SOVIET EXPENDITURES FOR DEFENSE AND SPACE PROGRAMS, 1962-71 (SR IM 71-5)

Created: 3/1/1971

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate- oE Intelligence JO1

INTELLIGENCE KEHORANOUM

Soviet Expenditures for Defense and Space

Introduction

In0 Soviet Minister oi Finance Carbutovlanned defense budget19 billion rubles, the sane amount aa haa been planned for. This marks the first time since5 budget that the Soviets havo not announced an incrcaac in the defenae budget.

The announced dcfcnne budget la not acceptedeliable indicator either of the amount of total Soviet spending tor military-related activities or of changes in the level of effort from year to year. The annual announcement doesroad range of questions relating to the economic aspects of the Soviet defense and space effort, iio-ever. and an occasion for addroesirc many of these.

The decade of the Sixties was marked by the Soviet drive toosition of overallco'iality with the OS. Thisot and urn presentsig<-nce ret nates of thecurred in this effort, focusing upon costs rather tftancapabilities. Ooll-ir. ir. tl-e Soviet

Hotc: Thiay>ia

ofti'mearchoonii'-uietiire'.tvrui. jfj.Hirc .

;-SECRET '

Pag*

The Soviet Defense Budget

Methodology

OS and USSR Conparlsons

Total

Strategic Attack Forcea

Strategic Defense Forces

General Purpose Forces

Research, Development, leat,

evaluation, and

The Soviet

Trends ln Defense Expend

Strategic Forces

General Purpose Forres

Military Manpower

The Economic

The Burden of Defense and

Space Prog rajas .

Military

Competition for Resoui

Future Outlook

TabM*

Estimated Soviet Defense and Space

Expenditures, by.ollar Valuation of Estimated Soviet

Defense and Space Expenditures, by

Mission,

Estimated Sovietand Space

Expenditures, by Resource Category,

Dollar Valuation of Estimated Si-wint

Defense and Space Expenditures,

by

Estimated Soviet ExpendituresAttacky

Valuation of Entlmated Soviet

Expenditures (ot strategic Attack

Forces, by Elwonv, it

Soviet Expenditures 'or

Strategic Defense Forces, by Element

35

I. Dollar Valuation of Estimatedfor Strategicby 16

9. Estimated Soviet Expenditures for General

Purpose Forces, by Dollar Valuation of Estimated Soviet

Expenditures for General PurposeElement,',1

Chsrti

Coaparison of US Expenditures With Dollar Valuations of USSR Expenditures for Total Defense and . 9

Comparison of US ExpendituresValuations of USSRStrategic Attack and Defense 11

Comparison of US Expenditure!,Valuations of USSRGeneral Purposend

Estimated Total Soviet Expendituresof Growth ford 16

Estimated Soviet Expendituresand Space, by Resource -vc: Mission. 16

Estimated Soviet ExpendituresAttack, by Element. 19

Estimated Soviet Hilitary Major Mission, 21

The Soviet Dcfonag fludgot

The single figure announced each year that constitutes the Soviet "defense" budget hasolitical and an economic function, it serves to inform the Soviet public, the party, and government cadres of the leadership's intentions with regard to the allocation of resources. The changes in the size of the announced defense budget from year to year are probably also intended to communicate to the world at large the stance the leadership wisheo to enphjsize in its conduct of foreign affairs at the tijoe.

Holding the line in their recent defense budget announcement, for example, is consistent with tho image of moderation that thee attempted to project at the strategic arms limit tion talks. This interpretation of Moscow's intent is borne out by Minister of Finance Garbuzov's claim chat1 budget is one "of peaceful economic and cultural

The Soviets do not publish an official defense posture statement nor do theyetailed explanation of what the published budget figure covers- Analysis Of the available evidence indicates that it covers moat direct expenditures for military weapons procurement and for the operation andof the forces in the field, tt may also include some expenditures for military aid to other nations, for stockpiling military commodities, and for some aspects of the military research andand space effort.

On the other hand, most of the large and growing costs of military-related research and development and both military and civil apace are covered by the announced expenditurescience." This isa peculiarity of the Soviet accounting syatera rather than an attempt to dinqulue these expenditures.

