INTELLIGENCE REPORT: COMMUNIST CHINA: CONFLICT AT THE TOP

Created: 5/26/1971

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence1

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Coraunlst Chlnai Conflict at tha Top

Summary

Two years ago tha Chinese Communists held their ninth party congresa to mark the "victorious"of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and to announce the formationew ruling elite ostensibly mora responsive to Mao Tsa-tung and his heir-designate. Defense Minister Lin Piao. Theof thawho vera named at the congress to fill all of theeats on the polit-buro, were not,oyal phalanx ofMaoists. Instead, they represented an uneasy conglomerate of disparate civilian and militarygroups thrown up by the twists and turns of tha campaign launched6 to purge and revitalize tha nation's power structure. Their relations in tha past had been marred by bitter personal quarrels and rivalries, and despite tha legitimacy conferred on them by election to the politburo, it was clear that allaw superannuated figures would wish totheir political positions further lnof tha eventual passing of Mao. Forear this fragile coalition presented virtually anpublic face. Beginning ina series of unexplained shifts in thehierarchy in Faking strongly suggested that the leadership waseriod of extended tension and more directconfrontationby tha process of reconstituting China's party and government apparatus and promoting economic and social recovery following tha turmoil that had disrupted national Ufa during the Cultural

Thia report was prepared by the Offioe ofIntelligence and diaouaeed within CIA.,

page #

blank

Mao averred mtion still continued in the form of the struggle for power at the national level," and others factional wrangling wasajor obstacle to rebuilding theChinese Communist party apparatus at thelevel. Since all decisions on staffing major party organs have to be taken in Peking, it appears that the leaders with whom Snow talked were referring to bitter internecine quarreling within the ruling Politburo itself.

The sense of fluidity and absence of cohesion within the elite that is conveyed in the Snowadd weight to the numerous indirect signs of backstage maneuvering and discord in Pekingthe past yean the persistent rumors that the major party plenum held early laat autumn was stormy, the year-long absence of Politburo member Hsieh Pu-chih followed by his sudden resurfacing this March under peculiar circumstances, and the apparentsidelining of Politburo standing committeeChen Po-ta and Kang Sheng, both of whom were

m

"

I II

ill

, Controlled>oj.ssem No Foreign Dissem/atfckground Use Only

i: , SECRET

page #

iv

blank

No Fore

leaden, of the radical Cultural Revolution Group and long-time associates of Mao. Beyond this, the steady drumbeat of propaganda warning that tha struggleMao's revolutionary line and the -revisionist" line of his former party opponents is not yet over strongly suggests that some elements in theand perhaps Maoby no means satisfied with either the new governing structure that iafrom the Cultural Revolution or the direction in which China's reconstruction efforts have been moving.

appear to be some discernible threads runningthe present pattern of political infighting in Peking. Put broadly, the strains within theseem to stem both from disagreements since the ninth congress on specific policies and from thaof personal antagonisms and divisionsover from the Cultural Revolution. To thismixture has been added an apparentlyquarrel over the enhanced role of the People's Liberation; Army in political affairs and civil

n the past year both the power anc folicylines within the politburo seem to have beensharply drawn between the radical ideologues who have been part of Mao's inner circle since the beginning of the Cultural Revolutionooser grouping of proponents of relative "moderation" in domestic and foreign policy, whose principalappears to be Premier Chou En-lai. Although tho impression gleaned last fall by Edgar Snow that "Chou is running the country" may be exaggerated, there have been indications in recentas the breakthrough in forming provincial partyt the balance of forces within the politburo isin favor of Chou and soma of the morecentral and regional military figures who are also responsible for day-to-day administration. the disappearance of Chen Po-ta and Kang

ControlledyDissem No Foreign Dissem/Background Use Only

SECRET

page #

(//

blank

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem/Background Use Only Centrelied Dlssem

Sheng amid reports that the activities ofare being denounced in Peking suggests ain the political fortunes of some, if not all, of those leaders below Mao and Lin most closely associated with the excesses of the Cultural

,! j i

Despite the uncertain atmosphere in Peking,atremains the dom* ^nt political figure, and there is no reason tc oel.ttre that he is not still setting the tone and the general direction of current policies, all of which contain an eclectic mixture of the doctrinaire and the pragmatic. Although Mao's prestige could be tarnished in the course of the current complex infighting over difficult questions of reconstruction policy and personnel staffing, andthe accompanying political maneuvering within the politburo, there is no evidence that any concertedis under way to thrust Mao once again on thesidelines. On the other hand, 'here continue to be signs that Mao's victory over his major opponents in the Cultural Revolution did not gain him the license to work his will unobstructed on all major policy and personnel questions, and the shifts within theover the past year have demonstrated that theequilibrium in Peking can be shaken even with Mao at the helm.

Barring any major leadership upheaval beforeof Mao, his post as party chairmanpass uncontested to his heir designate, Linbecause Lin can have no assurance that hisin China's top civil-militarywill be reliable, it can only beto retain nis position he will have toacquiescence of the conservatively orientedpowerholdsrs BS well as the governmentlsd by Chou En-lai. It seems equallyLin will not bs abls to rule the countryif hoi should persist in playing the role ofMaoist in all'

At the moment, the influence of those leaders who seem inclined to acknowledge readilymuch of Mao's revolutionary dogma has proved irrelevant

t I mi Ii i

1 Controlled No PoreignE

page #

Mill

blank

China's problems in the modern world seems on thef Mao again attempta to initiate drastic "revolutionary" actions it is possible that aopposition could coalescereater degree than before, posing serious challenges to Mao and Lin over major policy issues and possibly even over their prescriptions for the succession. At this juncture, however, it la probably erroneous to assume tftat Mao's opponents are ready or willing to challenge his1power'openly, to do mora than try to moderate his penchant for extreme programs, and to curb theof advisers whom Mao himself may be temporarily willing to sacrifice. In any case, Peking's failure to acknowledge any breaks in its leadership ranks and its continued reluctance to put forward anpecking order for the politburo reinforce the impression that relations among tlie elite are still in flux andovert power and policy struggle of considerable dimensions is still being waged intruggle that not onlyotentiallysuccession to Mao but alto leaves open tothe precise limits of his present power and, ;

11

1.

> -i.

1-f

ix

'

,

i'i

hi

led/olssem No Foreign Dieseri/finckground Use Only

ill. : /

Faking Atmospherics

I

1. On tha surface at least, tha fermentduring the past year appears to have hadlittle impact on the regime's- Cultural Revolution reconstructionprogress has bean evident inorder, rebuilding the Chinese(CCP) apparatus at the provincial levelstaffing and streamlining centralworkingew five yearand, moat important, inoreforeign policy. For these efforts toat all there mustegree ofSi ue willingness to compromise within the' Appearances can be misleading,the parustars of Peking's various programsin the domesticalways readily discernible. Thus, itthat there are serious divisions atthat account for the issuance ofguidelines,irect bearing on thepace in implementing various programs,explain the apparent discord betweenlocal leaders on many | ;jj - ilf:

i 2. Tha repeated delay in convening the much-heralded National People'sisto be the capatone of the regime's efforts to "revolutionise" tha central government bureaucracy and tha forum for presenting guidelines on future economicocialsuggests that the leadership cannot yet agree on mattersa general consensus. The facta that no Important leader in Peking is making speeches on domesticor writing reports forfor ritual incantations on major holidays andthat any article touching on sensitive or tendentious issues usually is signed by an"writing group" are additional signs that most officials are maintaining low visibilityime when tensions are high. Finally, Mao's admission to Edgar Snow that his deliberate efforts in the Cultural Revolution to create "fluid conditions"

Background Use Only Dissera

mm

necessary for tha party purge had leduch morefactionalism than he had anticipatedthat the current regime is still dseply troubled from within.

