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Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack
THIS ESTIMATE IS SUBMITTED BY THE DlRcCTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND CONCURREOY TH= UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD.
Th*n Ha praparolior- ot 'ho eittmott.
Cilralceeaaa^otfeo- elOppon. rn-uS-ole* MS*
In* Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Ihe Director olievrtn.ox, TheheNol-ono!oeoe,
The Aiut'aii General Marogt-j>a-
The Aitiilonl 'o In*ederalolineei'y Otili.de of rii iuriidi::ion.
ne-erial io-WovuiJr^MajU Nlnt (jailed S'oKm
eo-oo ol, iheq Jnc^PTSeed peion ii prohibited
[NOTE: Pages through Chapter II of the "Discussion" on pa,f this NIE were released inor conveniencehaveopy oft/ie earlier release with this package. The pages oftlteprevious release are not included in the total page count for7 release.]
APPROVEB FORIS HISTORICAL-REVIEW PSOGMK
SOVIET FORCES FOR INTERCONTINENTAL ATTACK
THE PROBLEM 1
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS I
L PRESENT STATUS OF .SOVIET IiNTERCOmTNENTAL
The Principal Types of Intercontinental Ballistic 3
POLICY AND FUTURE PROGRAMS 6
OF INTERCONTINE NTAI. BALLISTIC
Statu* of Operational
New* Deployment Program
The Range Problem .
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The Basic Problem ot
Roles and Missions of tbe
HI. THE SS-11
IV. THE SS-13
V. DIMENSIONS AND DIRECTIONS OF RESEARCHON INTERCONTINENTALMISSILES
Specific Areas of Research
Implications of Strategic Arms Limilation
VI. SUBMARINE LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES
Current Force Levels
General Characteristics of Soviet Ballistic Missile
Roles and Missions of Ballistic Missile Submarines
VII. HEAVY BOMBERS AND
Roles and Missions of tlie Heavy Bomber
VHI. SOVIET INTERCONTINENTAL ATTACK FOR USE
IX. DECISION-MAKING IN THE C2
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X. ILLUSTRATIVE FUTURE FORCES 53
The Soviet Perception of (he US Strategic
System CharaderisWcs and Deployment Options
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
Submarine Launched Ballistic
Alternative Force Developments" " 63
Possible Forcestrategic Arms Limitation Agreement .. trategic Amu limitation Talks Force I: Maintenance of Parity Under An Amu LlmiUtion
Strategic Aims Limitation Talks Force Posture Under An Arms Limitation -. * .
Effect of Possible Variations in Terms of an Arms gg
Likely Soviet Courses of Action Under an Arms gg
Possible Forces Without an Arms Limitation 66
Illustrative Force Modelinimum Posturean Arms Limitation 67
Illustrative Force Modelaximum PostureArms
Illustrative Force Model Z: Maintenance of Parity
Without an Anns Limitation Agreement 69
Illustrative Force Modelounterforce Against
Likely Soviet Courses of Action Without Arms Control 73
APPENDIX TO SECTION 79
ANNEX A: CLOSSARY OF MISSILE 91
ANNEX B: ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS ANDOF SOVIETWEAPON SYSTEMS 97
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE ^ewsaaffl HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM
SOVIET FORCES FOR INTERCONTINENTAL ATTACK
To assess the strength and capabilities of Soviel forces forattack, to estimate their size and composition throughnd to forecast general trends thereafter.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
I. PRESENT STATUS Of SOVIET INTERCONTINENTAL ATTACK FORCES General
A. The intercontinenta! attack forces considered in this paperintercontinental ballistic missilesubmarine-launched ballistic missilesnd heavy bombers. In the course of the pastears, the Soviets have engagedigorous and costly buildup of these elements of their military establishment.esult of this effort, the Soviets had operational1 anaunchers at regular ICBMLBM launchers,eavy bombers and tankers. To this may beaunchers at Derazhnya and Pervomaysk winch, though possiblyfor use against European targets, are nevertheless capable of reaching the US.8 ICBM launchers at test or training sites. When all construction now under way on currently operational systems is completed byhe Soviets willaunchers at regular ICBM complexes,l the largeype; about
LBMs. includinglass submarines;eavy bombers and tankers. During the past year, it appeared that the large-scale deployment programs ofad run their course and that no further deployment of existing ICBMs was plannedof new types of silos which wc believe to be underway, however, mayew phase of deployment
believe that construction of two, possibly three, newsilos is underway at the test center at Tyuratam and at somein the field. The purpose of the new silos is not clear.be intended to house wholly new missiles, variants ofor existing typesrogram aimed at increasedmay not be intended for missiles at all. We believe thatone new missile system has been under development forand is probably ncaring the flight test stage;.it maybeone of the new types of silos. Il would require about twotesting to reach initial operational, capability.
of theIass ballistic missilehas continued apace. We estimate that these submarinesbeing built at the rate of about nine per year. Thereperational, five or perhaps six in various stages ofand sea trails, and anothern the building ways. BesidesY-cIass, there arc missile submarines, of earlierwhich could contribute to the intercontinental attack mission.
USSR has not, in recent years, shown equal interestbombers of intercontinental capability. No heavy bombersin production, and the design of types now inandfrom. Testingewwe"however, and theTirst units could be operational by.ith existing weapons. All but the Air Force believe thatis best suited for use against Europe and Asia; the Airthat it is suitable for both intercontinental and
Soviet system of command and control has beenimproved over the past decade, and it is now flexible,highly survivable. It permits Moscow to exercise highly cen-
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tralized control over the Soviet forces for wtercontinental attack. Soviet writings liaveumber of circumstances under which the order to fire might be given; there is little evidence from these or other sources that the Sovietsolt-from-the-blue firstorkable strategy, or that theyS first strike likely. In the event of war, tho primary mission of the Soviet strategic attack forces would probably be the classic one of destroying the enemy's war making potential: ICBM launchers and launch control facilities, subinarine and bomber bases, command posts,and power facilities, and industrial centers.
The Principal Types of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles'
-F- The SS-U. Mody; far the most numerous of Sovietestimated toircular error probable (CEP) atofand a'
JljThus iteapon bestuse against softindustrial installations, and some miUtary targets. It can reach all parts of the US, but has also been tested to ranges as shortndicating much flexibility in its possible uses.esting began on two versionsodifiedaving greater throw weight and increased range. One, the Mod 2A,ew re-entry vehiclearhead probably yieldingand what are probably one or more exoatmospheric penetration aids. The other, the Mod 2B, has tliree RVs which are not independently targetable. Each RVarhead with an estimated yield
oft target weapon; the two new versions are most likely intended to improve the system's ability to penetrate antiballistic missile defenses.
C. Thexists in four variants: Modhich carries an RV weighingounds; Modhose RV weighs0 pounds; Modhich has been tested bothepressed trajectory ICBM (DICBM) andractional orbit bombardment systemnd Modhich carries three RVs. Leavingside for the time being, our analysis of evidence on the capabilities of Mods,urns up some perplexing problems.
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H. There is general agreement that theas developed, early in, to provide better accuracyarger payload than theresumably for use against hardthe US Minute-man system. Tlieppears reasonably well adapted for this purpose.owever, the Soviets began to test the Modhich, with its heavier payload, was estimated toield Q
J These tests were pursued with great vigor, and theas actually deployed before the Mod
theas never in its numerous flight tests actually demonstrated enough range to reach any Minute-man complexes. We believe that its demonstrated range could besufficiently to cover all of them by using up more of thepropellant, removing telemetry packages, etc. Yet it remains curious that the Modlone among ICBMs except theas never been tested to what we would presume to be its intendedrange.
I. The kill probabilityissile against hard targets is more sensitive to accuracy than to yield. The accuracy of theannot be ascertained from observations. It must be deduced Q
Jin the Intcllige nee Community, opinions as to the CEP of theangeow.igh. Theof these differences ist is generally agreed lhal in actual operational employment, accuracies in the forcehole would be somewhat poorer.
J. In sum. with respect to the capability of thegainst Minuteman, we have estimated that it can have sufficient range to reach all targets even though such range has not been demonstrated in tests.
' Setiieuiiian ol the nffCt ofInand yield.
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Wc sec no reason to doubt that in the event of general war the Soviets would use it for whatever it could accomplish against the Minuteman system. But. the Soviets would have to deploy several times the present number ofod Is and Mod 2s, with their present capabilities, beforeorce which woulderious threat to the Minuteman forcehole. Tliis brings usonsideration of tho Mod 4.
K. Inhe Soviets began testing thehree RVs. Byhey had conductedests, about the usual numberissile before it goes into operational deployment. In these tests, the three RVsQ
^Jwerc not independently targetable, and the weapon as tested was
ultiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV).
thead been operationally deployed.
L. Inests resumed, andovember there had been four more. One of these was like the earlier tests; one was aThe two others
his led us to point out in, "Soviet Forces for IntercontinentalatedOP SECRET, RESTRICTED DATA,ystem of the type implied by preliminary analysis of these tests could have the capability of attacking independently tliree separate targets,"^
analysis of the four latest tests has cast doubt on the prehminary judgment of last year thai the Soviets appeared to beIRV. There arc now divided views: some agencies believe that thes and willoft target multiple re-entry vehiclethers believe thai it could be either an MRV or an MIRV with limited targeting flexibility; still others think that it was intended to be an MIRV, but that development may have beenNo further tests of theave taken place since last fall.
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indications ihal thes being deployedAll
are agreed lhat if ibis is so, wbat is now being"deployed is an MRV.
M. Returning now lo theods observed above it has been tested bothICBM andOBS. In neither form does it have sufficient accuracy to attack hard targets effectively; itsfunction would be to attack soft strategic targets, avoiding early detection by the US Ballistic Missile Early Warning System. (New US warning systems give promise of reducing or eliminating this) Theppears to have limited capabilityOBS. It Is agreed that it has been deployed onlyery limited extent, and that its future deployment. If any, will also be limited.
II. SOVIET POLICY AND FUTURE PROGRAMS
N. The Broader reasons for the USSR's energetic buildup ofattack forces are neither complex nor obscure. In thehe Soviet leaden, politically and ideologically hostile to the US. and thinking and behaving as rulersreat power, perceived that in this particular respect their military forces were conspicuouslyto those of their most dangerous rival, the US. Consequently, they set themselves lo rectify theachieveelation of rough parity. Parity in this sense cannot be objectively measured; it istate of mind. Such evidence as we have, much of it from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talksndicates that the Soviet leaders think that they have now generally achieved this position, or are about to achieve it.
O. Many aspects of the present force structure are also susceptible to simple and probably correct explanation. The Sovietsarge number of ICBMs in order tonow lonumber of US ICBMs. and also to increase the probability that many would survive an initial US attack. They built missile-launching submarines which are highly survivablc when deployed, and theyanned bomber force as yet another option. The intercontinentalforce is obviously capable of being used in war. but there is no reason to believe that the Soviet leaders intend deliberately to nuke nuclear war. The force is an attribute of power, an instrumenteterrent to the US.
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P. Certain features of the Soviet system have affected the waydecisions are made, and by whom. In the case of militaryprograms, decision-making is probably centered on two keymilitary anduthorities whoprograms, and the top political leaders. The latter have thebut they must operateontort of other forces and takeaccount. Decision-making appears to involve clusters ofexecutive bodies which are likely, at times, to be inone another. Bureaucratic pressures, conflicts, andbe heavy on occasion. We think it unlikely that observedare the productarefully thought out strategy orwluch is undeviatingly executed. It is probably fair to saysystem is characterized by conservatism, both in making newand in disposing of,
Q. Looking to the future, we have little basis in evidence forthe content of specific decisions on strategic policy or particu- -lar weapon programs. It seems clear that the Soviet leaders intend to maintaininimum such forces as will continue to givetheir ownsense of "equal security" with the US. One method of doing so might be through an arms limitation agreement; theyseriously interested in this possibility. We do not know whether an agreement will be reached, or on what terms. If it were indeedthe development of Soviet intercontinental attack forces would be subject to its terms. While we have given consideration in thisto possible effectsALT agreement, wc confine ourselves mainlyonsideration of the situation in the absence of agreement.
R. With the general attitudes and policies of the USSR being what they are. if might seem obvious to innii (fall uafl Soviel Imm will strive to achieve marked superiority over the US in strategic weaponry. We do not doubt that they would like to attainosition. The question is whether they considereasiblewhether they believe the chances of success good enough to justify allocation of the necessary resources, adjustment to the political implications of an all-out aims race, and acceptance of the risk that instead of surpassing the US they might fall behind, especially in the technological competition. They might, in any case, think it feasible totrategic posture that, while falling short of marked superiority, makes clear that the Soviets have advantages over the US in certain specific areas. For
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example, they can now claim an advantage in numbers of ICBM launchers. Whether or not such advantages are significant militarily, they help to dramatize the strategic power of the Soviet Union.
S. But even if Soviet intentions go no further than maintenance of equalheir arms programs are bound to be vigorous and demanding. This is in part because Soviet leaders must have an eye not to what forces the US has at present, but to what it can have, or may have, in future years. In this respect, they are likely to beoverestimate rather than underestimate the US threat.the weapons competition nowadays isechnological race; the USSR is impelled to press forward its research andlest it be left bcliind. Soviet weapon programs also tend toa momentum .of their own; the immense apparatus ofinstallations, personnel, vested interests, and so tin, tends to proceed in its' endeavors unless checked by some, decisive political authority.
T. On the other hand, there are constraints upon Soviet armsThe most obvious is economic; resources are not unbounded; the civilian economy demands its share; one weapon system competes with another for allocations; and intercontinental attack forceswith strategic defense and general purpose forces. The various bureaucracies with interests in one or another area compete partly with rational argument and partly in sheer political infighting. Soviet leaders must also consider how far they may wish to press their own programs lest they provoke countervailing programs in the US. And they must assess not only the present and future US threat, but also that from China, and elsewhere.
U. While the foregoing considerations probably govern the nature of Soviet decisions as to future weapon programs, they provide us with, little or no basis on which to estimate in detail what these programs will be. We have never had solid evidence on the problem, and there is no reason to expect that we shall have such evidence in the future. Moreover, in the present era the rapidity of technological advance tends to produce especially vigorous action and reaction between military programs of the USSR and the US.
V. Yet the possibilities are not unlimited, certainly in the next five years or so. For one thing, intercontinental weapon systems arc of such
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complexity that tliclr development, testing, and deploymentong time. We can observe the testing phase, and thus project potential deployments. It usually takes about two years from the time we observe the first flight testew ICBM until that system becomes opera-ional in the field. The interval for SLBMs is about the same or longer, and for bombers it is much longer. We can therefore estimate with much confidence that the kinds of weapon systems deployed by the Soviets during the next two years or so will be those already in operation or in the late stages of development. Even in the period from two to five years from now the force will be composed largely of existing lands of delivery vehicles, but it could change substantially by the end of the period of this Estimate.
W. Because of the lead times involved in construction andwe can also bo highly confident of the number of launchers of intercontinental weapons which will be operational for periods up to about two years from now. Thereafter uncertainty increases as the time period of projection increases. Some reasonable limits to thiscan nevertheless be derived from our knowledge of pastrates, especially those obtainingime when the Soviets appeared to bearticularly vigorous effort.
X. The most significant developments in Soviet forces forattack during the next several years will probably lie in qualitative improvements to the'ICBM force. The most important of. these are likely to be in accuracy of missiles, in MIRVs for them, and in survivability.
Accuracy. There is still no direct evidence that the Soviets are taking the steps that would be required for them to improve significantly the accuracy of their ICBMs. Improvements sufficient to give system CEPs of. could come about through normal advances in present technology, but an improvement to. would require the Soviets to go to wholly new techniques of guidance. Whether they decide lo do this will depend on their future targeting requirements and particularly on how much stress they place on improving capabilities to attack land-based ICBMs.
Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles. We continue to believe that the Soviets will develop MIRVs for their ICBMs. Wclight test program to start soonew missile witli MIRVs and with better hard target capabilities
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than thebout two years of testing would be required for this missile to achieve an initial operational capability. The Sovietscould develop MIRVs based on the technology of (hoith only one year of flight testing, but such MIRVs could not, in soime, be made more accurate than the presentwould require an improved guidance system and about two years of flight testing. Although there are differences of opinion on the future of theodll agree that it is unlikely to be developedard target weaponew missile with hard target MIRVs is in fact to become available in the next two years or so.
urvivability. The USSR's concern about the survivability of its ICBM force is likely to increase, as the US deploys increasingly large numbers of independently targetable RVs. In addition to the employment of active defenses, survivability can be achieved through hardness and mobility. The new silos which are believed to be under construction will probably be harder than existing types. The Soviets may also pursue development of land-mobile ICBMs, but we believe this less likely than weear ago.
Y. With respect to ballistic missile submarines, the Soviets already have aboutlass units in service or under construction, and may continue this program for some time. By the end3 the Soviets will have as many launchers on Polaris-type submarines as the US, and these launchers willubstantial portion of their forces for intercontinentalew missile,jn. rangeas been undergoing flight testing since June. Although this missile wouldubstantial improvement overjn.ow carried bylass, theppears too large to be carriedlass submarines as they are currently coo-figured, and we have yet toew submarine class which might be designed to carry this missile. If tlie Soviets do in factew submarine for thehe first units probably could not reach operational status untily wlu'ch time the Soviets could have SLBMs equipped with penetration aids or multiple warheads, possibly including MIRVs. As an alternativeew class ofthe Soviets mightew missile of extended range (ator thelass. If so, the firstlass unit probably could not be operational beforeven if testingew missile began soon.
