1
WARSAW PACT FORCES FOR OPERATIONS IN EURASIA
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.. S
CONTENTS
. DISCUSSION .
I. EVOLUTION OF SOVIET FORCES AND STRATECY FOR
OPERATIONS IN
Period
Nuclear
II. WARSAW PACT CAPABILITIES IN fl
Soviet View of the Initiation and Nature of War ia 0
Pact Forces Available for Use Opposite NATO fa0
Forces Available
Mobilizationja,
Forces Available after Mobilization and15
Strategic Reservesm
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f
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Page
C Initial Conventional Stare of War in16
Concept of OperatiOfU
Theater Warfare17
Theater18
Naval Warfare19
Conventional War in
War in Europe
Concept22
Nuclear Strike in23
Naval Strikes
Nuclear War in
UL SOVIET CAPABILITIES IN
A. Tho Sujo-Sovief28
B: Force Posture Oppoiito
Mc^ilization and Reuiforcemeat
C Force Capabilities
Capability to Defend32
Capability to Attack33
IV. FUTURE FORCES
the Future
Genera] Considerations33
Inertia 34
Technological
Resource35
Ceograpby aod35
Precepbon of tbe
Strategic
of Modernization
Ia tbe Tneater37
Id Strategic Forces for Attack in37
In Cenrxa!Naval38
Alternative Force
CONTENTS OF VOLUME II
ANNEX A: WARSAW PACT THEATER FORCES
ANNEX li: WARSAW PACT GENERAL PURPOSE NAVAL FORCES
ANNEX C: THE SOVIET PERIPHERAL STRATECIC ATTACK FORCES
ANNEX D: READINESS. MOBILIZATION. AND REINFORCEMENT OF WARSAW PACT THEATER FORCES OPPOSITE NATO
ANNEX E: THE BUILDUP OF SOVIET FORCES ALONG THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER
ANNEX F: WARSAW PACT LOCISTIC SUPPORT
ANNEX C: SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR CHEMICAL AND BIOLOCI-CAL WARFARE
ANNEX H: WARSAW PACT COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
ANNEX I: COST OF ILLUSTRATIVE FORCE POSTURES
WARSAW PACT FORCES FOR OPERATIONS IN EURASIA
SUMMARY
Soviet forces for operations in Eurasia have changed considerably in structure, weaponry, and strategic doctrinehen the army constituted the main element of Soviet military power. Thehave assimilated nuclear weapons and doctrine, expanded their navy, improved the military effect) veness of their allies in Eastern Europe, and builtowerful military force along the border with. China.
In contracting their forces, the Soviets have evidently worked on the principle that, if war came, they would fare best bytrong capability to conduct offensive operations. Their current view of war in Europe seems torief period of conventionaluclear campaign. This campaign wouldassive nuclear attack on NATO forces, followed by the seizure of Western Europeew weeks. They maintain forces in forward areas immediately ready for combat; these arc designed to blunt anyttack and then seize die initiative. They are backed up with aand reinforcement system which the Soviets believe will enable them rapidly to raise and deploy the forces necessary to defeat NATO in Europe.
Available to the Soviets for operations in Europe withinours would beedium-range ballistic missiles, mtermediate-range
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ballistic missiles, submarine launched ballistic missiles, andballistic missiles (ICDMs) currently believed to be targeted against Europe, and about BOO medium bombers stationed inhere are now somearsaw Pact divisions in East Cermany. Poland, and Czechoslovakia that would be available opposite the Central Region of NATO. Of these,ould be essentially combat ready withinours from the startay. Thirty-seven of these are garrisoned near enough to the West Cerman border to form an initial force for use against NATO. On the flanks of NATO therearsaw Pact divisions which would be available inours, and thereirborne divisions capable of being immediately deployed. Aftereeks, someore divisions would probably bc available for operations against all of NATO, although we do not know whether they would or could be moved into forward combat areas within that time. Forces in all areas would be supported by tactical aircraftizeable portion of which arend major ground force units wouldactical nuclear capability. The Soviet Navy normally has aboutubmarines and IS surface ships on station in theand North Atlantic;eeks these numbers could be in-createdactor ofor further details concerning availability of forces seen pagend accompanying text.
Soviet doctrine callstrategic nuclear strike in Europe when NATO resorts to nuclear weapons et the tactical level. This doctrine has probably been adopted to prevent NATO from taking out Warsaw Pact aircraft and strategic missilesime of NATO's choosing, but it also presents problems on which Soviet military writings provide little guidance. We do not know, for example, whether the Soviets plan an mtercontinental nuclear attack on the US coincidentalassive nuclear attack in Europe. Some Soviet writers have considered waging nuclear war in Europe with tactical nuclear weaponsay which did not load to general nuclear war, but Ihe Soviets do not have a_ variety of low-yield nuclears comparable to that possessed by NATO. Thus, the limited tactical nuclear option does not now seem very promising. The Soviets have not preparedustained conventional war because they think it unlikely. If it should happen, they would have
' Far the vkwi of Mif. On. Ptuflipavidson, Anbtant Okf otto* iBteDifrocc DepuiBKf* at rfca Anny. Rear Adovfcaettc ol Naval la-.rUxpwt,of die Ni*y. uoi Brig. Gen. Edwud Ratiotich. Acting AaaMant CUrf ol Staff. lottOi-grace, USAF. toe theirn
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some problems, especially wiih logistics, (hough in time these could probably behe USSRilitary buildup along the Sino-Soviet border which continues lo this day. The initial impetus was defensive, but geography and Soviet military doctrine have apparently led the Soviets toorce structured and deployed for offensiveand they arc placing themselvesosition to initiate hostilities should they desire to do so. While there are someivisions in the Military Districts bordering on China and in Mongolia, only aboutf these are in tlic border area. Theseankslaunchers. Frontal Aviation providesin support of these ground formations. If all existing divisions were filled out. and the same level of support furnished as found in forward areas opposite the Central Region of NATO, Soviet troop strength would reach. Full strength Soviet forces on the order Just described, supported by bombers and provided with good air cover, could probably advance several hundred miles into Chinese territory and occupy large portions of the border provinces ofInner Mongolia, and Sinkiang; they could probably do this without resort to nudear weapons. But such operations would not destroy Chinese capabilities to wage war, and the Soviets would have to recognize the possibility of protracted hostilities.
There is no direct evidence concerning Soviet plans for the future composition and weaponry of forces. Some individual weapon systems can be projectedew years into the future, but the farther into the future one goes the less helpful is knowledge of currentThe problem of estimating future forces involves notense of the momentum and direction of on-going programs but also questions of possible changes in strategy and policy.
We expect Soviet ground forces to be modernized by movement into the forces of weapon systems currently in production and by newcoming along in thoow tank, more armoredcarriers, and more of current models of tactical missiles will be deployed. There will be more sophisticated tactical aircraft and better surface-to-air missiles. Major surface ship construction will continue to emphasize multipurpose ships. The surface fleet could changeduring,uch higher proportion being missile equipped New submarines will be predominantly nuclear powered. In
3
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the peripheral strategic attack forces, the new high-performancebomber will enter the force, and the introduction of missiles of ICBM range will probably continue.1
There could be upward or downward revisions in the overall size and composition of the force depending upon the Soviet perception of the threat or changes in Soviet objectives and in international relationships. There is. ofloor below which forces arc unlikely to go; this derives from geographical, historical, political, and ideologicalsuch as the length of the Soviet borders, the traditional fear of invasion, the desire to maintain domination in Eastern Europe, the overriding necessity to protect the homeland. Constraints of time and resources alsoractical ceiling on upward development. For the kinds and variety of forces we deal with here, there arelimits to what can be done in enlarging and re-equipping within the next six to eight years.
There are an almost irifinite number of possible Soviet force postures within those upper and lower limits. In the text, wc have chosen four alternative ones for purposes of Illustration. These are discussed innd accompanying Tables. Tabularaf force components are. of course,art of the picture; weaknesses or strengths in doctrine, tactics, training, command, and morale can modify the effects of numbers. We make no choice among the postures; this is partly because actual development of Soviet forces will depend upon policy choices made in the light of Soviet objectives and the developing world situation.
'For tho view,. Ceo. Phillipii. tan! Chief of Staff for lot-Jlip-noe, Department of tha Army; Rear Ado. Earl F. Rectanus, Director of NavalDepartment of tbe Navy; endeo. Edward Ratao-rfefc,niltant Chief of Staff. lotelllEeoce. USAF. eae theiro
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DISCUSSION
EVOLUTION OF SOVIET FORCES AND STRATEGY FOR OPERATIONS IN EURASIA
A. Prenudcor)
n the yean after World War II (he maisive Soviet Army was the main element of Soviet military power. It war deployedefend the periphery of tbe USSR, but waa concentrated primarily in tbe western USSR and eastern Europe. By it* accepted capability to teizc much of Western Europe by force, iteterrent against use by the US of its superior strategic nuclear power. In addition, it served as the most obvious instrument of Soviet control in EasternDuring the postwar yeaii under Stalin, although the Soviets were rushinguclear capability, their forces for operations In Eurasia were developed and deployed toon-Duclear war. Their 'doctrine for the fighting ofar was based oo the lessons of World War II; ft emphasized the use of massed infantry and artillery to break through enemy defenses, creating opportunities for exploitation by fast-
moving columns of armor. It appeared to ignore the nuclear threat
B. Early Nuclear
he Soviets had tested andstockpile atomic weapons, had toileddevice, and were in need ofand doctrine for nudear war.of Stalin in that year permitted adevelopment of this strategyBut it wasn'thenemerged as leader of tbe USSR,doctrine came into Its own.Khrushcheveans of buildingof Soviet power, nudear weaponsdominate all aspects of Soviet. War In Europe was seen as
, nudear from the start
initial nudear strikes, accordingevolving Soviet doctrine, were to beby bombers and tnissalcs againsttargets in Eurasia. By the earlySoviets hadormidablestrategic nudear attack on countries around
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periphery. An initial capability to attack with propeller-driven medium bomberiatomic bombs was followed by trie rapid growthet medium bomber forcethermonuclear bombi. Nuclear warheads were fitted to medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and to inter mediate-range ballistic missile?reas of deploymentthat the preponderant number of targets were in Europe, but substantialwas also made in the Far East
uring thehe Soviets began toactical nuclear capability. They stockpiled nuclear bombs suitable fordelivery by the tactical air forces. They deployed nuclear-capable free rockets over ground (FROCs) and short-range ballistic missiles under the control of the ground forces. With, nuclear rocket and missile forcesresponsibility for destroying stationary targets in the rear area, tactical nudear bomberi became primarily concerned with attacking nudear delivery means andof enemy troops. Tbe tactical air and artillery forces were reduced by more thanercent.
& Cowsirren'Jy with their assimilation of nudear weapons and doctrine, the theater forces were restructured to enable them tomore swiftly across Western Europe in the aftermath of initial nudear strikes. Instead of massed artillery and tanks, nuclear strikes were to be used to create gaps fo NATO's defenses and to destroy NATO reserves. Large tank forces were then to pass through these gaps, by-passifig or encircling any rematniag NATO forces. In general, the new structure favored mobility and rurvivabuity. Bothand support furors were streamlined, on the assumptionruick war reduced the need for staying power and for logistic support.
Beginninghe Sovietsthe con vers; on of their Eastsatellites into more effective military allies. The Warsaw Pact had been created5 in rcidion to West Ccrmany's entrance into NATO During its lust five years, it served largely as an instrument of political control over Eastern Europe and as acounterweight to NATO. In the, however, the East European armedthose of Poland andreorganized and re-equipped to conduct semi-independentoperations. The primary aim of the Soviets probably was to build up the military potential of their allies. They were simultaneouslysubstantial economies by reducing the size of their own ground and air forces.
At the same time that the theater forces were being equipped toudear war against NATO forces in Europe, Soviet naval strategy began to emphasize nuclear strikes On NATO carrier task forces in the open ocean io the initial stagesudear war. Thedeveloped, and in theastUhip cruise missiles for launching from submarines, surface ships, and aircraft-They also began to deploy new long-range torpedo attackat first, thenforWestern naval forces and sea lines of communicaboa.
These changes were made possible by technical advances in nodear weapons and in means of delivery. But the ultimate drive for streamlining the various forces foron tbe periphery of the USSR came from Khrushchev's desire to pay for the new nudear forces by cutting expenditures ooforces. Expenditures for forces forurasia were reduced from two-thirds of total expenditures for defense and
RET"
1
tstieiated (iptadiiutei tar Soviet farces 'or Dperatians la
military space2 toercentn the same period, expenditures for ground forces declined from less thanercent to aboutercent. (See
C. Recent.he Soviets have modified tbeir earlier view that any hostilities In Europe would either begin with, or very quickly escalate to, general nuclear war. They have come to accept tho possibility that at least the initial phasesar between NATO and the Warsaw Fact might be cooveDQooaL Recognizing tbe need for additionalfirepower to break through NATO's main defenses during the non-nuclear phase, the Soviets have strengthened their artillery. But they evidently do not expect that NATO would refrain from using nuclear weapons if the Pad succeededonventional offensive.
and have alto steadily incteaied theirof tactical nuclear weapons.
thai, once nuclear weapons Imvc been intrO' duced, the Soviets would employ them on whatever scale was necessary to achieve their military objectives. They evidently so far have not accepted the OS concept embodied in NATO doctrineeries of controlled andnutional steps from conventional war through nudear weapons of uKreasingly greater yields and numbers to general nuclear war. The Soviets believe that it would be very difficult, if not Impossible, to limit or control nuclear war once it begins, and characterize war in Europe as most likely remaining non-nuclear or escalating to use of strategic nuclear weapons. One of the reasons they do not holdlexible tactical nuclear strategy may be that they do not have some of tbeavailable to NATO at the lower end of the nuclear spectrum.
a for concern to the Soviet planner over the past five yean has been the need to0 blometers of border against the Chinese. The Chinese rebuffed the attempts of the new Soviet leadership5 to patch up the quarrel between the two countries, as they hadrejected Khrushchev's attempts to keepon-nuclear power. The Soviets have responded to Chinese hostility by steadily building up along tbe border force designed to assure Soviet victory in either nudear or conventional war, should one arise. The buildup has, thus far. been accomplishedappreciably drawing down tbe forcesNATO in Europe, although the border area has received preferential deployment of some new equipment
oviet naval capabilities fca support of peripheral operations have also continued to
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expandS. After the Arab-Israeli war7 the small Mediterranean squadron established4 began to conduct icgular anticarrier operations. In wartime thesquadron would attempt to counter the threat from US strike forces and to hinder NATO maritime support ol land operations in the Southern Region.5 naval air reconnaissance ol the sea approaches to the Soviet periphery grew with the addition of Bear aircraft to naval aviation. Theof thelass submarineimproved capabilities against carrier task forces and sea lines of communication.
he Czechoslovak crisisoncern over Soviet defenses on the Western periphery. The specter ofwithdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, which would haveaping bole in the Pact defenses, wasajorin the Soviet decision to Invade Czechoslovakia and reverse the course pitical developments in that country. Bya permanent garrison of five divisions in Czechoslovakia, the Sovleti have at one and tbe same time improved Warsaw Pact forward capabilities against NATO and improvedover Czechoslovakia. They have also worked toward strengthening the Warsaw Pact military organization by integrating more East European officers Into the combined head-quart en in Moscow, by improving combined procedures, and by conducting multinational eatresses.
e estimate that theseed deployments against China and in the Mediterranean, and increased conventional and nudear firepower amongachieved with an increase Infor forces for operations in Eurasia of only aboutillion,illion4illion0 These expeditures bavc. however, declined fromoer-
cent of total Soviet expenditures Tor defense and military space, largely because of rapidly growing expenditures for military research and development (It&D) and space in the total (Sec Figure
arsaw Pact forces for operations in Eurasia can best be described in terms of three major groupings by apparent role and
those in Eastern Europe and the western military districts (MDs) which appear to be earmarked for use against NATO;
those in the military districts bordering China and in Mongolia, which appear to be earmarked for use against China.
those In the interior regions of the USSR which could be used to reinforce either of the two main groupings, or to conduct operations on the flanks of NATO.
