Created: 4/1/1971

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Trends in Production

Of Electronics In The USSR



Current Plana and Programs

the recently published "Drafttho Ninth Five Year Plan, programs in theindustry of several years standingreaffirmed. The computer industry isgrow, as formerly,apid rate. The"computationalill increase by

uring, or at an average annual rate of. Within this category, th* output of computers will increaseomewhat faster rate,nd equipment for the "mechanization and automation of engineering and administrative work" will be pushed. Theof electronic instruments for use inresearch, electronic medical devices (based on integratednd electronic equipmeni for use with industrial process control systems and other forms of automation will be nmphasized. It is also planned that production of radiofor navigation and air traffic control will increase. Finally, aconic, almost casual reference, the "directives" reveal OM new program "to organize the series productionow family of electronic computers based on integrated

somewhat unusual feature of theis the total absence of guidelines for industryhole or even of a

rtd$tva oychisliteI 'noy tekhnik.," This category includes computers, computer peripherals, electronic calculators, and other buaitienn type mac hi nut* (orgo> .

4 4 e riyttuyc proizuodstvo novogu kompIttkxa etcktronnykh mauhin no baseykh tkhttm.

generalized reference to its projected rapid growth. Output goals are not given for either the Ministry of the Radio Industry or the Ministry of the Electronics Industry. Moreover, and most surprisingly, the current plan contains no explicit goals for the consumer sectorthat is, for the output of consumer radios and television sets.

These omissions may be significant and could indicate that programs for the production of military electronics are being expanded,at the expense of output in the consumer electronics sector. In that case, Soviet planners would be understandably reluctant to releaseon industry and consumer electronic goods that might revealhift in emphasis.

The failure to announce Plan goals for radios and TVs is especially curious in the light of the regime's current efforts to curry favor with the Soviet consumer. Possibly, the growth in output of radios and TVs is being deliberately slowed down pending improvements in the product quality. It is instructive to note that stocks

of unsold electronics consumer items in the retail and wholesale trade network have mushroomed in recent years- nventory was valued at more than one billion rubles, orf the value of retail sales of these goods 5 the inventory was valuedf sales. It is also possible that the rate of increase in the output of radios and TVs is being constrained to accommodate the increased production of other types of consumer goods in electronics plants. According to the "draftheof consumer and household goods is beingin all branches of industry and "in heavy machine building, instrument making, shipbuilding and electronic industries,imes."

it is possible that Sovietare themselves uncertain about feasibleand goals. From all accounts, theindustry isajorphase hat is, the Soviets are making

a big push to modernize the electronic component base, to shift over from time-honored production of electronic equipment based on electron tubes to the manufacture of equipment based ontechnology, and specifically, silicon

devices such as integrated circuits. Because this transition involves fundamental and far-reaching changes in manufacturing methods, Soviet planners may be uncertain about the quantity and mix of product that can be achieved in the short run. Uncertainty about the extent to which Free World equipment or technology will become available could be an additional complicating factor.

Parallel with efforts to reshape theand semiconductor industries from indigenous resources, the Soviets arc pressing forward with efforts to procure Western manufacturing technology in theseariety of related fields. It is abundantly clear that the Soviets are acutely aware of the significant and growing technology gap in electronics between the USSR and advanced Western nations and are seriously concerned about it. The gap is extensive and covers virtually all product categories- To close the gap, the USSR in recent months has offered to buy complete turnkey facilities from the West, many" vanced technology and advanced technological products for which approval for export would be most unlikely. For example, the Soviets want to purchase turnkey facilities for the production of computers, integrated circuits, magnetic tape, core memories, tape memories, disc drives, small video recording equipment, and professionalvideo tape recorders. Types of advanced products sought are: high-capacity multiplexing equipment, electronic switching equipment, avionics equipment, advanced oscilloscopes, and other types of scientific and industrial instrumentation.

From the foregoing, it is suggested that the electronics industry currently has three major objectives: (a) to put integrated circuits into large-scale production; (b) to begin theof third-generation computers; and (c) to maximize its purchases of advanced electronic equipment abroad to reduce the "technology gap."