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Z. The present fleet of intercontinental manned bombers will probably remain about the same size or diminish only slightly up to the. In time, however, increasing numbers of aircraft in the current inventory are likely lo be phased out. Wc believe that the Backfire is best suited for peripheral operations, but that it may have some capability for intercontinental attack. If so, it could be used to replace or augment existing elements of the intercontinental bomber force,uitable tanker force were also developed. All but ihe Air Force, however, believe that our knowledge of this aircraft is still too limited toonfident judgment of itsand future employment. The Air Force believes that theof the Backfireoviet intent to employ the aircraft in both intercontinental and peripheral operations.
AA. The various uncertainties summarized above make it evident that no exact estimate of tlie future Soviet force structure could be defended. We have therefore constructed, inf Uiisseveral illustrative models to depict various possibilities. The first two. callednd SALTepresent postures the Soviets might develop under the termsostulated SALT agreement.ssumes that the primary Soviet objective would be the maintenancetrong retaliatory capability.aximum Soviet effort within the constraints: of the postulatedand is designed to improve counterforce as well as' retaliatory capabilities. We have constructed several other illustrative force models which consider possible Soviet courses without an armsagreement The first of these. Forces illustrative of the resultsoviet decision to stay with what they have plus theimprovement necessary to maintain what they might consider an adequate deterrent It seems highly unlikely that the Soviets would be satisfied withorce. Another model, Forceample of what wc believe wouldaximum effort short of convertingartime basis; this also appears highly unlikely. Forceithout going as far as Forceepresents something the Soviets mightif they were to place top priority oil tlie early acquisitionapability lo knock out virtually all of the US ICBM force; wc also think this unlikely.
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BBi Between these outer limits of reasonable force structures wc have set forth three others, designated respectively 2A. 2B, andhese differ primarily in the rapidity with which the Soviets, cither for technological or other reasons, deploy MIRVs, and in the extent of deployment of new silos. They also reflect some differences in general force structure which would seem likely to obtain because of differences in MIRV development Our estimate is that Sovietattack forces are likely to fall somewhere in the areabycries of force models, hut we wish to emphasize that these and the other models are strictly illustrative, and not to be regarded as confident estimates or as projections for planning. As one moves beyond the next two years or so. all projections become increasingly uncertain; beyond five years they arc highly speculative.
L DEPLOYMENT OF INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES
L In Ihe aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis. Soviet leadersroadly baxed, high priority program designed to brine the USSH out of the. position of strategicwhich had prevailod since (he end-of World War II. In the Held ofballistic missileshis effort included the development of several new sys-tems and the deployment of three ofthendye-ployment of Ihese systems, combined with that for the oldernd SS8 systems, had brought the Sovietsosition of equality with Ihe US in the number of opciational ICBMthey have since pulled ahead.
t has become apparent during the part year that the large-scale ICBM deployment effort which began with th* initiation of thendrograms in1 hai run Its course and that no further deployment of existing missile systems, or at least ol their
silos. Is currently planned. No new groups ofilos arc believed to have been startedlthough limitedndeployment continuedive of the last iii groups of these rys*ems to be started were probably abandoned later that year. At about the -same time, however, construction of new types of ICBM silos Is believed to have begun at several complexes. The discussion which follows provides details on the current status o! ICBM deployment, including the apparent termination of the major deployment programs olnd die initiation of deployment of the new types of silos.
Status of Operational Systems
she Soviets had anCBM launchers in service at the regular1 ICBMor the
'Tint li.rpt-i'i al which oalf ICBMi tie dcflayW. In taa cooint. ike Derufcar* sodmonk oopbin. where ikefwithbhiII number ot medium-ranee balluife missiles (MRBMi) ind intermeiliitfl-iansc hilllille miliitesie not considered reguh' ICOM
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Urgeor the mailer0 lor the solid-propellirrtor Ihe older and more vulnerablendystems, (Seeho* five missile syslcmi ate deployedotalegular ICBM complexes: six for (heen for Ihenine of these complexes also havendne for (hewhich also hasndnly thendhelso is deployed at two missile complexes In (he western USSR which at (inl had only MItDMi or IRBMs. Tnere arc also ICBM launchr-rs at (he Tyuralam and
Pieset.lt test centers. (See Table on page
onstruction on the lastndaunchers ended tnll standardilos are now complete and only two groups of standardilos and tworoups ate believed toll underAl! four of (hew groups probably will be operational byiving theotalperational launchers at the regular ICBM complexes, assuming no phase out of older launchers. No additionalof these ICBM systems In standard types of silos Is believed to bo planned.
Estimated Soviet Operational ICBM Luunchers
at ICBM Completes
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must also be taken ol (hedeployed at the Deraihnya andmissile complexes in theThere is agreement within theCommunity that these SS-Ui caneither peripheral targets or targets inandfor armswould have to beany calculations of maximum Sovietto attack the US. Theie Is stillliowevcr, as to the primarythese missiles. Briefly. CMthat their primary mission isArmy. Navy, and Air Fenceto be primarily targeted against (heand NSA believe that their primarywould ;depend on Ihe situation asplanners viewed It at the timeor revised their overall altack plan.
The Soviets are also believed tootal ofraining launchers.t the test ranges, one at each of thendomplexes and one each at Deraxhnya and Pervomaysk. All of these launchershavn an operalional capability against the US. In addition, there areesearch and development) launchers at the test ranges which mighl be so employed. We do not know how long ft would take to prepare these categories of launchers for operalional use.
The total number of ICBMs which could be targeted against the US. both now and as ofs summarized in the following Table It should be noted (hat these totals represent gross capabilities rather than an estimate of the numbers which are in fact likelye targeted against the US at any given time. As indicated above, thereifference of opinion as to whether the SS-lls deployed al Deiazhnya and Peivo-maysk are intended for this purpose. In any ease, all of (he missiles nominally available almost certainly would not be used in an initial salvo against the US. For example,
(he long-standing emphasis of Soviet military doctrine on maintenance of substantialcapabilities suggests that Soviet planners would wish to withhold some portion of their ICBM forces fiom an initial allack in order to take care of contingencies.
m f _
'This Tabic does not include the new launchers now believed to be uodei construction at leveial ituul* eompleics and at Tyuiatans. becameot known what type* of raistilcabe deplored i" them orecome opera uoml
Each ol the softndunchersapability toelim missileouis nftei the initial launch.
* There are differlnc views concerning (he prtmaiy ouuion of these SS-lli. All are speed, however, that (her could be used ajiinn iho US.
' Meet of these launchers probably eOoSd be readied to foe al ihe US. althoughre enable to mahe any valid estimate ol therequired lo do so or the availabilily of missiles for them.
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Deploy men! Program
e believe (hat construction of, two.tliree. new types of silos is underway at the test center at Tyuratam and al some complexes in the field. Tho purpose of the new silos is not clear. They may be intended lo houte wholly new missiles, variants of present missiles, or existing types In aaimed at increased survivability. Some may no! be intended for missiles at all. We believe (hat at least one new missile system has been under development lor some time and is probably nearing the flight lest stage; it may be intended for one of the new type rilos. Il would require about two years of testing to reach initial operational capability (IOC).
II. IHE SS-9
hes the only missile now in the Soviet arsenal which could have Ihecombination of yield and accuracy to threaten US land-based ICBMs and other critical hard targets. (Seeorof basic characteristics of Sovietonsequently, estimates of itsand capabilities havenique Importance, comparedhose of other Soviet weapon systems, in their impact on US defense plannfng and on US thinking about requirements for an agreementstrategic arms. Last year, newof Ihevidently ceased Thus the danger that thes such might bein sufficient numbers to threaten the survival of the Minuteman force has lecedcd, thoughemainse seen whether the missile or missiles for the new silos will posein eat. At least for some years to come, however, theystem will remain aoperational element in the Soviet ICBM force.
e stilllear picture of all the factors which ledhe initiation and later unfolding of therogram over (lie course of (be last decade. The initial impetusuild Iheuch unproved follow-onlieay have resulted from "historicalconsiderations' without special regard to Its strategic implications, as one Soviet SALT delegate has asserted. The deliberate effort to increase accuracy as well as payload in the original design, however, together with later moves to improve the quality ofcomponents,iesumptionapability to attack hard targets was at least one of its major design objectives. The picture is clouded by the fact that (he Soviets by now have developed four different versions of thesingle RVndhich were developed first, the Modhich has been tested bothractional orbitsystem (FOBS) andepressed trajectory ICBMnd theith its three RVs.'
' Tin lour vmiimls ulilire (he same basic two-stage vehicle.In. primary Jjlfercnces among them beiou in (heir payloads.
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the two oldestparticularly the heavicrModup most of the present force. |_
datedOP SECRET, RESTRICTED DATA, there has been no new evidence to serve as the basis for resolving any of these Issues. Analysis of ihe old data has continued, however, and there has been aeffort among the USIB agencies toand narrow differences in interpretation of the available evidence- Theange problem has been at least partially resolved
roblems of understanding therogram are further 'compounded by uncertainties about the missilesand the Deed to rely on judgments or assumptions to resolve them.
n last year's Estimate, we focused on four of the most significant uncertainties about the performance of the missile system:
range of the heavier of theRV variants (the ModIhe capability of this variant locomplexes.
accuracy and the effecthas on theotential against(This is an importantall variants except the Mod 3not have sufficient accuracy loa hard target weapon.)
capabilities and likely missionModarticularly in themode.
capabilities and likelyith its multiple re-entry
ince publication ol, Forces For Intercontinental Attack".
study of data relating toccuracy has resulted in some analytical refinements and adjusted agency positions, but no additional information has become available
primary basis for differing views. -As far as thes concerned, (here is now general agreement on the demonstrated and potential capability of the vehicle, although an apparent anomaly persists coraccrningOBS role In-depth analysis of the fouriringsas cast doubt on the preliminary judgment inhat the Soviets appeared lo beultiplere-entry vehiclend (here arc divided views as to whether thes an MRV or an MIRV. Thewhich follows presents the results of new analysis on each of these four issues.
Tho Range Problem
heithoundV has been Right tested from Tyuratamangem. non rotating earthnough to reach targets anywhere
' The actual range of these, firingsut included effects of the earth's rotation which In this etise added an increment of. Mimic iantes quoted la (his Eilimair. therefore, are eipreued in terms of NRE dataaces. Rangesinti northward lo the US free" the USSR we in some easaa incmsed. i" acene easesa lesul' ol the aaiili'i rotation, depending on the lpcctlic launch stQliitt and target duecltoni tart had.
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the US (torn any of theaunch com-plexes. The Modowever,ay-load of0 pounds.it has, on only two occasions (in. been flight testedangeum.
No otheras been tested as far. This range is suificient to reach only the extreme northwestern portion of the US from the closesieployment complex. The pitch program used onlightsa minimum energyhat trafectory requited to obtain maximum range. Theas also been flight testedangem.itch program that resultsofted trajectory andesser rango capability..
o attack major US targets, andthe Minuteman complexes, theould have to be capable of attaining greater range than has been demonstrated. Specifically, the spread of ranges fiomomplexes to various hard targets in the US (Minuteman and Titan silos. NORAD and SAC Headquarters and the US alternate NMCC at Ft. Ritchie) varies from. In the case of Minuteman silos alone, the figuresjn. Analysts have therefore searched for ways in which the lange of (lieould babeyond that actually demonstrated in flight tests.
n NIKe noted thatcould be increased both by consuming more propellants (thereby leaving smallerand by removing the telemetry package or packages placed on the mistile lor test shots It was speculated that thero-pellant utilization system mighl be as good aa that used on the SS-fl Mod 3^
1 There was disagreementelimirumentaiion packages
which could be removed j
here were substantial differences over the maximum range of theodSA, State. Army and Navy estimated arangem. by assuming aenergy trajectory andQ"
^DIA and Air Force assessed the maximum operational range of thenthe same trajectory atn. tlie bajis of its apparent role and!""
dditional analysis during the past year indicates that some of uieod Is and Modested have had more, .energy than had previously been calculated!^
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ll USIB agencies now agree thaiasis of (cchnical analysts alone, therange capability of thesum.itch programa minimum energy tra|ectory. asin some of the tests of the Modaximum ofs achievable using the pitch programofted trajectory as demonstrated on other tests.
selectiveofo, range capability would permit coverage of all six Minutcman complexes, one Titan complex, and NO RAD and SAC Headquarters from at least oneomplex. The remaining two Titan complexes and the US alternate NMCC at Ft. Ritchie would be beyond coverage by the Modut withinange.
dditionally, DIA believes that, since minor variations in technical interpretations are possible, it is inadvisable to seize on any one maximum range.. Further, they believe lhat despite the apparent constraints indicated by the avail-able technical data, the possibility of full coverage ol Minutcman fieldsll Minute-men by anyomplex) by the Mod 2
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should not be ruled out. They argue that If theas in fad deployed as an anti-Minuteman system, it would be highlyof the Soviets to deliberately put themselves in the position of dependence on extremely marginal technical capabilities. Moreover.]"
"jlhey would point out that theffiat the bulk of theorce is theakes its apparent range limitation critical in assessing the capability of the ICBM force. In light of these considerations. DIA believesaximum range. Forhould not be entirely ruled out.
Ihe Basic Problem of Accuracy
s we pointed out in NIEhe two most important elements In determining the capabilityissile system against hard targets are the accuracy, or circularf the system and the yield of the warhead. Of ihese. the more important is the CEP.f"
J It is important, therefore, that the basis for deriving accuracy figures for thee clearly delineated, including theand requisite assumptions. The methods used to estimateccuracy arc summarized below.
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positions on the accuracy of theystem. The positions are as follows:
o. CIA, NSA, Stole, ond Air Force
ThendEPange. is estimated to be
b.y, ond Novy
In view of the many evidence and assumptions.^"
lthough the views of most USIB agencies have converged, there are still two
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licved (hatndccuracy ihould be expressedange (torn OAjn.
In addition, all agencies believe that ftthai handling and maintenancemissiles by operationaldegrade accuracy. We cannot Judge
effect of such activities on Use CEP of
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nhe Soviets began testing the third variant of tlieesignated the Modhe Modwo-stage vehicle with an additional dc-boost stage, has been successfully test flown in two modes. In one
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he FOBS mode, the RV Iioostedow-caith orbit into an impact area on the Ka pus tin Yar test range after leu than one revolution. In the other, the DICBM mode, it is fired into an ICBM trajectoryery low apogee and dc-boosted just prior tointo the Kamchatka impact area or the central Pacific Because of the low trajectory, anyaunched northward toward the US would be detected much later by the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWSJ than would an ICBMonventional trajectory, and the warning time to the US would be cut from about IS minutes toinutes orersdiag on theof theouthward launch into orbit with de-boost 'over- the' US would be coming from the wrong direction to beby BMEWS. However. US sensors now being deployed promise to provide earlyof launches regardless of their firing direction.
arge amount of data is available on therom theirings of the system to
t is quite clear from the evidence avadable that the basicCBMused for theith some minor modihcations.1
JtheEPm. when firedICBM ot FOBSortherly direction to the US. The CEP of a southcrly-Uuiichcd FOBS would increase toun. because of the longer flight time. These levels of accuracy make thencapable of attacking hard targets with any reasonable probability of success. On the other hand, the trajectoiy shapeesire to deliver an attack with less time for tho enemy to react. These factors in combination suggest strongly that (heas designed to attack strategic time-urgent soft targets, such as SAC bomber bases and command and control facilities.
Been use the utility of theppears limited to attacks on time-urgent $oli targets, which are relatively few in number, we believe that the number
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ultimately deployed will be small.
ery puzzling aspect of theod 3one thai we discussed inin NIEthe capability of the system. Theas been tested In the DICBM modeange. and can unquestionably provide fullof the US on northerly trajectories from any deployedite. The orbital tests,have been fired in an castedy direction and have relied on the advantage of the earth's rotation to achieve orbital velocity. AnFOBS altack against the US would have to be launchedortherly or southerly azimuth depriving it of most or all of this advantage. Without this advantage, the vehicle as testedOBS role is not capable of inserting tbe payload into an orbit that would permit an attack against any target in the US on the initial orbit, on either northerly or southerly launches.
The capabilities and likely mission ot Iheodhich has three RVs mounted above the second stage,ontentious issue. Preliminary analysiseries of four firings occurring in October andust prior to the publication of. had led to the tentative conclusion that the Soviets were testing a- MIRV, even though there had been no sign of this in tho prior tests. In-depth analysis of these fourtogether with other evidence, bothand negative, hasc-cvaluation of this conclusion by some USIB agencies and thereariety of positions concerning the status of the program and its purpose.
Prior to the firings in the fall7 flight tests of thead been detected betweenhen the test program began, and
light tests can be divided into two groups, with die first consisting of seven flights, end-ing with three firings to the Pacific inhe second group ofirings', begunour-month hiatus, included two firings to the Pacific.