The Unfinished Revolution

3. Despite Mao's claim to Snow that hstha Cultural Revolution ast would appsar that the root cause of the over-all instability at the apex of power in China today is the fact that tho political outcome of thois still in doubt. Indeed, the major themes in domestic propaganda over the past six monthsthe closr impression that tha central issues of the cultural Rostruggle againsttho fight to re-establish Hao's authority within tho party, and the attempt to preserve Maoist ideology as tho guiding force in China's future yet to be resolved. Thorefore, the politicsl maneuvering within tho politburo todayto bo essentially another phase of tha crisis in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that precipitated tho Cultural Revolution-ratherow snd unique power and policy struggle.

The Struggle Over Power and Ideology

|! ij* I

1 The Cultural Revolution, with its political turbulence, rapid shifts of front, and confusing rami-

j ficatlons, wss obviously an extensive campaign that affected every major phase of the Chinese Conmunist

; revolution. Doapito tho vagaries of tho revolution in process, however, its origins are not hard to dis-

' corn. It is now clear that beginning in thon intense debate developed within tho party on many important issues, that this debate led to questioning tho applicability ofnumber of the major tenets of tho "thoughts of Mao Tss-tung" to

I the problems of govsrninq and developing China, andajor struggle for power within the party Uvolvod around this question. umber of loaders grouped around Mao and supported by Lin Piao advocated the prossrvation and inculcation of tho "revolutionary

-2-

Controllod No Foreign Disse

SE

ferment* end mass enthusiasm evident in the early days of Communist power, whilewith former head of state Liulip service to Maoist ideals were more concerned with the practical problems of developing andthehis contrast in approach created for theested interest in "upholding Mao'snd for their putativeested interest:in limiting its application in practice.

The differences in viewpoint, although rather narrow on the surface, had deep roots. In the Communists' long struggle to attain power in the, they had emphasized class conflict and contradictions, protracted struggles, the primacy of man over material conditions, and the supremacy of political work. These political doctrines, which succeeded inide popular commitment, served as guides in formulating policies ondiverocial groups, party building,the et nomy, and resolving inner party disputes. They were closely identified with Mao himself anduilt-in bias in favor of uninterrupted revolution and of radicalizing the domestic programs of tha CCP. But by the, "uninterrupted revolution" could only be applied in an environment of increasing popular desireeasure ofroutinization, and individual economic In particular the disasters growing out ofreat Leapexample of "revolutionary ferment" indissidentmore importantly senior leaders within the party, government, and militaryquestion whether the Maoist approach was still applicable to the problemseveloping, industrializing, and modernizing aociety.

ifI

6. The emphasis on mass enthusiasm and ferment, however, had become so identified with the personality of Mao that to question it automatically became aleast in the Chairman's own eyes. Articles in the Red Guard press have disclosed thut Mao became increasingly concerned that after the Eighth Party Congress) some members of the inner circle were

-3-

Controlled jfC%

ssem

No Foreign Dissem/Sefckground Use Only

No foreign Dissem/flackground Use Only Controlled DiHsem

challenging hie basic assumptions; withrogram of economic retrenchment after the Great Leap Forward, he became convinced that some of his associates were pursuing programs that in spirit were conservative and evolutionary rather than revolutionary. Indeed, in the period between

9ao's control over party affairs was weakened to the point that veiled personal attacks

n *hln began to appear in the press. 7or Mao this was an intolerable situation. 2 heounterattack that culminated in the Cultural Revc-

| jlution four years later.

. Mao told Edgar Snow last year that it was

misleading to look for policy motives behind the

: Cultural Revolution. He said his challenge to his

' '. party opponents took the form of attacks on their

revisionist policies, but the real issue had been

tha leadership plus the need to revitalize the rav-

i 'olution. These remarks are interesting not so much

ecause theyatent distortion of

olicy differences were indeed an important cause

jof thebecause they suggest that Mao

imself is 'probably less concerned with specific

['policies than with the motives, of those who propose

i He has shown, forenchant for

jpushing radical programs, but he also possesses the

.political acumen to recognize the necessity for

j consolidation and retreat.

f It"t'lii' IY T' 'l- '

IM!ao: fait! threatened in the period prior

1 to'the Cultural Revolution, however, becauseleaders began to doubt the validity of his basic .prescription forelfless and classlesshina. Then and since he has labeled therevisionists" who sought to undermine the goal ofchieving communism in China. He concluded that revisionist ideas and schemes must be eliminated from the minds ot "dissident" intellectuals and party leaders, and he acted to remove the dissi-i dents trom power in the party and government. Ex-tirpation of revisionism became the overriding issue in the Cultural Revolution, and Mao's failure to ' root out its influence has much to do with themaneuvering in Peking today.

-4-

Controlled^Dissem No Foreign DissemAeackground use Only

SECRET

Revisionism Today

9. Indeed, thehigh degree of tension in Peking and the problems obliquely hinted at inpropaganda over the past six months suggest that the problem of rev'tionism is far from settled. Although he told Edgar Snow that the Cultural Revolution waaChina's leadership is apparently still ln flux precisely because Mao'sin purging his major revisionist opponents in the party was incomplete. Since the second plenum of the ninth party congress lastforounting campaign to have senior officials re-atudy Mao's philosophy plus continuingof persistant revisionist trends In thesocial, cultural and political spheres all suggest that tha major issues that inspired the "revolution" in the first place are still being debated.

10. One area of debate is the economic sphere. In the course ofecovery from theof the Cultural Revolution, Peking has made it clearajor goal of future economic plana is the development of small and medium-sited industries in rural areas, primarily to support agriculture. This program unquestionably has Mao's blesiingi it accords with hit known bias in favor of increaaingeconomic decision-making, promoting theof intermediate technology, and fosteringprime requisite, incidentally, for enabling China to defend itself "in depth" against foreign Neverthelett, in implementing thia program the regime has continued to avoid past mistakes such as encouragement of indiscriminate capital construction. Similarly, it hat quietly abandoned certain ditruptive experiments in agricultural policy that ware attempted

before the ninththat appeared to embody aome of the more radical notions putduring the Culturalas efforts to reduce further the material incentives to peasants by confiscating their private plots, to curb rural free markets, and to make institutional changes ail id at expanding decision-making at the commune level. There have been signs, however, that the present cautious approach has not won acceptance byassociated with the more radical measures, who claim that there are those who areo achieve economic recovery by following athey did in the.

a recent Peking editorial raisedbogey by declaring that continuedbourgeois influence is revealed by emphasis onofjprivate plots, material incentives, andThe editorial lashed out at "thoseargue that the struggle between Mao's line and

Liu Shao-chi's line has been settled andead issue. This notion is wrong, it declared. Inthere are still those who place production over politics and wont to put "experts" in charge of factoriesj in agriculture there are those who question the validityigh degree ofand in commerce, some give priority to profits and adhere to capitalist interpretations of the law of supply and demand. This editorial and others charging that the influence of thepersists seem to be warnings by the ideologues on tho politburo that sentiment is still widespread in favor of insisting on an essentially Incorrect ideological approach to economic Tho failure to mention tho fourthfivo-yoar^^

^

ratOMeovcr the applicability of Maoist precepts in economic planning.

are also many signs ofbetween tho two lines in non-economicuniversities were reopened this year and

-

Controlled Wflfsem No ForeignUse Only

SECRET

: Li. .

are supposedlyeries ot "radical" reforms, including the abolition of entrancethe introductior of more students withcorrect worker-peasant backgrounds, and the elevation to important academic posts of ordinary workers and others with "practical" experience. All this is designed to obviate the "elitist mentality" fostered by China'sultural Revolutionand to reduce what the ideologues consider an unacceptable gap between theoretical and practical training. Regardless of the individual merits of some of these reformseveloping country, there have been repeated indications in the press that they are being resisted in practice. Thus, denunciations are frequently published of those who are stillfor the necessity of advanced theoretical training and of bourgeois professors who have refused to mend their ways despite being chastened by Red Guards in the Cultural Revolution.