Sectoral Trends

Semiconductor Industry

quantities of integratedapparently are being manufactured at the

Radio Partis Plant in Voronezh, in plunLs of Che Svetlana Production Association* in Leningrad, and in unidentified facilities in the Moscow suburbs of Kryukovo and Zelenograd. All available evidence indicates that the output of usableICS in these facilities is so low by Western standards that the effort should beas experimental or pilot line production.

major Soviet effort to build anindustry based on planar, and metal oxide (MOS) technologiesevident since the. This taskto be unusually intractable. It isthat the gross output (including rejects)in the USSR0 was aboutunitsomparedillion inmainly transistors, diodes, and(see No breakdown of thesequantitative terms, is possible. However,general comments are believed to be an overwhelming proportion of the outputdiodes make up the lion's sharedevices; and probably lessfoutput is accounted for bymanufactured by planar epitaxial It may be noted in this connection

that many pieces of Soviet electronic end-products have been technically examined in the United States in recent years. None have contained silicon

is this relatively primitive stateof silicon transistor technologyin very large measure, for the relatively

* The Svetlana Production Association comprises five factories and five experimental design bureaus. It is one ofuch associationsfunctioning in the electronics (component) branch- In the Svetlana Association, subordinate enterprises have no juridically independent statue. All enterprises are administered by the head The Association has all the rightsMain Administration" and is directly subordinateeputy Minister of the Electronics Industry. The Svetlana Association (and all other are still an experimental form ofmanagement.

large and growing gap in advanced solid-state-technology between the USSR and tho United States-indeed, between the USSR and the West generally. The manufacture of monolithic integrated circuitsdeveloped silicon transistor manufacturing industry based on planar/epitaxial methods. Superficially, the tardiness of the Soviet electronics industry in mastering silicon technology is explained by its overlongon the development and production of devices based on germanium. But this explanation reducesautology. The true reasons are more complex and are deep-rooted in the psychology and organization of an economic system that discourages creative, innovative activity and adapts to change slowly, ew of the more obvious factors that have perpetuated obsolescence in the electronics component sector are: umbersome planning system, lack of incentives for factory workers and built-in resistance to change at the factory management level, faulty coordination between plants and between plants and research andinstitutes; and disharmony betweendesigners and end-equipment designers.

* The USSR has imported some advanced chemical etching machines from the West during the past year.

Moreover, in more concreteumber of crucial inadequacies are observable in the production equipment available to the Soviets. That is, Soviet progress in advanced solid-state manufacturing technology is impaired by theof high-quality precision equipment and materials of the following types: final test equipment, silicon diffusion furnaces, photo resists, photolithographic equipment and precision masks, chemical etchers for lead frames and printed circuitsondersnd scribing and dicing equipment. In addition, there are indications that the USSR does not make good quality plastic encapsulation packages. All of the above factors contributeeneral inability of the industry to maintain consistent quality in the manufacture of silicon semiconductor devices over long production runs.

eneral, appraisal, Soviet state-of-the-art lags at least five years behind that of

the United States in the area of monolithic ICs. in the area of hybrid integrated circuitsthat is, the use of thin and thick film passivewith discrete semiconductor elementsthe gap is probably somewhat less. The USSR lags least in the manufacture of thin and thick film resistors and capacitors.

The USSR is acutely aware of itsbackwardness (relative to the United States) in advanced semiconductor technology. This backwardness has denied the USSR many of the fruits of modern technology such as advancedcomputers, modern microminiaturized avionics equipment, and sophisticated instrumentation across-the-board. The USSR has been partlyin filling the gap by importing computers, oscilloscopes, and other instruments from the West in recent years- Such purchases are at bestmeasures and do notiable long-term solution to the expanding needs of the Soviet economy.

The USSR is committed to the developmentodern component manufacturing industry.

To accelerate the development of this industry, the USSR has embarked on an intensive effort to acquire the necessary technology and production machinery in the West. It is attempting to buy individual items of machinery as well as whole plantsurnkey operation. It is probable that the degree to which the Soviets will be able toodern semiconductor industry during the current five-year plan will hinge on their success in acquiring Western manufacturing-


lb. The most interesting development inelectronics appears to be taking place in radar production, particularly in the production of ground-based aircraft control and early-warning types (EW/GCl). Although no plant data are important inferences about production and':- 'r I canawni an f radar order of battle. First, emphasis has shifted from purely quantitative growth in output

tocitif existing sy stum:iml Lin- *li*YoLopf*cnt .ind production of new typcs. incurpoitit mrj newer .ind higher technology - Second, nuwOC Soviet mdars are hninq equipped with longer life tiil>es and better components to enhancereliability. Third, there ha*hift in design philosophy away from excess concern with ths maintainability ot radar systems under field conditions. The evidence for these inferences foilows.