It is not clear how seriously the Soviet leaders themoelvcs regard the announced defense budget, in

every year3 tho Soviets have said that actual expenditures were exactly the same as those which had been planned and announced for the year. Given the extraordinary complexity of budget planning in large, modern military establishments, it le hard to believe that the planners of the Soviet Union could arrangeerfect match between planned and actual expenditures year after year. the announced defense budget is not acceptedeliable Indicator either of the amount of total Soviet spending for military-related activities or of changes in the level of effort from year to year.

Methodology

The estimates of Soviet defense and space spending contained in this memorandum arc developed for the oost part on the basisirect coating methodology, judgments as to the numbers of weapons and forces are based chiefly on what is observod by means of US national intelligence. Thoae numbers are then multiplied by estimates of what the weapons andould coat in rublos and in dollara.* rinally, the results are aggregated into expenditure categories similar to those used by the US Department of Defense.*

To estimate total Soviet spending for military research, development, test, and evaluation, and all spaceowever, direct costing cannot be used. Although some programs--notably spacer-can be directly coated, there is not enoughon allrograms torogram-by-program accumulation of expenditure! which

* flctaTltd aaeimtitaa in rubltn and dollara for contained It the Ammai.

A fuller demc-:of it in0 Bvlonse Budget

in Perspective: ends in Spending foreincc lyfO Wi-rc

- 6

wouldeliable total. Fortunately, the

h*VZubstantial amount ofdataeir fPtfndifW for scientific activities j i8 for "BtlMtes of soviet spending for ROTE'S that correspond quite closely

SaSSS aSV-* theeronaJtics and Space Administration (NASA) as well as RDTiE

of Defense (DoD) and the Atonic Energy Commission (AEC).

validity of the estimates of Soviet militaryeli""ility of thehysical data base, and the accuracy of the prices applied to that base. The physical data base onfnd capons reflects the combined collection

fligcnce Cocm.unity. The available intelligence information has made it

possible toomprehensive and highlyunderstanding of the numbers and kinds of weapons and units that make up the Soviet armed forces. This extensive physical data base is used for costing purposes and includes such information as thelevels of the Soviet strategic attack, strategic defense, and general purpose forces, the production

nd the manning of the forces.

The price and cost factors are known with less certamty. The information on Soviet costs is good

or example,which account forourth of On the other hand, many other pricesfactors must necessarily be derived fromus data and experience. On balance, rhecost factor data base is believed to be

Naturally, the degree of confidence in the validity of the estimates decreases the further Lhey extend into the future. Unforeseen developments in either strategic or general purpose forces during theyear couldubstantial irpact or. tf-.eof Soviet expenditures

- 7 -

-SKCirrrr

nd USSR Comparisons

pOSeand estimateddefense programs in dollar termsoan appreciation of the physical size of the

in dollars -that would be required to reproduce the

Soviet programs in the US. in general' the doitar

values show what it would cost in the US to pSrcSase

and operate the Soviet forces. Dollar values oerwed

aS"

in reviewing US and Soviet comparisons, it important toind that dollar valuations

^ ShOUld be vleved JS -Pproximations rather than precise measures. It ls important to note also that relative levels of effort of -he two countries as measured inerms are only rough guides to relative levels of military capabilitieT tqual levels of effort for comparable programs do not necessarily result in equal force effectiveness.

.reValUCSChe comparisons are expressed in6 dollar terms. The

rice 0as" ensures that all changes from year to yearesult of changese

[^prices selves rather than change

Further, the DoD data used for the us in thehave been adjusted to include nasa and aec spending and to exclude military assistance. adjustments have been made in order to obtaincomparabilitye dollar values of SOvii-t programs,

I

Comparisons of th*ffects by the USorid space programs in the period

- 8

USwere stable. increased sharply? during tho Vietnam buildup, and9 Soviet expenditures onther hand,tead) upward trend throughout the entire period. esult the dollar value of Soviet programs, about bO percent of the US leveleclined to less thanercent, then Increased to more thanercent

Comparison ol US Expenditures with Dotisr Valuations ol USSR Expenditures for Total Defense and

ft:

H *0

0*-

S)

