THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM (NIE 11-1-71)

Created: 7/1/1971

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NATIONAL

INTELLIGENCE

ESTIMATE

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED

The Soviet Space Program

GCCIlCT

NIE1

NS

JILHLI

LSl!?MITTED BYDIRECTOR OFONADRDONCURREDYUN'TED STATK

gene, organizations participated in Ihe preparation ot

The following intelll the estimate)

ThoMllgMM Aoenc,he tmmgmm0Imeet, of Stole ond Oefeise, and the NSA

The Dee-rr Ow.rto/ of Control Irttdligcrtte

Ihe Director of iMeiftaeor. end Research.

ThenlelligerKe Aoeney

The Director, Nelional Security Agency

The AssiHant Geneiol Atanooer. Atomic Energy Comminion

Abstaining;

The Assists lo the Ducdo'. Federal fJureoo oflflesils^le of hu jvrndkJion

L

HE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM

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CONTENTS

Page

THE PROBLEM 1

SUMMARY OF KEY JUDGMENTS 1

5

I SOVIET SPACE ACTIVITY DURING THE PAST TWO S

I) POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS AFFECTING FUTURE

6

and Management'6

8

III. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL 9

9

Vehicles

C High-Energy

SpacecraftIt

SupportIS

K. Non-Nuclear Power Sources for

C- Nuclear Power and Propulsion

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H Communication* Systems lor Space

I. Command and Control for Space17

IV. FUTURE PROSPECTS. - 16

A.

anned Space Station

C Planetary

l>rui

E Manned Lunai

F- Applied Satellites

C- Scientific Satellitef

V. INTERNATIONAL SPACE 24

A. USSR-European24

B USSR-United25

ANNEX A. SOVIET SPACE ACTIVITY

ANNEX B. SOVIET SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLES

ANNEX C. SOVIET CHRONOLOGICAL SPACE IATC FOR THE PERIOD9 Throngl.1

srcna

THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Soviet capabilities and probable accomplishments in space over theoears.1

SUMMARY OF KEY JUDGMENTS

A. The Soviet space program continues to rank high amongefforts and to be relied onrincipal instrument (orthe image of the USSReading technological power. While the highly successful US Apollo program blunted theimpact of their achievements in space over the past two years, the Soviets doggedly continue to propagandize their space ventures in nn effort to improve their image. And they have achieved some noteworthy "firsts" during the period, one being (heir unmanned lunar vehicle. Lunokhodhich has been traversing the Sea of Rains area and transmitting data back to earth, and another Wing the Salyut/ Soyuz manned space station operation.

e* aie Ia ^sraJ IM

'The dollarderate ofonducted in .he US.

B. Wc judge that Soviet expenditures on their space program peaked oul about Iwo years ago and. burring some unforeseenarc unlikely to exceeder year for the next several years. This leveling off is due for the most part to the nearmg of eom-

1 Inanaule - 1- ch arc

hi* nf NIC

*OP OCCRC-T-

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pletion of (wo mujor launch vehicle development programs, andof their associated facilities, which have been underway for several years. These are the large SI.launch vehicle which was used recently lo orbit0 pound Salyui craft, and (he very large; booster which we refer lo as theehiclc" which will, among other ventures, probably be used to place men on the moon. There arc shortcomings in both of theseecord of success hascn impressive, theehicle" has failed both times attempts were made lo launch it, and the Salyut/Soyuzission ended in the death of three cosmonauts. To correct the problemsin these programs may require the diversion of resources from some other segments of the overall program. This, in turn, would resultlowdown in some of the less important programs.

rowing body of evidence of budgetary pressuresSoviet space program and disenchantment with the large sums

hem in

ing spent on (hat program. Further, (lie political leadership may the wake of recent failures, especially that involving the denth of three cosmonauts, be shaken in the confidence it extends to those managing the space program, and be disposed to delay new activities unless more solid guarantees of success are provided. At the same time, the Soviel leaders surely feel compelled to restore to their space program some of the prestige they enjoyed earlier. Thus, we judge that Soviet efforts inver the coming years will have to be justified on the basis of either, or both, of two criteria: I) are there demonstrabler military benefits to be derived; or,an the venture be exploited to capture international imagination. Al the same time, the technical feasibility of certain ventures must surely be questioned in light of thend Salyut/Soyuzhistories. We belu-ve that the future of the Soviet space program is being reviewed by Soviet leaders with these factors in mind.

in their program the Soviet) exploited launchwere developed originally as boosters for ballisticWith these rugged, powerful, and reliable vehicles theytoeries of "lusts" with payloads that did nothigh degree of sophistication in their development. Theythis course about as far as they can go and must nowtheir technologyigher level if they arc lo carry outmissions they appear lo be considering. This may not

come easily. The poor success rate they have experienced over the last two years in missions using new launch vehicles and spacecraft systems suggests thai the Soviets arc pushing their present technology to its limit. Their awareness of shortcomings In their technology may account for their refusal to announce the purpose of any payload prior to its launch and (heir insistencearticular payload in orbit is performing as expected even though we are well aware that it is not. Furthermore, the Soviet space program is so widely com pa rtmen ted in its organization and lacking of any apparent centralized direction that those factors by themselves surely aclottleneck loand rapid technological advance Nevertheless, we believe that the Soviets will press forward in space matters, using advanced technology when it is available or resorting to the "brute force"when it is not.

Up until recently, efforts by the US to induce the Soviets to cooperate i'i the exchange of space data or to participate in jointhave met wilh limited success. Recently, however, somehas been noted in the Soviet attitude and in ihe future they may become more cooperative. In doing so, they will likely seek lo get the US to contribute in those areas where they feel they can gain some insight into US technology and management techniques that will work to their advantage without their having to admit to any shortcomings on their part.

F. Looking to the future, we estimate thai one of the ventures of major importance that the Soviets will undertake wilt beong tenn. multimanned space station We eipect them to make steady progress in this program throughout the period. TheSalyut/Soyuz operation may have been intendedajor step in this direction. The deallts of (he cosmonauts on Soyuz II, however, willerious effect on this programrolonged standdown may ensue. The emphasis on planetary exploration apparent since early in the program will conlintic and more sophisticated andmissionsaunched to Venus and Mars. We also expect them to carryery ambitions unmanned lunar explorationAs attractivegrandf the planets may be during the optimum period that will exist forission, wc think it unlikely that Soviet technology will have advanced far

emih! lour" Jnvolvm ubyntie, Solum. UmtMri,Neptune by an- tpieeciaft.

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cnough by ld.it time forission to have an acceptable chance ol being successful.

C. In spite of the factanned lunar landing mission would be anticlimactic in light of the US Apollo program, it is believed thatission remains on the books but that it has been delayed. It is unlikely thaiission will be attempted. When it is undertaken, il may be the precursorrogram aimedthe establishmentanned lunar base, which we believe is one of the long-term goals of the Soviet program. Prior to tlie manned lunar landing, the Soviets will continue toariety of unmanned vehicles lo explore the moon's surface and report or deliver data back to earth.

II. Throughout the period the emphasis now given to military-related photographic and electronic reconnaissance payloads will almost certainly continue. The Soviets obviously attach great im-portancc to these systems. And they will almost certainlyatellite navigation system for naval use. More advancedand meteorological payloads, capable of serving both military and civilian consumers, will be orbited and we expect that much at-leiition will be given to ihe survey of earth resources by satellite means. This latter program is one wheicin the benefits to the economy can be clearly demonstrated.

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DISCUSSION

I. SOVIET SPACE ACTIVITY DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS

I During theean the Soviet (paces retained (he high prioiity among major national objectives that it has enjoyed since its initiation The steady annual increase in the number ol launches noted over past yeiiontinued0 andhereotal olaunches0 compared lo9 andhus far1 there haveaunches that have occurred since: "The Soviet SpaceatedOP SECRET. ALL SOURCE, was isiuixl, can be grouped Into the following gen-eral categories: Launchesirect or indirect military application (categories.

Numdqi

Catkioby

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- Applied imiin- tUons.

luvifiaUon. and rnrttwo-

X Manned flejHa (carta.Salyutl

A Scientific leaiili orbit only) .

unar *rxfprnfMi Oflcaiivr. iN-Itjivp, rwuibi:

nLbralioB

7.

and part ofontinued to constitute amaiority of the launches over the past two years and the capability to perform military-related missions was considerably

2 Some cvenis can be classified as "fiisfs" of the type that capture world-wide interest: the Soviets landed an unmanned spacecraft on Ihe moon,oil sample, and returned it to earth; theyunar rover vehicle.that been transmitting data during lunar days; one of their spacecraft made Ihe firsl and only transmission ol data from ihe surface of another planet,nd they orbiled the first manned spacethe Salyut/Soyur. operation, which, even though it ended in the death ofew icoord foi the lengthanned orbital flight (overhe latter almost certainly was in-tendodajor step in Ihe developmentruly long duration manned station. Ttiough the Soviets have concentrated their public relations efforts oo these eventi Into improve theirpace matters, the overall international impact of these events has been diluted by USduring the same period.'

ai)edimon ol Soviet Mix" Uiinchei overail iwo fttH.

II. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS AFFECTING FUTURE PROSPECTS

A. General

n deciding the future of their space program, Soviet leadersituationany other since thru program began Up until the successful Apollooonin the summer0 the Soviets hadigh degree of world prestige that .stemmed direclly from theii series ofspace venture* Since that event,Soviet accomplish incur* in space have not been accorded the esteem throughout the world that was the case earlier. This situation must be Irritating the Soviet leadership and they probably are determined to alter it

herelittle doubt that the Soviets intend toroad-based effort in space. Soviet leaders, including Brezhnev and the Piesident of Ihe Academy of Sciences, Keldysh, have rnpenledly stressed theof then space program from both an economiccientific standpoint. The directives foi5 five-year plan, published in April of this year, revealed no new space program but did reaffirm Soviel commitments in several areas of spaceThe directives call for:

"the pursuance of scientific work in space so as to develop long-distance telephone and telegraph lines, television, metooro logical forecasting, sludy of naturalgeographic! research, and the solution of other economic tasks with the use of satellites, automatic and mannedand the continuation of fundamental scientific research on the moon and planets of the solar syslem "

As in the past, no reference was made tospace programs, as such.

5 On tlie other hand, implications of buds; etary pressure* on the Soviet space program

continue lo appear. Further, there arc signs of disenchantment on the partarge segment of the Soviet populace with the sums being spent on space activities at the expense of consumer goods- This sentiment probably Is growing. Several Soviet articles published during the past year seem to be defensive reactions lo criticism of the space program. These articles tiy to assuage theby stressing the practical economicof spaceofearthemphasizing the comparatively low cost ol the Sovietlunar exploration program whenlo the US Apollo program.

hus. Soviet leaders probablyeed to align their space program In the future so as to enhance national prestige and to: i: emphasis to ihe economic value of the program. At the same time, they will continue-to emphasize thosu military related spacewhich they feel ate essential to their security. In doing so, however, Ihey probably realize that they cannot effect any basic changes in the overall nature of the program Iot the next few years but may be ahleffect some realignment in the prioritiesto various missions over the longer run. Tint number and types of missions that the Soviets will undertake in the near term will probably be limited as much by authorized priorities as by technical constraints.

B. Organization ond Management

ue to the secrecy surrounding these pro grams, including the Soviets' wish to hide military space activity, we have limitedabout the precise structure of the USSR's organization of its overall spaceand its management. So far as we have been ableetermine, Iherc is no single organizational entity that is tolally In charge of the space effort and, for thathere is no single entity that is totally in charge

7

any one specific program. Wc havehowever, several organizations andwhich play significant roles in one or more aspects of the overall program.the nature of Soviet society, these entities and persons are situated throughout the upper echelons of the Communist Party, the national government, civilian industry, the Ministry of Defense, and the scientificExamples of this diversity andinclude Ihe Politburo, Paity, Ustinov, the Military-Industrialthe Ministry of General Machine Buildinghe Strategic Rocketnd the Academy of Sciences. These organizational features appear to:I .ri in mission planning; hardware specification, design, production, and use; command and control; and postflightand adjustment.

he MOM was cieated5 and was given the industrial controlling authority for

space and missile production and almost all research and development) connected therewith. The MOM currently operates or oversees the principal design bureaus and production plants, and we believe that one of the primary objectives behind theof the MOM was to upgradethe spacein terms of timeliness and adherence to spcti-ficalious. Over the pasl six years the MOM probably has accomplished much of theupgrading, bul long-slnnding problems in supply and management still exist and show no likelihood of disappearing completely. We attribute these difficulties in part both lo ihe. organization of live space effort, as well as to its management, and wc suspect thai this basic lype of problem is repeated in other portions of Ihe overall program outside the MOM.

il. The culmination of this type ol problem is clear in the catastrophic per forma nee record of theaunch vehicle, in the failure ofvehicle" holh times launches were at-templed, and to some extent in theprogram. Thefirst truly complicated space launch vehicle the USSR hasanseries of failures between7 and0 (see. The random nature of Ihese failures also is clear: they could not be attributed to any obvious Oi easily remediable cause, orny oneof the system. They appeared to result from shortcomings in quality control during production and in test and checkoutalthough we cannot eliminate faulty designause.

e judge thai if the MOM (andoilier improvements in Soviet spaceand management since IOCS) had not existed8hewith theight have been worse and might have taken longer to correctihe first failure of the

ior sccurr

extremely complicatedin the same time period. We do not know what caused it to explode. Furtliermore. although it has been nine years since the photorecoo-naissancc program began, many of Ihesestill experience various subsystem failures which almost certainly reduce payloadsignificantly. We believe that these problems in then thend in die pttotoreconna dunce program imply Serious organizational and managmcnt dilfi-culties.

though theow appearsproperly most of the lime, wethese difficulties have beenWe have no evidence of anymajor changes in the organizationalstructure of Ihe space programjudge that in the near term, despite theshortcomings, the USSR will keepeffort organized and managed insame manner as in the past few years.knowledge ptccludn aas to whether or not theand management structure isto build, operate, and evaluatecomplicated spacecraft that will befor the missions we believe theyfor Ihe fnlure. Should itbe inadequate. It almost certainly willlimiting factor in the USSR's space program.

C. Economic!

expenditures (or space rosefrom an9 lo an estimatedaboutillionillion)although (ho increaseas not as rapid at it was in earlier years.

* The dollar talon airof wfcel tbe SciO spacewould real if condonedhe US. If ihe official rate ofilii Mould understate ccmiiderably ihe magDituilr of the ScWI ipicr cfforl rtfKOUeddollar I.

Jasedost analysis of the hardware used in the various programs which thehave already initiated as well us those they are likely lo pursue in the near future, and taking account of Ihe pressures to reduce the spending on space, wc estimate that the Soviets are unlikely lo exceed the currentlevel of spendingillion mbles over the next few years. We think it equally unlikely, however, that expenditures will drop significantly during the same period in view olIuit? of the present and oncoming programs which will probably keep theof launches required at about the level established over Ihe past few years. Total space spending tends to vary in proportion to Ihe number of launches involved but theis not exact. For example, there waslight increase in launches0 over liJG'J hut launch costs decreased slightlyfewer large, expensive vehicles were

IL Co*fs associated wilh the launchpace vehicle can be estimatedair degree nf conlidence but costsf new systems are more difficult to assess.1

a

Basedignificant part of Sovietfor space.

c believe that the Soviet spaceiseriodmallereffort than has been undeiway for about theean. Theengthy period ol failures, now appears to be more reliable and should not require further funds for its development. Theehlcle" and its associated facilities have been underfor so long "hat that program must b" considered as having passed the three-quarter mark inof course, the "J. vehicle" experiences an extended period of several years ol flight test failures, as did the

onsequently, expenditure* on the order required lo develop thoseillionillion)diirint;be released for other space^ more advanced pay-luads II"'. situation would allow for cither an Increase in launch operations without an in-CrMM In spending.light decrease in spending if launch activity remains al nlxnii the present level. We do not expect the So-vlets In iiiidertake another Mrnil.tr program for developmentew space booster. We are unable toonfident prediction ofafter5 f"

III. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL FACTORS

in the past, the Soviet spaceto rely heavily on boosters lhalinitially for weapon systemsvehicles have proven useful lor aof Space ventures, principally becauserugged nature and their reliability.the program, these boosters allowedlo orbit payloads which wen:standards of those days. Thisthe Soviets toeries of payloads that didpushing the stale -ofeart Inof components andwete simultaneously smallhighly reliable. By now. however,have about exploited ihnto the limits of its utility.ress forward in spacewe Ihink they do, many missions willmore sophistication in the hardwareof the progiam than has beendate.

Vehicles

space launch vehicles whichdeveloped fiom missile systems and used

in the Soviel space program in the.past arc discussed in Annex B. In this pait of the paper wc will discuss only the two launch vehicles which lave been built in ihe past decadefor thend iheehicle" Both of these systems arc quire large and complex, and could be usedariety of missions, but both haveserious developmental problems.

heas failed infaunch attempts. The failures wetc notto any one stage or component of the system. Seven of the Intt nine launches of theave been successful, suggesting that the problems are nenrtng solution.the cost of Ihe vehicle and tho number of tests involved, thorogiam has been very costly.7

With its estimated lift-off weight of about IS mtllton pounds, thes the largest booster ihe Soviets have used. Con venttonal propellanls ire used in all stages of the vehicle. It has been usedhree-stage version lo place0 pound "Protoncientific satelliteow-earth orbit and to orbit0 |Kiund Salyut craft.our-stage configuration, II hits placed0 poundsow.earth orbit. The fourth-stage engine hasestart capability that has enabled the Soviets lo put0 poundsrajectory to the moon. This capability will also allow them lo put fi.OOO poundsynchrunouiased on recent successes, we Judge that theow ready for useariety of unmanned space ventures.

his vehicleifferent case- Il exploded during its first launch at-

ntiiruto tKat each launch of Oieosts t'ic Cqui>ak-rilillion.

ircular. above ihein ill* plane n( I'm- Kguaior. Al this altitude, thefipncwall would tip equal Id the rotation? earth and Ihe ipncitciafi would bi* essentially st.iLOimyivenon tho earth.

tempt, 1'ittits Ix-foro or shortlyilt-olf. Jivl caused eitensrvc damage to the launch pad, which hat not been completely repaired after nearly (wo years. On1 il was tested again, probably from the adjacent launch pad, and again it failed. This time, however, the failure occurred well after lift-off and it is highly unlikely that any damage was done lo the launch pad. This vehicle is much laiger and more complex than theused on our knowledge of the level of technology used in developing the US Saturn vehicle, the problems encountered, and the nature of the solutions, It would nut be loo surprising if the Soviets find theehicle" problems very difficult to correct.

heehide"hm observed in Decern7 att Tyuratam, hence

us Mick name. All estimates ol its capabil-

"Jhave

assumed conventional propellanti in iH stages and current state-of-the-art in engine

he booster consiststages and is estimated to be capable of placingounds in low-earth orbit0 poundsrajectory to. or beyond, the moon. We estimate that the firstillion toillion pounds of thrust, the second stage aboutillion pounds, and the third stageillion pounds. The final stage probably developsounds. The gross lift-off weight of the vehicle is probably on the order ofillion pounds (Sec

ehicle Characteristics

eOJCOce writ) Sir* if tojulpccd wth (OfirttiUni.il upper KOaei h tmigi wiper rtoacs

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its problems arc solved, aIbis size and capability will enablelo canyide varicly ofunmanned missions which requirepayloads. These could include alanding mission,eryspace station, and unmannedof distant planets. Even moremissions could be flown if thisweiotilize high-energyits upper stages. We cannot make aforecast as to when the vehicle willfor use.

C. High-Energy Propellants

Soviel development of high-energystages, such as used by the US, svouldgieally the payloads lhal could be launched by thendchiclc. Recognizing ihis, the Soviets have foi the last decade been progressing slowly with several approaches to high-energy rocket engine de-vclopmeni. We believe the majorefforts arc underway atl Khimki and at Ihe rocket engine test facility at Zagorsk. These are considerably behind the schedule we estimated for them in. Lesser efforts are probably underway at test facilities at Zelenugorsk and Ni2hnaya

Toxic I'rvpellants Facilities foi teslengines using high-energy toxicprobably fluorine compounds, have been available at Khimki for several years. The te.il facilities appear tn he capable ofengines with thrusts0ounds.

Since Ihe first try for an operational fluorine engine probably wouldelatively .small one, (he Khimki engine probablyhrust0 pounds or less.

ad development proceeded smoothly, tlie Soviets might haveluorine engine ready for flight testing by now. Inell known Sovietexpert stated that tlicy were having "big problems" wilh fluorine, and it is likely that the program is well behind schedule. Wc do not know the extent of Ihe problems, and sve have no basis for estimating when aengine will be ready for flight tests-

The facility at Zclcnogorsk was equipped4 to test small rocket engines using toxic propellants. Fluorine propcllant tests have probably been underway there foryears. It isikely test-site for propellants containing beryllium.

Ltauui Hydrogen. Hydrogenctivity has been underway at Zagorsk for several years and statie testing is believed to have begun about two years ago. Theis estimated to generate0 pounds of thrust. Engines generating such thrust would beuseful in upper stages for Ihend themaller engine with0 pounds of thrust isievcd to be under development. If the test program proceeds smoothly, either or bolh of those engines could be ready for flight lesiing this year.

Another hydrogen engine dcvelopmcnl piogram probably got underway al Nizhnaya Salda sometime last year. Evidence of progress at the lest sland there suggests that thowillhrust00 pounds.moothprogram, it could begin flight testing as earlyear or so later is more likely.

An indication of Ihe emphasisitigh-energy propcllant that utilizes liquid hydrogen is the growing evidence of an intent In produce and transport liquid

+

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arge scale Construction ol large plants, probablyroduce liquidis underway at the three knowncenters in the USSR: Chirchik, Navni, and Tolyatti. The Chirchik and Navoi plants are. of Tyuralam and Tolyatti is near the Kuromoch test facility where much of the static testing of engines for space vehicles takes place. Of these, Chirchikto be ready for production; Navoi and Tolyatti are at least two years away fromA fourth plant, similar but notto the other three, is located about. from the Dnepropetrovsk missilefacility.as probably been producing liquid hydrogen for several years.

ere is

some construction activity going on at theaunch area at Tyuralam which could be interpreted as indicating the installation of facilities for handling high-energy propcl-lants.

ll things considered, however, we think it is unlikely that development of high-energy upper stages has progressed far enough for the Soviets to begin flight testing them on therehicle in the near future. If Ihe Soviets develop high-energy upper stages forehicle, we estimate that the hiss dense fuel would require greater volume in the tankage than the present version line the iCMilling vehicle would bet-iller than the present one. In order to serviceehicle, the service platforms on the gantry atould have to be

repositioned since the service-entry points Into the vehicle would be at different heights than on the presenl one. Such changes have not occurred. (Sec

D. Manned Spacecrofl

oviet spacecraft design clearly differs from lhat in the US- Whereas US designs arc lightweight and sophisticated, usingalternate subsystems redundant to one another to achieve reliability, ihe Soviets have built spacecraft that are heavy, cleaily not up to US standards, and that rely on system redundancy by duplication to achieveThis approach has been valuable in several ways. It has enabled the Soviets to accomplish many "firsts" in space. It has.limited their activities in olher ways. For example, flightseviation from the prc-sct program have not worked well. In general, the Soviet philosophy in spacecraft design restricts the extent to which the cosmonaut can control the spacecraft.

M. Soyuz.7 the Soviets have been using the Soyuz spacecraft in their manned space flights. (Seehis vehicle has proven to be quite reliable and. in comparison to its predecessors (the Voslok and thet has many advanced

shape provides it with someaerodynamic lift, allowing it to beduring re-entryorethan was possible wilh Vostokwhose shapes provided nolift.

has an onboard piopulsionenables it to perform maneuversmbit, including those necessary forand docking.

has the radar and otherfor rendezvous and docking.

filXRCT

Figure. 3

Soyuz Configuration

Cosmwaul's Work and Rest Area'

Reentry Capsule

Itom commodious "living" or "experiment" compartment; Vmkhod was rather cramped.

e It has more provision for control by the cosmonaut! than its predecessors.in the Vostok and Voskhod hsd virtually no control over the operation of the

f It uses solar pa neb for power supply Batteries were used in the other spacecraft.

g Its life support lyttcmonsider' ably greater capacity than did earlier ones.

hese Improvements have enabled the Soviets to undertake moie sophisticatedthan were possible with the Vostok and Voskhod, including rendezvous and docking, crew transfer, and orbit adjustmentas svel) as longer misflum tli.it were dearly impossible- In tho past.

he ipacceraft dow, however, suffer from several deficiencies which will limit Us usefulness if the Soviets Intend to use it in more ambitious undertakings. Among these arc:

a Poor VitibilUu. This problem is SO acute that manual rendezvous and dockingifficult opcralion.

b. Siae Whereas the overall volume of the vehicic is adequate, the "commandis quite cramped when occupied by three men Furthermore, the Soyuz basic life support system appears to be limited to aboutys To stretch the flight beyond that point, various spacecraft subsystems must bend replaced with added lifeequipment.itor example, both Ihe docking equipment and the rendezvous radar system were removed,

srcflff-

Attitude Control. The- spacecraftype of altitude control system which is Hither simple to build but is far more difficult to use for docking than the system used in the US Cemnu program. The system is adequate for automatic clocking but is very exacting when operatedosmonaut and mayfor the difficulty the Soviets have had in docking manually.

espite its hliorlIhe Soviets

show every indication of continuing to use the Soyuz for manned flights. The Salyut/ Soyuz operation suggests that one of its main uses will beferry" vehicle lo resupply or man orbital spaco stations. We do not rule out the possibility that the Soviets may rendezvous and dock two Soyuz craft to test subsystemsfor use lu space stations. We have no evidenceacoverahle'1 spacecraftollow or to Ihe Soyuz is being developed.

aluut. The Salyut craft which is now in orbit is estimated to weigh0 pounds It is repotted to beeet long,eetdiameter in its largest section, toorking spaceubic feet, and to use solar cells and batleries for power. The crew of Soyuzas able to move directly into the Salyut craft through theinn having to go outside lo make the tiamfer The vehicle lv reported to have various types ol life-support systems aboard and to be comprised of seveial compartments, including airtight working and habitation areas. Other areas arc provided foractuator systems, and scientific equipment The ma for life support systems probablyuperoxide environmental controlitemtoied foodandnd stored water. Tlie vehicle may incorporate ihe atmospheric-condeus.ittrm am) urine-reclamation watersystems like those tested in the one year ground trial conducted in the Soviet

Union three years ago. If the vehicle does use Ihe superoxide ECS. it may have the capability toreweneriod of several months

E. Life Support Systems

The superoxide atmosphere revitaliza-tion system used in all Soviet-ma noedto date has been tested foran-days in continuous flight andan-daysontinuous ground trial The ground test data demon si in led thai three men could he maintained in cabin cnviionment conditions, similar to that found in the Soyuz spacecraft,ix-month period. Furthermore, thehaveethod for packing superoxide compounds more densely than heretofore; we believe they are using this rriethodology in back-up systems forcontrol in submarines. Wc estimate ;hat this more efficient packing could allow three to four times as much chemical to be storediven volume This means that greater quantities of superoxide can be storedpacecraft, subject lo the limitations of available expendable weight at launchesult, Soviet use of higher density lifeexpendables would significantly extend tin- mission lilrtimc of those Soviet manned spacecraft whichuperoxidecontrol system.

Atmospheric condensation and urine water recovery systems have been tested2 month period on the ground The results of this trial demonstrated that when used in combination wilh the super oxidecontrol systempacecraft, such as trie ingle or double Soyuz configuration, these water lecovery systems could provide nominal potable waterhree men- The first operalional flight test of the atmospheric condeuution system, during the Soyuz 9was only partially successful and was nol (he major source ul drinking water during

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lhat (light. Kued weight of hardwarewcf requirements would not he limiting factors for inclusion of these watersystems in the Salyut spacecraft.

he Soviet! havehree-man tii-month ground testhysical/chemical life support system which regenerates water and atmosphere. The weight and powerof thli system rules it out lor use in the Soyuz program and male it impractical for operational use in the Salyul. We doubt thai this system is ready for operational use, bul it could be in about two years. The most likely use of this system would be in long-duration multimanned space stations Large enough to provide the powerystem requires.

Power Sources

expect the Soviets to continue tocells, backed up by chemicalthe principal source of electricalspacecraft for several years.expected in both elements We haveon any developmental workin the USSR on fuel cells of theon US spacecraft

Power and Propulsion

Considerably greater payloads could be sent to interplanetary distances if the Soviets were to develop nuclear power andsystems. Wc do not know whether or not tire Soviets urnuclear rocket engine. Prototype nuclear engines would have lo be testedemote location and would require large amounts of liquid hydrogen as the fuel

A Urge facility, nicknamedt the Semipalatinsk Nuclear WeaponsGround hat been under observation forhan seven years. One of several postu-

lated functions for the facility is that it will tcrvcest stand for nuclear rocketA possible liquid hydrogen production plant has been observed at the provingain Support Area some. away. However, many features of PNUTS hasv not been identified and the relationship between variousnclear. Then much more complex than the test standi in Nevada where the US tested nuclear rocket engines.

ased on available evidence, no linn protection can be made regarding flightdatesuclear rocket. If such ais bong developed, we doubt that It could be ready for use before the mid-lGSOs.

there Is very liltle directofevelopment, weonsiderable interest inpropulsion systems which wouldn.iclear power source forThe Soviets have recentlyoperationhermionicgenerates several kilowatts ofWe believe that this is areactor Although probablydesigned, it is neverthelesscomplete thermionic reactor toestimate that if the Soviets choose tothey could0 kilowattim in space by Die late l'J70s. Athis output would be adequate asof electrical powerugeor as power for electricalplanetaryuclearadioisotope powerbe available in Ihe mid- to.

II. Commonicalions Systems for Space Operations

USSR's space communicationshave remained relatively unchangedTheyide variety ol different

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space com muni cat ions systems, coveringi:roup tlsey secsn sufficient with minor tipgracltngi. lo handle Soviel command and control lequiietnents foi space operations well into.

The unified Ullr' space communications system which was inlruduced in theontinues tn be the most fleaiblc one in use

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3

"3The system's flexibility allows it to he used in eaith orbit distances and beyond The Soviets employ iho system on payloads such as 'he Soyuz vehicles, Molniya satellites, lunar probes, and interplanetary probes. Such use almost certainly will continue for the first half of the decade at least.

3

I. Command and Control for Space Operations

The USSR't eapabiuty to command and control its spacecraft has improvedover the pasl several years and will almosl certainly continue toew missiim control center, lefencd to in Soviet press reports either as the "Flight Control Center" or as the "Manned Flight Controlas been identified. This centeronly flights which are manned or man-iihiled and appears In be coequal to tlie much older Coordinalion-Computation Center which handles unmanned missions.

The network of space tracking ltalions for near-earth missions has continued to growast several years. In addition to the eonstiuclimi of new stations, antcnn.it. Jnd

3

SCCBLT

The two new space event support shipsagarin and Korolev, will provide the Soviets considerably more mission support flexibility and capability. Both vesselswill have significant improvements over other similar vessels in the Soviet fleet in technology and mission capability. Therecently began sea trials and may be ready for deployment by late summer. Tho number and size of the Gagarin's parabolic antennas, together with the alttence of aland-based tracking station in the Western Hemisphere,ery strong indication that the vessel is intended to support lunarThe most likely area for this support activity is the Western Hemisphere, near Cuba. The Korolev has been deployed, going first to Havana and thenosition off Nova Scotia where it supported theSoyuz operations.

o major improvements have been noted at Ihe installations which supportvehicles. Based on the reports on Venusowever, the Soviets apparently are now capable ofpace probe's very weak signal, and their processing capability apparenlly has been upgraded. There is no evidence the USSR is planning topace communications antenna larger than those, al Yevpatoriya used for interplanetaryoted Soviet expert on deep-space communications recently slated that such an antenna might not be needed since increased power and more directional antennas on the Spacecraft, reduced data requirements, and the introduction of better data-codingcould make the present system

IV. FUTURE PROSPECTS A. General

ur near term projections are based, when possible, on the extension of trcmb; which arc now evident. We can make, some

confident projections based on theand capabilities of hardware that is now available or is in late stages of development. Other projections stem from our analysis of indirect evidence on studies or experiments being conducted in the USSR that have some application to the space program. In other instances, we project on the basis of our appreciation of the Soviet state-o'-the-art in various hardware areas and its application to space ventures which we lielicvc the Soviets would like to undertake, but on which no direct evidence is available-

In Ihe long term, however, the future of the Soviet space effortoliticalGiven Ihe pressure on the leadership to make programs demonstrate their "coste think it unlikely that the aggregate expenditures on ihe space effort will increase Expenditures are now atigh level however,ide variety of ventures could be undertaken without any cutbacks. An orderly development ofprograms as herein set forth couldhe accomplished with no increase inand might be supported with decreased annual resourcetretchout of the various programs would, in fact, lead to substantial annual savings over Ihe current level of expenditures. Central to these judgments is our belief that the Soviets will not over the next decade undertake the developmentew large space booster, and thai the pacing item for some of thewe postulate as possibilities will be the development of highly reliable and durable spacecraft subsystems.

We think it is likely that the Soviet space program is being reviewed critically by the leadership end that some. rity Ii is Ien, oi will be, made.

Allhough wc believe that military-relatedwill continue to receive major emphasis, we have no good evidence on how other more

SCCRC*

ventures will be arranged in any priority listing, or what criteria will determine the priorities. In the following, therefore, wo diseuvs the various ventures the Soviets arc likely to undertake and estimate the dates when they could be attempted; we do not,atter ol course, attempt to determine what priority the Soviets have assigned to any particular one in relation to others. In making these projections, we haveigh level of success in activities leading uparticular mission. Delays and failures can, of course, occur at any time, especially when new hardware is involved. These could delay

b) r;ir Of SO.

anned Space Station

For several years the Soviets have been discussing the advantages to he gained by orbiting manned space stations. They state that such stations will have extensivein the areas of agriculture, forestry, weather prediction, oceanography, geography, geology, astronomy, and studies of tbein ourpace station which could serve these purposes wouldighly desirable venture fnr the Soviets to undertake as soOn as feasible; il would serve to restore some luster lo their space program and could offer some pay-off in terms of the economic benefits derived.anned space station will almost certainly be used to augmentaspects of the Soviet military space

Long-Duration Stationn its three-stage configuration, theas demonstrated the capability to place0 pounds in low-earth orbit. This weight would be adequate fnr tbe"core"ong-term space station. It is conceivable thai the cosmonauts would be

mi.-ii" wli--:

launched but, as was the case in the Salyut/ Soyu/ operation, it is more likely that the crew would be sent up in feiiy vehicles to rendez-

vous and dock wilh the main clement after it had been determined that it was in orbit ami functioningtation of this size could probablyix to eight man crew for four to six months, using present lifesystems and equipment. The mission could be extended somewhat if the new water recycling systems were used or if Soyuzwere used to resupply themaller crew would alsoongerThe Salyut/Soyuz operation wasintended to be the first step Inrogram.

erry Large Space Station. There is no evidence, direct or indirect, suggesting that the Soviets plan to useehiclepaceprogram. Using conventional propellants, that vehicle could be used lolatform in orbit that would weighounds; with high-energy upper stages, it would weigh on the orderounds. Considering the costs involved inchicIe program and Ihe advances that could be made in aput up by thec estimate that if the Soviets do plan to useehicle lopace station in orbit, they will wait until Ihe subsystems requiredruly long-duration manned station, capable ofcrews for many months or even yean, are available. These wouldlosed water, air, and food regenerative life support system which we estimale will not be available until thet the earliest.

n pursuing cither of the abovethe Soviets may see tlie need toore advanced "ferry" vehicle than the Soyuz.

C. Planetary Exploration

e believe that the Soviets will tiy lo use every availableuring the period of this estimate lo send probe* of one

M'iixl of time during which conditions are most favorable for launchingarticularin.

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20

Ot another to Mui andariety ol minion*oin bit', ami wc cannot judge which will be imilctlakcti

ats. Twit mode* ul exploration of Mars ate cuiiently within Soviet capability:bitcrehicle placed in orbit around Mars couldariety ofdata such it measurements of Ihephotography of live surface, and Other data valuable lo planning lor further eiploiatioti of tlx-oft lander could carry out scientific eaperiments. photograph the terrain, relay data to eailh. and provide data valuable lo the planning of even more ambitious missions Kit Iter of these missions could be attempted during3he Mars II ami III vehicles, now on their way after having been launched byay be intended to carry nit either or both of these missions.

ore ambitious venture, which could be within Soviel capabilities by the time5 "window" opens, wouldoverMuch of the information gained either by an orbiterander mission as well as the hardware developed and the experience gained in tlie Lunokhod mission wouldanover couM carryariety of eapcrimeriti, includingmeanirementi and analysis of soil from separate areas, that would not be possible with either an orbiter or vim pie lander mission The journeys that ihe rover could lake would be restricted, however, because of the delay in round trip communications lime resulting from the distances involved This delay rangesoinutes, depending upon the position of Mars relative to the earth Thus, the exact position of the rover must be known at all times. Ihe distances and timing of any travels mml Ix- carefully programmed, and Ihe "slop-go-stop" signal) mutt be passed al precise in-slanccs, taking into account Ihe delays

erhaps Ihe most ambitious mission to explore Mars lhal could be undertaken during tbe period, would be one lhalample of ihr planets toil and returned it to earth. This would require mayw. across-the-board advances hi all aspects of Sovietlect-sology. especially those affectingihe payload would have to remain viableeriodays- Moreover,apsule weighing,ounds lo beto earth, the million wouldpacecraft weighing on ihe Olderounds at the time It landed on Mats. The thrust required to deliverayload wouldehicli) equipped with high-energy upper stages. For these reasons, we estimate thatission will almostnot be feasible liefore5 Marsnd probably not unlil later in the decade

Venus. There seems to be littlelot the Soviets to repeat Iheission, principally because the data it traiisrnitted con elated closely with that sent by their earlier Venus probes aa well as the USillion. The nest bgical step in their Venus program would appear toore sophisticated lander mission. Theould bo used toayloadto survive within the hostile environ-menl for al least several hours and having more power for liansmlssion of dala than Venushe limdei could relay qualitative and quanlitattvn data on llie composition of Iheurface nut yet obtained by either the US or the USSR. This mission could be attempted when the next window to Venus occurs in

We have considered the possibility that the Soviet! willgrand tour"f Ihe plaru-ls duringeriod

and trail"t-by ofiSaturn. Uranus, anj Nrptunr by spacecraft. So:l- avkc fl lanvnntilrii-

tca:im--!

when Ihe planet* are in ihe relative positions required (or viichventure. We think It ii unlikely that they will have advanced faxevelopment of the long-life, highly reliable spacecraft subsystems required tn assureission of this duration and scope would have an acceptable chanceing successful.

D. Unmanned lunar Exploration

oviets have discussed ihe valuein refold approach to unmanned lunar exploration mid. based on their activities to daln, we believe they will fellow essentially that program. The first objective tliey dis-cussed waseluctc on the moon that couldample of the soil ami return It to earth, the Lunaission did this. The second objective was exploration of the lunar surfaceobile vehicle;s doing this. The third objective is the landingarge, stationary experimental platform that could serve asaselarger, more sophisticated experimental apparatus; this remains to be dono.

he design of Lunand ihe (light profile it followed limit the areas on the moon to which the vehicle can be sent Futurein this category will piobably involve more advanced payloads which can be landed lo take soil samples (rum virtually any place on the moony surface that Is visible from earth.

Thexperiment haslhat the rover can travel at least five miles andseful lifetime ol at least six monthi Another mission of this type probably will ly attempted this year toifferent area of the moon than the Sea of ftaim now hcing explored

A nc.ich more sophisticated and complex mission which probably would satisfy the first two objectives of ihe program as well as going far to fulfill ihe third would be one that in-

volved features of both Lunand Lunokhodnission, two payloadsent lo (he moon; onender/return vehicle, iheover. The rover could ea-tract soil samples from relatively distant areas, carry out certain measurements or otherandackage to thepayload which would ihen return to earth. Because of the weights involved, this mission would require twoo delivero payloads orehicle.nlikelyission of this lype would be attempted before the.

E. Manned lunar landing

Evidenceoviet minned lunarprogram has been accumulating for several yean. From that evidence wc could assess the progress being made in the program andteveml years ago Ihal the Soviets were not competing with the US Apollo program.

It is possible, however, that they may have hoped to take advantage of any majorlite Apollo program might havelhat would have allowed them to be Ihe first toan on the moon withouttheir program beyond acceptable limits. Ihe success of the Apollo program has ruled out that eventuality. Furtlier, whatever their timetable forission, it has certainly been delayed by the failures ofehicle There is little doubt that they intend to cany out ihe mission; the evidence onehicle and the obvious intent lo use it for manned missions, the construction of large, sophistl-calcd tracking facilities, and the improvements observed in their communications capability aro nil directly applicableanned lunar La ml mg und are quite persuasive. The major remaining question is its liming.

Repair work athere damagefrom the explosion during the firslto launch the vehicle does nol appear to

be proceedingace commensurate wilh an urgent, high priority program. Further, the long interval between the first and second launch attempts, and the fact that the second effort wasailurc, suggest that inherent booster design problems may be involved which will necessitate changes lo the basicDespite these problems, the Soviets will almost certainly feel obliged toe development of this type of launch vehicle. Abandonment of the program would seriously curtail the types of missions they couldFor example,ehicle of this type,ould be unable to carryanned lunar landing mission.

hatever the case, these failures have almost certainly delayed any missionsthis launch vehicle for at least two years and have delayed for an undeterminable length of lime any plans the Soviets may haveanned lunar landing. We think it is highly unlikely that any attempt to carryanned lunar landing would be made.

he Soviets could attempt such aeither by the rendezvous and docking of two vehicles placed in orbit by twopropellant versionsehicle which would then be elected from orbitunar trajectory, or by the useehicle wilh high energy propellant upper stages. The launch dale will not beaffected by whichever version is used. We believe the Soviets would precede (he actual launcheries of launches intended to test system reliability and to man-rate the system, including the spacecraft. During this time they mightannedflightanned mission to orbit Ihe moonoriod of time and then return to earth Data acquired on these preliminary flights would allow ns toore precise

estimate as to tltc likely timing of the lunar landing mission.

Soviets have been discussingbenefits thai could be derivedpermanent or semi-permanent mannedTheyunar base as beingfor advanced studies in Such areas assolar radiation, and the effectsol extended activityniqueWe believe lhat toward the end ofthe Soviets will have progressedin the various scientific andrelated toenture (oto carry out the first launchesacility on the moon.

f. Applied Salelliles

n the field of applied satellites, pholoieconnaissance and EMNT systems will continue to enjoy the highest priority. Wehowever that increasing emphasis will be given to other applied satellites, especially those for communications, meteorology, and earth resources survey, during the decade. This latter group represents one area of the space program where tho tangible andresults to be obtained can be used to counter complaints about ihe resources being devoted to the space program.

Pholoieconnaissance. During the coming years we expect the -Soviets lo continuephotoreconnaissancc satellites at about the same annual iate as that observed over the past two years. We also expect the trendlonger duration missions to continue, in both the high- and low-resolution programs. Minor improvements in the efficiency andof the program will probably result from more flights having (he capability to vary their orbits and from minor adjustments in on-board telemetry' and camera systems. There arc no indications that any major progiam changes, such as multiple-bucket spacecraft or signif-

leant improvement in ground revolution, arc Imminent.

Improvements of these types would re-qinieew spacccrolf with significantin instrumentation- it couldnot become available until the. By the, the Soviets could have the technology toystem lo relay col-lecled data to ground stations on abasis.

c believe the Soviets wiR continue an energetic ELINT program throughout Ihe decade. Late in Iheollow-on ELINT collector may be developed to supplement the third generation system now being deployed

Two yean ago Ihea notice with the InternationalRegistration board lor two newwith supporting giound stations.will employ Ihe same payehicle somewhat improved1 and using higherof these systems will have theol Western comsal systemsinc. One system,nvolve One vehicle placed in aorbit over the Indian Ocean. Tbe% reportedly will use threehighly elliptical orbits. We hadfin! launches or precursors tor bothto gel underway last year butnot. Wc nowem to bethis year but further delays wouldsurprising.

S3 The highernable2reater number ofthan Irs predecessor and increase il* en-

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tatsionars electronics are expected to lie similar to those ofts announced or bit, however, will preclude complete COv-eingc ol the northern laliludes of Ihe USSIt. Thus, Statsionar may be inlended forrather than national service andompetitor to IntelsaL

3

IfWe believe that the largebeing made in the Sovietsatellite program will result ingrowth and improvemenl in thatover the coming years. New andsensors will be employed and data collection and analysis will become moreparticularly as new computers arc more extensively used. Satellite data will be exploited more effectively lo meet tho broad scale weather requirements al the military forces.

mprovements in the near term will probably include better systems forof dataear-real-lime capability to relay collected data to Soviet military units and ships, as well as to civilian consumers,lt*>al basil. Late in the decade thepiobably willeteorological payload in synchronous orbit.

Earth Resources Survey S'OcUiles. The Soviets are giving serious consideration to tlie inoli t* that can be derived from an earth resources survey (CHS) satellite program. The types of experiments being considered by them forystem appear to parallel those suggested lor similar US systems.and spectrophotometry would be used (or hydrological. glaeiologieal, geological, uceanographie, agricultural and mineralogies! surveys, as well as botanical studies.capable of performing an adequate ERS mission may also have the capability tomilitary related missions, such asintelligence, camouflage detection and discrimination, or ocean surveillance.

We believe that the Soviets will launch their first ERS satellite within the next five years, possibly by the end of (his year. One way they could accomplish this would be by including an ERS package on one of their present metsats; this would be the simplest approach and could be usedaunch late this year. Another way they could do it would be to adapt one of the metsat payloadsure ERS function; some of the equipmentdeveloped for use in Ihe melsat program lends itself to use in an earth survey role. This type of payload probably could be orbited at any lime. Finally, the Soviets may elect toompletely new spacecraft for this role:that event we would not expect the first launch

A considerable number of earth resource experiments and observations will probably be conducted by manned space stations when ihey become fully operational.

Otlier Applied Systems. Throughout the period we expect the Soviets to continue lo improve many of the other applied systems nosv in use Tlicy will almost certainlyavigation satellite system In operational status and they will probably try to broaden

tlie use ol such systems; toward Use end of the period they couldun (lopplcr type navigation satellite system for use by aircraft. During the period they may investigate the use satellites for monitoring such things as: missile launches in foreign countries,nuclear detonations wherever tlsey may occur, and the movement of ships andat sea.

G. Scientific Sotelliles

scientific exploration ofhas alwaysosition ofrelative to other activities In thespace program. Wc do not expect itgiven any increased priority duringdecade. There will probably behowever, in such thingsinstrumentation, experimentdata handling capacity of Ihe systems.

V. INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION

A. USSR-European Nations

USSR and France have beennot too successfully, inventuresumber of years.reason for cooperation probablyol prestige, while the Sovietsto gain from French technology.the difficulties encountered stem fromon the part of the Soviets touseful design data to thehortage of French funds. Theled to slippages in some jointcancellation of others.

he most notable joint experimentby these two countries Is the laser experiment onsee

lierc has been some cooperation in the meteorological field- It has enmivted nl

25

vertical rocket progiam, using Frenchlor studies of tlierogram of balloonby the French which has been used by the Soviets to correlate with some of the data collected by their metsals. Tlicsehave been successful.

The French and Soviets have alsoin television transmission via the Soviet Molniya system. The program has been of little importance and has probably not progressed beyond the test stage.

One of the more venturesome joint programs was tooviet-launched probe to Venus which woulderies of balloon-like objects intended to float in the Vonutian atmosphere and transmit data back to earth. This progiam probably has been cancelled.

ome French equipment is beingby one of Ihe Mars probes now on its way to that planet.he Soviets also plan toeries of satellites this year and next which will carry French instrumentation. These are intended to study Ihe spaceas well as the effects of space on components of the spacecraft. Ko specific dates have been announced for these

e expect USSH-Fiench cooperative ventures to be continued over the next several years at about the same level of activity and degree of technical sophistication asby the joint missions undertaken thus far.

ICO. Except for limited eollaboraliuii with Poland and Chechoslovakia in backgroundon space physiology, ihcre has been little true cooperation until recently between the USSR and the Fast European nations. East European scientists have often slated that they received mure information from the US space program than from Ihe Soviel pro-

gram. This dissatisfaction among the East Europeans may have accountedoviet relaxation which became apparent with the first lnunchingt of tlie9 and the "Vcrtikal" rockets

most recent Soviet initiativecooperation has been with WestAn agreement has been proposedcooperative effort to collect data onobservations of space-relatedsuch as trying to determine theearih's magnetic field has on the

B. USSR-Uniled Stoles

Nearly all past efforts by the US to induce the Soviets tu engage in cooperative or joint space progiams have met with limited success. US proposals haveariety of areas, including the exchange, of data On biomedical problems, planetaryand solar and cosmic physicsThe Soviets agreed2 to theof satellite-acquired weather data but they still do not support fully their part of the agreement This delay was probably caused by technical difficulties in their Mctsat program and their reluctance to admit it_

There has been some warming,in ihe Soviet attitude toward cooperating with the US on the exchange of space related data. At the request of Ihe US, talks between US and Sovie: delegations were heldo discuss the desirability ofSoviet and US rendezvous and docking systems for manned spacecraft and spaceThis initial meeting considered thearea* in which compatibility was required and it was agreed that the precise details should be handled literorking group level. An initial agreement along these lines was confirmed in December by an exchange oletween Dr. Low, Actingof NASA, and M. V. Keldysh. President

;6

(lie Soviet Academy of Sdcnces. In ameeting between Dr. Low ami Keldysh. broader arous for cooperation were discussed.

This more cooperative Bttitude was most recently nunifestod in the spring of this year when the SovsetX began contributing biomedical data for useointly prepared monograph on bioaitronauiics This wasabout three years ago but ihe Soviets had not been loithcoming until now. Thus, there is the possibility Ihal the Soviets will piovc to bo more cooperative In the future than they have in (he past.

There arc, however, at least two factors which tend to justify continued sixpticism. First, the Soviets have used their successes in space as evidence of their technological parity with theimportant "publicfactor toully cooperative agreement would require an admission on their part of technological shortcomings.

econdly, the Soviets have yet todetails on the specific ob|cctives nl any

one of their apace launches imlil the mission is successfully underway. In many instances, the extent of the intended function ol ahas not been announced until after all applicable data have been collected andThe Soviets are most reluctant to admit that any mission may have failed to achieve its objectives, claiming that virtually every launch fulfilled its mission "as planned" even though It is clear to us that many of (heir missions have been only partiallyor have failed completely. Thissuggests ihal the Soviets would be rciuc-tant to .iitet into any cooperative spacewhich required them to declare theission prior to launch.

or these reasons, we believe (hatooperative program is implementedthe US and the USSR, the Soviets will restrict tlieir contributions to areas winch do not reveal their shortcomings They willask 'In' the US inputs be in those areas where they feel they can gain some insight into US technology and technique* olthai will work to their advantage.

SOVIET SPACE ACTIVITY

9 THROUGH1

Monned Space Flight

I. Inhe most complca manned space mm km everby the USSR was attempted when Soyux,ere launchedach had two cosmonauts aboard whilearriedignificant portion of the mission was to involve the automatic rendezvous andofndhe observation of this procedure by the crew of Soyuznd the cosmonaut-controlled rendezvous ofith the other two.

2 The five rendezvous attempts madethe mission all were unsuccessful for several different reasons. The first failedl he automatic rendezvous system would riot indicate tadar lock-on betweenwo orbits later the first manualattempt was made but it was broken off altersed more than the authorized amount of altitude-control propdLuit Amanual attempt, made the neat day. failed becauseid not properly control its lateral velocity relative to Soyuzhebyo carryosmonaul-controllrd rendezvous ivith the oilier two spacecraft failed because of insufficient tlmv to correcthree kilometer out-of-planc separation between it and the other vehicles The final manual attempt at rendezvous and docking betweenas poorly timed and the vehicles could not establish the cotrecl interval and relative velocity be-

tween them requiredocking operation before they entered the earth's shadow.

hile not engaged in theseefforts, crew member! of all threewere busyariety of other tasks. These activities included scientificspace technology tests, and tests ofspacecraft systems The most interesting scientific experiinenli wereobservations coordinated between spaccbome and ground observations. Space technology tests included navigationaland the much-publicized welding-ln-spacc experiment. The latter was performed automatically in the living com[>artment of thepacecraft which had been vented for the operation; the only function of the crew was to retrieve the caperimental samples

4 On three occasions during this mission anDt at continental ballistic missile (ICBM) was launched from Tyuratam as thepacecraft was passing over that aiea| ^

jjjlf this were aexperiment it would appear to haveapplicability since in each instance the bunch occurred at night; it is doubtful that the missiles could have been detected had the launch taken place in daylight

oymhis mission,rew of two. was launched in0 'Ihe flight was one of the truly "working* missions lhat the Soviets have attempted, despite the many

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that (hey achieved during past flights. Many condiments observed were relatedto space station applications andwith emphasis on determining the effects of long-duration flight on man; the flight lasted0 man-hours).

6 Other experiments involved theof sonic earth resourcesvaluation of star tracking and on-board navigation techniques, and testing various operational modes ol the spacecraft. Considering the many experiments that had to be rescheduled or cancelled, the list of undertakings set ioi this mission appears to have beena characteristic of many Soviet manned flights in (he past- This could result frompre flight simulation of the mission or unrealistic mission planning.

Thelight raised some serious biomedical problems. The cosmonauts had no major pioblcms while in orbit, but didserious aftereffects which lasted for several weeks. These included disorientation, fatigue, pain in the extremities, difficulty in movement, and an imbalance in then blood chemistry.

his event was carried out betweenndpril, this year. (Seehis operation, although notsuccessful, appears to have been Ihe initial step inarge manned platform in space. Onpril, the unmanned Salyut vehicle was pu(ery low orbit by anooster. The altitude of the orbit was so low that the vehicle could stay in orbit only about two weeks.

9rew of three, was launched onprillightly higher orbit than that of Salyut. After somein the orbits of both vehicles, an at-

1 Limited dari was collnclni relating lo meteorology, geology. hydo4uKy. oecanoitrjiphy. and Kei>Bia[iHy.

lompl to dock the two spacecraft was made onpril. Some misalignment of the two craft prevented completion of the final phase of docking

"^Further difficulties were encountered in attempting to disengage the two craft and after release had finally been effected there were no further attempts at docking. This operationeriod of two days and Soyuzas recovered late onpril.

t appeais thai the mission was tothe tiansfcrrew member, or members, from Soyuzo Salyut,ew docking device that would allow the personnel to move directly from one vehicle into the olher without having lo go outside lo make the transfer as was the case earlier in the Soyuz program. Had the docking elfort been successful, the mission would probably liave lasted somewhat longer. After Soyuzas recovered, the Salyut was maneuveredigher orbil-

lsorew ol three, was launchedune. The vehicle was placed inlo an oibil coplanar wilh that of the Salyut. Soyuzuccessfullyendezvous and docking sequence with Salyutunerew transfer was reported completedew crawl-di rough docking adapter.

While they were aboard the Salyut, the crew carriedariety of scientific and technical experiments and activitiesto the operation and useanned space station. And, in spite of difficulties

hcyew mannedendurance record olhe overall mission,in disaster. While attempting toSoyuz craft from the Salyut vehicle onthe cosmonauts had

] Prior

lotheir ri-cntry procedure, the cosmonauts depressurized the living com part-ment of Ihe Soyuz to check whether or not tlie hatch between II and the re-entry capsule was effectively sealed and it appears that they were satisfied that it was.f"

If ire occurred almost an hour later and*thc re-entry capsule separated from the living compartment of the Soyuz7 CMT. The reentry capsule landed in the Soviet Union at5 CMT and TASS has announced that all three crew membeis were dead when the capsule was opened and thai Ihe deaths were caused by dcpiessuii/alion of the reentryalyut vehicle is still in oilut.

he- Zond Circumlunarince7 the Soviets have carriederies of unmanned launches which we believe to be directly relatedanned circumlunar llight. So far the lasts havecheckout of Ihe spacecraft and its systems, mission control procedisres. andand recovery techniques. Throughout its history Ihe program has been plagued by problems wilh theaunch vehicle.

as launchedree-return ciieumlunar trajectory and the qaacccrafl was recuveied In the Soviet Union afterontrolled skip-out after first encountering the earth's atmospliere upon return and then truly re-entering on the second eracounter. This event appeared toull-scale precursoranned event; thefor this mission (including an early-abort capability) was much mote extensive than for previous Zond launches.

ear laler. onas launched on essentially the same type of mission. This mission may have been scheduled torew aboard hut the chronic problems wilh theoosterpreventedlight In this instance, the Soviets chose to lest the re-entry of the spacecraftallistic trajectory ralher than to use the skip-glide technique. The vehicle re entered the atmosphere from ihe Northern Hemiipheir instead of from theormal ballistic trajectory, and splashed down in the Indian Ocean Thismode is less desirable than one which allows recovery in ihe Soviet Union hut is an allem.itIvo lhal has been proven leasihle in ihe event something goes wronglight that requires lhal the spacecraft be tracked from within the USSR during the final stages of the flight just prior to re-entry.

he Zond circumlunar program was probably originally undertaken (along with the unmanned lunar exploration program) lo blunt somewhat the world-wide impact of the US Apollo piogram. llecause of the delay it iiat suflered. however, it appears that very little public relations value could be derivedanned cirvumlunar fight al tins time, althoughlight may be undertaken asrecursoranned lunar landing mission.

C. Unmonncd Lunar Exploration

Since our lasl estimate, (be Sovietlunar exploration program hasew phase, involving the use of theooster and more sophisticated payloads. The prime objectives of this series of lunar probes arc to develop techniques for maneuvering in lunar orbit, to conduct surface experiments and. in some instances, to bring back samples of lunar soil.

Lunaas launched on9 and was successful up to the attempt at soft landing Onuly it was inserted into lunar orbit and four days later it crashed in the Sea of Crisis after initiation of the final descent program We believe that the objective of this mission was tooil sample and il probably was intended to compete wilh the Apollolight.

hroe consecutive attempts to launch lunar orbiters or lunar landers were made over the next year, but all failed, lot one reason or another. Despite these failures, tho Soviets tried again on9 and Lunaas successfully placedunarThe vehicle was inserted into lunar orbit and succenfijlly soft-landed in the Sea of Fee-tilrty oneptember. Afterrilloil sample weighing about seven ounces and placed itecoverable capsule. Other minor experiments were also performed including radiation and temperatureand surface observations.boutours alter landing, the Lunascent slage was launched and the payload capsuleimple ballistic trajectory to earth, landing in the USSH.

arrying the self-propelledvehicleseeas launched on0 andsoft-landed in the Sea ofater. The vehicle contains equipmnnl Inrthe properties of the soil, for measuring extragalatic sources of radiation, and for tak-

ing televisionrench-built laseron the vehicle has been uicccssliillyby the Soviets. The vehicle has operated successfully during eight lunar days1 and coulddehrnc of several more months This venture has produced tome valuableand engineering data and has given theignificant payoff in the publicil has generated.

D. Planotary

ive planetary-probe launches wereby the Soviets during the past two years Two attempts were directed at Venus and were launched with.ii five days of each other inenusaunched onh, appears to have been very similar to previous Venus probes but the entryappears to have been more durable than the others, probably so that it could wiih-stand the surface pressure on Venus Earlier probes had carried out temperature andmeasurements as well as chemicalol the upper portions of ihe Venutian at-mosphcfv However, the added weight ol the strengthenedapsule did not permit tlie Soviets lo incorporate the equipment into the capsule for analyzing (he chemistry of the atmosphere and still keep within the payload weight limitations of theoostci. We believe that the Soviets intended to transmit data on both pressure and temperature but becausealfunction of some equipment in the capsule, only gross temperaturewere transmitted The datahowever, agreed with earlier findings The second attempt was made onugust but the probe failed lo get out ofe believe the payload wasto Ihal ol Venus 7,

'A lunar day it oiual to approximatelyaith Says,

'An orbitpin-call tii.it it uwd Inr assemblyini[>'nfnfi or to wallticmieparture Irom the orbit toward its objective.

34

l turn pis in launch Man probes wilh theere conducted during1 launch window. The first attempt was on1 and resultedailure when the 4th stage failed to leignite and take the vehicle- out uf parkingecond launch was conducted onay andas successfully ejected from parking orbit.the third attempl onay (Maisas been successful so far.re expectedeac.li the planet late in November or early in December. These probes are re-

ported lo0 pounds and could be Oihite.is or landers, although we feel lhal Ihe latter is more likely. The two probes willperform similar experimentsery basic natureurface photography,and environmental measurements, etc).

E. Photographic Reconnaissance Satellite

ver the past two years, pholuiecon-uaissanee satellites have accounted for neaily 40 icrcent ol all Soviel space launches Prior

bout Ihe same number of high-rcsc-lution and low-resolution missions were down each year. Since that lime, however, theof missions have been of the high-resolution type, indicating an increasedinterest in detailed data on various targets with losser emphasis on searching broad areas for "gross" information. The Sovietor "spotting" plwtography system isto achieve ground resolutions on the ordereet and is probably capable ol resolutions downeet underconditions.

J swathould be on the order of run. or couldbe as great asm. The Soviet low-resolution or "search" system is creditedround-resolution ofoeet; its swathn the orderm

he Soviets are also leaving their photo-reconnaissance systems in orbit longer than they did earlier in theoays as opposedhis allows them to obtain more coverage while maintaining about the same annual bunch rate as in earlier years.

e continue to believe lhat tlieol ihe pliotoieconnaiuince progiam are:

precisely target US strategicto chock their status.

map areas of ground militaryespecially those bordering the USSR.

c To monitor the development and lest-ing of mililaiy systems, especially in the US and in Communist China.

d. To monitor large-scale military and naval activity, wherever it occurs.

26

3

of thehas the capability of relayingto ground stations during itsfilm is recovered for processing afteris deorbited and procosing ofand read-out of data almostseveral days.

f. ELINT Satellites

USSH has flownINTsystems. The oldestpiggyback" ELINTis flown as part of theeconnaissance vehicle. Tin-on-recoverable payload. circular orbit andsolely for an ELINT mission.ami newest system also is devotedthe ELINT mission and operatesuteavier payloadof the earlier systems.

he USSR's two older ELINTsystems continue to be used at about the same level that has been noted over the past several years. There do not appear to have been any noteworthy changes made in the payload of the low-altitude program (Orbits having apogees on the ordernd perigees ofince it svas first oibited?

a four-satellite not could colled data from any point in the world at least once everyinutes.

he program rcprcsen I improvement over the older,

The programonsiderable iprovemcnt over the older, low-altitudey

L J

ix launches of the non-recoverable system were conducted during the past two years; five payloads were successful. The launch activity noted to dale suggests that tbe Soviets intend toatellites oftype in operatioo concurrently The satellite ate deplnyed in space Inaimer that

top ocean

Applied Satellites

MMIMtfMftolK Theoiii-inuiilentiuns satellite relay program haiat about the same level over the pavl two years as that established eaily in theNo significant changes to cither thepacecraft or the systemhole wore detected during the period. The ma|or use of the Molniya system is televisionto the network of "Orbila" receiving stations throughout the USSR. |

pait of the Navsat program was placed in near-circular orbit alm

he typical useful lifetime of a1 vehicle isonths although one has continued Operating for as long asonths Because ol the highly elliptical orbitinimum of four vehiclesphased lo each other) is requiredour coverage to all areas of the USSR. Replacement vehicles are lauuched as older payloads become inoperative.

herogram continues lo suffer in almostevery comparison with the Intelsat system.]

evcal things point toward the low-altitude groupivil system Satellites atatural limitation

on their potential accuracy. At that altitude, diag induced by solar activity canehicle to deviate from its intended orbit, nulling i" navigation error. The magnitude of the error would be acceptable for most civil applications, but would almost certainly be too groat foi most military uses. Vehicles in the higher altitude groups would be less subject to tins type of disturbance.f*

3

avigation The Soviet navigation(Navsat) programf"

J]0ne group ofhas been placedear-circular orbit atecond group hasear-circular orbit a;n while the most recent satellite to be launchedhich wc assess as being

c

^Thc primary users of an accurate Navsat system would probablylass ballistic missile submariiies.

One bonus that the Soviets could gain from their present Navsat activities would be the refinement of their geodetic data. The satellite's orbital characteristics would befor refinement of gendetic data with the best coverage aboveegrees north latitude and belowegrees south latitude.

Meteorological Satellites. The past two years have seen an increase in the launch rate nf Soviel meteorological satellites (Melsats) but little change in the system itself.ive satellites were placed in orbit as opposed9espce-tively The vehicles currenlly used in theare vintually the same as those orbited early in the program and theuffer the deficiencies that have been evident since iUelatively0rbilal altitude, an Optical systemarrow field of view, and an orbital path that causes the vehicle to view selected areas under slightly different lightingfrom day to day (the desired situation isetsat topecific area ol interest under the same lighting conditions each pass).

he Soviets have stated many times that their Metsat program is directed and operated by the Hydro meteorological Service. There isevidence, liosvever, that oilier agencies

I'.vr,K,i..: .ll-.

the Strategic Hockct rorccsjSRK) which has it* own need for the cnl-"^

3

date some 40

have been launched. ^

Some of Ihese satellites serve as targets for calibrating phased-anay and other large radars

H. Scientific Sotelliles

4R. The Soviet near-earth scientific satellite program has had little priority for the last five years. This lack of priority is reflected in the unsophisticated payloads used, the low launch rate, and the poor processing of the collected data. In general, these satellitesinvestigations in one or more of theareas:

and atmospheric radiation

composition andstudies.

studies.

studies.

e Metcoroid studies.

atellites in this category can be lumped into three general groups:

a Theayloads. The total number of launches of scientific payloads using Ihe

OIXBCT-

otntci bat dropped off in lb* but two years.0 there were five attempts in this scries and9 there were none. In comtrast. there were seven7 and eighthe spacecraft used in thisarc small and unsophisticated. Ihe data the Soviets have reported collecting by their satellites have contributed little that is new to the understanding of the Space environment.

Ii INTERCOSMOS.9 the Sovietsrogram of scientitic satellites with the label of INTEBCOSMOS Some of the instruments In these payloads hast Impby scientists in the Communist Bloc countries. There haw been two launchings in this series9 and two

heayloads. The Soviets launched Iwo satellites0 and one so far1 with Iheooster system which aie believed to be part ol the scientificThese are Ihe first satellites of this type launched by thehich can place payloads in orbil ihin can the SL-7.

^greatr

I. Satellite Interceptor Programhe Soviet satellite interceptor program, which vre discussed in Ihe lav! estimate on the Soviel space program under the holding "maneuverables continuing apace. The program over the past two years has in-volvedaunches Since tins is now accepteduiely military program, it is treated in detail in. *SovM StrategicatedOP SECRET ALL SOURCE,

J. UrKatcgofi*ed Satellites

he Soviets have on several occasions since the beginning of ihelr space program, orbited satellites whose ellaracteristics or functioning did not allow them to be placed in any of the categories discussed above- Some of the programs, whatever their intent, wore short-lived, comprisingew vehicles. Others have continued for several years. Some of these launches almost certainly were related lo later developments whose purpose became cleareriod. Some were probably related to programs which never came to fruition for one reason or another. Some are continuing but we still cannot fit them into any known or suspect progiam.

leven such launches occurred during Ihe past two years Two Involved groups of eight satellites orbitedingle launch vehicle. The orbital altitude was abouthese exhibited same characteristicsystem intended to serve as relay link for communications which were not so urgent as to requite real-time transmission

[Two launches involvedingle satellite which had differentthan the multiples Both of these programs may relateommunicationsn intended lo relay command anddata which does not need to he passedeal-time basisf

time

J

5i. Two launchesayload which used an injection engine to place itear circular. above the earth.

thout launched the vehicle ivused (or military-related programs, this launch may have some military related rale but we cannot at this lime dctermiiie what it would be.

wo vehicles were launched thatariable thrust engine thai was used to riled two in-plane changes in the orbtL This is the only objective ol the flight that we can identify. The operalion of the engine isto tiiat used In soft-lunar-landing mis-

sions However, wc cannot yet dctcrrnmc bow the engine will ultimately be used.

ne payload was oihitcd which appears lo have included the fourth stage of.theaunch vehicle. This composite spacecraltin maneuvers. Five involved in-plane changes in Ihe orbit while the siith changed the plane of theaneuver whichconsiderably more energy than anchange. Aside from testing the restart capability of the engine, the ultimate use of this pjyload is not dear.

SCCRCT

SOVIET SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLES (Soe

SS-fi Family. Theurface-to-surface missile, first launched in7 and subsequentlyhe Sovieti Itrst-gcttctation mletoontincntal ballistic missile, has been used in numerous space evenlsariety nf payloads and is still usedas the fust and second stages of the! ndaunch vehicles.'

heses Ihevoovler andhird stage referred to as the "Lunik- tinge. Tin* launch vehicle has been used for direcl-3scent launch atleinpts lo the moon, in manned missionsnd in carry prtotnieconnaivsance flights These missions were subsequently taken over by higherboosters Sinceheaa been used only for roeln>ro logical satelliteromHowever,laundicd on IBs the firstew series of payloads launched by this system. The SL3 is capable of placing. circular orbit from rWclsi

beses theoosterhird stage named the "Venlk" stage. Its first successful launch was from Tyuratam in Nolintottcnnnaisiance

'Tho SL-I..il nir-mbeis rat Theamily, aie ix. lonfci used Therobably

mp]puli

fcauraAal. naith staje aadi .

onlyaa ihe SS< Willi a

Uiiiil itaRK and was mcil in mini

satellite It has- since been employedal Tyuratam to orbit the mannedand Soyuz vehicles and their unmanned precunois. and at both Tyuratam and Plesetsk lo orbil photoreoonnaissante satellites. Theas also used in orbit the unmanned Soyuz-class vehicles which performed the automatic rendezvous and7 and. Thean put up0 pounds into low-earth orbil.

hes anith the additionourth stage capable of dehvaririg0 pounds of thrust. This fourth stage, with tlie payload. Is placedear-earth parking orbit.oast period, this stage is ignited and infects tbe payloadighly elliptical otbit orunar or planetary trajectory. The system was first launched in0 and resultedailurears mission. This vehicle has been used for interplanetary and lunar probes and to place Molniya cotnmunicatmiisin orbit. Untilolniya was launched from Plesetsk, all the launches had come from Tyuratam. Tbe role of the SL6 in interplanetary and lunar missions probably has ended, with thehat rule

hewo-stage launch vc hide thatodifiedrgc balkstte mtssde asil stageew second stage. The second stagelu usl0 pounds Tho launch vehicle

Family of Soviet Space Vehicles

DM]

Sllfl'l

II'ESM

lnxl tested in1 bul was nol successful untilhenas ot In led from Kaputtin Yir Since then, theas been used to orbit non-recovcrie satellites liom Plesetsk and scientific satellilea from both Plesetsk and Kapustin Yar Thean placeoundow-earth orbit.

hewo-stage launch vehicle lhatodifiedntermediate-range lialhstH. missile as its first stageew second stageultiple restart capability. This vehicle was first launched innd has been used from both Tyiuiitani and Plesetsk lor vertical probes.legation satellites, scientific satellites, and KI.IN'I reconnaissance missions. Thu SI--8

is capable of placingounds into near-earth orbit when launched from Tyuralam.

heas launched only four times in what were believed to be feasibility tests of components and subsystems thai were later incorporated into theehicle.

SL-'l- Tims used to orbit space-cnill associated with the satellite intcrceplni progrnm. It consists of the same Iwo stages a* on therttciconttnenral range ballistic inntilv

heaunch vehicle -tlie largest Hie Soviets have used-lft-nff wvghl of aboutillion pounds- It was usedhree-Stage configuration tu place0 poundcientific satellite

TOP SCCRCT

ii low-earth orbit.our-stageit lias placed0 poundsow-earth orbit. 'Ihe fourth-slage engine hasestart capability thatthe Soviets to put0 poundsrajectory to the moon and will allow them to putounds into aorbit.

he payload cap-ability of thes adequateariety of earth-orbital, lunai, and planetary missions. It has been used in the Zond program, for thendor probes to Mars, and lo i'mIi'Lit(ifhit The5 development and use have been slowedby repeatedn the firstowever, seven of the nine latest launches have been successful, indicating that Ihe problems have been solved. This launch system is expected to lie used for (uture lunar and planetary missions, for earth-orbital missions such as large Space stations, and to place satellites in geosynchronous earth orbit

chide 'I he Soviets largest space booster was lust observed in7 atomplex at Tyuralam. This bunch system has been designatedehicle. Alt estimates ol the vehicle's capabilities have

^ assumed conventional propcllants andble state o'-the-art engine technology.

he booster consists of four Stages and is olimateii lo be capable ol puttingounds into low-earth orbit0

poundsunar trajectory. Wc estimate thai Hie first stagehrust ofnillion pounds, the secondillion pounds, and the thirdillionIn- fourth stage probably developsounds of thrust. The total length of the four-stage booslcreet. When the payload (including escape tower) is added, the lengtheci. The lift-off weight piublibly is-abuulillion pounds.

"L"

3

['he first actual launch attempt was9 and resulted in an explosion which demolished the vehicle and heavily damaged the launch pad and immediate area. This launch apparently was intended to be an unmanned circumlunar flight with re-entry over the Indian Ocean and recovery in Ihe Soviet Union. Onnother effort tolso ended in failure when the boostersomeeconds after lift-off. This latest attempt appeared lo beropulsion test rather tlian some type Of space mission.

IS. Although there is no evidence of high-energy propellant facilities att Tyuralam. we continue to believe lhatehicle will eventually be fitted with high-energy upper stages which will permit it to putounds into earth orbit oroundsunar trajectory.

TOP SKiti-H-

SOVIET CHRONOLOGICAL SPACE LOG FOR THE PERIOD

June

Through1

9

287

na ina nee

9

288

July

Untr Probe

9

289

3

15

Lander

Partial

9

290

Cconnausa nee

9

9

Calibration

U

291

Test

9

7

August

292

293

Is ia

9

291

ccoo.ia in* nee

Aueurt lOftl

295

Calibration

S

cfon noma nee

3

297

istance

--.

r9

298

Mod 3*

ICBM

,

299

eec

9

300

Piobc

September VJS'J

301

nee

9

a

9

8

Oi-rob*.

7

Klifilil

r

8

FlirjKl

9

1

9

302

usance.

9

303

tion

T

304

9

Probe

Success

October 1VS9

306

iisjiice

9

9

306

Calibration

9

309

r. assail-e

fV

310

tAmeec ii. laissanue

9

3)1

Calilualion

at end ol tablo.

50

h

9

ins

D

Test

9

313

'liolorcconnaiiaance

9

114

Calibration

9

315

CollectkKi

9

ei"

9

317

J!

4

9

2

9

0

318

0

319

Cal.-br.la..

0

320

*_

0

Ml

0

322

me

0

Scientific

0

Probe

0

323

econiuee

0

0

324

Calibration

0

325

a ncc

i

0

328

ureconnaiua nee

M'l0

3

0

327

Calibratiop

0

328

i-r

0

329

330

INT

xest

0

331

0

332

0

333

0

3M

Calibrate

o

335

0

Possibly Communi-

fii rt tint 4tn-i

0

4

ircufeo

Meteorological

M .0

344

0

345

0

9

fined Flighr

0

348

0

17

0

348

e i.

0

349

0

5

0

350

0

331

CaKbratwn

0

352

0

353

isu nee

0

Kiroiecon na isia noi

0

354

9 Mod .1

ICBM

0

353

iuancc

6)

00

0

0

0

0

20

0

0 BS00

10

0

0

0

0

0

00ctober30

00

0

0

0

20

00

0

00 IH0011

Sonrr DisiCNAiiew

VMM 7

None

osmo, ;wo

una

Moterya5

ntacouno* Meteor 6

6

3M

7eteor 7

SrtcoiilK SetcnraVLander SUt PTOpokioo Tt Possible Calibration ELINT Voius Laodei I'Hutee Photite Lmh Lander I'ouAle Cal.br.oV.n

Hnmunlcatiuni Pliol nr ecoiinalsiduce Uniteiermined rbotoiccOfinButarx-Piwible Calibration

Mr^oloc-al

PoniUy Cnmnm-KiMnii Helilcd Satellite Intercept Tarfolellite Interceptor

Hft

Maneuver ine rJntjln* Ten

I'cMible Calibieliim

CommunlcaUuiu

MM*

EogkM Te*l

Namj a'* o

rtholonxonruiiuniv BUNT Sclcnttiie Probable EUNTommuniranrmi Pbntwecuruubu nee

PiMsble Calibration MrtcJxxal

i won

Vsjucr.

jwii

:j

ICBM

11

11

sr

Dat*

1

392

ice

1

393

Calibration

1

394

Intercept TjibvI

1

395

1

390

otcoinn. ttm ncc

1

397

Interceptor

1

398

Engine Test

1

399

iHitmccOiif is iutinco

1

naissa ncc

1

1

400

Inteicvprer Tareiel

1

401

1

402

1

403

rue

1

404

IntciccplOr

1

405

ELINT

1

403

1

8

1

Station

1

10

Flight

1

407

Communications Related

SoCOfM

1

408

CuibratKin

1

409

1

410

issa ncc

1

A 10

Sa.tcll.lc*

1

Probe

!

420

nartiancc

1

421

Calibration

1

2

Prole

1

422

1

423

Calibration

1

424

econnaissaitoe

i

3

Probe

1

425

1

426

Sciemific

1

11

Flight

in the

of 3

1

327

isu ncc

1

428

1

issa nee

1

Ten

deliils of therocram. seeniercontinental AttackatedOP SECRET. ALL SOURCE.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DISSEMINATION NOTICE

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The title c* this etocumeni when used sepo-olely (Ml BW leal should be

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Tor>GCencr

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