13. Indications of debate also abound in the arena ofregime's first order of domestic business since the ninth congress. There haseries of press denunciations since the second plenum, for instance, of unnamed comrades who have been propounding the theory of "inner-partynd who have been attempting to play down the need for prolonged ideological investigation of candidate members, in particular of party veterans; being returned to responsible positions,

Mounting criticism of the politicalof the veteran party officials and military officers follows the pattern of earlier attacks on the former party and state apparatus. They too have been rebuked for their elitism and their penchant for routinizing, organizing, and consolidating, which did not accord with Mao's notions of revolutionary leadership. In particular, the People's Liberation Armyhas takenider range of civil administrative and party functions than at any time since the early days of Communistbeen ccused of allowing attitudes of arrogance andto become widespread. These criticisms

-7-

could Indicate that the ideologues are concernedestructured organizational authorityby theipla may evolveechno-bureaucra-tic slits as divorced from the populace and asto Mao's revolutionary dicta as the old party and state machinery that was decimated in the Cultural Revolution.

at present the PLA is the onlyorgan of state power, these attacksmilitary raiss the possibility that Mao maybelieve his personal authority is beingand, by extension, suggest that Lin Piso,been charged with molding the PLA into ainstrument, has not been entirelynotion sssms to be supported by thein China's new draft state constitutionand his hair designate Lin as the nation'srulers. Although the citation mayramatic reaffirmation of Mao's andover their former opponents, it sssmsto visw it as an attempt by Mao topersonal legitimacy in order to compensate for

the weakening of his ideological legitimacy.

theory that Mao cannot and dossby fiat on many issues under debate insupportsd in his interviews with Bdgsr Snow. tha point that Mao should not be regarded asautocrat, adding that Mao himsslfhe formulated policy and issusd directivesthe detsils of execution to others. imprsBsion lsft by the Snow interviews ishas soma serious reservations over the shspeemergentultural Revolution party

and government apparatus.

1 Mao indirectly admitted these doubts when he told Snow that it was wrong to judge his success in renewing ths leadership by referring to theor provincial level, where many of the old cadres wars back in office and the army was strongly represented. Instead, Mao told Snow, hs should look at the county lsvstli it was hers that ths new leaders thrown up by ths revolution wsrs to be found. to Mao, they would be the next generation of

LET

provincial and national leaders, and they wouldheirs to his ideals. Available3hows that essentially the sameat the county and other localaa at the national leveli.it wouldthat Mao is either out of touch withstraining very hard to rationalize what hasfact very substantial modification of histhe Cultural Revolution. In any case, Mao'sto claim success for himself inthe top levels of administration andadmission that his job now was "tocounty-level leaders that they had won thaconvey the impression that not all ofthe principal levers of power in theentirely responsive to him and his entourage.f i

Squaring the Inner Circle

l1:'" '* i'

' ' As long as he remains on the scene, Mao may be tempted! to take'further steps to maintain the authority of his dogma and to revive revolutionary enthusiasm. But whether he now has the power to do thisoot:point. Reonsummatewho, if unable to have his way on all matters, is still able to retain considerable leverage by playing off opposing groups within the elite against one another. Indeed, much of the leadershipin Peking today may stem from Mao's devotion to thisdevice that in effect avoidsisk of raising any direct challenge to his'i i

ecause Maohariamatic figure of enormous prestige,hallenge seams highly unlikely at this stage; but the machinations within the leadership over the past year suggest that Mao may be playing tha game of palace politics under more pressure than at any time since hla new polit-buro waa formed at the ninth congress. Be haato work hla will by making timely concessions to the more moderately inclined leadera while on other occasions supporting the efforta of tha more radical "Maoiata" to improve their standing. The recent shifting within the politburo, however, may

i ,1

mean that the fragile balance of rival groupings has been tipped. If so, it seems likely that the shift was caused by an abortive effort by Mao's radiaal lieutenants to shore up their political positions.

Although the various terms employed to describe the broad leadershipversusextremists" versus"ideologues" versusthere isistinct group on the politburo which rose to its present position because of proven loyalty to Mao and vigorousof power and policy excesses in the Cultural Revolution. Opposing this grouperhaps looser conglomerate of government bureaucrats and central and military regional figures whosestatus was often in doubt during the Cultural Revolution and who generally appeared to favorits excesses. Although the members of this grouping may be personally loyal to both Mao and Lin, most seem to share an antipathy to the lesser figures among the radical forces.

Apart from Mao and Lin, the "radical" group associated with the excesses of the Cultural Revolution includes ths two leaders' wives; Mao's speech writer, Chen Po-ta; security specialist Kang Shengi propaganda specialist Yao Wen-yuan* and Chang Chun-Chiao, the political boss of Shanghai. All of thesethe exception of Madame Lin-belonged to the so-called centraln inner elite fostered by Mao and charged with purging the Chinese Communist Party and pushing his "revolutionary" ideas. Before the Cultural Revolution, these people, with theof Chen |and Kang, were political nonentities

or lower echelon leaders, with no firm independent base of support. Most, if not all, appear to be fanatical doctrinaire ideologues who shars Mao's belief that it is essential toigh state of tension and ideological fervor in China in order to sustain revolutionary momentum andrapid

Odd Men Out

hole, the members of theRevolution Group have hadimitedof their own since the Cultural Revolutionduring the more radical phases of thethey appeared to be formidable figuresof Mao's support and because they were able

toumber of powerful Red Guard groups throughout the country as their political instruments. Despite the fractious nature of these massthey provided the CRGajor source of leverage against entrenched party and militaryin the provinces. The "revolution"ortuous process, however, one that ebbed and flowed between periods of extreme radicalism and periods! of moderation and restraint. In its later phases the influence of the CRG in the councils of the regime waa noticeably weakened.

.

of the subsequent inner tensionregime has stemmed from the efforts of theto find politically secure positions inof countervailing moderate pressures. Theof "revolutionary leftists" in thelate8 and the normalizing trendin domestic politics since the ninthcertainly have further circumscribedroom for maneuver. Once Mao goes, the power

of the CRG is likely to diminish considerably since ita prospects for developing new sources of political strength seem remote.

i i

principal stratagems the CRGemployed to improve their positions havesince the group was formed in the summer Basically they have sought topower by acting as ideological watchdogsand by trying to weaken their opponentscentral and regional leadership. Inhas meant that they have led the way invarious policy proposals to the test ofThey have' tried to insertresponsive to their direction in responsible

positions in the rebuilt party and governmentto win military support for their followers, and to purge rival leaders. On the whole, however, these efforts have met with too little success to provide surety for their political futures.