Pact forces in Europe are preponderantlyhowever. East Europeans makecontributions. The Soviet Navy andRocket Forces (SRFJ also support operations in Europe. The forces In Aria are exdusively Soviet They are supported by the Soviet Navy with its growing capabilities in the area. The Soviets have deactivated MRBM/IRBM sites In the Far East Coverage of strategic targets in the Far East is probably now provided by other strategic weapons systems.
he following two sections describe Warsaw Pact capabilities in Europe and Soviet capabilities Ln Asia. Soviet theater forcein the central part of the country are treated as possible reinforcements to the areas of primary Interest. Ditcuisloos of Sovietpurpose ground, air, and naval forces and of strategic forces appropriate for attack on Eurasia are found in Annexes A, B.ollowing the text Other Annexes discuss specific problem areas: reinforcement opposite
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NATO. Ihc buildup along the Chinese border, logistics support, capabilities for biological and chemical warfare, and Warsaw Pact command relationships.
il. Warsaw pact capabilities
IN EUROPE
ovier View of the Initiation ond Nature of Wor in Europe
udging by the development of Soviet military forces for operations in Europe, the essential goal of Soviet military planners is to defend Soviet interests by developing and maintaining the capability to conductoperations against NATO. Precisely how thear if it cameof course, be predicted, but someto Soviet thinking can be defined}
jhrar in
Europe beginsATO attack byforceseriod of tension. Once the war begins, Soviet forcesounter-offensive and rapidly penetrate NATO'sdefensive positions. NATO then resorts to tactical nuclear weapons. Thisassive widespread Pact nuclear attack on NATO forces, followed by an offensive that completes the seizure of Western Europeew weeks.
Neither the Soviet military posture nor plans appear to contemplate an attack by either side without at least some warning.eriod of tension during whicn preparations would be made by both sides. In any event, Warsaw Pact forces, in terms of both readiness and position, could achieve only limitedwithout buildup of forces and supplies.
All of the above having beenumber of important questions .arise. .Do the Soviet leaders really believeould, so. easily turnATO conventional assajiltij. Do they believe they could respondATO's
initiation of nuclear warfareull-scale nuclear assault upon Europe, without at the same time engaging in full-scale intercon-tincntal nuclear warfare? We do nor know the answers;are not subjects on which evidence is particularly helpful]
jsuggest that the Soviets believesuperior in conventional warfare, aSoviet planner must also have some reservations about the reliability andof his East European allies in allespecially since their support would be essential in the early stagesonflictdefending as he would have to upontroops rapidly mobilized fromstatus, the Soviet planner might also have reservations about the effectiveness of his own forcesituation involving rapid military movement against opposition and In which lines of communications are interdicted.
hat.is more important, however, is the qucstioQ of responding to NATO's actionsuclear assault upon Europe. There is no conclusive evidence!
^ USSR would automaticallyuclear strike against Europeudear strike against the US. But how could the Soviet leaders be sure .that the US, UK. or France wouldassive nudear strike anywhere in Western Europe without retaliating against the USSR itself? It would be clearly imprudent to plan on the Western Powers not doing so. This, then,trong inhibition against the deliberate initiation of hostilities in Europe by the USSR. It alsoagainstituation to develop In which large-scale hostilities become likely.
2Lmeats have made it quite dear that the Soviet leaders believe general nudear war would! .pose an eatremeJy grave danger to tbe survivallhe USSR itself and. toic on the* Teadersfare, prepared.To abandon interests or'
refrain from pressing policies limply from fear of militaiy conflict ot that they will not seek to me the size and existence ol iheir military power for whatever advantage they can Rain from it without too great risk. Tliry almost certainly will continue to do what they have been doing in the past, that is, lo probe for the amount of risk involved and to utilize force or the threat of force whenicve the mLt are manageable.
he Soviets recognize, of course, that they may miscalculate risks and thai theycontrol the behavior of their adversaries.
Similarly, they recognize that the course of events innicht require them to initiate hostilities ui oidor to secure their vital inter-csls. In any coir, tlicy uutlurx.ind that events coukl get hcy<md their control and involve risks they would prelcr not lo accept. In short, they recognize that war in Europe is possible even though it it their policy to avoid it.
B. Worsow Poet Forces Available for Use Opposite NATO iniven the possibility of war in Europe. Soviet military planners have taken steps with-
iosUej:enlral Region ol^NATO
in Iho resources allowed lhan to prepare for il. They maintain In forward area; forces im mediately ready for combat; these are designed toATO attack and then tolic initiative They bad up these forcesobilization and reinforcement system which, tlicy beheve, will permit them quickly to raise and deploy forces sufficient to dcleat NATO in Europe. This section briefly describes the lorees immediately available, tlic mobilization and rcinlorccmcnt procedures and timing, and estimates the forces available after about three weeks of mobilization.
forces Available Within4 ST'otegKtrategic forcesavailable opposite NATO includeRBMs. IRBMs. submarine launched bah
or forces availabfeA Koun and alter about three week* el mothhradonre
lafircaaaw*.
"Piend II show tho tVnlkm ul wound and an force* oppoiitc Ihu Onlial Run ion ol NATO2
esenbes ia greater deUil tht' Sovkt iC>al*|ie raiulle tad bomber (aicei lor aprraiumi ui Eurasia.
r3
Warsaw Pad Frontal Aviation Regiments Opposite Central Region ol
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TABLE I
WARSAW PACT FORCES ACAINST NATO IN EUROPE
STRATECIC
MiuJr Laoecben
Medium Bom ben
Members
ASM
AIRBORNE DIVISIONS
THEATER FORCES* Opposite Cf otral Region
Ornuoat
Me"
Autt*ft
Tactical Nudear
FORCESINWEEKS
M
PUval Mptobakcq. Aj^omc"
Cruita Mbade
ttack 55
9
OoW WW Surface Cmd-tinti 43
ASMCarrim iad
"Far (feef Maj.kpoku. Odrf of Suff for lotdW*.
ear Adm.F. Rectanoa, DRcfor of Nival Intelligence. Drpm
HtAsoitaet Chief of Staff. Intdl,-
geoee. USAF. see their0
Detailed itndie* of poetible reinforcement scenario* egauut NATO's flardio thornbe Central ftegioa. hava not been awde.
Theatcr forcea conride.ed an- thorn force* k) the forward ere* whichlo be
up to itrenph and moved to their vnutfme asnemblr im. withinV?rvfaion. areull strength .ndganimned nee. enooeh to theernwn border to reed. defend ve iroduoo. end form an laltUl force to bo used anlbtt NATO within the fintour*.
* Ithat the theater force. Itated could, under other oprhoimdo their forward combat areas In as few aiart. We do not know Soviet plans fordo weeU* for ortlanatlac theloence of chance facton -anther bmakdowna. etc. HcetUe action also ta not cooaidered. nor ta the tme reoulred
lib&^lL "Zi ten/ ttfledof
ombat aircrafto
haul Nor doeslodode^oo. TOO
I of (hen- respective national twrftortm Theae Ea* Enmpean Neoooal Akf Frontal AvUbooforce avaDabdities aod trans* I
Iffarr
lilt* mrssilcsnd intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) believed currentlyo targeted against NATO inlicy also includeedium bombeis stationed in tlie western USSR. These forces arc probably maintained in combat status in peacetime and are ready to reactew hours. The medium bombers can carry eitheri mni-nudcar weapons. "Flic strategic missile forces do notonventional attack capability.
aoalhe Soviet Navy would rely heavilyeriod of warning to get available ships to sea, and thus increase the number available..Aboutoercent of Soviet ships are now routinely at sea, and about half of the ship inventory is ready for immediate deployment The other half iareplenished, in overhaul, major repairi, or conversion, or is unavailable for some other
eo. BuDap B. Davidaoa. Aasrstaat Chief(or Intelligence. Department ol the Army.Earl F. Reecaout. Director ol Navalol the Navy; ami Brig. Cen-Acting Altaian! Chief of Staff, Intelli-
gence. USAF. coniider aDCBMs to be pet-cnetily targeted ijaliur (he US. The SS-tl haa demon-straied the capability to be uaedide raise el Soviet targeting opoboi to Inetode bod.al and peripheral attack. However, evidence eoncem. ing the primary or secondary target* for specifically deployed SS-U. remains tacowluiive. The US rem aim the most powerful strategic opponent of the USSRhe only nation that could Inflict tevere damage upon tha Sovietsudear eachange. It Is doubtful thai the Soviets would elect toeapon ryitem with lotereootuwntal capabiUUMt agamtt peripheral urged that are already coheredtaog So-tet pe,.pKe,ai weapoo lyateaea. Or, balance, the above earned ir. ibelieva the Soviet, have targeted theCBMs at Deeaahaya aad Peevomevikagalnrt the US bat retain the option to change *to peripheral target areas should the cooungeBcr arise,aseuaeea the mlialou. fortes, deploy-meot and combat efiectsvenesi of Soviet geoeral pur pose naval forces aad the dupoUQon of East EW peaa aavsea k> ancee detaJ.
reason. Someombatants are rootindy at sea in the Norlh Atlantic, and somen the Mediterranean These are augmented during turnovers and major exercises. Additionaland East Eurcpean forces are routinely athe Baltic and Black Seas. The Soviet Navy also has an extensive air arm consisting of long-range leconnaissance aircraft andbombers equipped with air-to surface missiles (ASMs) or bombs. Almost all of these would be ready for operationsew hours. About three-fourths of Soviet naval sea and air forces are based in areas from which they could undertake operations against NATO in Western Europe and against seaborneof NATO In Europe.
Theaterarsaw Pact theater forces intended for immediategenerally those located closest to the potential combatkept in relatively high states of readiness. Others, which arc Intended as reinforcetnents or reserves, are kept under-strengthacetime and would requireof additional men and vehiclesbeing movedombat zone.
There are now somear law Pact divisions in East Cermany. Poland, andthat would be available opposite the Central Region of NATO. Of these,ould be essentially combat ready withinours from tbe startay. Thirty-seven of these are. in turn, garrisoned near enough to the West Cerman border to reach defensiveand form an initial force to be used against NATO withinours. Twenty-sixovietastre opposite northern West Cermany and would be supported byircraft of Soviet and Polish tactical air forces in East Cermany and Poland. Seven Czechoslovak and 4Croup of Forces (CCF) divisions are
A deacrlbaa Soviet theater forces lo aocoe detail and lasts auanben af drvbaons aad outer forcea, aueraft. aad other weacoaa.
Oppostte sou them Wert Cermany Thesewould be supported byircraft of Soviet and Czechoslovak: tactical air forces in CrechosiOvakia. and possibly by the Soviet tir army in Hungary.*
welve Polish divisionsoviet divisions in Poland and the remaining Soviet division in CCF would require several days to move into position. Four Soviet divisions in Hungaryungarian divisions probably would not bc part of Warsaw Pact forcesagainst the NATO Central Region, bu* would more likely be used either to defend the southern flank of the Pact forces against possible attack from Austrian or Yugoslavor to conduct offensive operations through those countries. No largeof Warsaw Pact forces are positionedon the NATO flanks in northernFive Bulgarian divisionsank brigades opposite Creoce and Europeanare available for immediate operationsigh level Bulgarian defector has statedlan calls for one of these divisions and one of these brigades to mass on the Yugoslav border lo insure Yugoslav neutrality in the event of war.)
irborne and Amprtihictu Forces. Into the above theater ground aod air forces, thereirborne divisions in the USSR. Most of these probably would beagainst NATO in .event of war. We believe they arc cither combat ready now or capable of being made combat readyay. The Soviets bave rufrkient transportto liftf these divisionsingle airborne operation. The Soviets alsorigade of naval infantry in each of the Northern and Baltic Sea fleet areas,be Black Sea area, along withmphibious shipping. These units couldbe ready for operations as soon as the
'See Annex D. 'Readiness. MobOtzat&oo, andof Warsaw Pact Pore* Opposite NATO."
logistic preparations could be made The Poles also have the equivalentaval infantry
brigade in the Baltic, but it would rely in part
on Soviet sea lilt.
Alobr'rra'ion
Soviets apparently considerlikelihoodudden outbreak ofrequiring the Warsaw Pact to fightforces outlined above. They baseon the assumptioneriod oftension and mobilization, anda large number of divisions in theof the USSR which can bereadied to move westward quickly.Europeans model their mobilizationafter the Soviet example.
The general outline of Warsaw Pact ground force mobilization plans andhas been indicated by classified andwritings and the testimony ofEssentially, the system is based onmilitary training, the prior designation of local reservists lo fill vacancies in low strength units, and the maintenance ofreserve motor transport units In the civilian transport industry to make up military truck shortages. Thereell developed organization for maintaining Pact mobilization plans in peacetime, and an effectivefor quickly alerting and assembling local reservists and driven with their vehicles. The procedure emphasizes speed rather thanMobilized units would have varyingof combat ability; some would certainly have serious short comings.
The Pact mobilization process has not been fullyull test would be eco-nocnically disruptive and militarilyIt has, however, been practiced in several partial rrwhilizaooos. The8 involved what was almost osr-
" Warsaw Pact motsllizabOa and reinforcementand apiblUOq are diseased ta greater detail
tn Adoci D-
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tainly the most extensive test of Pactcapabilities to date, but few details have become available. Someivisions wererequiring the call up of ateservists0 Ovihan trucks. Some East European mobilization was also probablyout.
eservistsrucks would he icquucd to fill out aboutnderstrength Soviet dinsiooi in the USSFt which probably are intended for early use against both the Central Region and the flanks ol NATO. Wc estimate that the great majority, and possibly all, of these reservists and trucks could be assembled with their units inays.0dditional reservists and large numbers of additional trucks and engineering equipment would be needed to fill out army- and /ronf-lcvel support forces. Mobilization of these latter elements would probably be accomplished in much tbe same manner as for divisions. However, since many of these reservists probably would be specialists, they would almost certainly have to be drawn from larger regions than would becase with divisions. This might stretch the -time for assembling support units.
igh peopcetion of reservists, many having no recent refresher training and Ucking familiarity with their leaders, theirsoldiers, or their equipment, mostSoviet divisions are likely to have low Initial combat effectiveness. Some of these mobilized from cadre status probably would have such limited combat value without atew weeks of training and shakedown that their early useact offensive would be Improbable. The most effective mobilized divisions would be tank divisions, but, even in these divisions, the motorized rifle regiments and most of the combat and service support would have high proportions of reaervists.