-

forcesfor command and general -tnPL "O" most affected by Vietnam-has ac^ted Jo? al the growth in spendingS. m c tPaCh th*music's, and coiumand and gen.-ral support accounted for aaou*

? toLal in *>

JS frT^ess thanercent2 to^otutT This resultedecline in xpenditures as programed force levels were reached n. "id-SiKti.,. The share going to strategic

cent lor the .ntire period.

i'fro*ceni in2 to nearly 2< percent in

^wtfl

thai

0 roturi.ee to about the fof BOTE is declined slighLly in total spending.

f-

ttern of Scviet cxp. fcient, with ftDTEtS atcountiiv of thee shares ofm 'j tod on this ruble basic

co/.stant. RDTEfcj experienced the greatestrc increasing fron about2r fC percent ofotal

Strategic Attack forces

Over the past -eca-Je cumulative toial ouMays ot Si-titegi- attack forces tor the US nave -con

-

ho ion" valuation of Soviet expenditures (see tho chart below). Only about two -

c -ttack have been for intercontinentalowever, while all US spending was for in-

a;taCk The remainder of

L OTwith acaPabi"ty--MRBMsBMs asnd conv'",tionallypart for

On the ruble basis, as thesee theroughlyercent ofxpenditures

Heevoted

to ICBMs. About 10 percent each went to

launched ballisticand heavy borers Dunn,

Cf th*^proximately JO percent for

bSSers 1 foreavy

Comparison of USn Dollar Valuations otend'tu<es for Strategic Attack and Defonie

Scalene

- 11 -

he dollarof Tho higher Soviet level is partially th*deploying more launchers than -he US

Soviets havetable force otcbms which are large, liquid-fueled weapons and are very expensive. The US force, on the othe? hand is made up primarily of the small,uch less costly system.

The reverse Is true for submarine launched bai-Ustic missiles-US spending was about twice the dollar valuation of the Soviet outlays-and forbombers-US spending was about seven times as high as the Soviet dollar valuations Soviet spending on the submarine ballistic missile rorce

end of the decad" how-

ever, with the beginning of construction of the V

class Prior to that time Soviet expenditure.

al* "bmarlnes-both intercontinental and period eral attack-had been equivalent toillion dollars per year. The US hasargebomber force throughout the period while the Soviet bomber force has been very small Sixties' ^intraduced since the early

Distinctive in the comparison of outlays for strategic offensive forces is the timing of programs Large-scale deployment ofissilein the US preceded such deployment in the USSR by several years In the tltst half of the decade US Spending for the Titan, Klnu'.emAn, and Polarisled to unusually hWh investment outlays. Soviet counterparts to these systems were ir, early stages Of development at this time. In the Inst half of the decade, as useclined andr.Ue deployment increased in the USSR, the dollar valuations of total Sov.et strategic attacksurpassed those of the US. oollar valuations of annual Soviet spending for intercontinental at-

tack surpassed annual us7 (see the chart on.

-EGRET

Strateqi

gic Defense Forces

the USSH has spent more heavily Cor strategic defense forces than has the US. Valued ln dollars, those expenditures in theare nearly three tines those of the US (see the chart on. Within this mission, emphasis on the three basic elements--ground-tased missiles (SAKs and ABKs). fighter aircraft, and control and warningalso differed.

Soviet dollar valuations and US expenditures for control and warning systems are about equal for thehole.* The Soviet effort has been about one-third more than that of the US over the past five yoara. however. The emphasis on ground-based missiles (almost entirely SAMa) combined with fighter-interceptors in the two countries is quite di-.'erent. The dollar valuations of Soviet spending for these systems over the decade are about four times the USfor the most part the magniftde of the intercontinental bomber threat faced by each nation.

Ceneral Purpose

Soviet spending for general purpose forces grew steadily throughout the. Prior to the large-scale commitment, of US force* in Vietnam, the dollar value of Soviet expenditures for general purpose forces was anoui SO percent o( that cf the US, 6owever, the costs of Soviet programs averaged only abjutercent of those of the US (see the chart on. imilar pattern exists for command and general support.

Raecarch, Development, Test, Evaluation, and Spacg

Cumulative US spendingoras aboutercent higher than the dollar valuation

OS expenditure* for ihe bailietic mioaile early

: c counted under control and warningaddition. OS data include sea* apenJiaa ia (he early to mid Sixtiea for radar shipe-

Comparison ot US Exptndilures wilh Dollar Valuations ot USSR Expenditures for General Purpose Forces and

.runj'jjll

10

AS *6 "

'0

of the Soviet effort for the 3ame period.* Decent reductions in US spending accompaniedteadily increasing Soviet effort have resulted in dollar values of Soviet spending that arc higher than the US levels for the past two years. More than half the difference in the last two years, however, is attributable to Soviet civil space progrann.

' Ae noted earlier. tho Soviet oullauB for HDTESS are eatimated in the aggregote aid coneeetuaIfy in-alude all expcr.diIures for military HDTAE (including those for nil nuclear program and all Sip* ndifor 'pace program. To obtain coiparabi. tht US data include allt> erpendl turto for HDTE4S, all NASA expend*furta, and AEC eryenditureo for FfG.

- 14 -

Trends in Defense Expenditure.

dollar valuations reflecting US production coats are necessary toasis for comparing the relative magnitudes of Soviet and US spending

ta of courae cpen' Litary programs. ier with itsoncern to the Sc/iet leaders. The ruble measure is. therefore, morefor examining the military claim upon the resources of the USSR and for assessing th* economi'.-implications of tho defense and space effort.

The ruble expenditure data are presented6 prices, the first full year which reflected theSoviet price revisioniated in Until recently, CIA estimates of Sovietand space expenditures3 price base, reflecting thw last previous major revision of prices in th* Soviet Union. The major consequence of the latest price revision was to ruse the ovorali ruble valuations byercent.

arge extent, the magnitude ted pattern o: defense spending by the Soviets In the Sixties have been shaped by their drive for equality with the US in strategic arms. Continuing improvements in the US strategicrapid deployment Ot ICBMn and Polaris submarines in the early and middle Sixtieshe development of HIRVs--tog*ther with uncertainty regarding US plans for deployment of AAHs ln tha late Sixties have madeifficult and costly task. The burden of the strategic buildup could not be offset by cutbacks ln allocations to other mlsalons, as had been the case in the previous decade whenspending for general purpose forces fell fron overillion rubles2 tcillion rubles Rather, the drive for stratogic parity ln the Sixties was accompanied by moderate Increases in outlays for conventional force*.

i ory(aF>* to6

prieta ioJ aubjeal to future rtviaion.

-

Total spending for defense and apace ln the USSR grew each year during the. Over theotal spending increased rapidly,at an average annual rateercent (see the chart on. The average annual rate of growth for the previous three years, in contrast, wasercent.

The rapid growth of total spending in the latter half of the Sixties resulted largely from theof strategic weapons systems and increasedto military research and development and all spacaeflecting the need--as seen by the Soviets--to narrow the strategic arms gap between the US and the USSR. Annual spending for RDTEtSat an average rateercent and forforcesercent in the.

1 total Soviet spending for def :nse and space ia projected toecord level of alAoitillionillionhich would be an Increase of lessercentontinued increases in spending for strategic defense forces and RDTEtS programs ara responsible for most of the moderate rise in total expenditures. Outlays for the other missions are expec-ed to remain near0 levels.

Expenditures for each of the major resourcerose during the period of mott rapidsee the chart on. Spending for RDTEtS increased by the largest amount--moreercent perthe Soviets vigorously pursued the development of future systems. Operating costs, while accounting for the largest share of the total, grew steadily but at an annual rate ofercent.

Outlays for investment--procurement cf newand construction of facllitics--grew at an average rateercent per yeareith the continued deployment of new weapons. for procurement accounted forf investment, and nearly all of the growth in procurement outlays represented increased expenditures for new missileSAMs and ICBMa.

- 17 -

-skgret"

Sys-cma designed to improve Soviet1 no

"9oarcs"^ul^oselied

rocurement of hardware of a

S^^nt, and nucleart0

Strategic Porces

Expenditures for strategicand defense combined--averaged about one-fourth of total Soviet defense ana space spending in the late Sixties. More resources have bean devoted toattack than to strategic defense systems. Ou lays for strategic defense, however, have grown aor rapidly than those for the attack forces. Preliminary projections1 spending for strategic forceslight decline in spending for attacklight rise in spending for defense.