25. In the arena of government and partyfor example, there are civilian and military cadres in nearly every central andorgan who seem to have been promoted because of their fealty to the ultraleftists at the center. But over all, the new party and government units are weighted in favor of conservatively orientedmen and veteran cadres who were stronglyby the CRG or their Red Guard cohorts in the past and who can be presumed to ba reluctant toultraleftist leadership in the future. Within the PLA, the radicals have had some success inadherents within individual units, but the overwhelming majority of the PLA seems to be commanded by order-oriented officers rather thanproteges of the CRG. Moreover, there have been signs over the past two years that within some of China'sajor military regions armies andthat supported local leftists during the iheight of the Cultural Revolution have been.neutralized.

Icassiva campaigns to undermine the power base of key !central government leaders and some of the regional military chieftains who it judged were against it. During the Cultural Revolution, for example, the CRG was .clearly behind at least two traumatic and abortive !efforts to divide and weaken the military. The first joccurred in the immediate aftermath of the Wuhanin the'summerhe second led to the purge of acting PLA chief of staff Yang Cheng-wU in

No Foreign Dissem/Background Use Only Controlded Dissera

J-jfj he Wuhan Incident was precipitated in7 when ths Wuhan Military Region Commander defied Peking's order to ceaseadical Red Guard faction that was opposing his authority in ths region. Tha commander was promptly dismissed,ubsequent series of editorials inspired by ths radicals that callsd for tha "small handful" of revisionist leaders in ths army to be "dragged out" touchedave of Red Guard attacks on PLA leaders. At the same time, there were indications that ths notoriousltraleftist group headed by second schelon CRG leaders, such as journalists Wang Li and Chimaneuvering to oust premier Chou En-lsl and several militarycommanders. All of this radical sound and fury came to an abrupt halt in Septemberumber of important regional military lsadsrs who feared for their political survival and who wanted to restore order apparently joined Chou Bn-lai in braking ths radicals1 drive to intimidate or purge their opponents in ths central government and regional military This wassvolt against Mao, but it did demonstrate an increased ability and willingness on the part of the conservative forces to coalesce whan dirsctly threatened by the ultraleftists and to attempt to deflect Mao's decisionsourse more acceptable to themselves.

28. Ths end of the radical thrust was signaled when the vitriolic Madame Mao (Chiang Ching)was forced tostrsat. Sheajor spsecheptember in which shs praised the PLA's political performance, denounced the "Maynd demanded that leftist Rod Guard factions turn in their arms and cease criticising local military At ths same time, several CRG leaders of ths "Mayorps" wsrs purgsd, and the group ostensibly was dissolvsd. Thus, ths Wuhan Incident earned the CRG considerable enmity within military circles; but it also probably convinced the CRG lsadsrs of the weakness of their position and of tha political danger to themsslvss if China'stroop commanders wsrs allowed to coalesce against them.

SECftCT

No Foreign Dissem/Background Use Only Controlled Dissem

29. After the regional military leaders were authorized to use force if necessary to halt Red Guard fighting inherief revolutionary pausereturn to normality." During this fraqile pause the ranks of the CRG were considerably thinned, and by8 only five of the originalembers of the CRG atlll survived. The remaining leaders-Chen Po-ta, JCang Sheng, Chiang Ching, Chang Chun-chiao, and Yaohave felt that their own future was at stake. They apparently did not cease their maneuvering against their opponents-maneuvering that was overtly demonstratedash of wall-pouter attache upon aome of Chou En-lai'a prominent vice premiers ln Ultimately, the machinations of tbe remaining CRG leadera peakod when the acting chief of ataff Yang Cheng-wu, the first political commissar of the air force, and the commander of the critical Peking garrison were ousted. The origina of thia purge era atill shrouded in

ITT;

According to the official veraion, Yang, in order to enhance his own position had been trying to undermine the authority of the CRG and wasto purge major regional military leaders and vice premier Haleh Fu-chih, head of the Pekingcoassittee. plotting" was allegedly uncovered by Madame Mao, and her importance along with that of the other CRG members appeared to be increased by the episode. According to the Red Guard press, Lin Piao at that time lnatructed several units charged with inveatigating political problems in theto aaek advice from har, Chan Po-ta, and Yao Hen-yuan, Tha affair alao waa accompanied by calls to stamp out the threatew "rightist resurgence" and by renewed armed clashes between radical Red Guarda and PLA unitsumber of provinces.

31. At the time, the purge of Yang Cheng-wu and his colleagues appeared toajor victory for the militant forces in the leadership. ase can be made that Yang's fall marked yet another downturn in the CRG'a disruptivo

guest for political dominance. Yang had fairly good credentials as ona of the military officers whowith, or at least was willing to exploit for psrsonal gain, the aims of the radical leaders. He had been handpicked to displace the disgraced Lo Jui-chlng as "acting" chief of staff, and hadattempted to implement changes in the PLA that emphasized the "revolutionary" over the professional qualities of the army. He also was firmly allied with periodic attempts to promote systematic rotation of PLA units to prevent military leaders fromwith local party and government bureaucrats who might resist the attempts by revolutionary activists to ssizs power in their bailiwicks. These programs supposedly were advocated by Mao and Lin and the CRG militants, so there is, on the surface, littlethat Yang was anything but faithful to them.

Yang's militant crsdsntialB werewhy did the CRG attack him? Thisimpossible to answer definitively, but itthat if Yang, as charged, had beenmilitary regionasChen Hsi-lien, and Hsu Shih-yu, whounder heavy radical attack for thsand ahis efforts probably hadfrom the CRG. Indeed, the vigor withCRG leaders denounced Yang stronglyhe was carvingtalking horse forand that this was recognized byn any case, it appears morathat Yang's ouster was forced by strong,coordinated, opposition from otheroppossd to the disruptive policieshe was associated.

| | I. Jij

machinations of the radical loaders

9 to sffeet changes in tho losdsrshlp of thoirevolutionary committees, to divids thaand to purge or neutralize those who wsro attempting to moderate the excesses of revolution generated powerful antagonisms that subsequently wore carrisd into tho now politburo. This bodya number of military and govsrnmont figurss

Controlled dIbbsri No Foreign Dlsssm/Background Use Only

SECRET

No Foreign Dlssea/Background Use Only Controlled Diiaem

Mho apparently had been the Intended victims ofRG and whose actions in the revolution mayaised doubts in Mao's mind about theiroha to his ideological predilections. Whetherot these men survived the political infightinghe Cultural Revolution because they ultimately were ij able to prove their personal loyalty to Mao andr because they were simply needed to run the country mayoot point. Their admission to the inner circle in any eventecognition of thealance of political forces in the nation ax. thef the ninth congress. It alao meant, however, that because they were powerful figures in their own right, their viewa wouldounterweight to those of the Maoiata in the decision-making process and thatr later the radicals might feel impelled to make yet another attempt to shore up their power positions.

