^estimate; intelugerjcef ntebc
h e' director^
by?th enited isfates
'afganizalicmsTpartic ipo! ecK'in
Inlolligente. TheNotional Security Agency .'* The AwJiIonl General Manager/Atomic Energy
lo Ihe Director, Federal Bureau of IrwejlkiotJon; tho tubloctof hit
OVIET NUCLEAR PROGRAMS
SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS 1
I. THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM 9
Developed During the Period of Atmospheric 7
Fission Weapons 8
C Weapons Developed Since tbe Beginning of Underground. 9
and Control or Nuclear11
RODUCTION OF NUCLEAR12
Electric Power and Efficiency
III. NUCLEAR POWER AND PROPULSION 18
A- Nuclear PowerU
B. Marine and Naval Nuclear Piopulskm
SEABCH AND DEVELOPMENT21
Applications of Nuclear EnergyIl
USES OF NUCLEAR23
VI. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION23
GLOSSARY OF NUCLEAR ENERGY27
ANNEX A: SOVIET UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR31
SOVIET NUCLEAR PROGRAMS
To review recent developments in Soviet nuclear programs and to estimate Iheir course over the next five years or so.
nuclear energy program of the USSR has evolved overfrom an intensive effort devoted exclusively to thenuclear weaponsiversified endeavorarietyapplications as well. In the development of nuclearSoviets have attained an advanced level of technologyto produce weapons of diverse types, weights, and yields,their requirements for present and future delivery systems.produced exceptionally powerful nuclear propulsion systemssubmarines. In non-weapon applications, they have theof research on controlled thermonuclear reactions in theliave carriedore versatile program than others inuse of nuclear explosions.
USSR has extensive facilities for the production ofand nuclear weapons, and ample stockpiles of naturalAlthough we cannoteaningful independentSoviet military requirements for nuclear weapons, wc have nobelieve that the availability of nuclear materials has imposedon the military program that the Soviets have chosen toIndeed, the Soviets have offered to provide uranium enrichment
services to others and to export nuclear power stations. Wo have no reason to believe that for the foreseeable future they will lack the capacity to meet their domestic needs, both military and civil, and to continue their international activities.
Soviets have continued to test nuclear devicesthe past two years, at about the pace characteristic of thesix years. They have apparently been willing to takethan the US of venting debris to the atmosphere whichdetected beyond their borders.9hetests producing debris that carried beyond the borders of theover any previous two year period. This could suggestSoviets have recentlyigher priority to test objectivesconcerns over possible venting.
is no reason to believe that the Soviets intend totesting in the atmosphere. We believe that the Sovietstest underground for at least the next two years. Should theto resume atmospheric testing, intelligence sources wouldlittle, if any, advance warning.
^Weair degree of confidence in our estimates of the general characteristics and performance of the nuclear weaponsduring this period, but almost no information on the actual size and coinposition of the Soviet stockpile of such weapons!"
number of underground tests of high-yield devices, and the spectrum of the yields, suggest that the technology incorporated in thermonuclear warheads of three megatons and above has not changed substantially
know little about the hardness of Sovietheir ability to withstand the effects of nuclearis reasonable to assume that hardness has been considered byin designing at least their more recent RVs, particularly inof their increasing concern for survivability and penetrability.
Production of Nucloar Materials
procurement of uranium has exceeded, by acurrent and past needs for the production of fissionableWe estimate the cumulative Soviet production ofas oft betweenndons,estof aboutons, and production for the yearuly5orn. The methodology used is reasonably direct andconfidence in the results. More indirect methods must beestimate the production of weaponsnd thesubject to greater uncertainty. Cumulative productionwas probably not lessons nor morebelieve that actual Soviet production would probably beegion somewhereid-range figureons,at, or near, cither extreme.
the past several years the Soviets have apparentlyconcerned with increasing the outputnd morewith reducing costs, and probably have taken olderbuildings out of operation. We have seen no evidence ofof reactors for the production of plutonium.
Power and Propulsion
J. Nuclear power plants representmall portion of the total electrical generating capacity of the Soviet Union.0 megawatts ofWend the total planned
7 is0 MWe.asis of past performance, (be Soviets ate unlikely to achieve this goal before the.
K. The reactors on the newer Y, C.lasses of nuclearhave exhibited excellent operational characteristics, and the Soviets appear toigh degree of confidence in them. The C-lasses probablyeactor generating about ISO megawatts, andotal reactor power ofegawatts. Work has not yet begun on the two Arktika-ddss nuclear icebreakers which the Soviets plan to construct
L. The USSR is making an active effort to exploit nuclear energy for use in space, but it has nol yetuclear reactor for use there. The Soviets recently developed the world's first prototype thermionic reactor. In tlie last half of this decade, they could0 kilowatt thermionic reactorower source in space.
M. The Soviets are continuing their efforts toractical way of producing electricity from controlled thermonuclear reactions. They arc investigating many approaches, but their main effort is directed at toroidal (doughnut-shaped) plasma and laser-plasma devices. We expect that one of ihoir Tokamak-typc toroidal devices will succeed in demonstrating the technical feasibility of the controlled release of fusion energy late in the decade.
Peaceful Uses and International Cooperation
N. The Sovietsigorous program for tlie peaceful use of nuclear explosionsince it began5 nuclearspecifically for peaceful purposes have been detected, mostly in support of the Soviet oil and gas industry or for excavation projects. The Soviets clearly intend to carry out an extensive program in the future; they have mentioned projects intended to stimulate theof oil and gas, to store oil and gas, to strip ores, to crush rock, and to create dams and canals.
O. The USSR has provided limited nuclear assistance to its allies and to certain non-Communist countries since the. At first, its aid was primarily in the form of training and tlie supply of reactors and equipment for research, but more recently it has included the construction of nuclear power stations. The USSR is constructingpower stations in Eastern Europe and recently contracted to
supply two power reactors to Finland, the first non-Communist country to buy them from the USSR.
P. The USSR has been an active member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since its inception in the. At tlie IAEA meetinghe Soviets stated that they wereto negotiate contracts to enrich uranium for non-nuclearthat are parties to the Non-Proliferalion Treatyhe USSR recently concluded an agreement to enrich uranium for Franco and return it for use in power reactors. Thisajor step in what isoviet effort to become actively competitive in the world market for reactor fuel.
THE NUCIEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM A. The Nuclear Toil Program
ne Soviets have continued underground testing during theears, withests detected9 and0 Thesearc about tbe same as those (or theears. By (he end ofn overall totaluclear tests had beenefore the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) went Into effecthereafter. At leastf tlie underground tests were part of the Soviet program for peaceful uscs.-f
nderground weapons-related tests have averageder monthhese
' SecaMog of Soviet underground (Mb lineeBT went into effect. Seeuutoa of the tests for peaceful use*.
tests have ranged In yield from lessdloton (let) to upegatonsost if nol all of theests with yields( were probably for the development of thermonuclear weapons. Of the remaining tests, some were probably for fission weapon development, and some were tests of weapons effects^
ost Soviet underground tests occur in either the Semipalatinjk area of Kazakhstan or in the Novaya Zemlya area of the western Arcticc knowotal ofnderground detonations which have taken place in other areas. Inhe Soviets conducted their largest underground test at Novaya Zemlya, which yielded an esti-
n area off the west pile. These postulated weapons reproduce the coast of Novaya Zemlya was closed to ship- yield observed in specific atmosphericping at the time of the test, indicating that the Soviets were less sure of the containment of debris from the test than for previous underground tests in the area.
he Soviets arc apparently willing to take greater risks than the US of venting debris to the atmosphere which might be delected beyond their borders. Oi thetests conducted since the LTfiT went Into effect, possiblyented Into thebeyond the borders of the USSR. Wc are certainince October
he percentage of tests-trufor possibly vented beyond thethe USSR increased over any previous two gperiod. This could suggest that thehave recentlyigher priorityobjectives than to concern over
e have no reason to believe that the Soviets Intend to resume nuclear testing in the atmosphere. We believe that the Soviets plan to test underground for at least the next two years. Should the Soviets decide toatmospheric or exoabnospberic testing. Intelligence sources would provide little, if any.
eapons Dovclopcd During the Period of Atmospheric Testing
ur estimates of the Soviet nucleartested priorhen the LTBT went into effect, are madeair degree of confidence. On the basis of these tests, we have postulated models of Soviet weaponsof those believed to be in the stock-
C. Weapons Developed Since the Beginning of Underground Testing
The information available for analysis consists' of only the estimated yields of the testedbased on their seismic magnitude, and the evidence on underground nuclear test sites. We rely wholly on our understanding of what US weapons development hasto be technically feasible, and of what Soviet requirements might be for their new delivery systems.
Despite the limitations of the data, wc can at least place limits on the lands of new developments that the Soviets may have acliieved through underground testing. Wc believe the Soviets wouldilitaryto test new warheads for important weapon systems at, or near, the full yield. This becomes difficult and very expensive, however, in underground testing at high yields. In any event, by the endhe Soviets had developed thermonuclear weapons which afforded very good yield-to-weight ratios in the yield range appropriate to most of the strategic delivery systems operational at that time. This, and the limited number of underground tests of high-yield devices, suggest that the technology incorporated in thermonuclear warheads with yields aboveT has not changed substantially
We do not know specifically whatthe Soviets might have forwarheads ol lower weight and yield. They might want small, compact warheads such as would be required for multiplevehicles (MRVs) on theallistic missile, or on submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
D. Other Weapon Developments
n their high-aldtudc tests1he Soviets showed concern about the possible blackout of antiballistlc missile (ABM) radars by nuclear bursts. [
IS. The Soviets mayequirement for an improved Galosh warhead. If so, they would have to undertake modifications of past weapon designs, or develop an entirely new type of thermonuclear weapon. We think that the Soviets would want to test theweapon; it could account for some of the underground tests which have beenIf so, the number, magnitude, and chronology of these tests suggests that an operational warhead could be availableear or two.
Little is known concerning the ability of Soviet re-entry vehicles (RVs) tothe effects of the radiation produced by nuclear blasts. It is reasonable to assume that the vulnerability of RVs has been considered by the Soviets in designing at least their more recent RVs. Wo are aware of the increasing Soviet concern for survivability andas evidenced by tbe development of MRVs, higher ballistic coefficients, and the use of penetration aids, and we wouldalanced program to include some degree of RV hardening.
The need to Insure survivability of their strategic weapons systems, and ihe cost of full-scale testing underground, have almost certainly caused the Soviets torogram to simulate weapon effects. Wethe Soviets have made efforts io simulate the various forms of energy releaseduclear burst (blast, thermal, and nuclear and electro magnetic pulse radiation) and the effects of this energy on materials, facilities, and weapons systems.
We know that the Soviets have anresearch program to study the effects of high pressure on materials; theirand theoretical efforts in this area are probably sufficient to enable them to simulate the effects of blasts. The simulation of tliermal effects poses no particular difficulty and is also within their capability. The Soviets are certainly aware of the electromagnetic pulse (EMP) producedeapon, and wethey are capable of simulating the CMP field to
he high-altitude nuclear tests eon-ductedere basically for other purposes and probably gave the Sovietsor no Information on the vulnerability of nuclear components to the effects of radia-
Don. They arc probably expanding their knowledge in this area both throughtests and the use of various simulation techniques. Tbe Soviets are probablyihe tame techniques used by the US for simulating nuclear radiation. Tliey have made significant progress through using plasma focus and laser-produced plasmas. They have DWMMUI steady state and pulsed reactors suitable for simulating the neutron energy released by fission weapons, and we believe they have used them for this purpose. Tbe Soviets probably have used various techniques to simulate the effects of low temperature ways and some highays. They also have higb voltageayand reactors which provide themimited capability to simulate the effects of gamma radiation.
E. Storage and Control of Nuclear Weapons
The Soviets store their nuclear weapons in national reservet regional storage facilities, at what we call "sensitive operationsnd at operational slorago sites at military bates. Because they exist in large number and arc of considerable size, the operational sites probably account for the bulk of the weapons inventory.
The highly-secured national reserve stockpile sites are spread throughout the country. The regional sites are far smaller than the national reserve sites, and apparently are used to serve remote areas. Tlie storage of nudear weapons is probably only one of the functions of theo-calledhey differ from thereserve stockpile sites io severalWe are not able tohat other functions these complcxri may have.
The nurnerous operational storage and handling sites are physically separated from tlie other facilities at tho bases where they are located They arc round at airfieldsnaval, tactical, and strategic air forces; at strategic rrdssue launch sites; at tactical surface-tc-suxface missile (SSM) support fa cilities; near Moscow, for the ABM system there; and at naval bases. In general, the newer installations are less complex than tile older ones, probably reflecting tbeover the years, ofs that require less handling. The chronology of construction shows that the strategic forces have received priority in the allocation of nuclear
he Sovietsew nuclearfacilities at Soviet tactical airfields in Eastern Europe, These sites were constructed In then East Ccrmany. Poland, and Hungary. It is possible that they provide some service to the ground forces as well as to tbe tactical air fbrces. It is not known whether nudear weapons are actually stored uSere-
We have very little information onprocedures for preventing the accidental or uiiautliorizcd use of nuclear weapons. The information wc do have is fragmentary and deals only with limited aspects of the overall problem. At the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the Soviets have showed great concern about preventing the accidental or unau-uSortxcd use of nudear weapons, but have addressed their comments to US procedures rather than to their own.
We have no evidence as to bow the unauthorized use of operational nuclearbombs oo board aircraft or war-heads oo readyprevented. Wc assume that the Soviets employ someor system which they regard asfor this purpose, but wc do not know whether they utilize authentication systems and/or permissive links.
PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS
ranium is basic lo any nuclear energy program.ound in nature at an ore; the uranium in the ore consists mostly8hich is not readily fissionable, and only in small parthich Is. By itself, natural uranium will not produce the chain reaction of fission which Is required touclear explosion. There are two ways lo use uranium to producehai will. The first involves the creation ofromuclear reactor. The second is an enrichment process whichthe ration the uranium, and thereby enhances its oplosivc potential. This section looks at Sovietin each of these areas, and at the amount of natural uranium available to the Soviets.
A. Production of Pluiontum-Equivalont
lutonium, one of the fissionableused in nuclear weapons. Is produced byith neutrons Inreactors (the irradiationbe uranium that served a* fuel for the reactor contains; tlie twomay appear in lhe same ratio as In nature, or the fuel may be enriched. Tbe latter supplies lhe neutroos. After the fuel has boonilixture of uranium,and many fission products. Theis separated from the irradiated fuelhemical process ineact on can also be used lo produce other nuclear materials, such. We use Ihe term "plutonium-equivalent' to describe tlie output of nuclear reactors. It encompasses all the products of the process of irradiation. and tritium) expressed in terms of equivalent amounts of plutonium; we have no means of determining the actual amounts of each.
Soviets have reactors, for theof weapons grade plutonium (orproducts) and chemicalat Kyshtym in the Urals, and atwestern Siberia.
Plutonium is also produced by reactors at nuclear power plants and by thereactors used on nuclear submarines. Tho Soviets have stated that the plutoniumin power reactors has nol beenand Is still contained in the irradiated fuel; wr believe that this is true for theproduced in the propulsion reactors as well They have further stated that the plutonium produced in power reactors would be used in their power reactor program. Wc do not know when the Soviet) will actually start processing this Irradiated fuel, but wc estimate that it will be
We estimate the cumulative Sovietof plufoniura-equivalent as ofo be about SO metric tonsange betweenoetric tons. Comparing this amount with (he amount estimatedear earlier, weoviet production ofO0 kilograms of plutonium-equivalent for the year0 (see Tallin HI).
n estimating the future production of weapons grade plutoniumc assume, on the low side, continuing production at present levels from lhe production reactors now in opexstion, and, on tbe high side,production at new production reactors ofear beginning in2 We of course have (onsiderahly less eonlidenco in our projection* of plu-toniunv equivalent production than In our estimates ol imt production On tho one hand.
TABLE III ESTI MATED
CUMULATIVE PRODUCTION AND AVAILABILITY OF SOVIET PLUTONIUM-EQUIVALENT [Uaric Torn At MiJ-Yearf
AvitutLr. ranIH me grin *
Minimum EiUmaw Mximai
production ttgumn rouitfled.
Thia roluina tab a* law maanl Ibao/dmd-oardrop al tha tnluie Tha*ootirtai*ercenttie (oul pculoaHuBi-cqaliaWat produeUoa. An additional 10
i-iti: hatlornuleilal contained inproduction aodiprlmr.
Soviets coo Id be buiklin* additional re actors. They could, conceivably, increaseat existing production reactors, or they could also optimize the operation ol some of their power reactors to produce weapons grade plutonium. On the other band, the production of weapons grade plutonium could slow down as rnililary requirements are met. Moreover, plutonium will become increasingly available from power and propulsion reactors. Wethat this output will increase to two metricearasis that all the power reactors In Table V,re completed as estimated there, and that the Soviets build nuclear-powered submarines at the rate we now projacL
he estimate of plutonium-equivalent available for weapons in stockpile is derived from Ihe estimate of the cumulative output of production reactors. In estimating the amount available, we have assumed that aboutercent of cumulative production is in aand reworking pipeline, or undergo-ing quality control check. We also substract the small quantities of plutonium estimated lo be used in weapon tests. Finally, we make allowance for the production and decay of irit-
ium. Ten percent of tlie plutonium-equivalent produced in, or5 wai assumed to be tritium This is about the maximum amount that can be obtained from thetypo of reactors that account (or most of tlie Soviet production, when tlwy are fueled will) natural uranium. The cumulative tritium stockpile so derived was reduced each year by the amount of tritium decay.
atural uranium contains only2, the isotope which isfor nuclear weapons utilizing uranium as the source of an explosive chain reaction. The USSR, like the US, uses the gaseous diffusion process to enrich natural.ontent lo someercent of the total uraniumatio necessary for weapon giade material^
aseous diffusion plants arc found at four places in the USSRNcyrtnsk in the Urals, Tomsk in western Siberia, andand Zaozemiy in central Siberia. Some of the older gaseous diffusion buildingshave been shut down either permanently or for the purpose of effecting improvements.
uture Production. Annualroduction could cliange significantly in the neat few yean. There isuestion as to the processes that may be used: available evidence can be construed as being consistent with substitution of gas centrifuge equipment in the older gaseous diffusion buddings.of the massive quantitiese-
iso M0 SM
BmM Ujjs Mr_ .
cumulated over the pastears and tho pro-loaged outages required for major modern ixa-boo or equipment replacement, it is unlikely that resulting changes in annual production rales could affect cumulative production sig-tiificantty during theears. For thisand because weasis for estimating the effects of changes that may now bewe have projected future productionon the basis of
IWr have reasonable coofideitoe, throughn tbe resulting range of cumulative production estimates; but(herrullfr hwd on the impliedproduction may become increasingly er-roonous in eilber directioo
C. Uronium Procurement
estimate that tbe Sovielof natural uranium has exceeded, bymargin, current and pastthe production of fissionableSoviets are believed to maintainof uranium concentrateThe stockpiles are probablytlie ability of the Soviets lo procureof concentrate from Kastat relatively low cost, and byto conserve their own uranium deposits.
information on Sovietresources is scanty, but wereserves are ample for probableneeds. We know that several areas ofUnion have been designated for future
uranium exploiration, but (he Soviets appear in no hurry to go ahead with the work.
acfa year, the Soviet Union produces or processes uranium concentrate containing an0 metric tons of uranium. The total, representing domestic and Eastsources combined, has changed little over die past decade.oncentrate with an estimated totaletric tons of uranium metal has lieen processed or produced.*
ur estimate of the cumulativeof fissionable materials could he satisfiedumulative uranium supply somewhereangeetric tons. The annual uranium requirement needed to meet the current estimated fissionableproduction rate fallsange0 mHric tons.
III. NUCLEAR POWER AND PROPULSION PROGRAMS
a. Nuclear Power Stations
uclear power plants representmall portion of the total electrical generating capacity of the Soviet Union. Because of the abundance of relatively cheap fossile fuels and hydroelectric power, it will probably be well intoefore the Soviets feel (he- need to rely upon nuclear power sourcesreater
degree- When they begin to do so, we believe thai they wiH concentrate on breeder type power reactors;ihe Soviets have slated, in the past, that tills is their intention.
lie Soviet nuclear powerfi called for the generationegawatts of electricity (MWe)ut this goal was not achieved until last year. The total Soviet nuclear powercapacity at the present timeWe. Construction presently planned will result in an overall capacity of0 MWeecause of dieir history of poor performance in mooting reactor construction
schedules, wcn*oviets I! r1 ufi
likely to achieve this goal before tbe.
' Breeder reactors rnodure more fttrimntJ* ma terul thn tbey toonjme.ccomplbhnl by piacmgocfceactor lo aUocb oeutiora whichcen of (how nreoVdmumoainc iheproccs. Tho .UorpOO. ol Mv4rOM eootab ferule muUxal into fuionibW naleriil which ran *rv* ai fuel for reactcn. ThUalled
5b. The Soviets have indicated that tbeyto standardise on two types of powerduring the neatean. TheseWe pressurized water reactorsOOT MWe water <oolod, Craplule-modcrsled. pressure tube reactorn addition, two experimental liquid metal fast-brooder reactors (LMFBR) are underwhich are scheduled tootalWe of powerrercent of the total nuclear power capacity at that time. These reactors are to provide the basis for designing the large fast-breeder readon to be installed in. (Secist of Soviet nuclear power stations and their characleristics.)
t is difficult to compare the technology of Soviet and Free World reactors because of basic differences in design and in safetyoviet nuclear power station would not be acceptable in the Free World because in designing for tbe containment of radioactive materials releaseduclear accident, the Soviets do not meet Western standards. Tlie Soviets behove that there can be no accidents involving an uncontrolled chain reaction or total loss of coolant Theironcerned mainly with coping with what they regard as the most serious accident that can. tbe loss of site power.
ROVIKT NUCLEAR POWLR STATIONS'
Power Uvel Kttlnwtcdn OpmUor.
Woio Jttt; MM la IH3
Yet* vi a
DM ri(h *
Soriru recrnti> .nncunced LnM two new powrr lUttam oil be coo*ttweted. or*the
Ukraine ittad tne olber ntWe do nolwhatfto bt Uiih. nor -Jo n* Igjio* whoiower lerol wttl It* lor ll-rararriot* Wvt wot indudrdin this
Wt;parity of the electric powerequipment in me^-wiiti of electric power.
Af Wi. rapaeU? ol iho rtarlortaw.tt* ol ibeeroal
*r< dual purpore reactors which alao pruduer. weapon* grade, plutonitim.
* reactorgener-ie about 1A0 Atbul meal of tbe inerroalitriahrtilio" plant.
itvtiooa ol Ihn lypo ol reactor arr> Uan.portea lo lag rnetor tit* for lurmbly.
B. Marine and Naval Nuclear Propulsion
Soviets first designed nuclearand icebreakers in Ihe earlya decade of development, threenuclear submarines and one icebreakerThese first generationutilized the same power plant. In thenew classes of submarinesof which are nuclear powered, andhave announced that they willnew nuclear icebreakers.
The first nuclear submarines wereallistic missile submarine;lass, armed with cruise missiles, andlass, an attack submarine We believe that the nuclear power plant used in these boats is capable of generating0 shaft hoisepowereactor whose power is on the orderegawatts. The reactor core originally had an average lifetime ofears. Current overhauling schedules indicate that the average lifetime isears.
Inhe Soviets begana second generation of nuclearrepresented by the Y. C,hese submarines have exhibitedoperational characteristics during the few years that they have been in service The Soviets have employed tliem on extensive long-range patrols and thus appear toigh degree of confidence in their reliability.
We estimateeactor generatingegawatts is required to attain theonots) ofnd Vclass attack submarines Wo estimate that the pro-pulsion system oflass ballistic missile
"More recently.lave delected two additionalP and oW A, wfckfc tnowetcd. bat we know Uric about OVu propahao lyUcon
submarine, and tbe boat's maximum observed speed ofnots,otal reactor power ofegawatts.
he first Soviet icebreaker, the Lenin, was commissionedI experienced early operational problems ami was out of service for lengthy periods, oneoviet official has stated thatriginal reactors of the Lenin were removedystraneactors. It is hkdy that tho now reactors generateegawatts of power each and have an increased lifetime of0 full power hours. The Lenin resumed operation during lite Arctic navigation season which began in the spring
here is no evidence that work has begun on the two A'kfuai-class nuclearwhich the Soviets plan to construct. The Soviets have stated thai the leactors of these ships will have an effectiveimes that of the original Lenin reactors, and that they will be similar to those of the "recotuxructed Lenin".
IV. ADVANCED NUCIEAR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
he Soviet program of advanced nudear research and development) Includes an active effort to exploit nuclear energy for use in space. It also includes the world's mosteffort to demonstrate tho feasibility of producing and contiolbog energy through nuclear fusion.
A. Aerospace Applications of Nuclear Unorgy
he Soviets have relied on solar cells and batteries almost exclusively for electric power on their spacecraft. They have used
radioisotopesower sourceew (Cosmos satellites andeal source on theehicle The USSB could make extensive use of nuclear sources for electric power if it chose to do so, since it has the necessary technology in ihermoclcctrics. The Soviets are doing extensive research on various other energy conversion pfopfnies including thcrmiooics. magneton ydrodynamicsnd various heal engine cycles employing tu/bogenerator machinery,
Technical literature indicates lliat the Soviets have established the materialsfor solid-core, nuclear rocket enginesngines utilizing solid fuel in theirRockets of this kind would enable the Soviets to trans port very large payloads over interplanetary distances.o direct evidence, however,rogram is underoviet scientist workingcientific institute in Moscow stated recently that be was involvedrotect to study the feasibilityocketas-core nuclearne using gaseous fuel Although theproblems arc much more difficult, the temperature of tlie gaseous fuel can be made considerably higher than that of solid fuel. The gas-core rocket, therefore, canigher specilic Impulse. We believeolid-core rocket engine coukl be developed in the next decade, but considerably more time would be required toas-corer to make other system operational
The Soviets have not yetuclear reactor into space, and they areto do so until the. Theya developmental reactor (calledor0ew years ago to test tlicrmoclcctrlc conversion, but it was ihen dismantled. Because of inherent power limitations and excessive weight, this reactor was not well suited for use in space.
lie Soviets must overcome majorproblemschieve success inork on the usearge MUD* power source. These problems mostly involve the coupling of the nuclear reactor to tbe MHD generator. There is no evidence that the Soviets plan to use heat cycles employingto apace.
be Soviets have been conducting an aggressive research program for lheol Ibwrmonie reactors' Recently, they successfully opeiated ihe worlds first proto-type thermionic reactor. We estimate that tho Soviets could0 kilowatt thermionic reactorower source in space in Ihe hut half of Ihis decade.
Soviets are continuing researchmaterials suitable for use in nuclearfor aircraft. There is no eviiienee,that they are engaged in theof nudear-powered aircraft.
B. Controlled Thermonuclear Reactions
Soviets are endeavoring tothe technical feasibility of acan produce and control theby nuclearheir programlargest in tho world. They areapproaches to the control of fusion re-
actions, but their mainirected at toroidal (doughnut-shaped) plasma and laser-plasma devices.The most promising results to date have been achieved with, their large toroidalargermachine is now being designed. We believe that in the, this machine will demonstrate the technical feasibility' of the controlled release of energy produced from fusion. If tlie approach used in thedevice does not prove successful, the Soviet program will have suffered asetback, because of the heavy emphasis on this particular method.
V. PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS
"Th* problem In adoevingo push OV atomic rraelei efcsw enough toffthec loespite nw stmt po-Ovc cJrcrricyUWy repel one another Tha can be oW>hotor pUnna. in which iht atomic rmdo have been (tripped' of ihcu electron!.
" Io dricuulng some of Iheu PNE teats, iho Soviets have mentioned ykjdi at variance with what we cstlnuie them I
The Sovietsigorous program for the peaceful use of nuclear explosionsince the program began inS nuclear detonations specifically for peaceful purposes have been detected, mostly in support of the Soviet oil and gas industry, or for excavation projects. Soviet officials have provided considerable information on these shots, including the dimensions of craters and yields of the devices used, but have consistently withheld information on the time and place of tbe explosions "
The first Soviet PNE experimentxatering test conducted inhat involved the formation of iwu reservoirs through the damming of the Shagan River.device used for this experiinentt. Four other entering tests have been conducted for exporiinenlul purposes,ow charge and another designed to inveati gate the contamination and the radioactive fallout produced by cratering shots. Other PNE shots have been used successfully to plug runaway gas wells, to stimulate theof oil and gas. and lo produce under, ground storage cavities.
The most recent PNE experiment, in1otal yield ofas associatedlan toanal, in tbe North Urals, connect Ing the Pechora and Kama Rivers. Tlie canal project is intended to draw water from the Pechora, which flows north, into the Kama, which flows south, and thus ultimatelytbe amount of water moving down the Volga to the Caspian Sea. The water would be used tor irrigaboo and the production of hyiuxclectric power, and would help restore the falling level of the Caspian Sea. Tlie So-vieti plan eventually toeriesevices totalingegatons in yield. The initial test vented particulate debris whirl, carried beyond the borders of the Soviet Union. Subsequent explosions almost certainly will also.
Statements about future projects show that the Soviets intendemain activearge way in the PNE field. They havo dis-cussed projects intended to stimulate theof oil and gas. to store od and gas. to strip ores, to crush rock, and to create dams and canals.
VI. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
USSR has provided limitedto its allies and to certaincountries since thets aid was primarily in the form of train-
TOP OCCWPT 1
ing and the supply of reactors and equipment: for research. More recently, it has included the coiirtiuction of nuclear power sUtlons. One station is in operation in East Cermany. and other large power stations are underin East Germany. Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria- The Soviets have agreed to provide nuclear power stations lo Hungary andand plan additional stations inFinland, the firstommunist country lo do so. has purcliascd two power reactors from the USSR. Preparatm'i for the construction of one of lliesc reactors is already under way. Various kinds of safeguards have been imposed by the Soviets in ihdron nuclear assistance, lhe spent fuel of the power reactors provided toand East Germany is to be returned to the USSR
oviets have in generalood job of meeting their commitments to thoof Eastern Europe. The construction of nuclear power reactors in East Germany and Czechoslovakia has run into difficulties and delays, however, largely because of theof these two countries to moel their commitment in cooperative protects, and the inability or unwillingness of tbe Soviets to take up Ihe slack. The Soviets should be able to meet their rommitmonts for future nuclear power reactors in Eastern Europe because they Involvo the construction of thepressurized-water type.
he Joint Institute of Nuclear Research (JINR) at Dubna, USSR, is tbe primaryvehicle for conducting multilateralwith other Communist countries in nuclear research. Most Communist countries are members of JINR and contribute lo itsommunist China and Albania haveubna provides advancedand training for tlie member countries in such liclds as high energy physics, which it would not ii.illy not be feasible (or the smaller countries to conduct individually. JINR also cooperates with CERN. lhe Europeanfor Nuclear Research.
Tlie USSR has been an active member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since its mception in lhe, but it has allowed the IAEA no access to its facdities for producing weapons gradematerials, and only limited access to power reactors and research faculties. At the IAEA meetinghe Soviets slated that they were piepared to negotiate eoulracts to enrich uranium for non-nuclear countries that are parties to the Nora-Proliferation Treaty. The Sovicfi stipulated that the countriesadvantage of this service must furnish their own uranium.
The USSR recently agreed to enrich uranium for France in Soviet gaseous diffusion plants and lo return it lo France for use in power reactors.ajor step in what isoviet effort to liecorne actively competitive in the world market for reactor fuel.
GLOSSARY OF NUCLEAR ENERGY TERMS
terras in this glossary are provided primarily for those who do not deal routinely with the subjects covered and who maydesire simplified definitions. No attempt is made toruly rigorous definition of the terms; the objective is to give their meaning as succinctly as possible.
Crateringnuclear test which is conducted to displace great quantities of earth.
Enrichedcontaining more ofsotope than the uranium found in nature.
Fertilematerial that can be transformedissionable material. The two principal fertile materials arend, which respectively formnd
Fissionable Materialmaterial which willhain reactionuclear weapon or reactor. The three primary fissionablearendill fission, but it will not by itselfhain reaction.
process by which nuclei of light-weight elements combine to form heavier and more tightly bound nuclei accompanied by the releasereat amount of energy.
Gaseousprocess of isotope separation used for the production of enrichedaseous diffusionn arrangement of thousands of diff users whose [nirpose is to increase the enrichmentn quantity.
Irradiation I'jpoiuK to radiation (the propagation of energy through space orwhether in the form of electromagnetic rays, charged particles, or neutrons.
form of an element belonging to the same chemical8 are both isotopes of uranium. Isotopeesigned to change thein which the isotopeiven chemical element appear and hence toorm of the clement enriched in one or another iiotope-
Nuclearrocket cniploying areactor to provide heat to the propelas-core rocket is one in which the fuel in the nuclear reactor isaseousolid-core rocketeactor whoseolid state.
Orallou (Oak Ridgehighly enriched in the-
refers toeavy dement which undergoes fission under the impact ol neutrons. Plutonium does not occur in nature, but must be producedeactor.
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Utilization Indexratio of separative work to the input of poweraseous diffusion cascade.
assembly of nuclear fuel and other components capable of sustaining achain reaction based on nuclear fission.
A production reactor is used to produce fissionable materials by the irradiation of fertile materials with neutrons.
A power reactor is used as the energy source for the generation of electric power,ropulsion reactorource of energy for propulsion.
In pressurized water reactors, natural water is used both to cool the reactor and to moderate (slow down) the neutrons. The term "pressurized" indicates thai theof lhe water is kept high enough lo prevent its boiling. In graphite-moderated, pressure-tube reactors, graphite is used to moderate the neutrons, and water is used to cool the reactor. The liquid metal fast-breeder reactor uses liquid metalodium)oolant because itigh-temperature coolant with good heat transfer properties. No moderator is used in this type of reactor and the velocity of Ihe neutrons therefore remains high. The lenn "fast" refers to this fact.
Separative Workmeasure of the effort expended in an isotope separation plan! touantity of uranium into aenriched.ortion depleted. Tlie number of separative work units required toiven quantity ofuranium depends uponequired, the concentration of the feed material, and the concentration of the waste (tails).
Tollenrichmentommercial basis. The customer supplies uranium for feed and gets back asesser amount of uraniuma greater concentration, and optionally, the rest of the uraniumesser concentration. For thistoll" is levied on the customer expressed in terms of tlie price per unit of separative work performed.
heavy, sUghtly radioactive metallic element.of the twoisotopes of natural uranium. Il is lhe only readily fissionable material which occurs in appreciable quantities inits importanceuclear fuel. Only one part in2 percent) of natural uranium. The other principal isotope olertile material: it makesercent of natural uranium.
energy releaseduclear weapon expressed in terms of the quantity of TNT that would be needed to generate the same energy release. The usual units are kilo-tuns (thousands of Ions) or megatonsof ions) of TNT equivalence abbreviated as kt and MT, respectively.
SOVIET UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTS1
SOVIET UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTS
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