Witrtn the totals for the strategic attack mission, expenditures for intercontinental systems increased sharply4 and have averaged about

ul!ion rubles illion dollars) since then. Spendinq in1 in frojeetcd to be slightly leas than this level. Spending for ttveteending on the peripheral forcese middle and late Sixties in contcaat to the earlier years. ft of outlays for ICBMs, which nowccounting for about ercent of the total intercontinental attack expenditures, occurred during the last three years . This trend, accompaniedreduced spending for heavyand mounting expenditures for the deploymentallistic missile auumari'.es, hat served to a*e spending lor intercontinental attack (see the cnart on page

Annual outlays for the pCf :rM oral attack also remained relatively stable and amounted to about illion rubles illion dollars) S th'ough 0 aa reduced outlays fordium bombers

iecret-

peripheral aubmarlnea were roughly offeet by ln-

MBBn and twH forcea. Thi. level probably will b, maintained

Estimated expenditurea for strategic defei.ae

Sixtle. when the Soviets

eurface-to-air mis.iw ay.tern, and in-

, "iblea 5 toallon7 hliny doUauhl) in mo (aee th. chartIncrease i. expected1esult of additional .pending for SAM.. Thea. outlay, alao

! "tenBlVe

inedoPlo^fnta Soviet ABM .yatemeployment, however,

ac. .nted for little moreercent of xtrategic

alf aof total Soviet military apending during the period.

Mflir< ft :

- 19 -

- SECRET

ted Sov.ef fjoendnufes to- Intetoni.neMal Artec* and St'.teg* Defense Force* Dy

-SECRET

General Purpose Porcaa

Despite Che high priority the Soviet* have placed on developing strategic capabilities,for tholr large goneral purpoae forces have regained higher than for any other major force element (see the chart on. The relatively stable level of spending ofillionillionillion toillion dollars) averaged about one-third of total spending for thend no substantial change1 is expected.

Ground forces generally accounted for aboutercent of total spending for this mission, naval forcea for aboutercent, and tactical aviation and military transport aviation each for aboutercent.

The most noteworthy trend within the spending for general purpose forcea has been the growth in expenditures for ASH systems.* Spending for naval forcea remained stableand is expected to remain sotillion rublesillion dollars). The share allocated to ASW,has grown from less thanercent offor general purpose naval forces5rojected share of overercent

The leveling off of expenditures for ground forcess causedlight decline in the procurement of nuclear and conventional weapons resultingap in timiig between the completion of current programs and the initiation of new ones. This does notecline in the forces; their Steady buildup seems to te continuing.

The definition of antisubmarine uarfare soatemg used in this memorandum ie the eaxte OB thet used in, Soviet Strategic Defenses, vhioh states thai 4SU ayeteme ore considered to include all Soviet forceaotential for use in an asm roU hough *oat of theae forcea in fact have muttipurp capabilities.

-

torespond'ng

to theinto areas not contiguous

Military Manpower

The importance of general purpoae forces ln the total Soviet military establlnhment appears even greater when viewed ln manpower terms. The chart below show* trends in total military manpower and in tho distribution by major mission. 50 total Soviet military manpower Increased fromillion toillion men and is expected to remain at about this levelhroughout this period, the general purpose forces account for aboutercent of manpowor resources.

-

EsOmaled Soviet Military Manpower, by

The USSR has the second largest economy in the world. Measured in terms of gross national product, the overall magnitude of the Sovlot economy has grownoint where it is Cor the first time slightly more than half that oC the US.

The structure of production in the two economies, however, is quite different. Th* USSR ia unique among Industrialized countries inighly developed industrial sector aide by sideackward agricultural sectorelativelytrade and service network. This imbalance stems from an overriding priority long given to rapid economic growth and defense, calling for the development of heavy Industry,roducer and military goods, at the expense of agriculture and goods and services Cor the population.