16. After moreecade of steady growth in the deployment of FW/GCI radars and radar sites, deployment levels have stabilizedotal of aboutadarsites. These numbers have not changed significantly in more than two years. In sharp contrast to previous practices, the Soviets in very recent years, have retired older model radarsthe inventory as new ones have been introduced. For example, TOKEN has entirely disappeared from the inventory of EW/GCI systems, and XNIFEREST is rapidly It is believed that as older radars are phased out, modernized versions arc brought in, probably incorporating electronic countcrmeasures

(ECM) devices, and improved signal processing circuitry. In addition, the newest radars being produced, such as PART TIME, BACK NET, SIDE NET, THIN SKIN, and LONG TRACK,uantum leap

in technolnov over most of the existing radar


17. ajor factor contributing to theof Soviet radars has been the relatively short life of radar tubes, and probably of other components as well. In the past the problem of reliability has been manageable because an excess number ol radars haa been stationed at rw/GCI sites. Hence, field personnel have been able to prolong the operational life of radar tube^ by using theernal.uly for only short periods ol timeegular basis. At the same time, multiple rad.trs provided operational advan-

5 such as frequency diversity, redundant


coverage, and increased survivability. It is obvious that, uo radar systems becoma over more complex, this practice becomes an extremely cost-intensive alternative- The Soviets now seem determined to overcome the reliability problem more rationallythat is, by upgrading thecomponents. Newer radars exhibit charec-teristics that require stable and reliable suggesting that this problem is gradually being resolved.

Historically, Soviet radars have beento maintain, and "downtime" for maintenance has been significant. Maintenance is andifficult problem in the USSR because radars are generally deployed without protective under harsh environmental conditions. Hence,have always emphasized simplicity in order to field radars that were easy to operate, test, and maintain, rt is apparent from the fact that designs are becoming increasingly complex that operational capability is now being stressed over maintainability. Probably with improved components available, maintainability is not now the problem it once was.

The trend toward increased emphasis on improved technology is observable in other areas of military electronics as well. For example, the Soviets are attempting to improve command and control communications by introducina hiah-speed data transmission svstems.rj

the efforts that are beingadvance the technology of radar systems,be emphasized that even the veryradars do not measure up to theor technology of modern US {andWorld) radars of corresponding types.


are manufactured in the USSRthe electronics industry and the industry. The division of production

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The developmentodern computerwas first stated toigh priority goal of the Soviet Communist Party at the November2 Plenum of the Central Committee, It is clear from the deliberations of that Plenum that Soviet planners were thinking in terms of computersfor industrial use. and only secondarily for the broader purposes of economic planning. This policy was. reaffirmed at the December9 Plenum of the Central Committee, according toushkov. He also slated that the Soviet objective is an inventory0 computersostly for use in industry.*

How realistic is that goal? During the past decade, the USSR is estimated to havelessigital computers- Output in the current"ould have tomore than fivefold to reach the announced total, in theear period, the planned rate of growth in output of computers averages toer annum, compared to rates ofuring theear period. Hence, it would appear that either Clushkov hasish andoal, or the Soviets are planning to pour enormous resources into tho computer industrythe second half of.

There is somv evidence of resistance to thecomputers at the plant level, Kyi&tingin industry ore noid totd enthusiastic triiems for computersin number i'nterpri VHframf compmterr.. Po? -riff tom$ttt ore suntri Jictul ora i*9 ort -

tho end it is estimatedUSSRigital computersor available for use. This is less than the number installed in the United States. half of the Soviet machines(roughly equivalent, in capacity, toor below). The US has about(capacity equal to or greater than computers in use, compared with about 30

in the USSR.

A comparison based on numbers, however, is misleading in many respects. The majority of US computers are third-generation machines (based on integrated circuits) equippedf input/output devices that permitfull use of the central processor's None of the Soviet computers in use are third-generation machines; theynd second-generation (transistors) machines equipped' with wholly inadequate peripherals and relatively primitive software. Given similar operating characteristics (that is,r "processing dataoviet computer hasless capability to perform useful work, compared to its US counterpart, because of the inadequacies of software and peripheral equipment.

The major shortcoming of the Soviet computer industry is in production technology, rather than design, without fundamental improvements intechnology, the USSR will continue toobsolescent machines with poor reliability.-The USSR would like to resolve its computerproblems with Free World assistance and can be expected to press negotiations with large Western suppliers toward that end. At the sane time, the Soviets will probably seek temporary relief by accelerating imports of computers from the west.

arc pressing some of theuropean countries to cooperate in the production of computers- Forhe Soviets would like Poland to provide the USSR with small central processors; Hungary with assorted magnetic storage? devices; andwith some, as yet undefined, computer cir-cui try.

27. ense, technological backwardness in computers is both the cause and result ofin other areas of electronics, and isof the inferiority (relative to the West) of Soviet electronics equipment generally- Failure to manufacture modern, high-speed, high-capacity computers affects the Soviet image abroad. More importantly, it frustrates Soviet programs at home, particularly in the area of industrial management. Hence, the Soviets are now investing heavilyhird-generation RYAD computer- productionew machines was to have begun by now, but only one or two prototypes are believed to exist. It is doubtful that any significant production will take place before the-

20- The RYADirect copy of the The Soviets had planned to solveproblems andostly andsoftware development program byIBM software. It appears, however,software is not compatible with theand that the cost of adapting IUMbe as great as developing an entirely J

Consumer Electronics

11ion electronic0

29. The USSK for several years hasarge quantity of consumer radio and television sets. it nowarge volume of audio tape recorders as wellore than one annually- bevels of output of consumer items in the United States and the USSR are compared in the tabulation below.

Mill ion Unit's


Black and white Color

Radio and phonographs Tape recorders



Includes US factory coles of domestically orvduced sets and sets produced by US manufac furore abroad for tale in the United* Estimated*

Soviet consumer electronic products are of relatively poor quality and incorporate outdated technology. For example, nost of the television receivers in production0 contain largeof tubes and semiconductor diodes, butfew transistors. ew all-transistor models have been advertised but, as yotj they aro in an experimental or very limited production stage- The Soviets have5 as the year in which all production model television receivers are to be fully transistorized. To overcome buyerumber of modela recently have been taken out of production and replacedroved versions containing more semiconductors. For some models, the manufacturer's warranty has been ex* tended fromoonths.

Color television in the USSR is still in its infancy. Color broadcasting has been carried out for iDore than three yearsery limited schedule, but color receivers are in very short supply andery expensive. Prices recently were cutubles toublen. No Appreciable effect on demand has boen noted. Tourf color TV receivers are currently bo ing

V/. Tin1 flovir.'ts hoveton. Tinr m< r*

bottleneci. sterna Irom difficulties in Die manulac-lure of ihe color picture tub**. The joint soviet-French development program for the production of mask less tubes is far behind schedule- Moreover, the Soviets, who also have a large program formask-type tubes, have had to Import uome technology from the United States, especially tor the manufacture of masks.

radio production, the trend istransistorization andtasteful design,omewhatHF reception capability toAccording to the manager of the RigaPlant, all portable receivers manufactured

by that plant (one of the largest producers in the USSR) are now transistorized. Console models, however, are still based largely on tubes.

The first transistorized radio was produced in the USSR about eight years ago. bout one-third of all the radios produced wereand8. During the past two years, several new transistorized models have appeared. During the current Plan period, most radios will probably be transistorized.

Audio tape recorders are manufactured for the consumer market inifferent models. Most are of the two-track, monaural type. According to the Soviet press, none of these recorders9 met the highest "state standards" (COST) for quality.*

Curiously, while the USSR manufactures audio recorders in relatively large volume, it does notroad-based magnetic recording technology. Some studio-type video recorders are produced butery limited, hand-built basis despite an intensive development program of overears duration und obvious and growing Machines that have been produced are direct

4 According to atata standarda, there are five closxaa of tape recorders: highest and Classes I, II, III, and IV. Hone of the recorders produced in o classified as "highest" or even

Class I.

copies of amp EX and HC.Fi equipments. Moreover, the reliability of Soviet-made video recorders is poor. Head-life of the kadr model vtr that has been "in production" in recent years is stillours. According to East European users, Soviet recorders are of poor quality. Unlike most Westernange of magnetic recordimr products usableide variety of scientific, commercial, and military applications does not exist in the USSR.

Some recognition of Soviet problems in magnetic recording technology has appeared in the Soviet press- In Pravda reported: "therehortage of recording equipment and recording Broadcasting studios must be equipped as soon as possible. They must be furnished with modern tape recorders. Questions connected with the repair of sound-recording apparatus must also be resolved." Inimilar sentiments were expressed at the first nationwide scientific-technical conference on the theory and technology of magnetic recording, held in Kiev. The conference revealed that "at the present time, tho demand for magnetic tape recording equipment significantly exceedsand that "owing to the absence of productionarge number of newly developedtape recording devices are frequently not introduced into series production." Thestressed the need for: (a) theoretical and experimental work to improve the quality oftechnology for sound, video, digital, and precision applicationsr (b) the development of methods and apparatus for testing and measuring bandwidth; and (c) the development of miniaturized components for use in recording equipment.

