WARSAW PACT FORCES FOR OPERATIONS IN EURASIA (NIE 11-14-71)

Created: 9/9/1971

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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i?iti

NATIONAL

INTELLIGENCE

ESTIMATE

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED

Warsaw Pact Forces for Operations in Eurasia

(Supersede! NIEnd

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ClCGReT*

THIS ESTIMATE IS SUBMITTED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND CONCURRED IN BY THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD.

The following inielligence organizations participated in the preparation ol

Tho Control Intelligence Agency and ihn intelligence cirgoniiatiom ol thoal Stale ond Detente, the Af C. ond the NSA

Concurring:

The Deputy Director ol Cenrral Intelligence

The Director ol Intelligence and Rcieoreh. Oeparlmenl ol Stoio Ihe Direcior, Delenio Intelligence Agency the OweOc, Kotionol Security Agency

lhe Atwvtont Gefe'o' Monogcr, AJomc Cnergy Cawnion Ah training:

Ihe Altaian) to tho Director, federol Buieou ol Invo legation, the iwhjtul being

*rV'A It lu 1

mem contoim inforrnolion ollocling the national lecurily a( the

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CONTENTS

Page

SUMMARY1

S

I EVOLUTION OF SOVIET FORCES AND STRATECY KOR

OPERATIONS IN S

A. Pienudear 5

D Early Nuclear 5

C. Recent Developments 7

II. WARSAW PACT CAI'ABILITIES IN 9

oviet View of the Initiation and Nature of War in 9

arsaw Pact Forces Available (or Use Opposite NATO in0

Forces Available Witluo 24

Mobilization

Forces Available after Molwlization and

Strategic Reserves

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viunL i

PaEe

Convenlional Slage o( War8

Concept of18

Thealer Warfare17

Thealnr18

Naval Warfare10

Convenlional War inO

War intt

Gjrtcept

Nuclear Strike in

Naval Strikes

Nuclear War in Europett

CATABIilTlES IN20

A. Thc Srao-Soviet28

B; Force Posture Opposite27

Mobilization and Rcinforccrnciit

C. Force Capabilities: 32

Capability to Defencl32

Capability to Attack

33

the Future33

Ceneral Considentioas

Jsiertia

Technological

Resource Constraints

Geography and History

Preception of Ihe

Strategic Concepts

of Modernization

In thc Theater37

Iu Slrategic Forces for Atiack in

38

In General Purpose Nnval

C. Illustrative Allernativr Force Postures

CONTENTS OF VOlUME II

ANNEX A: WARSAW PACTCES

ANNEX ll: WARSAW PACTURPOSE NAVAL FORCES

ANNEX C: THE SOVIET PERIPHERAL STRATECIC ATTACK FORCES

ANNEX D: READINESS. MOHILIZATION. AND REINFORCEMENT OF WARSAW PACT THEATER FORCES OPPOSITE NATO

ANNEX E: THE BUILDUP OF SOVIET FORCES ALONC THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER

ANNEX F; WARSAWCISTIO SUPPORT

ANNEX C: SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR CHEMICAL AND BIOLOCI-CAL WARFARE

ANNEX H: WARSAW PACT COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

ANNEX I: COST OF ILLUSTRATIVE FORCE POSTURES

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WARSAW PACT FORCES FOR OPERATIONS IN EURASIA

SUMMARY

Soviet forces for operations in Eurasia have changedtructure, weaponry, and strategic doctrinehen thc army constituted the main element of Soviet military power. Thehave assimilated nuclear weapons and doctrine, expanded thcir navy. improved thc military effectiveness of their allies In Eastern Europe, and builtowerful military force along the border with China.

In constructing their forces, the Soviets have evidently worked on the principle that, if war came, they would fare best bytrong capability to conduct offensive operations. Their current view of war in Europe seems torief period of conventionaluclear campaign. This campaign wouldassive nuclear attack on NATO forces, followed by thc seizure of Western Europeew weeks. They maintain forces in forward areas immediately ready for combat; these are designed to blunt any NATO attack and then seize the initiative. They are backed up with aand reinforcement system which the Soviets believe will enable tlicm rapidly to raise and deploy the forces necessary to defeat NATO in Europe.

Available to the Soviets for operations in Europe withinours would beedium-range ballistic missiles, mtermediate-tange

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ballistic missiles, submarine launched ballistic missiles, andballistic missiles (ICBMs) currently believed to be targeted against Europe, andedium bombers stationed inhere are now somearsaw Pact divisions in East Cermany. Poland, and Czechoslovakia that would be available opposite tlie Central Region of NATO. Of these,ould be essentially combat ready withinours from the startay. Thirty-seven ol these arc garrisoned near enough to the West Cerman border to form an initial force for use against NATO. On the flanks of NATO therearsaw I'ncl divisions which would bc available inours, and thereirborne divisions capable of being tatrncdiately deployed. Aftereeks, someore divisions would probably bc available for operations against all of NATO, although we do not know whether they would or could bc moved into forward combat areas within that time. Forces in all areas would bc supported by tactical aircraftizeable portion of which arend mafor ground force units wouldactical nuclear capability. Thc Soviet Navy normally has aboutubmarines andurface ships on station in theand North Atlantic;eeks these numbers couldactor ofor further details concerning availability of forces seen pagend accompanying text.

Soviet doctrine callstrategic nuclear strike in Europe when NATO resorts to nuclear weapons at the tactical level. This doctrine has probably been adopted to prevent NATO from taking out Warsaw Pact aircraft and strategic missilesime of NATO's choosing, but it also presents problems on which Soviet military writings provide little guidance. Wc do not know, for example, whether tlic Soviets plan an intercontinental nuclear attack on the US coincidentalassive nuclear attHck in Europe. Some Soviet writers have considered waging nuclear war in Europe with tactical nuclear weaponsay which did not lead to general nuclear war, but die Soviets do notariety of low-yield nuclears comparable to that possessed by NATO. Thus, the limited tactical nuclear option docs not now seem very promising. The Soviets have not preparedustained: because they think it unlikely. If il should happen, they would have

' For die viewa ol Mij. Oa. PbtUipavidson, Aufataotf Stall lor iDteQUrrnoe, Deparenent of theral Ado. Carl F. Rectaavf, Director ol Naval tofUiceoce.of Uie Navy, and Brif. Geo. Edward rUtlovich. Artine. AiiltUni CJiiel ol Staff.USAF, tne their0

some problems, especially with logistics, though in time lliesc could probably be overcome

5 the USSRilitary buildup along the Sino-Soviet border which continues to this day. The initial impetus was defensive, but geography and Soviet military doctrine have apparently led the Soviets toorce structured and deployed for offensiveand they arc placing themselvesosition to initiate hostilities should they desire to do so. While there are someivisions in the Military Districts bordering on China and in Mongolia, only aboutf these are in thc border area. These0 tankslaunchers. Frontal Aviation providesin support of these ground formations. If all existing divisions were filled out, and the same level of support furnished as found in forward areas opposite the Central Region of NATO. Soviet troop strength would reach. Full strength Soviet forces on the order just described, supported by bombers and provided with good air cover, could probably advance several hundred miles into Chinese territory and occupy large portions of the border provincei ofInner Mongolia, and Sinkiang; they could probably do this without resort to nuclear weapons. But such operations would not destroy Chinese capabilities to wage war, and thc Sovicls would have to recogiiize the possibility of protracted hostilities.

There is no direct evidence concerning Soviet plans for thc future composition and weaponry of forces. Some individual weapon systems can be projectedew years into the future, but the farther into thc future one goes the less helpful is knowledge of currentThe problem of estimating future forces involves notense of the momentum and direction of on-going programs but also questions of possible changes in strategy and policy.

Wc expect Soviet ground forces to be modernized by movement into thc forces of weapon systems currently in production and by newcoming along in thcew tank, more armoredcarriers, and more of curront models of lactical missiles will be deployed. There will be more sophisticated tactical aircraft and better surface-to-air missiles. Major surface ship construction will continue to emphasize multipurpose ships. The surface fleet could changeduring,uch higher proportion being missile equipped. New submarines will he predominantly nuclear powered. In

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lhc peripheral stralegic attack forces, the new high-performancebomber will cuter the force, and Uie introduction of missiles of ICBM range will probably continue,1

There could be upward or downward revisions in the overall size and composition of the force depending upon thc Soviet perception of the threat or changes in Soviet objectives and in intemational relationships. There is, ofloor below which forces are unlikely to go; this derives from geographical, historical, political, and ideologicalsuch as the length of the Soviet borders, the traditional fear of invasion, lhc desire to maintain domination in Eastern Europe, the overriding necessity to protect the homeland. Constraints of time and resources alsoractical ceiling on upward development. For the kinds and variety of forces we deal with here, there arelimits to what can be done in enlarging and rc-cquipping within trie next six to eight years.

There arc an almost infinite number of possible Soviet force postures within those upper and lower limits. In the text, we have chosen four alternative ones for purposes of illustration. These are discussed innd acrompanying Tables. Tabularpi force components are, of course,art of the picture; weaknesses or strengths in doctrine, tactics, training, command, and morale can modify the effects of numbers. Wc make no choice among thc postures; tin's is partly because actual development of Soviet forces will depend upon policy choices made in the light of Soviet objectives and the developing world situation.

' Por lhe views of Maj. Cen. Phillip S. Davidson, A) si)hief of Staff fee InteHigonee, Department of the Army; Rear Adm. Earl F.iieetor of Naval Hneiligence, Department of (be Navy; and Brig. Cen. Edward Batkovidi, Acting. Assistant Chief of Staff, lot ir [licence. USAF. tee Iheirn

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DISCUSSION

I. EVOLUTION OF SOVIET FORCES AND STRATEGY FOR OPERATIONS IN EURASIA

A. Prenucleor

L In lhe yean after World War II the massive Soviet Army was the main element of Soviet military power. It was deployed to defend the periphery of the USSB. but was concentrated primarily in the western USSB and eastern Europe. By its accepted capability lo seize much of Western Europe by force, iteterrent against use by the US of its superior ilrateglc nuclear power. In addition, it served as Ihe most obvious instrument of Soviet control in EasternDuring the postwar years under Stalin, although tho SovieU were rushinguclear capabthty, their forces for operations in Eurasia were developed and deployed toon-nuclear war. Their doctrine for the fighting ofar was based on the lessons of World Wax II, it emphasized the use of massed infantry and artillery to break through enemy defenses, creating opportunities for exploitation by fast-

moving columns of armor. It appeared lo ignore Ihe nuclear ihroal.

B. Early Nuclear

t3 Ihe Sovicis had tested and begun to stockpile atomic weapons, hadhermonuclear device, and were in needtrategy and doclnno for nuclear war. The death of Stalin in lhat yearore objective development of this strategy and doctrine. But it wasn'thenemerged as leader of the USSR, that nudear doctrine came into its own. Promoted by Khrushcheveans of building the image of Soviet power, nudear weapons came to dominate all aspects of Soviet strategy by thear In Europe was seen as nuclear from the start

he Initial nudear strikes, according to the evolving Soviet doctrine, were to beby bombers and missiles againsttargets in Eurasia. By thc. the Soviets hadormidable capability for strategic nudear atlack on countries around

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periphery. An initial capability to attack with propeller-driven medium bombersatomic bombs was followed by the rapid growthet medium bomber forcethermonuclear bombs. Nudear wai heads were fitted to medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and to intermediate-range ballistic missilesreas of deploymentthat the preponderant number of targets were in Europe, but substantialalso made in the Far East

During thehe Soviets began toactical nuclear capability. They stockpiled nuclear bombs suitable fordelivery by tlie tactical air forces, They deployed nuclear-capable free rockets over ground (FROCs) and short-range ballistic missiles under the control of the ground forces. With nuclear rocket and missile forcesresponsibility for destroying stationary targets in thc rear area, tactical nuclear bombers became primarily concerned with attacking nuclear delivery means andof enemy troops. Tlie tactical air and artillery forces were reduced by more thanercent.

Concurrently with their assimilation of nuclear weapons and doctrine, the theater forces were restructured to enable them tomore swiftly across Western Europe in the aftermath of initial nuclear strikes. Instead of massed artillery and tanks, nuclear strikes were to be used to create gaps in NATO's defenses and to destroy NATO reserves. Large tank forces were then to pass through these gaps, by-passing or encircling any remaining NATO forces. In general, the new structure favored mobility and survivability. Bothand support forces were streamlined, on the assumptionuick war reduced the need for staying power and for logistic support

G. Beginning, thc Sovietsthc conversion of their Eastsatellites into more effective military allies. The Warsaw Pact had been createdn reaction to West Germany's entrance into NATO. During its first five years, it served largely as an instrument of political contjol over Eastern Europe and as acounterweight to NATO. In thc, however, the East European armedthose of Poland andreorganized and re-equipped to conduct semi-independentOperations. Tlie primary aim of the Soviets probably was to build up the military potential of their allies. They were simultaneouslysubstantial economies by reducing the size of their own ground and air forces.

At the same time that the theater forces wefe being equipped toudear war against NATO forces in Europe, Soviet naval strategy began to emphasize nudear strikes on NATO carrier task forces in the open ocean in thc initial stagesuclear war. Thcdeveloped, and in theantiship cruise missiles for launching from submarines, surface ships, and aircraft. They also began to deploy new long-range torpedo attackat first, thenforWestern naval forces and sea lines of communication.

These changes were made possible by technical advances in nuclear weapons and in means of delivery. But the ultimate drive for streamlining the various forces foroo thc periphery of the USSR came from Khrushdicv's desire to pay for thc new nudear forces by cutting expenditures onforces. Expenditures for forces for operations in Eurasia were reduced from two-thirds of total expenditures for defense and

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estimated Kpendllure* le. Soviet ferces lor Operatises In

miliiary space? toeicentn the same period, expenditure! for ground forces declined from less thanercent to aboutercent. (See

C. Recent)

hc Soviets have modified their earlier view that any hostilities in Europe would either begin with, or very quickly escalate to. general nudear war. They have come to accept the possibility that at least the initial phasesar between NATO and the Warsaw Pact might be conventional. Recognixing Ihc need for additionalfirepower to break through NATO's main defenses during the non-nudcor phase, the Soviets have strengthened their artillery. But they evidently do not expect that NATO would refrain from using nudear weapons if the Pad suooeododonventional offensive.

and have also steadily increased thoirof tactical nuclear weapons.

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lhat. once nudear weapons have beendie Soviets would employ them on whatever scale was necessary to achieve their mihtary objectives. They evidently so far have not accepted the US concept embodied in NATO doctrinecries of controlled and interacting transitional steps from conventional war through nudear weapons of increasingly greater yields and numbers to general nuclear svar. The Soviets believe that it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to limit or control nudear war once it begins, and characterize war in Europe as roost likely remaining non-nuclear or escalating to use of strategic nudear weapons. One of the reasons tbey do not holdlexible tactical nuclear strategy may bc that they do not have some of thc weapons available to NATO at the lower end of the nuclear spectrum.

ajor concern to the Soviet planner over the past five years has been the need to0 kilometers of border against the Chinese. The Chinese rebuffed the attempts of the new Soviet leadership5 to patch up the quarrel between the two countries, as they hadrefected Khrushchev's attempts to keepon-nuclear power. The Soviets have responded to Chinese hostility by steadily building up along the border forces designed to assure Soviet victory in either nudear or conventional war. should one arise. Toe buildup has, thus far. been accomplishedappreciably drawing down the forcesNATO in Europe, although the border area his received preferential deployment oi some new equipment.

oviet naval capabilities in support of peripheral operations hive also continued to

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fter the Arab-Israeli war7 thc small Mediterranean squadron established4 began to conduct regular anticarrier operations. In wartime thcsquadron would attempt to counter tlie threat from US strike forces and to hinder NATO maritime support of land operations in the Southern Region.5 naval air reconnaissance of thc sea approaches to the Soviet periphery grew with the addition of llear aircraft to naval aviation. Theof thelass submarineimproved capabilities against carrier task forces and sea lines of communication.

Thc Czechoslovak crisisoncern over Soviet defenses on thc Western periphery. The specter ofwithdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, which would haveaping hole in the Pact defenses, wasajorin the Soviet decision to Invade Czechoslovakia and reverse the course ofdevelopments in that country. Bya permanent garrison of five divisions in Czechoslovakia, the Soviets have at one and tlie same time improved Warsaw Pact forward capabilities against NATO and improvedover Czechoslovakia. They have also worked toward strengthening the Warsaw Pact military organization by integrating more East European officers into thc combinedin Moscow, by improving combined procedures, and by conducting multinational exercises.

Wc estimate that these variousdeployments against China and in the Mediterranean, and increased conventional and nuclear firepower amongachieved with an increase infor forces for operations in Eurasia of only aboutillion,illion4illionhese expeditures hove, however, declined fromoer-

cent ol total Soviet expenditures for defense and military space, largely because ol rapidly growing expenditures (or military research and development) and space in ihc total. (Sec Figure

arsaw Pact forces for operations in Eurasia can best be described in terms of three major groupingi by apparent role and

those in Eastern Europe and the western military districts (MDs) which appear to be earmarked for use against NATO;

those in thc military districts bordering China and in Mongolia, which appear to be earmarked for use against China.

tliose Io the interior regions of the USSR which could be used to reinforce cither of the two main groupings, or to conduct operations on the flanks of NATO.

Pact forces in Europe are preponderantlyhowever. East Euiopeani makecontributions The Soviet Navy aodRocket Forces (SRF) also support operations in Europe Tlie forces In Asia arc exclusively Soviet. They arc supported by the Soviet Navy with its growing capabilities in the area. The Soviets have deactivated MRBM/IRBM sites in thu Far East. Coverage of strategic targets in (lie For East is probably now provided by olher strategic weapons systems.

he following two sections describe Warsaw Pact capabilities in Europe and Soviet capabilities in Asia. Soviet theater forcein the central part of thc couniry are treated as possible reinforcements to the areas of primary interest. Discussions of Sovietpurpose ground, air. and naval forces and of strategic forces appropriate for attack on Eurasia arc (ound in Annexes A. B,ollowing thc text. Other Annexes discuss specific problem areas: reinforcement opposite

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the buildup along tbc Chinese border, logistics support, capabilities (or onlogical and dtcmical warfare, and Warsaw Pact command relation ships.

II. WARSAW PACT CAPABILITIES IN EUROPE

oviei View of Ihe Initiation and

Nature of War in Europe

udging by thc development of Soviet miliiary forces for operations in Europe, the essential goal of Soviet military planners is to defend Soviet interests by devdoping and maintaining the capability to conduct oflen sivc operations against NATO. Precisely how the SovieU wouldar if it cameof course, be predicted, but someto Soviet thinking can be defined j

Jwar in

Europe beginsATO attack byforceseriod of tension. Once the war begins. Soviet forcesounter-offensive and rapidly penctrato NATO'sdefensive positions. NATO then resorts to tactical nuclear weapons. Thisassivo widespread Pact nudear attack on NATO forces, followed by an offensive that completes the seizure of Western Europeew weeks.

either thc Soviet military postureappear to contemplate an attackside without at least somea

period of tension during which preparations would be made by both sides. In any event. Warsaw Pact forces, in terms of both readiness and position, could achieve only limitedwithout buildup of forces and supplier.

ll of die above having beenumber of important questions .arise. Do the Soviet leaders really believe they, couldasily rumATO conventional assauit?-Do they believe they could respondATO -

initiation of laodear warfareull-scale nuclear assault upon Europe, without at tbe lame time engaging in full-scale intercon-linrntal nuclear warfare? We do not know the answers; these are not subjects on which evidence is particularly helplulf

jsuggest that fhe Soviets believesuperior in convcniiotul warfare, aSoviet planner must also have some iwervalions about the reliability andof his East European allies ui allespecially since their support would be essenlial in tlie early stagesonflict.depending as he would have to upon re-inforcing troops rapidly mobilized fromstatus, the Soviet planner might also have reservations about the effectiveness of his own forcesituation involving rapid military rnovemenl against exposition and in which lines of communicalions are interdicted.

more important, however. Isof responding to NATO's actionsnuclear assault upon Europe. There isDelusive evidencel

^ USSH would automaticallyudear strike againsi Europeudear strike against the US. But how could tbe Soviet leaders bc sure lhat die US,r France wouldassive nudear strike anywhere in Western Europe without retaliating agaiast the USSR itself? Il svould be clearly imprudent lo plan on the Western Powers not doing so. This, then,trong inhibition against the deliberate initiation of hostilities in Europe by the USSB. It also mill-fates againstituation to develop in which large-scale hostilities become likely.

Soviet behavior and Soviethave made it quite dear that thebelieve general nudear waran extremely grave danger to Uie lurvivstl

USSR itself-.and.to dviltxod'lifo on the entirehis is nothal'lfae-Soviet leaders rue prepared to abandon intecests or

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from pressing policies simply from fear of military conflict or that they will not seek to nstr the size and existence ol their military power for whatever advantage they flain from it without loo meat risk. They almost certainly will continue lo do what Ihey have been doinghe put, thai is. to probe for tbe amount of risk involved and lo utilize forcethreat of force when they believe lire risks are manageable

he Soviets recognize, of course, lhal they may miscalculate risks and that iheycontrol thc behavior of their adversaries.

Similarly, they rccopnizc that the course of ovonts in Europe might require them to initiaterder lo secure Iheir vitalIn any caic, ihey iimlcritnnd lhal events could pel lieyond their control and involve nski Ibey would prefer noi to .iccepi. In short. Ihey recognize thai war in Europe is possible even though il is their policy to asoid il.

B. Worsow Poet Forces Available for Use Opposite NATO in Europe

iven thc possibility ol war in Europe, Soviet military planners have taken slops with-

F^ure 2

in lhc resources allowed Ihem lo prepare for it. They maintain in forward areas forcesready fur combat; these arc designed toATO atiack and Ihcn to seize ihe initiative. They back up these forcesobilization and reinforcement system wliich, ihey believe, will permit them quickly to raise and deploy forces sufficient lo defeat NATO in liurope. This section briefly describes the

ninl illz.ilrni

and reinforcemeni procedures and timing, and estimates thc forces available after about threef mobilization.

Forces Avoiloble Withinourstralegictrategic forces imme-dinlcly available opposite NATO includeRBMs, IRBMs. submarine-launched bal-

' Seeor forces available4 hours and alter about three weeks of mobilitalioa and ic-

toforetiMM.

'Tlie irapi on pagesnd II show loc.ilinn nf Knund .ind an roicCt Of-poSitC tlie Ccnirnlon Cf NATO

C describes In fiicatcr detail lhc Soviet iliXetiic mnulv and bomber force* fee opeiatioia tn

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TABLE I

WARSAW PACT FORCES ACAINST NATOovn In Aboutwirei

STRATECIC FORCES

M il

Vri

nombew

,

airborne

orces*

Oppouir Central Kciior,

Divisions

Aircraft

Tactical Nuclear

FORCESINWEEKS

NavalFoocu Mrmiw-"IAN' Atiakttc'

Cruise Mutllo

Torpedo Aftacl

Cm Ma Mni.tr

Odier Milor Surface Co.nbaUnri

ASM Canlrn and

' Foe the view* of Mai Gen. PIUTIrp B. Davidson, AiiuUnt Oiirf of Suff lor iMefUcence, Department ol lhe Annr. Rear Adm. Earl F. RecUout, Director of Naval lntrftcewcr. Depart-menl of Oir Navy; and Bri* Cen. Edward Ratlovieh. Actint; Aui.tant Chief ol Stall.USAP. lee theirn

itudie* of possible reinforcement scenariosNATO'similar to dune ajaliuf theron. have not been made.

' Theater forces considered are those forces 1st the forward area which ere unimed lo be up to men jrth and moved to their wartime auembly aicej withlaoors.

* Tharty-aeveo of these drvmom are at full rtery-th and ere (arruoned nearo the West German border to reach defensive positions and form am uaitial force to bc Med NATO withinoon.

' It li eelimated that the thealn lorces luted could. uivoVr otlier optimited mumpuom. move to their forward combat aieai In aa few as IGWe do not know Soviet plain foi movement, nor do weails for ettlmatiiig tbe dc<radliur Influence ofiocsen liter, breakdowns, ef. Hostile actionot considered,he time required to orfianlie and deploy the force) once In place. Seeetailed dlieuuion of mobil nation and reinforceinrot.

' Thi) total does not include an av>raie of abortercent combat lirerafI which ere toreplacement! for openrSoruJIr ainftwd Froaul aircraft iratdfrfoing tnaaottneeee orNo* dora at iacfodelait Germm. Fofaih. aad CaccborJovat aircraft amrud lo the aU detente of their rapertlve national lun'oein. Tbeae Flail European NaUonal Ai, IVtrnie aircraft areart of Frontal Aviation.

' naieJ onorce avallabllillei aod transit bnict.

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missilesnd intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) believed currently to be targeted against NATO inbey aho includeedium bombers stationed in the western USSR. These forces are probably maintained in combat status in peacetime and are ready to reactew hours. The medium bombers can cany either nuclear oi non-nuclear weapons. Thc strategic ni mile lorces do notonventional attack capability.

2S. Naval Forces' The Soviet Navy would rely heavilyeriod of warning to get available ships to sea, and thus increase the number available.,About IS toercent of Soviet ships are now routinely at sea, and about half of the ship Inventory is ready for immediate deployment The other half isreplenished, in overhaul major repairs, or conversion, or is unavailable for some other

Oo. Phdlip B. Davidson. Assist.nl Chic/ of Slaff foi Intelligence. Department of the Army; Rear Adm. Earl F. tleccanus, Director of Naval Intelligence.f the Navy; and Brig. Cen. Edward BatVovich. Acting Assistant Chief of Stiff. Intelli-gence. USAF. consider allCBMs to be pn-manly targeted againit lhe US. Theia) demon-Hrated the capability to be usedide range of Soviet targeting option! lo include both Intercontinen-lal and peripheral attack. However, evidencethe primary or secondary targets for specifically deployeds remains inconclusive. The US remains Ihc most powerful stralegic opponent of the USSR and it the only nation that could inflict severe damage upon Ihe Sovietsuclear exchange. It is doubtful thai Ihe Soviets would elect loeapon syslem wiih intercontinental capabilities against peripheral targets lhat are already coveied by existing Soviet peripheral weapon sysiems. On balance, lhe above named individuals believe the Sovieis have targeted theCBMs at Deraihnya and Pervomayskagainst the US but renin the option to change lo peripheral largel areas should the contingency arise.

iscusser the mils ions, forces,and combat effect! venty of Soviet genera]naval forces and the disposition of Eastnavies in more detail.

reason. Someombatants are routinely at sea in the North Atlantic, and somen the Mediterranean. These are augmented during turnovers and major exercises. Additionaland East European forces are routinely al sea in Ihe Baltic and Dlack Seas. The Soviet Navy also has an extensive air arm consisting of long-range reconnaissance aircrafl andbombers equipped with air-lo-surfaee missiles (ASMs) or bombs. Almost all of these would be ready for operationsew hours. About Ihree-fourths of Soviet naval sea and air forces are based in areas from which they could undertake operations against NATO in Western Europe and against seaborneof NATO in Europe.

heater Forces* Warsaw Pact theater forces intended for immediategenerally those located closest to the potential combalkept in relatively high states of readiness. Others, which ire Intended as reinforcements or reserves, are kept undcr-strength in peacetime and would requireof additional men and vehiclesbeing movedombat zone.

here are now somearsaw Pact divisions in East Germany, Poland, andlhal would be available opposite lhe Central Region of NATO.hese, SO would be essentially combat ready withinours from lhe startay. Thirty-seven of these arc. in turn, garrisoned near enough to the West Cerman border to reach defensiveand form an initial force to be used against NATO vrithinours. Twenty-sixovietastre opposite northern West Gennany and would be supported byhcraft of Soviet and Polish lactical air forces In East Cermany and Poland. Seven Czechoslovak aod 4Croup of Forces (CCF) divisions are

escribes Soviet theater forces In some detail and lists numbers of dlrtsions and otber forces, aircraft, and olher weapons.

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opposite soiilhern West Cermany. Thesewould be supported byircraft of Soviet and Czechoslovak tactical air forces in Czechoslovakia, and possibly by ther army in Hungary."

Twelve Polish divisionsoviet divisions in Poland and tlie remaining Soviet division in CCF would require several days to move into positron. Four Soviet divisions in Hungaryungarian divisions probably would not be part of Warsaw Pact forcesagainst thc NATO Central Region, but would more likely be used either to defend thc southern flank of the Pact forces againsi possible atiack from Austrian or Yugoslavor to conduct offensive operations through those countries. No largeof Warsaw Pact forces are positionedon the NATO flanks in northernFive Bulgarian divisionsank brigades opposite Creccc and Europeanarc available for immediate operations.igh level Bulgarian defector has statedlan calls for one of these divisions and one of these brigades to mass on thc Yugoslav border to insure Yugoslav neutrality in tlie event of war.)

Airborne and Amphibious Forces. Into the above theater ground and air forces, thereirborne divisions in the USSR. Most of these probably would beagainst NATO in event of war. We believe they are eitlier combat ready now or capable of being made combat readyay. The Soviets have sufficient transportto liftf these divisionsingle airborne operation. The Soviets alsorigade of naval infantry in each of the Northern and Baltic Sea fleet areas,n the Black Sea area, along with supporting amphibious shipping. These units couldbe ready for operations as soon as tho

Anne* D. "Readiness, MobfliMtion. andof Wai saw pad Forces Opposite NATO."

logistic preparations could he made. Thc Poles also have thc equivalentaval infantry brigade in thc Baltic, but it would rely in part On Soviet sea lift.

Mobilization 10

1 Tic Soviets apparently consider remote thc likelihoodudden outbreak of hostili-he* requiring the Warsaw Pad lo fight with lhe forces oullined above. They base their planning on the assumptioneriod of prc-hastilities tension and mobilization, anda large number of divisions in the border MDs ol the USSR which can be mobilized and readied to move westward quickly. The East Europeans model their mobilizationafter the Soviet example.

The general outline of Warsaw Pact ground force mobilization plans andhas been indicated by classified andwritings ond the testimony ofEssentially, thc system is based onmiliiary training, the prior designation of local reservists to fill vacancies in low slrenglh units, and the maintenance ofreserve motor transport units in thc civilian transport industry to make up military truck shortages. Thereell-developed organization for maintaining Pact mobilization plans in peacetime, and an effectivefor quickly alerting and assembling local reservists and drivers with Iheir vehicles. The procedure emphasizes speed rather thanMobilized units would have varyingof combat ability; some would certainly have serious shortcomings.

The Pact mobilization process has not been fullyull test would bedisruptive and militarilyIt has, however, been practiced En several partial mobilizations. The3 involved what was almost cei-

" Warsaw Pact mobdiuhon and remfceceraentand capabilities are discussed in greater detail

ill ArliKl D

SfXRCI

thu most extensive (ot of Pactcapabilities to date, but few details have become available. Someivision* were mo-bilizcd, requiring tbe call up of atcseivisti0 civilian trucks. Some East Euiopean mobilization was abo piobablyout.

eservistsn trucks svould bc required lo fill out aboutnderstrength Soviet divisions in lhe USSH which probably are intended for early use againsi both Ihe Central Region and the flanks of NATO. We estimate that the great majority, and possibly all, ol these reservists and trucks could lie assembled with their units inays.dditional reservists and large numbers of additions! trucks and engineering equipment would be needed to fill out army- and frorif-levcl support forces. Mobilization of these latter elements would probably be accomplished in much the same manner as for divisions. However, since many of these reservists probably would be specialists. Ihey would almost certainly have to bc drawn from larger regions Ihan would be the case with divisions. Tbis might stretch thc time for assembling support units

igh proportion of reservists, many having no recent refresher training and lacking familiarity with their leaders, theirsoldiers, or their equipment, mostSoviet divisions are likely to have low initial combat effectiveness. Some of these mobilized from cadre status probably would have such limited combat value without atew weeks of training and shakedown tbat their early useact offensive would be improbable. The most effective mobilized diviiioru would be tank divisions, but. even in these divisions, the motorized rifle regiments and mosl of lhe combat and service support would have high proportions of reservists.

Naval forces would also have to he brought to increased states of readiness. Given

warning on the ordereek or two, the Soviets would probably aim at an initiallevel on thc order ofercent for regular surface ships. Because initialoperations wouldigh priority, the Soviets might deploy aboutercent of the cruise-missile force Thus, the Soviet Northern Fleet might deploy as many asong-range cruise-missile and torpedo attack submarines andedium-range torpedo altackin the Atlantic Aboutaiorships from the Northern Fleet probably could be deployed to live Norwegian Sea. Civcn warningonths, thccould achieve deployment of aboutercent of long-range ships and submarines. Once achieved, this level of deploymentcould be sustained foronths.

forces Avoirablc ofler Mobilizolion and Reinforcement

orces availableobilization of three weeks or so arc outlined inxecution of the entire mobilization and reinforcement plan lor the theater forces would bring Pact strength opposite the Central Region of NATO up lo aboutivisionsercent0COO0 artillery pieces (including heavy mortars and multiple-round rocketombat(aboutercent ground attack, light bomber, and reconnaissance aircraft andercent air defensenduclear-capable tactical missile and rocket launchers. These forces probably would bc organizedrontschelons on the

" This total does not include an overage of aboutercent combat aircraft which are to providefor operationally assigned frontal aircraft under going maintenance or overhaul. Not doesast Cerman, Polish, and Cwchosto-vak aircraft assigned to die air defense of theirnational territories. These East European National Air Defense ilrerall areart of Frontal Aviation.

SECWrT-

SECRET

approaches lo (tie Rhine River leading through Cermany. Detailed studies of possible reinforcement scenarios against NATO's flanks, similar IO those against the Central Region, have not been made. The theater foices opposite the Central Region and the flanks of NATO would be ssippoiled by the strategic forces immediately available, by the naval forces in ihe Mediterranean. Black, and Ballic Sea areas and in thc North Atlantic, and by thc airborne forces.

Strategic Reserves

In addition to the forces described above, virtually nil of which probably arcfor contingencies in specific NATO or adjacent neutral areas, the Soviets have someivisions in interior areas of the USSR west of the Ural Mountains. Thesen tbe Kiev, Moscow. Ural, and Volgawould be available to constitute strategic reserves In the initial stagesonflict with NATO.

Some of these divisions could be readyew days. Thus, the Soviets could, ifsubstitute some of these for some of those in the other regions which might take longer to become mobilized and ef leclive. This procedure is not followed in exercises and would bc counter to the practice ofarmiesnit But divisions were taken from different armies and MDs for theinvasion, and the Soviets do have the option of doing (his in thc future.

C. Initial Conventional Stage of War rn Europe

Concept of Operations

elying heavilyeriod ofthc Soviets would expecteositiontrike heavy blows against NATO

forces almost at the outseton nucleararge numbers of medium bombers, as well as tactical aviation and ground forces Although these forces have been furnished or have avadahlc largeof nuclear munitions, their ability toonvenlinnal war is also considerable, especially in the early stagesonflict.

Soviet, nnd hence Pact, doctrine about combat operations in lhc initial stages ofhave evolved largely in reaction to (he Russian historical experience of defeats in llie early stagesonflict ll calls for Pact forces rapidly to seize o: regain tlie initiativeATO attack, and to overwhelm the oppositionrief land campaign. Thclecognize that, without thc massive initial nuclear strikes Integral to their concepts of the start of nudear war, the penetration of NATO's main defenses would be moreThey nevertheless appear lo base their planning upon breaking through anda high-speed campaign in Europe.

The Course of the Campaign. TliePact ground forces' organization and tactics are intended to maximizechieve high rates of offensive speedonventional offensive, large numbers of heavdy armored units would attempt to achieve high ratios of local superiority over defending NATO forces, both in tanks and in fire support, in their effortsreakthrough. If it succeeded in breaking through NATO's main defenses, the Pact would then launch tank collimtis In high-speed drives toward majoron the Rhine River. According to the doctrine, these Unk columns would receive the highest priority for available combat and logistical support. Inituation, tbe Pact could pay littleto flank security for the tank columns and probably could notontinuous

SECRET

of advance across thc fronts. They would have to rely mainly on the inherent firepower and mobility of the tank columns, and on available air cover, for securily against their being cut off and defeated by NATO reserve forces. Thc alternative to such tactics would be to slow down thc whole advanceandontinuous front line,

fheoter Warfare

round Strike. In all these operations Warsaw Pact forces tend to emphasizepower more than staying power and logistic support, when compared to US forces. This is perhaps most noticeable in the case of Soviet ground forces. The Warsaw Pactuch higher ratio of combat units tounits in its active forces than does thc US or NATO in peacetime. Soviet writings, defectors, and exercises all indicate that in wartime the Soviets would continue toa higher combat-to-support ratioigher weapon-to-man ratio than thc US.'1

"Soviet anny ground force divisions containGO percent of theen inound forces. In the US. on thc other hand, divisional forces make up only about one-third of the total army manpower. Moreover, withindivision, maneuver uniti male up about one-half of the manpower in Warsaw Pact forcei. bul only one-thiid in US forces.

With respect to men and equipment, combat-ready Soviet divisions have roughly die same number of tank) and artillery as thc most comparable USbut only about half at many men. Foroviel tank division at combat strength huedium tints.owitters. andultiple-round rocketS armored divi-sion at full strength hu0edium Unks. andS division,receives much more non-divisional combatIhan its Soviet counterpart. Armored cavalry regiments, corps-level artillerynd aviationengineer brigades all augment the combat power of Ihe US divisionegree not enjoyed by the Soviet division. (SeoAescription of the organisation and equipment of Soviet and East European motooied rifle and taok divisions.)

For the initial breakthrough. Pactwould be most important. Probably in recognition of ihis requirement, Soviet division artillery has been increased by some SOduring lhe past few years. Now, after mobilization. Warsaw Pact forces would have about three times as many artillery pieces as NATO forces in the Central Region. This would include large numbers of multiple rocket launchers capable of debvering large amounts of firehort time, with lessthan tube artillery. In fluid battlethc Soviets rely on large masses of tanks. Analysis of Soviet organization and tactics indicates that the Soviets mightupanksreaktlirough zone no more thanilometers wide.**

While capable of nuclear and chemical fire support, the four free rocket (FROG) launchers in each division also have available conventional .and probably highwarheads for use against area targets up to about. in the enemy rear.

Air SfruVer. Warsaw Pactould be responsible for carrying out attacks on targets up to. from the forward position of the ground forces. Targets would include mobile missile,and anti-aircraft systems as well assupply areas, troop concentrations, and headquarters. Thc low payloads of thecarry onlyounds, fighter bombers upounds, and light bombers upthesortie rateser day would limit support to ground forcesonventional situation.

" See Annex A. Sectionor discussion of Warsaw Pact artillery capabilities and differing taterpreUbons of the effectivenew of Pact artillery.

"Each ficni Is Mpportedactical air armyhese armies are called Frontal Aviation by Ow Soviels.

sccRtr

missions in support oftheater operations would be thcof medium bombers of SovietAviation (LRA) because of theirand range capabilities. They0 pounds of bombsadiusmiles, fn addition, Soviet Navalmedium bombers for use againstof naval interest. Althoughthese medium bombers carry ASMs,carry'bombs, and many ASMs havewarheads in addition to nuclear.

The Soviets recognizemobility of pact maneuver elementscrucial importance, and they haveimproving their forces to givemobility. The high proportion ofthe Pact concept of themobile firepower. There arepersonnel carriers (APCs) andavailable to iirst-eohelon forces toin an offensive in Europe-forces would probably notAPCs and would also rely onfrom the civilianewcombat vehicle which can canyis being issued to Soviet units. Atransporter is being produced infor tank units and will not onlyof the load off the rail system inwar, but will also be less vulnerable

he Soviets also utilize air support to increase mobility. The Czechoslovak Invasion illustrated their ability to execute an extensive lifthort space of time in an unopposed situation. The manner of utilization ofin exercises provides an indication of how tactical air mobility will be used.or example, in7 three battalions were landed byas part of the tactical operations.the "Oder-Neissc" Exercise Inpecially equipped helicopters were used

as antitank reserves, as support for ground force movements involving thc securing of bridgeheads, and for vertical envelopment of enemy forces.

he emphasis in Soviet tactical doctrine on high-speed offensive operations and the prevalence of water obstacles across potential Pact attack routes in Europe have led Pact foices to stress (he capability to overcome water obstacles in their organization,and training. These efforts have had considerable success. Pact engineerboth at division and army level, are furnished with exceptionally well designed and effective bridging and ferrying equip-ment. Most Pact tanks are equipped for deep fording and can negotiate sliallow waterwith only minor engineer support.forces in East Germany devote consider, able, training time to mobility tjaimng andenerally high level of proficiency.

Theater Defento

Ground Defense. Although Warsaw Pact general purpose forces are structured for fast-moving offensive action, Soviel military planners are well aware that thc defensebe ignored. They have developed adoctrine which envisages allowing the enemy to spend himself against strong defenses and then striking himassiveFor slowing and canalizing thc enemy, tho Soviets rely heavily on mine fields and antitank defenses.

Air Defense. Defense of theater forces against hostile air attack is centered in front air defense, which coordinates early warning (EW) and ground-controlled intercept (CCI) radars. SAMs. and interceptor aircraftto the front. In recent years, thchave been steadily improving their air defense capability in Eastern Europe. The late model, all-weatherFrshbed J) is becoming thc standard Soviet interceptor.

SCCKLI

The basic ground weapons system for airis slill ihchich provides medium-to high-altitude coverage. In addition. Ihcas been deployed in Eastern Europe to provide low-aliiiudc point defense of Soviet tactical airfields in East Cermany. Poland, and Hungary. Thc mobileystem, which was designed specifically to provide medium-lo high-altilude coverage for ground forces, is now deployed in the USSR. East Cermany, andew track-mounted systemow-allitude capability is now operational in limited numbers, andmall, hcat-sccking missileimilar ty the US Redeye is dow confirmed. In addition to thc various missile systems, the Soviets have deployed with their ground forces large numbers of radar-controlledartillery. These weapons arceffective against slow flying aircrafl at .low altitudes, especially helicopters. The Soviets have also been constructing7 revetments and hard shelters to protect their fixed air defense installations.

of Warsaw Pactthese variousnevertheless be ainvolving as it docs EW and CCIand interceptor aircraft, severalthe operational components of Eastnational air defense. On theoverall effectiveness is alsoby the vulnerability ofto heavy use of electronicThe defenses will remainto low-altitude penetrationaircraft at least untildeployment of new weapons.

Novo! Warfare "

a war with NATO inthc missions of the Soviet general

"See Annei Iiore detailed diicussJoa oft naval forcei.

purpose naval forces would be to assure access to Ihe open ocean by Soviet naval forces, to neutralize Western attack carriers, to keep reinforcement* from reaching Europe by sea. to defend against close-in atlack from the sea, to support ground operations, and to defend againsi ballistic missile submarines.1*

Assuring Access to Open Seas. Most of thc Soviet surface naval forces which could bc used against NATO in the seas surrounding Europe arc stationed in the Baltic or Black Seas. Access to thc Mediterranean or North Atlantic from these areas is through narrow straits. One of the earliest Soviet navalin time of crisis might be to put their best ships through the straits before NATO forces could bottle them up. They might iu wartime attempt to secure these straits by amphibious, and possibly airborne, assault, and to follow this up with land operations. Although the Northern Fleet is on the open ocean, the Soviels would require strongwarfare (ASW) fo coe in the area to counter attack by NATO submarines, and they have based most of their nuclear attack submarines in the Northern Fleet,

Attacking NATO Carritr Task Forces. The primary Soviet naval concern in the initial stagesonventional war. next to assuring access to open seas, would be the destruction of NATO carrier task forces. The Soviets have adequate forces and procedures for finding and tracking enemy naval task forces at sea unless tlie enemy maintains nearly totalsilence. The network of naval radio direction-finding stations in the USSR Issupplemented by ELI NTmall fleet of specialized mtcUigcnce ships is available for locating naval ships at sea in their operating zones. Long-range naval air-

"The Utter mljitoa alio fans wiihlo tbe category of strategic defense.

ere mi

SCCRCT

of theype also perform eitonsive reconnaissance flights. Thc best Sovietcapability is in the Mediterranean because of the larger number of ships, submarines, and naval aircraft available there forand trailing operations.

he Soviets* anticarrier capability hinges largely on tbeir ability to confound andcarrier defensesarge coordinated miuilc attack from submarines, surface ships, and aircraft. Soviet skill in organizing this kind of aitack is highly developed in the Mediterranean, where their forces frequently practice all of the required techniques creep; the actual attack by strike aircraft The Soviet anticarrier capability it also well developed in the Norwegian Sea approaches, where naval and LHA strike aircraft participate Inand where about SO percent of the cruise-missile submarines axe located. The usual Soviet scenario thereeries of anticarrier barriers opposing carrierThe Soviets have the potential to trail carriers with cruise-missile ships andin the Norwegian Seaeriod of tension as they do in the Mediterranean They are still in thc process of refining the multi-force cruise-missile attack, and there aresome problems of tacticalof the timing and direction of the several attacks.

nterdiction of Sea Unes ofI^ing-range torpedo and cruise-missile submarines arc the primary threat to NATO sea lines of communications to Europe. Long-end medium-range aircraft might be used against convoys if no major naval targets were available. Soviet surface ships are noi likely to operate as commerce raiders in areas where tbe Soviets lack adequate air and submarine defense Antiship mines sown by submarines and aircraft would be used in efforts to block the ports of debarkation.

5fl. ln order to put submarines in aposition for interdiction againsttlie Soviets would try to counter NATO ASW forces, particularly Western submarines in tbe Norwegian Sea transit lanes to the open sea. They would probably concentrate thc major part of their Northern Fleet ASW forces there. They would probably attempt toNATO forward ASW barriers with large numbers ol attack submarines. Once into the sea lanes. Soviet interdiction capabilities in tbc North Atlantic piobably would be good. Soviet forces available (or the task, into any surviving cruise-missilo units, would include the Northern Fleet attacknot already committed to the

ffshore Defense and Support of GcQVltd Operations. The Soviet Baltic and Black Sea Fleets probably have sufficient forces to deny these seas to NATO naval forces. Their major problem, however, would be to assure access of these fleets to more open waters In addition lo denying the Baltic Sea to NATO, the Baltic fleet naval andforces augmented by Polish naval, airborne, and amphibious forces would engage in amp rubious assault operations along the Baltic lo support ground operations and to seize ihe Danishrime Warsaw Pad objective lor Black Sea fleet forces would be lhc Turkish Straits and bases in tlie Aegean: they might, however, be more effective in small amphibious assaults in support of land forces along the eastern border of Turkey. In either Baltic or Black Sea amphibioussuccess would depend mainly on the degree lo which thc Pact could firs) establish air superiority in tho assault area.

D. Sustained Conventional War in Europe

t is clear from Soviet doctrine andlhal thc likelihood of sustained corivcn-

20

sccncf-

warfare in Europe ii considered remote. Neverthcless, if event* did not evolve as the Sovielsfor example, the Pact failed to break through NATO defenses quickly or if NATO managed toact bteakthroughesort In nuclearthe Pact commanders would he confrontedituation different from lhat for which their plans were designed. They would notbe laced with lhe alternative of losing or escalating, they could accept sustainedwarfare. They claim, of course, that they could successfully conduct combat operations under any conditions- But Ihey would have some problems wiih conducting sustainedwarfare.

hc most immediate problem would bc thai of logistics. Present stock levels,and service support capabilitiesrief conventions! phase followed

hort nuclear campaign. Butelear campaign did not come about and if the con-ventiona! phasc were prolonged, dwindling slocks would make thc continuation ofoperations difficult. Stocks and forces in the forward area would have to be replenished and thc logistics system developed forresupply. While supplies probably exist in the USSB to sustain operations for someItrnc, they would have lo be brought forward, flow fast these could be moved to (he forces in the field would, of course, depend in pari upon the level of combat and theof NATO interdiction operations.hortage of trucks and logistic support would hinder operations, perhaps for some months.

mong the forces themselves, there would have to be regrouping and additional reinforcement, probably initially involving the strategic reserves. The Soviet practice ofwhole divisions would necessitate the cr on lion of new replacement units, which would take some time also. Moreover, tactical air foices svould have lo be redeployed, and

additional transport, engineer, andunits would need to be attached to the forward commands. Inathermobilization of rear services svould need to lake place along with regrouping and reinf or cement

ow long conventional operations could be sustained would depend upon how rapidly ihe Soviet leadership could mobilize tliesector lo provide additional manjxiwcr. supplies, and transport. In the mobilization of manpower and resources which would have to bc set in motion, there would be the problem of maintaining the momentum of the economy during the changeoverstained war economy. Soviel practice in World War II would suggest that military requirements would somehow bc met through ruthlessand pre-emption of civilian supplies. Bul such ruilJessness would probably have to be tempered if the governnienl wis'icd toa flow of materiel aircraft, and so on, from Ihc civilian secior. Production of war materiel as well as operation of the economy have become much more complicated since World War II and much more dependent upon skilled manpower and efficient management. We have not studied the complications that prolonged warfare would create for lheuntil we do so we can say nothing about how seriously they might affect operations.

o some extent, of course, the Soviet capacity to conduct prolonged cooventiorial warfare would also depend upon how cHoctive the Pact forces svere in preventing superior NATO manpower and resources frommilitarily effective. Thus, the capability of Soviel naval forces would become vital. The USSR could maintain about one-third of its Northern Fleet submarine force continually on patrol in ihcrutsc-missile andorpedo attack submarines. The submarine force generally has been adequately provided with specialized support ships to

21

SECriCT

ojienitioiiul requirements. During the past several years the Soviets have carried out limited support and replenishment operations in the Atlantic. Use of support groups wouldonsiderable incieasn in Ihe number of submarines which could bo maintained on station and would eatend the areas of petrol activity, but such groups would be highlyin time of war. Kvcn so. using only homo bases, thc Soviet Navy would have subs'arttial capability to conduct operations againit NATOustained conventional war.

l of thc present time, resortrof sustained conventional warfare isery attractive alternative to the Soviets. Provision bas not been made for it, though in an emergency the means probably exist lo cope with It. They have not prepared for sustained conventional war because they think ftIf it came, they piobably believe that they would have the timeuild up the logistics and cany out the mobilization re-quired.

E. Nucleor War inn the, tbe Sovietstheir long-held view that war inwould be nuclear from the start. Their current view appears to be lhat they woulduclear strike only when they have concluded that NATO will introduce nuclear weapons. It is unclear whether an mtercon-tinental exchange is part of tbe scenario!

jlhc Soviets arc wrrrslling with the problem of the application of nuclear weapons to theatrr warfare in Europe. They are well aware of tlie Westernarge and diversified stockpile, as well as by nuclear.configured strike forces. While we do not believe tbe Soviets have full confidence in tlie validity of the scenarios under which they now train and structure their

forces. we also do not believe that they have arrived af an artrrnatc solution to theUntil they do. theretrong possibility that the Soviets would respond to limited NATO use of nuclear weapons in the manner irrdicated by their scenarios However,esponse should not be considered automatic, the actual Soviel response would be the resultigh level decision in which political as well as military considerations mightari.

ConcepJ

Soviets' general scenario ofemphasizes the importance of anstrike against strategic and rear areathis is intended to destroy NATO'sfor organized resistance. The concept

. does not envisage use of the initial strikein direct support of the groundplan: on the contrary, tbe maneuver plan calls on the ground forces to follow-up and exploit thc elfecfs ol the nuclear strike and lo occupy key areas of enemy territory before NATO can recover from those effects.

initial nuclear strike on landmade by thend LRA onby fronlal weapons and aircrafttargets, and by nuclear rocketstargets. Naval strikes wouldthe theater strikes. The SovietsATO targetsstrategic forces. Wc believe theseinclude nuclear depots andairfields, air defense controlconcentrations, harbors and naval bases.

and. finally, industrial, administrative, and

command centers.

oviet_T

jplan the use of chemicalby theater field forcestrategic nu-

tttrf-

clearny decision regarding lhe actual use of chemical (and biological) weapons would be made at (he highest levels ofasecision on use of nucleai weapons. llul Sovicl leaders probably consider chemical weapons lo be subject loand constraints similar to those imposed on nuclear weapons, and if they authorized one, (hoy should be canceled to authorize (he olher. Once the use hud been authorized, the front commander would plan (he operations, as in the case of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear Strike in Europe

Slrategic Miitilei. The Soviets might usetrategic missiles against Western Europe, including MRBMs. IRBMs.nd SLBMs on diesei-powered submarines,ariety of nuclear loads, in ihoT range. Some ot Ihese wouldeload capability.

Medium Bombers. The Soviets haveedium bombers stationed in thc western USSR, and mos( of these could he employed against NATO. These bombers could carry variou: nuclear loads in (herange of one toT. Many carry ASMs. thereby givingtandoff capability.

raaataOssI Rockett and Missiles. Tactical rockets and missiles could be used against some of these same targets within. of tlie NATO frontier. Bul Iheir main use

" See Annei C. "Soviet Capabiilffe* for Chemical ind Biolorrkal Warfare'.

Mi; Con. PbilUp B Uivsosoo, ArUSUatSufi forerlrnerit of theArlin.irector of NavalIVpartmeot of the Navy; and Brig..ri .of Suff.

InlifaHmn. USAF. beorvc the Soviets Lave Uiected tbe SS-IU at two MHBM and IRBM ritot primarily ogainst the US. See Ib'iia

would lie against tactical targets in support of the baltie plan of (he front commander. Nuclear tactical missile delivery would be by freeROCs)ange up to, Scud missiles with ranges upnd Shaddock cruise missiles up. There arcuclear launchers in the forces opposite lhe Central Region of NAM) now.ould be brought forwardeeks. (Sec Tableage[

1

ooirrf FrorUof Aviation hasircraft, and Czechoslovakia and Polandore, which are suited by capability and bkcly deploymentnd later toof nuclear weapons against NATOThe light bombersadiusun,ounds of internal nuclear stores while the fightersadius of about one-half (hisounds of external stores. We estimate Soviet tactical nucleai bombs weighounds downounds, depending on yield, (ypc. nnd age.

ajor problem for the Soviets would be near real timeof movable targets and post-strikeReconnaissance units of Soviel tactical aviation have been Improved significantly in recent years through the continuedof the Brewer D. and more recently through ihe replacement of most Frescos with the Fishbed H- Thc new For bal will provide an additional reconnaissance meansho theater commander,

hemical Weapons^

"^combined nuclear and chemical

strikes by Pact tactical aircraft, Scuds, and

Jwcthat theo have designed chemical ammunition for their current artillery and multiple rocket launchers.

hemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Defense. Thc Soviets expect totlieir vulnerability to nudear attack by presenting fast-moving, hard, and dispersed targets. About half of the tanks opposite NATO Central Region52 models which can be shielded against nuclear fallout, and the new LIMP armored personnel carrier being issued to the Soviet forces in Europe is probably suited to useuclear environment Pact exercises emphasizeoperations su as to limit losses from tactical nuclear strikes. Moreover, much of Pact training consists of defense against CBR weapons. Decontamination and wash-down equipment have been issued in quantity. Detection systems have been developed for both reconnaissance and for protection of the individual soldier. Soviet research on antidotes for toxic chemicals has been both competent and extensive. (Seeorediscussion of Soviet CBR capabilities.)

uc leer Storage and Control We can. not tell for sure whether any nuclear weapons at nil are stored in Eastern Europe. It isclear that the Soviets anticipate Iheof many, if not all, of the nudear weapons to the forces in Eastern Europe by aireriod of tension. We have testimony

ariety of defectors to show the basic design of delivering weapons by air from the USSR Nevertheless, some warheads lor initial Strikes mie stored in thc forward area

lielievc no nudear warheadsfor use againit NATO arc inand we estimate that, even In waiSoviets would retain control over all

Novo! Strikes

addition to the SLBMs, Sovietare likewisearietynuclear delivery systems. Theyweapons on surface-launchedsuch as then theKresta dass cruisers and thethe Ifcldin and Krupnyy classis reasonable to assume that thcis also available on theversion of theheynuclearnd AS 6air strikes. The new missilesnn the Kresta II and probablyand thea the Moskvacertainly nudear capable. Thehave nudear totT>cdocx andj

uclear weapons are carried on ships at sea. Although we have no evidence of theomplete nuclear as well asoption would indicate that about one-half of the nuclear-capable cruise missiles on ships and submarines would be nudear. Nuclear storage at naval bases and airfields is suifldenl to contain the requisite warheads. The exact manner of control of nudear

scenep

SLCRfj

on ships and submarines al sea is noi known.

Defense. The Sovieis continueships with water washdownsealed compartments,systems, and decontaminationthat would enable those ships totheir assigned missionsoxictraining is providedmaintenanceermanent, high levelreadiness for die various naval units.

F. Limited Nuclear War in Europe

indicated at the beginning of(paragraphs. theof nuclearurope,!^

jpre-

scnts some serious questions. If, indeee, the Soviets conceive of war developing asjn their scenarios, they are Inhibited from any conventionaleven frommoves which might threaten to involve convenlionaltheir apparent belief in rapid escalation into general nuclear war in Europe. And. they would recognizeeneral resort to nuclear strikes In Europe could provoke an intercontinental strike by the US.

Some Soviet military writers havethc problem and have considered the possibility of waging war in Europe with tactical nuclear weaponsay which did not escalate into general nuclear war. Thc possibility lhat political pressure could beto inhibit NATO's use of tacticalweapons is recognized and the initial use of nuclear weapons by NATO may not automatically resultarge-scale Pact response.

Warsaw Pact forces do have sometoariety of nudear options

shorttrategic strike. The delivery systems available, especially tho tactical rockets and missiles and Frontal Avialion, could be limited lo purely miliiary targets and even lo Ihose close lo lhcf direct contact between ground forces. Their targeting doctrine already calls for use of nuclear weapons againsiand support elements, and their troops arc trained and equipped for operationsuclear environment.

hc Sovieis would be limited, however, by their lackariety of low-yield nuclear weapons comparable to those possessed by lhe NATO forces. In thehe Soviets indicated an intent touclearfor their larger conventional artillery piecesoctrine for use of thisbut the project was dropped It is within Soviet technical capability to develop nuclear artillery rounds;^

J

hcrc is no evidence that they have ac-done so. Similarly, while they probably have the technical capability to create nuclear warheads for tactical SAMs, atomicand other small tactical warheads^

ave no indications they have done so.

hc evidence docs not exist toudgment as to whether the Soviet leaders would, when confrontedATO use of tactical nuclear weaponsocal scale, reply in kind and attempt to keep the exchangeor would accept one of the other options open tothe conflict, go to general nuclear war in Europe (with the dangerS intercontinentalr resort to an intercontinental attack themselves. So long as they do not go further than they have inthc possibilities of the limited nudear warfare option, devdoplng the weaponry for

and Iraining lhcir forces for it, this option docs not seem toery promising one-Ill. SOVIET CAPABILITIES IN ASIA

A. The Sino-Soviet Confrontation

Early Soviet military dispositions in the Far East were directed against US forces on the Pacific periphery and against US allies along this periphery. Tlie ground forces in Siberia and the Far East were primarily for securily of thc Trans-Siberian Railroad. By thc, however, thc Soviet leadership liad come gradually to the idea that the growing instability of their relations with Communist Chinareater danger of war than did their more stable relationships with the US and its allies.

Ths traditional hostility of China aod Russia over the border lands taken over by Russia in thc past few centuries still is tbc basis for much of the Chinese attitude. This hostility was exacerbated by China's desire to control its own nuclear capability on the one hand, and by the subsequent Sosnet cutoff of further aid on the other. It was given anmanifestation by the differingof the leadership of the twoto the common legacy of communism. Thc vilifications incident to the attempt of the new Soviet leadership early5 to reach some accommodation with China probably onlythe Soviel leadership that their future relations would bc more on thc basis of enmity than ofso long as the Maoist leadership continued. Continuedincidents,eighto doubt only confirmed the Soviets in this belief.

5 the Soviel leadershipilitary buildup along the Sino-Soviet border

that continues to this day. It is clear lhat lhc initial impetus to thc buildupefensiveprepare the USSR for anystemming Irorn the unstable relationsthc two counlries. The fact that the buildup has already been stretched outix-year period and that at present rates it will take al least another couple of years lo fill out the present force arguesoviet plan for early deliberate aggression. On the otherradual buildup was the only way inorce capable of majoroperaUons against China could have been developed without substantial redeployment of units earmarked for early commitment against NATO or stiaming the civilianEven so, the buildup opposite China has required some slowdown in theof theater forces opposite NATO and has involved the movement of some air regiments from thc west,

he generally conservative approach wluch the Soviets take to defense of interests vital to the USSR has resulted in theira force opposite China that wouldlear deterrent lo any Chinese action, noi onlyuclear confrontation, but also in awar. To be most effective as ageography and Soviet military doctrine dictate that over Ihe longer term these Soviet forces be structured and deployed foroperations. Static defense along the border svoulduch larger force and would almost certainly lead to some shifting of units from thc west. Defense in depth is denied to the Soviets in much of lhe border area because thc major developed areas and lines ofrun parallel and close to theConsequently, thc Soviets will probably maintain the China border force in anof their strategic in-tent. But inorce suitable for of-

SCCfCT

SCCRCT-

the Soviets arc placingosition to initiate hostilities OnmM they dc-

site to do so.

liincse strategic capabilities remain modest compared to those of the USSR, tml they are also growing steadily They may have. MRIIMs An IRBM capable of reaching the Volga is probably iteming deployment The Chinese axe also workingissile probably capable of reaching any part o( thc USSR. This missile could be ready for deployment in3 ororeover, thc Chinese arc adding someU-lfl Badger jet mediumear to their present force ofach of these couldT nuclear bomb. Thc Chinese are alsodiesel-powered torpedo attack submarinesubstantial but still thin air defense system with interceptors and tlie Chinese equivalent of SA-2s. This force probably would not be enough tooviet bomber attack, but it would make repeated attacks costly.

hinas prime military counter to the USSR is thc obvious one of manpower. InChinese divisions deployed inand eastern Inner Mongolia represent twice as much manpower as on the Soviet side But the best of the Chinese divisions havehird of thc artillery andixth the tracked vehicles of their Soviet counterparts The Chinese have nofor tactical nuclear delivery by rocket. Theeagles could be used for delivering nuclear weapons but have not been exercised in this role.

oviet discussions of the naturear with the Chinese have not appeared in the military literature as have discussions about

war in Europe, f

reationtrong striking force in the Transbaykal MD alto suggests Soviet preparation for the contingencytrike to cut Manchuria olf from China proper. Soviet forces in the Central Asian MD also would be capable of occupying the Dxurigarian Basin of thc Sinkiang Military Regionoviet forces opposite China axe not strong enough, however, tooviet conquest of China proper. We do not know the nature of Soviet plans in the event of hostilities with China, but the sire and deployment pattern of their forces suggests that the Soviets wish to be able to take the oflertsive. citherounterninese invasion or in supportolitical decision in the Kremlin to take military steps against China.

R force Posture Opposite China "

order Guards.en in KCB Border Guard units stationedin the Sino-Soviet border area have responsibility for security of that border. These troopsight screen againstby unauthorized border crossers and can also provide warning in the event of attack. Recently, however, atattalion-sized heavy combat border guard units have been

"The buildup of Soviet forces along the Sino. Soviet boider is discussed in greater detail io Annei E. The location ot Soviet divisions, Frontal Aviationand Scaletroard units are shown inollow! ni;.

i

GCCftCT

organized, each withoanks or APCs. These units provide the border troopsapability lor handling skirmishes without lhe help of regular ground force personnel In lime of war. Ihe border guards would piobably be used lo supplement regular army troops for rear area security.

round Forces. Since lhe, So vlct ground forces in the regions near the Sino-Soviet border or in Mongolia have incrrnsed from aboutivisions to at leastivisions. Growth of Ihese forces continues, bul Ihe emphasis in Ihc past few years has apparently been more on filling out and bringing up to strength divisions previously formed, rather than starting new ones.ivisions have been formed sinceSoviet and East EuropeanPurposeECRET. CONTROLLED DISSEM. several have been brought up to combat strength from reduced strengthlmost all of (hedivisions appear to have someready to fight without furtherTher so divisions are organizedormiesn the Far Eastn the Transbaykaln Mongolia, andn the Central Asian MD.

hc development of combat support for theater forces opposite China generally docs not appear to have kept pace with the incieas ing number of divisions. SomeROGwithaunchers are believed lo be in divisions along the border, bul there arccud brigades with someis nuclear support is lighter than opposite

" lae cetraatcd thatere rUOoned near the Sine- Soviet border. Stone' we have reassessed fit! estimate, and now believr aornreie there then.

NATO, but it is supplemented by at leasthaddock crutse-musire batiihon andoaunchers) of. Scaleboard. units of which are deployed only opposite China Army- and /rrml-level conventional artillery has. however, beenin the Maritime Province al levels nearly Iwice lhal of Soviet forces facing NATO. Else-where, non divisional field artillery is prcs-nt al levels below those in lhe West.

ersonnel Strength. Thc personnel strength of Ihc Soviet ground forces opposlle China probably has readiedn divisions,nThese forces currently are equipped withC0 artillery pieces, anduclear launchers. If these divisions were to be filled out to full combat strength, and ihe same level of support furnished as found in the forward area opposite (he Central Region of NATO, the total forcertillery,uclear launchers

9S. Fronial Aviation. During lhe same time that the ground forces were being built up in Ihe. Frontal Aviation was increasedingle TAAombat alicrall and aboutelicopters loombat aircraftew TAA was developed in the Transbaykal MDhird currently is being formed in the Central Asian MD.

VdiW Forces. The Soviets have in (he past year increased (heir capabilities in Ihe Pacific by the transfer of (he firstLCM and (he third Kashin DLC phis the activationeserve Sverdkrv-class light cruiser. This brings the total number of major combatants tond enhances lhe anti-ship. ASW, and command and controlof thc fleet. TheI SSCNs and

-SKfetf-

iesd-powered cruise(SSCs) in lhe Pacificnwith lhclcararge! acquisi-lion aircraft and aboutSM equipped Badgers, are best suited for the antiship strike tote. Compaiedhis force, the Chinese have someubmarines andajor surface ships, ofany cruise missiles.

trategic Defenses. Soviet strategicdefenses In tho border area have beenin recent years, but some of this im pruverncnt probably would have taken place even had there been no Sino-Soviet dispute. As of now, the Soviets have In the borderAM launchers andnter-ceptors. includingll-weather interceptors armed with air-to-air missilesgainst these air defenses, the Chinese liave aboutedium bombers andight bombers.

trategic Offensive Forces. Peripheral strategic attack forces deplored in the Far Last are believed to have been targeted against the US and allied installations in Ihc area. Over time some of these and otherstrategic attack forces probably have been assigned largels in China, bui il is not possible to determine thc extent. Thereeavy and medium bomheri with tbe Far East Long Range Air Army within striking range of key Chinesethe same number ate believe lhat during thc past few years all MRBMs and IRBMs in the Soviet Far East have been phased out.

he potential vulnerability of the Trans-Siberian Railroad has caused the Soviets to stockpile relatively larger amounts of ammunition, petroleum, oil, and lubricantsnd equipment behind their lorces along thc China border than behind their

forces in Europe. There Is also evidence that the Soviets are prepositioninR equipment in the area. The widely separated locations alongnder have caused Ihc Soviets lo rely more on arr support: the concentration oflift is proportionately greater along the border than opposite NATO.

rVlobif'ZOfion nnd Reinforcement

he present buildup activity does notear indication of thc number of divisions in lhc (wider area (hai the Soviets plan to bring lo combat slrenglh. Manyare continuing to receive personnel and equipment; some of these probably will reach combat strength in the next year or so. Others may stabilize at less than full wartime strength. If so. it would suggest that the Soviets intend to rdyobilization plan similar to that for the Soviet forces opposite NATO. There the Soviets maintain only some of the divisions at full strength. Tbe others are keptit can be filled out with reservists and civilian vehicles wilhin abotit one week

obilization planlo that used in Ihc European USSR would probably not work a* rapidly, however. The required reservists may rsot be as readilyas lhc divisions arc spread more thinly in less densely populated areas. Thc Soviets may believe that the relatively immobileforces do nethreat requiring the rapid mobilization capability thai is needed oppositeiey may therefore bewith slower mobilization- One-fourth of all the Soviet males of military service age live in areas east of the Urals. Thc Soviets also have numerous truck parks (aufototonrku) In the East Mobilization procedures have not been exercised in tlie area opposite China as they have in the west: and we have not studied

SECHCr

Ihc bases for such mobilization as extensively. The Soviets 'lo have tank and ordnance narks at points along ihc Trans-Siberian Railroad and in the Tar East MD. Thuse could help to fill out existing divisions. Army and fromhowever, would have lo be Iransfeifed from other areas of the USSR, as they have not been established (even in cadre form) In many parts of thc Transbaykal ami Central Asian MDs

ivisionsSiberian and Turkestan MD? arcas reinforccrnents for theThree addibonalIsland and the Kamchatkathe Far Eastconsidered to befor contingencies involving Japanforces in tho area, but could also bereinforcements in the event ofChina.ivisions in the Uralalso bc used as reinforcementExcluding an airborne divisionall of these divisions arc inlow states of combat readiness,would need substanUal mobilization.exceptionivision in Siberia,ivisions appeals to havesince the, in fact,of them weie reduced in strength toof thc buildup for new divisions near

C. Force Capabilities

Capability to Defend

Soviet force on the borderthaiejtel any KofD>are likely to send against thethe next few years. The Soviel forcesmotorized, giving them groatover the Chinese In mobility. Thiswith an overwhelming advantageand conventional fire support as well

as tactical nuclear fire support, probablythc Soviets thc capability to respond quickly and forcefullyhinese forcealong any likely attack route into thc border area. Even assuming that all Chinese forces arc equippedar with their best units (which ishe Soviet force would have about four limes thc number of tanks and about twice thc number of artillery pieces. Moreover, the Soviets could quickly achieve clear air superiority in the area.

or the Chinese loerious threat against thc USSR at any point on thc border wouldassive concentration of troops. Except for two divisions opposite the Vladivostok area, however, and several smaller unils elsewhere, the Chinese forces are deployed well back from Ihe border. The time it would lake to move these into position toajor attack on the USSR would permit the Soviets, with their superiorand good intelligence resources, toforces to block the attack and to launch spoiling attacks of their own.

10S. In the Vladivostok area thc Chinese could mount an attack with perhaps as manyroopsatterew days. This is thc area of heaviest concentration of Soviet forces in the border area, however, and given the vast Soviel superiority in firepower and air support, it is by no means certainhinese force withadvantage could overrun Vladivostok before reinforcements arrived.

n any event, tlie Soviets probably have sufficient tactical nuclear weapons in Ihe area to deal with any Chinese attack which they could not repulse with conventional weapons. They haveactical nuclear rocket and missile launchers (including.actical aircraft configured for nuclear as well as conventional delivery, andedium and heavy bombers.

32

Capability Iq Attack

f Ihe Soviets were to undertakeoperalions against China, thc overallof lhe buildup of Soviet forces along the border, togelhcr with the natural and political geography of the border area, suggest the Soviets would plan the creation of at leastossibly A. fronts. Typical Soviet and East European potential fronts consist ofrmies containingoivisions,AAonibat aircrafl. together with front support. Potential fronts opposite China can be defined as follows, with cunent forces as indicated:

Province

MD

Mongolia

Asian MD

fourth potential front might be created in the Far East MD opposite northern Manchuria.rmies,ivisions, are apparently being developed in this area, there is no TAA. Three tactical air regimentsndependent squadrons are located in thc northern Far East MD.and in wartime these couldeparate front in this area. If the Soviets were to create an additional front they might add more divisionsore tactical air regiments to create an air army.

By filling out all existing divisions in the border area, and providing non-divisional support in the proportions estimated for the force opposite NATO, the Soviet troop strength would approach parity with that of the Chinese in the border regions.oviet troops would be positioned againsthinese troops in thc Shenyang MR, most of which arc nowin southeastern Manchuria-oviet troops would be deployed in

the Central Asian MD across the border from0 Chinese troops scatteredthe Sinkiang MR.

augmented Sovietdvantage in tanksdvantage in conventionalThis force would also havemissile and rocket launchers forsupport Completion of thcair army in the Central Asian MDtlie lactical combal aircraft in theto.

full-strength Soviet forces,supported hy medium bombersgood air cover, would bemajor offensive operations in theof China and probably couldhundred miles into the ChineseSuch operations would not havelimited to attack and withdrawal. Sothey do not penetrate beyond (hethe Soviets probably couldportions of territory, includingthe eastern part of Innerthe Dzungarian Basin in Sinkiang.air superiority, it is likely thataccomplish Ihese operationstactical nuclear weapons; tacticalstrikes would ensure their success.such as these would not, ofChinese capabilities to wage war,if they undertookto recognize the possibility of

IV. FUTURE FORCES

A. Predicting the Future

General. There is no direct evidenceSoviet plans for thc future composition and weaponry of forces. Such Information is

33

known Ioery lew within the Soviet hierarchy, and it is noi known lo us. The fact that economic pfenning In the USSH involves five-year lime spans, andew five-yeaj plan has recently been approved, indicates that an allocation of resources to military pur-poser hav been planned at lean (hat far into the fuiurein Westerneven programs which have been approved probably face annual reviews and would lie subject to cancellation and revision at any time.

individual weapon systemsprotectedew yeais intoespecially where ihese systemsfor existing ones The past isguide, however, in the case ofof systems because the Increasingcapability and cost of follow-onoften resultess than one forThis is particularly the caseand submarines. Some groundcould prove out the samesystems such as tactical rocketshave no forerunners, and thcof deployment is difficult to predictknowing the specific operationalthe decision to introduce them.case, the further into the future oneless helpful Is knowledge of currentOur problem in estimatingand capabilities involves not onlyabout the momentum and directionon-going programs, but alsoabout possible major changes ofbrought on by revisions ofpolicy.

Inert ia

of courseole Indevelopment The SovietIs cumbersome, as it is in anyIt is difficult to stopit is started. The tendency ofand institutions to keep on doing what

Ihey are doingcmiautooomoui nature lo fiends in the development of weaponand force elements. The Soviels have, however, slopped programs which failed to meet their goals, either in the dcvelojimental stage or after short production runs. Inwhere development of dual syslems for the same morion is undertaken, the losing design suffers an early demise The ground forces havearticularly favorable climate for bureaucratic inertia because of their sire, thc traditional nature of their tasks, and lhe lack of regular contact with hostile forces Naval general purpose forces have also suffered from such lethargy, but changing missions have dispelled much of this in the past several years.

Technological Advance

Technological advance is the enemy of inertia, and the USSR has rnaintained aRAD effort. But tho impact ofadvance is more In the fields of missiles, aircraft, and submarines, than In conventional ground and naval arms. One of llie more in-tcresting changes has been tbe development of syslems for mote than one mission. Oneis theissilel both intercontinental and peripheral missions. There are also new mullimission naval vessels such as the Krivak DDCM.

Much of the equipment used by the ground forces continues to meet requirements which change little with the passage of time, and tho pace of cliange lends to be slow. New modeh often come into the forces over as long asears, they are not subject to rapid obsolescence, and there are few technological breakttuoughs which warrant completeof inventory. When expansion of tlie ground force proved desirable because of the China problem, it was accomplished by not retiring equipment aad aircraft There arc active in the general purpose forces today

fiCCRCT-

SFOUi

tanks, aircraft, and ships which arc SOold. But as new models replace old ones

the cumulative effecteriod of years

can be substantial.

Resource Constraints

esource constraints upon theof Soviet forces are relative, notand derive mainly from political anddecisions. Soviet industry couldubstantial increase in defense output, and in many cases could do so without increasing capacity. In particular, land armaments,warship, and missile production could be easily expanded if the Soviets desired to utilize existing capacity for these pvrposes. But unutilized capacity is being given togoods, and the interest of the Soviet leaders in SALTartial consequenceesire to avoid the economic cost of maintain-ing. or enlarging, existing forces at higher levels of effectiveness. Moreover, theaterof their largeIn sharp competition with the civilian sector, especially for such items as labor, surface transport, food, and basic raw materials (steel, rubber, and fuel).

Geography ond History

eography and history havein important ways to the size of thcforces. Invasion and occupation by forces coming from both East and West have made the Russians very wary of any powerfulone technologicallytheir borders. This, together with the length of those borders and tlie hostility of thc nations across them, has contributednotsize and disposition of the So vict theater forces. Ceography and history have also affected the structure and size of the naval forces. The fact that two of the fleets can be bottled up in Baltic and Black Seas has caused the Soviets to keep tlie bulk of their

naval forces in the Northern and Pacific Fleets. The fact that the latter two fleets exist derives (torn the difficulty and length of passage from East to West and vice versa. Thc Sovietsthey arc lo maintain an clfiilivc presence in theeasonable seaof their shores,apacity to operate militarily on tbe highaimaige navy with considerable versatility.

Perception of tho Threat

he way in which lhe SovieU act upon the considerations noted above depends very heavily upon bow they perceive the threat. Thc pace at which technological improvements are introduced and nl what cost to the civilian economy will reflect how urgently the need for improvements or expansion is viewed. While historical factors In Soviet thin ling trod to change only slowly, the re la boo between tbe threat and geographical disposition is quite obvious. The existence of powerful forces under the control of governments viewed as hostile is. of course, reason enough formilitary forces. But there are varying degrees of seriousness with which the threat from such forces can be viewed, depending upon thc current policy of their governments, the armament and state of morale of thctr forces. etc. Moreover, military forces have other uses than deterrence orheyiplomaticeans of exertingand inajor factor in the policy decisions of oilier nations.

n Ihe current phase of military and political relationships in Europe, the Soviet leaders probably do not regard the threat from NATO as an immediately urgent one Theatmosphere in the US and Western Europe, the West German Ostpolitik and the generalized support and acceptance accorded it, US interest in MBFR, progress oo SALT, and widespread West European interesturopean Securitycould

T

be regarded by the Soviets as indicating little need for augmenting forces in the west and even as opening the possibility of some

y contrast, thc deterioration of Soviet-Chinese relations over the past decade, the events9 on the Soviet-Chinese frontier, and the signs of improvement in US-Chinesr relations haveense of urgency to the building up of Soviet military strength in Asia. It seems most unlikely that thc Soviet leaders in the current phase would be giving any thought to thc reduction of that strength. Instead, it would seem more likely that they would complete their present buildup byout existing divisions and backing them up with enhanced support forces. They might even be giving consideration to increasing those forces to the point of creating astrike force for operations in western and noithern China and Manchuria.

ut thc current phasc of relationships and forces are not the wltole story. The Soviets maintain forces in Eastern Europe also toa measure of control over governments and population, and thc existenceredible threat from NATO facilitates this politically. The desire to maintain control also serves to set limits to possible force reductions. The Czechoslovak crisisS would, forhave given the Soviets reason tothe utility of relying heavily on allies, and doubts on that account mighteason for maintaining, or even adding to. Soviet forces. Extensive reductions are probably also foreclosed by Soviet fears of possible shifts to more militant policies on the part of Western states. They probably anticipate thatpolitical change in China would occur after the passing of Mao, but they probably also do not believe they can predict whetherhange will increase or decrease Soviet-Chinese tensions. Finally,reat power

and self-styled leader of the internationalrevolution, the Soviets proclaim and believe that they musttrongposture and possess some visiblelo come lo Ihe aid of their friends.

Stralegic Concepts

oviet doctrine calling lor early andi nuclear wciponsar in Europe wasecade ago. While wc have seen some evidence that this doctrine has been questioned, we have seen nothat an alternative has been developed. Thc Soviets have always believed it would bc difficult to control or limit hostilities once nuclear weapons had been used; they may also believe that their doctrineetcsrent effect inis. that NATO would choose not toar to begin rather than to face early and massive nuclearBut this sword cuts both ways; their restricled capability to fight limiled nuclear wars al graduated levels of effort narrows their flexibility; thus, tbcy could bc put into the position of having to choose between standing down themselves or going nuclear on an intercontinental scale.

n alternative to this dilemma for both sides would be to keep hostilities convcnlional. At thc moment, the problems which the Soviets would facerolonged conventional war probably do not trouble them very much, perhaps because they believe tliat NATO does notis not nowonventional war. But the Soviets must also recognize that NATO would have some Significant advantages, especially in economic resources and population, over tlie Pact in sustained conventional warfare. Therefore, if tlie SovieU came to believe that the chances of war breaking out in Euiope were likely to rise, they might wish to widen their options by improving their capabilities for sustained

conventional warfare and byetter menus of fonducting limited nuclear warfare at various leveb of effort.

B. Areas of. All Urge military forces, regardless of tbc various doctrinal, political, historical, and economic decisions which affect their..i-i-i] willi llie question of fcecp-ing up to dale whatever tlie existing structure may be, and rhe Soviet forces are no exception. Later on we wdl discuss how thoy mighttheii forces depending upon how they might view thc nuud lor doctrinal changes, the changing iniemaiional relations of tbc USSR, or their overall military posture- and national policy. In thii section, we will discuss areas in which moderrdzanon teems likely to take place in tlie short term. How fast they press modernization is. of course, not unrelated to political and doctrinal considerations, but unless some major decision it made the pattern now in existence teems likely to continue forfew years at least.

fn Ihe Tfiealer Forces

oviet ground forces will continue to be modernized with llie introduction of weapon systems currently in production,followed by new systems by thc. Soviet medium tank productionwilt continue al ill present pace. In theew Soviet tank (which is now under development) with Improved firepower and night vision and range-finding equipment will enter series production, and by thet could account for about one-third of the tank force. Production of amphibious APCs will probably increase as the Services attempt to meetC requirement of one per squad The Soviets will also produce more helicopters for lilt of personnel and cargo and rjrovide additional air defense systems forof tlieir field forces against thc low-altitude threat. In tactical nuclear rocketry.

missiles of Ihe Scud lamily will continue to lie deployed, anil Scaleboard will probably be more svidcly deployed. Soviet logisticalwill improve through thc addition of larger numbers of medium and heavy ca;go carrying vehicles.

Soviets have initiatedthree nesv tactical aircraftprobably will be delivered tothrough lire. Two ofare variable geometry-wingedair defense and ground attack,ircraft that isbe deployed in thc reconnaissance andstrike roles. Developmental testbeen identified which suggest that abomber will enter service in theto four years. Deployment of tireprobably will be accompanied byout of older model fighter andaircraft introduced in thestill compriseourth ofaircraft Deliveries of mobilenow being deployed with frontair defense units probably willthc.

fn Strategic Force* for Aitack in Eurasia

only discernible trend inmissiles is thc introduction ofICBM range in lhe peripheralIn SLBMs at leastlassdiesel submarine is beingwe now have no evidenceonfident estimate of whatto be installed.

" For Use views of Maj. Cen. HuDip B. Davidson. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Department ofear Adm. Earl F. Rectanui, Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy, and Brig. Cen. Edward Ratkovrch, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, see iheirn

SCCRCT

he newackfire awing sving bomber will probably be deployedhe LRA. II will be well suited for pcnplieral attack. It will probably carry both bombs and ASMs, und could achieve an initial operationalits early as3 if existing weapon systems are used. The Badger is probably being retrofitted with tlicnd will probably bo kept ui lhe force through Ihe decade.

In General Purpose Naval forces

onstruction of current classes of nib-marines, cruisers, destroyers, and patrol craft will continue through theecline of submarine strengthesult of systematic retirement of older Less capable diesel units swill be offset by an increase in the number of nudcar-powered submarines to some two-thirds of the force,et effect ofoffensive and. detersive capabilities in undersea warfare. Major surface shipalmost certainly will continue tomultipurpose ships with improved ASW. anlisblp. anti-air, and dectronic warfareFollow-on classes will probably be constructed in the.esult of these changes, the csOTposition of thecombatant fleet could changemissile-equipped combatants couldfromercent of the major surface ships1 to someercent

s Soviet fleet capabilities improve, uaval air forces will continue, to bc used to support the missions of countering submarines and carrier tasks forces in the open ocean Soviet capabilities in ASW sonsois, weapons, and tactics will almost certainly grow. There will be more widespread deployment of tho May ASW patrol airoaft. ASW sensors, and wea]xins stores. Naval Badger aircraft are probably being equipped with thcissile indicating Soviet interest fa keeping the Badger

in naval aviation for some time lo come. The Backfire might be deployed as an ASM earner in Ihe Soviet Navy.

C. Illustrative Alternative Force Postures

The analysis and information in the preceding section suggest strongly lhatimprovements and expansions will take place in the armament of the Soviet forces. But there is much that we do not know andmuch that is unkriowable Our lack of knowledge of specif ie plans for the size, com position, andof Soviet forces springs not only from LntcUigence gaps but abo from the likelihood that tbe Soviet leaden have not made decisions on some import an (On some questions, they may simply be marking time until requirements can bc more dearly discerned; moreover, new questionsdecisions will arise from time to time as the decade progresses.

We have, therefore, adopted thotool of four alternative illustrative force postures, with thc differences between them tied principally to ways in which lhe threat might develop or be perceived They also take account of some basic Soviet policies, such as nx>dernrzaQoo of lhe navy, and thc opportunities and limitations produced by technological considerations There are, ofloor and an upper limit lo alternative postures. At thc lower end, some of thehUtorical and ideologicalwe have outlined come into play -the Soviet fear of invasion, Ihe length of Soviet borders, need for expansion of lhe navy in order to maintain an effective presence on the high seas, the desire to maintain Sovietta Eastern Europe, and tlie overriding necessity of protecting the homdand. At tlie upper end are Ibe constraints of lime andFor general purpose forces, the task of enlarging, training, and re-equipping takes

slcpx.-

ble lime and meant that, even when protecting forceshere are measure able limits to what can be done.

here are, ol comic.lmost Infinite number of posiible force postures. Bythem into four broad categories, wc have in effect ignored the shadings and variations which twist. Thus. Postures A, B. C,s described below canariety of stages between them, not only in the bastecircumstances which we describe but also in thcterms of force size, structure, andthe Soviet leaders might draw from them. Thus, theof four pastures and the tables which illustrate them tend to create an illusion of knowledge and precision which do not exist.

s based upon the assumption that many of the current steps toward the casing of international tensions will continue for some time, that is. that an atmosphere of detente will dominate the next five years or so. In more specific terms, it assumes that some agreements at SALT will be initiated and that arms control talks will continue, that talks lo achieve MBFR will take place and produce some results, that thc West German Ostpolitik will not lie abandoned and the treatiesto date will be ratified, that further movemeni toward detente in Europe will take place and US Soviet relations will improve, and that there wil! not be serious crisestho area uf Europe to disturb US-Soviet-West European relationships.ocs notignificant improvement inrelations, but it does note lhat these relations have slightly improved and might continue to do so.

osture If assumes lhat progresslhe casing of international tensions has slopped. SALT and MBFR talks have not produced major agreements; the Ostpohtik founders and the treaties remain in limbo;onsequence detente in Europe does not

go forward, though relations do not become batter Soviet Chinese relations arc clouded by rising suspicions, and lhe Soviet leaders are mistrustful of US-Chinese relations.in Arab Israeli relations continue and may have nsen In short, the Soviet readers are uncertain about thc future, they areto aggravate lite situation by engaging in enlarged miliiary programs at highcosts, but neither are they willing to assume any risks.by curtailing existing

ssumes that international rdatiooships have deteriorated- Negotiations have broken off with mutual recri mlk has foundered. Thc Chineae have become more truculent, perhaps because their relations with the US have improved, perhaps because their military capabilities haveperhaps because anil-Soviet elements are in political ascendancy. In sum. thehave become disappointed with the policy of detente, have become fearfuluture conflict, and have concluded that they ought to strengthen tlieir forces by speeding upby developing greater flexibility, and try new deployments and increased

Ml. Posture I) assumes that international relationships not only have deteriorated but that tlie Soviet leaders have responded with heightened fear and bellicosity. Those inleadership who had doubts about thc policy of detente wouldreater voice. They would Ore any developments abroad which appeared unfavorable to thcimproved US-Cliinese reUtions. an end to Ihe Ostpolitik, rising tensions in tbe Easternupward revisions in the US defense effort,signs of enmity toward tho USSR and of the need for the USSR tofor the worst. Io short, the Soviets would conclude that they ought lo develop greater

39

flexibility and stamina, and increase their military capabilities across lhc board

n military terms would mean the thinning out of forces in the forward area facing NATO, the reduction of the readiness status of some divisions in the European USSH, nnd probably fhe disbandment of somealtogether. In thc Far East it would mean halting the buildup, though not necessarily stopping fhe filling out of some of the units now incomplete (especially In the supportodernization of Soviet ground and tactical air forces would continue atn strategic attack forces, miisilei deployed for the peripheral role would deciinr, and theollow-on system (subject to any agreed limitations) partially replaceomber forces would be modomizodeasured pace, but would decline in num!>ers. Tlie navy would continue its modern-iia'.ion. though the introduction oi new types of ships and weapons would slow down.

n military terms would mean that the forces opposite NATO in Europe would be unchanged in numbers, but that their armament would improve withof thc modernization program. Th*in the Far East would continue to fill out forces now under development Peripheral milsilcs would be permitted to decline in numbers, but qualitative improvements would beandollow-on systemincreased. The medium bomber force would be permitted to decline, but thewould move in steadily to make up for some of this decline. The navy would continue to modernize, with new types introduced more rapidly than under Posture A.

For tho views ofen. PhUltp il. Davidson, Asustant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Department of llie Army; Hear Adm. Earl F. Rectanui. Director of Naval Intelligence. Department of the Navy;,ward Ratkovieh. Actio* AstirUM Chief of Staff, Intel licence, USAF. see theirn

Inhe forces dersloyedNATO would be unchanged in number, but their modernization would be more rapid. Divisions at thc lowest slates of readiness would be made more able to move into action quickly. The most important change would be the Introductionider range of tactical nuclear weapons to increase flexibility, wiih accompanying revisions in doctrine andThe buildup in tlie Far East would con-tinue with emphasis on the increased readiness of lhe units deployed there and on theof rOgistic buildup. The introduction of new and improved tactical air and air defense systems would be speeded up. Peripheralattack capabih'ties would be enhanced. Theollow-on system would be deployed in larger numbers to make up for the phasing out of old irussile systems."the decline in the total sire of the medium bomber force would bo moro than overcome by the deployment of substantial numbers of thc high-performanoe Backfire. Tho navy would not be significantly larger than under Poslure B, but new ships, submarines, and aircraft would bc deployed more rapidly.

Under Posture D, the number and readiness of the divisions opposite NATO and Chuia would be increased Divisions al lower conditions of readiness would be raised,trategic reserve created in lhe Faractical aviation in the Far East would be strengthened and mode miration of aircraft speeded up ss rapidly as possible. Peripheral missile forces would increase, as wouldassigned to lhe peripheral atlack role; produclion of Backfire would bc accelerated. Naval surface forces would be increased in

u For live viewr of Maj. Cen.avidson. AuUtanl Chief of Suff forepartment ol the Army;m. Ear) F. lie eta mu. Director ofet licence. Department of Ihe Navy, anden. Edward RatkovSeh. Acting Antitant Chief ot Stall. Jniefl.genoe. USAF. ie* iherr footnote fl oo

rjrnr r

sccfitr

of capability to land and supply forces by sea. submarines aad naval air strength and capabilities would be substantially irrcreased. Under Posture P, the Soviets would alsofurther their developmentider range of tactical nuclearthey would Still wish to avoid instant escalation to strategic nuclear svar in Kurope. 'Ihey would calculate that, in (lie atmosphere of Postute D, the US and illbe West would be made mote capable of fightingresort to nuclear weapons (especially if Soviet tactical nuclear capabilities hadthey would therefore attempt also to impiove their capability toustained conventional war, so as to avoid being the first side to resort to nuclear weapons.

omparison of tOusiratioe Postures. In the tables which follow, we have notetailed breakdown of all weapons and forces, and we have rounded off figures to permit easy and quick appraisal of the nhangci from one posture to anotltcr. It is

important to note, when examining tables such as these, that tabular renditions of numbers of men. divisions, regiments, aircraft, ships, or missile launchers provideart of thc picture There are other factors aflectingwhich wc cannot quantify or areuch as doctrine, training,of command and control systems, the quality nf the logistical system, andi I- Weaknesses or strengths in these things can at 'east to some degree modify the effects of greater or lesser numbers.

c make no choice between thcwo have illustrated. Wc do this partly because they are intended as illustrative and not as definitive. We beheve that the upper and lower limits of Soviet strength between now9 will lie roughly betweenA and D, but where within this range thc Soviet forces will actually develop will depend largely upon how the Soviet leaders react to the developing world situation.

ILLUSTRATIVE KORCE POSTURES

iMu<tr*te diff*ringo Soviet force* (or

ujaaiaand> tbe? couldandarc Pot directly

11

Nufiilwaofdirbiora reduced in Europe.ol diriatOBi unchanged In Europe, Headtne*-

ducedin western USSH Hutldup itopjin weatein USSH UuJldup continue* oppOfib*

XfodcfPiMlion proceed* at -dower pace Support Moderaiwifln continue* at pcttftl par*

limttff at current relation lo dtvipoaal forer*.coulinuea at current relation lo divtaioul lore".

rHJlftce On Urate**rrlinnec on rtfalCflO deterrent.

visional)

Non'divisional a* fxi

otal

Tftfths

APCS

Artillery

Rocket Launcher*

Nucka# Delivery Launch

Divisional

Arm/.

fast

SAM Launch*/*

Trwefc*

0

0

2 M0

0

.

joo.ooo

40

,4v:

0

0

no ito

ElM

XO

O

IBfl

210

SO

210

0

0

*

c

vg.

0 0 JXO)

U

3.

0

550

210

230

T

.

Mumbcr* decline creitlj inand steady inNumber* decline slightly in wesl, and steady in cutinterceptor, figfetcr bomber, and frconftiitian*** Same new aircraft brought in, at more rapid pace. In

itriVe aircraft now tn producUon oerought in at addition,* retonnaitnnce aircraft deployed in

moderate pace.

Regiment Equivalentsen each.

Oldert)

CurrentMig

h.

Not ft uf lear capable

ucUar capable (SU-71

{New. under litit}am

(lUas.capable)

(Fovhal) (Nuclear

i; II)

fatal-.

.ISO

.ISO

1

TH&ATEft FORCES AT MID-VEAR

for fliltitiij pl*nn.nft purposes For Oefcrw plannm* purpomt* ihr reAder diotrid consult Ihfroitetion* (or Planning

ToalurcD

Number* of iliv.tK.nfi unchanged IA Europe hulof diviaiuu inernaia in Europe-a* wrll Rr*di-

ppose Chin* Readiness improvedimproved, butuchlrAteftie

Kunipr ond China. PacC Ol modernisation suppedemtod opposite Cbitu. Modena much

Kuppon increase* snoicwlmt in relnlioo lomoid: support increaietIn relauon

rurcrv Imn^crt uetmlncrraied Ucttcal nuclear jnd con

vrnnonjl rapuljthiy.

iiioii*

Oil

Includingf

III* ftn

.AOD .UOO

UUO

IU

)

)

.

0 ,OUO

X>>

a*

of toul

.tOCl

.

J0V

.ICO

Delivery Launch-

t T L

1

Uuncher*

BOO

0 IU

630

Number* decline slightly in wesl. tod steady inNumbers steady tnand Increase in east Saqic Same w- aircrafl a* in Poslure B. hut new nuclear ea- ne* aircraft a* iout roroe in even more pable fighter Umber And* rapidly Ine. interceptor deployed end

l

11'

'I

2,OSS

0

500

500

130

crali come in much more rapidly

0

104

l,9W

112

0

3 M

I iX

Regiment

0

6 3fl

i .on

?:ui

eco

SCO

0

635

UO men each! /AlesrrpCvrx 7VcJ

Older

Current MI&

ak 2S)

New MachFlog-gffj

r.i:

730

M0

no

460

Hat nudear capable

NiteJnarptblr fSU-

vr;t

7)

too

too

(New.e*i) rffci tfo^oer* Torof

ai tiancef tlr lAe

Ttxal..-

(Foxbot)

I.

l.TJS

* QI0

4,TVjr

,

Toul

ILLUSTRATIVE FORCE POSTURES FORCES FOR

orce po.ture* illrjuftic di'f'nue eraphax* *Uh regard lo Sovietor

operation* in Eitruiipauiblc trend* ibey rould take.such am noi directly

ll

Btthtii*of mijttJfj decline byercent Numbers of mitnlci decline byercent,

eplaee* moreNo mofcteNo mota> avalem.

430

-

*

in only aubaurine

f

peripb*

riifriLon-

alto

1

aeV

m

*

force cut in half Backfire deployed in

force reduced byercent Baekf

00

oneahird of tote

(Aboul hull

Blinder (About halfackfiref with ne* ASM).

I7fl

wo

5

MH

300

-To

75

ISO

SO

no

out before ASM ctrritrf-

STHATECfC ATTACK IN EURASIA AT MID.YCAR

iable lor miliiary planning purpoM* rV Defence planning purpose, lh* reader should cunaullntelligencen* Planning

D

Mohlle MKtlM.riHltMa introduced

Number* of missiles remain aa al prctcnl Numbers ofincrease,nd neweplaces current MRRM&JIRBMs.* solid MRBMsMRDM* replace

MRBMs'lftBMs* Mobile syitem

RBMit RBM

420

SS-4

MHHM;

ohitr prored

or Nf

isd/or

ICBM**.

120

G-IC, IMI are deployed fur peripheralI.II coavmloodeployed for peripheral atratcne attack.

)

)

)

)

)

i

A V

)

/

)

)

i

models phase out more *lo*ly than Current models phase out a* ino Posture B. Backfire enmea in more rapidly. Backfire cornea in ere* more rapidly.

(About half

blinder (About bali

Backfire (About half *mh new ASM).

CO

ITS

173

95

535

ITS

(80

i

< J V

340

178

1 JO

4i

iLintTltATtYfc foro: rn>T< Kr>

ytfefU

i

|

tWlt iiyer* enter

kmln

a*dpimw

It at ii*rr

MwopU-r

al runeol

Theft -

f

Olderit**

buih OUei

Ic*

* 1

St

3

Cruiitifi.

1*

Crvtotrt

It

1

i

37

17

44

34

Ill

ind torpedo tuick tu

d u<

.m.

ow pare Nvmbrri of tub*

rUrU

quarter

by 40

aiurt auki

Uir4-

iore* -tetbti-t*

part***

3

*

m

4t

.

tt

14

B

34

...

iti

ATtofi#n

rtiiift Jofrr rJ^Hino SumL^nV ASW

Ntftto

ne*

n aSW fare*hrough

CurrffiM

ro

llom tier/Tan her

IMMpim

IrifauUy

eurrem

IniijAtiT (TOW*

pat*

Larnj ejr Tram*.

NAVAL FOR CCS AT MID-YEAR

luitdblc lor miliiary planning purpuirj. For Defense planning purpntn. (he reader ihnuh! raruult theirlUce nr* Pruiidi-n* lorP-TI>

D

Cruiseeruiier* and destroyer* eatrr Crissile cruiser* ond destroyers enter Meet more rapidly. Thrr* new helicopter fleet morr rapidive new helicopter

carrier* limit. Older unit* withdrawn more carriers fautU. Older units retained ir* larger

Tiumhcf} rreted support cap**

Hilly.

Helicopter Camera

Missile

Other Crutsers t

MisaiU

Cruise Mltiiit

Nuclear

Diesel

Torpedo.<

Vom( AtiO/lOn

rniaaik and torpedo attack aubmarlne*

flee!

much eno*

rapidly, New oritur

and cr

force dceU

byercent

carrier force

as

ASM

comes in. ASW aircraft grow through- earner comes in more rapidly. ASM aircraft. New aSW helicopter is deployed, gro*. Ne- ASW ttehcopier

and reconnaissance aircraft.

ASM Carrsers

n naiasaneel Bom bcr ^Tanker

Patrol/ASW

ASW Helicopters

4mpAi6tOM Ufi

Battalion Landing Teams

Naval Infantry growa at current

w* much more rapidly

GCCRCT

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