' MS
WSSUBMITTED BY THEBY THE UNITED STATES
CMtral laMligmtca Agancy ond iha intelligence organizations of fhaot, of Store and Defen*e. the AEC, ond Ihe NSA.
. >Uont porhe/pcrfad Jn.fiVspreparation of
31
Oeferty Director of Centrol Intelligence "Vr The) Dftocior of InteQigence ond Reieorth. Deportment of Slate ' etor. Detente Intelligence Agency The Director, National Security Agency The Aswstant General Manager, Atomic Energy Commission
Absfarnirtgi
"The AHiitant to tha Director, federal Buroou of Invcitigation. the subject being outside of his jurisdiction.
"nT-
communist china's weapons program for strategic attack
1
Tup
COMMUNIST CHINA'S STRATEGIC MISSILE PHOCRAM
Introduction
Firsl-Oericrafion Medium Range Ballistic Missile System
echnical Characteristics
Medium-Ransi' Ballistic Missile Development
Intermediate-Rangr Ballistic Missile System
Technical Characteristics of the CSS 2
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Program
Developments at Shuang-eh'eng-tzu
Tbe Ching-yu Missile System
Prospects for Full-Range Tastirnj.
I' npe 1for Initialrent
Solid-tTiipellant Strategic Missile Program
13
1 I
u
15
7
8 IS 19
20
21
BOMBER FORCE
Bomber Force
Bombers
MISSILE SUBMARINE SYSTEMS .
A. Background
B- Recent Developments
C- China's Option*
The Submarine
Prospectsubmarine Missile
Possible Initial Opaational Capabilitici. for Chim-veSubmarines
V. CHINA'S NASCENT SPACE PROCRAM
Satellite Launch.
Program Prospects
Prospectsanned Space.
VI. PROJECTED STRATEGIC FORCES
Concepts
Capabilities
Doctrine for
i 25
5 26
6 27
27
28
90
. SI 31
.25
IJEfiftLJ.
IQf GCCuTJ
on FutureCompetition lorConstraints
D- Deployment Through
Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles
Intermediate-Range BallisticBombers
E. Protecting Chinese Communist Weapon Systems
edium-Range Ballistic Missile
ntermediate-Range Ballistic Missile .
The Ching-yu System
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile System
36
36
. 37
37
38
38
to
39
30
40
41
Strategic*j
Ballistic Missile Submarines
F. Force Structure.hrough 42
nnriiT
TDP-SfSKH.
COMMUNIST CHINA'S WEAPONS PROGRAM FOR STRATEGIC ATTACK
1
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The Stage ond Direction of Ihe Chinese Effort
someears of effort, China is now beginning toweapon systems. Starting from scratchimitedtechnical, and scientific base, and denied Soviet assistancethe Chinese had to proceed on their own with therequisite skills, the constniction of basic facilities, and thetesting of nuclear weapons and delivery systems,
clearly intends to attain the statusajoraccepting the economic burden involved and the risks ofbasic economic development through diversion of scarceskills to specialized defense tasks. This is evident on thetoday where activity in both general purpose and strategicprograms is at an all time high. Though any forecast ofmust allow for additional periods of disruption and upset.reasonable to assume thai the existing high priority forwill endure in the years ahead.
China's efforts in the military field will beavailable skills and resources. But we lack the data to placeceiling on the level of the Chinese effort. Based on theChinese mililary programs to date, the Chinese seem sensitivedangers of trying too much too fast in their strategica country whose population growth threatens continuously toeconomic growth- While stressing the wide-ranging andof China's present effort, we should also stress itspace. The Chinese have been deliberate in testingand in no apparent ruth to undertake cosily and large-scale
SNKL
deployment of weapon systems of limited capabilities. No doubtissues of priorities and costs serve to trouble Chineseat the highest levels,
elaboration of the rationale fortrategicany discussion of strategic doctrine has appeared in China.some principles other than Mao's "peoples' war" doctrinecostly and wide-ranging strategic weapon programs nowin China. It seems most likely that Peking seeks throughubstantial nuclear force to enhance its claim tostatus, to deter the USSR and tho US from the resort toChina, and to insure foreading and dominantin Asia.
Strotegie Missiles
is probable that China has now deployed someballistic missiles
' 'missileange ol about OW BBC and probably uses non-storable liquid propellants. We estimate that there might be aboutnits deploy**
econd missile, theouge of at. and probably uses storable propellants. We believe that thestage of this system is well advanced and that it probably has reached the point of deployment, although there is uncertainty about this. While thes superior to then range and reaction time, it probably does not incorporate any great improvement in
C. The Chinese are developing another liquid-propellant missile. This missile, which appears to have sufficient range to provide full coverage of the USSR, could be ready for deployment by3 orhis system, referred to as the Xhtog-yu" missile,wo-stage vehicle with the first stage probably incorporating the design and technology of thets maximum range is unknown, but our
1
4
calculations,suggest that any
capability against trie Mnonenrar-rj^wuuiumarginal at most.
down the road, China is almost certain to deployintercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable ol fullthe continental US. China couldarge.ready for deployment as early4 but more likely atwo later. When full range testing into the Pacific or theoccurs, wc should be able to learn more about thethe system and to make more confident estimates of itsoperational capability.
addition to these four liquid-propellant missiles. Chinalarge and ambitious program underway for tho developmentof strategic missiles using solid propellants. If flightbeginsear, solid-propellent strategicin the MRBM or IRBMbe ready forearly56 is more likely in view of theinvolved.
Submarines
J. China has also shown an interest in nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarinesnd it is building shipyards which appear capable of producing and servicing such submarines. We judge that China could have SSBNs equipped with solid- or liquid-propellant missiles as earlyut this wouldrash effort and early success inultitude of support, training, andproblems. Thus, even if they nowrototype under construction, the first Chinese SSBN probably will not be operational until
Bombers
K. Production ofedium bombers began in8 and hasevel of two per month. Aboutf these aircraft are now operational. Theanound bombloadadius ofut it Is relatively slow and highlyto sophisticated air defenses. While there is no doubt that somerews are now sufficiently trained to deliver(TN) bombs to designated targets, it will be atear
and probably longer before the Chinese have two or Uiree regiments with crews trained to perform coordinated missions against modern air defenses.
Nucloor Bombi ond Warheads
L. To arm its delivery systems. China has concentratedon the development ofdevice andhave bombs ami warheads with this yield in stockpile. Ithave fission weaponsIt isthe Chinese an: working to expand production of fissionableand although thereroad range of possible error inthe output of these materials, it seems clear that Chinaample fissionable material, particularlyotcms it is likely to deploy.
Space
M. The two earth satellites launched by China over the pastonths marked the beginning of what probably will be an ambitious space program. Over the next few years, we expect continued launches involving larger and increasingly sophisticated payloads, partly in response to urgent military needs for targeting and geodetic data.
Projected Forces
N. We expect whatever strategic forces China now has deployed to be augmented gradually over the next two years, principallyuild-up ofnits and by the continued series production ofedium bombers.3 and for the period five years ahead, there is much uncertainty {Section VI attempts to project to thatut one thing is certain: the force will be weighted heavily on the side of systems capable only of reaching targets in AsiaUS installations there) and theapability against the continental US may begin to emerge, however, toward the end of this period.
1
DISCUSSION
I. COMMUNIST CHINA'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITIES
hina is on the road to becomingproducer of nuclear weapons.nuclear programeliberatecan hardly be described asChou En-lai would have il Wecould have in stock someweapons
nd some fission weapons
conducted in the atmosphere at or near the Lop Nor Test Site Trie other was antest conducted aboutf Lop Nor. (Seehe dataand the analyses we have performed on the Chinese atmospheric tests haveair picture of the nature and results oftests and of the scope, pace, andof the testing program.
he major thrust of the Chinese rlfort to date has dearly been the clcvelc-pment of al HTN weapon!
section summarizes the nuclearprogram and estimates when the Chinese could have various weapons ready to deploy wtth bomber and missile forces. It discusses the research and development) and weapons production facilities and examines Chinas nuclear stockpile system. Finally, it estimates the quantities of fissionablethe Chinese will have available through
a. Nuclear Weapons Testing
he Chinese haveU nuclear testa,i which were
SC6HP
If! 1 III
I
TOCtVlOTIry pattrd through two critical stages in the drvelopmcnt of nucleartestingesign concept andof the design to reduce weight and BBM and increase efficiency. In pursuit of theirthey have testedelatively slow pace bul haveumber of
changes In each successive design.
B. Nucleor Weoponi Development
atisfactory test device, the nextn operationaleither an aircraft bombissilethat om be scries produced.
IL Another critical unknown is which test design the Chinese have chosen to weaponise.
UI
uclear Bomb*
Chinese may haveewbased on thii design (or contingency use. but anticipation of more efficient design*would have limited allocation of scarce nuclear material to such a
tot srx&Ei
cstimate that these weapons could have been in stockpile as early, but the only earners then availableozen obsolete TU-is and the twohe ussr had provided
C. Nuclear Weapon! Control, Storage, and Logistici
ow- the Chinese will control store, and handle nuclear weapons for their strategic forces is not yet dear. We would assume that the authority to use ttritrjrjc nuclear weapons would he reserved by the highest authority in Pekmi
The evidence on (he system to befor storage and handling ofight be pcKuhle to infer something as to command andis still very limited. We believe thatational stockpile, facility toany weapons they may havefor stockpile. Operational storage sites for nuclear bombs at airfields have not been identified in China, but we cannot rule out the pom bib tv that some nuclear weapons may already be dispersed to temporary storageat some bomber-capable airfields
Nor have facilities constructedto store missile warheads been identified. With deployment of operational missile units the Chinese probably will provide facilities at the missile site or with the unit for check out and mating of the warhead and possibK* for separate or temporary storage.
We do not know whether the Chinese will keep nuclear warheads with missile units continuously or keep thementralor stockpiles, delivering them tounits onry in times of crisis. Missiles deployed at soft sites will probably not be continuously on alert, and the Chinese couldogistics system to rapidly deploy warheads from nearby stockpiles to these sites while the missiles were being readied.in hard sites can be keptigher state of readiness for extended periods, and when silo deployment begins the Chinese almost certainly will keep warheads at the sites or on the missiles.
D. Nuclear Materials Production
hina appears to have adequatereserves of uranium ore to meet Its needs. And the Chinese seem to havethe necessary facilities for concentrating uranium ore ami for processing uranium feed materials.
roduction
he only gaseous diffusion plant known to be In operation In China is at Lanchou. This plant is based on early Soviet designs and was begun with Soviet help. We believe that all or pari of the equipment within the Lsnchou facility was furnished by the Soviets from one of their ear her plants such as the smalllant at Verkh Neyvinsk The Lanclioii plant was completed by the Chinese in thend probably beganIn
3LUIW.
1
here is no informalion regarding any major construction at Ihe Lanchou plant since its stait up. The Chinese may have begun some minor modifications to upgradesome of the equipment; but, even so, such improvements would lead only toproduction increases well within theestimated ranee of production. Thus, we do not believe that production at this plant will be uBTUticantly upgraded during the period of this estimate
requirements appear to beit it likely they will seek tohe figures in Tablepostulated production rates ifdiffusion plant were to coroe2ecause there ison which to base projections of theof .in', suchi'v. theseery Hide margin of error.
Plutonium Production
is good evidence that there isenergy complex near Yumen inkamu Province We believe thisa large plutonium productionchemical separation facilities
| As the Chinese will
need increasing amounts of fUslonablefor their expanding nuclear program,
ditlonal facilikes for production of plutonium may be under construction somewhere in china.
we believe the chinese beganat yumen in the, probably with substantial soviet assistance. the reactorwent into operation byest-em plutonium separation processes have been fully described in open literature since the, and it is likely that the chinese have employed the hest ol such modernto meet their chemical separationthus wc estimate that thecan easily process the yearly output of their reactor.
as in the case. it is likely that the chinese will seek to expand plutonium output table iv shows our estimate of plu-tonium production from yumen
II. COMMUNIST CHINA'S STRATEGIC MISSILE PROGRAM
introduction
communist chinas extensive program to develop and produce nuclear weapons is matchedimilarly ambitious program in the field of strategic missiles. china hasdeveloped an mrbmange ofiles and may have begun its de-ploymenl, we believe ihe chinese haveange ofiles in the advance stages of development and possibly ready for deployment; and we believe that work ls proceeding on another missileange of. the chinese are also believed to beargeballistic missile (icbm) which has entered the flight test phase. in addition to these liquid-propellant systems, china is engaged in an extensive program for theof solid-propellant strategicand the static testing of such rocket motors is probably well underway.
communist china's strategic missilebegan with extensive soviet assistance.
dlcfliu
Formal agreements were signed in7 orut help had probablyear or two earlier. Wc do not know in detail what the Soviets agreed to provide, but by the time the Soviets withdrew theirin the summer0 they had given the Chinese the foundations for native missile development programs. Soviet missilefrom development and production centers in the USSH were stationed in ChinaS. and the guided missile development, static test, and production facility at Ch'ang-hsin-tien near Peking was under constructionhe Soviets also planned and.S. helped begin construction of the missile test center at Shuane,-ch'enp;-tzu.
presided exemplars of the SS-lbtactical missile and the SS-2ballistic missile. Wc think thegave similar exemplarsystemrange oftheor one of the other systemstesting to about this range Most ofmissiles we think the Sovietswere derived from theemployed cryogenic propellantsguidance, and were obsoleteby Soviet standards of thethe Soviets withdrewhemoved ahead svith an extensiveof their own.
A. China's First-Generation Medium-Range Ballistic Missile System
n few firings ofthe Chinese in3 madeto tesling iheir own version ofMRBM. This missile we laterthehe developmentculminated in the firing on 27
^was apparently carried
issile from Shuang-ch'eng-tzu
. to the Lop Nor area. Thistest (designated CHICndicated the Chineseigh degree of confidence in theuid it may haveinal proof test of the system. It is likely, however, that since that time there have been additional firings related to modifications of the system.
eehnicol Characteristics
pBc
system resembles the early Iwviet systems which evolved fromnd isirect copy of any that reached operational status. We think it most closely resembles tbe Soviet ss-a
here is no doubt that theinuid-propellant system, and there ts now evidence that the propcllant is non-storablc. most likely liquid oxygen and alcohol. Initially, the Chinese probablyadio-inert ialsystem which operatedrinciple generally similar to that used widi at least early versions of thec think it likely that this guidance system was subsequently replaced with an all-inertia! system. We have
oncrrj
Propulsion Pioptllanti
fiird position, liq-
uid-pioptllant rocket
cnpiw Probably cryoMnlc llq-
atygto and
alcohol
Ballistic Missile
ollowing the missile-deliveredest (CHICnhe general view oi Ihe Intelligence Community was that deployment would follow at an early date. At that time we had no knowledge of the in-tenncdiate-range ballistic missile (IRBM)and assumed China was devoting its talents and resources to the development of an ICBM which might reach initialcapability (IOC)
ESTIMATED TECHNICAL CHABACTEBISTIC3 OF THEEDIUM-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE
Coniifrvmtion
Length
Dumpier
Aboat MO nan. Nuclear
oet!eet
Warhead Typo
owever sound our logic, we werewe do not know why. From the fall6 through9 there appeared toecided lull in the MRBM program. This apparent hiatus led to increasingthat the Chinese did not intend, after all. to deployroduction program for theombers was underway which could provide an interim strategic force clearly able lo carry China's TN weapons. The picture began to change. however, as evidence accumulated ot new activity involving the MRBM.
f this activity means that China has begun deployment of the MRBM. it still does not account for the apparent two to three year
gap between completion of the development phase and deployment. Nor does il account for the apparent decmon to resumeime when we now know the Chinese were making good progressuch superiorhe Chinesene possible answer is that tht Chinese did. in fact, intend to forego MBBM deployment but that the continued deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations and the Soviet intervention in Ciechoskr.akueversal ol this decision sometimether possibilities are that the missile svas not really ready for deployment by the endr thai the Chinese decided to waiternpaliblv TN warhead. In any event, md in view of the unknowns, it seems clear lhat the history of the MRBM program presides us with fewfor judging the probable pace ol other Chinese missile programs or for making any broad lodgment concerning Chinese strategic
lthough we have not detected anyeheve that the Chinese pubablymsl! Mtmher ofnits in Ihe field. The Chineseompelling requirement to insure that some of their missile* could survive an enemy's disarming strike, because otherwise the credibilitv' of their fledgline missile forceeterrent would be seriously reduced. Since nothing we have observed in connection svith theuggests that it is Intended for silo deplos--ment. the only means open to tbe Chinese for insuring the survival of some of their missiles is In cnnce.il them In some fashion so they cannot br targeted. One way would be simply to deploy them in inconspicuous field sites. It would also be possible lo conceal missiles and support equipment in structures such as aircralt hangars. In tunnels or caves Such efforts at concealment would degrade tbe reliability and traction time of Ihe svstern and add considerably to operational costs, but it mightrice the Chinese are willing lo pay.
Another possibility would be to build many more launch sites than the number of missiles, moving missile units among sites al frequent intervals Even more thanhis tactic would increase operanug and maintenance costs and reduce the elfectivenevs and readiness of the force. Thus wc believenlikely that tbe Chinese would choose this option
force levels for thediscussed In Section VI on future forces.
B. China's Intermediate- Range Ballistic Missile System
ere urn-kingecondnow oesicoated theBBMis evidence tbat the Chineseanother rangchead nearShansi Provinceeking for the testing of the CSS-2that thr Wu-cbai launch facilityfar enough along to beginirs' firings by aboutthowever,ew earlyfirings were conducted frompriorS.
Tbe leneth of lime this missile
seems to base been under development is probably sufficient-for the Chinese to have
MLKLi.
completed the essential*evelopment program and to have worked out mostproblems. Indeed, one view is thatroop training could have begun as early asbe majority view is that tbere is inadequate evidence to establish this point All agree that even if there were some kind of training underway as earlyt Is likelv thatork remained to be donej
ESTIMATED TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THEntekmediate-rance BALLISTIC MfSSIIX
Smelt ting* TO ten or toen
C. China's Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Program
vidence now available indicates that China has recently begun reduced range flight testsehicle which, if used as an ICBM. would lie capable of reaching much or all of the US- This activity at the Shuang chenr-tru rancehead is in addition to thatew. flight test facility at Ching-yu, near the North Korean border. The missile system being tested at this latter lacllity is piobably also an ICBM in the stnet sencc of theut at the nsomentthink it will notignificant capability against the continental US.
We estimate that it uses storable propcllants and that it uses some (orm of all-inertial guidance. The maximum range ol the missile could. Our estimates of tbe capabilities of the missile are based in part on analogies and computer umuiatiotvi using various combinations of
'An ICBM is definedyMem capable of dVa*Suad mot*ud*nnceould cover all of iho USSR, but the Chinese would need an ICBMipe ii atu teach moreew Uteristhe ear.unmulynonanee oi 5SCOm totMtuaHy el af she vs.
1
13
swm
Developments at Shuang<h'eng-tzu
Weumber oi years that China was engaged in the development ol an ICBM system that would be able to provide reasonably good coverage ol the continental US as well as the Soviet Union and other areas. We thought wc had firm evidence ofrogram duringeiiod when constructionaige new launch facility began at the Shuang-ch'eng-tzu rangchead.
At that time we believed that the Chinese intended to begin ICBM fliaht tests shortly, but wc now believe that any early firings from this large launch complex were part of theRBM program rather than work aimed directly at an ICBM. We also think that it was probably used for China's two earth satellite launches.
e have some fairly convincingwhich indicates that the initial flight testarge launch vehicle took place Onhis evidence leads us to conclude that the tiringeduced range flight testultistage, Jiorable liquid-propellant vehicle fired to an impactn tar wrs'ein Ch.na.
e cannot be sure at this point whether the Chinese will conduct any additional in-country reduced-range firings of this largo vehicle or go directly to long-range tests to impact areas outside their national borders. VV'e think it likely, however,ew more reduced-range lests will be conducted.
5S- It is our present ludsmcut that thenow uuderzoint: preliminary testing will be used as an ICBM. It may also be usedatellite liunchei. and coulday-load weighing up to several thousand poundsow-earth orbtt.aunch would provide additional important data on theoverall capability and. il successful, would give the Chinese maior propaganda benefits. An approach such tu thn might be politically attractive to tho Chinese and would to some extent parallel the early Soviet ICBM elfort. Indeed, wcurprised ii China did not plan to use this vehicle for bothmissile and space applications.
Tbe Ching-yu Missile System
39that seriously complicate* assessment of tbestatus ot China's ICBM program is our inability to determine the precise nature of the program underway at Chtnti-yti. We believe that the Chint-yu launch facility was activated during tbe falls ofe are reasonably confident that theie had been only one firing from Ching-yi|^
J. There
are
indications that itwo-stage missile and that it is fired fromrototypeeployedsilo. Depending on the assumptions made about the size, the specific propcllantthe structurehe ratio of the dry weightissile staee to total stage weight, including propcllants I. and the weight Ot the RV, the missile couldide range of possible capabilities.
fi-i. On balance, we'believe the evidence tends to lavoi tbe conclusion thatwo-rfaee variant of theRBM. Although vre have little definitiveon which toonfidentot tts technical characteristics, wethe ivstcm, depending upon the levels of technology and proprilmi-.couid
maxinfrsui ranee that might be as low.igh. Only the high side would bring any part of the continental t'S into range, and this only if the missileeployed in extreme north China, close to the Soviet border. Thus It appears that thisis not designed to provide the Chinese
Prospecfs for Fwlf-Bonge Testing
he maximum range possible for flight lesting of missiles within China is less. Hence, when China gets to the
stage ol fuli-range testing ol missiles capable
of ICBM distances, it will have to fire to
OLCTIfit
1
20
ateai outiide its borders. Such testsecessnrv to obtain technical datu tothe perlormunce id the RV and thesystem accuracy and reliability atranges.
e have no basis for judging svhether tbe Chinese will choose the Pacific or the Indian Ocean as the impact area for thcir long-iinge tests. In the ease of firings from Cbing-yu. the Indian Ocean might bein order to ensure- that the booster stage would not fall on foreign territory, but in the case of bring* from Wu-cbai or Shuang-cbeng-tru this would notactor
vidence indicates that atne Chinese missile ranac instrumrntanon ship (MRISJ will be available for operational use in the neararge merchant ship has apparently been outfitted as an MRIS at the Tung-lang shipyard In Canton during the past year. This vessel iseet long andisplacement olQC0 tons. It entered the yard in
RheJ
n support missile tcsr operaiions into ocean impact areas by the end of this year Several smaller vessels have aho been observed which appear to beconversiofi to anole
Prospects for /mfiol Dtploymtnl
6S. On the basis of US and Sovietwe estimate that it svill take theinimum of about three years to brine an ICBM svithgood capability agaiust the US
(thatange of alrom tbe first flight test to the point where it is ready for deployment at an operational site. Because tbe Chinese are likely to encounterndement problems common to new proerams andesult of our study of thendrograms, we think it will probabiv take closer to four years ro reach IOC If significant problems occur during Ibght testing, the time required to reach IOC would be commensurateiy longer.
The vehicle bred from Shuang-cheng-tzu on! seems to be the best candidate for an ICBMood capability aaajnst the US. If this pros'esand using the guideline* described above, the earliest IOC date of this system would ber moreear or two later.
If. as seems likrlv. the missile being tested from Chine-vuwo-stacr serstoo of tbet could be ready for depkryrnent sometimee base this reiatrsely earls-IOC estimate on tbe fact that thr Ching-yu program would have benefited fromirings and the first two satellite launches. In the unlikely event that this is an entirely new-system in the ICBM class, it svtll probably be3 or. more likely,4 before it is ready for deployment. These IOC dates wouldear nr two if test difficulties occurred or. as seems to have been the case so far. the program is slosv-pacrd.
The csiderwr thai the Chinese areon silo deselopment Indicates that they decided severalo to deploy matespc missiles in hardened silos, and it now seems likely that initial ICBM depkryrnent will be in silos. Obviously, to meet thediscussed above, silo construction would have to begin during the flight test programs At least IS months would probabiv be requiredeployed silo site. Construction
"ii i' 1MB
hied soft site* uould probably take alear.
D. China's Solid-Propellent Strategic Missile Program
n thehe Chinese embarkedell organized and comprehensiveto develop 'trateffic missiles using solid propeUantv Besunning5ajor effort to import technology, equipment, and materials whichital role in the production of solid-propellanl rockethey bought advanced grutd-ing, pulverizing, and sorting machines suitable lor processing tbe oxidizer ingredient ofbase propcllants; largeay machines that can detect flaws in propellant grains; and precision machine tools suitable for case fabrication. Tbey imported large quantities of materials such as ammonium perchlorate and polybutadiene which areapplicablen composite base propcllants.
they undoubtedly drew ontechnical literature, especially thatorigin, which comprehensivelypioprilants Chineseignificant knowledgewild-propellant technology. Fora series of articles published
reviewed USthe structural design and stresssolid-propellant grains and discussedaffecting their operational usedealt with related subnet* suchMinding techniques lor motor
Chinese have abo conducted aeftort of their own. Dunng
the Institute of Appliedthe Academy nf Sciences was engagedpolymer research, applicablerubber tech do logy but abo ato the develc^nsent of rochetpoh butadieneoeKhng agentPolybutadiene is one of theandunder development in China forpurpose. The same instituloseries ol research reportshat ammonium perchlorateteebmque* were being investigatedperchlorate has mayor applicationan oxidizer in composite base solid
research efforts tie in wellChinese imports of large quantitiesperchlorate from Japan Irom mid-
o8 land unsuccessful attempts to import more from Western countries) ond the imports of polybutadirnend two umuccrssful anemptj to purchase complete production plants).