Naval forces would also have to be brought to increased states of readiness. Civen
warning on the cadeteek or two, tlie Soviets would probably aim at an initiallevel on the order ofercent for regular surface ships Because initialoperations wouldigh priority, the Soviets might deploy aboutercent of the cruise-missile force. Thus, the Soviet Northern Fleet might deploy as many asong-range cruise-missile and torpedo attack submarines andedium-range torpedo attackin the Atlantic. Aboutajorships from the Northern Fleet probahly could be deployed lo the Norwegian Sea. Civen warningonths, thecould achieve deployment of abouteecaot of king-range ships and submarines. Once achieved, this level of deployrneolcoukl be sustained foronths.
Forces Available after Mobilization and Reinforcement
orces availableobilization of three weeks or so are outlined inxecution of the entire mobilization and reinforcement plan for the theater forces would bring Pact strength opposite the Central Region of NATO up to aboutivisionsen (CO percent000 artillery pieces (including heavy mottars and multiple-round rocketombat(aboutercent ground attack, light bomber, and reconnaissance aircraft andercent air defensenduclear-capable tactical missile and rocket Uunchers. These forces probably. would be organizedrontschelons on the
" This total does not Include aa oversea of aboutercent combat aircraft which are to providefor operationallyfrontal aircraft endertouu; auiaieoanc. Of overhaul. Nor doeaan Ceraaea. Mat. endircraft assumed to the air deicoat of their raapee-tlve national territories. There Eail Earopeao National Air Defense aircraft areart of Frontal Aviation.
15
CCCIJCT
approaches lo the Rhine Rivet leading through Cermany. Detailed studies of possible reirdorcement scenarios against NATO's flanks, similarose against theion. have not been made The theater forces opposite Ihe Central Region and the flanks of NATO would be supported by the strategic forces immediately available, by the naval forces In the Mediicrranean. Black, and Baltic Sea areas and in the North Atlantic, and by the airborne forces.
Strategic floierves
In addition to the forces described above, virtually all of which probably arefor contingencies in specific NATO or adjacent neutral areas, ihe Soviets have someivisions In Interior areas of theest of the Ural Mountains. Thesethe Kiev, Moscow. Ural, and Volgawould be available to constitute strategic reserves in, the initial stagesonflict with NATO.
Some of these divisions could be readyew days. Thus, the Soviets could, ffsubstitute some of these for some of those in the other regions which might take longer to become mobilized and effective. This procedure is not followed in exercises and would be counter to the practice ofarmiesnit. But divisions were taken from different armies and MDs for theinvasion, and the Soviets do have the option of doing this in the future.
C. Initial Conventional Stage of War in Europe
Concept of Operations
heavilyeriod ofthe Soviets would expect to be inlo strike heavy blows against NATO
forces almost at the outselon-nuclca.-war. utilizing large numbers of medium bombers, as wdl as tactical aviation and ground forces. Although these forces have been furnished or have avaitablc large nurrv bcrs of nuclear munitions, their ability loonventional war is also considerable, especially in ihe early stagesonflict.
Soviet, and hence Pact, doctrine about combat operations in Ihe initial stages ofhave evolved largely in reaction lo the Russian historical experience of defeats in the early stagesonflict. It calls for Pact forces rapidly to seize or regain the initiativeATO attack, and to overwhelm the oppositionrief land campaign. Therecognize that, without the massive initial nuclear strikes integral to their concepts of the start of nuclear war, the penetration of NATO's main defenses would bevertheless appear to base their planning upon breaking through anda high-speed campaign in Europe.
The Course of Out Campaign. ThePact ground forces' organization and tactics are intended to maximize theirto achieve high rates of offensive speed.onventional offensive, large numbers of heavily armored units would attempt to achieve high ratios of local superiority over defending NATO forces, both in tanks and In fire support, in their efforts to breakthrough. Ii it succeeded in breaking through NATO's main defenses, the Pact would tlien launch tank columns In high-speed drives toward majoron the Rhine River. According to the doctrine, these tank columns would receive the highest priority for available combat and logistical support Inituation, the Pact could pay littleto flank security for the tank columns and probably could aotoorinuous
of advance across Ihc fronts. They would have lo rely mainly on ihe inherent firepower and mobility of the tank columns, and on available air cover, for security against their being cut off and defeated by NATO reserve forces. The alternative to such tactics would bc to slow down the whole advanceandontinuous front line.
Theater Warfare
round Sfrrfce. In all these operations Warsaw Pad forces tend to emphasizepower more than staying power and logistic support, when compared to US forces. This is perhaps most noticeable in the case of Soviet ground forces. The Warsaw Pactuch higher ratio of combat units tounits In Its active forces than docs the US or NATO in peacetime. Soviet writings, defectors, and exercises all indicate that in wartime the Soviets would continue toa higher combat-to-support ratioigher weapon-to-man ratio than (he US."
" Soviet army (round force divisions containercent of theen in the ground forces. In Ihe US. on the other hand, divisional forces make up only about one-thtid of the total army manpower. Moreover,ivision, maneuver units make up about one-half of the manpower in Warsaw pact forces, bat only one-third In US force*.
With respect to men and equipment, combat-ready Soviet divisioni have roughly the same number of tanks and artillery as the most comparable US divi-but only about half as many men. Foroviet tank division al combat strength hasedium tanks. GO howitzers, and IS multiple-round rocketS armoredat full strength has0edium tanks, andS division,receiver much rnore non-divisional combat tup-port than its Soviet counterpart. Armored cavalry regiments, corps-level artillery groups, and aviation and engineer brigades all augment the combat power of the US divisionegree not enjoyed by the Soviet divuioo. (Secaoipfcoo of tbe oiginliatkm and equipment of Soviet and East European motorized rule and tank divisions.}
or the initial breakthrough. Pactwould be most important. Probably in recognition of this requirement. Soviet division artillery has been increased by some SOduring the past few years. Now. after mobilization. Warsaw Pact forces would have about three times as many artillery pieces as NATO forces in the Central Region. This would include large numbers oF multiple rocket launchers capable of delivering large amounts of firehort time, with lessthan tube artillery. In fluid battlethe Soviets rely on large masses of tanks. Analysis of Soviet organization and tactics indicates that the Soviets mightupanksreakthrough zone no more thanilometers wide."
hile capable of nuclear and chemical fire support, the four free rocket (FROC) launchers in each division also have available conventional .and probably highwarheads for use against area targets up to about. in the enemy rear.
ir Strikes. Warsaw Pact Frontal" would be responsible for carrying out attacks on targets up to. from the forward position of the ground forces. Targets would include mobile missile,and anti-aircraft systems as well assupply areas, troop concentrations, and headquarters- The low payloads of thecarry onlyounds, fighter bombers upounds, and light bombers upthesortie rateser day Would limit support to ground forcesonventional situation.
"See Annex A. Section II for discussion of Warsaw Pact artiBery capabilities aad dlllcriog interpret*boos of the effectiveness of Pact artillery.
"Each from ts supportedactical air armyhese armies are called Frontal Aviation by the Soviets.
SCCRCT
millions in support oftheater operations would be tlieof medium bombers of SovietAviation (LFtA) because ol theirand range capabilities. They0 pounds of bombsadiusmiles. In addition. Soviet Navalmedium bombers for use againstuly of naval interest Althoughthese medium bombers carry ASMs.cany bombs, and many ASMs havewarheads in addition to nuclear.
Tbe Soviets recognizemobility of pact maneuver elementscrucial importance, and tbey haveimproving their forces to givemobility. The high proportion ofthe Pact concept of themobile firepower. There arepersonnel carriers (APCs) andavailable to first echelon forces toin an offensive In Europe.forces would probably notAPCs and would also rely onfrom the civilianewcombat vehicle which can carryIs being issued to Soviet units. Atransporter is being produced infor tank units and will not onlyof the load off the rail system towar. but will also be less vulnerable
be Soviets alto utilize air support to increase mobility. The Czechoslovak; invasion illustrated their ability to execute an extensive lifthort space of time in an unopposed situation The manner of utilization of heli-copten in exercises provides an indication of how tactical air mobility will be used.or example, in7 three battalions were landed by beli-coptcr as part of the tactical operations.the "Oder-Noisse" Ex excise inpecially equipped helicopters were used
as antitank reserves, as support for ground force movements involving the securing of bridgeheadi, and foe vertical envelopment of enemy forces
emphasis in Soviet tacticalhigh-speed offensive operations andof water obstacles aciottattack routes in Europe have ledto sUcss (lie capability toobstacles in their organization,and training These efforts havesuccess. Pact engineerboth at division and army level,with exceptionally welleffective bridging and ferryingMost Pact tanks are equipped forand can negotiate shallow waterwith only minor engineer support.forces in East Cermany devotetraining time to mobility traininga generally high level of proficiency.
Theater Defense
Cround Defense. Although Warsaw Pact general purpose forces are structured for fast-moving offensive action, Soviet military planners are well aware thai the defensebe ignored. They have developed adoctrine which envisages allowing the enemy to spend himself against strong defenses and then striking himassiveFor slowing and canalizing the enemy, the Soviets rely heavily on mine fields and antitank defenses.
Air Defense. Defense of theater forces against hostile air attack is centered in front all defense, which coordinates early warning (EW) and ground-controlled Intercept (CCI) radars. SAMs. and Interceptor aircraftto the front. In recent years, thehave been steadily improving their air defense capability in Eastern Europe. The late model, all-weatherFishbed J) is becoming tho standard Soviet toteroeptor.
scaler.
basic ground weapons system (or airit still (behich provides medium, to high-altitude coverage. In addition, theias been deployed in Eastern Euiope to provide low-altitude point defense of Soviet tactical airfields in East Cermany. Poland, and Hungary. The mobileystem, which was designed specifically to provideigh-altitude coverage for ground forces, is now deployed in tbe USSR. East Cermany. andew traefc-mounled systemow-altitudc capability is now operational in limited numbers, and the exist-enc*mall, heat-seeling missileimilar to tbe US Redeye is now confirmed. In addition to the various missile systems, the Soviets have deployed with their ground forces large numbers of radar-controlledircraft artillery. These weapons areeffective against slow flying aircraft at.low altitudes, especially helicopters. The Soviets have also been constructing7 revetments and hard shelters to protect their fixed air defense installations.
oordination of Warsaw Pact defenses inthese variousneverthelessomplicated one, involving as it does EW and CCI radars, SAMs, and interceptor aircraft, several fronts, and the operational components of Eastnational air defense. On the technical level, overall effectiveness is also somewhat degraded by the vulnerability of acquisition radars to heavy use of electronic counter-measures. The defenses will remainto low-altitude penetration by high-performance aircraft at least until the full deployment of new weapons.
Naval Warfare
ar with NATO In Western Europe the missions of the Soviet general
"Seeore detailed dneuinioa of VVBruv* Pact naval forcea.
purpose naval forces would be to assure access to the open ocean by Soviet naval forces, to neutralize Western attack carriers, to keep reinforcements from teaching Europe by sea. to defend againstttack from the sea, to support ground operations, and to defend against ballistic missile submarines."
Assuring Access to Open Seas Most of the Soviet surface naval forces which could be used against NATO in the seas surrounding Europe are stationed in the Baltic or Black Seas. Access to the Mediterranean or North Atlantic from these areas is through narrow straits. One of the ear Lest Soviet navalin time of crisis might be to put their best ships through the straits before NATO forces could bottle than tip. They might in wartime attempt to secure these straits by amphibious, and possibly airborne, assault, and to follow this up with land operatiooj. Although the Not hern Fleet Is on the open ocean, the Soviets would require strongwarfare (ASW) forces In the area to counter attack by NATO submarines, and they have based most of their nuclear attack submarines in the Northern Fleet
Attacking NATO Carrier Task Forces. The primary Soviet naval concern in the initial stagesonventional wax. next to assuring access to open seas, would be the destruction of NATO carrier task forces. The Soviets have adequate forces and procedures for finding and tracking enemy naval task forces at tea unless the enemy maintains nearly totalsilence. The network of 'naval radio direction finding stations in the USSR Issupplemented by ELI NTmall fleet of specialized intelligence ships Is available for locating naval ships at sea in their operating zones. Long-range naval air-
"The Utter mueSoo alao falls within the category of (Uategic defense.
19
ctaft of theype alio perform extensive reconnaissance flights. The bestn the Mediterranean because of the larger number of ships, submarines, and naval aircraft available there lor rcconnais-NtMN and trailing operations.
SO. The Soviets' anticarrier capability hinges largely on their ability to confound andcarrier defensesarge coordinated missile attach from submarines, suiface ships, and aircraft. Soviet skill in organizing this kind of attack is highly developed in the Mediterranean, where their forces frequently practice all of the required techniques ercept the actual attack by strike aircraft The Soviet anticarrier capability is also well-developed in the Norwegian Sea approaches, where naval and LRA strike aircraft participate inand where about SO percent of the cruis*missile submarines are located. The usual Soviet scenario thereeries of anticarrier barriers opposing carrierThe Soviets have the potential to trail carriers with cruise-missile ships andin the Norwegian Seaeriod of tension as they do in the Mediterranean. They are still in the process of refining the multi-force cruise-missile attack, and there aresome problems of tacticalof the riming and direction of the several attacks.
nterdiction of Sen tines of Cotnsnunica-tions. Long-range torpedo and cruise missile submarines aro the primary threat to NATO sea lines of communications to Europe. Long-and medium-range aircraft might be used against convoys if no major naval targets were available. Soviet surface ships are not likely to operate as commerce raiders in areas where- the Soviets lack adequate air and rubenarine defense. Antiship mines sown by submarines and aircraft would be used in efforts to block the ports of debarkation.
n order lo pot submannes in aposition for interdiction againstthe Soviets would try lo counter NATO ASW forces, particularly Western submarines In (ho Norwegian Sea transit lanes to the open sea. They would probably concentrate the major pari of their Northern Fleet ASW forces there They would probably attempt toNATO forward ASW barriers with large numbers ol attack submarines. Once into the sea lanes. Soviel interdiction eapabilities In Ihe North Atlantic probably would be good. Soviet forces available for the task, into any surviving cruise-missile units, would include the Northern Fleet attacknot already committed to the
ffshore Defense and Support of Ground Operations. The Soviet Baltic and Black Sea Fleets probably have sufficient forces to deny these seas to NATO naval forces. Their major problem, however, would be lo assure access of these fleets to more open waters In addition to denying (he Baltic Sea to NATO, the Baltic fleet naval andforces augmented by Polish naval, airborne, and amphibious forces would engage in amphibious assault operations along the Baltic to support ground operations and to seize the Danishrime Warsaw Pact objective for Black Sea fleet forces would bc the Turkish Straits and bases in the Aegean; they might, however, be more effective in small amphibious assaults in support of land form along the eastern border of Turkey. In either Baltic or Black Sea amphibioussuccess would depend mainly on the degree to which the Pact could first establish air superiority in the assault area.