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(cm wouldimited footprint but would be capable of targeting the US Minuteman force if the necessary accuracy could be achieved.^
H With (he yield RVTthe sincl
estimated for each of the RViTthe single shot kill probabiUly against hardened targets would be considerably lower than that of ther Mod 1
SO.o evidence that the Soviets are attempting to improve the accuracy of thever that of thend Modssuming present guidance accuracyhat for thendhe CEP of each-RV In the MIRV-system postulated last year could theoretically be the same as (or (lieingle RV. but could not be better.
n. we pointed outystem of the type Implied by the preliminary analysis of these (cats would have theof attacking independently threetargets.
ince last fall there have been aof factors which have influenced USIB agencies In evaluating the purpose andstatus of (heod 4
he positions of the various USIB agencies on the capabilities and purpose of theystem are as follows:
a. CIA and Slate
s an MRV for use against soft targets, and it is unlikely that thiswill bo developedIRV capable of'attacking-hard targets such-as missile, silos.
Soviets may have completed ihoest program. In adostion, the likelihood thai ihes being deployed raises the probability that the Soviets now consider the system operational in its present
b. 0IA ond Air Force
Based on available evidence. It istoigh confidenceon whether thes an MRV or an MIRV.
ISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS5 -
4 progiam could represent either nr. MRV or an MIRV system with lirnitodflexibility. Fiom what they havethey believe that if thes currently being deployed, it is more likely to be an MRV.
e. USA. Amy. ond Nervy
Available data does not provide the basisigh confidence judgment on Soviet Intent for theodowever, the evidence does suggest that the systemare more applicable to thedevelopmentimited footprint MMlV thanRV./_
"^further development of thes an MIRV may have been abandoned, perhaps because ofresults. Howevoi, use could be made of this system today as an MRV.
Tbe evidence suggesting Mod 4ii inconclusive, f
if it is being deployed, it could well be dueecision by the Soviets to make some use of the system In view of their substantial investment
stallatlons include strategic bomber andmissile submarine bases, unhardenedof air defense and aniiballistlc missile (ABM) systems, various kinds ofand administrative centers,depots, and military-industrial facilities.
ome potential targets,Minulernan and Titan silos andwell as National Command AuthoritySAC and NORAD Headquarters,hardened command andbe attacked effectivelyweapons with the high yield and thehigh accuracy of theods 1The extent to which theorce Is inagainst -such critical hard targetsunclear, for the'available evidence'and
here is general agreement that theas initially developed to provide better accuracyarger payload than tlieresumably for use against hard target*.it seems highly unlikely that the Soviets would develop andeapon as uniquely powerful and expensive as theeach costs roughly twoalf times asnf it were not to bea mission for which smaller missiles are less suitable. Such evidence as we havethai at least initially, most SS-Ss had US ICBM complexes as thoir primary targets.
and Missions of ihe SS-9
ost of the military and military-related installations which would probably be on Soviet target lists could presumably be dealt with satisfactorily by the less accurate, low yield weapons which make up the bulk of Soviet intcrcoiitinnnial attack forces- These In-
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dditional questions about how theintend to taiget Iheorce have been raised by the development of thend Modhes probably deployed in limited numbers L
^but there is uncertainly about the deployment status of the Modven in limited numbers, both versions could be militarily useful againstgainst time-urgent targets, and thegainst defendedAny deployment of these newer versions ol then lieu of Mod li and Modould reduce the number of Iho latter which would be available for strikes against hardmission which none of the Other Soviet ballistic missile systems is nowcapable ol performing effectively.
t seems quite likely that alewodre earmarked for key hardlike SAC and NORAD Headquarters. We cannot rule out the possibility that others are aimed al major urban complexes deemed vital to US military and economic survival. On the otherparticularly if we are correct in our basic assessment of Soviet targetingis difficult to conceive of thenot trying to eliminate as much asof'S ICBM capability, presumably through attacks on LCCv and other control facilities We therefore believe that al least some, and perhaps the bulb, of theeployed are aimed at US ICBM
he Soviets have not deployedn sufficient numbers to piovide assurance of putting motemall portion of US launch facilities out of action. Such targeting would
probably still make sense, however, from the Soviet militaryoint of view II is often argued that in view of tho immense,power of nuclear weapons, theof capabilities for attacking the enemy's strategic forces is pointless in modern wur unless his forces can be overwhelmedirst strike We believe that the Sovietleaders would regard this as an unduly passive, all-or-nothing approach. They are pressing aheadarge-scalewarfare (ASW) program which they almost certainly recognize is at best likely tn reduce rather than eliminate the missile submarine threat. They have built up massive defenses against high-flying aircraft without waiting to achieve comparable capabilities against low-level penetration tactics.
iven the unprecedented uncertainties of the nuclear battlefield, the Soviet planner would hope that attacks on the enemy'sforces might significantly contribute to national survival.re-emptive strike, he would probably seek to reduce the weight ol enemy attack as much as practicable without necessarily eliminating il. Evenetaliatory second strike, he might see need for some targeting against the enemy's strategic forces so as to deny his adversary the opportunity to undertake follow-up strikes, to repairthat failed to gel off because of technical problems, or to continue use of facilities such as bomber and submarine bases. For these missions, the 'our variants of theould play ii significant role.
HI. THE SS-11
hehich makes up some GO percent of the Soviet ICBM force, has been operational0 Itmall, two-stage ICBM using storablc-liquid propellents and an alllncrltjl guidance system. All presently deployed SS-lli are believed to be of Ihe initialype, but testing of two distinct
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versionsodified vehicle (Medegan inhe new vehicle probably has been flight tested sufficiently to be deployed, and retrofit of some eu'sting silos with theould occur
heas been test firedange of. (NRE).forQ
ange ofThis range is sufficient to coverall of the US from thes deployed, althoughcomplex can attack all likely USInhere wereresumably tothe capability of the missile forThearries an RVweighounds, althoughrecent data (see footnoteuggest it may behestoEP of about 1yieldit
unsuitable for effective use againstetv
heevelopment programis intended to enhance thecapability of thegainst ABMTheersion of the Mud 2what probably are eaoatmosphcricaidsalongew RV. Theersion apparentlyeparate RVs which would all hit at oringle target; if sufficiently hardened, however, they could
"TUr bee* Inehved M
" For theptrm- peoe-titbonas denon which our be includedthe luytoxj package olmissile ifilcm and Jiiprrwsl in order to confute detenuvb lytlcms. to preveni (hem liomny ItVs fariying waitiand).
or Ui utuiatc d'fenici beyond their capability Al-
multiple RVtirm let lalion, they lall ouUkd* the trope of ihb detiiiutm
eparate aiming points to asystem. (See Section V.ersionshrow weight ofpounds, compared toabove for theV. Sufficienthas been added to the firstnot only to compensate for thepayload but also to extend thethe missile toun. (NRE).on theersion isar-
here has been no change in thefor the Modoayloads arc suitable only for use against soft targets.
o new evidence has become available since last year on theayload, which consist* of an RV and ono or possibly two objects which probably arc penetration aids. These objects apparently are deployed in an in-line pattern, without appreciable cross-lange dispersion. They apparently function during the etoatmospheric (and possibly the eariy re-entry) phase of the flight. In the one test for winch re-entry radar data arc avail' able, the re-entry trajectories of the probable penetration aids became significantly different fiom that o( Ihe RVeel, and thoy probably burner! up prior to impact. Visual observation ol reentry on two firings of Ihts type to an extended-range Pacific Ocean area also indicated that only the RV survives
lthough the objects which appear to be penetration aids can be distinguished from ihe HV in the tciminalradars atdo sufficiently resemble genuine RVs for ato be forced lo lake them seriously. Moreover, the ballistic coelf icient of theVt
"^results in an increased speed of travel through the atmosphere and
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cquiicincnt on an cndoittmosplieiic ABM system to react quickly. Thev weight if compafable to or slightly heavier than0 pound RV ol theSec footnote lo pnrngiaphhe remainder ol the tlnow weight is devoted to theaids system.
ith respect to Ihe Mod 2B, visual ob seivatiom and optical data fiom two extended range tests to the Pacific inhat it canics thiee objects which survive to impact. An analysis of scveial tests indicates that two apparently cylindricaldo not survive re-entry and represent either Moatmospheric penetration aids or sepa ration hardware. Data from subsequent tests have reinforced our judgment that the three smviviitg objects aie RVs. intended to carry warheads, with radai noss sections andhistories to impact which arcfrom one another. Given tlietotal payload weight, each of the threeVs wouldhe ballistic coefficient of the threeJis MR higher than that of the ModfT
he ModsIRV as tested lo date and apparently is not intended to be one. As we iindersland the system used lo separate theew RV dispcisal technique would have to be developed to achieve antaigetmg capability If the system
were tod targetew guidance system would be required as well.
lie Modayload evidently is de-sij-iitdfacilitate penetration of ABM dc-fenies by multiplying flic number of warheads to be dealt withefender. In all but two of Iheests to date, all three RVs were diicctfdingle impact point and were released so as to space them out along their common trajectoiy and to impact successivelyci thap simultaneously. (In the single test lo the Pacific, all laudedm. of each oilier and without appreciable crossrango dis-peittun) In one test to Kamchatka and one to tlie Pacific, th# RVs were released so as to ptoduce atymmetrical crotsrange spie.id of aboutm. at extended rangehe RVs landed.his List dispersal pattern, howcvci. does notto provide any particular advantage and wc do not liinw tvhethei it reprcsenls anmode of employment or whether il was tested merely lo check out the inherentof the system.
s indicated earlier, the ballisticof theVs results in fastei tiavel through the atmosphere, therebythe reaction time available to an endo-alinospherc defensiveonus effect isduction of ihe re-entry contribution to syslem ioaccmacy. There have beennsprovements observed in the giiiiLutcemajor souice of systemanyight lestf"
bav.seuirbnce rnecnani/a'ion. hos'tni.n..iiioft large; weapon, and extreme accuracy ii cvs-deo.lv notn goal The CEP ol the Mod
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and Ihe cenlroid of impacts of thei estimated to belo.
heas been testedws since5 times In theci-sion nndimes withayload. Four tust flights, two of each type, wnt conducted toacific impact area in the Slimmern the past, eitcndcd range filings in the Pacific have usually presaged the end olest firing program. Since tin- Pacific firings, only oneaunch has occurred, inhere have been nine more Modiringsut this pail ol Ihe program is piobably also near its end. Thus, operational deployment could begin thts year for the modifiedilh either or both payload
ess is known about tho opera tin mil and technical cliaiacteristics of the SShanany other deployed Soviethough il evidentlysuitable only for use agnlnit soft targets
^These data indicate that the IfV is quite
PctfoimanccttM that the RV weighsounds. yield of tlie warhead associated with this vehicle is estimated at
heppearsse aall-itieitltil guidance system.
ThreeAD tests, two Type-Aoite Type-B. were to reduced ranges ofjn These short-range firings were presumably tests of the capability of theo performeripheral attack role Similar shoi Mange firings inere conducted with thehere are no ABM defenses ptusent or contemplated in Europe, however.
IV. THE SS-13
hehree-stage solid-pro-pcllant ICBM somewhat larger than tba US Minuteman. Although thenderwent initial devnlopmcnt in then competition with thehe Soviets evidently encountered difficultiesropel la nt technology in this case ond the program tagged. Flight testing did not begin until5 and IOC was no! reachedhin fnr the Soviets have deployed only one vciiion of thehough flight testingecond variant began in0 and may be close to completion.
"^Whilc we have no direct evidence on accuracy, our besttaking account of likely errors caused by tho blunt RV, as well as probableof Ihe guidance syslem, is that CEP is probably of the order.
o date Iheas been lestedaximum range of
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demonstrated capability sufficienteach only ihe extreme northeastern portion of the US from the one complex where thes believed to be deployed.
its range with the same payload to, sufficient to cover targets northine extending fiom southern Oregon to Raleigh, North Carolina. L
he maximum iange capability of thesange of. enough to cover virtually ell of the US, could be achieved, however, if
testing of theodhirteen firings have beenthe last onll ofhave been Irom Plesetsk. with threefor impact. nearintended. impact onand two for.. and onefailed; all othrr Rights apparently
the advanced state of the2 program, wc still lack sufficientto be confident about its aims. Ithowever, lhat the program doesdevelopment of multiple RVs or
'indicates that thenewigher ballistic ooellioeni.
some slight modifications may alio have been made in some or all the three booster stages, no significant changes from the propulsionof theave been identified inlights. The system CEP is probably slightly better than that of theue lo the highcj ballistic coefficient of the RV, but the: small improvement involved would not be significant. Although we do not fully understand the reason for the flights which went onlyne purpose may have been evaluation of the system at less than ICBM range,
V. DIMENSIONS AND DIRECTIONS OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ON INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES
here wereirings of Soviet ICBMshe highest ever. Thiswith9 andhe previous high year. The pace ol testing has since fallen off sharply,seven tests have taken place so far this year. The decline is not surprising, since the three HAD programs under way0 appear about over. That for the twoariants continued1 but, withests now completed, it is probably close to an end. Theas already been testedimes, but nothere has been onlyest this year, in March, of theoditheststo date, this test program appears to be heading into its late stages
e believe thai one. possibly two. new ICBMs are now under development We are uncertain, however, about which, if any. ol the new types of Silos arc intended for new ICBMcrni The pictuie should become clearer, however, once the Soviets begin (light testing the new system, or systems.
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Last year in, we cKprcssed 'he view that the Soviets would concentrate on tlie improvemeiir of existing systems ralher than on tho development of new ICBMrequiring entirely new launch facilities This judgment is now in question because of the new silo programs and the likelihood that one, possibly two, missiles are nearing the flight test stage In any case, the Soviets have recently finished developing variants for all but the oldest of the presently deployed ICBM systems. With workew missile orfor the new silos likely to be the focus of attention for Hie next two or threethere is no evidence of other major activity at the ICBM testother variants or follow-on systems appear unlikely to reach the test phase muchn light of the magnitude of Soviet developmental work in solid propellants, however, and ourabout their progress, testingew solid-ptopetlant ICBM might begin before then.
e can say very little about the course of Sovietn the latter hall of the decade, evidence is lacking and extrapolation from the present becomes mote unrebaWc. Clearly, however, the Soviets will want to modernize their force lo take advantage of technological advances, or to correct shoftcomings which exist or may develop. In view of the size ami capabilities the ICBM force has now achieved, we continue to believe that the Soviets will have strong incentives to do this, to the extent possible, by modifying or improving existing systems rather than by completely leplacing them.
Specific Areos of Research ond Development
enetrating AntibatUitic Missile De lenses. The Soviets have clearly beenwith the problem of penetrating ABM
delcnses. Theodarries One or
more exoatmoutheric penetrationfirst Soviet ICBM to exhibit that capability. Thu use of three ItVs on theodrovides another means of facilitatingWhatever its design objective, theould also serve this purpose. The pace of therogram in particulara desire to have the new system ready for tleployment long before any OS ABM could be operational. The Soviets may have felt they neededong lead time in order to perfect Ihcir penetration systems ami toignificant portion of their force with them. Another incentive may have been ato have such hardware perfected inof any agreement limiting strategic arms.
he three RVs of theodnd theould have to be hardened to withstand the nuclear effects of defensive weapons (and possibly also to avoid il they were to be effective.^
j The Soviets are presumably well aware of this problem and have done research in the area. Hence we believe that at least some degree of hatdening has been provided for these systems.
e had expected that the survivability of their land-based ICBM force would in time be of increasing concern to the Soviets, but inxpressed the view that they might regard silo hardening as loo expensive ana> m'ght instead look to sub-
Tiairwadr tales place when anaction ai the lesutl of the detonation
el an catliti incoming warhead.
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ballistic] mohilr systems lolurvivablc retaliatory forces. Theydecided lo harden al lean aiheir foiceirst strike orattack In arguing against USdefending Minutcman fields wilhdelegation asserted thn!alone were Sufficient to Insureof land-based ICBMs Themay also have been influenced bythat limits would eventuallyon SLBMs as well as ICBMs undercontrol agreement and byabout land-mobile strategic systems
otile Systems. Land-mobile ICBMs would provide an alternative means ofthe survivability ol letaliatory forces, and they rupicscnl an arei of weapon development in which the Soviets may still feel they have im edge on the US. Furthermore. Sovietat SALT have indicated that the USSB wishes lo retain the option lo deploy such systems There is no conclusive evidence,thai the Soviets presently intend toIhein. The one mobile missile program which appeared tootential ICBMprobably been cancelled^
^Thal missile, whichintended to be carried by theerector-launcherinparade!.flight testedS and Augustlute alsoalt in testingave
been no filings sinceuggesting Ihal the Sovn't* ate dissatisfied with that pro glillll .r> well
ie record suggests that infeicst in land-mobile
the practical difficulties in deploying and maintaining the large and complicated pieces of equipment which would be required.
ecurocy There is still no direct evi-dencc thai the Soviets are taking the steps that would be required lor them to improve significantly the CEPs of their missiles. We have noted in past estimates that Soviet RVs have ballistic cocflicicots (betas) considerably lower than those of US RVs and that one of the things Ihe USSR could do to improve accuracy would be lo go to RVs with higher betas. In tests of theodsnd 2B. as well as theode have noted moves in (his direction.^
SS Although an increase in betas is aslep lo achieve gieater accuracy with inertia! guidancu systems, II would not provide very high accuracy in the absence ofin guidance. Improvements sufficient to give system CEPs ofould come about through normal advances intechnology, but an improvement inlo. would require the Soviets toholly new techniques of guidaitcc Whether the Soviets decide to do (Sis willend on future largcting.utd :orticiilaily on how much stress is places! oncapabilities lo attackCBMs
detviulcntiy tar actable fle-
c-'if'u IV.-'tMIHVsf. We continue toli.ive for Mime years, tin: the? Sovkl* will devulon MIRVs (or their ICBMs
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capabilityi.t- luff!ki easing the number of available RVs by moans of MIRVs would also be useful foi penetrating ARM defenses nnd for enhancing (ho iclalia-tory capabilities of ICBM* surviving aattack. There have been variousome quite cxpllcil, that the Soviets regard this as an important aiea of stralegic weaponry in which they have need, for po-litical as well as military reasons, to catch up with the US.
Aased onod 4could reach IOC byssuming early resumption of testing and no further holdups in the program. Ono becomingthat soon, however, would be no more accuiate than the presenthus itsagainst haid targets would be limited, though it might be useful against some large soft targets where varied spacing of individual RVs was desirable
Developmentard targetwith theould require anguidance system and still another year's testing, delaying IOC to3 at tho earliest. If wo arc correct in our judgmentew and improved large missile system would be available by then, however,of theaid target weapon would appear unlikely.
The Soviets mightIRV basedifferent dispetsal technique, such as that represented by the "bus" system used by the US. If so, we would expect il to be developed in conjunctionew missile- Allowingormal test piogram.ystem could not reach IOC until the end3 at the earliest il testing began soon Accuracies on the order ofould be achieved within the same time period.
The first indications of the direction of Soviet ICBM RAD aie likely to emerge Iroin the flight test program which wc expect
to start soon. Out best piesent judgment is that this progiam will involve MIRVs as well ax increased accuracy and better hard target capabilities. Wc doubt that other possiblepresently enjoy asllure to make effective moves in these directions relatively soon would imply cither that wc had misjudged Soviet intentions or, less likely, that the Soviets were lagging in development of the necessary technology. In any event, we would eipect to determine the major objectives of the program relatively soon after testing begins.
Implications of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
he dimensions and directions of ICBM RAD will be heavily influenced by the outcome of the SALT negotiations. Under an agreement, the Soviets would probably wish to continuecross tho board, at least initially,edge against an early In cat down of the agreement. They might also seek to compensate for limitations onol launchers by exploring avenues ol re-search they would rejectoo-SALT en-virutiment, and by moving more rapidly to develop advanced MIRVs, higher accuracies, and other qualitative improvements. After an agreement had been in effect for some yearsstable strategic relationship hadhowever, the Soviet leadership might feel that it could safeguard its position at more modest levels of eflort.
VI. SUBMARINE IAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES
n the, the Sovietsimited ballistic missile submarine capability by converting si*lasssubmaiinesarry two ballistic missiles each. Soon thereafter, pioduction began on two new classes ofiliesel-
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G- amicleai-poweredof which were designed lo carry. ballistic missiles. Production of these two classes ended2 with theoflass andIass units. The decision to halt construction probably was made in then connectionecision, reported in classified Soviet writings, to divest tho Soviet Navy of responsibility for carrying out strikes deep in enemy territory.
hortly after the Cuban missile crisis,probably in parteaction to thatreversal of course look place. Authorization was given totrategic counterpart to the US Polaris force, based onlass nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine. Construction on Ihe first oftube submarines is believed to have begun at Severodvinskhis lead unit was probably launched6 and production is believed to have increased rapidly since then.9 thelass submarine was probably launchedecondin the Soviet Far East. The combined production from both yards Is now estimated lo be about nineear.
Current Force levels
The Tabic below shows the estimated number and status of Soviet ballistic missile submarines ashe number of missile launch tubes is shown in
Of thelass units in operation,rc in ihe Northern Fleet and four In the Pacific.f the units now estirnaled to be under construction or fitting-out probably will be operational byringing tho operational force tonits.lass unit almost certainly will be underby the end of1otal ofnits, the same number as in the USmissile submarine fleet. Allf these units could be operational by the end
General Characteristics of Soviet Ballistic Missile Submarines
terms o( submergedY-class is the largest submarine in
" There is seme evidence that anUss unit has been launched at Severodvinsk. If so, these numbers would be increased by one.
coHmvcnox Ouiiii line on
c* COrrvoKiON *
3 Launchers') )
H-UI (6 1
" All units currently in consuuetioo or conversion piobably will be operational byleast one of these uniu is being converted tol clasj; the oiheis inay be converted tolau. Seeiscuuisn olrogram.
number of launchers onl submarine has not been dclenninod.
'1 It not, itrie'Jy speaking, operational because at far as wc know it has not ret been equipped with iu miiiilei. See.
ii sbene evidence that anlass unit has been launched at Severodvinsk. If so, these numbers would be increased by ooc.
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is capable of speeds of
jlass probably can operate al depths!"
eet. Althoughlass is not as noisy, and thus nol as easy to detect and trail, as earlier classes of Soviet nuclear-powered missile submarines, it is still not "quiet" by US slandards.
heissile carried oningle-stage,systemaximum range ofn.m. With thislasscan take station as muchthe east and west coasts of the USmost major targets in the country;the submarines closer in or placingsubmarines in tlie Gulf of Mexicovirtually complete coverage of(Seehesaound
missileEP of about
un. Navigational inaccuracies probably would result in an overall system CEP ofaking it useful primarily against soft targets.
On Ihe basis of limited evidence, it is possible toalvo lime of lesseconds for all missilesass. Thisalvo time could raise problems with respect to such things as targetingbut there is no technical reason why these problems cannot be solved. If they have not been solved, Ihe actual salvo time might bethe orderinutes.
Of theIass nuclear-powered submarines built8ight have been converted to carry.issiles. These submarines have been designatedlass. Tbean be launched while the submarine is submerged and has more than twice the range of the sur-
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(ace-launchedhich it leplaced. The ninth unit, designatedII, has been extensively remodeled to provide it with six launch tubes instead ol its original three- It has completed basic sea (rials, but the missile which il is believedot yet be ready (orat sea (see "New.
f thelass dieselpoweredbuilt8en havebeen converted to carry threeissiles in place of the originals. One of these units was lost at seat least two more ol thelass submarines also are being convertedarry thehe converted units have beenIs. We think thatlassprogram is now under way atbul the purpose of this program is not yet known (sec "New.
Roles ond Missions ofli-.tic Missile Submarines
n the basis of its capabilities and of its patrol patterns, thelass forco is almost certainly intended for use against the US, rather than peripheral targets. But only aboutlass units are nowcontinuously onin the Pacific and about tluec in theabouterconl of the force. Thishas prevailed since thelass patrol more than two years ago It compares with aboutercent for tho US Polaris fleet. During the initialhelass submarines normally remained outside missile range of the US, but this has gradually changed.lass unlls are spending th* vast mafonty of their lime on patrol within missile range of Hie US.
he Soviets might choose to increase the percentage of the force on continuous
patrol. Because of Ihe lack of forward bases, however, they could probiibly maintain no more than aboutercent continuously on station within missile range of tho US. This could be increased to aboutercent in crisis periods, but probably for no longer than aboutays. Somewhat more lhanercent of the force probably could be maintainedon station just beyond missile range of the US.
lass force appears intended for use against urban-Industrial or softtargets, since its missiles lack the yield and accuracy to bo effective against hard targets. Beyond this, we do nol know how the Soviets intend to use the force. The Soviets may regard it as primarily useful foror follow-up strikes. Ortainly, asdeployed, onlyercent ofloss force could be usedurprise attack.the Soviets may plan to movelass units into range of US targets in (he eventerious threat of nuclear war develops. If so, as much asercent of the foice could he sent to sea. This force could then be used in an attack against soft, lime-urgent military targets such as SAC bomber bases, but at the risk of compromising the fact that such an attack was in preparation.
n this connection, use of depressed trajectories with SLBMs would reduce Ihe warning tune availableangeor example, the SSN-fl fired on awith an apogee of. wouldlight time of lesss opposed to aboutinute*ormal trajectory.angelight time would beinutes, or in the neighborhood of Ihe present reaction time for2 bombers on alert There has been no evidence to date lhat any Soviet SLBMs have been tested on such Trajectories. Significantly lower than rMnmal trajectories result in higher healing latcs and greater dynamic pressure
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onbailo which could cause struc-ttu.il failure. In addition, shallow re-entry causes degradation of accuracy.light lest program piobably would be required to determine Ihe effects of depressed trajectories on the missile involved. We would probably detect the test program before its complelion.
lass submarines do not patrolegular basis in either the Atlantic or Pacific Oceans, and patrol activity by units of this class in the Pacific has declined during the past year, probablyesult of the increaselass activity. There have beenlass patrols detected in the eastern Pacific sinceompared with three patrols in the same period last year. Two patrols, and possibly three, have been detected in the western Atlantic so far this year, compared with one during the same period last year. Al-dioughlass still is believed to befor use against intercontinental targets it may be relegatederipheral attack role' (as apparently was the case priorhenlass program reaches its planned force goal.
lass units are believed to be assignederipheral and some to anattack role, but it is not known how many, or which ones, are assigned to which mission. In previouslass units have on occasion substitutedatrol area in the Pacific about halfway between Hawaii and the US. Since the initiationlass patrols in the Pacific in late
lass patrols havethere, suggesting that the ninenow in the Pacific Fleeteripheral attack mission, orto be. In the Atlantic,lasshave been in ocean areas almostfrom targets in the US andseveral days transit time away fromlaunch areas against cither. Since Januaiy
at leastlass sub-
marines have conducted patrols in theNorwegian Sea. within range of targets in Iceland anday's sailing time of likely launch positions against the UK. Thus it appears that most ofass force may now be intended for use against peripheral targets.
he only naval ballistic missilebe under development now is thehas been undergoing fiighiwo-stagebe tested by the Soviets. Its estimatedoperational range isflight wasangeRV failed to separate from theso the bum tirne probablyhosandingle RV; there hasevidence of the testing of penetrationdepressed trajectories. The missile istoEPan. or so.an overall system CEP of aboutthis would
limit theo use againsi"soft targets.
III. Theith its extended range, would significantly improve the flexibility and solvability of the Soviet SLBM foice. but
"Rear Adm.. ReeUnus. Director of Naval TnWlhgenM, Department of the Navy, would note
ystem CEP ofe possible. nnee. All other members ol the Intelligence Community believe thatde>ice is too tenuous lo support lhe svmmI-ioayystem CEP.
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continue to bo umertain about the status and like'/ pace of the (eit program, and about bow the SS NXS will be deployed. Although there have beenand-based tests of theo far. six of them were failures, and it is uncertain bow close the test program is to completion. Only seven firings took place during the firstontlis of theslow pace by Soviet standards. The rate of testing picked up beginning last November, and six firings were carried out in thefive months. Three of these sis tests were failures, however, including the last one on IS April. Testing resumed with twofirings in September. If the programwithout further Interruption, the missile could be teady for operational deployment by
that this missile is relatively large for an SLUM and may be about the same sire as thelus feet longeet ina naval missile displayed In Sovietparades in theissile of this sire appears too long to fitlassas they arc currentiy configured. Thelass nuclear-powered submarines other thanII have recently completed an extensive conversion to carry theaking another conversion to carry theuestionable. It also appearsthat the Soviets wouldecond retrofit ofIowered submarines.
ast year wc thought it likely thatlass submarines, which had not been con vrrted to Gils, would be modified to carry
Ihehis now seems less likely though we cannot rule it out Thus, even though theould be ready for de ployment bye are uncertain about Soviet plans for deploying it. We continue to believe, however, that the Soviets would want to provide themselves with extended langc SLIlMs. They mightew missile of
extended tangc (athich could fit in thelass submarine with lew or no modifications. The firstlass unit probably could not be operational beforeven if testing began soon.
Another possibility is that the Soviets plan to deploy theew class of submarine but that they have delayedof the new class to concentrate on building uplass force as rapidly as possible. If Ihe Soviets do in factew submarine for thehe first units probably could not reach operational status untilS. considering the presentof production facilities tolass and the long lead (tines involved.
This leaves the problem of what the Soviets intend for the newlylass submarine, which we callII. As noted above, il still cannot be entirely excluded that the conversion is for thend thai others will follow. Another possibility IS that Iho con veiled submarine Is loind test bedew and as yet unidentified missile, possibly solidand lhat thelass units being con veiled at Severodvinsk willis. Still another possibility Is that Ihe GUI is for thend lhat some of thes tn the Northern Fleet will bo similarlyonfident choice among these alternatives will have to await further evidence.
IfII class is for thehan the modified submarine may be intendedfor peripheral operations. Thebcady being successfully deployed for pui poses of inteicontincnlal attack inlass iiibmarinc. and in large numbers. Use of sub marine-launched missiles against Europe was indicated in classified Soviet military lectures as iccentlynd deployment of thelass submarines would be mo
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way uf upgrading Iho capabilities of Ihe peripheral SLBM force."
VII. HEAVY BOMBERS AND iANKERS
eavy bomber and tanker aircraft as-lignedne.ia two (LRA) form Ihe third major component of the Soviet forces for Intercontinental attack. LRA currently haseavy bombers and tankers based at five airfields in the USSR. Thesetheearypethe only Soviet bombersrimary mission of intercontinental attack. In addition to tbe intercontinental mission, heavy bombers have other missions,ttack against naval forces.
here areour-engineBear aircraft, and they fonn the largest clement of the heavy bomber force. Aboutre thend C. equippedile aii-lo-surfaco missileheangaroo.esignated Bear A. are free-fall bombers. Five or six areeconnaissance aircraft which do not carry weapons. Only aboutf tho Bear ASM-carriers can be refueled in flight
ear aircraft pose the most serious bomber throat to the US. because of the size
" Iteai Adin. Eai) P. Rectamu, Director ol Naval Intelligence. Department of the Navy, would note that moil oflaa bVploynumts which have beenhe Atlantic were in ocean areas almost equally distant from targets in the US and Europe and several days transit time away fiom pos-ilble launch areal against either. He has long be-li.-wil thit ooce sufficient najcSrar-poweredbecome available,btt would he used primarily against ivripheral tiifcti. However,II conversion clouds this role. Il could be oneesl bedew naval ballistic missile. On the other hand, ifll hamslan paogiam lor the leoaminc Noftherns,lls would piobabiy be used in the mid-Atlantic patrol area well into this decade.
of the force and the range of Ihe aircraft. Tliey could rover virtually any US target nn two wayn-refuels We variants would have lo stage tlitoogh Arctic bases to obtain extensive coverage of US targets, but refueled Bear Bs and Cs could operate directly fiom bases farther south The range of the Bear gives it greater flexibility in routing and in the choice of flight profile than other bombers. Bear ASM earners would, of course, be able to launch their missiles far from die target tc- 'id terminal defenses.
of the strategic attackof the Bear ended about seven yearsthen, limited production of specialfor reconnaissance and ASW workmostly for Soviet Naval Aviation.
Tbe four-jet engine Bison Is found only in LRA. The strike version carries bombs bul no! ASMs. Al present, aboutf theisons are used as tankers to refuel Ihe heavy bomber force and, on occasion. Bears assigned lo naval aviation. The production of Bisons ended
The Bison bomberore limited range than the Bear. Bisons would require Arctic staging and inflight refueling for ex tensive coverage of tlie US on two-way missions.
total size of the LRAforce has remained relativelyfor over five years. Theis summarized below (figuresto Ihe nearest five).
TUBS Bc-*a KTm Bw Mtinle-Canieii TO
" . : i
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LRA also hasadger amilinder mrdium bombers based throughout the Soviet Union. These aircraftimited capability for intercontinental attack although some could be used onmissions if the Sovietseed toan all-out nuclear assault against North America. However, the continuing evidence available on their training patterns, basing, deployment patterns, and the limited number of tankers for aerial refueling supports our Judgment that Badger and Blinder forces are equipped and trained primarily for peripheral operations. The employment of large numbers ol medium bombers through Arctic bases would raise serious problems in airfieldand logistics.1*
Roles and Missions of the Heavy Bomber Force
e believe thateneral war with the US. the Soviets would commit virtually all of their heavy bomber force to attacks against US targets. Soviet tnibrary writings indicate that the U3 targets would bethe same type as those assigned toballistic missiles. That the Soviets haveeavy bomber force under these circumstances probably reflects their desire to add flexibility and diversity to an attack, and lo increase both the cost and complexity of US defenses. Increased survivability and penetration capabilities of the Bear force are provided by supersonic AS Ms which have ranges upbout half of the strike aircraft carry only ASMs. whichEP ofjn, and they would be pii manly suitable for attacking soft targets The remaining strike aircrult carry bombs, andard target capability.
Pact Foron lo. Opera-UOpS inECRET.
discusses i'ii; uie ol medium bomlicis in the peripheral role.
training of the heavy bomberto enspliasize intercontinentalBomber crews are believed to bein all basic aspects of strategicincluding navigation, inflightbombing. ASM strike procedures,staging, penetration tactics, andof electronic counter measures (ECM).
There is evidence that LRA Bears equipped with ASMs alsoission of attacking US aircraft carriers. Heavy bombers of LRAong history of providingto naval forces, including occasionalin naval exercises. It is not dear, however, to what extent the Soviets would employ these aircraft inole, because theangaroo missile is not known lo have terminal homing.uclearhowever, the missile would have some effectiveness against ships even with thecurrently estimated for it
There is still no evidence that thehave an airborne alert force or that bomben are maintained on the grounduick-reaction posture comparable tominute alert posture of SAC The entire Soviet complementeavy bombers and tankers normally is located at five airfields, each of which hasingle hard-surfaco runway. Unless ledeployed to other fidds, the forcebe highly vulnerableurprise attack. The Soviets may have plans tohen bombers or to deploy some of them to Aiclic staging bases during crises, although wc hiive no evidence of such plans. Wethat bomber strikes by the LRA would follow those ol Soviet ballistic missiles.
