THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
In response lo your memorandum ofish to reportave done with respect to providing guidance in the field of protection of classified intelligence information including that bearing on intelligence sources and methods.
I have issued through the United States Intelligence Board detailed guidance governing disclosures in this area. opy of these guidelines is attached. They have been concurred in by the addressees of yourt memorandum. Each of them hashorough review of existing regulations and procedures within his department or agency to make sure that they meet the criteria required for protecting classified intelligence.
The attached guidance for tha intelligence community asks that the chiefs of all components of Iho community do the following:
Review existing departmental and agency regulations, including briefing and indoctrination procedures;
Provide for periodic re indoctrination and continuing education in security practices and procedures;
-- Review procedures for authorising and controlling disclosures and releases. (This section specifies that the responsibility of the intelligence chief for assessing risks to intelligence sources and methods should be delineated andeview should be provided for when danger to such sources and methods may tjxist, It goes on to provide for sanitizing in appropriate cases and for procedures to report inadvertent or deliberate disclosures, including assessment of damage and remedial action, )
-- Take firm disciplinary action where appropriate, and refer to the Department of Justice in cases where violation of criminal statutes may he involved.
I shall ask the intelligence chiefs toarticular effort to assure that in the eventroposed, or an unauthorized, release of sensitive and specially-compartmented intelligence, the appropriate member of the community be consulted as to potential damage to sourceshe Director of the Notional Security Agency in the case ofintelligence). hall also ask the intelligence chiefs to report back to me periodically on actions taken to implement Lhe guidance, soan monitor these developments on your behalf.
I believe that these actions are responsive to your charge to me. ave stressed my particular area ofho protection of intelligence sources and methods. The broader field of reviewing the handling of classified information in general is being looked atommittee responsive to NSKM IH. The CentralAgency is represented on this committee.
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Guidance Governing Disclosures of Classified Intelligence
As pointed out in the President's directive ofubject "Disclosures of Classified Information and Coordination and Clearance of Officialachinery now exists to protect allified information. It is recognized that unauthorized disclosures of chii'Sified intelligence may involve thoughtlessness in the application of regulations and procedures already in effect. Further, with respect to sources and methods, widespread discussion of this subject, some of it unavoidable but much of it gratuitous, seems to have conveyed an impression in some parts of the Government that there is little, if anything, that is not known to the public. The protection of intelligence sources and methods continues to be of vital importance to our intelligence effort. The true origin of many categories of intelligence information to be used in public release or debate must be disguised and the use of all such information must be duly authorised. The responsibility for authorizing relesse and fsr devising proper disguise rests with the originating Agency.
The President's directive of refers to the statutory responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence for the protection of intelligence sources and methods. The National Security Act7 specifically states:
nd provided further, thai the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure;"
It is nol to be expected that all consumers of intelligence, policy makers and others would recognize or be fully alert lo potential danger to intelligence sources and methods resulting from release of intelligence. Consequently, it is believed that the intelligence community should take the leading role within their departments and agencies.
Chiefs of all components of the intelligence community should review tho existing regulations and impress on all concerned the necessity to abide by them. The following specific actions should be taken:
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existing departmental and agencythe control of classified information to makein every instance they meet the criteria required byincreasing volume and significance ofparticularly including sensitive Particular emphasis should be placedthat the need-to-know principle is strictly enforced,
sure that briefing and indoctrinationreviewed with the objectives ofbove inprocedures should he so designed as to assure thatmembers of the intelligence community andindoctrinated officials oi the Government fullydifferences which exist among various kinds ofrespect to danger to the source or method whichfrom disclosure. It should also be the purpose ofto explain the way in which cleaved individualsascertain the clearance status of others beforeinformation revealing intelligence sourcesand to make sure that they do so.
i. Provide lor periodic rcindoctrination and continuing education in special security practices and procedures relating to intelligence, in addition to those security procedures established as general policy, torogram for prompt debriefing of individuals who no longereed-to-know.
4, Review procedures for authorizing and controlling disclosures and releases.
a. The responsibility of the intelligence chief for assessing the risk to intelligence sources and methods involved in deliberate disclosures should be delineated. There shouldeview and assessment by intelligence authorities whenever any classified intelligence is proposed foror for use in bTicfings, testimony, symposiums,peeches, writings for publication, presentations, courses of instruction, press releases, formal and informal interviews with press representatives, or other activities in the course of which thereanger thatsources and methods might be revealed.
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Each assessment should include methods by which such intelligence can be effectively and plausibly sanitized by or with the approval of the originating agency so us to protect the source. Sensitive intelligence to be disclosed should be clearly identified as such and the official disclosing it should be so cautioned when appropriate. This can be particularly important in dealing with some public information officials who cannot be expected to be fully familiar with the origins of such sensitive intelligence. Records should be maintained regarding any classified intelligence declassified or authorized for disclosure.
facts surrounding inadvertentclassified intelligence to any person or personsfor access to such intelligence shouldto the appropriate intelligence chief, whotho originating agency in any potentially
person having knowledge of anyclassified intelligence made contrary to thecontrols of the department or agency concernedreport it to the appropriate intelligenceaction. Such action mayuch steps asto repair or limit tho extent of the damage;
request for investigation by appropriate authorities;
assessment of the possible harm toand methods and notification to allconcerned; prompt notification to
all official recipients that an unauthorized disclosure has occurred, together with advice of remedial action to be taken and guidance for responses to inquiries from public media representatives that may result from the compromise.
5. Take fully into account, in proposing the release of any intelligence derivedoint project in the intelligence community, the interests of any other members of the intelligence community which might be epartment or agency authorizes the disclosure of sensitive
intelligence fromource, that agency is responsible forotherembers of the action. Special attention should be given to defining the precise limits of the disclosure and to cautioning against inadvertent elaboration or extension beyond those
6. In conjunction with appropriate authority, take, or assure that disciplinary action is taken where appropriate,ust, clear, and definite manner which will demonstrate the extreme seriousness with which unauthorized disclosures are viewed. iolation ofstatutes may be involved, any such case should be referred promptly to the Department of Justice.Original document.