Because of the extensive military, military/ industrial, and scientific applications of magnetic recorders, it is likely that the strong development effort that is known to exist will be sustained during the current Plan period. In addition, the USSR will probably increase its purchases ofin the West to the extent permitted by the international embargo.




a quasi-military industry, theindustryigh-priorityeconomic and technical resources. Thisstatus has enabled the electronicsregister impressive growth throughout theWar II period. 0more than eight times withn theapering off

to During the Seven Year Plan, output was originally planned to triple,urther slowing of the growth rate tocompounded) per yeara result fully consistent with the secular trend of any growing industry as its base grows larger and the industry matures. That plan, however, appears to have been scrapped in2 in favorar more5 designed to raise output in that yearevel four times that No data on fulfillment of the Seven Year Plan for theindustry has ever been published, however, and it is still possible to argue, on the basis of conflicting evidence, that the industryourseenerally in accord with the original plan goals. It can even be argued from published indexes that output5 may have fallen short of the original Plan, although this would imply an inconsistency with the historic-pattern of growth and with the privileged priority status of the industry that would be difficult to sustain on purely logical grounds-

are good reasons for believingoriginal goals of the Seven Year Plan were,revised. First, it is believed thatthe military demand for electronicsesulting from thendystems, theandissile deployment systemsaccelerated the production ofand generated increased expendituresR&D. Second, an importantto have taken place in the generalof science and industry early in thecould have influenced the goals of thePlan. Research and developmentto have been transferred from the USSR

Academy of Sciences: tooctronics industry sometime* The number of facilities that were transferred to the electronics industry is not known. An editorial in the3 issue of Radio stressed the significance of this new policy for the electronics industry, but no data that would permit an evaluation of the Impact have been released. Itowever, that the electronics industry,as responsible for the administration and financing of scientific research and experimental design as well aswork not contemplated at the outset of the Seven-Year Plan. The expenditures involved could easily have engendered an upward bias in the gross value of output of electronics5 as well as for the wholeeriod.

an upward revision in thePlan goals may have been prompted, ina better-than-anticipated performance. it is known, forthe output of Soviet industry generally,the machine building sector in particularindustryranch of thesector), made impressive above-planoutput during this period. Theabetted by above-plan deliveriesinputs, could have shared in thesestimulated industry planners, in theof continued gains for the remainder ofPlan period, to project

* ew state policy designed to tighten the re-lationehip between RSD and production appears to have been initiated by then1 andat theZ Plenum of the CPSU. That Plenum decreed the "transfer of leading scientific, planning, and design institutes, and design bureaus of plants with developmental and experimental bases, to the branch state committees." Plenum Tsentra1'noa Komiteta Kommunistichesko Partii Sovctskogo2 Goda: Stenograficheskiy Otchet; Moscow, Gospolitizdat,..

the years of the Eighth, output in the electronicsbelieved to have expandedate of about

nnually. One source implied that the "output ot electronics" increased byear during the first three years of the, suggesting that growth may have tapered offatouring the final two years of"the plan, within the industry, it appears that theof components is growing significantly faster than end products. This would not be surprising since the inadequate supply of components has longroduction bottleneck and large resources are apparently being poured into research andin this area to catch up with Western technological advances. According. Shokin, the Minister of the Electronics Industry, his industry, which produces electronic components, grew three times. It is not known how fast the Ministry of the Radio Industry has grown, but according to the Minister, V.oubling of outputas6 press item reaffirmed this plan,that the industry was probably developing according to schedule and that the plan would be realized.

Gross Value of Output of

a. pi

IAethodology for deriving the ruble value of output of electronics in the USSR. It was emphasized, at that time, that the methodology depended rucial way on two values: (a) the gross value of output 'GVO) of the machine building and metalworking (MBMW) sectornd (b) the rate of growth in output of theindustry. Given true values for these variables, the GVO for electronics could be uniquely determined for'j.

4A. As indicated above, no plan fulfillment data for the electronics industry covering theave ever been released. Nevertheless, there are soaie grounds for believing that it qrew four times. In respect ton most recent evidence available pointsVO0 billion rubles* These dataVO Cor the

electronics industryillion rubles Other value.', for MBMW din aluo arguablethat is, other values falling in the rangeillion rubles can also be supported by statements of Soviet officials or are derivable from official data. Hence, other values for the GVO ofranging4 billion rubles are also possible. Pending further clarification of the GVO, MBMW, and the growth rate of the industry during the Seven-Year Plan, the figureillion rubles is the "best" estimate available for the gross output of electronics

the analysis of the electronicsthe gross value of output is usefula starting point. Of greater interest isvalue of output.* This paper presents(tentative) estimate of the net valueof the Soviet electronics industry. figures are significantly lower thanat previousesulta word of explanation.

holesale pricesin the electronics industry worereduced across-the-board. Prices inindustry were reducedthe "electronics" industryurther

Plan, Moscow, Tstoriya SSSR, Ho. pp.S. He gives the original goal forillion rubles), the original planned index of growthb8 -S - and the actual index of The gross values of MBMW production given in this report are somewhat higher than the net values shown in other reports prepared by the Office of Economic Research.

* Het of double counting of components. Het figures are derived by subtracting the estimated

value of output of the component sector from the gross value of output of electronics.

'" These references ore assumed to apply to the Ministry of the Radio Industry and the Ministry of tha FAoctronivo Industry, reup-'ue ly .

Net Value of Output of Electronics,

reductions were planned, but have not It is believed that these price changes were needed to correctystematic upwaid bias in the valuation of electronics Over time, the bias lias increasinglythe relationship of5 wholesale selling prices to the actual costs of production. Hence, the output of the industry in gross value terms has been inflated. The methodology used for recomputing the value of output of electronics in the USSR involved adjusting5 prices to account for changes in the wholesale price by prorating the price reductions for components (electronics) and end-equipment (radiotechnical) overyear.

The net value of output of electronics in the USSR0 is estimated to fall in the range1 billion rubles (see. Within this range, the best estimate of0illion rubles, an increase ofver the level of estimatedillion rubles. An overwhelming proportion of the goods producedabout four-fifths annuallygoes directly to the government for military and industrial use. Only about one-fifth represents the production ofor the Soviet consumer. Ruble values for there shown in Table 2.

The relative sizes of the US and the Soviet electronics industries5ased on

a dollar comparison, may be seen innd Figure 2. In comparing these industries, two important factors should be borne in mind: (a) the size of the Soviet industry, in dollars, is highly sensitive to the ruble-dollar ratios used toSoviet rubles to dollars. In this paper, two ratios have been used: one to convert the ruble value of consumer electronics (USnd one to convert the ruble value of military/ industrial output (USnd (b) capacity output in the USSR is being compared with actual output in the United States. ctual output in the United states lias been depressed below potential capacity levels by the general recession in economic activity.

49- SOfliC interesting conclusions resultomparison of the US and Soviet electronics

illduUti Li*!- in JoJIar*:. Kir:*L, UlC Soviui

cronici; iiHiii?ii.tyboutan; industry* Tho output ui '?ctnonlxiuct ths thai: of the United States and the output of electronics for military and industrial end-use is only slightly more than two-thirds that of the united States.-This last comparison should be qualified. In the United Statesf the output for military/industrial end-use represents goods for industry and commerce. In the USSB, on the other hand, the corresponding percentage is believed to be very small, ss. Thus it is more meaningful to compare the output of Soviet military/industrial products with the outputpurely military products in the United States. This comparison is also shown in Table 3- It may be inferred from that comparison that the output of military electronics (including expenditures on military, space,n the USSRs approximately as large as that of the United States- Looking forward, it is suggested that, in the course of the next few years, the output of military electronics in the USSR will catch, and surpass, in value terms, the output of military electronics in the United States. No linearof ectorspracticable, because, both in the United States and the USSR, future levels of expenditures on military electronics will depend on the outcome of the SALT talks, and, in the United States, on decisions made with respect to the deployment of the US anti-ballistic missile system.

SO. It is believed that these conclusions are valid despite the ambiguities in the data base and the sensitivity ot the dollar values of Sovietto the conversion factor used. This is so because: inimum figure has been used for the gross voluc ai output ol electronics in the USSR the starting point of the analysis (virtually any other alternative value would yield higher ruble and dollar figures for the USSR for the entire timend (hj although the United States has made remarkable and impressive gains in productivity in recent years, especially in the manufacture of components, Soviet gains elative to those of the United

States, may havt; neon over,juusc of the gross inefficiency (resulting from inferior capital equipmeni. and redundant labor) of the USSK in thu

ase year. Hence, it can be argued that the conversion coefficient should be somewhat legs than what has been postulated. esser coefficient would also yield higher dollar valuations Of the Soviet output.

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