Soviets are flight testingvariable-geometry wingwis initially called thenddesignated the Backfire. (See FiguresiliMrucrtcs of the Backfire and Usrcc
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Backfire, sightedeliable observer inas the subject of analysis and discussion inharacteristics were derived from the source's description of the planform ol lhe aircraft and from an engineering design analysis based on the description. Tho icsults were used lo assess Its performance in various mission profiles. Where information oncharacteristics was not available, estimates were made based on our knowledge ol Soviet technology, or, where nect-'tfcry. onassumptions. We made such estimates ,on type of engines, fuel capacity, gross weighl, and fuel consumption.
It was estimated that the Backfire, with anound bomb load, could achieve an um dueled combat radius of. by flying all the way subsonically at high altitudes with wings fully extended;0 pound ASM the radius.ore likdy profile,ow level approach. to tlie target at high subsonic speed, the aircraft could carry such an ASMadius ofop speed of aboutt high altitudes and an aerial refuelingwere also estimated.
was noted thai with suchBackfire was greatly superior toand Blindxr medium bombers foragainst Eurasian targets,deep in China, whose growingto the Soviets could have beenstimulus to the development of theHowever, on unrcfuded two-wayagainst the US, its capabilitiesbe marginal. Refueled and stagedbases it could reach virtually all olon two-way missions only by flyingaltitude, subsonic profile
the time of. it wastoonfident estimate ofrule ol the aircraft. Alt agencies but
the Air Force concluded that the Backfire was best suited for peripheral operationa. bat that it had capabilities for mlercontinental attack. The Air Force concluded that the Backfire had capabilities which would make it suitable for use in cither peripheral or intercontinental operations. All agencies ree ognized that the Backfire might havegrowth potential which in lheould resultariant with greater range
n the view of all agencies but the Air Force. evidence acquired over the past year pointss/range capability of the Backlire less than was estimated inerhaps much less. The new evidence is not sufficient, however, to negate theperformance estimates for postulated mission profiles. These agencies believe thai no estimate can be made wilh confidence at (his time In the present state of knowledge,iigb-levd subsonic mission with wings extended all the way, they believe dial the unrefueled combat radius of the Backfire could be several hundred nautical miles less thanstimated last year_ conceivably as little asm.^
hese agencies further believeetermination of how the Soviets will employ Backfire must remain uncertain until there is better information on its range, on svhethcr
" Maj. Gen. Rcekly Triantafellu. the Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. USAF, would note that cur-rently assessed performance is based on an engineer-log tnalyiii of the observed configuration. He fecli tharL
( do not
onclusion that the actual performance could dilfer significantly from the current high con-lldence judgment.
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ow tanker ii developed, and on the tactics used in operational training If itsradiui Is only.ackfire could be used by the Soviets both toand lo maintain the size of the focre ofdesigned to satisfy their strategic attack requirements against NATO or China. In this role. Backfire could deliver heavier weapon loads,reater range of targets, andreatar chance of pencil at ion and survival than the Badger or Blinder.ackfire could also be used by Soviet Naval Aviation,upgrading ils anhship strike force. With this combat radius, however, the limited uHcreontincntalestimated for the Backfire inould be further degraded.1*
The suitability of the Backfire for an intercontinental role will be heavily dependent on the existenceuitable force of tankeiv No tanker has been clearly identified with Backfire. Several aircraft such as theClassic) or theCandid) could be adapted to the tanker role,ew one could lie developed.
The evidence indicates that Backfire will carry an ASM. As yet, however, thete has been no evidence which would permit identificationpecific missile. If antype is used, therppear to be suitable. It is possible, however, thatwillholly new ASM; one dc signed for low-altitude launch wouldogical development
I3S- Last year we estimated that the Back-fire could teach IOC ineriod
" Msj. (Jen. Rockly Triwitafdhi. the Assistant Chic/ olr.co, USAF. believes that Uiecapabilities of Backfire mike it suitable lor both peripheral and intercontinental millions. The inlcip.eiationi of (he new information whichhochanterelle* and perfoimar.ee are inconclusive and do notonclusion Out ihe ranfie/radiiri may be significantly less.
Wc now believe that it could reach IOC as early as3ree-fall bomber or if an existing ASM is used.ew ASM is lo be used, another year or two would be required. Considering the lime thai the aircraft has been available, Ihe Soviets should have had time to evaluate its potentialroductioncould already have been made.
he Backfire may have considerable growth potential. If. for example, the Soviets were to develop high efficiency turbofan engines for it. tho range of (he Backfire- increased. Such improvements inare not likely to appear in deployedbefore the.
VIII. SOVIET INTERCONTINENTAL ATTACK FORCES! CONCEPTS FOR USE
ver the years, Soviet official pro-nounceinents have said or implied that the USSR would never be the first louclear attack and lhat its strategic forces would be employed only in retaliation During the period of marked strategic inferiority, and, more recently, when the Soviets have pulled ahead of the US in the numbers of ICBMs. Ihe Soviets have continued to stress that any aggressor wouldrushing retaliatory blow. In emphasizing the horrors of nuclear war they have regularly talked in terms of the certainuse Brezhnev'sSoviel strategic forces wouldon any aggressor. At Ihe same lime, they have physically deployed their strategicin ways which indicate concern about having survivable forces which would be capable of retaliation. The Soviets have never shown any indicattoo thai theyoll-fromihc-blue disabling first strike toorkable Soviet strategy, nor do they have counterforc* weapons in sufficient numbers lo maketrategy feasible.
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By their actions, tho Soviets scent to have also discounted the possibility of aflzsl strike by the US. despiteeir propaganda over tliemost frequently in the militarythe threatS surprise attack. In contrast to US practice, none of the Soviet bomber force has been kept on alert andew missile submarines arc within range of targets on the US mainland at any time Someoercent ol alllassarc normally in two ports, and nearly nil ol the heavy bombers and tankers are usually at their five home bases, making both of these forces highly vulnerableurprise nuclear attack. We do not know how much of the ICBM force deployed in silos is at lull, with the gyroscopes of the missile guidance platforms constantly running. If the gyroscopes are not in constant opeiation. the Soviets would have to allowinutes for them to stabilize after actuation before missiles could be tired.
he principal explanation for this low level of readiness probably lies in theSoviet belief that hostilities with the US and its allies would come about only in the courseajor political crisis, which would piovide opportunity for bringing Soviet forces to peak readiness. There is no evidence that during such crises as2 Cuban missile episode,7 Arab-Israeli war. and the invasion of Czechoslovakiaheplaced their strategic forces in peak readiness This may have reflected concern on die part of Soviet leaders that the US would detect such measures and mistakenly interpret themign of intent to attack, or their (ears of accidental or unauthorized use. If seems more likely, however, that the Soviet leadership did not consider that the situations cited had become sufficiently grave lo wntiant such an action.
M.T. Thcic is evidence that Soviet military leaders, fnr their part, would favoris. beating the other side to thethe eventrisis proceededoint where full-scale nuclear war appeared both imminent and unavoidable. As earlyhen Soviet lorces for intercontinental attack weie few in number andS first strike, the late DefenseMallnovskiy asserted that the way to forestall an enemy surprise attack was to 'promptly dealrushinglie same theme was recently restated by Defense Minister Crcchko who wrote that combat readiness requires, among other things, "the knowledge of how to discern in good time the possible intentions of the enemy and to dealrushinghis concept has also been explored in Soviet classified military writings. An articleor example, called (or "seizing and retaining Ihe initiative" in modern warfare and stated that "nuclear bursts on enemy territory (should) take place simultaneously with, or even before, his strikes on ourre-emption is likely toominant theme for some years in Soviet mditary thinking.
oviet military writers have alsothe concept ofthat is. on receipt of warning that an enemy strategic altack is under way. In the spectrum of risks, launch-on-warningind ol halfway point between pre-emption, which accepts responsibility for the initiation ofin order to maximize one's owneffort, and pure retaliation, which accepts some loss of retaliatory capability in older lo avoid possible miscalculation Veiledto launch-on-warning have appeared in Soviet writings since the, ami these formulations have gradually become more specific, For example, thef Marshal Sokotovskiy's authoritative Military Strategy states that "present meant of
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an opportunelyignificant, portion of ihe meaiures of direct preparationuclear attack by the enemy and in the very first minutes locate the mass launch of missiles and the take-offnd. at the right time, warn the polibcal leadership of the country about the impending danger. Thus, possibilities, exist not tourprise attack by an aggressor and to deliver nuclear strikes on him at the right* On two recent occasions well-connected Soviet scholars^
3-have asserted that present Sovietcalls for launch-on-warning.
t is doubtful, however, that eitheror launch-on-warning would lie all that simple. In view of the immense risksthe political leaders who would have final authority over the Soviet use of nuclear weapons would probably not be easy tothat the US was about to strike and that, therefore, the time for pre-emption had come. They would probably believe that the US would also continue to have strongagainstuclear war and that evenarticularly graveolitical solution should be possible. In the case of launch-on-warning they would have to gamble everything on the accuracy of whateverthey were able to obtain about the US attack. The Soviets themselves havesome of the dangers inherent Inolicy in an article in an openpublication in0 which said that launching an "automatic instantaneous counterattack" upon detecting the launch of enemy missiles would increase the likelihoodatastrophe and turn "the gloomiest of
" The editor of all three editions -JtrawJ lnt US Detente attache in1 (hat Mihlorytill inpccsend basic Soviet dunking.
the prophesies of military science fiction into sinister reality".
here are numerous references over die years to indicate that the primary mission of Soviet strategic attack forces remains the classic one of destroying the enemy's war-making capability The evidence wouldthat once deterrence had failed or was thought to have failed, the paramountof the So vie; military leadership would be with how to win the war. or at the least wilh how to maximize the chances of (he USSR's surviving itation. Thus, the basic and overriding objective of Sovietfor strategic forces would be tothe enemy's ability to cany on the battle through attacks on his military forces and installations, on command and controland on military industry.
n early indication of this targeting philosophy was containedlassified article published in an authoritative foumal of the SRF1 This article identified the basic targets of anegiment as strategic missile launch sites, nuclear weaponsand storage facilities, military-industrial and government centers, and various major military installations.escriptiontrategic exchange scenario in the classified theoretical journal MMtaiy Thought again stressed the importance of destroyingfor supporting and controlling strategictheme echoedublic statement by Marshal KryVov. chief of the SRF. asserting that Ihe targets for Ms forces Included the enemy's meant ol strategic nuclear attack.
asts of target categories which em-jiiuii.'e deduction of the enemy's military forces and military-economic potential are contained in successive editions of Marshal Sokolovskiy't authoritative Military Strategy.
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of Soviet SAM deployments uphe present indicates that the USSR ha* evs dently decided to use similar priorities in its own defenses, protecting militarymililary industry, and basic military and civil administrative control centers rather than population or industry per ig; some sizable population centers without such in-sttbatioos have been left undefended. ICBMs are also undefended by SAMs, buton the ground that bombers, even from forward bases, could notimely threat to their survival.
hese considerations lead us tothat the Soviet target list for an ICBM attack on the US would emphasize strategic military bases, ICBM launch control facilities or buncbers, Polaris submarine bases, command posts, oommuni cations and power facilities, and industrialprobably not in the same proportion under all circumstances.re cmptive attack, certain brne-urgenf targets such as missile warning radars and bomber bases might be targeted more heavily thanetaliatory strike, but fn the latter case as well the Soviets would probably seek to ensure that no further US strikes were possible. In any event. It appears unlikely that the Sovietwould be to annihilate the population as such, evenetaliatory strike. Thecertainly recognize, however,arge percentage of the US population would still inevitably come under Soviet attack in an all-out nuclear exchange in view or the location of important stralegic military targets in or near virtually every largo US city.
t is not clear what degree of freedom the Soviets would have intrike, nor whether their choice would be limited to preprogrammed attack plans. That somein targeting strategic nuclear weapons exists is indicated by the observed ability to
firen different jrimuths and to dif-feient ranges. Flexibility is also suggested by the need to deal with both pre-emptive and retaliatory attacks against the US. against Europe, or againsl China, and tho need to adjust to changes in the number and location of targets over time We do not know how many targets each Soviet ICBM, Is capable of covering without reprogramming bul wc think it likely that it is mora than one.
IX. DECISION-MAKING IN THE USSR
e have litde basis for estimating the content of specific decisions on weaponnow or in the future. We lack clearcut evidence even on present force goals. Our ability to assess the future is severely limited by the secrecy of the Soviet decision-making process, andack of evidence about the positions taken by key individuals andand the extent to which theso positions are taken into account. It is difficult,to draw analogies between the interplay of poliUcal forces within the Soviet systim and within Western societies,
c do know, however, that certain distinctive features of the Soviet system affect the way in which decisions are made, almost certainly including decisions on military forces. The principle of dose and relatively detailed party supervision of military affairs, in peace and In war, is well established in the USSR, partlyonsequence of the Party'sfear of Bona par tism. From the earliest days of the Soviet state, the primacy of lhe party has been stressed, particularly theof its central organs. The military has been drawn deeply into the party systemumber of ways,eans to Insure its fidelity. Finally, mote decisions are made by the top political leadership in the USSR than in Ihe US or other Western countries, partly because ol the general tendency of the Soviet bureaucracy to push decisions toward the top.
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Given this kirn! of system, it is tempting to conclude that all major decisions onpolicy must necessarily be made at the top. It is only another step to conclude that under the circumstances, decisions can be and ace in fact made in ihe lightarefully thought out strategy or rationale which Is un-deviatingly executed by subordinates. It then follows that observed military programs both reflect and reveal Ibis rationale
hough the above view may fit the Soviet Union in principle, there is good reason to believe that it is simplistic and misleading. For one thing, the very size of the USSRit impossible for the center to make all the important decisions. For another, any society has dusters of interests and power at and bdow the center, which have more or less distinctive goals of their own. In some degree at least, these goals inevitably differ from one another. In his later years, Stalin came close to bringing all other interests under his personal sway, but those who followed him have been both less willing and less able to do this
he change resulted not only from the departureniqudy potent and prestigious figure, but also from Ihe growing complexity of the decisions to be made and theof acquiring all Ihe irJorrnaHento make them. In the case of militarythe members of the Politburo appear to call on the military to formulateand recommendations. While they have machinery foi screening and evaluating such recommendations, they evidently do notdl established body of independent expertsosition to supply critiques. Thus, they are likdy to be heavily dependent on the tech-nical judgments ol their military advisers. The militaryiscrete institution and they are given ample opportunity to counsd the political leadership. They do nol consti-
isaffected element and they do not perceive of the nation's future in terms which am basically at odds with the concepts of the Party. But they do constitute an interest group which must contend with other such groups The presenl polilical leaders, unlikehave preferred to avoid direct conflict with the military in the area of tbe latter's piofessional competence. Khrushchev himself said thai i! toofc every bit of his power, and certain sops as wdl, to push through the large cut in military personnel which 'ook place in the.
V highest level body whichgovernment, and military Interestsgroup known as the Defense Councilanembers include CeneralChairman, Premier Kosygin, De-
fense Minister Grechko. Supreme SovietPodgomy, and possibly others such as Party Secretary Ustinov, who serves, in effect, as Brezhnev's deputy for military industrial affairs and who, among other things, oversees the activities of Ihe Militarythers may attend particular discussions The Council apparently is abody charged, in peacetime, withrecommendations to the Politburo on national securityecornmendation unanimously advanced by Ihe Council to the Politburo for final consideration wouldencounter little, if any, Opposition. The resolution of contentious and undecided issues would be achieved within the Pditburo
he military services dominate iho Ministry of Ddensend the top positions are held by professional military officers. The MOD isinistry of Defense in the Western sense; it has few civilians and iseneral Staff; in this role it has considerable autonomy. Il seems to be highly compartmentalized, both within if-cll andis outside organizations.