The move by the radicals apparentlyrather than later. As themoved forwardhere werethat the Cultural Revolution waa notand indications ln propaganda that thamaintaining their idjv^Qica^watchdoglnthe capi-

tfllr*at <vp. a> ance of wall posters callingxortne defense oi Chou Bn-lai,

|Once again something seen

to have fueled existing antagonisms in the politburo, and events in the remainder of the year bore out the notion that another round of battling between the Maoiata and their opponenta had begun.

The Mayffair

35. The full ramifications of there by no meana dear, but it apparently has been the central iaaua touching off thaalterations within tha top leadership ranka over tha past year.

launched in Its purpose,

Controlled Dissem No Foreign Dissem/Background Uae Only

ET

No Foreign Diasem/BacXground Use Only Controlled Dissero

is both to weed out former May :rom official positions they had acquired7 within various administrativeincluding ths governing committee of Pekinga.id ths Psking cityto prevent them froa joining the party comsiittass that wars in the process of being reconstructed ln th^ie bodies.

slatlvely small coterie ofjunior officials, journalists, andarmy officers, who hoped to promote theirby undermining the positions ofand rsgional officials. The groupths sosnss in Peking and innder the leadership of some membersman CRO. It certainly could notwithout the backing of Chen Po-ta,and Madame Mao. And it is equallyit was regardedajor throat by Chouwhose vies premiers were victimised byby ths' and by such majorfigures as Huang Yung-shsng, whose bassof Kwsngtungcene ofctivity.

nvestigation apparentlybitter recriminations at the top sndleast one major political cssusltyfewits inception. Insishies premier andminister who was raputed to be in chsrgs

of ths.invsstlaation. mysteriously disappeared from

public 'view.

Hsish, who had been among tne most active politburo members, staysd out of public viswull yaar and was clsarly on ths political sidelines.

SECJtET

Mo Foreign Dii

il fl j- I on-

'Background Use Only illed Dissem

jj3B. Haieh's record during the Culturalauggeeta that he could very well havehimself on thenvestigation. on occasion he apparently made accommodations to the radical forces, he waa more often on record ea an outspoken critic of militant tactics and was himself attacked several times by men openlywith the "Mayorps" and with radical Red Guards at Peking University. Even Mao once said that Halah waa one of those officiala who waabeing criticized, and Madameof the severest critics of the old public security apparatus-publicly described Haieheak man who had made aerioua miatakes. Moreover, Haieh,iceworked closely with Choua target of thettacks.

Hsieh's disappearance it appearedCRG leaders hadaneuver thatup toajor effort toauthority further. But the murkyin Peking failed to clear up. Atturnouts in May, for example, thereunusual flip flops in politburo rankingsthat another of Chou'a vice premiers,apecialist Li Hsien-nien, waa beingleast temporarily. Moreover, in June Pekingcommander Henpast associateHuang Yung-sheng--suddenlypublic view, another development thatthat efforts were being taken to realignand military power structure in the Whether or not these moves representedia uncertain, but it aeems thattriggered scbm intense jockeying forat the top.

thetobSjiiive issue in Peking afterwere confirmed in

tbT^theTlfflcuTtieaposedTy sponsible for burning the Britiah Embassy in7rofound problem with which the leadarahip

y

Controlled/Di&nem No Foreign Dissem/*ackground Use Only

wae still grappling. Thislear; its lsadsrs,

ths perpetrators of ths turnBi^TnTneuRneiieFoi eign Ministry and ths Peking diplomatic community during that period. The most significant indication that thsffair had not run its course, however, was the fact that two more rankingmembers, Chen Po-ta and Kang Shsng. dropped from public view between late summer and mid-fall lat they had been censured foractivities during and sines ths Cultural Revolution.

in

ten anauch lssssr extent, Madamecriticizedentral Committee plenum last autumn. Tha story claimed that Chan was specifically chargedozen "crimes"; thsss included organising ths "Mayttacking veteran cadres, mistakes in education reform, and advocating egalltarl&nism in ths sconomy. Most of ths charges are consistsnt with what is known about Chan's views or activities

jast.

Inor exemple,

|Chensslf-confess'lon"his support of the" and one of the secondary CRG figures later purged for leading the corps,said he was acting on Chen's orders.

By implication, Chen Kang committed similar errors,or sxampls, indicated thatajor role in ths sttacks on Chou En-lai. of the charges against him wsrs divulgsd. The only information provided was that he hadsIf-criticism at the plenum, which may explain why Kang continued to make public appearances aftsr Chen had dropped from public visw shortly before the plenum convened. Kang apparently gained only areprieve, however; he was not seen in Peking afterovember, indicating that hs too had been >litically sidelined.

!CRET

SECRirf'

No Foreign Dissem/Background Uss Only Controlled Disaem

43. At this stage It seems premature tothat both men, lona close allies of Mao, hava been permanently divested of allibilitywithinthslsadorship. In fact, |

and Kang havementBin the provinces since they disappeared from Peking. Moreover, ths unexpected resurrection of Esish Fu-riiih as first sscrstary of the newly formed Peking municipal party committee aftereen out of the political limelightear demonstrates how risky it is to describe purges in Chins's prsssnt unsettled lsadsrshipas final. Nsvsrthelsss, even if Chen and Kang have only been rsasslgned for ths past six months, they almost certainly hava bean at lsast temporarily excluded from ths highest councils of ths regime during this period.

The rsssons for their demotions srs not hard to fathom. Because of their previous ties with the "Mayoth men probably wsrs, or bs-came, targets of thsreportedly is still in progrsss and which, according to one recentaccount is still "too dangerous to discuss at home." Thessue appears to besrsonsl vendetta andeflection of deep-seated dissgrssments within ths politburo. These disagreements probably revolve around the cautious tenor of nomaultural Revolution reconstruction policies and the staffing of China's rebuilt party and govsrnmsnt spparatus with military 'men and veteran oadras who rasistsd the power plays of ultralsftists supported by Chen, Kang, and ths

t

Controlledo Porsign Disssm/Background Uss Only

SEC!

No Foreign Dlssem/Background use Only Contre*iled Dissem

other CRG leaders. Chen, for example, hadarticles in7 disparaging the army's political performance, and itistinctthat continuing criticism along these lines by both Chen and Kang may finally have pushedforces|on the politburo to coalesce against. if

Th*CRC:

Thus,road sense, the machinations of CRG leaders7 appear to have gained them little political insurance! instead they have strengthened the hand of their opponents. Therecord since the ninth congress in particular seems far from impressive, and there are fewthat the CRG leaders have significantly broadened their bases of power in the rebuilt party and government organs. Effective authority ln moat of the new provincial party committees, which began to be formed ins still in the hands of leaders with conservative records in the Cultural Revolution. In many cases, these are the same leaders who7 were threatened by the attacks of the "Mayorps."

Insofar as the army is concerned, Chen and Kang may have been questioning not only whether

-H-

Controlled/Dissem No Foreign Dissem/Jteckground Use Only

SECRET

ho foreign disaen/jjackground use only controlled disssm

the army should continue toeavy civiland political burden, but also the man' nor in which ths army was performing its newin othsr words, was it supporting local laftists and ths goals of ths radicals in sconomic, social, and political activity. in ssssnca, these were thethat prompted crg attacks on sslected army lsadsrsnd it sssms liksly ths criticisms have continued becauss ths radicals belisve that the plahole is still not fully committed to "maoist"yesrs of indoctrination under linbecause they feel that theof power by tha army had progressively under cut their own political positions and those of their lsttist supporters in various localities. theprice ths crg has psld so fsr for itsof "power-holdsrs" is dramatically underscored by the recent setbacks suffsrsd by chen po-ts and kang shang.

