilh other political parties, the PCI would emphasize the pragmatic advantages to them of cooperation and would stress that the facilitation of official action depended on some consideration for Communist interests. The PCI would often evoke the common interest of all the cabinet parties inesurgence of fascism or militarism. To the limited extent of its capabilities, the PCI would use its labor arm to back up its policy choices. The Sovieis would lend to leave Italy's Communists fairly free to make politicalin domestic policy but would demand their pound of flesh in the foreign policy field. The Soviets might have some concern about the effects ofCI role on the governments of Eastern Europe. PCI participation in the Italian Government would presumably encourage reformist elements in Eastern Europe both to promote their ideas within their own parties and to hope for an eventual softening of Soviet attitudes toward the reformist brand of Communism.nlikely that It would pose any short-term problems for Soviet control, however. The Finnish Communisl Party unul recently shared power in the Finnish Government without any perceptible repercussions in Eastern Europe.

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Speculation on PCI Cabinet Preferences

The PCI has never made dear which cabinet posts it would seek if it shouldoalition government. Most observers of the Italian political scene agree, however, that the Pa would not consider accepting Just one cabinet post, even in order to demonstrate its responsibility to npolitical parties. In the normal course of events the party could be expected lo hold out for eight or ten ofsome cabinet posts. While

lhe Communists would of course plsce highest value on such key posts as Defense and Interior, their chances of attaining them initially would be slim. They might be willing to settle for important posts like Treasury or Labor and hope to acquire ether vital mirustries as they consolidated their position in government. Despite the importance of communications to politics! control, the PCI would not be likely to prise the Ministry ofsince radio end television time in Italy is assigned in an election period in accordancearty's representation In parliament. Hence the PCI already has more time on radio and television for Its candidates than any other party except the Christian Democratic.

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Deputy Secretary General Berlinguer saidublic speech last July that the PCI believes in promoting stable economic growth as the most effective way to increase worker benefits. This isosition with which the democratic parties have no quarreL

In addition to stress on economic growth. Communist cabinet ministers would play up the concept of state ownership. They would probably push for nationalization of the tanks, for example; this wouldplashy popular gesture, although in fact some SO percent of Italy's banks are already ltalc-owned and stale-operated. Communist ministers wouldalso press for the PCI policies of nationalizing pharmacies,the "sugar barons" who run the sugar refineries in the Red Bell and have long been party targets, and takingercentage of urban land for low-income housing, j

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Pica Policy Ij. iU||jL j

The Italian Communists are not likely to be fanatics on the score of press policy, at least in the early stages of their acccssicnational government role. On the contrary, their record to date suggests they would probably try to work with the non-Communist press.

In the Red stronghold of Bologna, Ihe party runistory of pragmatic accommodation in Its relationship with the conservative dailyeno del Cirlina. The PCI administration even rewrote its city development plan some yean ago to facilitate II Reiio'i plans for constructionodem printing plant. This paper, which has links with the Italianof the National Association of Manufacturers, has continued-to have far greater circulation in the city than the Communist

The PCI might also hesitate to attack La Siampa. the Italian newspaper of greatest international prestige. La Slampa is closely associated with the FIAT industry, which has been working in the USSRar and truck plant that appears to be valued by the SovieU.

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The PCI's own official newspaper L'Umlia is already one of Italy's major dailies, while Communist leaning Paite Srra is the leading Roman evening paper. The PCI press gives broad coverage, despite Its bias, andonsiderable circulation on its merits.

Religious Freedom

koth'the PO and the Soviets haveteadily increasing interest In disarming Vatican hostility toward them. It seems most plausible that the Communists in the national government would seek to present themselves to the Vatican as an effective means of communication with the countries of Eastern Europe in which Pope Paul is particularly interested. The PCI would have tittle lo gain andood deal to lose if it should display open hostility to Oh* Church at thb stage.


Military and Police Power

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n domestic affairs, the priority target for the PCIational government role would be the neutralization of the armed forces and the police. The party has consistently felt the same sort cf constant alarm over the, possibilityilitary coup in Italy that the Soviet Union has had about the possibilityesurgent German militarist menace. Communbt infiltration in the armed services atelieved slight except in the local police in Commuiust-adnunbtered areas and possibly among thepolice. EnUsled men, particularly in the Army, probably are asto Communism as the general population but infiltration of the officer corps appears to be minimal.

Tbe most reasonable way for the Communbts to approach the difficult problem of neutralization mivht be through budding up the local police forces under PCI control at the expense, perhaps, of the national police. In any event, the party could be expected to move with extreme caution because it understands that otherwise the threatepressive coup would


Foreign Affairs

number of observers have long held thai neither Uie PCI norparties in Italy care as much about foreifn policy as theydomestic affairs. In political bargaining, however, the PCI is likelyfor concessions in the foreign policy field, where the interests ofSoviet mentors. j

oreign policy issue of key importance is Italy's membershipWithin Italy, the PCI has never mobilized strong andti-NATO feeling. P

mTnumAm aewonsirauon on int occasion ol the ministe-

m' meeting in Rome, in0 drewarticipants, and the party exhibited more concern for maintaining law and order than for arousing or exploiting hostility to the Western Alliance.

Nevertheless, the PCI is committed to an anti-NATO position Its propagandists haveyword, at least in some circles, of the slogan, Italy Out of NATO and NATO Out ofommunist pressures, which would be somewhat strengthened by Communist participation in the cabinet, will under any circumstances be exerted to reduce Italy'son with NATO over the next decade.

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Communist cabinet ministers in Italy would also pushwing to the Arab side in the Arab-Israeli dispute andove to supplant Western od companies with the national Italian company wherever possible They would getumber of European projects dear to the Soviet heart, suchonference on European Security. They would also seektrengthen West Germany's accommodation with East Europeannd to strengthen tic* with Communist governments throughout the world.

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The principal foreign policy issue on which the PCI would be likelySoviet pressure is that of the European Communities. Thethe Six and work against their cohesion. The Pa, on the otherbecause of its common interest with other Italian political parties ins economic growth, which they associate withtrong standis the Soviets on this issue, and wouldto bow ta any Soviet pressures for disruptive tactics. Insame spint, PCI cabinet ministers would probably not bedcmands for better trade terms and long-term creditsUSSR. '-

The themes stressed by CPSU Politburo member Arvid J. Pclshevisit to Italy in0 clearly indicate the issues the PCI isto push and give an idea ol the wide range of Soviet demandsforeign policy positions. Accordingeliable clandestinesaid the PCI should attack the foreign policies of the United Statesapply to problem areas, such as the Middle East, theaccording to Pelshe, the PCI has an importantietnam,North Korea, j .

According to Pclshe, the problem of Israel could best be resolved by isolating Ihc Israeli-American relationship irom other Western and West European governments. The US should abo be accused of "Vielnamizing" the Middle East situation, thereby abandoning the Israelis and Arabsloody crisis of American making. The Italian Ckrvernmenl's policy of improving relations with Middle Eastern, African, and Eastseful step in this direction and the PCI should encourage it, Pelshe further stated. Other clandestine reports have emphasized the Soviet interestCI effort to push Soviet objectives in Germany and Berlin.

Italy in the past quarter century has been one of the most pro-US countries in the world. The country is certain to become more independent as growing affluence replaces the devastation of the immediate postwar years and the threatoviet military sweep across Europe recedes. The PCI, in government, would thus have somethingownhill path to take as it responded to Soviet prodding to influence Romeore neutral



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Evsnt,oexistence: Commisnlsm and In PraetleeD^Lew*on; Notre Dame

lpantitsmo tmpen'ttto (Botognayiil 'll'lil'-M I'iI i!


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Original document.

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