D. Sustained Conventional War In Europe
t is dear from Soviet ck>ctrirse andthat the likelihood of sustained conven-
SECRET
SL'CPCt-
urope ii cormdVred remote. Nevertheless, if events did noi evolve ai ihc Sovietsfor example, tlie Pact failed to break through NATO defenses quickly or if NATO managed toact breakthroughesort lo nuclearthe Pact commanders would be confiontedituation different from that for which their plans wore designed. They would notbe faced with the alternative of losing or escalating. they could accept sustainedwarfare. They claim, of course, that they could successfully conduct combat operations under any conditions. But they would have some problems with conducting sustainedwarfare.
ho most Immediate problem would be that of logistics. Present stock levels,and service support capabilitiesrief conventional phase followedhort nuclear campaign. Butsclear campaign did not come about and if thephase were prolonged, dwindling stocks would make the continuation ofoperations difficult. Stocks and forces in the forward area would have to be replenished and the logutics system developed farresupply. While supplies probably exist in the USSR to sustain operations for sometime, they would have to be brought forward. How fast these could be moved to the forces in the field would, of course, depend In part upon the level of combat and theof NATO interdiction operations.hortage of trucks and logistic support would hinder operations, perhaps for some months.
mong the forces themselves, there would have to be regrouping and additional reinforcement, probably initially involving the strategic reserves. The Soviet practice ofwhole divisions would necessitate the creation of new replacement units, which would take some time also. Moreover, tactical air forces would have to be redeployed, and
additional transport, engineer, andunits would need to be attached lo the forward commands. Inathermobilization of rear services would need to take place along with regrouping and teinfeeccrnent.
ow long conventional operations could be sustained would depend upon how rapidly (he Soviet leadership could mobilize thesector to provide additional manpower, supplies, and transport- In the mobuaxalioa of manpower and resources which would have to be set in motion, there would be the problem of maintaining the momentum of the economy during the changeoverustained war economy. Soviet practice in World War II would suggest that military requirements would somehow be met through ruthlessand pre-emption of civilian supplies. But such ruthlcssness would probably have to be tempered if tbe government wis'ied toa flow of materiel, aircraft, and so on. from the civilian sector. Production of war materiel as well as operation of the economy have become much more complicated since World War II and much more dependent upon skilled manpower and efficient management. Wc have not studied the complications that prolonged warfare would create for theuntil we do so we can say nothing about bow seriously they might affect operations.
o some extent, of course, the Soviet capacity to conduct prolonged conventional warfare would also depend upon bow effective the Pact forces were In preventing superior NATO manpower and resources frommilitarily effective. Thus, the capability of Soviet naval forces would become vital.SSR could maintain about one-third of its Northern Fleet submarine force continually on patrol In theruise-missile andorpedo attack submarines. Tbe submarine force generally has been adequately provided with specialized support ships to
CCCRCT
meet operational requirements.he past several years the Soviets have earned out limited support and replenishment operations in the Atlantic. Use of support groups wouldonsiderable increase in the number of submarines which could be maintained on station and would extend the areas of patrol activity, but such groups would be highly vul< nerable in time of war. Even so, using only home bases, the Soviet Navy would have substantial capability to conduct operations against NATOustained conventional war.
s of the present time, resort to orof sustained conventional warfare isery attractive alternative to the Soviets. Prcrvuion bas not been made for It, though in ao emergency the means probably exist to cope with it. They have not prepared for sustained conventional war because they think itIf It came, they probably believe that they would have the time to build up the logistics and carry Out the mobilization
B. Nuclear War in Europe
n the, the Sovietstheir long-held view that war inwould be nuclear from the start. Their current view appears to be that they woulduclear strike only when they have concluded that NATO will introduce nuclear weapons. It is unclear whether anexchange is part of the
^thc Soviets are wrestling with the problem of tbe application of nuclear weapons to theater warfare in Europe. They arc well aware of the Westernarge and diversified stockpile,ell as by nudear configured strike forces. While we do not believe the Soviets bave full confidence in the validity of the scenarios under which they now train aod structure their
forces, we also do not believe that they have arrived at an alternate solution to theUntil they do, (heretrong possibility that the Soviets would respond to limited NATO use of nuclear weapons in the manner indicated by their scenarios. However,esponse should not be considered automatic; the actual Soviet response would be the resultigh-level decision in which political as well as military considerations mightart.
Concept
he Soviets' general scenario of nuclear conflict emphasizes the importance of anstrike against strategic and rear areathis is intended to destroy NATO'sfor organized resistance. Tbeoes not envisage use of the initial strikein direct support of the groundplan; oo the contrary, the maneuver plan calls on the ground forces to follow-up and exploit the effects of the nuclear strike and to occupy key areas of enemy territory before NATO can recover from those cffecti.
he initial nudear strike on land would bc made by the SRF and LRA on strategic targets, by frontal weapon! and aircraft on operational targets, aod by nuclear rockets on tactical targets. Naval strikes wouldthe theater strikes. The Soviets may strikeATO targetspercent by strategic forces. We believe these targets would include nuclear depots and delivery means, airfields, air defense control centers, troop conoentratioru, bar boo and naval bases, and, finally, industrial, ailirunistrative. and command centers.
oviet_f
Tplan the use of chemicalby theater field forcestrategic nu-
clearny decision regarding ihe actual use of chemical (and biological) weapons would be made at the highest levels ofasecision on use of nudear weapons. But Soviet leaders probably consider chemical weapons lo be subject toand constraints similar to those imposed on nuclear weapons, and if they authorised one. they should be cipcctcd to authorize the other. Once the use had been authonied. the front commander would plan the opeiations, as in the case of nuclear weapons.
Nuclear Strike In Europe
TO Strategic Af uruVr. The Soviets might usetrategic missiles against Western Europe, including MRBMs, IRBMs,nd SLBMs on diesel-powered submarines,ariety of nuclear loads, in the 0x3T range. Some ot these wouldeload capability.
Medium Bomherr. The Soviets haveedium bombers stationed In the western USSR, and most of these could be employed against NATO. These bombers could carry various nuclear loads in the gen-era] range of one toT. Many carry ASMs, thereby givingtandoff capability.
Tactical Rocket* and Missiles. Tactical rochets and missiles could be used against some of these same targets within about ISO nm. of the NATO frontier. But their main use
"See Anne* C, "Soviet Cepabuiuei for Chemxa!Biologic! Warfare".
eo. Phfflip B. Davidson. Anuteot Chief of Staff for laWlliseaot. Department of tba Army;m. Earl F. HecUBO, Oiraetor of Naval Lv tellupmca. Deportment af the Navy; aad Brif. Ceo. EoVard fUliovKfc. Aetiai Aadstam Chief af Staff. lafclHiatii. USAF. behove tha Soviets have targeted tbe SS-U. at two MRBM and IRBM litee primarily the US. See theirn
would be against tactical targets in support ot the battle plan of the front commander. Nuclear tactical missile delivery would be by free rockets (FPOCi)ange up tocud missiles with ranges upnd Shaddock cruise missiles up. There areuclear launchers in tlie forces opposite the Central Region of NATO now. andould be brought forwardeeks. (Sec Table I.[
. j
Soviet Frontal Aoiation hasircraft, and Czechoslovakia and Polandore, which are suited by capability and likely deploymentnd later toof nuclear weapons against NATOThe tight bombersadiusan.ounds of internal nuclear stores while the fightersadius of about one-half thisounds of external stores. We estimate Soviet tactical nuclear bombs weighounds downounds, depending on yield, type, and age.
ajor problem for the Soviets would be near real timeof movable targets and post-strikeReconnaissance units of Soviet tactical aviation have been Improved significantly in recent years through the continuedof the Brewer D, and more recently through the replacement of most Frescos with the Fishbe new Foxbat will provide an additional reconnaissance means to the theater commander.
^combined nuclear and chemical
23
SCCRtT
by Pact tactical aircraft, Scuds, and FROCs L
JyJethat the Soviets also have designed chemical ammunition for their current artillery and multiple rocket launchers.
hemical, Biological, end Radiological {CBR) Defense. The Soviets expect totheir vulnerability to nuclear attack by presenting fast-moving, hard, and dispersed targets. About half of the tanks opposite NATO Central Region52 models which can be shielded against nuclear fallout, and the new BMP armored personnel carrier being issued to tho Soviet forces in Europe is probably suited to useuclear environment. Pact exercises emphasizeoperations so as to limit losses from tactical nuclear strikes. Moreover, much of Pact training consists of defense against CBR weapons. Decontamination and wash-down equipment have been issued in quantity. Detection systems have been developed for both reconnaissance and for protection of the individual soldier. Soviet research on antidotes for toric chemicals has been both competent and extensive. (Seeorediscussion of Soviet CBR eapaWuties.)
uclear Storage and Control Wetell for sure whether any nuclear weapons at all are stored in Eastern Europe, it is' ever clear that the Soviets anticipate theof many, if not all. of the nuclear weapons to the forces in Eastern Europe by aireriod of tension. We have testimony
ariety of defectors to show the basic design of delivering weapons by air from the USSR. Nevertheless, some warheads for initial st nkes might be stored in the forwaid area.
believe no nuclear warheadsfor use against NATO arc inand we estimate that, even inSoviets would retain control over all
Naval Strikes
addition to the SLBMs, Sovietare likewisearietynuclear delivery systems. Theyweapons on surface-launchedsuch as then theKresta class cruisers and thethe Kildin and Krupnyy classIs reasonable to assume that theis also available on theversion of thoheynuclearndair strikes. The new missilesnn the Kresta II and probablyand then the Moskvacertainly nudear capable. Thehave nudear torpedoes and
uclear weapons are carried on ships at sea. Although we have no evidence of theomplete nuclear as well asoption would indicate that about one-half of the nudear-capable cruise missiles on ships and submarines would be nudear. Nudear storage at naval bases and airfields is sufficient to contain the requisite warheads. Tho exact manner of control of nudear
>vcapons on ships and tubman rva at sea is not known.
BR Defense. The Soviets continue to construct ships with water washdown systems, hermetically scaled compartments, filtered ventilation systems, and decontaminationthat would enable those ships to carry out their assigned missionsoaic CBR cnviiofiincnt. Extensive training is provldVil lot the maintenanceermanent, high level ol CBR readiness for the various naval units.
F. limited Nuclear War in Europe
s indicated at the beginning of this chapter (paragraphs. the Soviet concept of nuclear war ia Europe. Q
i en is some serious questions. If. indeed? the Soviets conceive of war developing asm their scenarios, they are inhibited from any conventions Ieven frommoves which might threaten to involve conventionaltheir apparent belief in rapid escalation into general nuclear war in Europe. And, they would recognizeeneral resort to nuclear strikes in Europe could provoke an intercontinental strike by the US.
Some Soviet military writers havethe problem aad have considered the possibility of waging war in Europe with tactical nudear weaponsay which did not escalate into general nuclear war. Tbe possibility that political pressure could beto inhibit NATO's use of tacticalweapons is recognized and the initial use of nudear weapons by NATO may not automatically resultarge-scale Pact response.
Warsaw Pact forces do have sometoariety of nuclear options
shorttrategic strike. The delivery systems available, especially the tactical rockets and missiies and Frontal Aviation, could be limited to piuely military targets and even to those close to the area of direct contact between ground foices. Their targeting docttine already calls for use of nuclear weapons againstand support elements, and their troops are trained and equipped for operationsuclear environment.
he Soviets would be limited, however, by their lackariety of low-yidd nuclear weapons comparable to those possessed by the NATO forces- In tbehe Soviets indicated an intent touclearfor their larger conventional artillery piecesoctrine tor use of thisbut the project was dipped. It Is within Soviet technical capability to develop nuclear artillery rounds;^
lthere is no evidence that they havedone so. Similarly, while they probably have the technical capability to create nuclear warheads for tactical SAMs, atomicand other small tactical warheads {_
ave no indications they have done so.
he evidence does not exist toudgment as to whether the Soviet leaders would, when confrontedATO use of tactical nuclear weaponsocal scale, reply in kind and attempt to keep the exchangeor would accept ooe of the other options open tothe conflict, go to general nuclear war in Europe (with the dangerS fatercontihentalr resort to an uitercontincntal attack themselves. So long as they do not go further than they have Intho possibiliries of the limited nuclear warfarc option, developing the weaponry for
GCCRCT
and training their forcea lor il, thii option does not seem toery promising one.
III. SOVIET CAPABIIIIIES IN ASIA
A. Ihe Sino-Soviet Coo (ton lot ion
arly Soviet military depositions in the Far East were directed against US forces on ihc Pacdic periphery and against US allies along this periphery. The ground forces in Siberia and the Far East were primarily for security of tbe Trans-Siberian Railroad. By the, however, the Soviet leadership had come gradually to the idea that tho growing instability of their relations with Communist Chinareater danger of war than did their more stable relationships with the US and its allies.
hs traditional hostility of China and Russia over the border lands taken over by Russia in the past few centuries still is the basis for much of the Chinese attitude. This hostility was exacerbated by China's desire to control its own nuclear capability on the one hand, and by the subsequent Soviet cutoff of further aid on the other. It was given anmainfestation by the differingof the leadership of the twoto the common legacy of communism. The vilifications incident to the attempt of the new Soviet leadership early5 to reach some accommodation with China probably onlythe Soviet leadership that their future relations would be more on the basis of enmity than ofso long as the Maoist leadership continued. Continuedincidents,eighto doubt only confirmed the Soviets in this belief.
5 the Soviet leadershipilitary buildup along the Sino-Soviet border
that continues to (his day. It is clear that the initial impetus to the buildupefensiveprepare the USSR for anystemming from the unstable relationsthe two countries. The fad that the buddup has abeady been stretched outix-year period and that at present rates it will take at least another couple of years to fill out the present force arguesoviet plan for early deliberate aggression. On the otherradual buildup was the only way inorce capable ol major offen sive operations against China could have been developed without substantial ledeploymenl of units earmarked for early commitment against NATO or straining the civilianEven so, the buildup opposite China has required some slowdown In theof theater forces opposite NATO and has Involved the movement of some air regiments from the west.
he generally conservative approach which the Soviets take to defense of interests vital to the USSR has resulted in theira force rjpposite China that wouldlear deterrent to any Chinese action, not onlyuclear confrontation, but also in awar. To be most effective as ageography and Soviet military doctrine dictate that over tbe longer term these Soviet forces be structured and deployed foroperations. Static defense along the border woulduch larger force and would almost certainly lead to some shifting of units from the west. Defense in depth is denied to the Soviets in much of the border area because the major developed areas and lines of com-municatioo run parallel and close to theConsequently, the Soviets will probablythe China border force in anof their strategicBut iaorce suitable for of-
i -
lense. the Soviets are placing themselvesosition to initiate hostilities should they da-situ to do so.
Chinese strategic capabilities remain modest compared to those of the USSR, but they are also growing steadily. They may haveew. MRBMs. An IBBM capable of reaching the Volga is probably ncjuing deployment. The Chinese are also workingissile probably capable of reaching any part of the USSR. This missile could be ready for deployment in3 ororeover, the Chinese are adding someadger jet mediumear to theirl force ofach of those couldl nuclear bomb. Tlve Chinese are alsodiesel-powered torpedo attack submarinesubstantial but still thin air defense system with interceptors and the Chinese equivalent ofhis force probably would not be enough tooviet bomber attack, but it would make repeated attacks costly.
Chinas prime military counter to the USSR is the obvious one of manpower. InChinese divisions deployed inand eastern Inner Mongolia represent twice as much manpower as on the Soviet side. But the best of the Chinese divisions havehird of the artillery andixth the tracked vehicles of their Soviet counterparts. The Chinese have nofor tactical nuclear delivery by rocket. Tbeeagles could be used for delivering nuclear weapons but have nol been exercised in this role.
Soviet discussions of the naturear with the Chinese have not appeared in the military literature as have discussions about
a war in Europe.
JTlic cieationtrong sinking force in the Transbaykal MD also suggests Soviet preparation for the contingencytrike to cut Manchuria off from China proper. Soviet forces in the Central Asian MD also would be capable of occupying the Dzungarian Basin of the Sinkiang Military Regionoviet forces opposite China are not strong enough, however, tooviet conquest of China proper. We do not know the nature of Soviet plans in the event of hostilities with China, but the size and deployment pattern of their forces suggests that the Soviets wish to be able to take the offensive, eitherounterhinese invasion or In supportolitical decision in the Kremlin to take military steps against China.