47. although tha difficultias of thass two men oast doubt on the future prospects of othsr crg lead era, leftist voices in ths regime have by no means been sntirsly silsncsd. in ths prsss for exampls, there are continuing criticisms of "arrogant" atti-tudss in the pla, attacks on those in the military who put professionalism ahssd of "revolutionary" concerns, and diatribss sgsinst advocates ofpolicies that subordinats politics to thsof technology. moreover, the recentof crg members chang chun-chiao and yao wan-yuan to tha top party posts in shanghaionscious sffort to snsurs that thass man will at least retain soma ragimal powar bssa.

it is also somswhat unrealistic toentirely ths tola of leftist forces in newly formed party organs. as was ths csss during the formation of the administrstlva revolutionary com-mittoas, in many of ths provincial psrty committees so far established thsrs sssms toeliberate sffort by peking to inssrtosition of power at'least one military or civilian leader who had supported radical alamsnts during the cultural

No Foreign DlssepfBackground Use Only Controlled Dlaaem

Revolution to serveolitical counterweight to other more conservatively oriented officiala. Finally, the continued failure of Haieh Fu-chlh to bein his previous positions as public security minister or vice premier or even to appear in public since tha announcement of his appointment aa Peking party aecretary auggests that some form of leftist pressure may be preventing his full rehabilitation.

49. Despite these caveats, not only have the local leftists made few inroads in the new party organs, but it ia possible those who retain their positions have leaa room for political maneuver. In fact, aevaral provincial leaders who ware highly praised by the Maoists inas, Wang Hsiao-yu in Shantung, Liu Ko-ping in Shansi, and Li Tsai-han into have been purged in the past

left are unlikely to wane completely, although there have been recent indicationa that thenvestigation may belimax. Accordingress article by pro-Communistjournalist Wilfred Bt-.rchett, who recentlyfrom Peking, he was officially informed about an investigation into an alleged anti-Mao ploteference to theffair. Burchett's article discussea an extreme leftiat ehadow cabinet that tried toitaelf into power during the cultural. The journalist claims that the names of the plotters, who may include Chen Po-ta, would bewhen the inveatlgation was completed. In any case, the setbacks to Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng, the forward movement in provincial p'rty building, the pronounced flexibility in Chinese foreign policy, Haieh Fu-chlh's appointment as Peking party boss, and the continuing denunciations of the "Mayorps" are all eigne that the political seesaw in Peking has tipped at least temporarily in fevor of the moderates.

Controlled/Dissem No Foreign Oissem/Background Use Only SECRET

'/Jho's Up on the Seesaw?

Attaching political labels to tha various members of the Politburo outside the ranks of the CRG is particularly difficult because of the paucity ,of data on the activitiesumber of lesser, but nonetheless important, full and alternate politburo {members, such as the new head of tlie PLA GeneralDepartment (GPD) Li Te-sheng. Even within :the CRG membership there may be differences in posi-Itionsior at least styles. Thus it is possible that Chang Chun-chiao, whoistinct facility for .bending with the wind in the Cultural Revolution, might be better able tooliticalwith hiB enemies than, for example, the radical firebrand Chiang Ching. Nevertheless, the reactions to, and activities in, the Cultural Revolution ofemaining hon-CRG members suggest that the principal icivil government and military leaders of the polit-"buro are not mere opportunists and can be safelyas opponents of those favoring furtheror ideological excesses.

51. The military leaders who rank just below LinYung-sheng, Yeh Chien-ying, Chen Hsi-lien, and Hauall under heavy andradical attacks in the revolution, whichgenerated bitterness and anxiety on their part.Since then they have appeared to favor getting on with the business of reconstruction and probably have sought to modify the disruptive impact ofsocial and political programs. Their basic inclinations are apparently shared by theministers, Li Hsien-nien and Hsieh Fu-chih.

The political affinities of the lowermilitary men on the politburo, who seem to play an important role in day-to-day affairs, are more difficult to pigeonhole.

, a 4vvAiiviJbaa bwnauauuei wnuea uw* eteoric rise sinceh Army was ordered into Anhwei Province7 to curb Red Guard dia-ordera. His success there does not in Itself explain

t

Controlled/bissem No Foreign PisserVBd^kground Use Only

why hs was alsvatsd to the pollthuro or ths GDP directorship over men more senior than he, and it rsmains debatable whether he should be regardedepresentative of the conservativeensitive army political post,ro-tags of Lin Piao, oravorite of the CRG lsadsrs. Ths records of Gsnsral Rear Services Dirsctor Chlu Hui-tso and navy political cossmisssr Li Tso-peng ars also mixsd, although it is worth noting that ths navy linsd up in province after provinca with radical forces attaclcing ssnior array lsadsrs during thsRevolution. Tha air foresimilar pattern, and both Li Tso-peng and air fores commander wu Fa-hsisn appsar to be good sxamples of military lsadsrs who have been ready and willing to accommodate trams pushed bv the CRG.

! Neither of the rsmaining alternate msmbers of ths politburo, party veteran Li Hsush-fsng orChi Tsng-kuei, sssms toolitically significant role. Little is known about Chi sxcspt that hs was personally praissd by Mao for ths support hs gave radical forcss in Bonan Provinca through the Cultural Revolution. Dsspits this rscord, howsvsr, Chi was recentlyarty post in Honan bslow ssveral ordinary membera in ths local hierarchyi his failurs to raovs up to ths top psrty post inlear departure from long-standing party practice snd may be tsXsn as an interesting commentary on the political weight leftist lssders ars currently pulling in the politburo.

ven with ths uncsrtalnties surrounding some of ths lesser figures on ths politburo, it is reasonable to infsr that bslow Mao and Lin the major actors in ths complsx pattam of interrelationships within ths elite ara polarized into two mutually antagonistic groupings, tha ideologues and tha Dividing them are not only ths broad issus of ths continuing validity of Mao's ideological pra-cepts but also tha narrower problams relative to

;ret

^Background Use Only

the political future of the radical ideologues. The ideologueseemingly identifiable coalition of top army men and civilian bureaucrats who appear to befor greaterof theand political apparatus or at least for the orderly pursuitore pragmaticof Mao's romantic vision. The principal spokesman for this group seems to be Chou En-lai, who throughout theturmoilanaged toan image ofmoderation, and responsibility.

During the Cultural Revolution, Chou had enormous responsibilities not only for theadministration of the central government but also for overseeing provincial politicalask that obliged him to win the confidence and cooperation of powerful local military satraps, suchChen Hsi-lien and Hsu Shih-yu.

any

case* cnou nas not oeen laenuueu wiuiworst excesses of the Cultural Revolution and is one of the fewnot the only leader other than

i Controlled &issem No Foreign Dissem/Batkground Use Only

has genuine popular appeal. Be alsosputationaster of subtle compromiss andough political infightsr. Thus, hs is uniquely qualifiad to orchestrate the views of those opposing the power and policy pretensions of the CRG leaders.

Chou has shown considerable responsiveness to the problems of the top military and civilianin the moderate grouping on the Moreover, his political future, like theirs, had been placed in jeopardy by radical onslaughts in the Cultural Revolution. irect result of their attacks on his vice premiers and other centralofficials, Chou's personal power base suffered serious attrition. Through his efforts to curbexcesses, Chou apparently incurred the wrath of tha principal CRG leaders;

57. It is liksly that Chou survived these il political perils because in the snd he was able toretain Mao'stha key factor cementing their relationship may not have been so uch Mao's belief that Chou was always loyal to hims his conviction that Chou's multipls talsntsndispensable to holding the country togathsr. Buthatever the basis of tha Mao-Chouhere haveumber of indications sines the ninth congress that leftist pressure against Chouayrime ingredient in keeping the Pekingcauldron boiling. In the weeksrior to the convening of border talks with Moscow

in ths falloreries ofultural polemics appeared in the pressnnamed comrades who favored the "right capitula-tionist" line of negotiating with ths enemy. Since Chou probably was instrumental in persuading Mao to talk with the Soviets in order to rsducs thetensions, it seems probable that these diatribes were directed at Chou to warn him not to go too far and to cast aspersions on his fsalty to Mao's anti-Soviet position.

sem No Foreign Dissem/Baekground Use Only

wi uin wan puatais caning ror ms aeii^^

nT"EHe^in^ffle^ffta^^Tr

clearer sign that Chou continued toobject of radical machinations was thethe wall posters calling for his "defense" early

.nvestigation. Chou has played tt autumnseveral major speeches dsnouncing the "Mayorps." Thus it is likely that in pushing through the investigation Chou hss successfully weathered another test of strength with his radical opponsnts. Indeed, the sidelining of Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng has in some wsys givsn Chou even store freedom for political maneuver.

position ln both domestic andaffairs seems to hava been strengthened since

autumn.

flatly stated for the first time that he was ln charge of rebuilding the party machinery. This revelation contrasted rith earlier reports that Lin Fiao was directly supervising ths process and that ths CRG hada facto party secretariat with Kong Sheng playing tha principal rola. Although it still seems unlikaly that Chou is ln "sols" command of this sensitive projeot, the dlssppearance of Kang Sheng and Chen Po-ta may mean that Chou's personal authority in overseeing party reconstruction has been enhanced at tha sxpsnss of ths CRG members. This speculation sssms substantiated by ths fact that Peking did not begin endorsing provincial partymost important party organs formed since the central committee was produced at tha ninth partyafter Kong Sheng and Chen Po-ta had vanished from center stage. The naming of Hsish Fu-chih as first sscrstary of tha Peking party com-mittss may also be atymbolic victory for Chou since the two hsd appeared to be workingaclosely together until Hsish's fsll from grace last March. Finally, the feet that Chinese Foreign Ministryhave recentlyoint of tailing visitors that they do not condone "sxtrsmist" activities and ths continuing snlargament of the image ofand reasonableness" in Chinese foreign policy both suggsst that Chou doss have increasedfor "running ths country."

lllfllpFj - i:

( 'ill-i ControlledyOlsssm

No Foreign Dissom/Beckground Use Only

SECRET

60. It is important to recognize, however,although Chou himselfany burdens haveon him because he apparently is the onlyber of China's top triumvirate with sufficientengage in the day-to-day direction of thegovsrnment. This does not in itself mean thatis the dominant figura in the rsgime or that hsnot have to consult with both Mao and Lin onissues. Given ths apporant psrslstsnce oflattempts to weaken hia position, howsver, it isaxiomatic that Chou doss or will always retainfull confidence of Mao and Lin. Nsvsrtheless,apparently protected himself over the yearsreassuring Moo that hs was not addingto the list of possible successors to thsj

i ' :

A Successful Successor?

61. There sssms to be little question that Mao has carefully weighed the possibility that hismightrotractsd powsr struggle that could thwart his revolutionary willumber of unforeseen ways. To avert this Mao has worksdto arrange for an orderly transfer of power. Thus the position of Lin Plao as Mao's chosenhas been affirmed both in ths new partyand in ths draft stata constitution endorsed at last fall's Central Committee plenum. Moreover, the emergence of the PLA as ths primary instrument of political snd sdministrativs control probably has enhanced both the power and authority of Linis other members of ths slits and has possibly improved his chances of consolidating his position after Mao goes. Thus, on ths surface at leant, Lin appears toormidable figure ln ths prssent powsr equation in Peking.

62. Nevertheless, Lin remains one of the least known of China's leaders and must be considered in many ways an enigma.

Controlljro Dissem No Foreign DissemfBackground Use Only

SECRET

No Foreign DissaavBackground Use Only Controlled Dissem

charisma and physical vigor. Lin's record, however,that he is driving andough and demanding troop commander,killed political infighter. His rapid rise in the military and party hierarchy over more senior officers, his ability to promote himself as Mao's foremost disciple andand his transformation of the PLAodel of Maoist organization in the, all indicate that it wouldistake to discount Lin's political acumen and to dismiss him asonvenient instrument of Mao's will.

63. There are indicetions, moreover, that Lin has attempted to shore up his personal power base by influencing in his favor tha promotional pattern in theulturel Revolution leadership hierarchy. Nearly all the military men on the present politburo, for example, have had their careers advancedsince Lin took over aa Minister of National Defense The fact that more officers from the 4th Field Army, which was commanded by Lin from its inceptionave been placed in keyposts than officers who aarved in China's other former field army systems is probably another exampleeliberate effort by Lin to offerto men who might owe him some personal loyalty.

Wto Eiimmw th* PuptJ Affcf tW

Controlled/bissam No Foreign Dissem/Background Use Only

:ET

segi(et

Uo Foreign Disseu/fiackoround Use Only Controlled Dissem

On the other hand, other aspects of Lin's rolearticulsrly during ths Cultural Revolution, raiss serious questions about ths sxtent ani depth of support for him in important military Kid civilian circles. The major turning point in Lin's career came9 when he was charged by Mao with improving morale and tightening up laxpractices in theove that inwas part of Mao's plan toejuvenated PLA under Lin as the major instrument for combat lne the visvs of both the professional military leaders and ths party apparatus chiefs who wsrs opposing him.

Lin's efforts to put "politics in command" in the army, however, exacerbated strains between officers oriented toward political action and those more concerned with professional problems involved

in modernizing the PLA. Thess strains have continued, and polemics against officers who insist on putting professionsl considerations to the fore and onarmy building from building political power" have been an important element in the mountingsince last fall of the PLA's performance of its civil administrative tasks. Lin himsslf is on record as stressing the importance of professional training and of learning to deal with ths growing problsms created by modern weapons, but most of his remarks on the subject have concentrated onal skills, such as hand-to-hand combat, snd on small-unit sassult techniques. These preoccupations in tha post have been derided by officers who opposed continuing ths "guerrilla mentality" in PLA training and who favored developing the sophisticatedussd in large-seals fisld operations andair-ground defanss systems.

willingness to push Maoist dogmapoint also casts doubt on his readinessto the less doctrinaire views of somepresent colleagues on ths politburo. Fordlffsrsnoes in tons and content of many ofgiven by Lin snd Chou during thswith Lin oftan supporting revolutionary

litttflifcmi

ControlledyOissem' Ho Foreign Diss em/Background Use Only

SECRET

. No Foreign Dlssem/eackground Use Only Controlled Oissem

*

excesses and Chou seeking to limit chaosritical disparity in thsphilosophies of both men. There is also evidence

that Lin attempted to play seriousness of the "crimes" of ths "Mayorps"hich suggests that hs was not one of Chou's most stalwart defendersime when the premier and his colleagues were being seriously threatened by radical elements in ths leadership. There were instances in the Cultural Revolution when the responsibilities and concerns of Lin and Chou more nearly converged, but the possibility remains that differences between the two men over policy and personal priorities in ths reconstruction period could have set them at odds.

thein's supportpurge of numerous senior officers and hisadmonition that the PLA leaders considerths "targets of revolution" (as well asstovers) ralss questions about his abilityths loyalty of some of the PLA officerstoday's major power-holders. Leftist attacks

on powerful Lin subordinates, Lin's demonstrated propensity for purges, and his own public statements that "no ons can be trusted" may all be morefactors in determining the future responsiveness of Lin's colleagues than their working relations with him before the Cultural Revolution. Little in the Cultural Revolution demonstrates that Lin was ever ready to risk his csreer toollaague, and this knowledge may wall have prompted some of his apparent proteges to seek new sources of support.

it seems possible that theimportant regionalas7 Wuhan Incident was due asths fact that these people had been lsadingfor local military power-holders who at thsdemanding that disorders be curbed and thatattacks on ths PLA be halted, as it was toties to Lin Piso. In any case, someof both Mao and Lin, such ss LiuYang Cheng-wu, have in the past sithsr failed

SJJCRET

their politicel mentors or shifted their allegiances in crises, which suggests that in China tha career identification of one leader with another is not always an accurate measuring rod of the depth of what may outwardly appear toonolithic |

final problem that casts doubt onof Lin's political position involves hisstewardship of the PLA and thethe PLAMaoist" political instrument. Lin had been industriouslymall scale, purgingcommandut in spite of allthe cohesion of the militaryseverely strained when it was inserted intoRevolution. And since then the PLAsome of tho same divisive left-rightthat ruptured the party and government,that Lin was never the complete mastarown house. Moreover, the problems of thethat devolved on the provincialtended to reinforce the PLA'ato espouse the administrative virtuesand rationality and to opt for an earlyposition that Lin, with hisand loyalties, often said had ledestablishment to commit political errors.

-

though the army has emerged aa thepower system in China and seems heavilyawn who might be termed Lin proteges, it iacontinuously criticised for ideological andfailingr The criticisms probably emanatefrom the res lining CRG leaders. But theybe aaaociated with Lin aince they includeof lapses within the army on tha scopeto Mao'a thought, atraas the need forideological revolution!sation, and urgepolitics inpanaceas that Linrepeatedly If there arethe army who are atill "arrogant andtheir critics charge, than it seems almostLin may continue to feel some elements in the

Controlled-Bissem No Foreign Dissera/Mekground Use Only

secret

PLA are now, or are potentially, disloyal to him. Thus, it appeara that Lin Piao'a preatiga andstrength derive as much--orMao's confidence in him aaecure power baae in the military establishment.

71. nevertheless, Lin's position aa head of the military eatabllahmentital one. Hhile it ia certainly true that politburo members, such aa Chen Hal-lien, Bau Shlh-yu, and particularly Huangof whoa have roota in tha regionalpowerful figures in their own right, they could hardly have risen to their present eminence without at leaat the acquieacenoe ofand of Mao. Lln'a relations to theaa and otherfigures who not only command troops but alsoajor voice in local governmentare likely to be crucial once Mao departs from the acene. For thia reason it behooves Lin toa working relationship with these men, whose political vlewa are almostood deal more "conservative" and pragmatic than hlaao much out of ideological conviction but out ofnecessity. Indeed, something of thia aort may already have occurred. The crlticiama of the PLA that have surfaced in the past months were probably inspired not by Lin, but by the CRG ldeologueaa. rear-guard action againat tha steady erosion of their power. Such attacks may help cement an alliance not only between the military aatrapa and Chou En-lai and the civilian bureaucrats, but also between the regionel military figures and Lin. r event there were enough crosa-currente in the Cultural Revolution to auggest that Lin and theradicals did not always see eye to eye. But in forging any alliance with more conservative forces in the military, Lin must constantly look over his ahoulder at theultimate aource of powar. Thia in turn closely limits hia freedom of action.

em Ho Foreign Dissem/Background Use Only

SECRET

Outlook for the Post-Mao Era

72. Prior to the Cultural Revolution, itthat the comparative stability of theleadership and the unifying influence of Mao Tse-tung wouldrotracted power struggls untilspsrturs from the scens. Thsof the Cultural Revolution proved, however, that for some time past Mao had not been undisputed leader of the party, that his own power interests andpredilections couldisunifying factor, and that the struggle among his heirs was alraady under way. This struggls continuss to bs complicated by major questions concerning the limits of Mao's authority, the capabilities of his desig-natsd successor, the persistence of deep-seated quarrsls over the proper mix of pragmatic andprescriptions in policy-making, and the heating up of volatile personal rivalriss within the Politburo. Ths succsssion problem is furtherbecause tha probabilities are high that death or ill health might soon striks down any or all of China's top three lsadsrs. Mao atsems to be in good health, but how much longar hs will be around is doubtful. Lin Piaoong history of debilitating ailments and might not even last as long as Mao. Chou En-lai ateems full of vigor, but ths magnitude of his official burdens may shorten the time he will be able to function with the prodigious energy for which hs is renowned.

Ths rscent draft stats constitutionunderscored the difficulties facing the Chiness leadership in coping with ths nation's short and longer term succession problems. Presumably because itroduct of compromise among ths competing forces, the new draft in many respectssriss of loossly wordsd general apparsntly almost deliberately deslgnsd to be subject to varying interpretations. By designating Mao and Lin as ths nation's personal rulers and noting specifically that they are supreme commander and deputy commander, respectively of sll ths nstion and all the army, the constitution attests

to Mao's determination to avert any possibleto him or to Lin from other powerful figures in the army, party or government apparatus. The fact he felt the need for these designations,seems to reflect considerable internal tensionealization that the succession could prove difficult. Finally, the highly personalizedof the constitution renderseak and irrelevant instrument for coping with China'sproblem should both Mao and Lin die or should Lin predecease Mao.

of all the uncertaintiesthe Chinese succession question, there can be

no definitive assessment of how the presentis going to cope with the problem. At thethe influence of the comparative moderates in the military administrator group on the politburo seems stronger than that of the radical Maoists. In assessing the political future of China's leadership, however, the problem is not simply to determine which leader is up or downiven moment but also to understand the manner in which compromises are made between ideological and pragmatic considerations. Will the leadership, for example, continue tothe politically unpalatable but economically essential institution of private plots and material incentives? Will it recognize the limited appeal of abstract revolutionary theory in motivating humanand instead emphasize nationalistic andgoals, both of which are better understood and generally supported by the people? These are the questions at the root of the conflict at the top in China today. At present, time seems to be on the side of those leaders who are generally morewith political, social, and economicthan with the pursuit of pure revolution.

will continue to be majoras to how far Mao is willing to go inhis principles and as to whether he willreverse trends that he feels are contrary tovision. There seems little doubt,that those who succeed Mao will have to accommodate

to changing conditionsanner that substantially roodifias his idsological precepts. China will stillarsh and disciplined society, but itwill be run by men who, even while elevating Mao to the pantheon of China's heroes,choice ordiluting his thoughts.

No Foreign Dissem.

a Dissem

Use Only

Original document.

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA