Created: 9/1/1971

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Cuban Subversion in Latin America





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SUBJECT uban Subversive Activities in Latin America Summary

paucity of hard evidence of current Cubanin violent aubvorsion--particularly in view of thewhich such evidence was uncovered in theHavana's involvement in this activity ia at itssince Fidel Castro assumed power. Only in Guatemalainformation about direct Cuban participation with anAmerican guerrilla force; Havana's subversive assistance

to other Latin American groups consists primarily of continued propaganda and probably limited insurgent training and funding. Cuba's foreign intelligence apparatus now seems more to intelligence collection and political action than to support of insurgent movements. Castro would probably insistery low risk factorigh probability.of success before lending substantial Cuban support to an effort to unseat an "unfriendly" Latin American government by violent means. It has taken himecade to learn that sponsorship of violent subversion often bears bitter fruit and that there are more subtle ways of promoting hla foreign policy objectives with less risk to his own revolution.

by the failure of Che Guevara's guerrillaBolivia and by the many other defeats in similarand hard pressed by the domestic economic.situationmore attention to internal affairs, Castroradual disengagement from those violent subversiveshowed little promise of succcbs. At the same time*to improve hia relations with his chief economicworked to re-establish ties withCommunist parties formerly alienated by hissupport of revolutionary movements. He alsoto refurbish his image among non-Communist circleshemisphere and, although he continued to give verbalviolent revolution, he reduced his material commitmentmovements to such an extent that some guerrillapubliclyithdrawal of Cuban assistance.



of the last three and one-halfpolitical developments in Peru, Chile, and untilled Castro to believerend in Cuba'smaterialized and that it is growing stronger. As long as

he can continue to take advantage of this trend and dilute the isolation imposed on Cuba by the Organization of American Statese will be less inclined to chance an international, political reversal occasioned by blatant involvement in violent subversive operations. His adoptionew policy onhowever, does not mean that he has rejected completely his support of violent revolution; neither does it represent an abandonment of other forms of subversion, which he is believed to continue to regard as valid and useful political tools.


Fidel Castro has been involved in subversion and armed struggle in varying degrees ever since the Cayo Confites expedition Almost every Latin American Republic has felt his interference at least once. His involvement has taken many different forms ranging from direct personal participation, as in the Cayo Confites adventure against dictator Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, to the supplying of arms and ammunition as in Nicaragua9 and Venezuelais efforts have consistently met with failure, with the single exception of his war against former Cuban President Fulgencio Batista.

As soon as Castro assumed power in Cuba in January

avana became the center for subversive operations against other Latin American countries. In9 alone, expeditions were mounted against Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Panama. These ill-planned and poorly executed operations, developed during the euphoria created by the unprecedented success of Castro's guerrilla forces, were total failures.

by his early failures, Castroin subversion. In the early ands,the form of money, weapons, training,directed to those rebel groupsColombia, Peru, Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina,and the Caribbean willing to take to the hillsguerrilla warfare. Proof of Cuban involvement in many

of these affairs was irrefutable. orache of several tons of weapons and ammunition, much of it traceable to Havana through identification of serial numbers and restoration (through scientific processes) of partially



obliterated imprints of the Cuban Army's coat of arms, was unearthed by government officialsenezuelan beach where it had been secreted by the Cubans for use by Venezuelan guerrillas.

The Tricontinental Conference, held in Havana in6 was an effort by Castro toajor role in the leadership of revolutionary movements throughout the world. At the Conference, which was co-sponsored by the USSR and Cuba and was attended by moreelegates, the African-Asian-Latin American Peoples Solidarity Organization (AALAPSO) was formed to coordinate the activities of all "anti-imperialist" rebel movements. uban, Captain Osmani Cienfuegos, was appointed AALAPSO Secretary General and Havana was designated as the location of the organization's Following theecond meeting, also sponsored by Cuba and attended by the conference's Latin American delegates, was held at which the Latin American. Solidarity Organization (LASO) was formed. Havana was declared the permanent seat of LASO and Cuba presided over the LASO's ruling Permanent Committee. Castro apparently intended that LASO would functionupport mechanism for guerrilla expeditions such as Che Guevara's Bolivian operation which was already in the formative stage, but by the time LASO held its first congress inhe Bolivian guerrillas were already doomed, thanks largely to the premature exposure of the group in March long before it was ready for combat.

Further proof of Havana's sponsorship of subversion surfaced inhen four Cuban military officers were captured near Machurucuto, Venezuela. The Cubans were attempting to infiltrate into the Venezuelan interior and had been brought to the infiltration pointuban fishing boat, the SIERRA. The equipment they brought with them readily identified them

as prospective guerrillas.

was dismayed by the embarrassing turn ofVenezuela but he suffered an even more damaginghen it became clear that the Bolivian armedliquidated Guevara's band. The Bolivian adventureCastro's most important attempt to "export theit was carried out with the roost expert leadershipfinancial support that Havana could provide. TheGuevara apparently forced upon Castro the realizationvery specific and unique conditions wereoperations of the magnitude that Havana could

muster enjoyed little chance of success.


SECRET NO FOREIGN nT""P'VrvV]Tnoi,iirn I'lN^DI NO DISSEM abroaq-fflftCTtT^q'uKp use ONLY

The unsuccessful operations in Venezuela and Bolivia, culminatingecade of failures in internationalcaused Castro to pause and reassess his foreign policy. He probably realized that his adventures abroad had beenin terms of personnel, money, and prestige and that they did little more than give his opponents justification for advocating continued restrictive measures designed to further Havana's isolation.

Although Castro had predicted that success in guerrilla warfare in Latin America wouldong-range prospect and that victory could not be expected in the short term, he clearly was exasperated with the failure of Cuban-supported revolutionary movements to gain momentum, and he openly criticized those rebel leaders such as Douglas Bravo in Venezuela who had had opportunities but had "fumbled them away."

Furthermore, Castro was aware that his espousal of violent revolution had sparked bitter opposition in the local Communist parties in Latin America. Local Communist leaders judged themselves to beetter position than Castro to determine what was the proper way to achieve power in their respective countries. Whereas Castro looked upon them as ossified hacks too concerned with creature comforts toeizure of power, they consideredountry bumpkin,

a Johnny-come-lately who had come to powerolitical accident and who, despite his gross political and ideological inexperience, had the effrontery to press upon them his naive and fallacious interpretation of Marxist-Leninist theory. These leaders made their dissatisfaction with Castro known in Moscow and Moscow in turn relayed this dissatisfaction on to Castro.

Castro had largely ignored previousrestrain his subversive activities--his promisesleaders to that effect in3 and Novemberneverwasess favorable negotiatingin7 and8 because of serious Faced with the decision of continuing ansterile policy or shiftingore pragmatic approach

that offered to be more productive in the long run, Castro chose the latter. e began the painful process of improving his relations with the USSR, re-establishing ties with the Latin American Communist parties, and refurbishing his image in the



decision was not adopted withoutnudging from Moscow which had expressed itsvarious ways. The Soviet ambassador in Havana was notreplaced following his recall in7 and, atof the Middle East criais, party chief Bre2hnev iahave likened Castro to the Chinese and to haveMoscow would not keep Cuba "afloat" if the Cuban leader

did not soon come to hia senses. Premier Kosyginersonal call on Castro following hia visit to the US in the wake of the7 war and there were reports at the time that he dropped hints in line with Brezhnev'a admonitions. By the springowever, the situation began to improve and inew Soviet ambassador was sent to Havana, filling the post left vacant foronths.

Castro's reluctant endorsement of the invasion of Czechoslovakia inackhanded though it was, con-atituted the first major public concession by Havana in the interest of improving Cuban-Soviet relations. Perhaps tha high point in Havana's campaign to please Moscow came in0 when Castropeech slavish in its praise of Lenin and,ointed affront to one of the specific preraqui-aites for an improvement in Cuban-US relations, calling for even closer military ties with the USSR.

Havana's gradual disengagement from guerrilla groupa could not fail to please both the USSR and the local Communiat parties. In addition, special radio programs that were sources of considerable irritation to the Communist Parties of Chile, Venezuela, and Brazil were dropped from Radio Havana'sschedule and contacts were developed which eventually led to the restoration of formal ties between the Cuban Communiat Party and several Latin American Communist parties. Cubato provide safe haven for revolutionaries who fled their homelands by hijacking airplanes, being exchanged for kidnaped diplomats, or other moans, but Castro could hardly have retained his credentialsevolutionary had he denied entry to those seeking refuge.