B. Force Posture Opposite China '*
order0 men in KCB Border Cuard units stationedIn the Sino-Soviet border area have responsibility for security of that border. These troopsight screen againstby unauthorised border crosiers and can also provide warning in the event of attack. Recently, however, atttahoo sized heavy combat border guard units have been
"The buildup of Soviet forces alonf tha Stoo-Sovietiscussed In greater detail la Aorta E. The location of Soviet divUlooa. Frontal AvieUoo regt-tneots. and Sealeboard unts ne ahewa ai Fhrore 4
following.
organized, each wiihoanks ot APCs These units provide the boider troopsapability for handling skirmishes without the help of regular ground force personrtel. In time of war. the border guards would probably bc used to supplement regular army troops for rear area security.
round Forces. Since theround forces in the regions near the Sino-Soviet border or in Mongolia have increased from aboutivision! to at leastivisions. Crowth of these forces continues, but the emphasis In the past few years has apparently been more on filling out and bringing up to strength divisions previously formed, rather than starting new ones.ivisions have been formed sinceSoviet and East EuropeanPurposeECRET. CONTROLLED DISSEM. several have been brought up to combat strength from reduced strengthlmost all of thedivisions appear to have someready to fight without furtherTher so divisions are organizedormiesn the Far Eastn the Transbaykaln Mongolia, andn the Central Asian MD.
he development of combat support for theater forces opposite China generally does not appear to have kept pace with thenumber of divisions. SomeROGwithaunchers arc behoved toivisions along the border, but there arecud brigades with someaunchers. This nuclear support is lighter than opposite
-lar estimated thaiivisions were stationed near the Sino-Soviet bordct. Sine* that time we have reassessed tint estimate, and now believe someere there then.
NATO, but it is supplemented by at leasthaddock cruise-missile battalion andoaunchers) of. Scakeboard. umis of which arc deployed only opposite China Army- and fionflevel conventional artillery has. however, beenin the Maritime Province at levels nearly twice lhal of Soviet forces facing NATO. Else-wliere. non divisional field artillery is present at levels below those in the West.
Personnel Strength. The personnel strength of the Soviet ground forces opposite China probably has reachedn divisions,nThese forces currently are equipped withanks,artillery pieces, anduclear launchers. If these divisions were to be filled out to full combat strength, and the same level of support fumiihed as found in the forward area opposite the Central Region of NATO, the total forcertillery,uclear launchers.
Frontal Aviation. During the same lime that the ground forces were being built up in the. Frontal Aviation was increasedingle TAAombat aircraft and aboutelicopters toombat aircraftew TAA was developed in the Transbaykal MDhird currently is being formed in the Central Asian MD.
Naval Forcer. The Soviets have in the past year increased their capabilities In the Pacific by the transfer of the firstLCM and the third Kashin DLC plus the activationeserve Sverdlov-class light cruiser. This brings the total number of major combatants tondthe anti-ship, ASW, and command and controlof the fleet TheI SSCNs and
30
iesel-powered cruise missile(SSCs) in Ihe Pacificnwith Iheargetaircraft and aboutSM equipped Badgers, are best suited for the antiship strike role. Compared to this force, the Chinese have someubmaiines andajor surface ships, ofairy cruise missiles
Strategic Dr-ferna. Soviet strategic air defenses HQ the border area have beenin recent years, but some of thisprobably would have taken place even had there been no Sino-Soviet dispute. Aa of now. the Soviets have in the borderAM launchers andindudingll-weather Interceptors armed with alr-to-air mluilcsgainst these air defenses, the Chinese have aboutedium bombers andight bombers.
Strategic Offensiveeripheral strategic attack forces deployed in the Far East are believed to have been targeted against the US and allied insUllations in the area. Over time some of these and otherstrategic attack forces probably have been assigned targets in China, but it is not possible to determine the extent Thereeavy and medium bombers with the Far East Long Range Air Army within striking range of key Chinesethe same number ase believe that during the past few years all MRBMs and IRBMs in the Soviet Far East have been phased out.
Loginici. The potential vulnerability of the Trans-Siberian Railroad has caused the Soviets to stockpile relatively larger amounts of ammunition, petroleum, oil, and lubricantsnd equipment behind their forces along Ihe China border than behind their
forocs in Europe. There is also evidence that the Soviets are propositioning equipment in Ihe area- The widdy separated locations along the border have cauied Ihe Soviets to rely more on air support, the concentration oflift is proportionately greater along the botder than opposite NATO.
Mobilization ond Rein/oreemcnf
The present buildup activity docs notear indication of the number of divisions in the border area that the Soviets plan to bring to combat strength. Manyare continuing lo receive personnel and equipment; some of these probably will reach combat strength in the next year or so. Others may stabilize at less than full wartime strength. If so. It would suggest that the Soviets Intend to rdyobilization plan similar to that for the Soviet forces opposite NATO. There the Soviets maintain only some of the divisions at full strength. The others are kept atstrength but can be filled out with reservists and civilian vehicles within about one week.
obUizarion planto lhat used in the European USSR would probably not work as rapidly, however. The required reservists may not be as readilyas the divisions are spread more thinly in less densdy populated areas. The Soviets may believe that the relatively immobileforces do nothreat requiring the rapid mobilization capability that is needed opposite NATO. They may therefore bcwith slower mobilization. One-fourth of all the Soviet males of military service age live In areas east of the Urals. The Soviets also have numerous truck parks (aotokoiorinas) in the East Mobilization procedures have not been exercised in die area opposite China as they bave in the west; and we have not studied
scene.
bans lor such mobilization as extensively. The Soviets do have tank aod ordnance parks at points along tbe Trans-Siberian Railroad end in lite Far East MD. These could help to (ill out existing divisions. Army and fronthowever, would have to be transferred from other areas of the USSR, as they have not been established (even in cadre form) in many parts of the Transbaykal and Central Asian MDs.
ivisionsSiberian and Turkestan MDs areas reinforcements for theThree additionalIsland and the Kamchatkathe Far Eastconsidered to befor contingencies Involving Japanforces in the area, but could also bernnforcements In the event ofChina.ivisions In the Uralalso be used as reinforcementExcluding an airborne divisionall of these divisions are inlow states of combat readiness,would need substantial mobilization.exceptionivision in Siberia,ivisions appears to havesince ihc; in fact,of them were reduced In strength toof the buildup for new divisions near
C. force Capabilities Capability io Defend
Soviet force on the Iwrderlhat required to repel any forceare likely to send against thethe next few years. The Soviet forcesmotorized, giving them greatover the Chinese In mobility. Thiswith an overwhelming advantageand conventional fire support as well
as tactical nudear fire support, probablyIhe Soviet! the capability to respond quickly and forcefullyhinese forcealong any likely attack route into the border area. Even assuming that all Chinese forces aic equippedar with their lies! units (which ishe Soviet force would have about four times the number of tanks and about twice the number of artillery pieces- Moreover, the Soviets could quickly achieve dear air superiority in the area.
For the Chinese toerious threat against Ihe USSR at any point on tin-border wouldassive concentration of troops. Except for two divisions opposite the Vladivostok area, however, and several smaller units elsewhere, the Chinese forces are deployed well back from the border. The time it would take to move these into position toajor attack on the USSR would permit the Soviets, with their superiorand good inlelligcnce resources, toforces to block the attack and to launch spoiling attacks of their own.
In the Vladivostok area the Chinese could mount an attack with perhaps as manyroopsatterew days. This is the area of heaviest concentration of Soviet forces in the border area, however, and given the vast Soviet superiority in firepower and air support, it Is by no means certainhinese force withadvantage could overrun Vladivostok bdore reinforcements arrived.
In any event, the Soviets probably bave sufficient tactical nuclear weapons in the area to deal with any Chinese attack which they could not repulse with conventional weapons. They haveactical oodear rocket and missile launchers (indndingun.actical aircraft configured for nudear as well as conventional delivery, andedium and heavy bombers.
-secftCT-
tlt*_Kt_f1
to Attack
f Ihc Sovietslo undertakeoperations against China, the overallof Ihc buildup of Soviet forces along the border, together with the natural and political gcogiaphy of the border area, suggest the Soviets would plan the creation of at leastossiblyronts Typical Soviet and East European potential fronts consist ofrmies containingoivisions,AAombat aircraft, together with front support Potential fronts opposite China can be defined as follows, with current forces as indicated:
to tin Province
MD
MonjoU.
Allan UD
fourth potential front might be created In 'he Far East Ml) opposite northern Manchuria.rmies,ivisions, are apparently being developed In this area, there is no TAA. Three tactical air regimentsndependent squadrons are located in the northern Far East MD.and in wartime these couldeparate front In this area. If the Soviets were to create an additional front they might add more divisionsore tactical air regiments to create an air army.
By filling out all existing divisions In tbe border area, and providing non-divisional support In the proportions estimated for the force opposite NATO, the Soviet troop strength would approach parity with that of tbe Chinese in tbe border regions-oviet troops would be positioned againsthinese troops in the Shenyang MR, most of which are nowIn southeastern Manchuria.oviet troops would be deployed In
the Central Asian MD across the border from0 Chinese troops scatteredthe Sinkiang MR.
These augmented Soviet forces would have1 advantage in tanks and atdvantage in conventionalThis force would also haveissile and rocket launchers for direct nuclear support. Completion of theair army in the Central Asian MD would bring the tactical combat aircraft In the border area to.
These full-strength Soviet forces,supported by medium bombers and provided good air cover, would be capable of major offensive operations in the peripheral regions of China and probably could advance several hundred miles into tbe Chinese border provinces. Such operations would not have to be limited to attack and withdrawal. So long as they do not penetrate beyond the border provinces, Ihe Soviets piobably could occupy large portions of territory. Includingthe eastern part of Inner Mongolia, and the Dxungarian Basin in Smiling. With complete air superiority, it is likely that they could accomplish these operations without using tactical nuclear weapons; tacticalstrikes would ensure their success.such as these would not, of course, destroy Chinese capabilities to wage war, and theit they undertookhave to recognise the posribility of protracted Iwstilities.
IV. FUTURE FORCES
A. Predicting the Future General Considerations
Is no direct evidenceSoviet plans for tbe futureweaponry of forces. Such Information is
33
occnc;
nlyvery few within ihe Soviet hierarchy, and il ii nol known to us. The fact that economic planning in Ihe USSR involves five-year time spans, andew five-year plan has recently been approved, indicates that an allocation of resources to militaryhas been planned at leasl lhat far into the future.in Westernprograms which have been approved probably face annua! reviews and would bc subject to cancellation and revision at any lime.
ome individual weapon systems can be projectedew yean into the future, especially where these systems are replacements for existing ones- The post is an uncertain guide, however. In the case of new types of systems because the increasingcapability and cost of foflow-onoften resultess than one for one replacement. This Is particularly the case with aircraft and submarines. Some ground force equipment could prove out the same way. Weapons systems such as tactical rockets and missales have no forerunners, and the ultimate level of deployment is difficult to predictknowing the specific operational concepts underlying the decision lo introduce them. In any case, the further into the future one moves the less helpful is knowledge of currentOur problem in estimating future forces and capabilities involves not only judg-mcnts about tie momentum and direction of specific on-going programs, but alsoabout possible major changes ofbrought on by revisions of strategy and policy.
Inertia
nertia of courseole in Soviet force devdcn^rrient The Soviet bureaucratic process is cumbersome, as rt is in any large organization- It fa difficult to stop something once it is started. The tendency of interest groups and Institutions to keep on doing what
they areemiaulonomous nature to trends In the development of weaponand force elements The Soviets have, however, slopped programs which failed to meet iheir goals, cither in the dcvclopmcnlal stage or after short produclion runs. Inwheie development of dual systems for Ihe same mission is undertaken, the losing design suffers an early demise The ground forces havearticularly favorable climate for bureaucratic inertia because of their sire, the traditional nature of their tasks, and the lack of regular contact with hostile forces Naval general purpose forces have also suffered from such lethargy, but changing missions have dispeUed much of this in the past several yean.
lecrmologJeol Advance
Technological advance Is the enemy of inertia, and tbe USSR has maintainedffort But the impact ofadvance is more in the fields of missiles, aircraft, and submarines, than in conventional ground aod naval arms. One of the morechanges has been the devek>prnent of systems for asore than one rnission. Oneis theissilef both Intercontinental and peripheral missions. There are also new multimiision naval vessels rich as the Krivak DDCM.
Much of Ihc equipment used by the ground force* continues to meet requirements which change little with the passage of time, and the pace of change tends lo be slow. New rnodeh often come into the. forces over as long asears, they are not subject to rapid obsolescence, and there are few technological breakthroughs which warrant completeof inventory. When expansion of use ground force proved desirable because of the China problem, it was accomplished by not retiring equipment and aircraft There are active In the general purpose forces today
iomc tanks, aircraft, and ships which areean old. Bui as new models replace old ones ihe cumulative effecteriod of years can substantial.
Resource ConWrorrrfs
constraints upon theof Soviet forces arc relative, notand derive mainly from political anddecisions. Soviet industry could supportincrease in defense output, andcases could do so withoutIn particular, land armamenfs.warship, and missile productioneasily expanded if the Soviets desiredexisting capacity for theseunutilized capacity is being given togoods, and tbe interest of thein SALT ispartial consequence ofto avoid tbe economic cost ofor enlarging, existing forces atof effectiveness. Moreover,of their largecompetition with the civilianfor such items as labor,port, food, and basic raw materialsand fuel).
Geo'jiaphy and History
and history havein important ways to the lire of theforces Invasion and occupation byfrom both East and West haveRussians very wary of anyone technologicallytheir borders. This, together withof those borders and the hostility ofacross them, has contributedsire and disposition of thetheater forces. Ceography andalso affected the structure and sizenaval forces. The fact that two of thebo bottled up in Baltic and Black Seasthe Soviets to keep the bulk of thcir
naval forces in the Northern and Pacific Fleets. The fact that the latter two fleets exist derives from the difficulty and length of passage from East to West and vice versa. The Sovietsthey are to maintain an effective presence in theeasonable seaof their shores,apacity to operate militarily on the highaimarge navy with considerable versatility.
Perception ol Ihe Threat
The way in which the Soviets act upon the considerations noted above depends very heavily upon bow they perceive the threat. Tbe pace at which technological Improvements are introduced and at what cost to the civilian economy will reflect bow urgently the need for improvements or expansion is viewed. While historical factors In Soviet thinkiog tend to change only slowly, the relation between tbe threat and geographical cuspodtiOLis is quite obvious. The existence of powerful forces under the control of governments viewed as hostile Is, of course, reason enough formilitary forces. Bat there are varying degrees of seriousness with which the threat from such forces can be viewed, depending upon the current policy of their roversuncnU. the armament and state of morale of their forces, etc Moreover, militaiy forces have other uses than deterrence or defense; theyiplomaticeans of exertingand inajor factor in the policy decisions of other nations.
In the current phase of military and political relarionshipi In Europe, the Soviet leaders probably do not regard the threat from NATO as an immediately argent one. Thoatmosphere in the US and Western Europe, the West Cerman Ostpolitik and tbe generalized support and acceptance accorded it, US interest fa Mlil-'R, progress on SALT, and widespread West European interesturopean Securitycould
GCCncr
regarded by ibe Soviets as indicating lillle need for augmenting force: in the west and even as opening the possibility of some
y contrast, the deterioration of Soviet-Chinese relations over the past decade, (he cvonls9 on the Soviet-Chinese frontier, and the signs of improvement in US-Chinese relations haveense of urgency lo the building up of Soviet military strength In Asia. It seems most unlikely lhat the Soviet leaders In the current phase would bc giving any thought to the reduction of that strength. Instead, it would seem more likely lhat they would complete their present buildup byout existing divisions and backing them up with enhanced ssrrport forces. They might even be giving cornsderatoo to increasing those forces to the point of creating astrike force forestern and northern China and Manchuria.
12S. But the current phase of relationships and forces are not the whole story. The Soviets maintain forces in Eastern Europe also toeasure of control over governments and population, and the existenceredible threat from NATO facilitates this politically. The desire to maintain control also serves to set limits to possible force reductions. The Czechoslovak crisis8 would, forhave given the Soviets reason tothe utility of relying heavily on allies, and doubts oo lhat account mighteason for maintaining, or even adding to. Soviet forces. Extensive reductions are probably also foreclosed by Soviet fears of possible shifts to more militant policies on the part oftates. They probably anticipate thatpolitical change in China would occur after the passing of Mao, but they probably also do not believe they can predict whetherhange will increase or decrease Soviet-Chinese tensions. Finally,reat power
and self-styled leader of the internationalrevolution, the Soviets proclaim aod believe thai they musttrongposiuic and possess some visibleto come to the aid of their friends.
Strategic Concept*
oviet doctrine calling for early and massive use of nuclear weaponsar in Europe wasecade ago. While wc have seen some evidence thai this doctrine has been questioned, we have seen nothat an alternative has been developed The Soviets have always believed it would be difficult to control or limit hostilities once nuclear weapons had been used, they may also believe that their doctrineeterrent effect inIs, that NATO would choose not toar to begin rather Ihan to face early and missive nuclearBut this sword cuts both ways; their restricted capability to fight limited nuclear wan at graduated levels of effort narrows their flexibility; thus, they could bo put Into the position of having to choose between standing down themselves or going nuclear on an Intercontinental scale
n alternative to this dilemma for both sides would be to keep hostilities conventional. At the moment, the problems which the Soviets would facerolonged conventional war probably do not trouble them very much, perhaps because they believe that NATO does notis not nowonventional war. But the.Soviets must also recognize lhat NATO would have some significant advantages, especially in economic resources and population, over the Pact in sustained conventional warfare. Therefore, if the Soviets came to believe lhat the dianees of war breaking out la Europe were likely to rise, ihey might wish to widen their options by improving their capabilities for sustained
conventional warfan and byetter menus ol conducting limited nuclear warfare at various levels of effoit.
reas of Modernization
large military forces, regardlessvarious doctrinal, political, historical,decisions which affect theirarc concerned with the question ofup to date whatever the existingbe. and the Soviet forces are noon wc will discuss how they mighttheir forces depending upon howview the oced for doctrinalchanging international relations ofor their overall military posture-policy. In this section, we willin which medcrnization seems likelyplace In the short term. How fastmodernization Is. of course, notpolitical and doctrinal considerations,some major decision is made thein existence seems likely to continuefew yean at least.
In Ihe Theater Forces
ground forces will continuemodernized with the introductionsystems currently in production,followed by new systems by IheSoviet medium lank productionwill continue at Its preseni pace.ew Soviet tank (which isdevelopment) with improvednight vision and range-findingeater series production, and by theit could account for about one-thirdtank force Production of amphibiousprobably increase as the Sovietsmeet their APC requirement of oneThe Soviets will also producefor lift of personnel and cargoadditional air defense systems forof their field forces against thethreat. In tactical nudear rocketry.
missiles of ihc Scud family will continue to bc deployed, and Scalcboard will probably bc more widely dqiloyed. Soviet logisticalwill improve through the addition of larger numbers of medium and heavy cstgo carrying vehicles.
he Sovieu have initiated production of three new tactical aircraftnd these probably will be delivered to Frontal Aviation through the. Two of the aircraft are variable geometry-winged tighten for air defense and ground attack, and the thirdircraft that is expected to be deployed in the reconnaissance andstrike roles. Developmental test programs have been identified which suggestew fighter bomber will enter service in the next three to four yean. Deployment of die new aircraft probably will be accompanied by the phasing out of older model fighter and light bomber aircraft introduced in the, which still compriseourth of Frontal Aviation aircraft. Deliveries of mobile SAM systems now being deployed with front and army air defense units probably will continue through the.
In Strategic Forces lor Aitock in But aiia
he only discernible trend in land-based missiles is the introduction of weapons of ICBM range in the peripheral attackn SLBMs at leastass ballistic missile diesel submarine is being retrofitted, but we now have no evidence upon which toonfident estimate of whato be installed.
Farview, of Mai. Cen. Phillip B. Davidioo. An Want Olid of Stall for Intelligence. Department of the Army; Rear Adna. Earl F. Rcctaum. Director el Naval IntdUaWoa. DaparUDeot of the Navy; and Brla. Cen. Edward fUtkovitfe,ssistant Chtaf of Staff, inienajeoee. USAF, ace theiro
The newackfire swing bomber will probably be deployed in the It will be well suited fort will probably carry both bombs and ASMs. and could achieve an initial operationalas early as3isting weapon systems are used. The Badger is probably being retrofitted with thend will probably be kept in the foicc through the decado.
In General Purpose Naval Forces
ons auction of current classes ofcruisers, destroyers, and patrol craft will continue through the- Decline of submarine strengthesult of systematic retirement of older less capable diesel units will bo offset by an increase in tho number of nuclear-powered submarines to some two-thirds of the force,et effect ofoffensive and- defensive capabilities in undersea warfare. Major surface ship coostruc-fcon almost Certainly will continue tomultipurpose ships with improved ASW, antiship. anti-air, and electronic warfareFollow-on classes will probably be constructed in tbe.esult of these changes, the composition of thocombatant fleet could changemissile equipped combatants couldfromercent of the major surface ships1 to someercent
s Soviet fleet capabilities improve, naval air forces will continue to be used to support the missions of coonlcring submarines and carrier tasks forces in the open ocean. Soviet capabilities in ASW sensors, weapons, and tactics will almost certainly grow. There .will be more widespread deployment of tbe May ASW patrol aircraft. ASW seniors, and weapons stores. Naval Badger aircraft are probably being equipped with the AS-fl mLsiue indicating Soviet interest in keeping the Badger
C. Illustrative AlMrnolivc Force Postures
The analysis and Information in the preceding section suggest strongly thatimprovements and expansions will take place in the armament of the Soviet forces. But there is much that we do not know andmuch that is unknowable. Our lack of knowledge of specific plans for the size, corn-position, and weaponry of Soviet forces springs not only from intelligence gaps but also from the hkeLhooJ that the Soviet leaders have not made decisions on some importantOn some questions, they may simply be marking time until requirements can be more dearly discerned; moreover, new questionsdecisions will arise from time to time as the decade progresses.
Wc hove, therefore, adopted thetool of four alternative illustrative force postures, with the differences between them tied principally to ways In which the threat might develop or be perceived. They also take account of some basic Soviet policies, such as modernization of the navy, and the opportunities and limiUtions produced by technological considerations. There are, ofloor and an upper limit to alternative postures. At the lower end, some of thehistorical, and ideologicalwe have outlined come intoSoviet fear of Invasion, tbe length of Soviet borders, need for expansion of tbe navy in order to maintain an effective presence on tbe high seas, tbe desire to maintain SovietIn Eastern Europe, and the overriding necessity of protecting the homeland. At the upper end are the constraints of time andFor gcncaal purpose forces, tho task of enlarging, training, and re-equipping takes
considerable time aod meams that, even when projecting forceshere arc measure-able limits to what can be done.
There arc, of course, an almost infinite number of possible force postures. By(hem into four broad categories, wc have in effect ignored the shadings and variations which exist. Thus, Postures A, B. C.s described below canariety of stages between them, not only in the basiccircumstances which we describe but also in theterras of forcetructure, andthe Soviet leaders might draw from them. Thus, theof four postures and the tables which illustrate them tend to create an illusion of knowledge and precision which do not exist.
s based upon the assumption that many of the current steps toward the easing of international tensions will continue for some time, that Is, that an atmosphere of detente will dominate the next five yean or so. In more specific terms, it assumes that some agreements at SALT will be initialed and that arms control talks will continue, that talks to achieve MBFR will take place and produce some results, that the West German Ostpolitik will not be abandoned and tlie treatiesto date will be ratified, that further movement toward detente in Europe will take place and US-Soviet relations will improve, and that there will not be serious crisesthe area of Europe to disturb US-Soviet-West European relationships.ocs notignificant improvement inrelations, but it does note that these relations have slightly improvedight continue to do so.
ssumes that progressthe easing of international tensions bas slopped. SALT and MBFR talks have not produced major agreements; the Ostpolitik founders and the treaties remain in Umbo;onsequence detente in Europe docs not
go forward, though relations do not become bitter. Soviet-Chinese relataons are clouded by rising suspicions, and tbe Soviet leaders arc mistrustful of US-Chinese relations.in Arab-Israeli relations continue and may have risen. In short, tho Soviet leaders arc uncertain about the future; they areto aggravate the situation by engaging in enlarged military programs at highcosts, but neither are they willing lo assume any risks by curtailing existing
ssumes that international relationships have deteriorated. Negotiations have broken off with mutual recriminations. Ostpolitik has foundered. The Chinese have become more truculent, perhaps because their relations with the US have improved, perhaps because their military capabilities haveperhaps because anti-Soviet elements are in political ascendancy. In sum. thehave become disappointed with the policy of detente, have become fearfuluture conflict, and have concluded that they ought to strengthen their forces by speeding upby developing greater flexibility, and by new deployments and increased
ssumes that international relationships not only have deteriorated but that the Soviet leaden have responded with heightened fear and bdlicosity. Those inleadership who had doubts about the policy of detente wouldreater voice. They would die any developments abroad which appeared unfavorable to tbeimproved US-Chinese relations, an end to the Ostpolitik. rising tensions in the Easternupward revisions In the US defense effort,signs of enmity toward the USSR and of the need for the USSR tofor tbe worst. Io short, the Soviets would conclude that they ought to develop greater
flexibility and stamina, and increase their military capabilities across ihc board.
n military terms would mean the thinning out of forces in tho forward area facing NATO, tho reduction of the readiness status of some divisions in the European USSR, and probably the disbandment of somealtogether In the Far East it would mean halting the buildup, though not necessarily stopping the filling out of some ol the units now incomplete (especially In the supportodernization of Soviet ground and tactical air forces would continueod-crate pace- In strategic attack forces, missiles deployed for Ibe peripheral role would decline, and theoDow-on system (subject to any agreed limitations) partially replaceomber forces would be modernizedeasured pace, but would decline in numbers. The navy would continue its modem-fradon, though the introductioo cf new types of ships and weapons would slow down.
n rrulitary terms would mean that the forces opposite NATO in Europe would be unchanged in numbers, but that their armament would improve withof the modernization program. TheIn the Far East would continue to fill out forces now under development. Peripheralwould be permitted to decline in numbers, but qualitative improvements would beandollow-on systemincreased. The medium bomber force would be permitted to decline, but thewould move In steadily to make up for some of this decline. Tbe navy would continue to modernize, with new types introduced more rapidly than under Posture A.
Inhe forces deployedNATO would beumber, but their modernization would be more rapid. Division! at the lowest states of readiness would be made more able to move into action quickly. The most important change would be the introductionider range of tactical nudear weapons to increase flexibility, with accompanying revisions in doctrine andThe buildup in the Far East would ion tinue with emphasis on the increased readiness of the units deployed there and on theof logistic buildup. The introduction of new and improved tactical air and air defense systems would be speeded up. Peripheralattack capabilities would be enhanced. Theollow-on system would be deployed in larger numbers to make up for the phasing out of old missile systems."the decline ua tbe total site of the medium bomber force would be more than overcome by the deployment of substantial numbers of the high-performance Backfire. The navy would not be significantly larger than under Posture B. but new ships, submarines, and aircraft would be deployed more rapidly.
Under Posture D, tbe number and readiness of the divisions opposite NATO and China would be increased. Divisions at lower conditions of readiness would be raised,trategic reserve created in the Far East.on in the Far East would be strengthened and modernization of aircraft speeded up as rapidly as possible- Peripheral missile forces would increase, as would sub-marines assigned to the peripheral attack role; production of Backfire would be accelerated. Naval surface forces would be increased in
tbe vitw, af MaJ. Geo Phillip B. Davtdwe, AiiiiUnr Chief of Staff for lirfeUirenca. Department cf the Army; Heararl F. rUetaaoa, Director af Naval leaelbtMKa. Department ot ttw Navy; td Beta. Con. Edward Kiilovich. Actm| AiiOUnt Chief of Staff.. USAF. see Iheir footnoteon
Forwi ofan.hief of Staff for LstaiLfencn.the Array; Rear Ada. Earl F. IWctaeoa,Naval Intrlhtence.of theCon. Edward Ratkovkh. AcUaf Assistantsea theira
40
terms of capability to land and supply forces by sea. submarines and naval air strength and capabilities would be substantially increased. Under Posture D. ibe Soviets would also e. lend further their developmentider range of tactical nuclear mis. silcs; they would still wish to avoid inslant escalation to strategic nuclear war in Europe. They would calculate lhat. in ihc atmosphere of Posture D. the US and its allies id the West would be made more capable of fightingresort to nuclear weapons (especially if Soviet tactical nuclear capabilities had fmhey would therefore attempt also lo improve their capability toustained conventional war. so as to avoid being the first side lo resort to nuclear weapons.
omparison of Illustrative Potturtt In the tables which follow, we bave notetailed breakdown of all weapons and forces, and we have rounded off figures to permit easy and quick appraisal of the changes from one posture to another. It is
important lo note, when examining tables such as these, that tabular renditions of numbers of men. divisions, regiments, aircraft, ships, or missile Uunchers provideart of the picture There are other factors affectingwhich we cannot quantify or are unquan-tifiable. such as doctrine, training,of command and controlhe quality of the logistical system, and military morale. Weaknesses or strengths in these things can at least to some degree moddy the effects of greater or lesser numbers.
c make no choice between thewe have illustrated. We do this partly because they are intended as Illustrative and not as definitive. We believe lhat the upper and lower limits of Soviet strength between now9 will lie roughly betweenA and D. but where within this range the Soviet forces will actually develop will depend largely upon how the Soviet leaders react to the developing world situation.
m_T-
ILLUSTftATIVK rORCK FOSTURluS
Tho*OAlurrj. iIlgtUiL*areaIiwuMirectly
or pon* tftMl
an Uf*fricf^'i^f
.
|
r
i
i
lmMmIIm)
0
0
0
DtvMJonal) .
r
0 1
.-Ml
tO00l
VMiOftal aa per-
Ofml
.tOO
UvMbm
:y
DtWy Ua*cV
fr*nl*ldeclW greatly in *wt imf Heady indeclineI*Andin cut.
inicrreptor. fiiMer bomber,irlift brottf hi In. al more rapid put. In
f4aheraft deployed in
.
Refjiiwent
Mif
New Mach, 10 ISO On
.ISC 0 0
Not nvfUar KK)
T)
Nuclear capable
(Haw, lAattf Ual),
titf*/
(IL-2S>Nu-eka* i
{PvibaO {NotiUae ea>
afcl)
TcHaJ
ozena-
THEATER FORCES AT MID-YEaR
lUiUbfe for military pUaninf* pufpoit* To* Deicnfrc planmn* pirmi. Iht ttttUi lUoultt ceuiulirfcAM*rr PrOjecUOfti for PlmaiuiW
dumber* ofnctunccd in CvrOfW Uvtofia Europe ttx *HI Readi.
CrtMCil oppoiile China oluch uC Strilffic
Europe andf offteppedoppoitte GWa. Mottomention much
Supportn relation tos.ppoc*onudrnWyUor>
IfH-ffiMy. uriioilO*rdivttionalIncreurdaveflnai And enn-
vrntional Capability.
Including aiiv* rr*iinr<
im
0
|
fWo.OTXi
II
<
.
)
on-divisional-
r.. -| (Aral
Ol (QUI
Tmb
.GCC
It j
uclaa. Deb very Launch-
Launched
"
34
0
770
decline slightly in And iteedy ininndast- Same
5eme ne* aircraft a* in. but newa foiAurc B. but come in even more
mole fighter bomber andikeIa addition, ainterceptor deployed end
wait come in much
Rejimtn t 0 men each >
I nU'ttpttr* TtMQl
Older
19)
CurrantMi.j
MackRof-
FiftSurtmt...
Not nuciW
ucleu oApable fSU
7)
underfamicraL-2S. Yak 2t)
n n i
Tof#f
<Foiba.t)
.
Tola! frontal Aviatjon.
to
.6S0
SCCRCT
ILLUSTRATIVE FORCE TORTURES FORCES FOR
Theae lore* poeturee llloMeoie dll'triai imphuaSoviet force* lo*
operasff Euwia tAd pnuibl* iifi-.di ibey mid tohe.vcK arc nol di'tCll*
A
Numberi ofc*oi
RBMfcf
l
i II
Number* of miiln decba* bjpCfcHl Dite^pvtooeetpUce* more MRBM/
yevenv
HtAUtl rlllkt
as-4
MRBM/IRBM
laapfovod SS-14 of tf>w
nd/or Near ICBH
MM* oMomKroi o ooly tubrnertoe deployed for port eonreriienj aro alio deployed for
^* tfaJ iUiWteueel
3 4 3 4 4
Q4 (3)
mm IMB1
H-ll SH-41
G-tll>
UlW ) ) 1 )
B'fare- rut io lulf. Backfire deployed In Toul force reduced byercent* Backfire
ti roroo
[Abort botf vmb 7
(Abort half
Be*Wi* (Aboui haJf *ltb
Seeo page IX
Borobere phoJO out before ASM
RTRarrnic attack in cura^ia
MUM lorpwt. tbe
cmulL lK*iUiVwfor rUnft.oe
r
ri Number* of roueilet r u of miieA.ee ImhnI and
1: reirWeet MftBMrJlROMe rrplet*
Mobile -ytiem inuo-
CffWDd.
*j
re depleted for
N ooe
ore
deployed (or peripheral eUatefic ittlot.
IfMl
(to 1
pboe* *
moretiea
pbo*
OOt Oi HI
ore C
FoototO
to Oi
eoem
eoore rmpieVy.
-
llXt^TRATlVt rOHCG hrjn.MW
for*rtHn^m*ciofd lotorrro 'or
anil put*iW.oar. anrl a* utrliiK
OvtJfandrwti*^OVoWojce* *Wt rWu elUp.ui fWU at rorrrotTbreoMlMf4rt rprt/irr* butll OliUrore earner* budt. OldVr vniU withdrawn Ir**
LujIf Cruiwn
12
Si
CrtWfJu*le
T- - i mm m - mr v
I 11
m.wl
l: JjfJfJ pt
by
o attack ci
m Nvjibf
. i
flidvlr aad lot ped* elUek *obman
eoter Ilrctee*
torpedo tvUod deployed Vrfinea bvercent.
AtfiMttV
dffor*
Nuclear
A notion
carrtrr
-ni
asw
car
force
coemnai
e
in eorl?cornea in ASW force pOfrl thrvveh
e* ASW helieopter come* If
ASM
A6W
. nfantry
Battnlton Loading Too me
4
HO
Infantry grow* at forrcnl pace.
9
24
MAVAL FORCES dT MID -YEAR
feeplaaauic*/eaalrf
cvnaiftl ihe Dffrnw Jn mrr Puiif.-imI
CfitiMcairoyeri enUr rwfatn and dcatraym eater
rirat nara rap-dly. Tbrae new hatmple* fleetly mat Fivepier
tap4i*
Otder
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mart
b
M*i
iilaV.
*
tpa>*
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M tattle Cmiacre
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i
it
it
tr
44
Ill
34
*
07
41
3 94
0
tt
2
<
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107
34
n li
97
03
H 0
n
mJaaflc and torpedo attackind torpHo attack aubaa/iriae
eater flafU mace rajaalj,cratcicrflaataaaare raptatlT.qvJctar
a*de attack avbaaafiaa Sabaaaria*atuct ea4 trmt
drclineiaroe dccLaea byereroi
aYwMal
Hacker
36
33
4*tac*
23
carrier forte arewr aa nc* ASM ASM wrier iwc* fro*e M new ASM
earner cornea ia. ASWrri pa* threwfV* earner comae ui aaaea rapidly.te- ASW Wkcaptar to pawItTOa, Ha* ASW bewceptor
aircrrJ:
Carrier-.
Tinker .
W
HeKaapteca
Ufi
Infantry jrotri
at current
(raw
mucb man
eam*
A7
MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS1
WARSAW PACT FORCES FOR OPERATIONS IN EURASIA
CONTENTS
NATURE OF.
Pago
II.
.. 1
THE STATUS OF SOVIET FORCES ALONG THE SINO-SOVIET
Divisions
Fortified
Logirtie
III.
Frontal
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EQUIPMENT AND
Cround Forces
Nuclear Warhead Storage tn Eastern
Lena-Yield Tactical Nuclear Weapons
Man Portable SAM
New Soviet
Naval
Ai'-Ass&ciated
'* Missile: The KY-9
Frontal Aviation and Air
7
RAM-P
Tactical Air-to-Surface Missiles (ASMs)
ind
Passive Defense
IV. TACTICAL ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE
WARSAW PACT FORCES FOR OPERATIONS IN EURASIA
NATURE OF CHANGES
L In the short time which has elapsed since1 was issued, there have beendevelopments which should be brought to the attention ol those holding that Eiti-mate. These developments include new orInformation oa troop deployment, weapon systems, or force capabilities. InCIA and DIA have been carrying out joint research on Warsaw Pact logistic sup. port, and their study to date provides more reliable data than were available at the rime that1 was published. Also, new analysis it available on the USSR'sfor antisubmarine warfare (ASW)in defense of its own naval forces and merchant shipping. The remit of this Utter analysis is presented at Anand summarized ia the text of this memorandum. The new information and rcanalysii has not altered our basic judgments in NIEe find those judgments to be still valid.
II. THE" STATUS Of SOVIET FORCES ALONG THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER
Dioifionr. The size and disposition of Soviet forces along the bolder with China have remained generally unchanged sinceofe-evaluation of the Pacific Fleet area has indicated that the naval infantry forces there are being organizedivision-like structure. No new divisions have been added in the immediate border area ia the last yearalf, and the Soviets may now concentrate on rilling out units already deployed there. They have, however, recently deployed major elementsotoriied rifle division in the Siberian Military Districthe initial elements of the division arrived thisdther divisions In the MD.
In the Central Asian MD. four garrison areas that had been thought to house two understrength and incomplete divisions wee found to bousesingle and nearly full strength motoriied rifle division. Conse-
fifxncr
f GCCflE*-
the estimated number of divisions In lhat MD has been reduced from the seven cited in1 lo in
Fortifiedc Sovietsefensive concept first UMd in the Soviet Far Eait in theo defend against Japanese incursions. As many asoviet combat unitsew type arc deployed in the FarMD along major avenues of approach from China. These units are not identical in itruc-tuie. They are about half the sizeolor-iied rifle regiment and lack tho infantry maneuver elements but have more fiieThese new units probably are partefensive formation knownfortified area" (ukreplyennyy rayon) which thedefine as as area with prepared field fortificationsermanent garrison to man them.
Each fortified area typically has pre-pitted defensive positions, including artillery and anti-aircraft gun emplacements, tank revetments, trenches, and bunkers- Nearyby. in garrison areas, are the new type units which would probably occupy the fieldin time of crisis. One other fortified area may be located in the Transbaykal MD. Additional fortified areas may exist elsewhere in the border area.
e believe that these fortified area units provide (a) increased border securitythe KGB Border Guard unitsalong thereedom to commit ground divisions to other actions; andime delay factor to permit mobltiza-lion and reinforcement of existing general purpose forces along the border.
ogistic Support. Emphasis continues to be placed on developing better logisticparticularly at higher ground forcefor the combat forces already deployed along Iho border. Since publication ofew army and front-level support
units have been identified and others have received additional equipment. This process is continuing By now. most divisions have their essential combat and combat support units. Heretofore, the bulk of tlic border units lacked cargo trucks and logistic supportNow, however, they are receiving these trucks and personnel, thereby reducing the shortages which in the past have limited their ability to cany out operations. Present indications are that the Soviets do not intend lo bring all their divisions in the border area to full combat strength but insteada force which would be maintained at reduced strength and would require theof reservists andcargothe civilian sector prior to operations. Nevertheless, because of their remoteness from mayor urban sources of manpower and equipment, the divisions along the Sino-Soviet border .probably will be manned and equipped at higher levels than units in tho western USSR.
Aoiorion, Since NIEaircraft have been added lo Frontalunits on the border, and there hasslight increase in numberso. There has beenIncrease in numbers.
HI. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EQUIPMENT AND ORGANIZATION
Ground Forces
Warhead Storagt InIne noted lhatstorage facilities existed inThese were at fivein East Cermany, Hungary, andThere were also seven othersites, whose subordination wasbul whose function might be theof nuclear warheads for tacticalmissiles and rockets. Subsequent to
" SCCRCT
Ihohere have boon no significant changes atsties. Five moieintended to hold tactical nudearbeenEvidence indicates that thcie sites are operational, and they appear to be occupied by th* Soviets.
Of thetorage sites apparentlyitiitg tactical missile utiils. two arc in East Cermany. three in Poland, three in Ciecho-slovalia. one in Hungary, and three inMost of them are set off by themselves but are withiniles of tactical missile units or support facilities, either Soviet or EastAll the sites were constructed6
The locations and sire of the sitesthat each is designed to support one Scud missile brigade and the three to five FROC (frce-rocket-over-fhe-fround) battalions nor-mally found In an army area. Ii this pattern is repeated throughout Eastern Europe, an additional eight to nine sites may be found there. The five storage sites associated with Soviet airfields in Eastern Europe may also be intended to hold warheads for tactical missiles. Thedentified sites coulduclear weapons, depending on storage arrangements.
We believe the Soviets are now storing nuclear weapons at nuclear storage sites in Eastern Europe. Soviet concepts of howwar in Europe is likely to evolvethe importance ofassive coordinated nuclear strike once it wasthat NATO would introduce nuclear weapons. This concept would require asupply system structured to deliver warheads to the missile units swiftly andinimum chance of disruption.
Lout-Yield Tactical Nudear Weapons. Ine noted that Warsaw Pact
forces had some capability to exercise nuclear options shorttrategic nuclear strike and that their targeting doctrine called for use of nuclear weapons against maneuver and sup-puit elements. Wc also noted that llic Soviets had the technical capability to develop nuclear artillery rounds, but that llieie was nothat they had done so. We continue to receive unconfirmed reports that tin; Soviets haveuclear artillery round, but we still have no persuasive evidence lhat they have done so.
he mobileystem, designed to provide medium, to high-altitude defense for ground forces, is now extensively deployed in the USSR and with the CSFC. It has now also appeared in limited numbers with the Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia and Hungary. There is no firm evidence of deployment with Soviet forces in Poland.
SA-tf. Deployment of theobile low-altitude air defense missile system has now been identified with Soviet ground force units In East Cermany. Severalnits have been activeoviet training area In East Cermany. but their subordination cannot be determined.nits alio are deployed in five ground force division areas in the USSR. Thenit appears to be replacing the divisional anti-aircraft artillery regiment. It is not known whether this is also the case with thenits in East Cermany.
Thenit in Soviet ground force division areas in the USSR apparently consistsaunch battalions, eachriplecquisition radar,racking and guidance radars. Each battalion probablyiring uniti, eachriple launchersracking and guidance radar.
Uan-Portoble SAM. Since publication ofe have acquired no new information regarding the deployment with Soviet forces of the man-portable, shoulder-
firedrail. We have, however, obtained considerable infotmatioci on its technicalDuring the North Vietnamesein the springheas introduced into South Vietnam.issiles and launchers were captured by Southforces, and preliminary examination of the captured equipment (manufactured in l'J*yi) confirms that our earlier assessment of theas generally sound. Thes believed to be effectiveaximum rangeautical miles (nm) and up to aaltitude ofeet. The missile speed is unknown at this time, but is likely to be supersonic
The system intercept capability in any particular engagement is heavily dependent on the target speed, altitude, maneuvers, and infrared signature In most cases the target would be engagedail-on aspect. The missilemall warheadounds and containingound of high explosive) andirect hit to be effectived
New Soviet Tanks. There is evidenceew type medium tank is now at least in limited series production. The plant which produces these tanks is not known.
The new tank is conventional in design :itiJ tl-cs not appear toignificantimprovement overtto bc armedun similar to the US mm smoothbore armament ofccording to one source, it is lower, faster, and quieter than ptesent Soviet tanks and is equippedultilayercd composite armor to reduce spilling and provide betteragainst nuclear radiation.
- SI. The in: v. t,ill presumably be Issued initially to Soviet units to replace the older tanks in tbe inventory. If the new tank isat the same rate as tbe
erT-SSsillto comprise the bulk of the Soviet force through.
new light amphibious tankul the stale or extent of itscannot bc determined. This tank Isthend is armedun and an antitank guidedIt is air droppable.
orces
Air-Associated Combatant. The Soviets are in the process ofarge ship at Nikolayev. It is reportedly about twice the displacement of the Moskva-classship. We believe that the new large ship Is designed to carry helicoptersTOL aircraft. It could be operational byhip could be capableumber ofASW,air defense, and possibly limited tacticalon the aircraft(Including helicopters) and thesituation. It probably will not be an attack aircraft carrier in the Western sense.
Possible9 the Soviets have been testing at shortallistic missile capable of maneuvering in flight to change tbe Impact point of the re-entry vehicle (RV)f
here Kill iff many uncertainties, about the ultimate objectives
"
weapon system, it will probably turn out to0in) navalmissile. It appears suited to attacking movingcarriers and other major surface ships, for example. But it Is also possible that it iseapon system in itself, butest bedQ
frontal Aviation and Air Defense
uring the past year there have been increasing indications that Ihe Soviets arcgreater attention to the ground attack role in Frontal Aviation, New aircraft such as Ftoggcr androvide morefor use of air defensehe ground attack role. Fishbed units have also increased their ground attack training. The newill provide improvedweapons delivery capability. Increased emphasis on aerial reconnaissance adds better target acquisition capability. Electronic coun-termeasure support to Frontallso being improved to provide active and passive countermeasures for an attacking force. These changes will provide Sovietreater flexibility in tho use of Frontalto support ground forces In conventional or nuclear operations.
eployment. The variaUe-geornetry-wing tighten, Floggcr andrc con* bnuing to be deployed with operational units, butlow pace. Sinceas been delivered to two regiments and thero are now aboutn service.