arly tn the program the Chinese almost certainly constructed the facilities necessary for RAD "or* on solid propellanis tor stra-tesuc missiles, and we havearge solid-propellant rocket motor productionnear Hu-ho*hao-te in Innere estimate that at least limited productionocket motors seas underway at Hu-ho-heo-t'e bynd that stanc letting mas' have been underway by the middle ol the year
iew of the problems inherent in drseioping large solid-propellant rocketpropeli.nr formulation, case bonding, and preventing propellantwc believe the Chinese will need at least two and probabiv three or more sears of static trshne and advanced development workthe lint flight test Thus, if static testing did beginhe first Mieht tests could begin ass this sear2 is more likely.
imple flat launch pads could br used for the initial flightis ample |iicc-edent in the t'S. France, and Soviet programs. Wc believe the Chinese will want to deploy solid-propellant ivitrrru in silos, and mila prototspr launch facility. Esprnrocr they will havr sained from the silos for liquid* propellant missiles will be useful even though silos for solid-propellaiit missiles probably svill differ com-derabrv. pamcularh* because thev do not require systems (or seating
inimum of about three year* ol flicht testing probubK would be required to solve problems of flight stability, thrust control, and guidance, and it will probablyeni or two longer to reach IOC because ofand management problems common to new procrarns. If flight testing beginsear, solid-propellant strategic missiles might be ready for deployment as early56 is more likely. The Ilu-ho-hao-te facilityll be capable of full series production by that time.
t is too early to determine precisely what types ol ballistic missiles will beand produced at. We think thr Chinese nil) concentrate initialK on dr-velopinz land-baled MRBM* or IRBMs to master solid-propellant technology before moving on to an ICBM. Es-en if an ICBM is already in an earlv stage of deselopment. we think it sviD probabiv not reach IOC before late in the decade. The Chincsr mav have alrendv elected loolid-propellant snbmarine-Uunched ballistic missile 'SLBM) and work onystem could now be under way at Hu-ho-hao-tr If this is the case, the missile could be ready as early5See Section IV. which treats themissile submarine program in details Sc4id-procellsnt missiles would have to be quitr large to earrv any ot the TNhe Chinese have tested so far. and the Chinese mav elect toighter TN warhead of lower yield or to arm thr solid* propellant missiles with fission warheads.
he facilities at Hu-ho-hao-te probably are adequate to suppoit several missileand production programsThe production rate of the tacihry depends on the number and type ol systems under development and production at any time, but probably is sufficient to support deselopmmt and pioduction programs for more lhan one type of system at any given time.
III. CHINA'S BOMBER FORCE
S3he, thr USSR gase China ma>oi help in establishing an air
TSJLCHW
force (hai has now grown to be Ihe world's third largest. The Soviets providedircraft, mostly lighters and light bombers, trained Chinese air crews, and sopervisedof airfields and aircraft production facilities in China. As part of this program they delivered twoadger medium jet bombers9 and helped the Chinese begin construction of facilities forroduction.
hen the Soviets withdrew theirwork stopped for several years. But the Chinese began moving ahead on theirhend in3 the first Chinese builtas rolled out. Wethat9 the Chinese producedircraftonths, graduallv increasing the rate lo the piesetil level ofonth. Aboutere produced by
A. Medium Bomber
hes highly versatile, having been used by the Sovietsree-fall bomber, an air-lo-suriace missile (ASM)anker, in electronic intelligence and photo-reconnaissance roles, and in antiship andwarfareheanound bombloadadius of. or to. with one mid-air refueling. Itaximum bomb-load capacity of0 pounds at shorter ranges. Most key targets in Asia arc within the unrefueled radiusormal bombloadC0 pounds.
e assume that the Chinese willand train most oi theiroicetrategic attack rolcj
Theroduction program
ostly one and appears gearedub-
stantial production run. Tlie investmentexcessive simply toong-range naval reconnaissance vehicle, an antiship weapononventional bomber. It has been used tor airdrop tests which were part of the TN weapons program.
he aircraft does havetrategic role since it is relatively slow and highly vulnerable to sophisticated air defenses. But "ith properly trained and motivated crews there are various ways in which the Chinese could hope to increase the chances ol at least some planes reaching their targets in such an environment. These would include the commitment of many aircraftingle target, the use of low profile approaches to avoid detection combined with in-flight refueling to extend range, and the piovision of an ASM capability.
here is no evidence to indicate that the Chinese now have an in-flight refueling capability. Wc consider it likely, however, that tanker versions will be produced once the aircraft crews have developed proficiency in basic operations and are ready to attempt the more complicated maneuvers of in-flight
S9 There is no evidence of an activein China which wc can identify clearly as ASM related, although the Soviets helped build what may be an ASM support facility at Shuang-ch'eng-tzu airfield in the. In theory, the Chinese could adapt their vcrsioo of Sovietbeing produced for naval use) for use as an ASM2 if they are already at work onrogram. But this missile would onlyange of about. An ASM of native design and longer range would probably take five years to develop and might involve problems ofstability, and control and accuracy of the missile that would extend this time even more.
c believe that al present ihere ii only onend that it bas aboutssigned aircraft as moteecome opcr.itiimal. additional regiments will prc-sumablv be rormed and depkryed to some oi the otherdd airfields in China which have runways long enough to handle the aircraft. (Ofbout two-thirds have the ta-cilitaes to support sustainedome deployment should begin by the end of this year. Thus while there is no doubt that some crews now available could lly aircraft carrying TN bombs to designated targets, it will be atear and probably longer before the Chinese have two or three legiments whose crews are unifceinly and highly trained and 'ready" for compli(ated missions againstair defenses.
he Chinese apparently intend to use theorce as an integral part of astrategic delivery capability which will include MRBM* und IRBMs. In view of the size ol the Chinese investment in therogram we beheveustainedrun is planned.roduction schedule ofonth were continued through Ihe, tbe force would consist of some ISOircraft byForce pronations are presented inVI.)
he Chinese could now base bothand fusion bombsize and weight suitable foreliveryee
B. Light Bomber Force
he USSR providedeagle jet light bombers to China in. The Chinese maintained the size of this force with an extensive overhaul program through, and there is evidence tbey began limited production ofndicating that they intend to keep this aircraft in service. Ihey have dispersed and relocatednits many times, and there are now over bO airfields in China from svbich the force can operate.
We do not Irrtow whether the Chinese intend to useto deliver nuclear wrap ons. The bomber variant of theaximum (ombat radius of onlyv. buttrategic role ihe aircraft could be used to strike some targets around Ibe penphery of China. Tbeould also he used for tactical battlefield densery of nuclear weapons.
A fission weapon or evenN weapon mav be available whuh could be carried by the
fSuT"
even though thereumber of routes that the Chinese could follow toiucle.ir weapon hn the licht bomber force, there is no evidence that they has* stockpiled or are dewroptng one.
here is no evidence lhat the Chinese presentlyny intrnlion of employing tbe hflht bomber forcetrategic attack role. Training of II,rews has consistently
"Top-strati
25
conventional tactics in exercises involving ground support or attack against surface ships and submarines. Over the years theorcc has been deployedattern we think suitable primarily for defense of the mainland, and this pattern has not changed recendy.
C. Future Bombers
is no evidence that thedeveloping any new bombers. Butin copying thendnative designed fighters and theirthe strategic missile program suggesthave the capability to undertake ato design andoreGiven the technical problemshowever, such as fabrication ofairframes using exotic metals orChinese probably could not have suchoperational before the end of
IV. BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE SYSTEMS
A. Background
the Sino-Soviet7he USSRagreed to help the Chineseprogram to build Soviet ballisticand to equip them with aliquid-propellant missile. Proceedingownhe Chinesemissile submarine4 at the Lutain Dairen, probably using Sovietat least some components suppliedbreak. The design is that of theC-ciass, which has three missilelaunching theissile from aposition and torpedo Cubes forattack. It is diesel-powered andpatrol radius. withays
he Chinese probably intended to equiplass submarine with theingle-stage ballistic missile using storable-liquid propellants andange ofut wc do not know what assistance the Soviets planned or actually provided prior to the split. The Soviets may have given the Chinese some technical data on theut there is no evidence that any missiles were provided.
0 the Soviets apparently also assisted the Chinese in starting construction of facilities which appeared suitable for basing, overhaul, and construction of2 these facilities were in the initial stages of construction with activity either low or suspended, suggesting that little or no progress had been made after the Sino-Soviet break.
Limited Chinese
The Chinese continued to show interestallistic missile submarine program2S. but the pace of the program was slow and activity was sporadic.lass. submarine which had been launched4 became operational5 but had noand it carried out only occasional routine operations, never moving tar from home port. It entered the Lu-shun Shipyard near Dairen for extensive refit in the fall
To some extent this inactivity may haveack of resources resulting from the economic collapse that followed the Creat Leap Forward. Priority may have beento thendrograms which were in the development and flight test stages in the early and. But thealso suggests that the Chinese hadthoughtsubmarine program based onlass andissile. That the Chinese did not constructlass submarines or begin sea tests of asimilur to thetrongly suggests
1
(hat neither will be produced or deployed. They may have decided thatystem was hardly worth the cost and that they should defer construction until they could deucn vnmething better
he Chinese hadnnuclear propulnon systems by tbe, and possihlv as far back ai the. The Director of the Shanghai ShipInstitute has written articles on theand this Institute has probablv been the Incus since then on theffort in marine propulsion. AccordingressPremier Chou Fin-lai stated whileRangoon in0 that "Chinau build atomic submarine* within five veers"
17The Chinese made substantial rllorts ino acquire equipment andfrom other countnes thai could be used in nuclear research and missile development loi submarine programs. Thev had success in obtaining items such as sibranon test units, canned rotor pumps, high strength steel plates, and special stainless steel rubins
B. Recent Developments
here Is no unequivocal evidence that China has embarked on sn active prozram to obtain an SLBM capability. But recentlargely circumstantial, suggests that China intends to pursue development ofapability, albeit different from the onrjnal concept founded on the prospect ofSoviet aid
eginning inhe missile lube area oflass submarine was extensively modified. This work suBgrsts ttrongly that the Chinese are preparing the submarine for useest platform inew missile of native design. In this connection it is worth norms; thatbus is well adapted for useest bed because of the ample space available in the missile launch area.
e now have evidence that the Chi-nesr havearge new submanne.the Mao-class by US intelligence, ilorpedo attack submarine olull specially suited for high speed submerged operation The appearance and configuration of the hull suggest that it may be nuclear powered. If it is nuclear powered, the Chinese haveig step toward amissile submarine. Even if it is diesel-powered the design demonstrates new Chinese capabilities applicable toof modem nuclear-powered missileFurthermore, there is evidence that China hasismodern and sophisticated shipbuildingto supportuclear submarine construction program.
C. China's Options The Submarine
We have few clues indicatinghinese ballistic missile submarine mightoperational or what itsizht be The approach taken will notapparent until an active submarineprogramissile tost proaram forystem can be detected and studied.
If. as seems apparent the Chinese do not intend lo produce an interim systemoflass submarine and theype miuile. there are two other options open to them. They could elect to deploy asystem consisting of an improvedand more advanced submarine ibul with dirsel rather than nuclear power for the first
1
"TUI1 SLUIU.
27
unils) The first submarine forystem might be complete as earlyhis approach would ease the transition topower by testing the suitabilityew hull design while the nuclear power plant was being developed.
Chinese are unlikely to chooseif they already are svell alongdevelopmentuclear propulsionsubmarines. In this event, they wouldto concentrate on developing asubmarine carrying,eel of the first submarine of thishave been laid bynd wcthat the Chinese could have thecomplete as earlyf thedo not yetuclear reactor forthe earliest completion dateSSBN wouldear or two later.
Prospect'submarine Missile
Liquid-propeilarit missile. There is no evidenceiquid-propellant missile for subrnarines has been under development, but the Chinese have adequate facilities and could have begun the early stages ol land-based testing. We think it unlikely, however, that an entire land-based flight testwhich wouldear or so for completion, could go undetected. Pop-up testsummy missile might go undetected, but live firings fromlass submarine or from any new submarine would soon become evident. Seaborne test firings probably would take at least two years. Evenquid-pro-ppllant missile iseady for land-based flight testing, we think the earliest il could be available for test firingsubmarine is
Saltd-propellaMubmarine missile employing solid propellants would he easier to handle and slore than one using liquid propellants. ff the Chinese chose this route, they might be ready to begin flight testingolid-propellant missile within the next year orlight test program could take at least three or four years and wouldessentially the one outlined for liquid-propellant submarine missiles, although the land-based portion could lake somewhat longer because ol Chinese inexperience insolid-propellant missiles.olid-propellant submarine missile might be ready for lest firingsubmarine as early
Possible fnrfiol Operational Copabilrties for Chinese Bo/fistic Missile Submarines
ubmarine is completeully tested missile is available, we calculateinimum of six months is necessary, at least for the first unil in Ihe particular class, for testing the integrated system andreadiness for operations. Thus, in thediscussed above the system basedore advanced dlesel-powercd submarine and an improved missile could be operational as early asf the Chinese go directly to an SSBN system employingiquid-or solid-propellant missile, il could beas early as
These estimates ofates for various types of ballistic missile submarines are consistent with the evidence at hand of Chinese capabililies in submarine construction and missile development. These estimates go beyond the evidence, however, in assuming that the Chinese are going forward with the development ol essential skills and equipment. For example, Chinese submarines seldomoutside of local fleet areas. To be ready toiable ballistic missile submarine force by thehe Chinese will have to start soon lo train crews in long duration, open ocean patrols.
Inallistic missileforcerecision navigation
25
iechlt-
of some sort Bathymecnc and grai'i-metric surveys or navigation satellites could provide the bawi forystem, but we have no evidence yel that China hasor has plans fot any ol theseThe sack of evidence of these sorts of activities may indicate that the depkrvment of ballistic missile submarines hesnnning56 wouldrash effort.
hey would also face the difficultof melding submarine, missile, andwarhead into an effective weaponThe Chinese will face new operational problem* in maintamtne missilesubmarinedaptingew type of launch platform. In short, the inherent dilfi-culties of ballistic missile submarinewill beifferent sort than thehave faced before. They mav have used theirlass unit for some initial systems planning and experimentation, but there would still be specific problems connected with any type of new submarine thev built Although wc cannot ptedict whether there are problems they might not readily solve or what bonlenecks mifjht develop theretood chance that the first nudear-powered ballistic missile submarine will not hecome operational until aller the period of this tstimate
V. CHINA'S NASCENT SPACE PROGRAM
11S. Communist China launched its space proirram byatellite on0 several sears after we expected them to mak* the attempt. We had estimated that the Chinese could make an initial attempt using theooster any time alternd we do not know wfiv the program did not beainhe Chinese may havrtn wait untilpacen adaption of thehat had theand growth potential lo be usedariety of missions in the luture.
he firstaccording to ihe Chinese weighedhe Maoist melody "The East is Bed', and the way the event was treated in the Chinese press indicates the strong propaganda importance Peking attached to the event. {
he initial space successonthsecond satellite3ayload.
announced asounds, wag also^ successfully orbited.]
Satellite launch Vahic/t
nalvsis ol the available evidencetomt two space event*the same type oi satellite Launch vehicle (SLV) was employed in both instances. The energy required to insert the pay load weights announced by thevalidity of which we have nn reason tothe orbits actually achieved clearly was greater than that inherentehicle based on thoRBM. Thus, the Chinese apparently elected to lorego the opportunity of orbiting their first satelliteelatively early date in favor ofore capable andsystem. Alter renewing all the inlorms-bon bearing on this prostrarn. we believe the Chinese were successful in using tbeRBM effort as the springboard forof their initial SLV. Indeed, weairly convincing case can be made for the existenceelatively close technological relationship among the programs involving the CSS-2, Chlng-yu missile and space
he observationmall spent upper stage ai orbit with both satellites!
the Ching-yii complex. Thereeasonably good chance that the second stage nf this latter system comprises the second stage of the SLV. at least in some modified form. Aphilosophy such as this would take maximum advantage of China's relativelysupply of aerospace resources anda pattern svhich is quite common in both the US and Soviet missile and space programs.
ased on the energy required to place the first two satellites in orbit, we can say that this system should be capable ofa payload weighingoundsow earth orbit ofm. It is conceivable, however, that the Chinese have as vet not fuDy utilized the man mumilitv ofrucle. which could be to place as much0 poundsow orbit. We should be able to refine our estimate of this vehicle from future launches. We expect the Chinese will continue to employ the system since it appears to have the potential foruseful missions, including scientific and developmentnd ils capability could be increased through the use of various upper stage combinations.
ScrteJJrta AAiJiio/ii
SLUIU.
We think ihe Chinese could acquire ain these areas by ihe
Prospectsanned Space. The Chinese have demonstrated an interest in the biomedical aspects of highaircraft and space flight sincehen an institute of Aviation Medicine was established in Peking by the PeoplesArmynow pressure chamber was set up at the sarnc time.01 the Peking Military Medical Collegebiophvsics institute for space studies"
Program Prospects
e think these first two satellite launches are onlv the initial phasenous Chinese commitment to an ambitious space program durine this decade. China's ipace program has probably been closers tied to and dependent upon progress in theof strategic missiles, related hardware, and facilities as typified by the probable use of theRBM as the basis of China's satellite launcher Althoueh certainof the space program during the next iew years may have some purely scientific applications, we believe that militaryprobably wiH dominate it for thefuture. One urgent military need is targeting and geodetic data in support of the strategic missile forces.capability for intelligence purposes.
1
jLCfc'rx
VI. PROJECTED STRATEGIC FORCES A. Introduction
rojecting the size, composition, and capabilities ol Communist China's strategic attack forcesarticularly troublesome task even over the near term and becomes extremely difficult for the.
. Wc know most about China's force ofet mediumtechnical characteristics, production rate, numbers, and location and something about their training. Even here there are uncertainties such as when the Chinese willanker version, what percentage of the force will be equipped with nuclear weapons, where operational units will be based, what their targets and tactics will be. and whether the Chinese will develop an ASM totandoff capability.
n the case of missiles, we start with an uncertain baseline. We believe that the Chinese have deployed then small numbers, but we have not identified deployed units and can only estimate their numbers, mode of deployment, state of readiness, and strategic dispositions. We believe theasr soon willhe end of its flight test phase and that units are being trained, but wC have not identified operational sites under construction and the IOC of the system is uncertain.
ur uncertainty increases sharply when we look at missile systems justor possibly approaching the flight test phase The missile system tested from Ching-yu probably is designed as partegional force directed against Soviet and Mianbut it may have some capability against the continental US.
13S- Our uncertainties become morewhen wc undertake projections of the rate uf deployment of any of the strategic attack systems we believe the Chinese arc developing and. more importantly, projections of the mix of delivery systems which will comprise the force- We have no idea what mix of forces the Chinese will choose, and in some cases the Chinese may not have taken ayet themselves. For example, wheneployment begins wc do not know whether the Chinese will continue to deploy theaintain the existing force, or retire the deployed units. We do not know what the mix will be ol hard and soft sites,
uluiu.
oi permanrnt and field sites. And if the missile tested at Ching-yu is deployed, we do not know what impact that will have on the loice con because we do not know its capabilities
nd we have no experience to go on. We have watched closely while the Soviets tested and deployed aboutand-basedmiisile systems,alf-dozenmissile systems, and several strategic bombers as wellariety of other military systems. Even so, when looking at new Soviet programs we can project with only fairhow fast they arc hkdv tocanon past programs In China, we base not been able to follow and measure
strategic missile ; at all, we base
seen onlv one strategic bomber program un-foldouple of years, and China's one submarine missile program provides fesv clues. In short, we have nut seen tho Communist Chinese In action and have litde feel for how production and deployment constraints inter -acting with strategic concepts will bein the physical realityeployed strategic attack force.
B. Strotegrc Concepts
hinese strategic concepts will provide the context within which they will allocate resources and plan deployment programs tor their strategic attack forces^ nuclear attack capability in Asia; theedium bombers; thend theheould provide coverage ofportions of all of China's Asian neighbors and most US bases in the Far East, butof the USSH ts limited to the border regions and the Soviet Far East. Thend theould extend coverage of Asia to include must ol Indonesia and India, but their major importance is in sharply increasing coverage of the USSH as lar west as the Ural region.^
We doubt that the Chinese willegional nuclear car^bihty. and Qunas ultimate obsactises rn building aforce in this decade are probabiv foundedesire to erihaoee ils poaibonorld power. Continuing development of Chinas nuclear, missile, and space capabilities will elevate China's statuscientific,and military power in the eyes of most of the svorld, and such status could pro-side substantial leverage for China's political offensives in the underdeveloped world.
The sire of China's continuing invest -merit in the production of nuclear weapons and desetoptneot and deptoymcnt of delivery systems indicates that Peking plans moreoken force for prestige or status, however. It is not content merely to have becomeember of thot the other end of tho spectrum, the achievement ol anythingparity with the US or USSR lies, at best, in the distant future and the most the Chinese can hope to achieve over uV next decade is some degree of deterrence against
Copobilifias
he strategic attack programs the Chinese are known to have underway are clearly directed at developmentegional
Chine-*lealnbe nuclear threat
aaaiial Moscow unlit they depkiyrnWile with longer ranw thon ti .Minnied for thererhaps Ilia mnuledeveloped a' China, yu. Thehe Ihronrbcal range lo reach Moscow il refueled or sentne-way minion, but would0 njii ol heavy Soviet air de-le-bc* en route
GECflQ.
the two superpowers. but although chinas strategic weapons force will remain smallwith us and soviet forces through this decade, it will be overwhelming in relation to the capabilities of its asian neighbors.
reqwiremenfs
the chinese regard the usa|or threat and almost certainlyequirement to deter the us directly. peking probablythat if the us were to overcome all its other inhibitions in deciding toirst strike on china, it would not be deterred by the possibility that the chinese might strike back at one of our asian allies. the chinese probably believeapability lo deliver nuclear strikes against the continental us would also enhance china's standingorld power and provide greater freedom of action in asia than the regional force already docs.
china's distance from the us makesredible deterrent against ushowever, and would require icbms or ballistic missile submannes capable of hitting the us homeland. in the meantime, thecount heavily on the existing inhibitions against the use of nuclear weapons, including the weight of world opinion, to deter the us and the ussr from attacking them with these weapons.
their two potential majorthe ussb is probably of greatestconcern to china. the continuingbuildup on both sides nf the borderharsh polemics from moscow andthe past several years indicate thatin ideology and competitionare so strong that relationsand the soviet union probably willcool at best the era ol comradelyofs not likely to beat least for the near future. inclimate, the chinese arc apt to view the soviet union rather than the us or any asian country as their primary' antagonist. the geographic proximity and military power of the soviet union also will influence the chinese in their assessment of the threat.
or china, the grave imptication of the ussr's strategic superiority is that any soviet full-scale nuclear strike, whetheror retaliatory, would result indamage and enormous casualties in china. anduclear capability china has little influence ononflict would be conventional or would escalate to nuclear attacks.
14s. china is nowritical transition phase in whichew mrbms are deployed and theorce is relatively small. wc think the chinese will attempt to pass through this phase by minimizing the chances that tbe ussr can detect, target, and destroy theire think the chinese are deploying the mrbm in concealed sites or base areas, using sites with fewcharacteristics, or moving units among field sites. when the irbm is deployed the chinese may adopt one of these sameat least initially.
the credibility ofoncealed forceeterrent against the soviets would depend upon the soviets' being convinced that the force actually exists. although the soviets are geographicallyetter position than we arc to collect intelligence on theprogram, it would nol be surprising if the soviets haveorst-case" estimate of present chinese capabilities that ishigher than our estimate.
the chinese may considerela-lively small nuclear force sufficient toonlronlation with the soviet uniononventional level. even now the leaders in moscow must be in doubt as to what sort of
GuCEU.
*TU' 3LW*fcI
they could launch that wouldno surviving Chinese capability toleastweaponearby
target such as Vladivostok or Khabarovsk. The Chinese may calculate that they have alreadyirst small measure ofagainst the Soviets.
military threats to China inlimited. India lacks both missiles andweapons and its relatively largeforces pose little threat to China.capacity and military potentialthe attention of Chinese leaders infor nuclear forces more thannation in Asia except for the Sovietthe Japanese veer from theirof political pacifism and theiroutlook, they could confronta nuclear threat within0 7the decision to pursue such aChina's nuclear forces in thehe heavily influenced byJapan.
Doctrine for Use
When Ihe Chinese leaders decided some time in theo embarkrogram to develop and produce nuclear weapons and strategic missile deliverythey may have had no very clear idea of just how they would employ these systems. They may not have developed much doctrine beyond the conviction that the possession of such weapons was essential il China were to join the ranks of the leading military powers. We have no way of knowing and, in any case, the subsequent hreak with the Sovietsa major change into whatever strategic equation they were developing.
The only thing the Chinese have since said about their nuclear doctrine is that theyirm no-first-use policy. In the light of the overwhelming nuclear superiority oi the
US and USSR, this isealistic statement of intent. And we think It highly unlikely that Chinese doctrine provides for initiating the use of nuclear weapons against its Asian neighbors. Considering China'sstrength in conventional forces, nuclear strikes against its Asian neighbors would seem unnecessary, would entail great political costs, and would risk retaliation from one of the superpowers.uclear attack on the US or Ihe USSR would invite theof China as an industrial and military power.
e also think it unlikely that Peking would make any crude, direct use of nuclear blackmail against its non-nuclear neighbors. To do so would be against its policy as an-nounccd and practiced up toaneuver would be complicated and perhaps even dangerous because ofreactions by the USSR or the US ina nuclear umbrella lor the non-nuclear powers. Nevertheless, in any confrontanonChina and an Asian neighbor. Chinas nuclear weapons capability would be in the consciousness of tbe other party and might" have some effect on the outcome.
e do no know how the Chinese would proceed should deterrence fail. They presently lack systems which would warn them that strategic missiles had been launched against them (and any such systemew minutes warningovietot this reason, the Chinese cannot launch on wanungbut would have totrategic nuclear attack beforeTheir national command and control systems will have to be devised with this in mind, but we have no evidence of the kind of procedures and systems the Chinese will utilize. Wehave nothat the Chinese will take stringentagainst accidental or unauthorized launches of missiles or bomber strikes,
seem
C. Constraints on Future Forces
ver tbe past decade the Chinese Communists haveide variety of programs to develop and produce strategic attack svitems with nuclear warheads They are now movingeriod of deployment which will involve new problems and costs. Thev will still need tn maintainffort looking to improved or more advanced terns This Sectionarictv ofconstraints on deployment of strategic forces: the competition for resources, thennd technical base available to Chinese science and industry, the production capacitsfor nuclear warheads and delivery swlem* and China's ability' to train missile units and construct launch sites.