The process of disengaging left Castro extremely sensitive to charges that hia revolutionary fervor might be on the wane. When guerrilla leaders in Venezuela and Colombia complained in9 and0 that Havana hadits assistance, Castro respondeditter attack, promising that revolutionaries "likeilling to fight and die, could always count on Cuba's aid but that pseudo-revolutionaries who fumbled away precious opportunities would get nothing. Probably because of that sensitivity, hla break




with large-scale support of violent revolution was neither quick nor clean. Deeply impressed by the headline-grabbing exploits of the Tupamaros in Uruguay and Carlos Marighella and other revolutionaries in Brazil, Castrohort-lived flirtation with urban terrorism. Following the death or capture of important pro-Cuban rebel leaders in Bolivia, Brazil, Nicaragua, Panama, and Haiti all in the spaceew months beginning in"owever, Castro seemed to lose interest even in this form of violent revolution.

18* Toore respectable image in Latin America, Havana encouraged increased contacts with foreign nationals through expansion of PRENSA LATINA; exchanges of sports,and cultural delegations; participation in international meetings and conferences FAO and ECLA meetings in various Latin Americannd developing trade* PRENSA LATINA itself was reshaped to give the outward appearanceatin American rather than Cuban press agency but itranch of the Cuban foreign intelligence apparatus andto serve as an intelligence collector.

19* After the emergenceationalistic military regime in Peru inastro expanded his definition of "revolutionary" to embrace not only guerrilla movements but any regime which in his opinion demonstrated its independence from "US imperialism" and initiated basic domestic reforms. Ine publicly expressed approval of the military government in Lima andampaign of cautious cultivation of the Peruvians* He succeeded in getting approval for the openingRENSA LATINA office in Lima and it was through this office that Havana, quick to take advantage of thearranged for the dispatch to Peru of blood plasma, medical personnel, and relief supplies in the wake of the disastrous earthquake of May Seeking to extract thepropaganda value from the occasion, Havana gave wide publicity to its relief efforts and outdistanced even the Peruvians in demanding special consideration for the earthquake victims in the United Nations. The propaganda value accruing to Havana far exceeded the actual cost of the relief effort and is an example of Castro's new sophistication* The Cubans nowermanent medical mission in Peru and--in contrast to Havana's aid to Peruvian guerrillas in thebuilding six field hospitals in areas hardest hit by the earthquake. The Peruvian government has responded by ignoring OAS sanctions andons of fishmeal to Cuba.



Chile also responded to Castro's new posture. Although direct trade was resumed during the administration of President Frei early last year, in November the government of President Allende re-established diplomatic relations with Havanaarked increase in Cuban-Chilean trade occurred. Normalcommercial, and cultural contacts have been resumed between the two countriesontingent of Cuban Interior Ministry officials are in Chile engaged in training Chilean intelligence and security officers.

Commentsavorable attitude concerning the ending of OAS sanctions against Cuba and reintegrating Cuba into the hemispheric community have also been made by important political leaders in Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Trinidad and Tobago and, up until the recent coup in Bolivia, the Torres government in La Paz had been expected to announce the resumption of diplomatic relations

in the near future. Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela followed Peru's lead and permitted PRENSA LATINA to open offices in their respective capitals. Several countries have hosted Cuban sports teams and many countries have permitted sports delegations to travel to Cuba to participate in various competitive events. Cuban technical groups have visited British Honduras, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Martinique, and Guadeloupe in the past two years and return visits from several of these areas have been accorded special attention by Havana. Although Havana has attempted, unsuccessfully so far, to establish commerce with some of the English-speaking islands of theodest trade has been conducted with the French islands for at least the past two years.

23. Havana has undoubtedly maintained contact with other revolutionary organizations in Latin America and probably is involved in some funding and guerrilla warfare training. There


The Current Picture


is very Little evidence of this, however, and the level of activity is well below that7 and previous years when proof of Cuban-sponsored subversion was comparatively easy to uncover. Fidel Castro apparently weighed tho results ofecade of subversion against the potential dividendsonger term but more realistic and flexible foreign policy and he opted for the latter. Rather than trying to createto enhance his own revolutionary influence in other countries through the use of violence, he now seems willing to be more flexible and take advantage of opportunities as they arise in order to promote his policy aims.

adoptionew policy, however, does nothe has rejected subversionalid and useful As he has frequently stated, he will continue tomovements; but his definition of whatrevolutionary movement has changed radically. He nothe terra to units engaged in waging ruralaccording to textbooks such as those produced byand Regis Debray. Defined much more broadly, themovement can now even include governmentsa strongly nationalistic, "anti-imperialist* stancethe governments of Allende in Chile and Velasco in Peru.

The nationalization of foreign-owned businesses and genuine agrarian reform are two key criteria in Castro's determinationovernment's "revolutionary" status.

views the trend of events in Latin Americashifted in his favor. He is aware that byrevolutionary involvements abroad he has createdin which he can much more easily take advantage

of opportunities precipitated by growing Latin Since he reduced his sponsorship ofCuba's isolation has diminished and heeversal of this trend by giving support torelatively Ineffective rebel groups Intent uponof governments such as those in Venezuela,Ecuador. He probably views these countries asthat will someday follow independent policiesthose already taken by Chile and Peru. Uruguay, hereach this stage later this year via the Frenteforeign intelligence organization will presumablyon such "enemy" countries as Brazil, Argentina,Nicaragua but will probably restrict itself moregathering activities in these areas, contentits subversive apparatus in check until aopportunity presents ltself^^



26. Certain countries are expected to be excluded entirely from the threat of Cuban-sponsored subversion. Trinidad and Tobago is in this category primarily because Prime Minister Eric Williams has gone on record as favoring Cuba's integration into the hemispheric community. Williams' remarks, including those made at an FAO conference in Caracas, Venezuela, last year, were particularly pleasing to Castro who responded byhipment of breeding cattle to Port of Spainift of the Cuban government. Guyana is another country in this category as is Jamaica. The latterrospective trading partneronvenient transportation transfer point while the former, under the independent-minded Prime Minister Forbes Burnham, has carried out activities theof Canadian-owned mining interests) in line with Castro's own political thinking. Chile and Peru of course, are already following paths which have produced deep satisfaction in Havana and thus will not be targets for Cuban-supported violent


that Chile's President Allende is anxious to see Havana aonere to its more pragmatic approach in foreign rolations. Allende reportedly has urged Castro to maintain his stand-down on subversive activities ao that Chile could persuade other governments to reassess their attitudes toward Cuba. Castro should be receptive to the idea because it would require nothing moreontinuation of Cuba's present policy in return for the valuable intercessionespected and able politician. There is evidence that Allende has already embarked onampaign on Cuba's behalf.




Fidel Castro continues to give verbalLatin American revolutionaries, his statements havemuch the same manner as has Cuba's policy. Whereas theformerly was restricted largely to thetoovernment by means of ruralit has been expanded to include incumbentpursuing policies "of economic and socialin Castro's opinion,ourse independent of

US influence. Thus, Castro today can describe the governments of Peru and Chile as "revolutionary governments" worthy of Cuba's support, in addition, the definition of the term "revolutionaryuerrilla band operating in the mountains, has evolved toroad front composed of political, labor, student, and other groups pressing for social change. The Church and the military are no longer looked upon solely as pillars of the establishment and defenders of the oligarchies but are now recognized as potentially valuable vehicles for achievingpolitical and social change.

slogan "The duty of every revolutionary is tothat was so prominent in thet theof Cuba's involvement in subversion is rarely heardis subject to wide interpretation. ThePeoples Solidarity Organization, formedromise of revolutionary achievement, has degeneratedmoreiscredited printing press tirelesslyout its propaganda pamphlets and literature. TheSolidarity Organization, created7 to support

such movements as Guevara's Bolivian operation, has become totally defunct.

however, Castro's oratory and that of"spokesmen seems contradictory and reflections ofbecome apparent only under more-than-casualover an extended period of time. Minister Carlosa key official in the Cuban hierarchy, foras late as last November:

ould say categorically that our frequently presented revolutionary position that armed struggle is the basis for revolutionaryin Latin America has not been altered."


his statement, Rodriguez seemed to beold "hard" line; he went on to compare Cuba's supportelsewhere in Latin America with the disregardboundaries shown by men like Bolivar and SanLatin America's nineteenth century struggles for:

"So when one country helps another at present, it is following the liberators' gloriouso therefore we are not concerned because there have been Cubans in several parts of the world. We feel very proud, very satisfied, that Cubans feel every country's freedom is like that in their own country."

It is important to tako into consideration, however, the setting in which Rodriguez made these statements; he was replyingointed question directed to himress conference in Santiago, Chile, where Salvador Allende, taking office as Chile's new president, had proved that leftists could attain power through participation in legitimaterocess the Cubans had long scorned. Rodriguez, therefore, having in9 derided the decision by the leftist political parties to attempt to achieve power through elections, was on the defensive and apparently felt obliged to reiterate Cuba's position in strong terms oross of face among the hemisphere's revolutionaries.

At the Lenin Centennial ceremony in Havana onidel Castro himself was on the defensive on the same subject. Evidently feeling the sting of criticism for having cut off Cuban funding for such rebel chieftains as Douglas Bravo in Venezuela and Fabio Vaaquez in Colombia, Castro said:

"Cuba has never nor will it ever deny support to the revolutionary movement. This is not to be confused with support of any impostor just because he is using the namehat type of pseudorevolutionary can expect no aid from Cuba, of course. But revolutionaries like Che, willing to struggle to the final consequences, willing to fight, towill always be able to count on Cuba'sut one must not worry about cur position toward the revolutionary movement. So long as there is imperialism, so long as


there are people struggling, willing to fight for their people's liberation from that imperialism/ the Cuban revolution will support therm"

7+ Well before that, however, Castro had given the first indication that he was willing to scrap the dogmatic guerrilla-oriented theories expounded in they Regis Debray and accept aseaceful, evolutionary process of social changes being brought about by an incumbent Latin American government. One called attention to the "revolutionary measures" being effected in Peru to accomplish agrarian reform and nationalization of foreign businesses and,ajor concession to some of his strongest critics,that guerrilla warfare was notrerequisiterue revolution:

"It is only fair that each country develop its revolution, its own revolution in its own style, in accordance with the conditions of each countryCuban revolution will support with firm decision any revolutionary process in any Latin Americanf someday,esult of the revolutionary development in Peru or any country in Latin America the criminal blockades and imperialist aggression and threats arise, our people will support that threatened

s. Except for his sensitive reaction onpril to criticism of the withdrawal of support to guerrilla groups, Castro devoted little comment to Cuban backing ofmovements during his speeches owever, he again used the term "revolutionary movements" in the context of "revolutionary governments" and "radicalized masses" rather than guerrilla warfare-oriented organizations. One added the people and government of Chile and the people (but not the government) of Bolivia to the "revolutionary" classification and boldly reaffirmed Cuba's commitment to assist revolutionaries:

"Cuban revolutionary fighters have shed their blood helping peoples of other continents,peoples of Africa and Latinhe people of Algeria arereat distance from us, butifficult moment for them, our men sailed across the ocean and arrived in time to


assist the Algerians. Thatart of our history and our tradition. This means that the revolutionary peoples of Latin America can count on us; the revolutionary governments of Latin America can count one say that we have supported, we now support, and we will continue to support the revolutionary movements in Latins far as Latin America is concerned, any time that other revolutionary sister nations ask for aid, they will have it: whether it is technical aid, as technicians, or as soldiers, even as soldiers. And we will do this as the most sacred of all duties, as fighters."

he themes reappeared in Castro's address on1 as heopeful glance toward the elections to take place in Uruguay later this year:

"If we pay close attention, we can see how circumstances change, how history marches on inexorably: we now have the Chileanprocess on the march, the Peruvian revolutionary process on the march. The conditions in each country and the methods employed are different in each case. There are these three, but we also have Uruguay. The armed struggle of the Uruguayans is growing stronger as is their Broadhere is no reason to dismiss the possibility that, by the end of the year, Uruguay, too, mayeople'sguiding her destinies."

10. Castro, in the same speech, also analyzed the situation in Bolivia and, afterillingness to consider favorably any initiatives of the Bolivian government toward restoring diplomatic ties with Cuba, said:


"if, in the future, the people of Bolivia, the workers of Bolivia, the students and the peasants of Bolivia, should findface to face with difficulties; if the advance of the Bolivian revolution should lead to strife, blockade, and sacrifice; we say torepresentatives

of the people of Bolivia--that you can count on Cuba's solidarity and you can be sure of one thing: olidarity will not fail."

11. Souba's assistance is offered togovernments and revolutionary peoples to help defend against the counterrevolution and imperialist reaction whereas7 it was offered to guerrilla warfare-oriented movements aimed at violent overthrow of the government.



During the last two or three years, the availability of firm, proven facta about Cuban involvement in current subversive activities in Latin America has declined substantially. This is believed toecision by the Cuban government following the disastrous failure of its Bolivian guerrilla venture in7 to cut back sharply on its direct involvement in revolutionary violence in favorore sophisticated and cautious approach for supporting revolutionary causes. Thus visible signsirect Cuban role in tha various subversive or revolutionary movements currently active in the area are generally absent, and of thefew recent reports of such involvement that have been received, most have been difficult or impossible to confirm. Thia is as true of the larger Latin American countries as the smaller onoa. As the following material shows, much of the tangible evidence of Cuban meddling in Latin America consists of continued propaganda attacks on some governments and auch indications of support fororganizations and individuals as providing safehaven to Latin American revolutionaries freed from Latin American jails as tha raault of political kidnapings.


Cuban support for insurgency in Colombia, never veryhas declinedhen guerrilla activity there began to decrease. While the pro-Cuban Army of National(ELN) remainsevolutionary group in Colombia, ita combat effectiveness has been severely weakened by the success of the Colombian government's counter-insurgency efforts. between the ELN and Castro continueow level, and there have been no reports of training in Cuba sinceLN leader Fabio Vasguez has, in fact, publicly complained about the drop-off of Cuban support. There is no evidence of Cuban contact with the other armed subversive groups in Colombia which are either pro-Soviet or pro-Peking.

Dominican Republic

Havana long has extended guerrilla warfare training to Dominican revolutionaries. Thia aupport has been supplemented by sporadic doses of propaganda aimed at undermining the Balaguer administration. Cuba has also offered its territory as safehaven


for Dominican revolutionaries, including those who have hijacked aircraft, those released from Dominican prisons in exchange for kidnap victims, and those who have sought asylum in foreign embassies in Santo Domingo to escape arrest. f the revolutionaries released in exchange for the kidnaped US air attache inor example, went to Cuba, and some openly admitted their intention to return to the Dominican Republic to overthrow the government. Prominent Cubans (including Fidel Castro himself) have neither confirmed nor denied occasional foreign press allegations that Dominican revolutionary Francisco Caamano, military leader and "president" of the rebel government in the Dominican civil wars in Cuba training an invasion force for an attack on the Dominican Republic. Castro has, however, commented that he thinks Caamano has the necessary qualities toominican revolution.


For many years, the only hard evidence of Cuban interest in supporting subversion in Haiti has come from Havana's regular radio broadcasts in the Creole language beamed toward Haiti. Thesewhich occasionally feature inflammatory language, urge and exhort the Haitian people to revolt against the Haitian government. The general tone and frequency of such broadcasts have not changed appreciably since President Francois Duvalier's death inince that time, the Cuban line has been that conditions in Haiti have not been changed by Duvalier's death and that violentaction is the only way to bring about such change. to President Jean Claude Duvalier in these broadcasts are generally scurrilous in tone.


Cuban interest in and support for moves against the Nicaraguan government are almost as old as the Castro government itself. uban air force plane delivered arms and supplies to9 for use in anti-Nicaraguan government activities, and since that time the Cuban government has provided training and some other support to pro-Castro Nicaraguan groups, notably the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). Cuban radio broadcasts have sporadically given propaganda support to anti-Somoza and pro-rebel themes. Such broadcasts usually publicize the goals and activities of the FSLN whose chief, Carlos Fonseca Amador, isin Cuba. He arrived there late last year after he and several other jailed Central American terrorists were released in return for the freeing of the passengersosta Rican airliner that had been hijacked to Cuba.



Despite the close ideological kinship between the Cuban revolution and the terrorist activities of the NationalFront (MLN) in Uruguay, there is no evidence of significant Cuban aid to this group, popularly known as the Tupamaros, or to any other subversive group in the country.

In1 the Uruguayan government shut down the Montevideo Bureau of the Cuban News Agency Prensa Latina and expelled its Director, following its publication of interviews with the abductors of British Ambassador Geoffrey Jackson. The closure decree, signed by President Pacheco and his Cabinet, also charged that the Bureauonduit for exchangingmaterial with Havana. The decree also prohibitscompanies from transmitting and receiving Prensa Latina reports.





Cuban involvement in subversive activity in Brazil probably is limited to training guerrillas

iavana is tne tavorite Id terrorists, however, including many who have been exchanged for kidnaped foreign diplomats. At, and probably well, Brazilians have received guerrilla training in Cuba Of those trainedhe largest number have been members of the National Liberating Action (ALN). Its founder, Carlos Marighella, had very close ties to Cuba and the Latin American Solidarity Organization ILASO) until his death at police hands in

The Brazilian terrorist groups are now badly demoralized and disorganizedesult of internal dissension in their organizations and an intensive government campaign to eliminate them. Many insurgents have been imprisoned or killed, their support groups have been destroyed, and caches of arms and documents have been seized by security forces. Although only remnants remain of some insurgency groups, they still retain the capability of carrying out isolated actions such as assassinations or kidnapings.


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