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he mihUry Icadenhip is not. of course, always of one mind. There is ample evidence of rivalries in theacute, for example, when Khrushchev was trying lo build up the SRF at the expense of the general purpose forces, but they have been evident on other occasions and over other issues as well. These conflicts almost certainly continue, although they appear to havemuted The combined arms tradition is strong, and since the time of Khrushchev, the services appear to have been generally successful in composing their differences andnited front. Part of the reason, perhaps, is thai under the collectivetho total military budget has been slowly but steadily increasing, which may have made the competition for rcsouices within theless keen than if the budget were constant or diminishing. The estimated shares spent for the individual services appear. In recent years, to have been remarkably steady.
he proposals to the Politburofrom the MOD are likely to bein approach, emphasizing continuitythan change. Tho militaryis stilt largely headed by men who woo their reputations in World War II and who probably acquired many of their basic coo cepts at that time. This is nol lo say. however, that these men are entirely resistant toMany of them appreciate Ihe importanceffort. Furthermore, jusl below the rapidly t'.*rn:lirg line of World War II leaders is an ever-growing number of younger, more technically oriented comers.
ith respect to the defense industries, we are uncertain about howole they play in the decision-making process. The ministries responsible for producing military hardware arc majoro scarceTheir favored position in the Soviet economy should provide themtrong lever for influencing deciitoiH In general, the paity meddles less with military production
than II does with other forms of economicand (hereuch closer relationship Ixrtweon producer andthis case Iheit true elsewhere in the
he eight ministries primarilyfor defense industry are represented on the VTK- Litlle is known about this super-ministerial body, which is officiallylo the Council of Ministers but has direct links with tho Secretariat of tho Central Committee as well. In addition to its obvious role oforum for the discussion of problems and programs, it apparentlysome kind ot supervisory role tn the coordination of defense pioductton. Theindustries have, in Ihe broadest sense, common interests and objectives, and the VTK is thus likely to behave, on occasion,ort of defense industry lobby. On otherhowever, il probably behaves more like an uneasy coalition of members serving their own interests.
he scientific and technical elements in the defense establishment appear to have less leeway for innovation than their Western counterparts. Indications at SALT andare that scientists and technicians lend lo be regarded more as skilled aids rather thsn asf the military. By and large, they are apparently (old only enough about the task at hand to handle the requiiernenti explicitly levied upon them. We havehuwever, that the major planning and coordinating agency lor RhD. the Slatefor Science and Tcclinology, lays before ihe Council oferies of goalspractically all fields of science,those lelated to the military, ond all of the economy.
oreover, th* influence of scientists and technicians Is almost certainly felt in other ways, which are important if indirect. For one thing, Soviet military and political leaders
their options at least partially defined for .them by those responsible. To put ir another way. new technology, and thus the nature of the weapon systems developed, is piobably influenced as much from below as from above To the extent that this is so, the resultotesponse to some grand design,eflection of the interests of individual services, particular designand the like.
rondlyrademarks "straight line"frequently, design concepts do not anticipate the state-of-the-art. The history of various Soviet strategic missile programs provides some evidence of the continuity of scientific and organizational influence on acategory of weapon systems. Theor example, can be viewedarger and betterhich in turnproducton theRBM. These three systems were apparently all designed at the Dnepropetrovsk missile development center by the same team Similarly, but perhaps less clearly, the SS-fi can be viewed as aof thend both were apparently designed by the same team.
ther individuals and groups alsoole in the decision-rnaking on military matters, bul we do not know in detail how they opctate, or their exact relationship to the top political and military leadership. Three departments of the Central Committeedeal with political, personnel, andaffairs; the latter Is handled by the Defense Industries Department. We havethat studies and testimony by such officials as Yuriy Arbatov, bead of theof the USA in the Academy of Sciences, have been used by members of the Defense Council The top State economic planningCaspian, coordinales and Integrates therogram, including therogram.
he preceding discussion provides an incomplete picture of the way in whichabout military forces are made. Theiereat deal that we do nol know or do not know in detail, most notably where particular decisions arc made and by wlrOm. and what weight particular persons or institutions carry in the process. Nonetheless, an outline emerges which permits the following tentative
appears that thenvolves clusters ofexecutive bodies, which are likelyto be in competition with oneThese clusters funnel their viewstop leadership, political and military.numlier of ways.
and bis colleagues onand the Defense Council workcontext of bureaucratic pressures,and constraints, which may betimes, and which serve, in practice,and balance the power of theand military leadership.
the case of military programs,process is probablyon two keymilitaryindustrial authorities whopropose new programs and the topleaders, particularly those who servethe Pohtburo and the DefenseOther Individuals and interesta role, but almostesser one.
the institutional andof the military, the scientificdefense industry, and othermay be involved, the politicalclearly has the final say. Just asit must operate in the contextforces, and take them intoonscious rejection of what
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e One consequence of the process seems tootiservatism both in proposing and in disposing Specifically, in the areas of weapons development and procurement, now solutions seem lo be ollcrcd In the con-teat of proven approaches, rather than by constantly pushing the state-of-lhe-ait.
X. IUUSTRAT1VE FUTURE FORCES"
e believe that the Sovle! political leadership looks upon most aspects of the USSR's present stralegic position withsatisfaction. The Soviets now have Overtaken and surpassed tho US in numbers of ICBMs. are in the process of at leastthe US in SLBMs, and have won clear recognition, both in SALT and in world opin-
* Mai. Cen Roddy Ti(middle, the Assistant Chief of Staff. Intettieence. USAF. cancels toad iue believe* that the illustrative force models do not adequately address The Problem stated ono estimate (he sire and cempesitio* al Soviet 'Orel through mid-lHO and to forecast general
He agree* that these tfluitiaorce* are nottor us* in military planning. In has view, the lackpcciflc erltrnata limits the utility of the document ami at the same time provides loo much latitude for inisintarpretauon of lhe data.
New Soviet ICflM lilo construction programs, tbe eapansioa of Soviet submarine production, and Ihe development of die HacVfire indicate loevft intent In achieve both qualitative and Quantitative iocreatesthen malefic weapon
Further noting die Soviet requirementOfeeces uKiUa for aocrationi acamal theEwope. and China, and lhe historicallot large inventorks. he wouldathe Soviets are not
tilery to accept strategic loeeei lor inter corn mental "iI thai arethan those Ihey now have inor undngoMig deployment Morea-er. hathat the likely Soviel course oj action in the absenceALT agreement wouldevel of effort greaser that thoseseroup.
ion. as the strategic equal of the US. Advances in Ihe size, makeup and breadth of operations of (he Soviet Navy have further strengthened the Soviet claim to equal treatment with the USorld power. Although Chinasprogramsong-term threat.military preponderance over Chinaassured for many years to come
resent Soviet thinking about theof strategic weapons is probably based on the belief that atimited first-stage agreement can and should be achieved in SALT in the near future This is certainly the implication of Soviet participation in the joint announcement ofnd ofSoviet efforts to push ahead with the negotiations. To bo sure, the Soviets have clearly shown far more interest in anlimiting ABM deployment than inof offensive systems. They must clearly reckon, however, with the official US positionoffensive limitations must form anpart of the bargain, and arc probablylouid pro quo in this area.
oviet leaders probablyumber of potential advantages in stabilizing themilitary aspect of their continuing world-wide rivalry with the US. In view of the vast strategic resources now in place On both sides and US sensitivity to Soviet force developments, they may doubt their ability to improve their relative position; indeed, they may have some fear of losing ground in any all-out competition. Although militarystill enjoy top priority and will presumably continue to do so, there have been repeated indicationsesire to reduce the burden of military expenditures if this can be done without prejudice to the USSR'son full strategic equality with the US- Tbe Soviets piobably also believe that completion of a strategic arms limitation agreement would reinforce US inhibitions against using or thie.ilcuing the use of nu-
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS7
goal of Soviel policy ever Unco the ban-the-bomb campaigns of Ihe.
c still liave no good basis forhowever, howonsensus in lavor ol an agreement exists in Moscow and whether that consensus is based on terms which would also be acceptable lo Washington. Soviel SALTives have indicated that the top political and military leaders in the USSR ate now directly concerned with SALTand it has been asserted thatM tary. as well as Ihe political leaders, favor an agreement in principle Individual Soviet SALT reprcscntalives, however, have alsoumber of things indicating lhat some cle mcnli in Moscow remain highly suspicious of the US and skeptical about an agreement, and that much difficulty had beenin hammering out the Sovietposition.
o some extent, such remarks probablyegotiating tactic, designed to encourage the US to be more forthcoming. Our best judgment, however, is that some such reservations, particularly among bul not limited lo the military, do exist Nonetheless, we believe that the dominant element in the leadership is presently willing to settle for "equal security with no military advantage to eitheruse an expression used frequently in SALT by theuch depends on one's definition of "equal secu-
Mai Cen. Itocklv TrianUlellu. the Assistant Chief ot Staff.SAF. does not scree widi uut jvdemtnt. He brlieiei Soviet aunt ut toS itialcatc foreei pecticululy while ihe
So'iitti sic occupied with the Chinese problem. If Ui* Soviet leader ihip were in failf tolor equal tecuilly" there would be sceneof lenlina off or redact to* in their del eru* efforts instead of coMinumj extensive Soviet nutilary developmenU in deployments as arc noween.
owever There are certainly powerful elements, moreover, whose Instinct is lo press ahead with the expansion of Soviet forces in an effort lo secure some advantage, because they are not satisfied with parity, or simply because they believe thai more is better than less. Some sort of understanding has probably been struck in Moscow on how much leeway for development and deployment of improved weapon systems the Soviet military will have if an arms limitation agreement isreakdown of. or prolonged delays in, negotiations, in turn, would probably lead to renewed internal debate as lo how the USSR should proceed with its strategic programs.
e have attempted to reflect these coraiderabons. and the various urrcertamties, in this Section, Iteries ofillustrating the range of choices available lo Soviet decision-makers, taking into account their probable assessment of the threat posed by US forces, Ihe type of Soviet weapons likely to be available, and possible Soviet requiiements and goals.
reat variety of intercontinentalforces can reasonably be postulated for the Soviets in. Wc think that some limits can be set in terms of technological development, deployment capability, and availability of resources. These limits arc by no means hard and fast, however. And within the limils there are many options, greatlyby other factors which impact on Soviet strategic policy such as the Sovietof ih" threat. Moreover, forceis an incremental process, worked out year by year as the choices and requirements change in the eyes of Soviet planners. Future forces that appear appropriate to the Soviets this year may look different next year, and decisions about forces will almost certainly
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many times during the period of this estimate.
illustrative projections ofattack forces in thisbased on our estimate of possibleunder various conditions asby Soviet military planners. Theplanner woCld probably utilize hisof the threat posed by USand the present and projected stateweapons technology andbasic inputs, operating within theformal policy guidance on strategicany arms limitationof funds available for weaponsand deployment The remainderSection utilizes what we know oror postulate about these factorsa set of illustrative Soviet forces.
Thc Soviet Percepfion of the US Strategic Threat
Soviets have accuratethe deployment of currentood understanding of theircharacteristics, such as yield andThey are also well aware of somelatest technical developments in weaponry
and of deployment programs proposed for.
do not know exactly how thewould project the threat from USforces during. They knowexperience that not all proposedarc adopted, but theygenerous assumptions about USpartially to be on the safe sidebecause they view the USmilitary-industrialthey have seen the US deployweapon systems relativelyprobably think in termsangeUS strategic forces, particularlyperiod beyond the next few years.
Soviets piobably judge thatUS forces and the presentlyand improvements representUS force posture for the next fewinto the. For the periodthey are likely to viewinimum US force postureprobably allow for new systemstechnical characteristics toforces toange ofthreats. The range of possibilitieslike this to the Soviets:
chances included in PPOCBAMMXO rfmcta
etrofitted to about
half of the force. Poseidon missile retrofitted to 3!
Some reduction;o replace some ol Ihe
Safeguard deployment for [our Minutcman completes.
Ma;c* CHANCES INCLUDES! IN AUCMErTEO II
MAJOn ciuxces inciuped
IH AOCStEKIED I
etrofitted lo Bnlf-r etrofitted to entire
Poseidon missile retrofitted toSBNiT
ploymenti. SiAteen Safeguard ,itej.
fBegin deployment ol ULMS7
Addition.! deployment c4 ; Maintaintill nvorc dc-
duction2 force. Twelve Silcgiianl sites.
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II Ibc Soviets view possible US force postures along theseere are three important features Ihey would have to consider in planning Iheir own forces:
a All three postulated forces contain large numbers of accurate MIRVs byworsthe Sovietswould assume that the MIRVs would have yields and accuracies sufficient loignificant pari of their existing ICllM force.
b Two-thirds ot more of tbe missde RVs would be carried on submarines, which would be highly survivable when deployed.
c. The two augmented US forces would, in the, include large numbers of AllMs which the Soviets mighl wish to counter with multiple RVs or penetration aids.
he postulated US forces outlined above do not reflect all of the qualitativewhich could be made to these forces. Soviet force planning will certainly take account of US plans to harden some or all of lhe Minuteman silos, to improve yields and accuracies of missile RVs. and to introduce new bomber weapons such as tlie shoit-iange altack missile (SRAM) and the subsonic cruise armed clccoy (SCAD).
ISO. Wc do no! know what estimate the Soviets might make of the probability that the US would deploy either of the augmented forces. For the mid- andhey mightevel of effort something like the postulated US Augmented Force I. and they might look upon something tike theForce IIworst case" possibility.
he possible range of US force postures within the constraints of an arms limitation agreement would depend, of course, on tbe
urinal terms of the agreement. Presentare that such an agreement, at least initially, would sharply restrict ABMon Imth sides, thus easing thefor enhanced penetration, but would place little if any restraint on the MIRV and silo hardening programs. Thus, as the Soviets might view them, US strategic altack forces could develop along Ihe lines of programmed forces even within tbe constraints of anand further qualitative improvements, such as highttr yields and better accuracies, could be made to existing systems.
System Characteristics ond Deployment Options
Section presents die basicabout Soviet stralegic attackunderlie our projections of futureIt briefly reiterates our estimates ofof presentas theof eachodfor each weapon system, such asof MIRVs. Some of Uiediffervarious projected forcesdifferences are spelled out here anddiscussion of each projected force.
Iiiirrcontincntol Ballistic Missilesnd
systems are old. entail highcosts, and are relativelythe Soviets will probably retire themcourse. We assume that allndwill be deactivated by the enddecade, except in the two SALThich illustrates an nil mil
postulate that tbe currentperational missiles consistsModod 2s,od 3s, and 30
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Modoe the reasons stated in Section II.c have limitedof Iheo three launch groups in all the illustrative forces. We do notadditional deployment of Ihe SS-9Iheaunchers now under construction, and we assume that theill bein theseilos.
New targe Mimic
e postulateew missile will be developed for some of the new silos. Basedwo-year flight test program, this new missile would be ready forin3 if testing started soon Accordingly, the first time the new missile appears at mid-year in the illustrative force tablessing pasteployment patternsuide, we have postulated that the Soviets could build additional new large silos at rates of up to aboutiloear. In addition, we assume that the new missile could be utilized in standardilos after modifications to Ihe silo.
We assume lhat Ihe new large missile will have throw weight capabilities similar lo thes stated in Section V.ur best judgment is lhat it will carry MIHV's. Accordingly, three of the fourpayloads we have postulated for this missile are MIRV systems.
We do not know whal characteristics the lust Soviet MIRV system will have,the number of HVs and theirew large missile with payload capabilities similar to theould have as few as three RVs. but su RVsf"
j would piobably lit as well. Moreover, it should be no more difficult tech no logic ally toystem with six RVs than one wilh three.
"For di(ieimE view, on whether Ihes inact P'cscntl,ection It,
c noted earlier lhat the Soviets probably could achieve accuracies on the ordern. CEP wilh improvements loguidancelight test program to improve accuracy probably would take about two years lo complete but could behe test program lor the new large missile.
o lake account of the possibility that the new missile will notIRV pay-load, we have alsoingle RV payload for this missile In this case, we assume an uccuracy similar lo thai of the presentystem.
he four alternative payloads wc have postulated for the new missile arc:
IRV payload with an accuracy of about. CEP;
IRV payload with an accuracy ol. CEP.
IRV payload with an accuracy of. CEP;
A single RV payload with an accuracy of. CEP and which also carries exo and endo-atrnospheric decoys
he type of payload included In any one of the illustrative forces follows from the assumptions we make regarding Sovietand their rate of progress. The new single RV payload is pcj'ulatcd in the lower limiting force and in Force 2C. which assume that MIRVs will nol be deployed prior5 We haveIRV systems for those remaining forces (SALTnd Forces ZA and 2B) whicha retaliatory capability. TheIRV payload for the new large missile with an early IOC date is postulated for SALT Forcend forndhich place heavy emphasisounterforcc
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assume that if lhe first MIRVdeployed does not have an improvement in accuracy over the currenthen one with improved accuracy, on the order3 run. CEP, would be introduced
The Soviets could probablyIRV payload with moreVs. say aboutVs.arge missileMIRV
"TJwuuld offer advantages in terms of largebng flexibility and assuredWe have not included it in theforces, however, because it does not have betlcr hard target capabilities than theIRV system and
IM, We assume no further deployment of standardilos. We also assume that all presently operational SS-lls are equipped with the Modut that both versions of theill be operational by the endc have included then all of the projected forces, although we do not attempt to decide what the mis will be between thend Type D. The number ofodostulated in each'of the illustrative forces is based on the level ofUS ABM deployment
Now Small Mi.iJfo
e assume that an existing variant of theill be deployed in some of the new silos andew missile will beInto these silos when it becomesFlight testingew missile could begin by the end of the year. Basedwo-year flight lest program, the missile could reach IOC by
f, inew small missile is developed, we assume it would have throw weight capabilities similar to Ihee would eipect it to iiscorpotale improvements, such as better accuracy or more RVs. We have postulated four different payloads forew small missile in Use illustrative forces. They are:
single RV system carryingaids and having an accuracy of about
A single-RV system carryingion aids and having an accuracy. CEP.
IRV system having an accuracy ofun. CEP;
IRV system having an accuracy of5 run. CEP.
new single RV payload. CEP Is included inwhich assumes that there will bedeployment6 and thatdeploy additional. CEP) siBglc RVis postulated in Forcehich iscounter Minuteman. The accurateis postulated in SALTndhich assume rapidadvance. Tho less accurateis included in the other forces.
UwKrwri of Dororhnre ond Pervomaysfc **
Ihe case of the SALT forcesbelow,aunchers at Dera-
" Dr. Ray S. Cline, the Director of Intelligence andIe(tS-lls deployed at Deraxhnya and Fervomayst should be included in all the illustrative future force tables in. These launchers could be targeted against the US In Ihe future, even il onehat ihelr primary mission al prerenf is lor peripheral attack.
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and Pcrvotnaysk are included in the tables, because they would be subject to the restrictions of an agreement. As was the case last year, we do not include them in our other tables, in view of Ihe differences of opinion as to whether theyrimary role in peripheral or intercontinentalo the extent that these launchers are or will become available for use against the US. they should be considered additive lo the otherforces-
light of the limitedtheo date and our presentinformation as lo the advantagesver ihe Mode haveno further deployment of thishave made no assumptions regardingand extent, If any, of they the Mod 2.
indicated inhere is no firm evidence lhat theintend to develop mobile ICBMThe only mobile missile programhave had an ICBM application,apparently has been cancelledhave projected deploymentICBMs only in the high sideillustrates an all-out Sovietand-mobile ICBMteach IOC5 at Ihe earliest and
" Mai. Cen. Philip B. Davidson, il* Assistant Chief of St.iff for Intelligence. Department of the Army;tin. Earl F.he Director of Naval Intcllijtcnce, Department of the Navy; and Maj. Cen. IlocMy TfiaMAfellu. tin Assistant Chief of Staff. In-lelliliC'icv. Ub'AF, would include Iheaunchers it Dcrsihnya ami PcrvoniaytL in all lables became ihoy contidci those launchers to be primarily for usehe US.
that it would have payload capabilitiesto those of the
Submcirinc launched Ballistic Missiles
t is estimated thailasshas been modified to cany theince the other eight have onlybeen through one modification program, they probably would not undergo another. In any case,lass submarines would not provide the Soviets wilh the number of longer range SLBMs which we think they would want lo have. Accordingly, wc have postulated two ways of meeting such a
One alternative assumes that thedevelop an entirely new missileange. or more and which is compatible withlass submarine. The missile would reach IOChis alternative assumes thatlass force level lies betweenndubmarines.
The other allernalive assumesew class of SSBNs will be built to carry (liehe new SSBN would become operationallass construction would end when aboutad beenbut in all but Force I.lass would be retrofitted beginning8 wilh an entirely new missileange.
Wc haveIRV payload (or the new missile and for then some of the Forces, beginning as early as the-
or all of the illustrative forces, we have assumed thatJ class submarines are transfcircd from the intercontinental attack role to the peripheral attack role by the. TheII is carried in theattack role throughout Ihe period in allIass sub-
aie not included in tho projections, on the grounds that they probably arc now intended primarily for peripheral altack.I class submarines are included in lhe pro-icctxms until lhey which time it is postulated that they will all be transferrederipheral role.
he Backfire appears best suitederipheral rolencluded in" Wc have included it in most of the illusttative force tables because of the possibility that some portion ol lhe force (perhaps in an improved version) mighl be used for intercontinental missions.
We have postulated that the Backfire would begin to enter operational units inbe earliest date at which it would enter the force using current weaponeasonable annual produclion rale wouldahoulircraft byhe following year, andorceigh priority program could ptovtde SOear, resultingorce
We have postulated rates of attrition for older Soviet heavy bombereduction of the force to less than half its present size by the, lo maintenance of nearly tbe entire force.
Alternative Force Developments
alternative forcein this section representthat Soviet strategic policyMany other models could befor any one modelarticular
KMa| llie Assistant
CW of Stall. Intelligence. USAF. bel-vei thefue when deployed will be suitable for bothaivjental miiiioni For hit learont ice hu footnote In Section VII to.
force planning philosophy and level oftechnology, many other force levels could be protected in general or lu detail.we believe the models chosen areof the range of possible Soviet courses ol action. It should be emphasized, however, that we consider no one of them an estimate that Soviet intercontinental altack forces will be composed of the particular weapon systems in the precise numbers listed. They are intended to be illustrative oftrends and differing emphases, and as such are not suitable for military planning purposes For Defense planning purposes the reader should consult the forthcomingIntelligence Projections for Planning
n the following discussion, thetables show the status of the various postulated forces as ofhe6 represents the end of the near-term period of about five years for which we are able lo project with some confidence. In modeling these forces, however, we have furtherthe protections9 and have briefly summarized these extended projections and their rationales in the text" By extending the projections for these three additional years, wc are able to depict more clearly Ihe trends effected by major qualitativeaccurate MIRVs and follow-on SLBMs fordo not enter service until thend are not available in significant numbers until the.
Possible Forcestrategic Arms Umitolion Agreement
ALT could have any of severaloutcomes with varying effects on Soviet forces We assume for the purposes of our
"Ther.dn toontams tablet Eivmc. numbers ol delivery vehicles in each illuiiiaiivc force at mid-year for the.
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thai an agreement would contain provisions similar to the following;
ICBM launchers are limited to theoperational or under activeas
Existing silos may not be replaced with new silos and the internal diameter and the depth of existing ICBM silos may not be increased.
Silos for modem large ballistic missilesre limited to those externally complete by
Replacement of missiles is permitted as long as the limitation on MLBMs is not exceeded.
Construction starts of new ballisticsubmarines are prohibited as.
Conversion of ballistic missile submarines lo carry additional SLBM launchers is
Intercontinental bombers are not limited. ABMs are limitedew hundred launchers.
There would be no limit, on deployment of MIRVs. or on improvement in accuracy.
have projected two forcesikely andiximumwithin the type of SALT
Slralcrjrc Aims [imitation Jotit Force I: Aioinlenonte of Porily Under An Armi (jeiirofron Agreement
force illustrates tlie kind ofatlack capability lhal the Soviets
" Modem targe bnllistic missiles are defined it targci thanubic meters in volume and which became opeiaiionalhes fit cubic meters, theubic meters.
could achieve duringithin tlie constraints at an arms limitation agreement similar to the one outlined above. The force is based on the assumption that the primary Soviet objective would be totrong retaliatory capability throughout the decade against the US ptogrammed forces. Wethat the Soviets would be concernedabout the survivability of their strategic forces and consequently would Improve the hardness of their ICBM force. To increase Ihe number of targets they could attack and thus improve the retaliatory capability of their forcc, they would begin lo deploy MIRVs as soon as possible.
t is possible that the progress ofMIRV development will not be as rapid as reflected in (lie two illustrative forces under an arms limitation agreement, or that themay choose not to deploy MIRVs at alL The latter case appears to be much less likely. In either case, we would sull expect them to move ahead with the new silo programs to improve the survivability of their ICBM force.
ALTssumes that the Soviets achieve an early IOC for MIRVs. but at first do not improve accuracy over that of present missileitsiloIRV pay-load is deployed inilos whichew harder configuration. More accurate MIRVs arc Introduced later in the decade. Ycljss SSBNs would bo limited toew. longer range missile forlass is introduced In the.
hendissiles arethroughout the decade, although it is recognized that under the postulatedthe Soviets could replace them with missiles of less thanubic meters in volume SS-llsollow.on small missile would be deployed in the new silos at Pervomaysk and Derazhnya.
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MRVi) ) New UrgeIRV,.
Bear ASM Carrier .
* Includes fltoi it Deeaihnya and Pervoinaysk
"There areiews on (be mission of the Backfire (ie*nd
Slroleg'x Arms limitation Tofts forcePosture Under An
ALTaximum Soviet effort within the conslraints of the postulated arms limltalion agreement. The force is designed to improve counterforce as well as retaliatory capabilities. It postulates rapid technological progress for all systems.
trong counterfbrce capability isby the introduction4 of an6-MIRV payloadew largeHardening the large silosIRV payload for both SS-lls and SLBMs would improve the retaliatory capability of the force. Thend SS-Ss arc maintained through-oul Ihe decade. Startingomber strength would be increased over current levels by deployment of Backfireaster rate than in SALT Force 1.
ILLUSTRATIVE FORCE MODEL
Deuvusr mnv TArorrro
VDllCICS CTnr VEHICLb)
Ne* Small Missile
' Includes silos al De.aihnya andhere are dilferinit views on the mission ol die Backfire (wc
TJIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PMAl RELEASE AS SANITIZED
Efti-ct of Possible Vocations in Terms of on Arms limitation Agreement
The provisions of any agreementreached may differ in importantfrom those postulated above. Themay be more generous and allow Other side to construct additional SSBNs or be more restrictive and prohibit modernisation of the ICBM force, even al existing launchers.
The Soviets might successfully press for more liberal provisions permittingof some of Ihe new silos now underand additional SSBN construction. If so, in SALTe wouldnewypo missile deploymentotalaunchers rather than the 2SS shown. In the case of SSBNs. we would in SALTncludelassor. alternatively, deploymentew SSBN to carry then SALTe would include both these
S-iT r. ME '.
New SSBN/SS NXIRV.
t-cwu/SS N< 4
. m SSBN/SSM1RV.
m CEP 0
likely Soviet Courses of Action under on Arms Limitation Agreement
If an actual agreement were along the lines of the one postulated above, we consider it unlikely that the Soviets would improve their force as rapidly as illustrated by SALTxcept in response to improvements in US forces corresponding to the Soviet "worst case" threat estimate. The costs of SALTould not be excessiveto Soviet annual expenditures forattack forces over the past several years, bul the Soviets would probably estimate that their attempt to build SALTould cause the US to accelerate its Ownfor force improvements.
We believe SALTeliberate pace of forcethat is within the terms ol the assumed agreement and well within Iheof the Soviet RcVD program. The force preserves strong retaliatory capabilities against likely. US forces while reducing the costs of the intercontinental attack forces below recent levels of effort-
Possible Forces Without on Arms Limitotion Agreement
The alternative force developments presented in this section represent possible directions that Soviet strategic policy could take on the absence of an arms limitationOur evidence provides little basisonfident estimate of the size and composition of Soviet forces beyond the next few years.wc present here not one but several examples of possible Soviet forces in theof an arms limitation agreement.
The first two cases presented arearc an attempt to establish the upper and lower limits wilhin whichforces arc almost certain to fall. The
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RELEASE AS SANITIZED
casel of forces wilhin these two limits and the last case isorce primarily designedounter Minutcman.
fattm MooW Ii MmMbui* Poirure Without onimrtoiton Agreement
s illustrative of the resultsoviet decision essentially to stay with what they have plus the minimum necessary toeterrent against US programmed forces. It is similar to %Illustrativenn that 'it includeslittle technicaldeactivation of most of the older ICBMalt in fixed ICBM deployment after currentis complete, and modest forceintended only to ensure acapability.as with Illustrativen) was deliberately designed to setough lower limit of the range in which Soviet strategic attack forces are likely to fall in the absencetrategic arms limitation agreement.
olould implySoviets were willing to accept someof their strategic capabilitiesUS forces.till would providewith strong retaliatoryUS programmed forcesdecade. Butf the USdeploy other proposedthe four Safeguard sites orforces would have fo bemuch more rapidly than illustratedforce totiong
is enhanced by thedeploymentlass SSBNs toeforce level of somenitsol ABM defenses would bereplacing some of Iheod Ithe Modhe retrofit of the SSIRV payload beginning7
would improve countcrforco as well ascapabilities. Thendissiles are maintained for most of the decade. The bomber forcegradually reduced through attrition ami the phaseoul of older aircraft.
22S. The Soviets might adoptf they were convinced that US forces were not going to developace more rapid than the programmed forces and il theyeed lo cut back expenditures on Jorees forattack Implementation of Forceould result in substantial savings compared with spending levels forattack forces in the.
New Urge Missile, I RV. OS nm
' Does nol include silos atnd Pcivq-maytfc.
'The number ond type ol muiiles this submarine wxll carry have not been determined.
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iSE AS SANiTIZED
llluiltot;-'- Force Model Ax Maximum Poriueo WilBovf Aim, Umilalkm
orcehich is similar lo illustrativen, illustrates what we believe wouldaximum Soviet effort, ft represents the Simultaneous deployment of systems at about the highest sustained rate ever achieved in the past. Rapid technological progress it assumed for all systems. Parallel developments in strategic defense programs on Ihe order of Force Model IV in. -Soviet SlrategicatedOP SECRET,
are assumed. We consider that this illustrative force represents the highest resource allocation the Soviets would make to inter cont in ratalfoices during peacetime.
ike Force I,s an artificial one in that it was deliberately designed to reprcscnl the limitange. It isough upper limit because we arc not able touantitative limit on any of the physical factors which constrain deployment levels for major weapon systems. Itormidublo undertaking in terms of the size and pace of major weapons programs It also represents our view of maximum technical progress, and we bebeve the rate and extent of progicsi; postulated could not be reached unless the Soviets were making an all-out ReVD effort.
ould provide the USSR with excellent strategic capabilities through, even when compared with the USII Force. The MIRVs in theloice would enable the Soviets toarge number of soft military targets
as well as to maintain an independentcapability.he number ofweapons in the Soviet ICBM force would be theoretically capable of destroying someercent of US land-based missilesounterforce preemptive strike. Even so. the Soviets could still expect to receivetremcly high levels of damage from surviving USUS Programmed Forces.
Counterforce car>abihtics would beprimarily by deployment of an6-MIRV payload on theeginning inoth large and small ICBMs would be hardened by reconstruction orwith the new types of silos. In addition lo the hardening program, retaliatory capabilities would be improved by building small new missiles,obile missdcnd adding to the sea-basedew SSBNong-range missile.
The soft ICBM sites would boAlthough Ihe current bomber force would be reduced somewhat Backfirewouldevel ofy tlie.
The Soviets might undertakeuildup if the US were toassive buildup of its own strategic forceslear effort to unset the present balance. They might also rlc so in an effort to achieve some measur* of recognizable superiority over the US They would probably see both political and military utility in achievement ofosture, although they would also sececonomic disadvantage. Moreover, they would be unlikely to embark onourse unless they judged that the US would not react inay as to offset the Soviet effort.
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t> WTtYNTIIY VElllCUi
y mirv. oi.in
Bison Bombei 33
" Does iwi Include silas al Dcraihnya and Pervo-maysk.
number and type of miijilei this submarine will carry have no! been determined.
'Thcie are differing view* on the million of the BacLIlie (jec
Iffusfealivr forte Model 2- Maintenance of
tot'if Wahov* on Armi UmJotron AgrcawrU
oitset ol three illustrative forces that arc intended to represent different ways the Soviets could maintain strongcapabilitiesange of US threats. This set is similar toet of forces in. These illustrative forces are based on Ihree assumptions:
The Soviets will continue to spend annually about as much on intercontinental attack forces as they have in recent years.
Theii estimate of the likely USthreat will correspond to US pro giammed forces lor the nest few years and on the order of the postulated USI Force for the.
Tbe Soviets will want to have about die same level of retaliatory capability against the USorce that they now have against present US forces and sufficient letaliatory capability to serveeterrent even if tbe postulated US AugII force is deployed in the.
The total number of large missiles andiffers among the three forces. In Force 2A. we assume that new large silosilos so that the maximum number ofnd new large silos. In the two other casesuinc that some new large silos are constructed to augment the existingorce before retrofit of existingilos is begun. In Forcee postulate an addition of SO large silos to iheorce which gives an ultimate foicc levelnd new large missiles. In Force 2C. weew Urge silos to theoice. which raises the number ofnd new large missiles.
Similarly, the total number of new small missiles and SS-lls differs among the tliree forces. In one force, we assume that
',IA HISTORICAL RtVIEW PROgSP'
new missile is retrofitted inloilos and the total number of silos would remainn the two other cases, we assume (hat new small silos are built al ICBMOne hundred new small silos arc added lo the SS-lIs in one force, whicha combined force level; the other forceew small silosombined total.
nother principal difference among the three forces is in the type of MIRVs developed and the timing of their deployment.
orcessumes that the Sovietsachieve an early IOC date for an accurate MIRV. MIRV payloadsVs. CEP) would be introducedew huge missile andew small missile innIRV system would be deployedew large missile in the. The SLBMs would be outfittedIRV payloads stalling
Forcessumes that the Soviets are successful in developing MIRVs at an early date but do not at first improve the accuracy over current missile systems.IHV payload with an accuracy of. CEP would be deployedew large missile starting inIRV payload with an accuracy ofm. CEP wouldew small missile at the same time. More accurate MIHV payloads for the, new large. CEP) are introduced later in Ihe decade
Forcessumes that the Soviets do not deploy any MIRVs lor several years but instead deploy additional deliveryICBMs andcompensate for ihe
absence of MIRVs in the near term. AnMIRV5 nm. CEP) isew large missile in then Force 2C
eployment stops ataunchers in all three forces.
Two alternative SLBM forces arecntcd for Forcesnd 2B.ssumes that the Soviets buildlassandonger range missile for It.ssumes that constructionlass submarines stops atnits andew SSBNs which carry there deployed Two alternative SLBM forces are presented for Forcelso. They differ from the two SLBM alternatives included inndn two aspects: (a) they includedditional SSBNs and (b) they do not have MIRVs
The current bomber force is reduced somewhat through attrition in all three forces, and the Backfire is deployed starting4 By the,ear aircraft carrying ASMs andackfire would make up the ir.tereon linen tal bomber force.
Forces 2A, 2B, andre intended lo show possible variations in tho size andof Soviet intercontinental attack forces during, if the Soviets place major emphasistrong retaliatory capability and in addition seek some improvement in counter-force capabilities. They havecpa-bihties. although Forceould be :ome-what more potent than Forcesndn theecause by then it has accurate MIRVsarger number of delivery vehicles.
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ILLUSTRATIVE FORCE MODELS 2A, 2B. AND
Nem- Small Missile
Bear ASM Carrie
This MIRVEP. in Forcend. in Force 2B.
Dow not include silo* at Dcnuhuy* Mid Potoomayst.
This MlltV hniCEP. in Ferca. in Force 2B.
' The number ond type nfhij submarine will cany have not been determined.
are dillerinft view* im lhe mission oice
HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS7
ore* ModotoonlWoec*FORCE MODEL 3
i we did irt5 70 ivtuT.ncnu)
Force Model C) we have included a
which illustrates tlie type of effort the
would have to undertake if uSey placed ^
priority onapability to g
US Minutcman force while at the 1M 1M
time retaining enough weapons to attackt
military and industrial targets. This3 ) )
would provide by theMRV.) ) )
capability to destroy morennk
ol Ihe US ICBM force presently
the bulk of which we assume will by then,,
he Soviets would probably chooseX .
course only if they believed that an
ment in their strategic defense jjq
order of Model IV in NIE 00
reduce the destructive potential of surviving
US missiles and bombers to anIII *
level. The defensive imptoveroenU would include (he successful development of ASW
measures and bomber defenses as well
ABMMissile 0 The counteriorcc capability of Force 3
Alt renal fc* t
results primarily bom the Increase in
large missile deployment and the
ofilos with anEP) BoeuVn MO
ASM Camcr .
jThe retrofit program wouldBomber 15
4 and be completed 30
to achieve the desiredercent kill 80
ability of the hardened Minulemau silos,
count erforce capability of the large-
must be augmented by new smallnot include- silos ai Derarhnya and Pervo-
which have an accurate guidance
0m number and type of noilfi (his sobmann*
will carry bawe not been dnier mined
he SLBM and bomber forces of m or. us* pcimory mum
3 are similar to those in Forces tot
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
Soviet Courses of Action Withou! Arms ControI
e do not coowder either of thelimiting cases toikely Soviet course of action. It seems mi probable that if the US went ahead with something hke its programmed forces the Soviets would accept the deterioration in their strategic positionin Forcet may be, of course, that the Soviets will have to settle, at leastfor reduced retaliatory capabilities as US programmed forces are deployed, but we do not think they would do soatter of choice. They would be unlikely to limit their forces to 'he levels ofn Ihe absence of an aims control agreement, or evenacit one. We also beheve (bat the pace of Soviet technical advance will lead their forces by theell beyond the limited advances in Forcend finally, although die Soviets have been concerned to hold down military spending, we beheve that they are unlikely to feel compelled to reduce expenditures for intercontinental forces appreciably below cunent levels.
24S. Wc also consider it unlikely that the Soviets would come close to the levels of effort illustrated by Forcexcept possibly in responsereakdown in SALT followedS force buildup substaritially larger than the ones depicled ins representing likely Soviet perceptions of the threat. We think the Soviets would consider the costs to be too heavy and the likelihood of stimulating offsetting US counteract>on too great. Moreover. Soviet efforts have notthe sense of urgency that would be apparent if the Soviets were in fact now planning the development of Force 4.
o think something likeould be unlikely. Recent Soviet efforts have been directed primarily at developing systems tn penetrate US ABM defenses and al im-
provements in force survivability and give no indication thai development of hard target capabilities is to be given increased emphasis. Moreover, we doubt that the Soviets would pursue the single-minded effort to build up counter force capabilities as rapidly asin Forcethe high cost it wouldthey felt they could cope more adequately with Ihe US Polaris ami bomber threats than appears likely, at least for some time in Ihe future. They would also hav? to be concerned that the US would react touildup with large new programs of its own to ensure the survival of adoouate retaliatory forces and perhaps to increase US counterforce capabilities as well.
Birring an arms control agreementignificant slowing in projected US strategic programs, wc believe that the likely Soviet course of action would be somHhing like the levels of effort represented in theroup. Each of these forces has been modeled to preserve strong retaliatory capabilities against US forces at levels ol expenditureto current levels. The Soviets could achieve something less or somrthing more than (he capability of those forces depending on who is doing the viewing, on what kind ofhe Soviets deploy, and on (lie cxrenl to which tho US increases or decreases pro giarnmed forces in the future. The Soviets may opt for the introduction ol accuralcm. CEP) as early as possible. This objective is best met by Force 2A. whichaccurate MIRVs at the earliestfeasible date.
ither (he accuracy improvement or the MIRV development program could, of course, slip. If the Soviets get an early MIRV but are delayed in attaining significantin accuracy, they might go in (he direction of Force 2B, deploying the MIRV when it becomes available and improving its accuracy later. Forces also representative
TJA HISTORICAL REVIEWRELEASE AS SANITIZED
tho kind of force that the Soviets might deploy if they are less concerned with keeping pace with tbe US. If it should take the Soviets5 to finish their flight testing of adelay which we consider much less likely than the delay in attaining improvedbelieve tbe Soviets wouldattempt to compensate by continuing to build mote hardened launchersIHV becomes available In this case, the Soviet forces inight look mote like Force 2C
ut these projections are necessarily illustrative at best. There are reasons why the Soviets might be willing to settle at least temporarily for rates of force buildup below those illustrated by Forceheir lead in
numbers of ICBMs present and projected, for example, might cause them to believe they had some ealra leeway. On the other hand, some Soviet leaders would doubtless seek larger forces because ol iheir commitment to particular weapon programs, because they perceived opportunities to improve the USSR's ovciall stratcgicposiuon and bargaining poweris Ihe US, or for some other reason. In any case. Ihe Soviets are almost certain in the course of theoears to cmbatk on some strategic programs of which we presently have httlc or no inkling. As in the past, the Soviets will doubtless continue to makeprogram decisions which we find hard to explain in terms of clear-cut rrtihtaiy ot political goals
COMPARISON OF ILLUSTRATIVE FOllCE MODliLS OF SOVIET INTERCONTINENTAL ATTACK FORCES (DELIVERY VEHICLES.
Bear ASM Carrier
This MIRVEP. in Foreendorcend Forco 2B.
n.m. in Foicend
ICBMal Deraihnya and Penronayalc are included in the SALT fore* but Dot in the other*.
This missileEPn. in Force 2C.
This MIRVEP. it. Force SALTorcendnd.
in* fcbMtype ofthis submarine -ill carryot
'All. CEP.AH. CEP.
There arc differing,n the mission of lhe Backfire (see
*tlA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROfjM RELEASE AS9
APPENDIX TO SECTION X
ILLUSTRATIVE FORCE MODEL PROJECTIONS BY
ILLUSTRATIVE FORCE MODEL PROJECTIONS BY
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
The alternative force developments presented in this Appendix representdirections that Soviet intercontinental attack forces could take. It should be emphasized that we consider no one of them an estimate drat Sovietattack forces will be composed of the particular weapon systems in the precise numbers listed. They arc intended only to be illustrative models of possible trends and differing emphases, and as sveh are not suitable for military planning purposes. For Defense planning purposes the reader should consult the forthcoming Defense Intelligence Projections for Planning
No- Large 0
. CEF. 0
. CKP. 0
force model la illusirnuVeossible trend and emphasis, and, as such is not suitable (or military planning purpura. For Defense planning purpose* the reader should conauK the forlhcominK Defense Intelligence Projection* (or Planning
ilus al ICBM complexes and ICBM siloscrnihnyn and Pervomaysk.
ares on lhe misaion of the Backfire (see
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SALT FORCEin Id-year)
Tbis force model isossible trend and emphasis, and. as such is not suitable for military planning purposra. For Defense planning purposes ihe reader ihould consult she forthcoming Defense Inente Projections for Pianninc
ilos at ICBM complexes and ICBM alios al Deraihnya and Pctvoinarik.There are dilferiruj views ou the mission of the Backfire (sec
VlNWSIORirilRW PRC RELEASESANiTlZ"
utside SALT" (miii-yeur)
Boar ASM Carrier
Iwec mode* ia Illustrativeouibie trend andnd. aa Mat lamill tanForlannmcIht reader should consult the lortheom.nn Detente inieiligcnc* Pronctiorsii-i-
nol odode aOoai
la.bcoU-M, aa U> ta, poaaaeyof these subr-annc* (see)* bchtvach
Iheeen aangnederipheral etrik* role
number and type of maailea lb* aubosarttc -illean deterea.oed.
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
4 0 0 0 0 2 4
foico model I. IHuiuaUreoa.lbla trend andnd, a. auch .aa-.Uble (or military pl.nnin.
oU lhcInWHenw Projection* (or
1 Dora not ineluda siloi al Deraihnya and Pxrvomayak.
.) Itbd^ho-ever, toal by Ineve, -ill Kaneripturral (Uiha role
ol bora dele.-ur.td
WtM or. tfce tabur* of Ik. Bj.ikl.re (act
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(arcomibtr Uend .ndand.fa laublt for militaryU*Mi MW";'Projection.
'ot include aflc* al Dr-raihnya and Per.omayak.
y thehey will have been alignederipheral alrika role.
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nd type of miaalle, UMot been determined.
hereon tho mlaaion of th. Backfire (tee paragraph*
forcewitie salt *
Now SSBN/SS-NX-8 .
on. not Include
TfaU force model
New Large Mobile
New Small Missile
Beat ASM Carrier
force mudel is illustrativeossible trend andand, as such is not suitable for military planning piup.-o. For IM.-nsc planning purposes Iho reader should consult the fmtlieominri Uelcnsc Intelligence Projection* lor Planning.
ol tideDcrnhnyn and Peivnmaysk.
- Tlicrc is considerable uncwUinly asvn Ol thcuc submarines (senl is believed, however, lhat by ihehey will have bocn assignederipheral strikerie, number midmiles this submarine will carry have not been determined.
are differingon the mission ol the Biu-kliic (see
HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS7
iteltitencc Projections for
- This IW model i8 illustrative-ossible trend and emphasis, and. as such is not suitable for military'he raador should consult the forthcoming Dclense Inlelheencc Projections fn
Does nol Include *ilos ol Dciaxtiriya and Pervoiniytk.
" There waneerUinty as to Che primaryof those suhmam.e* (seet is believed(hat by thehe, -ill have been alignederipheral lU-,fcehe number and type of missiles this submarine willave not been determined.There are differing views on lhe mission of the Backfire (secJ.
TOr :racCIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PfiCt^B* RELEASE AS SANITIZED
GLOSSARY Of MISSILE TERMS
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GLOSSARY OF MISSILE TERMS
This Appendix is virtually the same asfxceptefinition of nuclear system weight has been added, and one on probability of kill has been doleled.
TRAJECTORY ICBM (DICBM)
An ICBM system launchedrajectoryuch lower apogee than one launchedormal ICBM trajectory. The only Soviet DICBM. theods retro-fired (tee definition beiow) juit prior toto increase th* re-entry angle and deboost the re-entry vehicle (RV) onto the denied target.
FRACTIONAl ORBIT BOMBARDMENT SYSTEM (TOSS)
A FOBS is placed Into orbit and deorbited on the taigel prior to completion of the? first revolution. lis opcrolional and controlarc lilt* llioao for attt is deployed on Oin ground, largcted prior to launch, and launched with intent to attack. This concept is contrastedultiple orbit bombardmentOBS) which would be deployed in space. launched into orbit with no immediate commitment totargeted after launch, or retargeted as necessary.
INERTIAL GUIDANCE SYSTEM
A guidance' system that is complelelywithin the missile and has no linkround station after launch. Two principal elements of such guidance systems are:
device that measures the musue's accelerationivenThree accelerometcrs mounted at right angles to each other can measure the entire acceleration profileissiles powered flight.
device that measuresof the missile twayeference direction Three gyroscopes mounted at right angles to each other can measure any movement ol the missile during powered flight.
Ale-tpercentage of themissile force that is maintainedondition of readiness.
Circular Error t'nihabltindei of accuracy defined as the radiusircle centered on the intended
HISTORICAL REVIEWELEASE AS SANITIZED
within whichercent of themissile warheads are expected to fall. Tho otherercent of successfully arriving warheads ate expected to detonate within Vh CEPs of the target.
Initial Operational CapabilityThe date on which the first operational unit is equipped with Us weapons and capable of carrying out an attack.
Maximum Operational Range
(Air-io-Surfacerangethe launching aircraft and the target at the time of missile launch.
(Suifaee-io-Surfacerange under operational conditions withweight indicated. In the case of ballistic missiles the maximum range figuresthe effect of the earth's rotation.
Reactiontime required to launchiven readiness condition. The time requiredunction of the type of system, the mode of deploymentard ornd tlie checkout procedures used.
Refiretime required toecond missile from the samo launcher.
RE-ENTRY VEHICLES AND WARHEADS Ac-entry Vehiclepartissile which carries the warhead and is designed to survive re-entry into the earth's atmosphere and detonate on target
Multiple Indcpeudentty-targetable RVsor more RVsingle missile payload package, with each RV capable of being directedeparatepoint
RV which has tho capability to maneuver during free flight or reentry.
Multiple RVsor more RVsingle missile payload package. The individual RVs are dispersed but not independently-targeted or maneuvered.
technique whereby the RV is deorbiled or is deboosted outormal ballistic trajectory.
Ballistic CoefficientRV characteristic whose valueunction of the RV weight and shape and is defined as the weight of the RV divided by its drag coefficient and area. The speed with which on RV passes through the atmosphereas the ballistic coefficient Increases. An RVigher ballistic coefficient is less susceptible to the re-entry errorby tlie effects of wind and densitythe atmosphere. Re-entry vehicles with lower ballistic coefficients are lessto the effects of prior nuclear bursts in the impact area,ind. dust, debris; arc more adaptable to hardening against the radiation effects of attacking ABMs; and facilitate the design and packaging ofweapons.
Warheadweight of thesystem of an explosive device and of its sating, arming, fuzing, and firing
RVweight of the warhead plus necessary shielding and structure, of any internal penetration aids that may be present, and of any other necessary orcomponents of the RV including hardening.
Throwweight of that part of the missile above the last booster stage. In the cascoi MIRVs or MHVs, lor example, throw weight would include tho weight of
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRArV RELEASE AS7
MIRV o. MRV release mechanism as well as that of the RVs.
Forcepercentage of Ihe operational missile force that, in the absence of countermeasures, will successfully deto-
nate in the taiget area. This is the product of alert rale and weapon system reliability.
Weapon Systempcicent-nge of Ihe alcit missiles that willdetonateEPs of theirThis is the product of launch, in-flight, and warhead reliabilities.
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ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET INTERCONTINENTAL WEAPON SYSTEMS
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SOVIET SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE
Maximum Opersuonal Range
slorablc liquid slorableliquid
Re-cniry Vehicle Weight
Nuclear System Weight i
MUsile CEP About0.5
nalvo Time 1
Time to Fire
ould be ready tor deployment byut -capon system IOC would depend upon th- avail. Abilityaunch platform.
discussion of thenf
' Baaed on analogy with US systems, these nuclear system *ci*.huercent of the mid-peinl of the range showneights, and are rounded. This spread reflect* our uncertainty as to how muchoviet RV package islo such things as casing, heat shield, etc.
System CEP includes both rnia.lle errors and submarine position location errois.
Pertains onlv to submarines on patrol.
Timeaunch of first mfculle until all misfilra arc launched.
Time required to proceedpecified readiness eondiUon lo launch, after receipt of order to fire
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SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES ESTIMATED CIIARACTRR1ST1CS AND PERFORMANCE
Speed AptxeD- Serm Opera-
Submerged male Shaft and Tuina Uooa Depib Lccc-th
Noma! opiating depthefined aa lhe depth toubmarine mar proceed an unlimited number ol limes. Dunn*ubmarine eaay eireedrplb U> anpoint approachinc collapse depth aod Hill mi .or
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Average NormalfDuration Speed Idayt) (knots)
BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE
KANGAROOTH-TO-SURFACE MISSILE SYSTEM ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE
titude0 feel)Sjatem Weight A. SOOs.sOOpounoi
Corner Aircraft/Number f Miatllea
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
iii. doejnml wenbyrelij copy ii lot Ilia infoiir>clioii ond use ol ibe lecipcdfllOflCM under hissed-io-lnow boai. Addi'iona'.hjing oflkioli within rhen respective dvccrirnc*:
kr o(d Retectd. 'CirtrtCMtole
b Dimeter. Defense InlflHigumyicelbootfCf/ of
Dviupiv wiu';>'uii<!ii ol lhe ioini Ciiil* ol Staff e Atustoil ChiefS fee lriicliicjercc> f thj Army, 'cr lhe
Deportment al lhed. Asi'iioni One* ol No>oloreportment ol lhe
o. Ass tlonl Chtel of Stall. Intel <ige"o. U'Ae,uof 'he At* Farce!
f Directorntel ligttneo. AEC. lor lhe A'ctiielroclor, FBI. foi Ifie feJuiv' Director of NSA, lo: tht. Nalion<il Security Ag-.n.
i D'raetrrr of Sclcntilic Intelligence, CIA.yt or Agency
2 Jhii document may be retained, orurting in occordcmce -ith applicobe securityc returned re 'he Ceeirs inieiltgenee Agency by oi.-niiye^wil wilh Iho Oil ice ofige>-ce. OA
this document is d'Sieminuled oce-icci.verseas recipientsiieriod no) Inol one yeuc. A: ifr endis period,should either be destroyed, retwiieu to the no-ding agency, orshould bo requeued ol thegency is reoin il in2
trill of Ihii document when used ieco-ulety ne-tn 'hehould be ctco-
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Noimi-ol Security Counciltit-enl ol State Depo'lment ol Defenseargy Commission Fedciol Bureau of investigation
TOU SECRET'Original document.