The Soviet econjmy also differs from the US in that all of the major resource allocation decisions are made at the center. Each year the Soviet leaders must make very specific decisions about how the available resourcese allotted to claimants lor consumer satisfaction, for economic growth, and for defense and space programs. Two of theSovietstrength and economicespecially competitive for the same resources. The leadership must consider the fact that military strength ia obtained in part at the expense of economic growth and, therefore, that large military programs today could reduce the total amount of resources available in the future.

The Burden of Defense and Space Programs

One common measure of the burden of defense and Space spending upon the Soviet economy is the sizo of these expenditures relative to GNP. when valued in ruble prices, as the Soviets would view it, the current defense and space share of GNP isercent. This is roughly the same share of GNP that the US devotes to comparable programs.

-ECRET

The lopsided development ol the Soviet economy, however, has caused an apparent anomaly that arises when the economic burden ol its military effort is vieweo in this way. Given that US GNP is about twice as large as Soviet GNP, it would be logical to expect that Soviet defense and space programs must be about one-naif the alio of USwhuh they are not. The USSR supports defense and spacrt programs, almost as large as those of the US but with about the same share ofuch smaller GNP.

This does not mean that the USSR is merethan the US in the production ofand services. Tho apparent paradoxfrom differences in the price -'roeturestwo economies. Th* Sovietessentially

dual economy, consisting ofod, d efficient industrial sector alongside ol backward agricultural and consumcr-oriei.ted sect-- Because of these wide disparities in efficiency, the eosis ofoutput arcalive to costs in the back--ard sectors.

Military Programs--Theleaouicer.

A further appreciation of the rurdon of the Soviet defense effort is gained by considering it in the context Of economic growth, which a;or objective of th* Soviet leadership. It is clear that th" persistent escalation of tnecompetition with the Westmpeded economic growth in the USSR. Many Sovietgree with iTtis view as indicatedumber of statements byofficials over the past several years. Therecent wasosplan official -no cited 'defense costs' as on* of the major factorseconomic development in lh* forthcoming five-year plan.

To none extent defense and space spending input! Soviet industryiverting the rest modern machinery and equipment from Civilian investment

. -SfeC-rVET

programa. More Important from the standpoint of economic growth, however, is the fact that theeffortarge snare of the finest scientific, engineering, and managerial talents of the ecoi.-my--assets needed to stem tho declining productivity of the civilian sector.

Over the past decade defense and space needs have siphoned off abou* one-third of all machinery and equipment potentially available for investment in thehalf actually went to civiliand the, remainder was directed to consumer durables. An even greater share of total research tend development75devoted to the military effort, tying up resources that might otherwise enhance the technology andcapability of the civilian economy. The denial of those resources to ihe civilian economy almost certainly has contributed to the Soviet

failure to maintain during the Sixties tho rates of growth of industrial productivity that were achieved

the Fifties.

* Future Outlook

The question of what resource allocation policies the Soviot* are likely to adopt over the remainder of the Seventies laifficult one.

Tho traditional Soviet strategy would be to -tter.pt to secure rapid growth by maintaining high rates ol investment in the capital goods sector of the economy. It appears unlikely that this wouldruit'u. strategy in the long run -jn.tss it were complemented by effective measures to stem the prrsii-entf diminishing returns to.nvcstmeiu. This, in turn, would require the rapid diffusion o. new tocn-nology throughout the economy by dirocung capital investment into modernization of the production

Accordingly. Soviet growth strategic willfocus on both technol->gvcai innovation and lates of investment. elaxation olitary burden

- 24

could be of significant benefit, freeing high quality physical and human resource* for theof the economy.

At the same time, care should be taken not to overstate the economic importance of military expenditures. The fundamental problem facing the Soviets is Implementation of effective managerial roform--bettor planning and bettor incentives--to facilitate tho adoption of now technology in the civilian economy. Despite the efforts launched by Kosygln and Brezhnevrospects forreorganization of the economy remain dim.

The resource situation ln the USSR will probably remain taut over the next several years, as Che Soviets attempt to shor* up th* industrial sector* and at the same time find resources needed to improve housing and other consumer services and modernise agriculture. esult, thoro will continue to be considerable incentivo to holt1 military spending down, particularly among those leaders harboring tneview calling for high rates of .investment.

Tho Soviet economy is now so largo, however, that even low rates of growthubstantial increase in resources. Thus, it is unilkoly that the USSR will be deflected, by purely economic considerations, from undertaking thos* future military programs that it beliovea are required for Its security. Moreover, the present level of Soviet military expenditures is such that the Soviets could continue increasing their military capabilities in the future without increasing their spending for this purpose or even with somein spending.

- 25

Summary

Soviot defense spending in the Sixtiesrive for overall equality with th US in modern strategic arras. Expenditures for deiense and space grew by over one-third2 throughIB billion rubles5 billion rubles. Annual spending increased at an average rateercent per year," rate of growth accelerated toercent per year in the.

The principal elements contributing to the rapid growth ln the latter half of the decade wereresearch, development, test, and evaluation, and all space, which grew at an annual rate of moreercent, and strategic forces which grewercent per year in the.

Projections1 indicate that Soviet spending for defense and space willecord level of almostillionillionn increase of lessercent Continued increases in spending for strategic defense forces andre responsible for most of the moderate rise in total expenditures. Outlays for the other missions are expected to remain near0 levels.

Soviet defense and space efforts can be compared with those of the US by estimating what it would cost to reproduce the Soviet programs in the US. of the total efforts shows that the dollarof Soviet spending amounted to aboutercent of US spending overeriodhole, and rangedow ofercent of the US lovelo more thanercent

Significant differences appear when US and Soviet expenditures over the past decade are comparedission by mission basis. Outlays for strategic attack forces by the US have been roughly the same as those of the USSR over this period. Only about two-thirds of Soviet expenditures for strategic attack have been for intercontinental attack,while all US spending was for intercontinental sysl?ms. The US and Soviet efforts also differ with

- 26

regard to the timing of programs in the two countries. Large-scale deployment of ICBM systems ln the OSsimilar deployment in the USSR by several years.

Historically the Soviets have invested heavily in strategic defense forces. This has led them to spend nearly three times as much a. the US for strategl" defense over the.

Cumulative US spending for RDTEtSas aboutercent higher than the Soviet effort for the same period. Recent reductions in the US effort, accompanied by steadily increasing Soviet outlays, have resulted ln Soviet spending for kDTEtS which exceeded that of the us for the past two years.

j?yia.ksp0nd.lng general purpose force- grew steadily throughout the. Prior to the large-scale US commitment in Vietnam, soviet expenditures were aboutercent of those of tho US. , however, Soviet spending for general purpose forces has averaged only aboutercent of that of the US.

5?strategic equality wltn the

US was not carried out without cost to the economy of the USSR. In addition to diverting the most modern machinery and equipment from civilian Investment the defense effortarge share of the finest scientific, engineering, and managerial talents of theneeded to stem the declining productivity of the civilian economy and promote economic growth.

The resource situation in the USSR la expected to remain taut over the next several years, and debate within th. Soviet leadership Indicates that there will continue to be pressure to limit military spending.

The Soviot economy is now so largo, however, that even low rates of growthubstantialIn resources. For this reason lt is unlikely that the USSR will bo deflected by purely economic considerations from undertaking those futuro military programs lt believes are required for Its security.

-

These expenditure data ere basedetailed single-valued statement of the Soviet forces which was specified solely for costing purposes. The same level of confidence should not be attachederiesin this fashion as to the ranged series which at times are used to describe the degree of uncertainty associated with the estimates of the force structure.

The expenditure data in these tables arc expressed in billions to two decimal places. This level ofmakes it possible to follow small movements in the underlying physical data. The uncertainties arc such, however, that no other significance should be attached to the second decimal place.

The ruble expenditure data are presented8 prices, the first full year which reflected thesoviet price revision initiated Inome further selected readjustments in Soviet prices have been made since then to implement the revision and are reflected in these estimates. As the Soviets publish more information on the implementation of the reform we will continue to review our estimatos and make adjustments where necessary.

112

i m

s

II: ;S

j

in.'

5

3

3

5

5

5

3

5

5

3

Ii

1

15 'aas ss siaiaa

a91111

Original document.

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA