Created: 2/25/1971

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Soviet Strategic Defenses



Ihe following intelligence organizations porlicipatod in the preparation ol Ihe estimate!

monti gl Stole ond Defense, the AEC. ond iho NSA


Iho Oeputy Director of Control Inteliigenc*

Iho Director of Intel.!gene* and Research. Oeportnant ot Slate

Iho Director. Defense IMe-Uigerto Agency

oSoooJ Scesnty Aoency

IS* Assistantnager. Atornk Energy


Iho Aimlonl to the Direcior. federalhe subject being

i" of his jurisdiction.

M'lU IH'l I

approved for release


oviet Strategic Defenses






Ballistic Missile Defense

Defense Against Ballistic Missile Submarines


iuuii, nioMie

Antisatellite Defense


Technological Development .

Strategic Alternatives



I. THE SOVIET APPROACH TO STRATEGIC DEFENSE A. The Threat to lhe USSR and the Soviet Response

B- The Cost of lhe Program ,

C. Major Continuing Defense Problems .


A. Introduction .

R. Organization. Command and Control

Organization of th.

Thc Command and Control

Joint Suilnco-to-Air Missile and Interceptor Aircraft

Surveillance and Control Radars

Ground-Based Radars ..

Sea and Airborne Radars ..


Current Interceptor Forces

Aircraft Under Development .

Missile Systems


Other Surface-to-Air Missile

F. Tbe Continuing Problem of Ixrw-Altitude Defense


and Control

Miuile Detectroo and Early

Moscow Antiballistic Missile System .

Target Acquisition and Tracking Radars

Terminal Engagement Radars

Interceptor Missile

Operational Concept of the System

of the Moscow* Antiballistic Missile

Agaiast Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

Against Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles

In An Area Defense

In National Command Authority

Missile Research and Development .

Flight Tcstiec

New Co nstru

C. The Use of Surface-to-Air Missiles for Antiballistic Missile



B Organization. Command and Control

C. Antisubrnanne Warfare

Antisubmarine Warfare Surface Ships .

Antisubmarine Warfare Submaiines .

Antisubmarlno Warfare Aircraft



Warfare Sensors

low-Frequency Active

Monostotic Direct Path Propagation .


Convergence Zone

Bistatic Mode of Operation

Variable: Depth Active Sonar

Passive Array* on Submarine*

Fixed Acoustic Arrays ..

Other Detection

Warfare Weapons .

Againsi Polaris Submiirines


C. Antisubmarine Warfare Systems Under Development

Platiotms Under

Sensor Development .


Tracking, and Orbit

ol Soviet Interference wiih US



Threat to the USSR

Arms Limitalion

OJfcnsivc-Defensive Relationship


Soviet Defense Coverage Requirements

Defensive Versus Orher Military and Civilian

D Development and Deployl New Weapon Systems


Air Surveillance and


Surface-to-Air Missiles .

Command and Control




AntUubmarirse Warfare


Surface Ship 79

Antiiubnvarine Warfare Aircraft Systems

Fixed Acoustic

Non-Acoustic Sensor Developments SI

Tha Use of Satellites in Antisubmarine


E. The Illustrative Force



Force Rationale and


Air Defense

Antisubmarine Warfare

Implications for the Strategic



Force Rationale and

Missile Defense

Air Defense


Implications for the Strategic



Force Rationale and

Missile Defense

Air Defense

Antisubmarine Warfare

Implications for the Strategic Defenses



Force Hiitionale and Composition

Missile Defense



Implications for tlie Strategic

F. Likely Soviet Cournn. of Action






for many yearstrategic threat from thegreater in size and complexity than that which the USthe USSR, the Soviets have regularly expended greaterstrategic defense than the US. Consequently, they havemost extensive and. in some respects, most modern strategicin the world. This Estimate treats mainly those Sovietto defend thc USSR against manned bombers andmissilesgainst ballistic missiles, andmissile submarines in the open ocean. Briefer treatmentto Soviet capabilities to render inoperable or destroyorbit, and lo civil defense.

total Soviet outlays for military and spacey someercent, the proportion devoted todefense remained constant at aboutercent. (Thisaboutercent for intercontinental and peripheralercent for general purpose forces, andercent forand general support, research and developmentprograms for the decade off thestrategic defense, aboutercent went to air defense. 5ballistic missile defense, and the remainder to antisubmarine war-



farexpenditures for th esc defenses0illion rubles (the equivalent of abouthesehowever, represent only the cost of producing, deploying, and operating already developed weapons systems. They do notamounts allocated, which we cannot quantify, but which are very substantial, and are especially significant in the fields of ballistic missile defense and ASW.

Air Defense

a result of this effort, we estimate that the Sovietstrategic air defense establishment withnterceptor aircraft, and overmissile (SAM) launchersites. During theyears they have introduced new automated techniques incontrol these forces moro rapidly and effectively. Theand control (AWAC) aircraft. Moss, is now believed toand capable of limited overwater patrols for earlyprobably airborne intercept control. Their integratedexcellent defense against bomber attacks at medium andDefense against current air-to-surfacc cruise missilesthese altitudes is almost as good.

Soviets still have not solved fully the problem ofaircraft coming in at low altitudes. Soviet capabilitiesflying beloweet remain limited, althoughhave continued over the past several years. Forthc Leningrad area ground-based radars on masts probablyprovide continuous tracking of an aircraft flying as loweet. Theas been modified to permittoeet, and deployed more widely. Someay also now be able to intercept at altitudes as lowfeet in favorable locations,eet is alow-altitude limit. The Firebar interceptor aircraft candown to about GOO feet, and perhaps somewhat lower over

' Theoiled under ASWmulti-missioned nsv.ilFor the purposes of this Flttimntc we Iiave included the entlie cost o! ll.rie fotcrt under ASW although the specific portion of their cost which It dedicated to counterine. the US fleet ballistic minile loser cannot he dutioitu kited from those emit incurred Inlr1nj; thuii other mission capabilities.

"Tbe dollar fiffmei (appealingrcnlheses nfler the rublei) areof whatwould cost to piuchaM and operate the estimated prog rami in the IIS.



water and flat terrain. To engage penetrating aircraft at suchariety of weapons, however,ery heavy burden on the command and control network.

Ballistic Missile Defense

thc past eight years the Soviets have installed aearly warning system on the periphery of the USSR andmissile (ABM) system around Moscow. Additionalradars are still under construction, and an improvedis under development al Sary Shagan. Thc Moscowis not yet maintainedigh state of readiness. Tests ofinterceptor missile show that it can attack an incomingoutside the earth's atmosphere at long ranges, or within theat much shorter ranges; the use of both modes againsttargetwo-layer defense with an improvedsuccess. But the system cannot discriminate between re-entry(RVs) and decoys and chaff outside the atmosphere.the interceptor missile does not have very highthe USt cannot wait for thc sorting of RVsaids by the atmosphere before being launched.

optimum conditions, our theoretical calculationsthat the Moscow ABM system,wo-layer defense,best successfully engage aboutCBM targets beforeof interceptor missiles. Decoys and chaff puffs would appearand separate targets, and their use could rapidly exhauston launcher. The system could handle an equal numberballistic missile targets if they arrived fromby large acquisition and tracking radars. In an attackdirections, however, such as from the westerndefenses would have to rely on engagement radars at thefor acquisition of targets anti could be saturated by aattack.8

of its long range, lhc Moscow system has anto defend regions outside lhe Moscow area, but it can pro-

'Vlcr Adm. Noel Caylcr. tho Direcior, National Securily Agency, believes dial wiih respectommand and control, thc performance of the Moscow ABM system on Its first lull-scaleactually under ballistic rntss.lealmost certain to be well below design level. The cumulative effect of its various weaknesses Suggests that (lie Moscow system has little capability tu defend Moscow, etccptmall and unsophisticated attack.


tect such regions withingle layer, and therefore quite thin,This area defense would be more effective against attacksmall third country or an accidental or unauthorized launch, as the number of targets would In; small, and several interceptor missiles could be sent against one target. The ability of the Moscow system toMoscow and its environsoderate, unsophisticatedand its ability touch larger areaightmake it well suited to the National Command Authority (NCA) type of defense which has been proposed at the strategic armstalks (SALT)- .

is ample evidence that currently deployed Sovietnot been modified to provide themallistic missilecapability. It is technically feasible, however, for the Sovietstheir ballistic missile defense by upgrading their SA-2systems forurpose. Thc marginal effectiveness ofballistic missile defense which would result, along with thcin bomber defenses that almost certainly wouldery unlikely Soviet course of action. It is agreed withm theCommunity that even in an arms control environment, inopportunities to deploy ABM defenses would be limited,of upgrading SAMs for an ABM role would bethe Soviets and would discourage them from followingourse.

Against Ballistic Missile Submarines

the past three years the Soviets have deployed newships, submarines, and aircraft with improved sensorsoncerted effort to deal with the problem ofidentifying, locating, and destroying nuclear-powered ballisticsubmarines in the open ocean. There is general agreement thaton new surface ships and submarines represent an improvedto detect and maintain contact on liirget submarines,degree of improvement remains debatable. (See alternativeSectionhe Soviets are employing two new ASWships, which operate as the leadersask forceimprove their capability for surlace search fornuclear-powered attack submarines have more powerfulspeeds, and operate more quietly. Two new ASW aircraftgreater range and load carrying capability. The Soviets are also

TOP SfcOftfrF-


experimenting with fixed hydro-acoustic arrays and with new types of moored and air-dropped buoys.

J. Despite these improvements, the Soviets areong way from developing an effective defense against ballistic missile submarinesin the open ocean. For one thing, although two Moskva-type task forces may be able to place some constraints on Polaris operations in the Mediterranean, they do notignificant threat to the survivability of Polaris submarines operating there. Because of the larger areas to be searched, the capability of these task forces against Polaris submarines in the relatively unrestricted waters of thc Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and the Norwegian and Barents Seas would be even more limited.'

K. Lacking an open-ocean search capability, the Soviets mighttheir new submarines to detect ballistic missile submarines atpoints in their mission, while they are leaving port or passing through narrow straits, for example, and trail them lo their open-ocean operating areas. Such trailing tactics might be either covert or overt. But present Soviet submarines still are unable to detect and traila Polaris submarine while it is on. or en route to, station. Their noise levels arc still higher than Polaris. This not only degrades theof their sonars but also makes it virtually impossible for them to approach close enougholaris submarine to trail it withsonar without being detected themselves. Elimination of thcprobably would require redesign of the submarines.

L. Overt detection and trail of patrolling or transitingore likely possibility. The speed advantage and sonarof thclass submarine ate such that they may have icduced the effectiveness of present US countermeasures in breaking trail. The theoretical Soviet capability of maintaining an overt trail does not nowignificant threat to the survivability of the Polaris del (Trent, however, since there are notlass submarines to conduct such trailsufficient number of Polaris submarinesand since construction oflass is currentlyate of onlyear. Moreover, the problem of initial detection remains.

MnJ. Cen. llixlciy Triantafcllu, tlic Aunt ant Chief oficence. USAF, does not agree with judgments cipiOiwd In this paragraph. Fo-wsp slc his footnote lo Section IV(



Antisatellite Defense

M. The deployment of an extensive space tracking network and the development of an ABM system have provided the Soviets with an antisatellite capabilityy-product. We believeon-nuclear intercept capability has been demonstrated and could be used at any time against selected US satellites. The Moscow ABM system as located at Moscow and at the Sary Shagan test center has the accuracy and guidance to kill satellites with non-nuclear weapons at altitudes up toautical milest slant rangesew. The system could also be usedallistic intercept mode against satellites up to. altitude, although this might require useuclear warhead. The Soviets have alsoapability to perform orbital intercepts using maneuverable satellites. In tests, wherein the target and interceptor were launched so as to be in the same plane, the interceptor maneuvered in-plane to overtake and close on theully operational system would require greaterthan was displayed in these tests.


N. The Sovieis have traditionally been preoccupied with defense and willing to expend the necessary resources for nation-wide defense in depth. The momentum of existing programs will continue for at least several years and keep the commitment to strategic defenses high. Moreover, the forces capable ofuclear attack on tbe USSR will continue to grow in extent and complexity, as the US brings in new systems, its NATO Allies continue to develop their nuclear armaments, and the nuclear capability of Communist China grows. The resources devoted to strategic defense will reflect such considerations as the status of technological development, bureaucratic competition for scarce resources, and general policy aims. Of these, technologicalwill probably have the most influence on future capabilities.

Technologicol Development

O. Since World War II, strategic offensive innovations have usually exceeded the capacity of defensive technology to counter them. The resulting defense lag is most acute in two areas: lhal of providinganddetect, identify, and keep track ofand lhat of providing the computers and associated equipment



needed Io process die information on which defensive systems operate. For without sensors and processing equipment to pinpoint the target accurately, thc task of destroying it becomes very difficult, if notThe principal defensive problems being encountered by the Soviets stem from the inability of current technology to provideeffective equipment at costs which permit widespread

P. Air Defense. The principle continuing problem in Soviet airis development of an effective capability to interceptintruders. The major problem of low-attitude air defense lies in the fact tliat in most of the current radars, the echoes from attacking aircraft are lost in reflections from terrain features. An airborne radar system which can look down over land, as well as over water, and see targets against the background return from the terrain, would offer significant advantagesast proliferation of ground radars,improved. Thc Soviets are undoubtedly working on thefor an airborne warning and control system (AWACS) with an overland look-down radar, though apparentlylower pace than estimated several years ago. As the required capabilities have not yet been demonstrated by the Soviets, its introduction6 now seems unlikely.

Q, An interceptor that would work with the AWACS.ook-down air intercept radar and missiles with radar guidance that would enable them to engage aircraft penetrating at lower altitudes,oviet requirement which will probably be met in the mid- or.ystem could be puturther development of the newoxbat interceptor just deployed,ew interceptor specifically developed for this role or. more likely, on both.

H Another defense problem for the future will be that ofASMs now under development to be carried by US bombers. These nuclear-armed ASMs will not only present extremely difficult targets to Soviet air defenses, bill they will alsoaturation problem to Soviet air defense command and control systems. In order to intercept these ASMs withwill be too many to attempt to do so with interceptorSoviets would have to upgrade considerably their current SAMs or deployew SAM system, or Itoth. Thc modifications required lo theif such were to be made) would include substantial changeseven replacement



the radar, shortened reaction times, and faster interceptor missiles These riwdifications. incidentally, mighterious intelligence problem because they might be confused with those for the upgrading of SAM systems for ABM use.

S. Anlibailistlc Missile. Soviet ABM development has been limited by the capabilities of radar systems toarget, to tell whether the launch unit should shoot at it. and to do this in time if therearge number of potential incoming targets. The development of new phased-array radars should provide significant increases in targetcapabilitiesollow-on ABM system in ther later. We believe that thc Galosh missile of the Moscow system has sufficient propulsion flexibility for useoiterode in which the interceptor is launched toward the general vicinity of thc incoming objects, flics at reduced thrust until thc target can beas it enters the atmosphere, and is then directed to the target at accelerated thrust. The loiter thus utilizes atmospheric sorting ofRVs. but does notery high acceleration interceptor missile. [_


T. Weew defensive missile system is being developed in what mayew complex at Sary Shagan. Ca!osh-type interceptor missiles are being tested at one launch site within the complex. The poisibiliry of an air defense role cannot now be ruled out. Thc weight of our limited evidence indicates, however, that these components will probablyignificant ABM capahilily and that the system is probably intended to fulfill an ABM role. The Soviets may beystemwo-layer defense consistingodified Galosh in associationew smaller missile and new radar. It might be used to increase thc effectiveness of defenses around Moscow and may lend itself to rapid deployment.

U. Antisubmarine Warfare Thr fundamental limitation of Soviet ASW remains the difficulty ofubmarine in the open ocean. Wc expect thai Soviet sonais will continue to he Improved during, and lhal their submarines will be made more quiet Even with the improve ine: its projected lor the end of the decade,ew


submarine could not gain an advantage over Polaris sufficient to give any significant probability of maintaining covert trail for an extended period. The Soviet use of long-range acoustic detection systems is nowby geographic and hydrogcographic conditions around the periphery of lhe USSR. Development of remotely emplaced acoustic detection systems may enable thc Soviets to overcome this limitation in the nextears. To do this, however, would require significantin their sensors and undersea cable technology. In any event, an open-ocean search or trailing capability, utilizing acoustic means of detection, and sufficient to neutralize the on-station force of Polaris submarines, appears beyond the reach of thc Soviets during

V. But wc are not so confident in our judgments with regard to non-acoustic sensor developments. Non-acoustic methods seek- tothermal or electromagnetic radiation from thc submarine,of the earth's magnetic field caused by the submarine, or characteristic wakes created as It passes through thc ocean. There is evidence that thc Soviets are seriously mvestigating various techniques of non-acoustic detection. But we hive almost no technical information about their

Soviet progress should occur, the result mightecidedly improved Soviet system for search of the open ocean. Though we might become aware dial the Soviets were detecting US submarines with unexpected successf



Cen. Hackly Triantafcllu, the Attluant Chie! ol Staff. Intelligence. USAF. doc* not agree with mtfjmenb oaptuced in itili paragraph. For hitee hit footnote lo Section IV. pair 50

Leonard Welti, foe the Director of Intefligi-ntr mil Reimrch. Department of Stjle; Vice Aden Noel Cayier. the Director. National Security Agency- and Rear Admi'li-tir. II. the AimtiDiaval Operation! II*eoa.-tmer! of Ihc Navy. WUevrQ

jho likelihood of trrhi-alogical mrjiriie very mull Mr. Leonard Vveus. further liellevrt that the translation otevelopment into on ASW tvropon intern capable ol nrulialiimg the US mlnile-launching tuhmaiinc foice would Milltaior undertaking extendingeriod ol tcvnielndhatapability would comeipiuD to the US.


course, still remain the problem for thc Soviets of incorporating these techniques into an effective counter to thc US fleet ballistic missile force.

W. Antisatellite Defense. Efforts made thus far indicate thewill have in the corningested non-nuclear antisateUite capability based upon their maneuverable satellite and ABM programs. As these two programs grow in sophistication andhe extent that additional ABMs are deployed, antlsalellite capabilities willeliable capabdity for non-nuclear disabling of satellites up to and including synchronousan be expected in the, and any widespread deployment of ABM defensespportunities for attacking satellites in low-earth orbit. Inaser system capable of producing physical damage to the film, the optical system, and other componentsatellite, could be available for use by the.

Strategic Alternatives

X. Developments in Soviet strategic defense forces over the next two or three years are reasonably clear, as they result from construction programs now discernible. Thereafter the alternatives open to the Soviets in the planning of their future strategic defensesajor indeterminate factor at present istrategic arms limitation agreement. If one is agreed upon, explicitly or tacitly, it may be limited to an agreement on ABMor it may be more comprehensive, including means forattack as well. In these cases the Soviets might at aaccept mutual deterrenceasis for strategic defense and do little more than complete current deployment programs. Without an agreement, they might continue to develop tneir forces at rateswith past trends, or they might attempt toaximum defense posture through greatly expanded deployment of improved and new air defense, ABM, and ASW systems. As between the various defensive forces concerned, they might continue to emphasize air defenses, while concentrating mainlyrograms in the ABM and ASW fieldsearch for better solutions before deploying new systems. Or they could deploy ABM and ASW systems widely, with less emphasis on air defense. Within each of these general courses ofarge number of strategic lorce developments could take place.


Y. The various uncertain tics summarized above make it evident that no exact estimate of the future Soviet force structure, al least after about the endould be defended. We have therefore constructed in Section VII of this Estimate, several illustrative force models to depict selected possibilities. The first, called Force Model I, represents little moreompletion of programs presently under way; it seems unlikely the Soviets would stop at this. Another model. Force Model IV, is representative of what we believe wouldough upper limit, short of convertingartime basis, especially if it were to accompany extensive deployment of intercontinental attack forces; this also appears unlikely.

Z. Between these models we have set forth two others which we consider to be more likely, but under differing conditions. Force Model II illustrates the level of effort and technical progress that might obtain if there were toomprehensive arms controlForce Model HI illustrates an approximate level of effort and of technical progress we think likely in the absence both of an arms control agreement andignificant step-up in the arms race. But we wish to emphasize that all of these models are strictly illustrative, and not to be regarded as confident estimates or as projections for planning. As one moves beyond the next two years or so. all projections become increasingly uncertain; beyond five years they are highly speculative.




A. The Threat lo lhe USSR and lhe Soviel Response

This section reviews successive stages lit the Soviet response to the developing strategic threats to the USSR, and telli briefly Sow Soviet expenditures fordefense have reflected thisFinally, thc section indicates throe continuing problem areas of Sovietlow-flying aircraft, against ballistic missiles, and againstmissileare lechvery difficult and for which the USSR has not yetatisfactory answer.

wenty-five years of intensivehave provided tho Soviets with the most extrusive and in some respects, most modern Strategic defenses in the world. Soviet strategic defense forces have cone through several stages ol development since World War II in

response to changes which the Sovieis have perceived in the threat facing them. The last two decades have seen both Soviet defenses and US offensive forces interacting inanner as to produce thc substantialthat today exist on each side.

Confronted through thcith large US strategic bomber forces, thc Soviets built large numbers of interceptor aircraft, reinforced at Moscow with numerous surface-to-air missiless the US improved its bombers, the Soviets in turn developed faster interceptors. By the, the US responded to expanding Soviet defenses by introducing low-altitude penetration tactics and air lo-surface missiles (ASMs) forattack; and the Soviets countered byinterceptors and SAMs withcapabilities against low-altitude targets as well as longer range interceptors and SAMs lo counter the ASMs

In Ihe, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICDMs) and sub marine-


ballistic missilesere added to tho threat originally posed by bombers and by nuclear-capable tacticalbased around the periphery of the USSR. The increase in the size and diversity of US strategic attack forcesremendouson Soviet strategic defenses. It caused the Soviets to expand and modernize- their air defense forces, to develop and deploy amissile defense system, and to expend considerable resources in efforts to Improve their antisubmarine warfare (ASW)

Soviet leaders are deeply cotxoned about the threat from NATO, particularly US tactical air and missile forces in the forward area. Tlie Soviets consider nuclear-capable US forces based in Europe and Asia and on aircraft carriers to be strategic weapons since those forces could be used to attack strategic targets ln the USSR. In addition, thc Soviets now arc faced with two potentially hostile nuclear-armed NATOBritain andsvith small but growing strategic attack capabilities.

Finally, China's emerging nuclear attack capability hasactor of growingto Soviet military planners. Wc believe that the Soviets have been steadilytheir air defense installations near the border with Chirm and there probably has been some Increase in SAM. aircraft, andartillery (AAA) deployment th ere Soviet concern for the Chinese ballistic missile program is reflected in the construction of Urge early warning (EW) radars, some of which probably are oriented toward China.

6 Soviet decisions about how tu respond to these threats have been affected not only by thc way In which the Soviels view them, but also by the pace of technologicaland the extent to which thc leadership

hits been willing to commit manpower and economic resources. The present Soviethaseneral disposition tomiliiary programs, and military ex-pendihires have continued to rise. Moreover.the military establishment, strategic defense has longavored position. Both in absolute terms andhare of lhe total military budget, the Soviets strategic defense effort is larger than that of the US.

B. The Cost of the Program

0he Soviets spent an estimatedillionequivalenttrategic air and missile defense forces and on forces for ASW. As total Soviet outlays for military and space programs grew duringy someercent, the proportion devoted to strategic defense remained constant at aboutercent. (This compares to aboutercent forand peripheral strategic attack,ercent for general purpose forces, andercent for command and general support,and developmentnd space programs for the decade ofsuring, of the share fordefense, aboutercent went to airercent to ballistic missile defense, and the remainder toxpenditures for these purposes0illion rubles (tho equivalent of aboutillion).'

"The lord costed ilnoVr ASW are mull tinnedforces- Tor the pueposes of this Estimate we hen*be entire cost of these naval force! under ASW orthotic* the specsft portion of thetr costceUited to countecmg the US fleetmissile loroe cannot be didlngutihed from those costs Inclined in acquiring thoir olher million

"Hie dollar liguies (appealing In parentheses after lhe rubles)iktw of what It would cost to purchase snd opera'e the estimated programslha US.



These figures, however, represent only the cost of producing, deploying, and operating already developed weapons systems. Tbey do notamounts allocated. which we cannot quantify but which are veryand ire especially significant in tho fields of ballistic missile defense and ASW. (See

C. Major Continuing Defense Problems

As the Sovieis view the future, they face thc fact that the US has begun planning or Is already deploying systems which could signlficandy degrade their ability to defend themselvestrategic attack from the West. These includetrategic bomber, advanced ASM. improved SLBMs, andlr>dependectly rargetable re-entry(MIRVs) for ICBMs and SLBMs More-over, by the, China probably willimited but nonetheless significant capability for delivering nuclear weapons to virtually any part of the USSR. Thus, tho siie and diversity of thc threat continues to grow, creating new problems for Soviet defense planoers before they have fully solved tho old ones.

Three special problems continue to face Soviet strategic defense planners: defense against aircraft attacking at low altitudes;against ICBMs equipped withpenetration aids; and defense against ballistic missiles bunched from submarines. The failure to solve any one of these problems can undermine progress made with respect tu the others.

The Low-Altitude Problem. Soviet enpa-billtics against aircraft penetrating at altitudes beloweet remain limited. Steps arc being taken to improve these capabilities, such as more widespread deployment of the improved version of theow-altitude SAM

- T<


Hut, even as tho Soviets beginake steps to counter this shortcoming, new standoff attack weapons threaten the effectiveness of Soviet air defenses at higher altitudcv

IL The AntibalHstic Missile {ABM)Tho Soviets have die'world's onlyABM system and are believed to beollow-on system at the Sary Shagan test range. There Is still no evidence of ABM deployment outside the Moscow area, however, and our analysis indicates that the Moscow system, as presently configured, has significant weaknesses. Among these are the limited number of launchers and its inability to discriminate between re-entry vehicles (RVs) and thc penetration aids which haveart of the US ballistic missile threat. In its current form, the Moscow ABM system provides long-range radar coverage of the US ICBM threat corridor, but coversart of the multidirectional threat trom Polaris submarines.

he ASW Problem. In the absence of an effective nation-wide ABM system, the Soviets for the foreseeable future, must rely primarily on their antisubmarine forces to counter the Polaris threat. Recognizing this, tho Soviets have built and continue to build new ASW Ships, submarines, and aircraft and arcthem with improved ASW sonars and weapons. They are vigorously investigating non-acoustic detection techniques which may have an application to die ASW problem. They are also developing new tactics for the use of submarines, ships, and aircraft inantisubmarine operations. Despite these efforts, we believe thc Soviets have nota reliable capability to detect,and locate Polaris submarines operating in tbe open ocean.*

"Mai. Gen. HucWy Tilantafellu, the Assistant Chief at Staff. Intelligence, USAF. docs not agiec with judgments expressed in thu paragraph For hii views, see bis footnote to Section IV. page SO.

estimate which follows considersdetail the efforts which the Sovietsto cope with the problems ofIt treats both the forces whichdeployed for thisandtlie specialwhich arc likely to dominateof those forces over theConsjdaaTtifea pjtogiven to Sto develop an antisatellitean improved civil defensethe estimate provides fourto illustrate the possible courseof Soviet strategic defenses in thedecade,


The strategic aircraft threat perceived by the Soviet Union consistsariety of aircraft ranging from intercontinental bombers to forward-based tactical aircraft capable of dcliveting nuclear weapons to targets within thc Soviet Union. Attack may come fromany direction and could take many forms, such as supersonic attack at medium or high altitudes, low-altitude penetration aimed atthe radars upon which Soviet airrely, or the bunch of small, fast ASMs from aircraft Hying well beyond the borders of the USSR

The variety of options available to an attacking force calls for variety in defensive measures and weapons, long-range inter-ccptors able to operate hundreds of milesthe border are necessary to attackbefore they launch ASMs. Long-range SAMs deployed in peripheral barriers are needed to intensify this defense before actual penetration of thc defended territory occurs. Aircraft. SAMs. and AAA are required toboth .iics and point defense within the


itself. To use such defenses effectively requires that they be directedoordinated fashion and be provided with rapid oollec-tioti, processing, and transmission ofabout both attacking and defending forces.

be USSR hasoncerted effort to insure the coordinated use of radar facilities, interceptor aircraft, and SAMs by creating an elaborate command and control system. Airsystems hava been deployed in great numbers. Older equipment has been modified and improved, and new equipment has been introduced to meet new threats. The resultiversity of equipment, redundancy, an"lorce-innd greatin tho development and production of air defense systems.

n tntograted defense system hasthe Soviets to achieve an excellentagainst bomber attacks at medium and high altitudes. To be sure, careful sequentialon defensive systems with ASMs. ICBMs, and SLBMs together with electronic counter-measures (ECM) and selected approach routes would significantly degrade medium- and high-altitude defense systems. Defense against current standoff ASMs at these attitudes isas good. Defense against low-altitudeby bomber or standoff weapons nnd against new generation ASMs pose special problems, which the Soviets have not yet fully solved. Tho search for their solution will likely dominate Soviet efforts in the air defense field over the nextears.

B. Organization, Command and Control Offjanintllon of the PVO This section describes the organization, command, control, and communications of Soviet defenses against air attack on strategic targets in the USSR. It also

illustrates how these elements workin combined SAM and interceptor operations.

he PVO Strany (anti-air defense of the country) in its various organizational forms dates back to World War II. The PVO Strany aa it is organized today dates from theof Ihe Soviet Ministry of DefenseAt that time, the PVO Stranyranch of service equal in status to the Ground Forces, the Air Forces, and the Navy.0 the Strategic Rocket Forces became the fifth branch oft is commandedeputy Minister of Defense, currently Marshal of the Soviet Union, P. F.Seehe PVO Includes three arms of service- The Radio-Technical Troopsthe radars and other electronic systems; the Anti-aircraft Missile Troops man thc SAM units; and the APVO (PVO Aviation) is responsible for interceptor aircraft.

he PVO exercises control of all its forcesierarchical structure of command echelons. Area control of the PVO forces for use against aircraft is theofir defense districts (ADDs) which are themselves dividedotal olir defense zoneshcconstitute thc key command echelons in the PVO. Eachelieved to be responsible for conducting its own defense through its air defense weapons operations centerhere operational tasks such as target and weapons assignment and decision to launch are .performed. The ADZs are further divided for the purpose of air surveillanceepresentative of each of the arms ofis assigned to each ADD and ADZ and,

"rNevioully refencd lo ai IAPVO; since ihoith, the Soviets have dcsiirnatad these oi gamut mi in asossible fourth aim. tbc AntanUasikTroops, is osscsueed in the ABM section ol tha


ofir and


Iho PVO Strang j

bl'I ABM

irVO Aviation

j District ) j

liaison wiih adjoiningnd. where appropriate;

j the Warsaw Pact countries. 1 and Mongolia

pSAUTroopa Ig.'PVO'A


Commander ol

i Ce.-iiiH'.(ADWbC).


RaiiVo-Techmaal Troops

;urVeillance Operations

Liaison withdjoining MOM Mdippropriate, wiih At tkI flo'enaa oiganltaiioni of

I: WafBa"1 UongoBa

Sod or Headquarters or ^Subconfol Radai Stations fe. Radar.

.he Sovieto(^ticSfhTflou^LTMincheso.ive comroi thrown a

nraplnc areas or the operation ol iod,vidualither .or neo-


the commander, they form the battle staffs at the district aod zooe command(See

be PVO Strany also exercisescontrol over air defense elements of the tactical air forces and ground forces at such times as those elements are required forof the USSR. Defense of tho Groups of Soviet Forces in East Cermany.Hungary, and Poland rests with the local Soviet commander, while air defense of each Warsaw Pact countryational responsibility. This close coordination of the

functions of the PVO Strany. PVO of the field forces, and the Soviet trained and equipped national air defense forces of theestward extension of air defense of the USSR. In the Farimilar situation exists between tbe USSR and tbe Peoples Republic of Mongolia.

The Cofnmond and Control Network

he Soviets clearly recognize that the effectiveness of their air defense dependsupon the reliable andommand and control network. The hi action of this network is to provide data



by the radar Dctwork to tbe weapODs elements of tbe system and to direct and co-ordiaato tbeir responses. The continuedof higher performance interceptors and SAMs. together with the need for rapid data tnuumission systems, havo Imposed Increased requirements on this command and control system. The Soviets continue to place highon Integrating and automating their air defense system.

ecent changes have modified the strictly hierarchical structure of theand control network.esult, thc vulnerability of tho system bas been reduced but not eliminated. We believe newsystems have been introduced so as to improve the efficiency, security, and reliability of the network, and that sophisticatedprocedures for coordinating theuse of SAMs and Interceptor aircraft have been established. These procedureswould be hard to maintain in theof ao actual attack. .

he effective use of radar datain large measure the effectiveness of PVO forces. The Soviets haveariety of air defense radarsumber of sites tliroughout die Soviet Union. (These are discussed in some detail in the section whichn oide- to increase the reporting speed and reduce the vulnerability of the sir surveillance system, tbe organization of radar elements witlun tho ADZ is being modified. We believe that the old organizationalerit, still followed in most Tones, has each zone dividedumber of air surveillance sectors which evaluate and pass radarreceived from subordinate echelons up to zone headquarters. Under the newthe sector probably will be dropped, and instead, so vera! subcontrol radareach of which controls several radarair situation data directly to the zone. To

provide for the required internetting of groundystem wu deployed in thend. This system isey PVO communications syslem for point-to-point transmission of tracking data.

ontrol ofndAM sites is generally exercised through SAM regimental headquarters, each of which has command authority for about four sitesew data transmission system probably has been put into operation to link SAM control authorities to as manyoubordinate battalions. This system would provide target

designations and tracking data more rapidly, accurately, and efficiently than was previously

possible. It would alto provide for automated

responses of weapons status and engagement


Control of interceptor aircraft at-the ADZ level is the responsibility of the senior ground-control intercept (CCI) controller, who is responsible for coordinating thcoperations of subordinate CCI controllers at radar sites. Thc controllers use radar data to direct interceptors either by aground-to-air data transmissioo system or by voice communications.

The most disruptive loss which could occur within the PVO command and control system would be that of the destruction of ADZ headquarters. To offset the effects ofoss, the Soviets in some areas most certainly have established communications Links among operational units at lower levels, some of which might be used as alternate zonal command posts.

We believe that flights by AWACSover thc Baltic and Barents Sea areas have been used not only for air surveillance (seeut also to carry outintercept (ACI) operations. (Seeperational testing of AWACS has been in progress for the past several years.


Maura 4

Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) Operation

In addition to the intraduction of moro advanced data transmission systems, theprobably have taken steps to incorporate: diversity and redundancy in PVOequipment. Provisions probably also exist for the PVO to utilize the communications facilities of the other armed forces of the

USSR- Additionally, we believe that specific channels of Ministry of Communicationsaro leased to the PVO.

ew-generation communication2 and thc geostationarybe in operation within the next year or so and will provide an efficient



to pass data over long distances, further increasing PVO coram uni cations diversity and redundancy.

Joint Surtoee-io-Air Missile ond Interceptor Aircraft Operations

air battle with any aggressoruse of coordinated PVO fighterelements. Control andbe exercised by the ADVVOC tnwhich in turn would select tacticsthat the SAM units were provideddata to avoid destroyingInterceptors under targetcoordination by the ADVVOCengage their targets beyond thebut stay close enough to maintaincontact with their CCI controllers.thc SAM zone, the fightersfrom the hostile aircraft. Thisreduces the need for closeground controllers.

exception to this defensivethe "miaed zone" operation. In thisdefense, fighters operate at varyingagainst targets within the SAMaddition to the inputs from their ownforcesore completethc air situation by monitoring airbroadcasts or by receiving datathe ADWOC. Thc Soviets may bea capability lo use mixed-zonethe ADVVOC is inoperative.

C. Air Surveillance and Control Radars

This section describes the deployment concepts and the capabilities of Soviet ground-based air surveillance andradars. Il also describes tho Soviet efforts to extend air surveillance out over the sea approaches to the USSR by means of sen-based radars of tho Soviet Navy and by an AWACS.

The derJoyrnent of radars able to detect attacking aerodynamic targets at long ranges aod to maintain continuous track on them at all altitudes Is necessary for fully effective-air defense. The extent and diversity of Soviet air defense radars is unmatched by any other country,

Thc present Soviet air surveillance and control network consists of moreadars atites. Coverage isdense west oi the Urals. These radars are supplemented byites containingadars ln the Warsaw Pactof Eastern Europe. Though we arethat our count of thc number of sites is approximately correct, no such assurance can be given on the number of individual radars deployed. Uncertainty continues toas to the actual number of deployed radars. (The basic characteristics of Soviet airand control radars are given in Table I, Annex. J

Ground Boscd Rodors

Soviel EW/CCI radar sitesultiplicity of radar acts of several types which can operate in several frequency bands. In addition to their radar complements, lite sites are equipped with Identification Fricnd-or-Foe (IFF)many of them integrated into the radar surveillance system. Also present is the equip-ment needed to introduce thc radar dataInto the command and control network in several different forms.

A number of advantages result from this approach to radar deployment. Theof radar sets ensures that each sito can maintain surveillance with high reliability despite thc loss of Individual radars. Inthese radars operate in differentranges which allows the site tomany of tho frequency sensitive factors


wliich degrade radar perforrnance. Thereweather conditions which affect radars operating at higher frequencies or nucleareffects which limit theof lower frequency sets. Because radars of different types are available at eachhole range of varying functions can beIn general, Soviet radar depkryment practices haveidespread, flexible, highly reliable air defense radar network.

Frequency diversityideof tbc radar band also poses serious difficulties for the use of ECM by anecause soand of frequencies must be countered. Tho deep concern of thoabout ECM Is also revealed in the design of the circuitry and antennas of their radars and in the frequent training of radar crews to operate in the presence of oountenncasures. All of these steps serve to reduce greatly the vulnerability of Soviet air defense radars toelectronic interference 11

Soviet surveillance and control radarsormidable capability against aircraft attempting to penetrate at medium and high altitudes toward principal target areas. These radars are fully capable of supportingair defense weapon systems by providing them with EW and acquisition mforrnatlon as well as data for Interceptor aircraft control. Under optimum conditions, where detection and tracking is limited only by the radarSoviet land-based air warning capabilities.. beyond the

en. Hackly TriantafelJu. the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence. USAF. note that the USAF has had ulnmt experience tn taapeoyfcig ECM Msoss most bands used by Soviet radars with the notable eiccjHlon ofand, and actions arc under*ay lo covet that band. Ila believe* It Important totlie vulnerability of Soviet electronic syttemi to ECM and other countcracasures (such as roll back tactics and radar surspcessien weapons) ta balance the image of iovulnclability suggest rd by the apparentand quantity of Soviet radars.

ders of the USSK. Under normal operating oondltlons, detection and tracking at medium and high altitudes Is virtually assured out toiles.

recent yean, the Soviets havedevelopmental versions ofto speed the trarismission ofTho Soviets apparendy are testing asystem with integralix sets of radars andantennasortion of abeen identified to date- Little isknown about the characteristics ofsystem and Its Intended rolo.links two widely separated radarsreceiving terminalilestarget data apparently areaulornaacally to the receivingThe nature of the data and the formthey are transmitted has not yethowever. The potentialof the data transmission system, ifautomatic radar detection aad air riwould be speed and accuracyturn would facilitate rapid tracktracking capabilities of the radarsthe present system, however, do notbe good enough to capitalize on aU ofadvantages of the data

Sea ond Airborne Radon

In addition to new land-based radars, radar surveillance ships subordinate to the Soviet Navy have been identified in each of the four fleet areas. These ships couldtracking data to PVO Strany facilities, and they could be used to guide land-based interceptors to airborne targets. Ships of the Moskva and Kresta II classes seemwell equipped forole.

The radars employed by theseships all have good medium- and high-alrJtude tracking capabilities, and some are


capable of tracking targets at low altitude as well If deployed in sufficient numbers, they could significantly extend Soviet air warning and surveillance capabilities. As yet, however, their deployment remains very limited and in arty case deployment in the northernmight be restricted in the winter months by ice

he Soviets have (as indicated above inn AWACS in limitedwhich has operated offshore, thereby extending their radar coverage seaward in portions of the Barents, Baltic, and Norwegian Seas. Thc radar set used is believed to have some capability to distinguish moving targets from the stationary background, therebyits performance against low-altitude targets in the presence of sea clutter. The limited moving target indicator (MTI)of the Flat Jack radar on the Moss can be enhanced by operation of the Moss aircraft at medium to low altitudes where It can look either up or horizontally to. sec approaching aircraft so as to avoid looking down Into sea clutter. The radar is estimated to have arange of.2 target. When the Moss operates0 feet. Its coverage is limited by tbc horizon in thc case of targets flying beloweet. AWACS will extend Soviet EW range against air targets flying at medium to high altitudes byiles beyond that provided by land-based radar. It probably also has aACIreater extension of coverage will be possible if additional AWACS. aircraft arc deployed. But thc number of AW ACS aircraft now available (aboutimits present possible coverage. The present Soviet AWACS is believed not toook-down capability over land.

D. Interceptor Aircraft

This section describes thc composition of the Interceptor forces deployed for Strategic air defense of the USSB, the

capabilities of new interceptors deployed over the past several years, and testfor new fighter designs.

0 the initial unitnterceptor (Foxbat) became operational near Moscow. Deployment of two other new interceptorsand Flagon A. We have been unable to identify any new aircraft which are clearly destined for the strategic defense forces.

interceptor aircraftrimary element inthe air threat and can be expected tokey role for the foreseeable luture.the only means for interceptingwell beyond the borders of theto the launch of ASMs. Theyuture solution to theproblem ifn coordination with anover ground terrain.

Current Interceptor Forces

aircraft are deployed onof the USSR and on theto prime targets. (Seeis most heavily concentrated in theof the Urals and in the southernof the Soviet Far East We estimateforce comprises0 fighterinighter rejoments, eachinto three squadrons. Soviethasighters based inUnion and Eastern Europe. Mostwere designed as interceptors and areto tactical air defense fighterAlthough the primary mission ofis the support and protection of thea-

"Thc ability of tbo fire-control system in theto look down with its radar and distinguish its targets below it from ground clutter, phis an ability of the missile while shooting downward to home on Ihe target.

forces,hird of these are assigned to regiments based in the Soviet Union thatrimary minimi of sir defense and could be used to supplement the forces of APVO In an emergency.1*

ho interceptor force of APVOia coordination witb SAMs and ground force AAA. About one-half of theforce It composed of fighters introduced7 orFresco. Firmer, and Flashlight. (Thc inventory breakdown of the interceptor aircraft force is provided in Table I. Detailed weapon system characteristics and

" There are Id addition,nterceptorIn East European Warsaw Pact countries which might provide limited support to Soviet air deiemer.

capabilities are provided in Tables II. in, and IV, athese subsonic or low supersonic models are largely gun-armed,to tail attacks at rangesalf mile or less, and have little capability0 feet About one-half of them have an all-weather attack capability. These olderare gradually being withdrawn from tbc force.

notherercent of the forco is made up of theisbpof. Thc Fishs armedirst generation air-to-air rnissile (AAM) whichange of only two to four run. and limits this aircraft to tailThe Fishpol C, of which there are, Is armed with Ihehich






Oldoi Models


Newer Models





ange ofo. and is capable of head-on attacks. The remainder of the force is composed of four newhe weapon systemsby these new interceptors have longer ranges and can be used in two or more attack modes, thus significandy increasing the Soviets' air defense capabilities.

Tho first of the newer aircraft to bewas tbe all-weather, low- andFirebar interceptor. Thecarries twoissiles, one with radar and the other with infrared homing guidance. With this armament the Firebar can conduct both head-on and tail attacks. Thc aircraft can achieve speeds neart higherbut is limited Io subsonic speeds at low altitude. In low-altitude defense, the Firebar Is used most effectively over water or relatively flat terrain.

Another of thc new interceptors ls the long-range, medium- and high-altitudeall-weather interceptor. The Fiddler is armed with fourAsh) missiles which apparently use either radar oris: of the two. The Fiddler isof :itfucking targets from any direction.

Tlie third of these modem aircraft, ihc-medium- and high-altitude Flagon A. is an all-weather point-defense interceptor and is armed with theAnab) missile. It can attack both head-on and from the rear.

The fourth and newest of tho aircraft in thc Interceptor force is the Machigh-altitude Foxbat all-weather fighterVO regimentt is expected that thc Foxbat will be deployed further to bases both on the periphery and in the interior of tho USSR to improve Soviet capabilities against Itigli performance aircraft andew AAM, similar In size to thearried by the Fiddler, bas been identified at the factory where the Foxbat is being produced. This missile probably btfor thc Foxbat. There has been nothat Lhe Foxbatook-down/ shoot down capability, although thc aircraft is believed to be equippedew air intercept (AI) radar. An advanced look-down radar system could be developed later on. There are still no Indications of theofadar, however.

In contrast to their inability to handle low-altitude penetrators effectively. Soviet alr defenso interceptorsood eapaVrility against existing bombers and standoffat medium and high altitudes. Fiddler's combat ceiling of0ould be satisfactory against most free world bomber aircraft. Fiddler could attack targets up to0 feet using theissilenap-upactic In which the missile is launched at targets above the interceptor. The point-defensepot and Flagoncombat ceilings of0 feeL All of iho newer interceptors can attack targets above their combat ceiling using either zoom climb or by firing their

AAMsnap-up mode. These are very difficult tactics.

Soviet efforts to extend thenetwork are of particularif successful, they would betterinterceptor aircraft to cope withThe use of long-rangeparticular thcwith AWACS will enable the SovietsASM carriers before thesethe weapon-release line. At aFiddler-AWACS combination mayto degrade the penetration andof the ASM carriers byto adopt evasive tactics beforeweapons against the USSR. Thoseaircraft armed with AAMs andboth head-on and tail attackaircraft are also estimated toability Io carry out head-oncurrent ASMs themselves.

Aircraft Under

Virtually nothing Is known about aof aerial refueling of Soviet fighterIf inflight refueling of fighter aircraft is developed, however, it would extend thedr range or endurance.

We have been unable to identify any new aircraft which are destined for thedefense forces, although the Sovietsa new fighter aircraft every five years or so.

Tlie Flogger, Mikoyan'swing fighter, has recently becomewith the tactical air forces. Flogger's weapon system has not been identified, but it probably carries twoAnabs. Tlie Flogger design is believed toapeed capability at sea level, which is an Improvement over the low-altitude capabilities of currently operational APVO fighters. Its low-altitude capabilities may be used to augment those of APVO.

E. Surface-to-Air Missile Systems"

This section describes the deployment, unit makeup, and capabilities of SAMdeployed for the strategic airof the USSR.

During the pastonths,of the low-altitudeystem and of the long-rangeystem continued. Since. "SovietOPRESTRICTED DATA, wc have re-evaluated downward our countattalions.

In order to cope with thc improved bombers which emerged at the end of World War II. the Soviet Union turned to SAMs to augment its AAA and interceptor aircraft forces. By the end of the war. aircraft had been developed which could fly at altitudes beyond the reach of AAA and could be cm-ployed in numbers too large for Interceptor aircraft to handle. SAMseans for massing large amounts of firepowerigh probability of Vail in defense of key areas.

Wc estimate that0 SAMlaunchers are deployed Inbattalions throughout the USSR around key targets and astride the majorroutes. (Sechese SAMare most effective against aircraftat medium and high altitudes. They are as yet unable to cope effectively withflying at very low altitude. Small, fast standoff weapons would also challenge the capability of these defenses. Efforts to meet these two challenges probably will dominate further Soviet SAM development.

Our knowledge about individual SAM systems varies greatly. The location andof deployment of strategic SAMare generally well known, though the

"See Table V, at Anmst toe SAM characteriitics.






deployment of two mobile tactical SAM systems has introduced somo uncertainty. With respect to characteristics, rather precisesuch as that needed for the develop, ment of countermeasures bas been collected on systems such as thendhich have been exposed outside tho USSR/_

1 generally true, however, and even in the examples mentioned,technical information is needed on the equipment deployed in the Sovietrecise assessment of the capabilities of tbcndajor intelligence problem duo to continuing technical inteUi-gence gaps.


he first Soviet SAM system to betheas installed atites in two concentric rings around Moscow during the. This system was neverelsewhere.ites remain opera-tional though only aboutercent of thcaunchers in these sites arewith ready missiles. The foilorce probably could be activated in times of crisis, however. Although the phaso-out of theight lie expected as newer systems were deployed in the Moscow area, modifications toquipment suggest that thc system may remain operational for several more years.

ypicalite consistsinglo fixed radar installation and launchers foruild missiles. The guidancerack-while-scan system, reportedly can guide as many asuild missiles to as many aseparate targets simultaneously. Since itsdeployment, the intercept range of therobably bas been increased, theof the missile upgraded to cope with higher velocity aerodynamic threats andan even greater number of targets. The system is now believed to be capable ofaircraft with speeds up tot

rangesnd. at altitudes0 feet. There fa some evidence to suggestuclear warhead may bewith someissiles.


Theystem was thc successor to thef was designed to cope withaerodynamic threats and to be more mobile and rnore suitable for widespreadDeployment beganadditionalites were Identified during the past year in the USSR and inEurope, deployment of the system was essentially complete

Thcs the most widely deployed SAM system in the USSR It provides point air defense of virtually every importanttarget in the country. The system also is deployed as an air defense barrier on the western and southern borders of tho European heartland of the country and along the central Asian borders of tho USSR. We estimate that there areites occupied bybattalions andnoccupied sites, which probably are intended to serve as alternate or supplementary firing positions during periods of high tension. Tbo number of operationalattalions has declined slighdy over the past several yean. Continuing rnoddkabon ofaunch sites and missile and guidance components indicate that therobably will not be phased out

ulliring unit consists of one Fan Song guidance radar, six singlo missile launchers for Cuideline missiles arranged around the radar position, and related support equiproent. Permanentaunch sitesarc revetted, although missiles can be fired from non-revetted field positions, lhe system has been constantly improved,through at least five fundamentallyvariants, four of which remain in wide-



uie In the Soviet Union. Easternand in other countries such as North Vietnam and the UAR.1*

wo Fan Song models are now in use in the Soviel Union: Fannd E. Fanrobably employs MTI for better pcrformnnco against low-altitudeuideline missile, designated Mods used with the Fanadar. Little is known about this missile, but there is evidence that the Fanuidebncombination can achieve interceptsaximum range of about0 percent greater range thin that of earlierariants. We estimate that about one-half of the rites in the USSR contain thisariant.

Fanas two additional large dishhile the function of these antennas is not clear, they probably improve the radar's perforrnance at low altitudes,its target detection and tracking ranges, and provide thc radar with an improvedcounter-co unterrncasuics (ECCM)

Theuideline missile, used with Fan Song E,ajor redesign. Its longer intercept range, better maneuverability, and modified warhead and fuzing system have resulted in greatly improved performance against high speed, maneuvering targets. The Fanuidciino combination can intercept small targetsr

Jat speeds up to.

"Them lour variant! coniiit of tlie 1'anucuaud below, and tbe Kanhich an the principal export motels of tha radarnand let formerly deplored tn the USSR The Panew export tnodef which inetudea an optical tracking device which improve* its performance against targets in the rsrasessce of ECM. Tlili version has been deplovad to North Vietnam and thc UAR. We have no evidence that it lias bean ileployed in tlie USSR or East Europe

The maximum range of thc system Is about. Its high-altitude ceiling is0 feet.

heuideline missile seen in recent paradesarger warhead section.




Deployment of the low-altitudeystem has occurred in7 to present. It is estimated thatperationalattalions are now deployed in the USSR, more thanf them having been installed in the past year. Inalternateites have been identified. The most recent developments havethe barrier defenses originally sot up In Iho Baltic Sea, Black Sea, and Polish border approach routes. The new deployments have also extendedefense beyond Moscow and Leningradew other key industrial and military areas.

The typicaliteingle Low Blow radarual launchers lor Coa missiles. The hiatus ineployment47 may havo been the result of modifications made to Improve the low-altitude performance of thoc have not been able to Identify any changes in tlie Low Blow radar,ersions of theissile are known to exist. The modifications were intended to improve its propulsion and aerodynamic characteristics for use at lowIn its modified form, theystem is estimated to be capableintercepting tar-gels at altitudes as low asl


aximum altitude capability0 feet and can reach targets at maximum slant ranges of about.

b. Ground photography has revealedon tho configuration of the rrje-conrrol radar. Power vans associated with the radar have been analyzedough limit of thc power Supplied to the radar has been established.


eployment of tbe long-range SA-5begane estimate that there ore nowomplexes, aboutf which appear to be operational. Only four newhave been detected in the past year, indicating that deployment is prol>ably coming to an end. Nearly all of thc identifiedwill be in service byL Theyslem is deployedarrier defense tobey military and industrial targets In the European USSR andoint defense toimportant but more Isolated targets.

A typicalomplexaunch areaites, eachaunchers, an electronics areaquare Pair engagement radar for each launch site,entral control area for the complex. Anradar site isew miles away. Most launch positions contain twodollies to facilitate the rapid reloadingle launcher.

Thc intended role of thoyslem within Soviet strategic defenses and theof the system to cope with various types of targets have in thc past constituted major uncertainties and sources ofwithin the Intelligence Community. But the following has been learned about this system in tho past several years:

a. The components of the system have been identified.

d. Tbe configuration and dimensions of thearamon missile have been ob-tained-T


c Theissileadar horning guidance system.

f. The flight profiles of therobably extend to altitudes0 feet and ranges.

umber of critical gaps in ourremain, however:



f. Theissile almost certainlya radar homing guidance system,that ft is intended for use against aerodynarnic vehicles rather than missile RVs.

Despite these and ether gaps in ourthere now is agreement within the Intelligence Community that theystem is in tended to provide long-range defense against aerodynamic targets includinghigh performance aircraft and small supersonic air-to-surface standoff weapons. This judgment rests primarily on theconsiderations:

s deployed in ais typical of other Sovietbarrier defenses with reinforcedaround key target areas. Thopattern could provide limitedtoew targets if the systemof being used in anmode.

sites themselves are similar into those associated with earlierSAM systems and use groundthat arc known to beother Soviet air defense systems.

size and estimated powerthe system's fire-control radarIt would be only marginallyMinuteman RVs.


acquisition radars for theystem (the Back Net surveillance, and Side Net height finder) are well known Soviet air defense radars which operate in their normal modes when deployed atites.

e. We believe theissile isfor aerodynamic control andat highto about0his suggests that an ABM role is not intended.

J Another source has reported that the system Is intended for air defense; he alsoest in which theuccessfullyrone target



Although the information needed to characterize thc performance of theetailed fashion still is not available, sufficient information has been obtained to resolve most of the disagreements wiJun the Intelligence Community as to thc role and basic characteristics of the system. Theystem is estimated to be capable of engaging high performance aerodynarnic targets at ranges of about. Theof thcissile indicates that it would be able to maneuver against targets at altitudes as higheet The minimum altitude of the system cannot be established.oming guidance systemonventional warhead, the missile wouldighof kill againsi an aerodynamic target

It also is agreed within the Community that theystem is not now used loABM defense and is not well suited for such use. Nevertheless, the present state of knowledge prevents us from conclusivelyout all possibilities for its use In an ABM role.

Oihar Surfoco-ro-AIr Missile Systems

n addition to SAM systems which arc employed specifically for the purpose ofair defense of the USSR, tactical SAM systems have been deployed which might be utilized to bolster strategic air defenses. These systems include thend SA-fl. Bothare now being deployed to the Soviet Ground Forcer- Tbe more important of these is theecause of its apparentcapabilities. Based on its apparent role and design intent, rather than technical data, it is estimated to be capable of engagements at altitudes down tocot, andbelow, and up to0 feet. The maximum range is estimated to be abouto. Uncertainties about tbe irussiles propulsion system preclude more precise

' F. The Continuing Problem ofDefense

This section investigates theproblem of defenselow-flying aircraft and ASMs. It explains why the problem is difficult, describes Soviet efforts to overcome tlie problem, andtbe present Soviet capabilities against low-aid hide intruders.

During the past year the Soviets have continued their deployment of thelong thc western sea approaches to the USSR and of air surveillance systems which can better handle the low altitude problem. Sincee have also obtained information on the ruling of tbehich indicates it has beenso as to enable it to makeat lower altitudes.

ignificant weakness of Soviet airagainst the existing threat Is theircapability to prevent penetration at lowajor problem io this respect is

the inability of tbe ground based radarto detect and track targets at very low altitudes. Thc radar detection range for such targets is limited by the radar horizon. This horizon range varies with the height of the target and the height of the radar antenna. Over tlie past five years, thc Soviets have attempted to improve low-altitude coverage byew antenna for their chief low-altitude radaroot mast- This modification, designated Squat Eye, has been deployed in considerable numbers throughout the USSR and Eastern Europe.

7S. Within the USSR, Squat Eye isto have been deployed to atites, though it probably has been much more widely em placed. The extent of deployment is uncertain. In ibe area around Leningrad, where deployment of Squat Eye is believed to have been extensive, continuous radar coverage extends downeet over an area of00 square miles. Spotty coverage exists downeet in some areas. Elsewhere in the west-em USSR and the Warsaw Pact, it Isthat Pact air defense forces can detect, identify, and track aerodynamic targetseet. Nevertheless, it is possible tothese areas inay as to deny the necessary tracking information required for command and control of the air defense weapons dements.

oviet efforts to overcome thisin low-altitude surveillance almostwillrincipal part of this effort probably will be the development of an AWACS radar capable of detecting andlow-altitude targets over land- Thcofystem would greatly augment the Soviet ability to maintainand continuous tracking on low-altitude targets and toeans for theof intercept attempts.

At low altitudes, coonrurad and control requirements for systems employing ground-based radars becotne more stringent sinceare io viewadarery short period of time. Reporting of plots on low-altitude targets from the radar sitesilter center calls for automated aids becausereporting and plotting would bo too slow. Soviet command and control communication systems have the capacity to transmit dozens of plots per minute together with such data as target height and identity. With suchthe Soviet command and controlwould be able to maintain trackimited number of low-altitude targets in tbo area of radar coverage.

Weapon system limitations of theforce at low altitudes and the lack of tracking continuity provided by present Soviet EW/CCI radars make Sovietleast effective against low-altitude penelrators. The primary low-altitudein the PVO is the Firebar, but even this aircraft apparently cannot adequately perform intercepts of targets flying beneath it at low altitudes. The tactics used by the Firebar indicate that the radar which ithas limited ground clutter suppression capabilities. Against low-altitude targets, the launch range for theissiles carried by Firebar falls tocapability of shextends down toeet but may be somewhat lower over water or flat terrain. Consistent with this. Firebar has been deployed to defendroutes to the USSR from the sea and over relatively flat terrain. Although theas designed for medium- and liigh-sJHtude missions, it is equipped with an Al radar similar to that of the Firebar; it can intercept targets down toeet. At such altitudes, however.s limited to subsoniceducedradius,imited AAM range.

Tbe older gun-armed interceptors in the PVO also would have soma capability against low-altitude targets under good visual conditions. Lacking the AI radar of the newer Interceptors, however, they would require closo CCI vectoring or would have to bejn patrol patterns. In cither case, tliey are available in sufficient numbers to harass an attacking force along both entry aud exit routes.

Soviet efforts to improve thecapability of Interceptor aircraftwill be focused upon the developmentownward looking AI radar andomplementary shoot-down miiiileook-down system capable of detecting and tracking aircraft at lowagainst ground clutter is critical if the Soviets are to make real progress toward solving the low-altitude defense problem.

Present Soviet SAM systems also are limited in their ability to cope with low alii tudo attackers. The low-altitude performance of any SAM system is dependent upon many factors and is difficult to assess even wheu oil of die factors are well defined. This assertion Is supported by recent reportsefector who was trained in the Soviet Union on thoystem. He stated that his Sovietcould not agree on the lowerlimit of theystem when using MTI and. further, that different text boob specified differentimitwas specified by someeters was specified by others. We have no reports such as these regarding the newer variants of theystem, and we must base our estimates of the performance of these systems upon Iheir observable technical features and the known performance of comparably

For Ihe most part, low-altitudedepend upon the ability of tlie guidance radar to detect and track low-altitude aircraft



sufficient range toissile to be launched in time to engage the target, and upon useroximity rose system that can operate at low altitude without triggering on reflections from the ground. Guidance radar performance is in turn highly dependent upon siting the radar inay that it can point its beam at very low angles without seeing returns from the surrounding terrain {groundr upon the radar's having circuitry that enables it to distinguish atargetany ground returns which it may see. Tbe placement of individual radars in relation to surrounding terrain (causing the ground clutter situation to vary from location to location) is almost impossible to generalize. Very little is known about the MTI circuitry of newer models of Soviet SAM radars. In these circumstances, no generally validcapability for the radars can be derived.

Recently obtained irtfotmation about thc newest export model.of theystem (Fan Song F) indicates that'it can Intercept targets at altitudes as loweet Itthat this ability is derived in part from thc use of an optical tracking device, so this adds little to what we know about radarThc information also indicates, however, that the proximity fuse used by the missile has been improved so as toeet possible. Though thisifferent variant of the system than those employed in the USSR, it must be assumed that the fuses on those missiles have been similarly improved. Under theseit appears that thc low-altitudeof Soviet SAMs will be limited primarily by the radar down to altitudes ofeet.

The Fan Songat about half the Sovietknown to have better low-altitude performance than the Fan Song R, aboul which wcood deal of in-

formation, Documentary dataoot minimum altitude for the Fanuidelineombination which is no longer deployed in the USSR. The Fans, in turn, known to operate better in this regime than tbe Fan Song C, because of the addition of the two dish antennas andMTI circuitry. Consideration of all the information available regarding thisimprovement leads us to conclude thatntercepts are possible down toas loweet where radar siting is good. Though many sites might haveapability, ft carmot be possessed byore likely minimum altitude which would generally be obtained would be inoot region. At these and lower altitudes, however, intercepts canbe performed onlymall kill zoneew miles beyond the forward edge of thc system's dead zone At altitudes ofeet, It is likely that the Fanould rely upon the use of its MTI circuitry to distinguish the target even in the presence of substantia! ground clutter. However, single shot kill probability it most likely reduced when MTI is employed.


A. Introduction

he difficulties of defenseS strategic ballistic missile force arc formidable.efense must contend not only with land-based ballistic missiles whose launch points and approach corridors are known, but also with SLBMs which may come fromany direction. Strategic defenses might cope with this threatumber of different ways:

a. By attacking ballistic missilebefore they can launch their weapons;


By attacking missiles during the mid-course phase ol flight; and

c By attacking incoming RVs in the final portion of their flight.

Thc difficulties of finding andtrail on ballistic missile submarines in the open ocean are still so great as to preclude reliance on that approach to counter theportion of the threat. However, the Soviets areonsiderable effort to build an effective ASW program. (SeeIV of this Estimate for discussion of Soviet capabilities in thisid-course systems pose difficult technological andproblems and have not been tried to date in either the US or the USSR. The Soviets are involvedignificant program designed to cope with ballisticland and seathc terminalof their flight, and have in fact installed the worlds only operational ABM system.

The Soviets have been involved in ABM development since thehen they began constructionest range at Sary Shagan. They have been attempting to meet the very stringent technical requirements on ABM radars and missiles which must detect, track, and intercept ballistic missile RVs. The detectionissile attack which might come from any direction requires the surveillance of large volumes of space. US RVs have been designed so as to appear very small to most radars. Such small targets must be detected at long ranges to allow sufficient tracking data to be obtained in order to launch and guide Intercepting missiles. Further compounding the detection and tracking problem is thc necessity of distinguishing individual attacking objects from each other to determine their trajectories and to see whether tlie offense is employing non-threatening, but confusing, penetration aids. Characteristicsadar

which might enable it to meet some of these requirements prevent it from meeting others. The Soviets in general have relied on the use of large, high power radars and bigmissiles capable ofhole range of requirements, rather than ondesigned to cope with lirnited parti cu. lar parts of the ABM defense problem. During the past eight years the Soviets haveallistic missile early warning system in five areas on the periphery of rhe Soviet Union and an ABM system around Moscow.radars are believed still underAn Improved ABM system probably Is also under development at Sary Shagan.

B. Command andnformation as to how the Soviets have organized their present ABM force Is very limited. There is as yet no conclusive evidenceeparate missile defense command has been established. In the, Soviet statements suggested that their ABM forces mighteparate command within the PVO called the Antimissile Defense Troops. Fromo the present, the name of Lieutenant Ceneral of Artillery, Yuriy Vsevolodovich Votintsev, has appearedwith the names of the commanders of the three previously identified arms of the PVO, suggesting that he heads an organizationomparable level. There also is anthat Votintsev has an office at the national PVO command center, as do the threeof the identifed PVO arms. Thecenter for the Moscow ABM system is probably located at the Dog House targetand trackingey element of that system. Virtually nothing is known, however, about the command and controlthat links together the elements of Soviet ABM defenses.

C. Ballistic Miisile Detection and Early Warning

Henhe Soviets have relied on the deployment oi large, high-powered, phased-arrayHenprovide early warning (EW) ot* missile attack against the USSR. Tbe locations andof these radari afford tbe SovieUalthough incomplete, coverage of US ICBMs and SLBMs. as well as intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) launched from other countries. Construction startedn radars at Skrunda and Olcncgorsk to provide radar coverage of the US ICBM threat corridor Into theUSSH. The orientation of four new radars, which have been under coristructioit at Skrunda. Sevastopol'. Saiy Shagan. and Mishelevka sincendicates that they are intended to provide coverage against SLBMs launched from parts of the NorthArctic. Pacific, and Indian Oceans and the Mediterranean, as well as against ballistic missiles launched from Europe and Communist China. At present, there is apparently nowhich would provide warning of ICBMs launched from the US toward targets in the eastern USSR, such as Irkutsk andor of SLBMs launched from theor southwest Atlantic to targets in the western USSR.

It is estimated that the Hen House radars can detect any type of US ICBM RV

missile defense potential. The radars arealong the borders of the USSR so as to provide maximum warningissile attack and are,onsequence, difficult to defend. In addition, the relatively low frequency of the Hen House signal makes the radarto nuclear blackout, Moreover,]

Hen Housesange of frequencies which cause US ICBM RVs to appear larger than they would at any other frequency. In addition, thc Hen House uses sophisticated tracking signals which enable it to detect small targets at long ranges while providing precise tracking information.

espite these capabilities, thc flcn Houses have limitations which degrade their

J Since the Hen Houses must perform their primary function in an environment free of nuclear effects. Soviet planners probably do not consider Hen House information necessary for whatever actions need to be takenuclear exchange has been initiated.


Hen Houses coxa, within their viewing sector: (a) positivelyissile attack before it reaches the Soviet Union;issile impact points to an accuracyc) determine the origin of the attack; and (d) estimate the initial number of attacking objects. In addition, the EW and threat assessment information provided by these radars would be valuable inputs to decisions relating to the commitmentetaliatory strike and thc allocation of the limited number of ABM interceptor missiles of the Moscow system.

oer-the-Horizon Detectionhc Soviets may in time deploy an OHD radar system in order to further extend EW.

" An OHD radar can transmit its signalar greater distance than that allowed by line of-sight by using the ionosphereeflective surface. It is not as sellable, however, as radarirect line of sight.

(Seehe Soviets havean interest in OHD techniques since thend probably have had aodevelopmental OHD program in progress since ther. What is assessed asew OHD facility has been identified under construction at Nikolaycv. Because of its orientation, it appears that flight test activity on Soviet missile test ranges could be usedource of targets for future development of this system. No operational use of the Nikolayev system against missiles launched from the US appears possible. Tho distortion and attenuation experienced by HF signals passing through the northern auroral regions could thwart efforts to develop an operational OHD system capable of rebablc detection and Qacking of ICBMs launched toward the USSR from the US. The Soviets probably couldystem which would




them'mited capacity to tie. tect SLBMs and sua teg ic aircraft attacks, however.

D. The Moscow Antibollistic Missile Syitom

Thii section describes the development and components of the Moscow ABMIt assesses the capabilities of the target acquisition and tracking radars of the system, of the terminal engagement radars, and of the interceptor describes an operational concept for the system.

During the past year, we believe that thc Moscow ABM system reached Its currently-planned goal ofaunchers. Also, the initial checkout of theface of the Dog House targetand tracking radar commenced; when operational, this face will survey the missile approaches to Moscow from the Indian Ocean.

s part of their first attempt at meeting the problems of ballistic missile defense, the Soviets deployed radar and interceptor missile facilities around Moscow. Startedhe construction of these defenses followed an uneven pace and was finally substantially curtailed. The system only recently became operational at all complexes.

hose Moscow defenses are limited bolh in the extent of their deployment and in their capability. The Sovicis apparently are notwith the system in its current form, and any further deployment almost certainly will await refinement of thc present system. It appeared at one lime that the system would include as manyissile launchenomplexes. Only half that number has been completed, however, and com!ruction on the remaining complexes has stopped.ince the deployment began before

development was complete, difficultiesin thc test program must havethe pace and scope of deployment.with system performance in the face of increased complexity of the threat probably caused its curtailment.

Moscow system consists of aand tracking radar which wcDog House; another acquisition andnear Chekhov, engagementwe call Tryfourthc Calosh rrussile and its launchersat these four complexes.

of the identifiable elements ofABM system, except thenow are estimated to be operational.

^jhe system is notigh state of readiness.

Torael AequhiKort and Trocking Rada'i

To be effective, an ABM system must acquire and track incoming RVs at song ranges in the presence of many penetration aids anduclear environment Tbe Hen House EW radant alone are not adequate for this task. Thus, the Soviets have deployed very largo phased-arrayDog House at Naro Fominskew radar atwllhin the ring of the Moscow ABM defenses. The size and capabilities of these latter radars, and the high degree of protection from direct attack provided by their location, indicate that theyattle management role In addition to iheir acquisition and tracking functions.

The Dog House covers all potential ICBM trajectories from tbe US to Moscow butery small portion of the Polaris threat The southeast face of tbe Dog House.


only recently has como on liio air, is directed toward the Indian Ocean. Although Polar is submarines currently do not operate there, the Soviets may be guarding against thc possibilityolaris or fractional orbit bombardment system (FOBS) threat from this quarter.

ithin its area of coverage, the Dog House can: (a) provide warning of an(b) dtfermine the extent of thc attack; (c) determine the origin and intended target of tbe attack; and (d) predict the trajectories of thi eaten in r. objects with sufficient accuracy to permit assignment of the incoming HVry Add radar facility and launch of anSince ICBMs from the US do not begin to re-enter the atmosphere until Ihey arc. from impact, thoseagainst Moscow normally wiU beIhe Dog House coverage at re-entrythe radar is offset loo far from the path of tbe rnissile. Thus, tbe radar is intended for exoalmospheric tracking in the defense ofand cannot take advantage uf atmospheric sorting to discriminate an RV* frompenetration aids.

hc new pbased-airay radar underat Chekhov.m. south ofwill perform thc functions of tlie Dog House against some additional threats, such as SLBMs launched from the North Atlantic and IRBMs launched Irom Fiance. Like the Dog House, the Chekhov radar will consist of antennas in two separate operations areas. Thc southern antennaortion of the northern antenna probably will work together toa bistatic radar system. Inarge part of tlie northern antenna probably will serveeparate, pulsed radar system for precision Backing. It may also be used to obtain special resolution measurements ofof immediate interest as indicated by the

bistatic radar. The Dog House bas no such additional radar. If this separate radar isto the same sector estimated for thearray, the Chekhov radar, because of its location relative lo the paths of RVs targeted against Moscow would also be limited to the exoatrnospheric tracking. It is estimated that thc Chekhov radar will begin transmitting2 and could become operationalear later.

Terminal Engagement Radars

issile guidance during thc intercept phase is derived from tracking information on the target and interceptors provided by the Try Add engagement radars. For eachtracking radar there arc two smaller defensive missile tracking and guidanceAll Try Add radars usesteerable dish antennas which are large enough to track ut long ranges, and which have features indicating that they can also operate effectively at very short ranges.among these features is thc type ofmount. Though more expensive and cumbersome lhan more conventional mounts, it enables the antenna to track targets at thc high elevation angles (that would characterize engagement of close in targets) withoutexcesvively high accelerations.






couldingle target with two inter-ceptors. Tracking of the interceptor missile probably is accomplished with the aideacon aboard tlie missile T




hc interceptor missile backing and guidancesmall Trylocated close to the missile launchers, so that thc interceptor can lie acquired by the Try Add as soon as possible after launch. This, and the fact that the small Try Add dome containsingle dish antenna, indicates that the radar piobably can track and guideingle interceptor missileime. Since there arc two small Try Add radars for every large one, it appears that one Try Add site

he Soviets designed andwo-stagerhefor Uie Moscow system. Flight tests at Sary Shagan have confirmed the long-range intercept capability of the Calosh which earlier had been suggested by its sheer size. Certain cliaract oris tics of other components of thesuch as trainable missile launchers and special Try Add radar mounts, and theof any other missile which might be used with the system for short-rangesuggest that the Galosh Is to be used for intercepts at short ranges as well."

"The Galosh rmsulc in its canister was First paraded by ihe Soviets iniwas appaiently underway at that time.I

Unambiguous range ii the maximum distancearget from which tlie reflected signal can return to thefore thc not pubc tl transmitted. Il Is thm Invcisely proportional to the poke repetition frCQUCncyor targe targets at sufficientmany rsdari have thc power to detect at greater than unambiguous range. Should this occur, thcwill appear on the rndar scopeuch nearer, but false, range.

(There it no basis for distinguishetween any variants that may eilrt. The tcrniherefore, is used here to deSiE-nato all verilans ol the missile.

Operolional Cooeopt of lhe Systnir.

he cbaracteristics of its variousand Ihe deployment pattern ofhole, indicate that theof thc Moscow system embodiesdefense in which an Initialat long range can beecond attempt at shorttwo-layer, or shoot-look-shoot defense,is the only means by which anprobability of kill (greaterngagement) could be achievedexcessive expenditure of interceptorsincomingiring doctrineuseingle Interceptor for.judgement, plus two inter-

ceptors for each target which gets through the first layer of defense, appears to he ihe best means of utilizing the limited number ofavailable. (Seet is not known, however, what firing doctrine theactually will employ.

sing the shoot-look shoot doctrine, the Calosh missile would be used for both Ihe long- and short-range intercepts. In fhe short-range mode of operation, the Calosh is in no way the equivalent of the highUS Sprint. Because of its low launch acceleration, tlie Calosh cannot wait fordiscrimination of the target to take place before launching, as the Sprint does. The Calosh might be usedloitern which case it could be launched before discrimination but not be targeted speafi-cally until Ihe RV actually was identified. The Galosh can flyow thrust coast and hat demonstrated significant terminalcapability, both of which are required to omploy Ihn loiter mode. Il has not been observed, however, using these capabilities to intercept taigets after atmospherichad occurred. In this loiter mode it


Figuro 9

have only limited eiloctiveiies. againit current US chadurthermore, there is no evidence lhat lhc Moscow systemapability forophisticated threats by either ground based or missile borne sensors. Thus thc Soviets must pay the price of shooting at every incoming ohfcct without waiting towhether iteal ItVecoy. Calosh tests observed it Sary Shagan have confirmed both its long-range and short-range intercept capability.

|1S. The Moscow ADM system probably is

neither wholly automatic nor centralized lie. the Soviets probably have not chosen to lime-share all theind data processing tasksingle, large centralized computer array) It It more likely that suitable process-

ing units are dedicated to specific functionalsing computers especially designed for thc various functional requirements of the system. This approach enables the Soviets to avoid the tremendous computer requirementsholly centralized system

he requirements that impose the greatest demands for data processing in the system probably are those of detection and tracking of targets by the Dog House radar. Estimates of the minimum operational speeds and storage capacity requirements for these functions vary, but known Soviet computer capabilities appear adequate for ooatmos-pheiic detection ond tracking ol atbjectsecond time interval. We have insufficient Informal Ion to estimate the computeror battle manage-



command mid conirol, andfunction? of the Moscow system.these uncertainties, it appeals that tha Soviets have the necessary computing and data processing equipment to support the operations of the Moscow system when used in the two-layer mode described above.

E. Copabilities of the MoscowMissile System

This section assesses the capability of the Moscow ABM system to defend both the Moscow areaarge portion of the western USSR against ICBMs and SLBMs. Our judgments of theseare essentially the same as those we held for several years.

Against Intercontinental Ballistic. Assuming optimum conditions, our theoretical calculations indicate that theABM system, employing its inventory ofnterceptors in' a two-layer defense mode, could at bestigh probability {aboutercent) of successfully engaging aboutCBM targets before exhaustion of the interceptor inventory. That is. in theory, there0 percent probability that5 target raid is directed against Moscow at least oneeak through the defense. Decoys and chaff puffs would appear as valid and separate targets to thu system and their use could rapidly exhaust the system'son-lautichcr interceptor Invenlnry. While the launchers could be reloaded, there is no evidence that provision has been made at tlie launch sites for storing reload missiles. The deploymenl of radars and interceptorsto be so balanced that the system, ln coping with the ICBM threat, is equallyto saturation of its target handling capability and to exhaustion of the supply of on-launchcrttipletion of moie

complexes would not materially improve Uie defense against an all-out attack which made use of penetration aids."*

"^Tirningbecome stringent for second-layer intercept attempts, however. Since theaccelerates slowly, and since the second-layer bunch probably is not intended tountil alter the results of the first attempt have been observed, any single site cansecond-layer defense for only part of the area wilhfn the Moscow defensive ring. T


Agoamiaunched BollKik Miuihs

US The Moscow system appears to bedirected toward defense against US ICBM attack, but it alsoimitedto Intercept SLBMs. (See) For those SLBMs on which long-rangedata could be obtained by the Hen House or Dog Home radars, thu probability ofintercept would be about the same as (or ICBMs. In some of the azimuth sec-

* Vice Adm Noel Carter, the Dteeetor. National Sncvnty Armey, brieves that with respect toand control, the perfonnance ol the Moscow ABM ivstem on its (list full scaleunder ballistic bi<>sis>alnscst caetaia to be well below dctifin level. The cumulative effect ofarious tvcakrniMct sucepsts that the Moieow system has little capaSiLty to defend Moscow exceptraaltti>phisticalod attack.



from which SLBMs could bo launched against Moscow, however, Try Add target bracking radars would have to assume theburden of search, detection, andingle Try Add probably could search an azimuth sector as large as the threat from the Mediterranean Sea,3 degrees, but it could not track and search simultaneously for new targets. Since tho Try Addery limited target handling capability, and since there arc only eight Try Adds in thodeployed system, the Moscow ABM radar defenses could be saturated by alight SLBM attack.

In An Areaole

of its long range, thesystem has an inherent capabilityregions outside the Moscow area:can protect such regions with only adefense. (Secarge area for which the Moscowcould provide some degree ofmissile attack, thc limited numberdeployed and the design whichfor intercepts at short range as wellargue that area defense was notpurpose of the system. Since onlyintercept attempt would bearea defense provided would beWith the expenditure of severalon each long-rangepossible if defensemallattack or an accidental orlaunch wereareabo much more effective.

In National Comoend Aurhcetty Defense

ability of the Moscow ABMto protect Moscow and its environsmoderate, unsophisticated attack, andtouch larger arealight attack, make it well suited forof ABM defense which has been

proposed at thc strategic arms limitation talksnder an NCA-typc agreement, neither tho US nor the Soviet ABM systems would be expected to provide defense against an all-out attack, since the number of missiles and radars permitted under the agreement would be too small. The defense would be valuable however to defend the NCA against accidental attack or third country attacks. Thus, the principal shortcomings of theMoscowtoanddiminish inAndimited attack, the likelihood of exhaustion from penetration aids would not be so great. Another weakness of thc presentreliance on large and numeroushich would make more widespread deploymentalso decline in Impcetance. since furtherwould not be allowed under an NCA agreement anyway. Finally, current radarat Sary Shagan involving thc Try Add target tracking radar could result inin the system which mightsome of the weaknesses of the present system againit Polaris missiles.

F. Antiballistic Missile Research and Development

This section describes the Soviet ABM tesl programs now underway at the Sary Shagan Missile Test Center and the new constmction there in support of fu-luro test programs and new ABM system developent.

e believe that Soviet ABM BAD Is continuingigh level and Is directedtoward improving upon Ihe present Moscow ABM system. Activities of principal interest include the flight testing of the Galosh missileariety of intercept modes, the construction ol new radars and launchersormerly abandoned Try Add radar site,


and tho constructionew large bistatic radar wliich probably Is the prototype for thc one being built at Chekhov. Although these acdvitjcs arc probably related toon tbe ABM defenses presentlywe cannot rule out the possibility that developments at Sary Shagan will lead to more widespread ABM deployment.

hl Tasting

he observed characteristics of ABM flight tests at Sary Shagan indicate that the Soviets are experimenting wiih bothand endoatmospheric intercepts of targets simulating US missiles targeted to the Moscow area and possibly beyond. ABM tost, involving Galosh interceptor missiles and SS-4

target vehicles have been observed at Sary

Shagan slncef_ Tl96S.

^Actual ICBMand re-entiy angles have not beennor has an attempt been made tothe radar reflection characteristics of


12S. Several of the tests suggest, however, that the Soviets were testing the Caloshong-range exoatrnospheric intercept mode, simulating the geometry that would obtain during engagements with US ICBMs. In three of the tests which involved two interceptor missiles, the secondcould not have engaged the SS-4used toimulated target endoatmosphctically (belowm. altitude) in much the same manner as the short-range intercepts discussed above as part of the Mos cow system's postulated mode of operation

ecent Soviet ABM tests are ofinterest since they differ from earlier ones. The absence of target vehicles in all but the lust, and the obvious departure from the previous pattern of trajectoriesew ABM program has begun which involves now intercept modes.

New Construction

e believe that workollow-on ABM systems underway at Sary Shagan. This system is apparently designed to enable the defenses at Moscow to overcome the satuiation problem posed by SLBMoutside the Dog Houseew launch area which will include at least two launchers, now is being built next to aabandoned Try Add radar site at Sary Shagan. It appearslat, antenna has been installedome on top of the large Try Add building. It is likelyechanically slecrable, phased-array radar is under construction with significantly better target handling capabilities than those of the large Try Add radars deployed aroundIf so. it would be capable olsearching for. and tracking, aof targetselatively largeperhapso SO degrees. The new antenna is (he most significant difference noted thus far between the facilities at Sary Shagan ami the deployed Try Add facilities.

t may be that at Sary Shagan an ABM systemwo-layer defense is being developed, consistingodified Galosh in associationew smaller missile and the new large radar. The smaller missile couldigh occeleiationakin to the US Sprint Withissile. Soviet ABM defenses could use thc atmosphere to discriminate between RVs and penetration aids. The system. If developed, might be used to increase Ibe effectiveness of the defenses around Moscow without rcqulr-



the addition of very large and expensive Try Add radars. If might abo be used toother areas, and may lend itself to rapid deployment.

It must be noted, however, that such an approachignificant departure from thc approach taken In put ABM projects. Our information at present Is so limited that we cannot rule out the possibility that thc system developed will fulfill an air defense role The weight of our limited evidence, bow-ever, indicates that the comr>onentsignificant ABM capability, and that the system is probably intended to fulfill an ABM role.

Beginninghe prototype for the Chekhovwo call the Topconstructed at Sary Shagan.signals intercepted during the past year have revealed that the two antennaslstatic radar system similar to the Dog House radar.

G. Tho Use of Surfoca-to-Air Missiles for Anfibollistic Missile Defense

This sectionkclihood of tha SovieU upgrading SAM systems for ABM defense under conditions of an arms conirol agreement, and concludes thatrogram is not likely.

Thcip Is ample evidence that currently deployed Soviet SAMs hove not beento provide themallistic missile defense capability. It is possible, on the other hand, that the Soviets could augment their ballistic missile defense by upgrading theirndAM systems foe such a

Thc geographical extent of coverage which might be provided by suitablySAM systems would be large under

certain circumstances. It appears technically feasible loAM system so as to give it some ABM capabilities. The quality ol iho missile defense which could be achieved by such measures, however, would bo low:

success of the defense wouldon tho continued use by the USand tactics that would bevulnerable to the upgraded SAMs;

perfenroance in an ABMbe marginal tri severalV detection atextremely short reaction tiroes,false alann rates,nd

forward ABM radars, uponschemes for utilizing SAMsextremely vulnerable.

Despite these considerations, there are so many SAMs deployed in the USSR that, even if marginally effective, they might be able to reduce somewhat the strengthetaliatory US attack.

In viewing the development of the Soviet ABM program over the pastean, it is clear that the Soviets take the technical problems of ABM defense seriously. Thus far, they have sought to overcome them by relying upon big radars, high power levels, large missilus,nd have cut no corners in doing so This probably will apply to the next generation Soviet ABM system as well. In view of tho Soviet commitment to, and undemanding of. the ABM problem, it is very unlikely that the Soviets would choose to rely on the SA-5alone theystrm^to defend against US ICBMs.

Further more, it is evident that the Sovietserious view of tbe bomber threat In responding to that threat, they have developed and deployed an air defense sys-



unmatched anywhere else in tbc world. However appealing id use for ABM deEcme may appear, there is no evidence that the Soviets arc willing to compromise thoir bomber defenses to do so.

But in an arms control environment in which Soviet opportunities to deploy ABM defenses were limited, the incentive forair defense systems to augmentABM defenses might be high enough to cause the Soviets to ccazridertep. It is agreed within the Intelligence Commu-nity, however, that the shortcomings ofSAMs in an ABM role would be recognized by tho Soviets and would dil-courrge ihem from followingourse. Upgrading SAMs for ABM defense would almost certainly in this situation be inof the arms limitation aspreement. and would have to be done clandestinely. No matter what degree of SAM upgrading the Soviets achieved, the ABM defense thus pro-vided would be vulnerable to changes in US weapons and tactics. In the effort to Over-come theseuch substantial SAM modifications would be required that tho upgrade activity would be detected in thc test program. Even in tlie case of modest modification, the Soviets could never have assurance of successful corscealment

The Soviets for years haveconservatism in assessing their ownrequirements and in desigrring systems to meet thoseith this conserva live outlook, conscious of the shortcomings ond ephemeral nature of any defense which SAM systems might provide against missiles, nnd uncertain alsout the effects ofreaty violation. Soviet leaders nre unlikely to view lhc upgrading of SAMsiable means of altering the strategic hula nee.

Although the inherent ABM potential of Soviet SAMs might be utilized tn exTremis

in an effort to reduce the destruction causedS missile attack, the uncertaintiesin such awith upgradedit very unlikely that Uie Soviets would adopt this procedure. In view of these considerations, we believerogram of SAM upgrading for ABM defense is not likely to be undertaken by the Soviets.


A. Introduction

This year, for the first time,ddresses Ihc problem of defense against ballistic missile submarines. This section outlines some salient aspects of rhe prob-lem-

he growth of the USSRaritime power and, more importantly, the advent of ballistic missile submarines in the US, caused the Soviets to reassess their ASW potential and toigorous program of im-

" Maj. Cen. Roddy TrUnlsuillo, the Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence, USAF. agiee. that detecting and filing submarines In lha open oceanifficult lechniol problem. TV Soviets have been working on the problem with nrereaied emphasis since theof* the Polar* seecrasr.IMS They bow have Ihetr ftrsr-eeoeratfc* ASW .ystm in wdejpread opeeauoo.ii view st hi sSgMncaot these sys-ten,oncept fora.geo-duding loeg-ranc* ASW aircraft. He notes that Intel-ligenccm-.ited on ih, type of technical senson employed on these aircraft but that lhe suspected tensor complement could Include conventional mag-MliB, infixed, nnd blrtalle recepMon of aie considered affective In restricted areas and taking the Soviet penchant (or mass, hc believes quantity coulduality in broad ocean ASW eceiations.ecti that new underwater detection technology will be ItKeepeeaWd intoASW eewpeaent. Thb coupledurface to space receiver and relay system would bntsrove Soviet breed; aid attachebelieves wai the vuWaW.t, of the SLflM force




and expanding their ASW forces. Progress has been made, but tha magnitude of thewith respect to the developmentapability against Polaris submarines operating In the openprecluded rapid solution.

f the Polaris threat is to be countered by means other than an ABM defense, ASW is the most likely approach. Though it might be possible to destroy submarines at their bases or to deny them command and control communications when on-station. these tactics do not appear promising against the Polaris retaliatory force. However, such actions would be anticipated as part of any overall effort to blunt or delay an SLBM attack. Operational practices have been designed to assure that mote than half the Polaris force Is on patrol at any one time and that communications are maintained through useomplex and highly redundant command ondesult, thc defenso is forced toto destroy the submarines while on station, before Ihey launch their missiles.of the vast areas in which ballistic missile submarines can operate, this must be done io the open ocean where ASW is most difficult and where Soviet ASW capabilities have traditionally been weakest*

n order to combat the Polaristhe SovicLs would most likely employ cither open-ocean search or trailing tactics. Open-ocean search consists of combingsubmarine operating areas with ASW forces until contact is made. It is thus effective

" Ma) Cca. Roddy TiiaoUIfUn. the Auirtantstaff,WMF, does aot .pre

i^al the Untie of PoUrual iheir Use, doe. not appear ptomisme.thr portion of Uw submarine final In port,coniidcii It unlikely that them

undue-ay with only tactical wainlne. Thus, ho be-llovot that the ports mould appear to tlie Soviets as lucrative targets.

only in relatively small areas, and requires an ability toide path in the sea. The Soviets have been experimenting with the Moskva helicopter ship and ASW aircraft in this approach.

Trailing involves detecting submarines at those points in their mission when they are most vulnerable towhonport, during transit, or when passing through narrowthen trailing tho submarine from that point to its operating area. The best tiailing platform is anotherand the Soviets have developed new classes of nuclear nibtriannes with unproved capabilities for trailing.

Covert trail is very difficult While the trailer must maintain continuous track of the target, it must not let the target become awore. of thc trail. It thus must use passive seniors-only. In order to maintain covert trail the trailing submarine must produce less noise detectable by the target submarine than vico versa, and thisignificant amount. The noise advantage can be obtained either byufficiendy quieter submarine, or more capable sonar,combination of both.

overt trail by passive means is difficult because of tho short ranges at which passive sonars canuiet submarine. It is estimated, for example, that currently operational Soviet passive sonars are unable to detect US nuclear ballistic missile submarines on-station at rangesile or so. Even if initial detection is made, evasive action by the submarine being trailed can preclude such dose shadowing as is required to maintain, rack.

likewise, overt trail (where the target is aware ol the trail) is very difficult, but for different reasons. It is much less sensitive to acoustic lechnology. Contact can beeither at closepassive


performance of an acoustically inferior submarine will still beat longer range by an active sonar, which is lesson the quietness of the trailingThc use of active sonar would carry tbe advantage of increased trailing ranges. But even so the target submarine could takeaction, making thc trailing submarines task much more difficult.peed advantage to the trailer is necessary In either co vest or overtigh speed advantage is most useful in the overt trail situation.

B. Organization, Command and Control

Within the Defenseeputy Chief of Staff is believed to be assigned as director of the Soviet ASW effort. Thedirectorate of the main naval staffmonitors tbe prosecution of validcontacts within the four fleet areas. Each fleet commander normally is responsible for naval operations, including ASW, within each of Ihe four fleet regions and inocean areas.

For ASW operations, thc major surface forces and fleet air forces are employedleet-wide basis with control exercised by the flee! commander through the respective force commander. The offshore defense forces of eacli fleet, which are responsible for coastal ASW operations, arc organized under regional commanders. The manner of control ofASW forces depends upon tlie area of operation. Normally, submarine control is ea-excised by Naval Headquarters. Moscow, oe by individual flee" headquarters. NavalMoscow, is able to assume direct command over any naval forces when thcwarrants.

The Soviet organization for ASWlowo-part approach to thedirected against the so-called "near rone" and one against the far zone" of operations. The "near zone" is the area in

which the assets (ships and aircraft) available to the local commander can operate. Its radius therefore varies with the capabilities of the forces assigned The "far zone" is the area beyond thc "near zone" eatending to at least the range from which enemy ballistic missiles can be launched, and even to the enemy shore itself.

engaged in ASW operationsinto groups called PUCsCruppa, or search-strikePUG is probably similar to the USand Attackoviet PUCof from one to five ships. Two ormay operate togetherivenmost cases, ships of the same class, orsimilar sonar installations, are useda PUC. As many as four land-basedASW aircraft or helicopters mayof an air PUC.

C. Antisubmarine Warfare Forces

This section briefly characterizes tbe surface ships, submarines, and aircraft used by the Sovicis in open-ocean search for balliilic missile submarines.

During Ihe past year the Sovietsconstruction of major ASW surface ships, submarines with significant ASW capabilities, and haveew ASW version of tbe Bear bomber.

the effort to overcome itsin ASW, the Soviets havea vigorous development program forsensors, and weapon systems.of this mixed ASW arsenalthe Soviets lo pursue tho taskto fhe ASW problem.

Woriora Surface Ships

Soviet Navyarge numbertypes of ships which play cither aor auxiliary ASW role. (Sec Table II.)pastears. Ihe Soviets have produced












dnclmlliij Mod 33




Hound. Q




For ih. purpose of this estimate.have considered all Soviet foreotential (or mm In ASW. Moal of tba* forces In facthese, nidi aa tha R-lnsa sob-

aaartoeihav,ap.WI.Ue. aaanat FBM. The, -a, and -nolo. ASWmple,saabae*ef cocentuaieaUow or eaKa(.n| surface .ink. foreea. Ia sdektso-ASW lorces.edicated to toualerinj tee PBM threat, cannot be dlaUnpuahed Irom those miemtad to combat USbmar.oea. Ii should not be aasensed lhal all tho ferces Iratad In thU Table -ould be emploTedo tcotn the FBM threat,

There are other older mailerhips, -hich hav, .limited ASW capabilitiesera not tendered Important in ASW aaainal bautlUc missile submarine.

Aa man, aa ihree ASW Bcara have bees noted or.n tha Rarenla Sea area, bui the, probably are nol operational

the P.lasaaaor ASW. tbe,rlmar, antiship mlaalon

thanajor surface ships which they themselves designate for specialized use in ASW. Most impressive of the new ships are the two Moskva-class helicopter ships, eachomplement of aboutormone ASW helicopters, ihese ships, each with their cmbaikeil helicopters and two accompanying Kashin-class frigates, constitute the mostASW tactical unit which the Soviet* have.

Augmenting Iho surface ships specificallyfor ASW mo ore someodern multipurpose combatant ships which are also equipped for ASW operations. All of these ships have been built or modifiedhe cruiser-destroyer classes in this category arc capable of operations on tho open ocean but they have loss sophisticated ASW sensors and weaponi thanprimary ASW ships.


Warfare Submarines

In the past four years, five classes of general purposeour of which are nuclear powered, have been underin the USSR.lasa, aattack submarine, is believed torimary ASW mission. The C-asses are nuclear cruise-missQo submarinesrimary antiship missionecondary ASW capability. Thc roles ofmall nuclear-powered submarine, andiesel-powered unit, are as yetUnits of these classes have begun to augment the older attack and orulso-mlssile forces built around N-lass nuclear submarines and several diesel-powered classes. These older classes still constitute aboutercent of the general purpose submarine force (Detailed cbaractcrisdcs of theseare given in Annexnd XI.)

One of ihe newV-class torpedo attack submarino-^has markedlyperformance over its predecessor,lass. and is considered to be the most effective ASW submarine In the Soviet fleet. It is estimated toaximum operating depth limit of ateet and aspeed capability ofnots, making it the fastest nuclear-powered submarine in the world

Tit Is somewhat quieter thanlass, but Sot as quiet as US nu-clear-powered ballistic missile subrrsarlnes at comparable speeds. There Is potential forquieting of these submarines, however, because the dominant noise sources are not in the main propulsion system but in auxiliary machinery which should be susceptibleuieting program. It is equipped with new. low-frequency search sonars which have con-slderably improvedapabilities over earlier sonars. In addition, it Is equipped wiih new hydroacoustlc emitters fur underwater communications, and an underwater IFF.

These characteristics makeIass the best submarine In the Soviet fleet toopen-ocean trail operationsolaris submarine. There arc only eight of these units operational now, however, and they are being built at tbe rate of only two to three per year.

Another of tbe newa maximum speed ofnots. It is believed to have the same propulsion plant and sonnr equipment aslass. Its armament Is different, however, andincludes at least one new weaponEight missile tubes located in the forward part of the submarine are believed to be for the submerged launch ofontHhipping cruise missiles. Fire-control data for the missile system apparently are obtained from passive sonar. In addition to tbe eight Ltunrh tubes, two circularin the bow have been noted whoseis not yet known They are probably for launching torpedoes, however, they could be used to launch SUBROC-typcM weapons, if the Soviets had *uch weapons. Since the main armament oflass apparently is intended for use against surface ships, this classdoes not have ASWrimary mission. The other qualities of this submarine, such as its sonar equipment and torpedo armament, would enable it to play an ASW role, however. There are sixlass submarines. They arc now produced at tbe rate of one to two per year.

The diesel units in the Sovietforce have inherent capabilities for general ASW operations. They are suited for antisubmarine reconnaissance and possibly for attack on submarines at exits to bases and at "choke poind" in transit lanes. Their capa-

SUBHOC'I .uk-narlne-kuoehed, sur-face-to-surface rucfcituclear depth charge, or homing torpedo pay laid



against ballistic missile submarines, however, probably would be limited to barrier operations at selected places in the oceans.

Antisubmarine. Warfare Aircraft

The vast areas Involved in open-ocean ASW operations cannot be adequately searched by surface and undersea platforms alone. To help with this problem, airborne patrol craft carrying sonobuoys, magnetic anomaly detection (MAD) gear, and ASW weapons, can operate up to hundreds of milesase and, working in consonance with other ASW platforms, can improve the overall open-ocean, search-and-destroy capability of thc waterbome ASW forces.

The Soviets have become increasingly committed to the use of aircraft in ASWSoviet production of ASW aircraft inas limited to twoMadge seaplane and the Hound helicopter, 'lhc Madge, which is only now being phased out of service, has good endurance and range capabilities, but. is limited by its slow speed and unsuitability for winter operations. These shortcomings were overcome iny the Mail amphibian. Despite the Improvement in speed and payload, Ihe Mail lias lessand range than thc Madge, however. Until recently, the Hound was the only ASW helicopter in the USSR. Ithore-based helicopter of limited range and payloadIt is not suited for shipboard deployment.

Another Soviet ASW aircraft is the May, which is operational in the Northern and Pacific Fleets. This aircraftombat radius. with three hours on-station. These aircraft have recently begun patrolling in limited numbers over lhc Norwegianolaris submarine patrol area.

The newest Soviet ASW aircraft is the latest variation of thc basicear heavy bomber design. Thc new Bear probably is

equipped with submarine detectionand has two weapons bays,ariety of dropablc antisubmarine stores,engthened fuselage, possibly for ASW equipment and operators. Since the first new Bear was observed ins many as Ihree ASW Bears have been noted on occasion exercising in the Barents Sea area, but they probably are not yet operational.of the aircraft is anticipated since it appears to be newly produced ratherodification of older.

new mediumnow available formajor ASW ships. It is inIhe Moskva and Kresta classes ofcruisers.ormonesbuilt to date and production isThe Hormoneotal expendableof0 pounds. It carriesand depth charges, and has aof about two hours. Wc have nosuggest that it has ans replacing the Houndservice.

D. Antisubmarine Warfare Sensors

The following pages set forth one method of analyzing the capabilities and mode of operation of Soviet sonarson new ASW surface ships and submarines. They give estimates of the capabilities of thc sonars, in which thc Navy is in disagreement with the rest of thc Intelligence Community,

This section also discusses Soviet fixed acoustic arrays and other detection

the last three years, theintroduced several newsystems. Foremost among these aresonars that clearlynew generation of Soviet ASW sonars. These

arc found on Moskva-class hdicoirtor ships, the Kanln-class destroyers, andlasslass nuclear submarines. The technicalincorporated in these sonars, coupled with the introductionariable depthsonar on the Moskva-classew helicopter borne dipping sonar employed by tbe Hormone operating with the Moskva diss, provide the Soviets with greatly increased detection ranges against submarines at all depths, ln addition to these active sonars, the Soviets have also put out over the past three years new passive sonars on the V-lass nuclear submarines and new fixedarrays in the Pacific, have experimented with sooobuoys fields in narrow straits such as those south of Sicily in the Mediterranean, and have mounted new MAD gear on several types of ASW idrcraft-

low-Frequency Active Sonors

he low-frequency active sonarsabove have enough features In common that, for purposes of analyzing theirtliey may be considered together. They all operate at lower frequencies, emit stronger signals, are more flexible In their modes of operation, and probably employ moresignal processing than earlier Soviet sonars.



fixed Acovitic Airayt

Geographical factors currentlySoviet use of fixed long-range, hydro-acoustic detection stations except in thcOcean where deep water channels with good sound propagation conditions exist. Short-rangeoclive and passive systems are installed near Soviet naval bases and harbors in thc Pacific and elsewhere, but these offer no threat to US FBM (FleetMissile) submarines.

Aohydroacoustic detection station has been installed near Pctropavlovsk in tbcPeninsula and it is estimated thatof other stations at Shikotan and Onekotan in lhe Kurile Islands chain bas been completed or is underway. There also is evidence which suggests that the Soviets plan to deploy additional sensors at otherin thes/ Kamchatka area. This area of thc Pacific is not restricted by the unfavorable hydrogeographic conditions. lack of ready access to deep water with acoustic characteristics favorable for long-range sound propagation) lhat prevail in the strategically important Barents Sea area.

hen operational. Ihc arrays in the Soviet Far East and in ihc Barents Seawill have some capabilily against noisy

lubmarlnes. The defection range of theseIs estimated to be about SO miles against soorkcling diesel submarines, but less than. against Polaris rubmarines operating under quiet conditions. Like other hydro-acoustic sensor estimates, this one rests heavily on judgments as to the stutc of Sovietin this field. Indeed, the state-of-the-art has not developed to tho point where quiet submarines can be detcctod at long ranges by any passive array, US or Soviet.

the coming decade, some ofshortcomings may be overcome.exists that the Soviets may beacquire access to esnraterrrtorialtbe emplacement of fixed arraysfar more effective. Tlir developmentemplacedunderwayalso enable the Sovietsgeographic limitations, Thoughof array technology sufficient forof nuclear ballistic missileon station appears unlikely In thetoears, some improvements willof these possibilities. Soviet effortsbetter systems and find ways tothem in strategically significantalmost certainly continue.

Other Deletion Syitsxns

senors carried by presentaircraft include MAD devices andsonobuoys. Tho MAD gear istoaximum range offeet in air and water paththis past year. Soviet air-droppedtheir twin cylinder mooredbuoys (Twinranges (lessards)submarines and thus offered little orOnly by usearge numberclosely spaced, could an effectivebe created.

e now see evidence of the useew air-dropped sonobuoy with thc May aircraft. While our information concerning the new air-dropped sonobuoy is limited, It appears to be different from any previousTho capabilities and characteristics of the buoy remain unknown, as thc Soviets tako operational precautions in the use of these buoys to preclude thc possibility of recovery by any but Soviet forces.

1BO The Soviets have alsoew moored buoy which is probably hydro-acoustic. We hive recovered part ofuoy and have some photos of anotherin the water, but cannot yet provideor characteristics of either the buoysomplete system. We know that some type of new buoy system is in place Di'lirc Strnllr nffSgsrj in tho Barents Sea, but we do not know whether they are of this type.

addition to this wide varietysystems, the Soviets haveuse of gamma ray spectrometers forof radioactivity in the wake ofsubmarines. Uttle is known aboutthough its testing has beenc

2 'he program had not met with much jurcess; nor indeed, is It to be expected thai such an approach would lead lo die detection of Polaris submarines.

E. Antisubmarine Warfare Weapons

weapon systems onsurface ships include conventionaltorpedoes, conventionalocson-propeUedcharges, andariant ofweapon whichorpedo in place

"MHU (Mnocnslvolnavaepthn ciotipc ofo IB to ranges up0 yards.

epth charge. ASW weapon systems on Soviet submarines Include conventional ASW homing torpedo systems and possibly rocket-propelled torpedoes and depth charges (SUBROC-type) with cither nuclear orwarheads. Airborne ASW weapon systems include conventional homingand depth bombs.

oviet passive acoustic homingwere first designed in tbend had eatierncly short homing ranges against quiet submarines. Known Sovietacoustic homing torpedoes were initially designed0 and sufferedigh homing frequency, medium speed, poorlogic, and apparent difficulties inand repair. There is little infonnation on later model torpedoes, but it is expected that their design has overcome many of these deficiencies. Thc Soviets have steadilythc range capabilities of their multiple-tube MBU systems. The rocket-propelled depth chargeaximum range of aboutjn. installed aboard the Moskva-class greatly improves the Moskva's standoff weapon delivery capability against submarines.

n addition to these weapon systems, the Soviets have both acoustic and magnetic influence mines which could be moored In shallow waters to restrict thc use of narrow straits. They also have developedocket-propelleduoyant self-rising mine with acoustic dctectioa that can be moored tn waters with depths of ateet

F. Capabilities Against Polaris


This section evaluates Sovietto search for Polaris submarines with the Moskva task forces and to trullovertly or covcrlly.

oviet ASW capabilities againstsubmarines suffer from tbe historical emphasis which the Soviets have put on ASW operations for the delonse of coastal waters. The Soviet Navy slill conducts most of its ASW training in thc vicinity of its mainbases. During the past two years, the Soviets have conducted at leastsmall ASW exercises per year in these areas.hundreds of ships, submarines, and aircraft have been involved in thesemost of the ASW training observedto have been of an elementary nature oriented toward convoy and harbor defense. Such training does not provide realisticIn open-ocean operations against ballistic missile submarines.elatively few large scale ASW exercises have been conducted oulsidc Soviet fleet operating areas, although the number of such exercises has been increasing.

SurToca> Seorch

espite tho historical bias toward coastal defense, the development of ato detect and counter Polaris submarines on-station isajor Soviet goal.the most significanthis direction has been the development of the Moskva-class helicopter ship. These ships already have engaged in intensive efforts to detectdeployed in the easternThe four exercises In which thchelicopter ship and its sister ship,took part have shown that the Soviets intend to employ this class of ship and its associated helicopters with shore-basedother ASW ships, escorts, and deployed submarines in coordinated ASW operations. These operations can be viewedoviet approach toward development of anopen-ocean ASW task force.



During some exercises in the Mediter-ranoan, thc Moskva has deployed two groups of Iwo helicopters each aboutiles ahead of the Moskva, wtth each group aboutiles to port and slarboard of thc Moskva's steaming path The helicopters move out to station ainots, putipping sonar at the endable which stays down for aboutinutes while the helicopters hover in place (and tho Moskva coversiles towarduring thesethe hull-mounted sonar has beento be transmitting One pair of heb-coptcrs then pulls up Ihc sonars and goesewiles further on.the tworoup go togelhcr.they leap frog. These operations are tests of the operating techniques andof the Moskva.

ISS. these activities mean in terms of area search capabilities is not agreed upon,


a. CM. DM.SA. Army, and At> Force Position: The observed ship speed ofonots, together with an estimated sweep path ofo. indicate that area search ratesquare miles per hour are feasiblerobabilitylection. Underconditions, the Soviets wouldigher probability of detection. In this case, search rates would he lower. The development of such capabilitiesajor goalong period of research and sensor development and of recent exercises in the Mediterranean by Ihe Moskva-class cruisers. Even if these exercises were not wholly successlul. there is substantialto indicate that the search rates cited above arc within tbe capability of Moskva-class ships. This evidence includes published Soviet research on hydrOacoustics;Soviet capabilities to develop the

necessary equipment; and the compatibility of recent Soviet hydroacoustic surveys,Moskva operations, and theof the equipment involved in the recent exercises.

b. Navy Position: The Navy believes that to ascribe such theoretically attainableto the Moskva, even with its now low-frequency sonar, is to underrate the difficulties inherent in sonar operations at long ranges.)

jThc Navy believes that it is not meanmgfuTtoearch rate except under carefully specified

ith two Moskva-type task groups, the Soviets may be able to Inhibit Polarisin the Mediterranean somewhat, but two of these task groups do notignificant threal to the survivability of Polaris submarines operating there. Because of the larger areas to behe capability of these task groups against Polaris submarines in the relatively unrestricted waters of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and theand Barents Seas, would be even more limited.


he Soviets have also begun toASW operations in the vicinity ofsubmarine bases. Soviel surface ships

top sccna


iles north of Guam have, oo at least twoonducted ASW exercises; Soviet submarines may have participated. These ex cr dies sure est that the Soviets may intend to initiate contacteploying Polaris submarine as it departs from thedetection and trailing opportunities would bo greatest, as they exit port on thc surface. Soviet Intelligenceships stationed near Polaris bases play the initial role in the detection of these

Despite the recent advances In Soviet submarines and hydroacouitic detection equipment, present Soviet submarines still are unable to detect and trailolaris submarine while il is on. or en route to. station. Although the new Soviet nuclear submarines ore faster than present US nuclear submarines, Soviet noise control practices continue to lag those of the US. Thc higher noise levels not only degrade the performance of Sovietbut also make it virtually impossible for present Soviet submarines to approach close enougholaris submarine to detect it with passive sonar without themselves being detected. Elimination of this problemwould require redesign of theadditional noise control measures would not be likely to correct this deficiency.

Overt trail of patrolling or transiting Polaris submarinesore likely possibility.lass submarine appears to have the greatest potential in this regard. Thc speed advantage and sonar capabilities of thisare such that they may have reduced the effectiveness of present US eountermeas-ures in breaking trail. But the theoreticalcapability of maintaining an overt trail does notignificant threat to tlie survivability of the Polaris deterrent, since the Soviets cannot now conducl such trailsufficient number of Polaris submarines

development of anor trailing capability sufficient tothe oo station force of Polarisappears well beyond reach of fheduring tbe period of this Eitimate.thc Soviets appear determined totheir efforts to improve theirballistic missile submarinesthe open ocean.

G. Antisubmarine Warfare Systems Under Development

Platforms Under Construction

This section discusses the new cruiser, new destroyer, and two new types ofsubmarines under construction which will Increase Soviet ASWIt also discusses Soviet research on new ASW sensors.

of contmoing SovietASW surface ships has been providedrecent appearanceew cruisernew destroyer. The first of the newin Ihe process of fitting out and couldservice int bgeneral appearance to the existingcruisers and, Uke them, has SAMfore antielicopter platfoiintorpedo tubes, and small guns.weapon systems have not beenyet, though it appears toargedome The identification of this shipnew ASW ship is based upon itsto the Kresta, whichuge ajitiiurimarine ship

IBS. Series construction of the new Krivak-class destroyer is underway at two shipyards. These ships apparently will be lined with torpedo tulxrs and possibly ASW rocket launchers. In addition, it appears to have SAM defenses and surface-to-surface antiship mis-


top- &ncn&.

These ships probably are intended is the replacements for aging ASW destroyers and destroyer escorts. They undoubtedly will be equipped with late model sonar gear and may have sea-keeping and endurance qualities sufficient for open-ocean operations with the new ASW cruisers. Thc first units oi this class will enter operational service this year.

Work continues on two types ofboth of which probably are nuclear powered. Tlie first of these,ass, is expected to be operational later this year, and little is known about it Its hull shape is roughly similar tolass butlarger. It is unusually wide for its length ind has its maximum beam near the bow. The bow appears to be fitted with at leastissile tubes similar to, but larger than, those ofass

The second of these,elatively small submarine still underis estimated to be nuclear powered bc-causo fitting out is taking-placeuclear submarine support facility. Itighly streamlined hull suitable for high submerged speed. It alsonit of its size, which mayarger sonar. These characteristics suggest thatass will have an ASW role. The first unit oflass should be operational later thb year.

Sensor Development

Is known about SovietASW sensors, but lhc reneral directioneffort can be estimated on the basisliterature and other source material.planned program in hydioacousticsconducted by the AcousticsMoscow. Fundamental data necessarydesign uf powerful, low-frequency,systems, and shore-based activesurveillance stations, are beingThe Soviets may be imtalhng experi-

mental hytboacoustje detection systems in thc Barents Sea. Substantial effort in theof signal correlation detection methods, using optical correlators and computeris known to bo underway. These efforts, when coupled with the detailedstudy of acoustic reflection from the bottom and surface of the ocean, stronglythat the Soviets will be utilizing these correlation techniques in the sonars presently being developed for buoys, helicopters, surface ships, and submarines. Tlie Soviets also are training many new acousticians andacilities.

n addition, the Soviets areextensive military cceanographie work in all ocean areas. The main thrust of this work is to obtain the oceanography data needed for the design of both active and passiveand to obtain thc oceanographic data needed lor developing an environmentalsystem for ASW. Such predictions are used to deploy hydroacoustic detectionmost effectively and also providenecessary for selection of the number and spacing of ships in ASW operations.

c believe that the USSR isexploring non-acoustic means for submarine search in tho hope ofreakthrough in underwater detection.application of new discoveries in such fields as magnetics, electro-optics, nuclear em-anations. and the utilization of satellitemay have potential foeignificant advance in ASW. This is anjudgment, howeverQ

There ii no basis on which to estimate witiP confidence the contribution that non-acoustic systems might make to the solution of Soviet ASW problems in the corning decade.



Tliis section evaluates Sovietto detect satellites, accuratelytheir position, and intercept them with direct ascent or orbital weapons or with non-destruction mechanisms. It also gives our assessment of tho likelihood of Soviet interference with US satellites.

The Soviets began building spaceradarsince then, the deployment of an extensive space tracking network and the development of an ABMhave provided the Soviets with an anti-satellite capabilityy-product. The testing of an ABM interceptor that can be guided to the point of intercept with satellites in low-earth orbits, and the development of anintercept capability with maneuverable satellites, have added to that capability.

Thc technical problems involved in attacking satellites in near-earth orbit are, for the most part, less severe-than those ofmissile defense. Satellites appear as much larger targets to EW radars than do missile RVs, and. if tracked on successive orbits, their future position can be predicted withIn addition, satellites are vulnerableider variety of weapons effects.

A. Detection, Tracking, and Orbit Prediction

Thc primary Soviet means oftracking, and predicting the orbits of US satellites is thc Hen House radar network. These radars could be augmented by theand tracking radars of the Moscow ABM system and several deep space trackingadars at various locations in the USSR.

A number of possible means exist for destroying or interfering with spaceas well as non-nuclear, direct-ascent, as well asfor each of these

methods, the Soviet's Hen House radar system would provide the data necessary forengagement.

B. Intercept Techniques

Thc Soviets have both direct-ascent and orbital interceptors suitable fornon-nuclear intercepts of US satellites at low and mediumon-nuclearcapability has been demonstrated and could be used at anytime against selected US satellites- The Calosh ABM interceptor could be usedirect-ascent mode against low-altitude satellites. Thc Calosh iswell-suited to this role because of itsto fly under power and guidance sJl the way to intercept. This would permitof the interceptor trajectory throughout the engagement. Based on reasonable estimates of Try Add radar and Galosh missilenon-nuclear kill probably could beagainst satellites up to, altitude, and at slant rangesew. Beyond these limits the Galosh could also be usedallistic intercept mode against satellites up toith some reduction in accuracy, and possiblyuclear warhead.

The Soviets also haveapability to perform orbital intercepts in their maneuverable satellite"


he. and itc flight restsas revealed^ound interceptor ve-hiclej"

^JThc purpose of the tests appears to have been to evaluate tlie orbital components of an antisatellite system. Q

he guidance system produced the very small miss distances neededigh probability of killon-nuclear


Another test of their system oc curred in lateith the launch of the,atellites. This test series was nearly identical to the earlier test. Further developmental flight testingnecessary, however, before the system could be considered fully operational. In past Soviet tests, the target and Interceptor were launched so as to be ooplanar, with the in. terceptor maneuvering in-plane to overtake and close on theully operational system would require greater flexibility than was displayed in the Soviet tests,

onsiderably less potential exists for non-nuclear intercept of satellites atequatorialut this capability is expected to Improve over the next few years. For nuclearumber of space and ballistic launch vehicles, already in the Soviel inventory, could be adapted for use against satellites at all of the altitudes of concern to thc Soviets, since payload weight, orbit prediction accuracy, andrequirements aio less stringent than for non-nuclear kill.

everal other means of interfering with satellites are possible, including tho use of lasers and of electronic intrusion. Soviet capabilities in laser* are generallyar with those of the US.f_

J They could employ aof bmited capability at any time, and it is estimated that more powerful systems could be developed in the next two to five years.

pportunities exist to jam satelliteand control links. This approach would depend upon thc ability to monitor satellite traffic and to establish critical frequencies to be jammed. Jamming of satellite receivers is

within present Soviet capabilities.^


C. Likelihood of Soviet Interference with US Satellites

Wc consider it highly unlikely that the Sovieis would undertake widespread and continuing destructive attacks on TJSin peacetime We rate the chances for selective or sporadic attacks, or forinterference, nearly as low. In an arms control environment, the Soviets would probably secourse as particularly risky.

Thc considerations which presently militate against Soviet interference with US satellites are likely to become even more compelling over thc next several years. Doth political and military considerations deter the Soviets from such action, and Sovieton satellite-derived intelligence, already heavy, it likely to grow with the growth in Chinas strategic nuclear capabilities. Aarms limitation agreement would also increase Ihe importance of this intelligence source.


This section evaluates Soviet civilpolicy in general, and evacuation policy and procedures, in.hc USSR has intensified and broadened its civil defense efforts.Soviet civil defense pobcy relies on urban

-stent r-

as the principal means Ic*most ol thc population of likely target areas. The ability of Soviet civil defense preparations to reduce casualties substantially appears, however, to beelatively large commitment0 full-timeand annual expendituresillion0 million rubles.

Reliance upon evacuation makes Soviet civil defense critically dependent on several days' warning rime for maximumUnder the most favorableweather, sufficient transport,dispersal areas,isciplinedto four days would be needed to evacuate thc non-essential personnel from most Soviet cities. It would almostrequire more time to evacuate Moscow and Leningrad.

ecision to evacuate were made, the Soviets probably would attempt toaboutercent of the population of their larger cities. Theould stay in the immediate vicinity to man key industries.

The organizational structurefor evacuation in the USSR, however, has not conducted any exercises that wouldapability to evacuate all Urge cities simultaneously. Such an evacuation would create complications that would almost surely delay thc process beyond ihree lo four days. There is. in addition, thc strongthai military mobilization would occur at about thc same time. In that event,requirements would undoubtedlyigher priority in the competition for trans-portAtlon facilities.

Thus, the Soviets probably do not noweal operational capability lo carryapid and orderly evacuation, andof the population of all their large

cities. Even if adequate warning were given, thc Soviet transportation system probably could not meet the simultaneous demands of the military forces and civil defense

Tbe Soviets may not view theiron adequateeriousThey haveonvincing nuclear deterrent that probably gives them sufficient reason to presume that it Isthat the USSR would be the victimurprise nudcarevent which would preclude urban evacuation.

Several other distinguishing features of Soviel civil defense are its reliance on tho use of inherent or hastily Improvised sholters for protecting evacuees and residents of non-strategic areas from radioactive fallout; tho extensive involvement of the military In 'ttt organization; and its emphasis on compulsory public training.

The Soviet civi] defense program Is controlled and administered by the Ministry of Defense. Military officers man civilcommand posts and superviseoperations even at the local level

Most of the school-age and adulthave undergone compulsory training. Tlie chief objectives of the training are toeneral awareness of protectiveto provide leaders and specialists for thc civil defense organization, and lo prepare most of the working population for service In rescue and recovery units. Besides reducing Iho likelihood of panic and minimizing the probable number of casualties, this training alsoonvenient vehicle for po-litical indoctrination.

The Soviets have gradually increased their commitment of resources to civil defense over the past several years. Their attempt to minimize total spending for the civil defense


however, is clearly reflected in their extensive use of low cost resources andfacilities. Compulsory public training, for example, requires relatively littleor investment in facilities. Thc desire to avoid the large cost or constructing enough blast shelters for the Soviet urban population wasajor reason for the Soviet leaders' choice of evacuation as their basic civil defense policy.


Sections A, B,f part VIIsome more general considerations with regard to estimating thc futureof Soviet strategic defensefuture threat to the USSR, possible influence of an arms control agreement, and the relationship between the olfense and tbe defense.

n the decade ahead, the Soviets must determine the extent to which they willand deploy new and improved defense forces to overcome their continuingto ballistic missile and low-altitude air attack. Most of the options open to them depend heavily upon the achievements of tbeir technology in the years to come. The timing of these achievementsarge degree of uncertainty to which theof future forces is extremely sensitive. Forecasts are also sensitive to tho rapidlycosts of modern forces which cause major problems of resource allocation.inimum, the Soviets could accept mutual deterrenceasis for their strategic defense policy and might do little more than complete deployment programs now underway. They must decide as well the extent and naturetrategic arms limitation agreement with the US which couldortion of the future threat. With orALTthey might continue to expand their

air defenses while searching for betterto the problems posed by ballistic missile defense and ASW. In tho absenceALT agreement, they could attempt toaximum defense posture through gready expanded deployment of improved and new air defense, ABM. and ASW systems. Within each of these general courses ofarge number of strategic defense force packages can be postulated to meet their objectives.

be Soviets have traditionally been preoccupied with defense and willing to spend the money needed for nation-wide defense in depth. The momentum of existing programs will continue for at least several years and keep the commitment to strategic defenses highime. Thereafter, thc resourcesto strategic defense will reflect Soviet tradeoffs between such considerations as policy aims, technological development, and bureaucratic interests. Their priorities,may change. This section of the paper considers the shape that future slrategieforces might take under differing

A. Future Threat to the USSR

ne of the key factors affecting Soviet strategic defensive force goals is theof the threat which confronts them.planners are probably well informed about current US forces, as well as possible changes in these forces over the next few years.

^Soviet planners perceive any weapon system capable oftheir territory as part of the strategicthreat. This includes thc more obvious elements of thc US and NATO strikeICBMs, bombers, and submarine-launchedwoll as carrier based aircraft, fighter bombers, and tactical missilesin ureas near Soviet borders.



US strategic forces5 will be able lontercontinental bombers, and

nuclear warheads de-

livered by missiles.5 there will also beircraft deployed aboard US aircraft carriers and at bases in forward areas. In addition, the Soviets will faceissiles belonging to NATO countries, all capable of nuclear attackagainst Soviet targets. Further, themust keep in mind thc possible USof new systems employing advanced technology which will greatly complicate the defensive problem; these include new RVs, the Underseas long-Range Missile Systemtrategic bomber, advanced air-launched cruise missiles and decoys, and quieter, more sophislicated, submarines.

do noi know, of course,the Soviets would project the threatbe posed by thc US strategic. It is probable, however, thatbegin with present forces andadditions and improvements.they would add some further majorand improvements talked aboul inpress- Thc range of possiblein US strategic forces might lookfollowing to the Soviets:

Advances in both ECM andaids for missiles and bombers willthc USSR inhreat qualitatively more complex and difficult lo meet than that which they face today. Thc significant increase in US nuclear forces,submarine launched warheads, will make the USSR vulnerable to attack from nearly all directions.

In addition to the threat from the West. Soviet planners must continue to de-ploy forces to deal with thc growing andthreat from China. During thc, China will probably deploy ballistic missile systems of intermediate range and possibly intercontinental range as well. These weapons could have warheads in therange, In this same period. China will increase its capabilities for air attack along contiguous borders of thc USSR and -into key areas of Ihe Soviet heartland.

In spiteuildup of defensive forces during, the Soviets remain vulnerable lo ballistic missile attack and to aircraft and air-to-surface weaponsat low levels. Soviet RorD activities which might improve defenses against each of these threats continues. But even iftechnical progress leads to more ef-

chances inciaidsc im pROCnAMMeo roncx Some reduction In

etrofitted to about half the Minuteman force.

Majok chancxs included in augmksto roerc 1


III retrofitted to the

entire Minuteman force.

MajOu Ckancbs includes- in



Minuteman III retrofitted to the entire Minuteman force.

Phase II, providing light area defense of the entire country, as well at defense of Minuteman complexes.



top secret

weapons systems, they probably could not be deployed to significant levelshus, thc Soviet strategic0ill improve only marginally, in spite of the incorporation of new and modernized equipment inlo their forces.

Arms Limitation Agreements

is apparent that the Soviets takeinterest in reaching anwouldtabilized strategicwith the US. in the course ofnegotiations, tlie Soviets haveInterest in prohibiting ABMlimiting it to the defense of the NCA.taken this latter possibility intopostulating illustrative strategic

Offensivo-Dcfensive Relationship

factors governerceived offensive threat:tactics, tbe extent of therequired, and thedefensive programs and otherand civilianefensivecan take severalof new weapons or modificationsones, changos in deploymentchanges in tactics.


World War II. strategichave usually taxed the limitsdefensive lechnology. Becausethe defense has come to lag tbetechnology has become thc mostarea to advance, accounting forthe lag in defensive responses.accurately pinpoint the target,adequate data on the targetelements of thc systemegree, weapons technol-

ogy, and good command and controlcan offset shortcomings in sensorsystem inaccuracies can befor by using nuclear devices with larger yields: faster missiles and aircraft can make up for some delays in target acquisition; prompt decision-making can minimize the engagement delays. Nevertheless, suchimprovements can only rnarginallyfor sensor deficiencies.

defenses are in significantaffected by this problem. Indeed, thedefensive problems beingthem stem from tbe inability ofto provide highly efficientcosts which permit widespread

major problem of low-altilude air defense lies in the fact that radar echoes from altacking bombers arc lost in reflections from terrain features.

fundamental limitation of Soviet ASW is tlie difficulty of making the initial contactubmarine in the open ocean, and holding it in trailing operations.

potential is limited by radar state-of-the-art in such regards as target acquisition, discrimination, and handling capabilities.


tactics change asare recognized. US bomberfor example, adopted tacticsneulralize key SAM sites, and openoordinated attack, lnSoviet air defense forces adopted:

use of alternative and dummy SAM sites, and thc rotation of equipment between positions, to frustrate effective offensive



in forward barriers and ambush sites along key approach routes to attackbombers, thereby reducing thethat defenses around the objective will be hit simultaneouslyoordinated attack.

areonstant stateThese changes often result fromof new equipment, andit seems, when forces go intofind classroom tactics wanting.tactics are limited in what thoy cansome problems can be met onlyadvances in the performance ofsystems. The US ballistic missileforce, andesser degree thetechniques of SAC bombers,problems of this type. If thc concepttactics is broadened toerfor ce targeting plans fordefensive and offensive forcebecome more difficult to differentiate.

Soviet Do Ion ic Coverage Require mo nil

their writings and in theirpatterns, Soviet plannersthe protection of the ISO oradministrative centers uponcontrol of the country depends.are also situated to protectand control centers.

strike and support forcesbut the pattern of protectiongeneral, Ihe defensive patterns forforces emphasize the protection ofmiliiaryliasesand military supplies whichthinkers see either as decisiveoutsetuclear war, or as neededa continuous strategic offensive.

oviet doctrine foresees mlbtoryinvolving general purpose forces (Soviet ground, air. And naval forces using

tactical nuclear and conventional weapons) subsequent to the initial attack. These general purpose forces are to be supported by the military-economic potential of theransportation, andozen types of defense related Industries. The amount ofaccorded defense industrial centers varies with thc importance of the center.

World War II, Sovietdefense related industries have beenthroughout the USSR, makingto attack. To protect them hasa widespread series of defendedwithin an cncu:clang barrier. Mostforces arc concentrated in theof the Ural Mountains, alongRailroad to Irkutsk, and inof Vladivostok.

Defensive Versus Olher Miliiary ond Civilian Programs

Resource considerations and theof bureaucratic interests also exert an influence over the course of major defensive force developments. Policy makers at thelevel in the USSR must balance theirfor strategic defense against other needs, both civilian and military, and allocate money, manpower, and scarce technical resourcesNew undertakings are fittedariety of programs inact which tends to inhibit abrupt change.

We cannot place precise limits on the resources to be devoted to future defensive programs. Plant capacities, for example,onstraint in some aircraft and submarineperhaps in some electronics products asthey can be expanded. Military expenditures can be, and have been, redirected within thc defense budget and tlie defense budget itself has been Increased.


TOP SueftrT-

so. past weapons programs provideyardsticks for putting bounds on thc likely pace and magnitude of future ones. Detailed estimates of Soviet defense spending over the pastears have been used to derive rough guidelines of tbe Soviet wiUingness to commit resources to priority weapons

Policy decisions in the USSR today are the productollective leadership in which each of thc principal leaders weighs thc alternatives against his individual views and interests. This policy environment isto the Interplay of conflictinginterests, among which militaryman in uniform, his system design bureaus, and productionweight. Here, as with resourcelittle is known of the balance of competing forces within the Politburo or the implications of these forces for futuredevelopments.

In years past, Ihe initiation ofnew military programs at the expense of others has resulted in debate and resistance, When the Soviet Cround Forces were reduced during lhe growth of the SRF, the controversy erupted into thc public media. When tbeNavy's strategic strike role was changedhere was considerable agitation within thc Navy which did not end until it was restored.

Today, we have no evidence ofpolicy or resource shifts in progress which will have direct implications for thc strategic defense, unless itALT ABM bmitation. We believe, however, that theinterplay of vested interests continues and ihat major programs will evolveOtherwise, significant redirections of resources will probably result in discernible controversy.

D. Dcvelopmont ond Deployment of New Weapon Systems

This section sets forth considerations in Soviet development of new strategic defense sensors and weapon systems. It indicates briefly why we think thewill, or in some cases willpecific new weapon system.

Soviet research on, and development of. military weapon systems has been recefv-ing increasingly greater funding. There is every reason to believe this trend willas systems grow in complexity. While wc have no knowledge of the share ofunding effort going to strategic defense, the extent of known facilities and theof new systems deployed, leads us tothatffort is substantial and that it will continue.

Major technical advances in weapons for strategic defense must be anticipated from this effort over the next decade. Somewill result in significant upgrading of systems already deployed, while others will permit the fielding of new systems. The thrust of currentlyrograms, and the problems they are intended to overcome, have been described in relevant sections above. This section summarizes the nature and pace of these developmentsasis for the pos-lulattons of new weapon systems projecled in the illustrative force models.

Air Defenses

key air defense problems,in the discussion of currentthe need for additional and improvedat altitudeseel,need for additional weapons whichattackers effectively at lowall weather conditions. To this isproblem for thethreatsuch systems as the United States' short-



attack missileomef which can be carriedomber. Also under consideration is the subsonic-cruise armed decoy0 of which can be carriedomber. Such ASMs will not only present extremely difficult targets to current Soviet air defenses, but will alsoaturation problem to Soviet command and controllong before the borders of the USSR have been penetrated by bombers.

Air Surveillance ond Control

ow-altitude air surveillance can be enhanced either by the improvement andof ground-bated radar networks or by the introduction of an overland ahborne radar system. Improvements in tbe near term arc likely to be thc continuing deployment of Squat Eye radars, the upgrading of other deployed radars through the installation of MTI circuitry and the introduction of new height finders. The illustrative force models include qualitative changes.of this type even though total numbers of radars change but slightly. Closing major gaps in the low-altitude air surveillance network by ground-based radars, especiallyeet, would require many additional fixed radars.

he threat of improved, long-range standoff weapons carried by US bombers will accelerate Soviet efforts to extend radarbeyond that now attained by ground-baser! systems. To engage bombers carrying such weapons before they can launch them will require both tbe extension of EW and the range at which AI can be controlled by monitoring facilities. Both airborne andsystems will probably be improved and enlarged to meet these requirements.

l is possible, that in the course of the nest decade, the Soviets might deploy an OHD system for EW use against bomber attacks from thc US. Ifystem were successfully developed and deployed, il could

extend thc detection range of the Soviet air wamingiles or more from the borders of the USSR. Though there is no evidence thatystem is now being built for air defense, past Soviet activity with ovcr-the-horizon radars has probably included the investigation of their use against aircraft. An OHD system used for this purposelike any OHDfrom either the unreliability or high false alarm rateswith propagation at relatively lowIn the Soviet case, additionalwould be created by having to look into the auroral zones where significant electronic interference is encountered. Ifto these problems can be made, however, it would extend Soviet EWomber attack.

someuitable airbornewhich can look down over land,as over water, and see targets againstreturn from the terrain,significant advantages over theof ground radars. Ina system could greatly improve theof interceptor aircraft againsttargets in areas beyond thc horizonradars. We continue tothe Soviets will develop anan .overland look-down radar. Theyrequirement and they are working onthough apparentlylowerwe estimated several years ago. Aslook-down capabilities have notdemonstrated by the Sovids.0 is unlikely.


interceptor that would workAW ACS,ook-down AIshoot-down missiles with radarwould enable them to engageat lower altitudes,ovietwhich would probably be md be-


lore the end of the decade. An advanced long-range aUtoeothtr interceptor, with look-down, shoot-down capabilities and capable ofruiseombit radiusould be available in the. Should Soviet experience with the Foxbat show that Iho costs of building andircraft are so high as to make extensive deployment too costly, they mayesign with dash speed of about.

The Soviets may not wish to wait for this interceptor, however. The Soviets have never beforeap of over five yearsmh^ucrJon of new fighters into APVO. They could bringew low- lHuude Itfjitcr with improved MTI capabilities in the. It could be constructed less expensively than Foxbat and could complement thcwhich will probably bo deployed well forward in peripheral locations and along key approach routes. They couldersion of the Flogger, which is .now being deployed to Ihe tactical air forces,

li the US deploys. the Soviets will need additional modem fighters tothe bomber and the numerous ASMs lhat it can carry. Older systems havethat limit their adaptation lo this role. The Foxbat bas good capabilities which can be further improvedew fire-control system. Although we havo no evidence to indicate that the Foxbats currently being deployedook-down, shoot-down fire-control system, we believe that an advanced fire-control system with this capability will be incorporated in the Foxbat in the.

Surface-to-Air Miss.lcs

Soviets will probablymodification programs as the low-altitude capabilities oi lhe

ystem has probably reached its low-altitude limit, bui theay be further improved to enhance its low-altitudeIn addition, thengagement radar has been seen in the Leningrad area atopootpractice which extends the range of its low-altitudewithout redesign of the system. Wide-spread use of such towers offers an easy means of bolstering low-altitude engagementin many areas. We may. therefore, see additionaleployment.

The deployment of SRAM by the US will seriously tax current Soviel SAM systems The small radar cross-section, high speed, and low-altitude flight profile of this ASM will require SAM system performance beyond that which can now be attained by Soviet SAMs without substantialWhile theystem has sufficient range to operate against theaircraft itself, other systems may not be able to. Il Is likely, therefore, that thcystem inof itsbe further improved, particularly if the SRAM system as designed (or others like it) emergeshreat lo the USSR. In order lo upgrade theystem to meet this it is likely lhat substantial changes, or even the replacement, of the Fan Song Radar will be necessary. Other changes may well include shortened reaction times and faster interceptor missiles. Thesewoulderious strategicproblem because they might bewith those for the upgrading of SAM systems for ABM use

By the, the Soviets couldew SAM with superiorinlerceptas loweet at ranges greater than now possible.


continuous wave, semi-active homing sys-tem, with the engagement radar elevated above the site,ossible design approach toystem. There is at present no evidence oirogram.

Command ond Control

inally, the saturation problem posed by the complexity of tbc defense system and by the large and growing number of targets and decoys, will require improved computer technology in both weapons systems and in thc command and control network. We believe that new generation systems and improved computer technology will give theapabib'ty byo make better tactical use of available forces. This control,ear real time basis, wiU encompass both SAM and fighter operations, effectively providingtarge; assignments to those weapons best suited to the offensive threat.

Missile Defenses

he Moscow ABM system has two key technical shortcomings; it lacks the moans to discriminate between real targets andaids, and, as currentlyigh ratio of radars per launcher whichimits the systems Brepower. Tne Soviets apparently recognize these ptob-Jems and arc directing theirrograms toward their solution In order toasis for the further deployment of ABM

iscrimination between penetration aids and real targets Is vital If the ABM site is to avoid exhausting its interceptors against false targets. The most promising approaches to discrimination generally involve either an interceptor whichaunched after thc atmosphere has stripped away penetralion aids, and unmasked Ihe true target or tatgets.

or one able to loiter after it has been launched Inay as lo allow it to intercept an RV not recognized until minutes after launch.

he great propulsion flexibility dem-onstraled by the Calosh missile suggests that it mayery good interceptor to use inoiter mode. The Soviets could develop and put into operationaloiter mode of operation for thc Calosh within thc next five years.oiter mode of operation, theIs launohed to the general vicinity of the incoming objects. It then Hies up the threat tube at reduced thrust until the real target emerges from chaff, which hasin the upper atmosphere- Tbeis then committed and accelerated at high thrust to thc target. The loiter mode of operation makes eihaurbon of the Interceptor inventory more difficult for the offense,the defense know, the rrsajdmumof real targets which will emerge from the penetration aids. Use of tho Caloshoiter mode is an improvement that might be incorporated into the Moscow ABM defenses in all the ABM deployment protections.

ore effective alternative solution to thc problem of discriminating against chaff and decoys, and the one used hy the US, is the developmentprat-type, very Itifih acceleration interceptor. The acceleration ofehicle enables the defense to delay launch until the atmosphere has unmasked tho real targets.evelopment may now be in progress in its very early stages; no firings of such missiles have yet occurred. It is unlikely thai the Soviets couldigh acceleration interceptor for operational use muchts deployment would he most desirable in more widespread ABM programs designed to defend against heavy attacks.

top gccec?-

Reduction of tne number of expensive radars per launcher is to be expected if there is toidespread deployment of an ABM system in tbe USSR. One method of doing this is suggestedtcomble phascd-arroy radar which we believe is under development at Sarylanar phased arrayto have been substituted for the large Try Add dish radar. Additionally, thehas been enlarged, perhaps to expanded data processingThese modifications would most likely resultadar with greater surveillance and target handling capability than the current Try Add. Incorporated into the Moscowthe new phased-array radar willreater capability to maintain surveillance over areas not covered by long-rangeand tracking radars. Elsewhere, these new phased arrays could be deployed to cover areasajor threat is not anticipated, although the larger acquisition and tracking radars will probably be required in ICBM threat corridors. The use of these radars in place of thc Try Adds might also be relaled fo reducing the high radar overhead which makes extensive deployment of the current Moscow system extremely expensive.interceptors, remote from major ABM radar, could perhaps be controlledew large radar. The developmentystem employing long- and short-range interceptors, which is much less dependent upon very large ABM radars with long construction times, may be thc intent of ourrcntwork. If the short-range Interceptor does not haveacceleration,ystem couldbe advanced enough for deployment

nother method of increasing theof launchers per radar may be underin the Top Roost acquisition and tracking radar at Sary Shagan. The Top Roost (which is the prototype of the Chekhov

radar)istatic radar which probablya separate pulsed radar.f"

he follow-on long-range ABM system (which we designate thessumed in Iliustrative Force Models I, II. and III" consistsop Roost acquisitionteerable phased-array radar,alosh missile. The launchers have been projected at eight per site. Larger launcher/ site ratios may bo possible buto positive evidence that such is planned. Thc pulsed radar in the Top Roost may. on the other hand, bo intended to replace the Try Adds. Inase, this new design may be an attempt toigh performance radar which would reduce the overall costsollow-on system. For tbe projection in Force Model IVthe Top Roost is assumed to be tho only radar in the system and the pulsed radar face on the receiver, about which we know little, is assumed to replace thc Try Adds. The cost of radars per ABM launcher is cut significantly by such an assumption and widespread deployment becomes moreThe number and siting of Caloshassociated withyslem could vary widely. They could number perhaps upnd Ihey could be located withinm. of the radar.r


Antisubmarine. The major ASW problem confronting thc USSR is that of coping with hostilemissile submarines on patrol in large

See diKUSSioaSee eUcuKicm hecuming with.


MM, Technical progress Is recjuired in Ihe development of improved ASW aircraft, ships, submarines, and fixed installations.

ZCS. For several yeais. tho Soviets have hadarge-scale, aggressive effort toariety of new ASW sensors, weapons, and platforms, some of whichtechniques which are not used by the US. Thc ASW systems, currently deployed throughout the Soviet Navy, represent aimprovement over those available only five years ago. They arc indicative of Soviet intentions toeaningful capability to conduct surveillance and harassment in peacetime and. during hostilities, to destroy any submarine that is delected.

as these improvementsthey do not now give thc Sovietsthat they could detect,andignificant numberballistic missile submarines at sea.remains the crucial ASW problem.1"

Svbmorine Systems

constructed nuclearV-classlass. fordistinct improvements. Tbeyquieter than theirnoisier than the best US nuclearAdditional quieting ol theseis feasible. Such quieting woulddetection range of their new sonarsself-noise, and would improveof acoustically initiating andtrail on US submarines. The newclasses arc faster than previousand, in fad. are faster than USThe preponderanceASW sensors has been on acoustic detection

Ceo. Kocldy TriaolafeUu, Asslnant Chief nf Stall. InMltigaooa, USAF. does not agree with fwJEr roent, opnatcd id this paracraph- Far hitseeotaot* la Section IV, page 50

systems, and the sonars mounted on these new submarines are obvious improvements over earlier sonars. Only gradualwill occur in these sonars wiih advances in signal processing acoustic beam forming techniques, and sensitivity.

We believe thatoviet quieting and sonar signal processing would,e more than offsd by new improvements in the Polaris program. The programmed sonar improvements of thewill enable it to increase itsdvantage in covert trailing attempts by class submarines.

Two nrw classes oflau- -will be ready for operation later this year. They probably will have at least thc detection capabibties of thc C-lass, and could now have thecapabilities projeded above asfor thc C-lass.

A vigorous quieting program couldthe Sovieu nearly to match US quieting achievements by the end of theetermined effort to improve both sonaraod processing could, by lhe, also result in considerably improvedSome quieting and sonarcould be brought together, as early as the,ew advanced attackEven with the improvementsfor the end of the decade, however,

J new Soviet submarine could not gain an L ver Polaris sufficient/"

Jto give any significant proUbtuly of

maintaining covert trail for an extended period

of patrol.

Surface Ship Syileins

new cruixer-class. now underand Ihe new Krivak-dassuradergolng sea trials, are almostwith one of the new generation



The new cruiser will probablyower frequency sonar, like those of the Moskva, while the Krioak is likely to have the sonar carried by the Kresta-II. The do-sign of the latter sonar probably will permit the refitting of most of the older ASW ships.

eploymenlew ASW helicopter ship is estimated by the. It probably will be fitted with improved sonars based upon detailed evaluation of experience with the present Moskva-class ASW helicopter ships. This new ship probably wouldew ASW helicopter with improved station keeping, signal processing, and weaponscapabilities.

dvanced sonars and long-range ASW guided missiles will probably emerge in theo give surfaceignificantly improved attack capability. Coordinated ASW helicopter operations could further extend the search and attack range. The trend in surface force development has been to provide each ASW task group the ability lo operate beyond the umbrella of Jand-based air, by providing surface-to-air and surface-to-surface guided missiles for defense against both air andattack, while extending thc range of Its own ASW sensors and weapons. By the, we expect lo see open-ocean ASW task groups capable of carrying outsearch and attack operationsegular basis.

Andiobmotinc Warfare Aircraft Syrtcmi

he May anti Mad aircraft provide the Soviets with medium-range airbornefor both coastal and open-ocean ASW operationsew selected areas out to. There is some evidence that these aircraft employ new sonobuoys. and possibly electro-optic systems, although details at this time are ambiguous. The new Bear ASW air-craft has sufficient range to participate in ASW

operations thousands cf miles from its bases. It has an increased payload capacity for sensors and weapons, but we do not know how this aircraft is equipped for search and attack. Large numbers of Bear aircraft would bo required to achieve andignificant threat to FBM submarines.

The Soviets have become increasingly concerned with the development of moored acoustic buoy systems. Improved systems are likely although fhe efforts to date have not been impressive. The widespread sowing of moored buoys would provide surveillance of substantial portion! of the Norwegian Sea Basin, and the northeastern Atlantic, into the closed Mediterranean Sea. Such systems would rignificantly improve theof ASW aircraft capable ofthe system, though the exploitation of contacts would probably require an improved air-dropped sonobuoy system.

Although we cannot, at this time,specific airborne sensor developments. Soviet activity in this field is of sufficient scope to clearly indicate continuedof ASW aircraft over the next decade. The appearance of Ihe new ASW Bearthat the Soviets intend to concentrate on sensor performance, area coverage, and aircraft payload. Late in the decade, themayuch more advanced ASW aircraft system.

Fixed Aceuillc Arrcyi

acoustic array systems willimproved. Tlic deployment of firedarrays at locations remote fromcould be made possible byin underwater cable technologyto those made recently by the US.success inevelopment couldfrom the geographical constraintsface in deploying such systems. Such


have the advantage of constantof Urge ocean areas, though their effectiveness varies greatly depending ooradiated noise, and ocean floor and water conditions. Tliey can provide only the general locationontact, and eachmust be exploited by seaborne or airborne systems. An acoustic tubtnartne detection lyi-tem, able to consistently detect ballistic missile submarines on station at ranges beyondhousand miles, is not likely even withimprovements in Soviet sensorIn the coming decade.

Non-Acoustic Sensor Developments

on-acoustic detection methods seek to exploit the physical changes in the ocean medium causedubmarines passage through it, or any radiations from theItself. These include such things as electromagnetic radiation from rotatingmachinery, heat, disturbance of the earth's magnetic field, or the creation ofwakes.

ur information on Soviet research on non acoustic detection Is extremely limited,

feel reasonably certain that the Soviets are mounting an intensive effort. [


he Soviets may have alreadynon-acoustic ASW sensor systems and. by thc, may deploy more. To the extent that the Soviets arc successful in thc field of non-acoustic sensors, thc result mightignificantly improved system for search of thc open ocean, f

^Though we mightaware that tlie Soviets were detecting US submarines with unexpected success^

jlhc development might comeechnologicalhere would of course, still remain the problem for theof incorporating these techniques into an effective counter to the US FBM force.

Tbo Use of Satellites in Antiwbmorine Warfare

t Is possible that, by tho end of the decade, satellites may be used us Integralof ASW systems. The most significant development to be anticipated Is the use of satellite relay systems to monitor mooredor possibly rrugneoc sensor, fields Though tbe use of satellites in low-earth orbit inole is possible, it would allow only sporadic monitoringargeof satellites were employed. The use of synchronous satellites, with very largewould, on the other hand,r.eans for the lOtitiuuotis surveillance of many buoyseal time return of data. The Soviets have yet toeostationaryand there is no evidence thoy are now working on such an ASW program. Systems

Leonard Weiss, for thend Research, Derailment ot State: Vice Acra. Nodhe Director. National Smearier Agency, and Rear Adm. Krederlcl J. Heillineer. 'he AsirK-ant Chief of Naval Operations {Intelliience),ol the Navy; believcf^


of technological surprise very unsTr Mr. Leonard Weiss, father believes that tht bsMlatsoa ot such a

neutralising the US mlunching nilminrxould Millajoreriod of levernl yeats. and doubts lhatuld comeurprise to lhe US.

TOP SECffiir


(he use of satellites lo search ocean areas for submarines directly with radar, laser, or infrared (IB) sensors, appear unlikelywithin the nextears.

Anlhotellito. In the coming decade, the Soviets will almost certainlyosted non-nuclear antisatellite capability based upon theirsatellite and ABM programs. As these two programs grow in sophistication and as ABM deployment is expanded, antisatellite capabilities will grow.eliablefor the non-nuclear disabling ofat synchronousm) is to be expected in thc, and any widospiead deployment of ABM defenses will increase the opportunities for attacking safe!-sites in low-earth orbit. Inaser system capable of producing physical damage to the film, the optical system, andeconnaissance satellite could be available for use by the. Tbeforce models developed below do not treat antisatellite capabilities specifically, as they arc basically the same in every case. In 'hose models which include extensive ABM deployment, these capabilities wiU beenhanced.

E. The Illustrative force Models

This section presents four illustrative force models for strategic defense which thc USSR could adopt under differing policy objectives. The key assumptions, and force rationale and composition, for each of the forces is set lorth, as well us the Implications of the several forces for Soviet strategic defense. Section Fwhich of these illustrative courses of aciion are more likely lhan others.

An Appendix loivesforce model projections ofweapon systems.

The alternative force developments present possible directions thai Soviet strategic defense forces could take. It should bethat none of the Force Models wiU be composed of the particular weaponsin the precise numbets listed. They arc intended only to be ilhsstrative models oftrends and differing emphases. Forplanning purposes, lhe reader should consult the Defense Intelligence Projections for Planning

Four illustrative force models arebelow. Each is based upon different assumptions about key variables such as policy goals, technological progress, coverage requirements, and available resources wliich influence Soviet strategic defensive

Illustrative Forcessumes that thoas expressed in aarms limitationaccept mutual deterrenceasis for continuing US-USSR relations. It projects little more than lhe completion of deployment programs now underway, although it provides for some improvements late in. Tbc keyof this force model turn on thc future of thc ABM deploymont program and the influence il has on subsequent airsystem deployment. The ABM islo be limited to an NCA defense around Moscow, ond Soviet planners oreto believe that air defenses elsewhere in' the USSR would be leftissile attack.esult, ihey are inclined to reduce future air defenseprograms alter completing those already in progress.

Force Model II makesassumptions about tlie Soviet ABM dc-


program but different ones about future air defense programs. In this model, Soviel planners continue to deploy additional airALT agreement limiting the size of the attacking bomber force, and other offensive forces, lead* the Soviets to believe that the air threat can now be managed.they may fear that Ihc agreement will collapse and want to hedge against this day with systems that arc not constrained. In the eventimited ABM defense is the result of technical difficulties and notagreement, they may expand airin anticipation of eventual success in tlieontinuing airprogram will find strong support with elements of Ihe Soviet military who have been associated with it in the past

nd Model II includeresearch program In the areasand ASW.

Illustrative Force Model III assumes thai strategic competition with the USabout as. it has In thc past, without any strategic arms agreements It alsothat the Soviets, as they have in the pavl. rely on damage-limiting strategicprograms as well as upon deterrence. Force Model III assumesrograms in the areas of ABM and ASW succeed enough to permit widespread deployment of thedeveloped. No attempt is made, however, tootal defense.

Force Model IVough upper limit for strategic defensive forces in termseacetime effort ii, as is likely, it should be coupledomparable effort in thc development and deployment of strategic offensive forces. The forces entailed in this model would constitute an attempt by thelo create strategic defense that could significantly limit damage from the responseoviet oounterfofec strike.orce

would strain Soviet technical, financial, and production capabilities. Even without such an all-out effort, however, particular systems could exceed tlte numbers projected in this force model.

n none of tbo force models have wc postulated that the Soviets willajor program aimed at upgrading deployed SAM systems for ABM defense. We believe it is unlikely that the Soviets will followourse under the assumptions whichthe force models. The reader Isto the section on the use of SAMs in an ABM role in Section III for discussion of the ABM potential of SAM systems.


Key Assumptions

e assume under this model that:

because of aarms limitationaccept mutual deterrenceasis for continuing US-USSR relations.

Soviets will decide not to deploy ballistic missile defenseserysystem-In the Moscow area.

SovieU will continue, but not ABM deployment.

on deterrence, the Soviets will recognize the extreme vulnerability of strategic air defenses In thc absence of effectiveABM defenses, and will not consider them necessary tourvivablcmissile retaliatory force.

will be no significant advance In ASW sensor development whichajor portion of Polaris or

Poseidon forces.


Force Rationale and Composition Missile Defense

n this model, national deployment of ABM defenses would not take place. Thewould, however, continue ABM BAD and would be alert to tbe possibilities of major technological improvements that might alter the strategic balance. ABM efforts wouldbe directed toward the qualitative impiovcmcnt of NCA defenses to betterthem to cope with the threat ofor provocative third country attack. The nature of specific improvements to NCA defenses may be affected by the specific terms of an arms limitation agreement. Were tho Sovieis not constrained by restrictions on qualitative improvements, however, lhaimprovements appear likely, a.5

incorporation oflements into the Moscow defenses. The large Try Add dish radars will be replaced with stcerable phased-an ay radars Should there be no hrn-itation on the number of large radars allowed, new long-range acquisition and tracking ra-dan will be added.

developmentoiter modebased upon the propulsion flcubility of the Calosh missile.

addition of any radars or missile launchers needed to expand the Moscowto tlie maximum size allowed by aarms limitation agreement. U.0

of Moscow defenses in theof any NCA-level ABM agreement.

Air Defense

efense against bomber aircraft would be only marginally effective in limitingto tbe Soviet Unionuclear exchange

because air defense weapons systems would themselves be severely degraded by an earlier ballistic missile strike. Nevertheless, theof air defense programs already In progress. Soviet institutional rigidities and So-viet preoccupation with the formidable US aircraft threat would assure continuing airdeployment for awhile- Failure toABM defenses could leadradual de-emphasis of strategic defense near the end of the decade In this event, some of the more difficult technological problems associated with gearing air defenses to cope with the problems of low-altitude attack and advanced ASMs would not be addressed. Soviet airwould continue to be adequate tothe USSR from third country attacks which do not include significant ballisticforces. Changes in existing air defenses would include the following:

a. Thcndrograms would be completed byout gaps in the air defense barriers andew more key targets.

b Many existing SAM batteries would bo modified and their performance

ystem aroundwould be phased out

olderFan Songthe widely deployedystemdeactivated around many peripheralpriority targets, but thc latestremain in high priority areas.

Foxbat interceptor would boonly in limited numbers. Somewould be phased out.

would be no increase in theof AWAC aircraft

g Efforts to defend against low-altitudekey air defense problem of the



continue. Only limitedwould be gained in this area, however. By the, some inrpiovoments would appear in the formlightlynumber of EW air surveillance sites located across tbo approaches to key target areas and continuing emplacement of new equipment on existing sites.

o new strategic SAM prototype Istested currently at the testituation which argues againstew SAM system for the strategic defenses during the. As we assume declining Soviet air defense efforts throughouteriod, no new SAM islater in the period either, even though there is adequate timeevelopment program,

Antisubmarine Warfare

Motivation fur the expansion andof ASW forces would remain high and these forces would continue to esrpandffort- loapability toajor portion of US ballistic mis-silo submarine forces at sea will be limited, however, because of the apparent difficulties of the problem and the threat of ULMSwhich could negate such aeven if developed- The forces available5 would enable the Soviets to continue to deploy ASW groups in the Mediterranean, Norwegian, and Philippine Seas, and possibly in tho Indian Ocean This capability could protect the operations of Soviet fleets and serve to inhibit the free movement of Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean Sea, andIn the Norwegian Sea. Open-ocean ASW capabilities would remain marginal, however.

The principal Improvements tn ASW forces would include the foOov/ing:

a. There would bo improvement in the technology of ASW, but no dramatic devel-

opments in the improvement of sensors for submarine detection.

coastal acoustical arrayscompleted in the Barents Sea and inPeninsula, and Kurilebut these would not bePolaris submarine operations.

rogram of quieting Sovietwould be undertaken which would improve their perforrnance somewhat, but willby thc end of theenable them to trail US ballistic missilecovertly.

d. Continuation of naval constructionbut with major ship starts slowing in the, would result in an ASW loice of abouttatojWi andubmarines,orce would permit formation of aboutSW search-strike units, about two thirds of which could be available at one time.

would Increase in thoto Include new classes ofand destroyers.

In-plications for lhe Strategic Defenwi

key problems of strategicmissile attack,penetration, ornothe composition of the Sovietthoir over-all capabilities wouldonly slightly: and the USSRvulnerableS retaliatoryThc combined strategic defensesfewer resources in theeliance may be put uponlimitationsasis fordeterrence, and the lack of anwould inhibit expansion in otherdefense programs.

orce inprograms are completed, but no new

ones are introduced, except in the ASW forces. Itough lower limit on possible Soviet defense choices, and would be atwith Soviet behavior in the past where large defenses have been considered necessary, even if not totally effective. To date, such defenses have been acquired steadily.


Under this force model wo have again assumed that the Soviets would not deploy the ABM beyond the Moscow area. They would, however, improve and expand it slightly, particularly later in the period,Model I, the Soviets, under this oltortui-live, would continue to build up their airsystem, particularly against ASMs which pose forubstantial threat- They would also continue research in the field of ASW sensors.

In this model, assumptions match those of Forcexcept that:

Soviets actoncern lhat aircraft-delivered, stand-off weapons might threaten their retaliatory forces, despite any armsarrangements that might be in effect.

vigorous Soviet efforts, particularly in the development of improved ASWwould take place, but still would not produce advances in ASW sensorwhich would permit effective open-ocean operations against enemy submarine*

Force Rationale and Composition Missile Defense

s in Force Model I. there would be no national deployment of ABM defenses.components of the Moscow ABM defenses would be improved and upgraded. Vigorous BAD would continue in the ABM field, but it

would not result in such an improvement in the protection afforded by an ABM system as to cause tbc Soviets to abrogate anyarms limitation agreement, or tonation-wide ABM deployment.

Air Defense

n this model, Soviet programs for air defense would continue vigorously throughout the decade. Emphasis would be placed on defense against low-altitude attack by both aircraft and advanced ASMs, the key airproblems of.

ecauseore vigorous air defense program, some differences with Ihcachieved by Forceould:

ndrogramsut in greaterin Force Modelout gap*barriers and defending more key targets.

ystem aroundprobably not be phased out

c As before, some older units of tlie widely deployedystem would bearound many peripheral and low priority targets, but the latest models would remain in high priority areas. Many existing SAM batteries would be modified and their performance upgraded againsi ASMs.

ew, long-range, low-altitude SAM would be deployed in limitedround key local ions. Wider deployment might not be undertakeneliable low-altilude defense capability can bo given lo interceptor aircraft. The new SAM wouldow-altitude capability equal to. or better lhan. thai of the0 feet or less) a; ranges greater than now possible. (The maximum Intercept range could be as much as)


Foxbat interceptors would be deployed into Ibe. Older model aircraft would be retained in the force ingreater numbers than in Force Model I. Deployment patterns of interceptors would continue to emphasize defense of the west-em USSH.

against low-altitude aircontinue. Advanced interceptorwould receive downward lookingand complementary missiles, buttbc.

surveillance capabilities wouldfor low-altitude coverage. Butthc, this improvementlake the formlightlyof EW air surveillance sitesthc approaches to key target areas,continuing emplacement of newat existing sites. Equipped with aof detecting targets over land,AWACS wouldnd be an effective andsubstitute for the furtherof land-based iadars- Sufficientwould be deployedomeWACS aircraft Onperiods of crisis. Major AWACSwould include the Baltic andcoastal areas, and possibly theareas, the Bering Strait, andmaritime provinces.

Antisubmarinea re

ore vigorous effort to develop an anti-FBM submarine ASW capability isunder this model, though solution of the problem Is still likely to elude thc Soviets. Despite this, greater improvements lhanwould be made to Soviet ASW forces. Forces available5 would enable the Soviets lo deploy ASW groups in theNorwegian Sea, Indian Ocean, lbc approaches to the Sea of Japan, Ihc Philippine

Sea. and possibly the West European basin in the North Atlantic. Despite the lackong-range submarine detection system, ihe Soviets could patrol small areas of the ocean.apability could protect the operations offleets and serve to inhibit free movement of Polaris-type submarines in theSea. Their ASW capability in the open ocean would remain marginal, however.improvements would include:

hydroacoustic arrays wouldin the Barents Sea, and inPeninsula, and KurileIn addition, Ihe Soviets wouldmoored sonobuoy systems whichdeploy in several locations.

submarine quieting program,like that of Force Model I. would

naval constructionresult in an ASW forceestroyers andircraftforce would allow the formation ofASW search-strike units, aboutwhich could be available at oneof the force in thcould include new classes ofand destroyersew classcarrier.

5 wouldas the ASW force grew to aboutunits. Larger ASWadd little to Soviet open-oceanwithout significant sensor

Implications for the Strategic Defenses

hc key problems of strategicmissile attack, low-altilude air penetration, and ASW, would not be solvedhc composition of the Soviet forces and their over-all capabilities will have changed



by then, but the USSR wouldvulnerableS retaliatory missile strike.

programs for thenhanced capability againstair attack, would be deployed; butthe only critical area in whichbe discernible. Even here the airare subject to disruption by missileThe combined capabilities of thedefenses would continue to grow, even though thc force levels


We assume that the forces in Force Mode! Ill would resultoviettoignificant investment in ABM defenses whiht continuing to improve air defenses and ASW. Although these forces would not reflect an all-out arms race,resources would be devoted to stra-tegic defense.rograms would accompany the deployment of defensivein all strategic areas.

In distinction lo the other models, we assume under this one that;

ABM deployment would follow an improvement in Soviet ABM radar and


fforts in ASW sensors could produce improved capabilities toward the end of the decade.

new low-altitude interceptor,ersion of the Flogger, is deployed with the strategic defenses

advanced long-range all-weatheris introduced

Forco Rationale and Composition Miulla

A follow-on ABM systemomposed of components currently undergoing tests at SaryTop Roost phased-array radar (Chekhovhe steer-able pbased-array radar,odifiedbe available forwhich could begin in23 period. These components would probably be deployed at Moscow to fill out defenses there which were started in theut never finished. These complexes could be operationalhe extent of deploy, ment to other areas beyond Moscow would depend upon the effectiveness and cost of the follow-on system, and probably upon thc possibilities for hardening its componentsthe level now attained.

A follow-on ABM system, emplaced in areas other than Moscow, could be deployed in several different patterns, depending on the Soviet view of the threat and theof theedoubt in Ihe northwesterntrstegrated system of mutually Supporting firing positions at Lenin grad, Moscow, andbeThe Soviets might see thisdefense, employed in conjunction with improved ASW,oans of limiting the damage to the key Administrative and control centers of the USSR it the price of leaving the rest of the country unprotected. Inwithefense, they wouldsee the needigh acceleration ABM. of the Sprint typend deploy it along with the long-range Calosh.

On the other hand, the Soviets may believe lhat the follow-un ABM system,because of its lack of hardness, is not equal to this task, and deployight area defense of larger regions in the western USSR.efense would provide some


top sccret-

ight attack or accidental launch, but would lequirc greater expansion of the largo acquisition and control radarthanoncentrated defenseedoubt area. It could provide lightiriBf' in seven key target areas such as Leningrad.orkiy, Dnepropetrovsk, Kiev, and Minsk, and would cost about the same as the redoul* defense.

Air Defense

ntensivo Soviet programs for airwould continue throughout the decade, as they have in the past- As En Force Model IL defense against bombers flying at lowand armed with new ASMs. would be stressed. a* would improvements to counter offensive electronic warfare capabilities. In general, the improvements made in air defense would be somewhat greater than those of Force Model II. and the competition forwould be keener:

Soviets would continue toand Flagon interceptors intowhile taking some ol theirout of service. Tho Foxbatwould not be deployed Ingreat as previous interceptors. Theon the other hand, would replaceall-weather fighter on aAn improved interceptor, perhapsof the Flogger, wouldew designn the interim prior toook-down/shoot-downsystem.

new long-range, low-altitude,would be deployed moreunder Force Model II, the resultdelays attributable todeploymenl and to thean interceptor with improvedcapabilities. Wider deployment might

occur should the Soviets fall to develop an effective advanced AWACS and aircraft capable of intercepting targets at low altitudes.

Antiiubmorine WoHoro

SW technology would Improve.sensors for submarine detection could occur late In the decade, but would affect force levels and capabilities only slightly priororces availablen Force Modelthe Soviets toASW groups in the Mediterranean,Sea, Indian Ocean, the approaches to the Sea of Japan, the Philippine Sea, and possibly the West European basin In tho North Atlanticonger range submarinepossible either by the development of remotely emplaced fixed arrays, or by the granting of extraterritorial emplacement rights toould be able to moreemploy their forces in the several ocean areas. To make effective use of these arrays, forward basing rights for both ships andwould be required. This could hamper Polaris units and necessitate an expansion of existing patrol areasounteraction. The improvements achieved would include the following:

a.resent naval construction would result In an ASW force of aboutestroyers andsome of which could be fast, quiet attack boatsew class,ircraft.orce would allow the formation of aboutSW search-strike units, about two-thirds of which could be available at one time During the5ome new classes of ASW ships and aircraft would be introduced with improvedsystems. This could include aboutast, quiet attack submarines.


igorous quieting program mighl be undertaken which would reduce the noise levol of new Soviet submarines, appearing late in the decade, lo nearly (hat of USReliable covert brail would still not be possible without tha improvement of Soviet passive sonarevel well beyond that achieved by the US- Such aain this period is unlikely.

Ifflplkoliofu 'or tho S'rotcg!. Forces projected in Force Model III would diminish the threat of ballistic missile attack and low-altitude penetration by bombers with ASMs. Although the comand capabilities of the Soviet forces would have changed somewhat, the improved forces would remain vulnerable to USmissile strikes using multipleand advanced penetration aids.

he ADM deployment which occurred would provide only limited defense against missile attack. Because the ABM defenses have hmited capabilities, the air defenses are still subject to disruption by missile attack.ABM deploymentignificant scale would tend to draw resources from airprograms unless the over-all level of effort were increased. The combined strategic defenses would continue to grow through tberograms directed at ABM and ASW sensor improvementsigh level throughout the decade


his foice modeligorous resumption of the arms race, including the wide deployment of an ABM system designed to protect key areas of the USSReavy US attack. Extensive efforts also would be made in air defenses and. as in Force Model II. deploymentew SAM and new

supersonic interceptor would occur.improvement in the number of ASWwould take place, as well as theimprovements of the previous force models. Forward basing rights for ships and aircraft would he necessary to best use the available forces.

This force wouldough upper limit for Soviet defensive forces in terms ol effort thc Soviets might expend during peacetime. Even with careful scheduling, the force levels entailed, although achievable, would strain known Soviet productionas well as thetr technical and financial resources.

We assume uniquely under thisthat:

vigorous arms race characterizes the basic strategic relationship between the US and thc USSR during the coming decade.

significant advance in ABM sensor technology would occur, making reliable, nation-wide ballistic missileealistic possibility. (Thisifferent ABM system than previously assumed.)

fforts in ASW sensors could produce improved capabilities toward thc end of the decade.

Force Ralionole and Composition

Missile Defense

he absence of an agreed limit on ABM deployment, and significantin ABM effectiveness, would probably lead to an AUM deployment throughout the Soviet Union. We assume thatrogram, when completed, would emphasize protection of aboulrincipal Soviet target areas, nnd wouldignificant poet ton of the Soviet strategic offensive force.


paceational deploymentwould depend upon the tirning of needed technological advances. If significant advances have been made in the development of new ABM component) under development at Sary Shagan, an entirely new typo of ABM system may be fielded by thc Soviets in the comingears- The Top Roost phascd-amy radar, with its separate pulsed radar incorporated into the receiver, may well be able to perform all thc acquisition and engagement tasks required of the system. In this case, the steerable phased -array radar would not be required.ofystem could start within the nest two years.he first complexes would become operational at Moscow where much of the radar and communicationsalready exists. Systems deployed to other locations without the radar andbase of Moscow would become operationalater time, and the entirecould be operational In the.

Although there is no firm evidence ofnitial deployment ofissile is projected in the latter part ol thc decade. It is assumed that this missile Is used in conjunction with the Calosh and the Top Roost radar used in the rest of tbe system.

Air Defense

As the prospects for an effectiveABM system grow, air defensein general would be pursued more vigorously. As before, emphasis would be placed on defense against bombers attacking at low altitudes and on the counters toelectronic warfare capabilities. The achievements of this program would beabove those of Force Model III.

Sufficient AWAC aircraft would be deployed5 to supportn patrol continuously for short periods. Major AWACS

operating areas would includo the Baltic and Barents Sea coastal areas, and possibly the southwestern areas, tbe Bering Straits, and the for eastern maritime provinces.

Antisubmarine Warfare

this force rnodd we assumewould be vigorous improvementtechnology as in Force Model III,efforts might acquire navalin such locations as the Indianwestern coast of Africa, theor the Caribbean, from whichsearch-strike units could be deployedpoints, like the Straits of Gibraltar,lanes leading to Polaris bases.forces could severely hampermovements in such restricted waters.

forces would expand wtthof new classes ofand aircraft. An increase ofconstruction programs could resultASW force of aboutandubmarines,hese forces couldquiet attack boatsew class,antisubmarine cruisers, andlong-range aircraft.nits could be formed fromforce, two-thirds of which could beat one time. Forward basing rightsand aircraft would bo necessary tothc available foices.if supported byundertake searchin the open ocean, increasingof the detection of currentile subrnarines.

n50ajor effort would be made to Incorporateimprovements into existing vessels. New construction would be somewhat reducedhift in force composition toward advanced atiack submarines would occur.


(oi Ihe Strategic Defonses

Significantmprovement in ABM venters and the deployment ofABM defenses would give impetus to the increased deployment of other defensive systems Resource constraints would require that some programs be scheduled more slowly than would be the case with lessEven so. substantial progress Inagainst intercontinental ballistic rrussile attack, row-altitude air attack, and submarine-launched missile attack, would be made.

Heavy strategic defensesariety of Soviet offensivefrom deterrence to strategic superiority. Depending on their over-all effectiveness, particularly that of the ABM, defenses at these levels couldritical difference in the US deterrent in circumstances where the USSR mightre-emptiveattack.

strategic defenses posited Inare expensive, butcquisition of the aboveand of large offensive forces,the extensive redirection ofand military programs. Hardestprobably be consumer programspurpose military resource aUocation withinSoviet concerns wiih NATO.thc Middle East, andand the momentum ofin progress, minimize themassive new defensive andwill develop simultaneously fn

F. Likely Soviet Courses ofc do not consider either of thelimiting casesnd IV) toikely Soviet course ol action. It seemsthat if the US went ahead with

something like its programmed forces, the Soviets would accept the deterioration in their strategic position Implicit in Force Model I. Their historical interest in strategic defense Is likely to continue, evenossible arms control agreement limiting ABM defense to the national capital area. They are likely, if only out of tho momentum of ongoing RocD and production programs, to devote more effort to strategic defense than the level of effort represented by Force Model I, although they have been concerned to hold down military spending.

n rhe other hand, we consider itthat tho Soviets will wish to make the effort represented by Force Model IV, except possibly in responseS force buildup well beyond that depicted above asprobable Soviet perceptions of the threat. This would be particularly true in the likely ease that they would wish to parallel the high effort in strategic defensearallel effort in strategic offense. We think the Soviets would consider the combined costs of high strategic offensive and defensive programs too heavy, and the requisiteof other program* too groat.

We think that. In absence of on arms control agreement on the one hand, or astep-up in tho arms race on the other hand, something like the level of effort and technical progress represented by Force Model IIIikely Soviet course of action. This force would maintain, and In some areas improve. Soviet capabilities against their probable view of the Ukety throat. It could probably lie done without straining Sovietmore than does the current level of effort In actuality, the Soviets could achieve something less than this, or something more than this, depending on specific developments in specific forces and weapon systems.

If there were toocripcehcmive arms control agreement, limiting both Soviet


top oB&ter-

defense ind US offensive forces to something like current levels, wc think the level of effort and technical progress, like those represented by Force Model II.ikely Soviet course of action. It wouldmaintaining, and in some areas improving, Soviet capabilities for strategic defense under conditions in which the threat did not grow appreciably, and do thisost not much different from the current level of effort.

hese force models are necessarilyThey represent levels of effort, and show in general our view of what the Soviets might do with regard to developments in specific weapon systems aod forces under these levels of effort. They are presented as

illustrative courses of action, in the full awareness that our confidence in thedeclines as they move further into the future, and that the Soviets are certain in the course of thcrears to embark on some strategic programs of which wehave little or no inkling As in the past, tho Soviets will doubtless make strategicdecisionsear-to-year basis, and their forces will grow and change in gradual increments, in response to their view at the time of the balance hetwecn their view of the threat, technological developments in weapon systems, resource and bureau eroticand thc general national policy aims of the leadership.




limit' Missile1 ate lltii n.ystems

Radare (Hutilw of



Redoubt Delcnsne

(Number of

* -mu


Terminal iBtereeplor (Launchen)


Western USSK Aria Defease


Reelonal Radars

Missile &ta Radars...


Um: MoM IVcagesient Radars

(Nnsnber ef Antennas)

Long-Its uRt110

I LsUI '

(Abo current. Moscow dcfeiiirs indicated above).


Srsleuu (Operational Sites]

Older Systems



Interceptor fly sterna

Older Model*


Flaron A


Advanced All-Weaiher Interceptor

Air Surveillance It&dnri*



Total Site*



WnnHiiB and Control Radar*

Plat Jack (Mora AW AO

Number of Radar*

Overland Re-dar

Number nf Redan.

ASW System*

Majce ASW Snrfaea Ship*








OuW ASW Surface Ship*




Older AlUek Unite







Dleael Attack Sub matinee

Older UnlU










; : : ;


Porce Model II

he basis. Possible SALT agreement limlUng ABM. Gradual decline In strategic defense allrr em rent program* ceo pie tod.

No development In AIIM technology to

make It effective against heavy attack.

NCA defense only, retrofitted with new

component* under development al Sary Shagan

No orcrlond AWACS capability developed. Mom AWAC kept at eurrenl levab.

Noown capabilityalthough work continued on |L

Mutual detcrreoee is >be basil Possible SALT agreeaBenl liaUUeg; offeeeiveand ABM. SovieU see opportunity to improve air defense against limited offensive forces.

No development in AIIM technology loftecUve againit heavy attack. NCA defense only. reUtsflUed with irsunder development at Sary Shagan.

AWACS with capability lo look-downperaUonalvenatrol area* In Baltic, and BarerU Seas in weal, and Bering Strait and maritime provincei in the eaet. Look-down air intercept radar developed5 with complementaryetrofitted Intoquadron* of Foxbat deployed along key approach roules.

new interceptors deployed, bui Foxbat doca get retrofit of new weapons systemS. Some older nircrafi would be phased out rapidly.

Sonar ranges improve, but ara not adequate for long-range detection No remote fay-dreacnesUc system

ASW force capabilities improve In local area* around Soviel littoral. MedlUrra-nestn, and in selected areas of Atlantic, Pacific, and Norwegian Sea. wh-re ASWusut* opera le

Submarine quieting program permit* In-ci potential to trail US HIM sub-marina* exiting

Enough new ASW rruuera and destroyer*

to lorm cp to IH ASW search group* by

ew ASW helicopter and hcheopler ships.

Current SAMs modified throughout decade for impiored performance. Improved ECCM. Bctlererformance against small high speed targe ti.

Sonar improve, but are not adequate for long-range detection.

ASW force capabilities Improve in local areas around the Soviet littoral, Mediterranean, snd In selected areas of Atlantic. Pacific.Nerwesnenger lercsahroe clen search wide* areastlanlic. Padlic, and Indianubmarine quieting program permit* lit-ereaiud potential to trail US HIM sub-mat ine* *nting baaes.

Enough ne* ASW cruisers end destroyers to

form up loSW search groupsow ASW helicopter and helicopter ships.



Force Model IV

ranpfKMp with tbe US conlisoci wilKoulagreement* limiting weapons Vigorousrogram* produce systems successful enough lo warrant widespread deployment.

ABM technology develop* sufficiently Io warrant further deploymenlS la ether right defensewestern USSR ot heaner defense, using Sprlct-lype Interceptor, for Morcow-LeninirBd-Gorkiy arru.

New AWACS wiifi capability tn look down over land operationaloven lOpaUolareea in Bailie and Barest* Sea, in lhe watt, and Bering Strait and maritime proTiaee* It, lha out.

Look-down air Interest radar developed alter 1BTS wllh complementary shoot-down missile system. Retrofitted intoquadrons of Foioel deployed alone; forward approach route*.

Interiminterceptor could be available by

f adoptedurrent design like Flogger,Ion dnir.n* currently being lasted. Aboulquadrons could cover forward arose end keyto the Soviet heartland.aevafleed all -oalfcer interceptor i* latradared In the

SAM developed by IB7S. Deployed

to defend aboutey locations.

Current SAMs modified throeghoul dread* for lm> proved performance Improved ktO la prcsroc* of electronic jamming in all areaa of SAM coverage Hellererformance small high ipirri Inrgeta.

Sonar rnoees improve, but are noi adequate lor long rang* detection

ASW force capabilities improve In local areas around iho Soviet littoral, Mediterranean and Norwegian Sens. Larger lorco* than those ofanwider arena in Atlantic. Paeillc, aod Indian Oceans

Submarine quseUng programncreasedal loS TDM submarine* eaiUng base* Nc-quiot submarine Introduced Ino patrol Polnri. transit areas; up tovailable

Koough new ASW cruisers and destroyers to form up loSW search group* byew ASW hrl>-cepler aad beliropler (hip*.

h vigor, no agreements llmitiag weapons; tuceeestul HAD programs produce new systems winch warrant widespread deploymenl.

New phased-array radar used a* ABM acquisition aad engagement radar at each com pies. Sprint-lype intcrcepVirs supplement Galosh in the lataat high value targoto. Widespread deploymenl covers the Urals and the west.

New AWACS with capability lo look-down over land operational0 coven IS patrol area* in Baltic, aad Barente Seas in the wast, aad Bering Slrail aad eastern man Urn* province. In the east; lo work with Foxbat and new interceptor.

Look-down air intercept radar deployed5 with complementary .hoot-down missile Ilelro-lilted intoquadroni of Postal deployed along forward approach routes particularly in tha north-weal. An advanced all-weatherntro-deeed in the.

Interim low.alutude interceptor could be avallabl*2 if adoptedurrent design like Kloggor. or5 II baaed on designs currently being tested. Aboutquadrons could cover forward areas and key approaches to the Soviel heartland.

New tow-allltude SAM developedefend aboutey locations.

ystem upgraded loapability against SRAM, and kept at three-fourth* of current

Current SAMs modtficd throughout deeadi farperformance. Improved kill ia presence of electronic jamming In all area* of SAM coverage. Bettererformance against small high speed targets.

Sonar ranges improve, but are not adequate forrange detection. Remot* hydroneouiiieew cable technology In Green-

land Straits. Moored buoy* are also available

ASW force Increases caps'iliUiin local arose around Soviet littoral, Mediterranean, Caribbean, andSeas. Larger force* than Model III can search mar. urea* of Allanuc, Pacific, and Indian Ocean*.

Submarine quirting program permits increasedto trail US FBM lubmatlnca calling bases. New nuiei eubmaiine introduced in lOT* lo paUol Polaris transit areas, up lo 2fi unit* available

Enough new ASW cruisers and dealroyera to formear tn strike group*ew ASWard Kettcopter carrltrsS.




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