Tha CompefrfJon for Resources
The human and material resouicesby advanced weapons programi are scarce and expensive in any countrv. but espe-ciaUvhina where the scientific andbases were extremely small pnor to the Communist takeover. The Chinese have demonstrated their willingness to invest scarce resources heavily and continuously in strategic weapon program' WhuV nf cannot quantify the cost of their effort, it is obvious that thev havearge portion of their scientific and technical manpower, advancednnd machinery, skilled labor, andand transportation resources Al Ihe same time they haw been generallynsulating their advanced weapons program from the political ami economic upheavals of the hut decade.
The demand In China for scarce, hlgli-quahtv resources has not been limited to the advanced weapon* program, however. The Chinese have been iimultancouslv ma kmc heavy expenditure* of fesources to equip their conventional forces. expand their industrial base, and increase agricultural output All of these efforts will continue far beyond the period ol this estimate, and whatever the priority accorded strategic attack forces there will be other important claimants for theChina has available.
e have little knossiedge as to how decisions are made in Peking with respect to all Ihe key issues involving the strategic weapons pjogrsm including the establishment of priorities for allocating scarce nationalas between individual sveapon systems and between defense Industries as a'gronp and basic economic developrnent. Mao Tse-tung prolsalJi'inal autbontv in all these matters and the powerful Milrtarv Affairs Commissioney role. But despite the monolithic appearance, there are no doubt difference'* of views svithin the militarvand between some military elements and the state buieaucracv responsible for economic planning and dnetopenent Vested interests in particular programs probably exist svithin the various Re.search Institutes and special ministries involved. And theu"vt of resource allocation and nationalare prime candidales lor exploitation in themaneuvering and in-lighting that has gone nn svithin the facade of parts unitv everoining" intn the open in times of stress as during the Cultural Resolution.
here Is little doubt that the Chinese will continue toigh priority toweapon programs, especially now that deployed forces arc coming into being.the Chinese will deploy their forces more slowly and deliberately than therate possible with an all-out physical
flErffCL
and technical effort because ihey will want to achieve Iheit strategic goals withoutother vital efforts.
think the strategic forcesthis Section are within Chinasindustrial capabilities to produceThe Chinese could do more, but weknow how much. The most we canis that an effort in the strategicabove that postulated hereinto otherforces (particularly in thethe growing Sovietveralldevelopment, and feeding the hugewill remainenough in Chinese eyes that theysome of the resources which couldto strategic weapons.
Other Constraints
We haveariety ofconstraints on Chinas strategic forces which Chinese planners are likely to confront during the period of this estimate, including technological and industrial factors,of nuclear weapons, and production capabilities In such fields as liquid and solid missiles, aircraft and submarines- The analyses of these factors did not lead to any conclusion which could be used to quantify limits onprograms.
The balance among resource claimants may shift, of course, with changing military and political relationships in Asia, and the Chinese will continue to have hard choices to make. Should the threat of major conflict with the Soviets increase sharply, for example, we would expect to see greater efforts in support of both strategic and conventional forces at the expense of industrial and agriculturalWe think the Chinese have beenin developing stratcjic weapons long enough to take the realistic view towardforces as but one clement of national power and prestige. While they will probably uccept the drain on other efforts imposed by their ambitious programs for strategic attack forces they arc unlikely to allow this drain to become so heavy that other equallynational programs will bet';!.
D. Deployment Through
Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles
s indicated in Section II. we believe the Chinese began lo deployRBM units9e estimate that there could have been aboutRBMs deployed by|
fr, Whatever the exact sire ot the presenTorce, it is likelv that the ultimate force willelatively small one because of the operational and logistical limitations of the system when compared with the IBBM. which" appears nearly ready for deployment. Inbecause it is limited in range, the MBBM could reach and destroy fewer targets that would justifyuclear weapon.
he MBBM has other majorshortcomings compared with the IRBM. If. as we helieve, the MBBMon-stor-able oxidizer, itonger reaction time and shorter hold timeigh state of readiness. It could be held for launchigh state of readiness forew "hours and possibly as little as one hour. The IRBM on the other hand probably could he erected, fueled, and held ready for an indefinite period, then launched on relatively shorttoinutes. Neither missile could be transported or erected while filled with propellants.
SLOllkk
1
v.eCSS-2during the comint; year, the Chinesenotarge mvestrnent ofin then fact, it seemsdeployment ofnits willIheeployment program isway.onservative basis,might level off at aboutbyut it could benumber and depkjymentost of the CSS-ls willdeployed within range of Soviet targets.
Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles
Timing. As already It is possible that IOC tor tbes at
bandunusual problems or adecision to dclavcertainb will be reached sometimeWe bebeve that flight testing of theas probablv been basically completed. The period between completion of training and deployment will probably be brief so that the unit retains its proficiency, andissile unit hasraining firing woit to deploy to an operational site Inpractice, initial training launches bynd SS-ll crews preceded site activation bv three to six months, but later training firings were conducted much closer to the activationaunch group.
Wa estimate that the first fixed soft sites would takeear to buildon how hard the Chineseith somr subsequent reduction as thecrews gain experience. Construction of soft sites could have begun last year with completion set for this summer or frdt. Ifhas not yet started, it would2 before the first units are deployed.
Mode ol Deployment. Initialof theill probably beoil mode. Silo derscymeril may corne later but we have nor. identified any prototype silo for this missile.
he Chinese have several options in undertaking solt site deployment of thohey could elect fixed solt sites wtth clab-orate permanent support facilities; Ihey could deploy at fixed solt sites with fesv distinctive cnaractertttics; or tbey could attempt toall or part of the initial force
oncealment might be achieved by placing some IRBMs in caves,uildings, svith nearby launch pads being camouflaged. During crisis periods, however, if the Chinese svanled to keep their missiles on alert they would have to expose them. If the missiles were kept concealed until placed on alert the reaction times would be about three hours tor erecting, fueling, and aiming the missile
The Chinese may decide that total con-ceaiment of part or all of theirissile force is not practical. Even so thereood chance they will build sites with lew.characteristics or will attempt to make the sites inconspicuous rather thanelaborate soft sites like those the Soviets built for their first strategic missdc systems.
Force Level* We must allow for the possfbibty that theas reached IOCoft or concealed mode in whichaunchers could now be operational. In any event, we estimate that theorce couldoaunchers by
Sfroregie Bombers
y1 the Chinese had peochncd aboutadger |et medium bombers. At the present rate of production the total should be up tooye do not know how many bomber crews thehave (rained, but byhey
sccnci
shouldegiments, ofach, whose crews are "ready" formissions against modem air defenses.
We know little about the training the Chinese have conducted, Thus, we can say nothing concrete about the tactics the Chinese intend to employ with theheof training, and the degree of proficiency attained.
Another major problem in ourof the capabilities of theomber force is the concept of nuclearlogistics the Chinese will adopt. It is too early to know whether the Chinese willnuclear bombs at each of the medium bomber airfields or keep them at some central location for delivery or pickuprisis (see
hereariety of uses to which theould be put. In additiontrategic nuclear strike role, the Chinese may use some of the aircraft for long-range naval strike and reconnaissance missions, tactical or strategic reconnaissance of ground forces,countermeasuresnd ASW. Even in the strategic strike force the Chinese may use some aircraft primarily as tankers or to provide ECM support to the weaponWe think, however, that at least during the period of this estimate the bulk of theorce will betrategic strike mission. And however the Chinese deploy, arm. and employ their, it is clear that over the next several years these aircraft will compose the majority of the delivery vehicles available to the Chinese-
E. Projecting Chinese Communist Weapon Systems To
edium-Range Ballistic Missiles
do not know how long thekeep their smallorce in thedeployment of theegins.begin to phase it out4 orsubstantial numbers ofrc inOn the other hand, in the light ofpropensity for retainingequipment, we think there isthat theill stay inwell beyond the period of this Estimate.'
nftrmediafe-Ronge Ballistic Missile
theas manyover thet is likely to beIn much greater numbers andthe fieldonger time. The use ofpropellants substantiallyUme and it probably is avehicle. If thean in facta TN svarhead tocouldajor part ofegional capability.
f the primary function of China'sweapons program is to establish athe missiles would be targeted against value targets, mainly population centers. From
reasonable distances back Irom China'si consiCkrnnB inch factors as security, transportation, andbeould reach aboutoviet citiesopulationr more. This would include all the cities along the Trans-Siberian Railroad from Vladivostok westward to Sverdlovsk. Allmilitary installations along the Chinese border would also be in range, of course J-
uring the time that the Chinese have no significant capability against theUS. they may try to establish aby targeOng US bases in the Farnd Ihe major cibes of US allies in the area. particularry in Japan. This could add betweennddditional targets, depending on the criteria lor selection.ajor Asian rival, hasore citiesr more population svhich could be targeted bv the CSS-2
ltogether, this makesag-nihcant targets within range of thehere is no way of knowing how many of these targets the Chinese might choose to cover. Ultimately they might wish to provide redundant coverage for these targets. This could require several.orce of this sue probably could not be achieved until well beyond tbe period of this Estimate We suggest i* only to give some idea oi an upper limit6 CSS-2might even have given wayollow-on system.
s indicated in preceding sections, era believe that initial deployment of theilloft mode But concern forof the missile force may lead to later deployment in silos. Barring unexpectedwe thinkew silo launches of theould be needed to test its com-paribiliryilo. There are. however.
many' uncertainties in our rudgrnents about the nature, timing, and scope of the firstin silos.
f the Chinese elect to take somearedeployment could begin at any time and the first hardened sites could be operahonal sometime afterf the Chineseore deliberate approach, however. IOC would be later.
n anv event, we think the Chinese will halt soft-site deployment if silo deployment begins. Thee will probably retain in the force the existing soft sites because of doubtsardened missile force would survive aattack if the number of siles is small.
1S9ent in ntos ofoear is within Chinese capabilities for site construction and probably would place no undue strum on their capacity to produce missiles or svaiheads. Training sufficient crews also would seem to present no insurmountable problems. We believe that ii ckepknmerrt in silos begins inbe Chinese couldorce ofoRBM silos byn addition toooft sites. This force wouldize capablo of striking most of the important targets that He within IRBM range Tlie size of the force might turn out to be considerably larger If lighterbecome available thus permitting the missile to reach more targets Betaimng and improving missiles which essentially are sound systems can be as effectiveconsider-ably cheapernew systems. Conversely, the adventollow-on IRBMsolid ortend to cause the Chinese to limit the deployment of the CSS-2.
The CfWig-yu Sysfem
s indicated in Section II. there are great uncertainties about the Ching-yu missile. We think that its prirnary lundion is to pro-
1
vide coverage of the USSR and that at roost it would havearginal capabihty to reach the US.
there has only been oneof the missile, and that inthere is now little basis forIOC or the rate and extent ofif the test program begins soonahead without serious difficultiesoccur in3 orwould probably be in silos andprobably be withinorce of someyssuming anIOC.
Intercontinental Bollisfie Missile System
It now appears that in1 the Chinese flightehicle which if used as an ICBM could hit much of the US. The earliest possible IOC for an ICBM based on this vehicle would beecause of the technical complexities of the development program, however, IOC would be more likely toear or two later.
The uncertainties and unknownsthe postulated Chinese ICBM make any protection of deployment rates even more speculative than is the case with thend the Ching-yu missile. Wc think, however, that the Chinese could deploy ICBMs in hardened silos at the rateoer year in the early years of the program.
Solid-Propeflont Missiles
Chinese may have alreadytests of solid-propellant rockettesting of missiles could begin intesting would probably take aurn of three years to complete. Thus, astrategic missile might be readyas early5 ormore likely.
expect the Chinese will firstmissiles in the MRBMclass. How well their developmentgo for these systems will affectstructure they have in thesolid-propellant ICBM will probablyready for deployment until toward thethe decade, even if development isway; but the Chinese couldandajor effort into an ICBM.deployment of shorter rangesystems for peripheral attack.
Strategic Bombers
We expect the Chinese to produce theet medium bomber at or near the present rate for the period of this Estimate. China's missile forces will still be fairly' small bynd theorce willarger number of delivery vehicles,of the threat,easure of sur-sivabilitv through mobibty and, possibly,alert- In addition, theana variety of other missions such as naval reconnaissance, electronic and photographic -intelligence, and conventionalareas in whichapabilities could stand considerable improvement.
We see no evidencerogram tohinese-designed follow-on bomber, and wc think it unlikely the Chinese could build andrototype and begin toew bomber in significant numbers until well
Ballistic Missile Submarines
19S. We think it possibleewarmed with ballistic missiles could be operational byf the Chineseegional capabihty and decide toiesel-posvered submarinestrategic missiles, the first one or two units could be in the force by
GPCP.U.
think it more likely that asubmarine would beorder toapability against thewell as tbe USSR. If the Chinese havedevelopmentuitable missileachieved some measure of successa nuclear power plant, the lustmissile submarine might enterbyand we base madefor this in our force proiections.it may take longer to field the firstnew class of weapon systems and in any
case do not expect many in the force untilhe decade. Section IVuller discussion of the evidence and reasoninghese Judgments.
F. Force Structure.hrough
We have used our generalof the present status of China's advanced weapon programs and our estimates of the likely future evolution of tfae individualof China's strategic forces to project three possible force mixes byhe differences between them come from the inter-play of technical achievement and strategic decisions. For example, technical success svith an ICBM may lead the Chinese to decide to divert resources from other programs to hasten deployment In other cases, strategicmay lead the Chinese to emphasizeof one system at the cost of slower development or curtailed deployment of another.
These proiections are only illustrative, and wc would be surprised if China's forces inorrespond in most details to any of them. There are just too many unknowni to predict bow the forces will evolve. The projections do provide ways of thinking about somewhat different courses China may take and our best judgments of what the Chineie are likely to accomplish over the next five years.
Cose A: The first projection assumesorce will receive most of theat least that the Chinese will not succeed in completing development of an intercontinentalthat liquid-propellant missiles will comprise the major elements of the missile forces, with the first solid-propellant missiles entering the force at the end of the period. It seems likely that allissiles will be deployed in soft sites as will the firstRBMs, but we assume that all the missiles deployed in tbe last two or three years of the period of the Estimate wil) lie in silos-
This rmjjection assumes that the missile tested at Cbing-yu would cocmderablyChinas capability to attack the USSB bul would at most providearginal capability against the continental US. It also assumes that ballistic missile submarines will not enter the force byut theorce could be modernized svtth an ASM by that time.
In short, the force presented IneUtneh* conservative protection of present and likely future systems along the lines of evolution nosv evident.
Coir ft. The second projection (see Table Bl assumes that bybe Chineseforces will still proxnde primarily acapability but rapid progress will have been made in solld-ptopellant systems so that they begin to enter the force in some numbersesuk. theorce Is phased down more rapidly than inndeployment is held al lower levels to permit more rapid deployment of solid-propellant systems in silos
It is also assumed that theorce builds at the same tate as in the firstand is armed svith an ASM toward the end of the period In addition,irsel-
JLLIIkl
ABU
POSTULATED REGIONAL FORCE OFND BOMBERS
Mid-Yfak
ystem
!>ropeuint MBBM or
Id tae case of rnttauet. rhe populated (oece reten to the number of deployed UMnehen.
ABLE
POSTULATED RECIONAL FORCE',1'.ND SOLID PROPELLANTOMBERS. ANDUBMARINES
Mid-Vkak
Svrtem
MRBM or
Baflitlif Mrt-
Submarine (SSBt or
BaDistic
Sabmarcc :SSBN>
Id the CM olhe poMnUted feece .em.he Dumber of deployed Uuaeben.
ballistic missile submarinei-clear-powered model may be entenng the force. If the protected missile submarine is diesel-powered it would probably be asystem. It couldubes if itersion oflass or abfutubes il itrototypeuclear-powered version. If the Chinese progress rapidly, they could have thetube nuciear-powertdm the force by
he third force protection is based on the assumption that the Chineselnh rate of progress svirh an ICBM capable ofignificant number of targets in the US. theorce would level offower number than in our first protection because resources would be going to ICBM deployment in silos. Theould flay in the force longer to compensate. {As in Case A. solid-propellant peripheral attack systems would not enter the force until the end oi the period. |
The Ching-yu mrssue system seouWisdsrJy higher rate lhan in tbe
fifcTfiO.
44
other two casesupplement to (ossubmarine but would go straight to a
of) the ICBM force. Theorce issystem. Tbe first unit or two
same as in the other twoenter the force bynd tho
If the Chinese stress anduring the latter part of the decade
capability as early as possible theybe more rapid because resources had
probably notiesehpoweredbeen devotediesel -powered model
ABLE
POSTULATED REGIONAL AND INTERCONTINENTAL FORCE'
Mas Ikaa
CSS-2
Chi riff vii Snlm ICBM. range) Sebd-Propellacl MRBM or
IRBM
TU-lfl
Nuclear-Powered Ballistic
Missile Submarine
(SSBN) with 16
Uunch
' Id the raw of rainlJei. the postulated lore trim to tlw number of deployed launcher*.
reffeTOUGENCE AGENCY
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