Flogger deliveries resumed in May of this yeariatus of someonths. (The Soviets had delivered about) Evidence suggests that at least one andtwo squadrons have been deployed with one regiment in the weslern USSB. This could bring total Floggcr in service to someircraft. During the gap in deliveries,continued at the two airframe plants involved, and the delay in deliveries may have been due to technical difficulties which have now been eliminated.
Deployment of the reconnaissanceof theoxbat to Frontal Aviation Is still limited to one training unit, although the number Increased fromhe Soviets are contiauing to deploy
SCCRCT
intcrccplor variants of tlte Foibat wiih the air dofcnsa force, however, and the priority given to satisfying the initial needs of this force may account for the slow deliveries to Frontal Aviation.
Soviets arc continuing to
arge variable-geometry-wingaircraftange andforis considerably greaterof tho aircraft now In Frontalprobably be employed in
Frontal Aviationighter-bomber aircraft
C
will likely beat the Novosibirsk aircraft plant, the current production site for the FlagonIt will probably enter production there when Flagon production draws to aprobably by the end of this year. If so. It will probably enter service with Frontal Aviation
actical Air-to-Surface Missiles (ASMs).
a maximum range of aboutmpeed of about
S
t may be an antiradiation weapon hrike. but other possible guidance such as television or incrtial command cannot be ruled out The missile could enter service
n addition, the Soviets may now be equipping some of their Frontal Aviation forces in East Cermany with another tactical ASM. Lastissile that resembles the US BuTJpup was photographed1 fighter In East Cermany. It has been
designated thoerry. The missile was fuedround target aboutm from the aircraft. No testing of this missile has been detected in llic USSR, however, and it has ivot been seen again in East Cermany since September. It is nol known, therefore, how widely the missile is deployed or how its guidance system functions.
ind Helicopter. Tlic Soviets have developed and arcew assault helicopter, theind. It isdestined for service wiih FrontalProduction at Arsenyev in the Far East MD had reached an estimateds of the end ofnitial deployment Isthis year, probably to existingunits in tbe Far East and Transbaykal MDs.
The Hind Isunship, in the sense that the US Huey Cobra and Cheyenneare gunsiiips, but is basically an armed transport, like other Soviet helicopters. It can canyersons in addition to the crew. There are, however, some important features which improve its capability for armed missions;
is more maneuverablc. with itsmaximum speednots, somenots faster than theip.
has stub wings which carry armament and add lift and stability in cruising flight.
ow silhouette and narrow profile. These features, together with its speed, will makeore difficult target for ground fire.
ind's primary mission probably will be to provide armed support and transport for airmobile or helibonie operations; it probably will also bc used for other combat support The Soviets have used helicopters in anrole during exercises, but few details are available. There is no indication that theIntend to employ large numbersrimary antitank weapon.
hcro is no evidence that Hind machine guns, cannons, or other weapons will be con. tained in an armament turret faired into the fuselage as on US gunshlps. Some Hind have two ordnance prions under each stub wing while one has been seen with what appears toocket under the wing. Hind'soptions probably are similar to those of older Soviet mediumHound andip- -which can carry ma. chine guns, cannons, unguided rockets,guided missiles, and bombs.
assive Defense Measures. Tho Soviet Union, andesser extent her Warsaw Pact Allies, continue lo implement theirprogram to increase the survivability of essential military systems by hardening against nuclear and/or conventional weapons.Staff and CSFC command, control, and communications facilities have been provided bunkers and hardened antennas. Construction of hangarettes has continued to tbe point that most Frontal Aviation airfields in Easternand the USSR possess such protection. Most of the SAM-assodated dcerronic vans of the air defenses of the front have also been protected by revetments.
IV. TACTICAL ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE '
ver the last dozen years the Soviet Navy hasubstantial effort to build up Its, capabilities for ASW. Soviet Interest In the subject appears to have been greatly stimulated by tho advent of the nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine and the new strategic dimensions It provided. Inhowever, an overwhelming proportion of
'This lectJoo aumnuutxei an evaluation of Soviet tactical ASW equipment operations, and eapahlllMei contained in an Annei to this Memorandum to Holders ot
the Soviet ASW effort to date has beento Ihe lactical aspect ofhe defense of Soviet naval foices and shipping against hostile submarines. Thisis primarily concerned with ihe Soviet tactical ASW effort, though it necessarilyequipment which can be used forASW operations. Le, against Polaris.
SW detection gear and weapons have been provided for all surface combatants, though they all have substantial armaments for other purposes. Much of the coastal defense force, the largest In the world, is designed for ASW operation. All Sovietpurpose submarines have some potential for ASWlthough more than half the nudear-propelled units are equipped with cruise missiles and are intended primarily for use against surface ships, and the remainder, based on their operations, are multipurpose attack submarines. Since the. tlie Soviets have Introduced long- and medium-range ASW aircraft as well as improved coastal types. The Soviet Navy also has both land-based and shipboroe ASW helicopters.
ach of the four fleet commandersariety of ASW-capable surface, air. and submarine units under his command, and ASW cxerdses haveegular feature of fleet level training. Most of these involve short-range operationi. Recently, however, thehave shown increasing concern overASW protection in their sea approaches, suggesting that they intend to extend their ASW defenses further to sea. In the major annual exercises conducted by the Northern and Pacific Fleets, ASW activity has grown to include what are probably combined ASW
nuclou-KOwcred balliilic mlulbabo carry taniefloos. but their ASW capabrhUei
are nothere.
fiCCttCT
and search operations oil* northASW operations were carried outIhc0 exerciselthough over three-quarters of the defending forces wore principally engaged in anticarrier and antishipping operations. The SovietSquadron has also practiced the forma-lion of combined ship and submarine barriers across the Sicilian Straits and south of Crete. ASW has received less attention in other out-of-area operations although some practice in escorting convoys has taken place
the sizeable effort (hemade with the tactical aspects ofresults to date have not beenSoviet ASW operations andfailed to demonstrate the Ucaca!and proficiency needed to cope withnuclear submarine. Mostall, almost all Soviet sensor systemsinadequate to the task oflocalizing enemy submarines beforeclose enough to attack.
older major Soviet surfacefirst or second generation sonarsranges of no morereven under the most favorableThe Moskva ASW helicopter carrierthe Krivak destroyer arethe latest model sonars, which haveranges ofconvergence zone0 nm)with thesen all,thanajor Soviet ships0 yards. Mostperformance appears to be furtherby deficiencies in signal processingstructure which prevent fullthe sonars range potential
' Direct.court*lo ili- target and bcMirxwi back to the tcunc
'Converger**looet of sound fccui-Inf more lhan JO mueaow, occoniai to many deepwator ocean inn
lthough there has been steadySoviet capabilities in submarine sonars alto remain inferior to those of Ihe US. Many sonars are of older and less efficient types. Even the more modem ones havtpassive ranges only about half those of modem US submarine sonars, in partof design limitationi and because of the high level of noise generated by Soviet
Improvements in Soviet ASWand training are expected. The Soviets are probably continuing to experiment with low-frequency sonars to extend the detection range and improve the accuracy ofn ASW is also going on In other areas- They will probably also take some steps to reduce the high noise levels of theirImprovements can also bc expected in other areas of ASW technology, including weapon design.
Over the next few years, however, the Soviet Navy will not have any significant capability for defending its seaborne forces from attack bym submarines,nuclear. Even if new sonars and other modem detection gear are Introduced, iheir uytroduction in the bulk of the surface fleet unils wouldumber of years.the ASW task will be compb'cated by US development aod replacement programs.
V. WARSAW PACT LOGISTIC SUPPORT
The assessment of Warsaw Pact logistic support contained inf1 reported some sigruiicant analytical problems. These are still under study. Sigiiificanthas been made in tbe areas which are discussed below.
Manning Factors. Wo now have good evidence on the planning factors osed toWarsaw Pact ammunition requirements.
.ill hough we must still make someIn applying tlicm. To dctctminc tSerequirements. Warsaw Pact planners use estimated expenditure rates calculated in accordance with the type of combat expected. Consumption is expected to be more rapid In the attack phase than in the exploitation phaseampaign oreriod of passiveTlunti) estimated expenditure rales arc calculated for each weapon and unit and are expressed in terms of so many units (or partial units) of fire, each unit of fireixed number of rounds per weapon,
of such factorsarand meaningful calculation andof Warsaw Pact logisticcapabilities than our previous use ofmeasure as "days oflie 'daystandard made no allowance forthat dally expenditures vary greatlyon the specific daily eombatencountered during the course of aAlthough the term "days of supply"used in Soviet logistic writings, itIn general contexts without anyof what Specific expenditures It
o determine tbe effect of different combat situations on the logisticcnients of tlie three Warsaw Pact fronts wUdi would engage NATO forces In theRegion, two conventional war scenarios were developed. Bothday period of mobilization.day advance to the Rhine under conditionsrelatively low ammunition expenditures after the Initial days of attack. Scenario Bmuch heavier fighting and ammunition expenditure, with the Fact forces forced to halt short of the Rhine afterays of much slower advances.
The scenarios do not encompass therange of ways inarsaw Pact-
NATO battle might develop, hut they are ^faithful to Pact plans as wc understand them
'They necessarily lack elements of realism, as" they exclude important but unquantifiabtc factors. Some factors, such as interdiction,and bad weather would reduce the capabilities of the logistics systems. Other factors, such as the quality of commandan ability to alter plans and practices to meet unforeseeneither enhance or reduce the
capabilities of ibe system.
of Ammunition Slocks. Theresulted In estimates of ammunitionIbe CSFC as follows:
divisional stocks. Eachestimated to be able to carry at leastIons and possibly as much astons of ammunition loadod onvehicles, in tlie hands of troops,with crew-served weapons.number reflects Ihe tentativebasedcstudy of the motorbattalions of four CSFC divisions,number of vehicles In ammunitioncompanies might be higher Ihanestimated.
depots.he CSFC haveto store atnd possibly as muchoviet army and front-levelstorage facilities in Fast CermanyanThe high side of the rangeeffect of adding suspected storage fa-to those confirmed as being for
Stocks. POL (petrol, oil,of (he CSFC ground forces arealetric tons. East Cer-
m
TACTICAL ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE
{Vote: This Anne* evaluates the Svvict Navti'* eiiuiimertl, nprratians. and viiitnhilitlct lor tactical antisubmarine warfarethe defame of Soviet naval surface forces and shipping, against hostile submarines.
SOVIET TACTICAL ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE FORCES
The Soviet Navy has traditionally been most concerned with preventing hostile naval forces, whether surface ships or mbmarir.es. from operating lo lis borne waters and their approaches. To this end it has long maintained the largest coastal defense force in the world, much of It designed for antisubmarineWith the expanding scope of Soviet naval high sea operations, Iwwevcr, defense offorces has become moreactor.
Most of the principal components of the Soviet Navy now have some capability forwarfarehe offshoreforces are charged with coastal ASW and protection of intra coastal shipping. Aerial ASW support is provided by naval aviation units to each fleet in coastal areas, in the open ocean, and in the Mediterranean. The larger Soviet multipurpose surface ships from escort size on up. while performing their primary missions, are responsible for their own defense againstre responsible for escorting some convoy groups and occasionally assisting in coastal defense. The submarinerole In ASW is small butbeen observed, albeit Infre-quendy. conducting submarine versusexercises In barriers.
The ASW-capable forces are distributed by fleets approximately as shown in the Table. The basic characteristics of these forces are outlined below.
Major Surface Forces. The major surface forces arc intended primarily for generaloperations. Tbe current forcehips (excluding those deployed In the Caspian Sea)SW helicopter carriers.ruisers.estroyer escorts (or oceanhe Soviets designate some of their newer cruisers and destroyers as "large ASWut all of these ships have multipurpose capabilities. While these ships carry improved ASW systems, they also have strengthened air defense armaments; most of the newer units carry cruise missiles for anti-ship missions. The bulk of the ASW-equipped ships are of the destroyer escort type and arc used by the Soviets for operations conducted withinautical miles (nm) of Ihe USSR or In the Mediterranean Sea.
Tho newest of the major combatants is the Kara-class missile cruiser now entering service. The appearance ofon vessel may be accompanied by an end to the Kresta II program after the seventh unit is completed. Construction of the new Krivak-
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w fJIAmO
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FOnCEi CAPABLE OF ANTlSUBMAniNL1
NotlTNIHH i'. Hi Jt'M
Flo* Fuct Su Fuct Fuset
MajH Swfaer I'onu
47
Dctuoyn
Firit Line'
i* FriBlMCy or Lower Sonar)
Second Line'
requency Sonar) Coaital IWcw Foreaa
Patrol Craft.
(Ciul.a. Poll. Stenka. Olher)ir Force)
Lonf- indce
(May and Bear)
(Mai)
Holkoplon
(Hormone and Hound) Central Purpose Submarlae Form Currant. CeooratJoo (V. C. A. aod P) Early Generation
NuclearI. andnd j)
in ASW terms ai defined hero. Include
Hi or lower sonars. Them Include the Moakva. Krata II.ara and Kanin classes. Shipshei ficqoeorr tonus are included aa lecondhips deplored la Ok Caiplan Seaeiduded.
missile destroyer continues, and Istoale of three or four units per year. Construction of the older Kashin-dass appears to have ended with theof the twentieth unit
Modification activity also plays anrole In the continued upgrading of the major surface forces. Krupnyy-dass cruise missile destroyers are being converted to the surface-to-air missile-armedimilar program will probably be undertaken for the Kildin class destroyers.
Coastal Defense Forces. Smaller escorts and patrol craft provide surface ship ASW capabilities in coastal areas. In cootrast to the
major surface forces, many of Ihese units are equipped mainly for ASW tasks, although they abo perform general patrol duties.
The most important new minor com-batant of ASW interest is the Crisha-cUss. This unit is considerably larger than earlier patrol craft, and fallsategory somewherethe ocean escorts and coastal parrot craft. Construction is estimated at five to lis:per year.
Fleet Air Forces. Most of tbe ASWcurrently deployed are suitable only for operations in coastal areas. In the past few years, however, the Soviets have deployed aboutedium-range (May) and about 10
flCCRCT
(Bear F) ASW aircraft. In addition, each of Ihe two helicopter carriers canit op toSW helicopters,ew other major surface combatants can carry one or two helicopters.
ay aircraft entered service8 and continues in productionate of about one aircraft per month. In90 the Soviets also began mating an ASW version of the TVear heavy bomber, the Bear F. Production of theayow rate, although there is no evidence to confirm any increase in the force sincehe Soviets arc continuing low-rate production of theormone helicopter andail amphibian ASW aircraft
ubmarine Forces. AH Soviet general purpose submarines have some potential for ASWf theuclear-powered submarines in service, however.re armed with cruise'missiles andrimary anti-ship mission. The remainder, termedby the Soviets, exercise in antishipping and ASW roles. All Soviet submarinesto be handicapped by their noisiness in comparison to US units, but the late mode! nuclear submarinespeed advantage.
heass attackworld's fastest operationalin productionate of two units per year. Thelass cruise-missile submarine alto is being builtate of two per year. The Soviets have also built single units of two other new nuclear-powered submarines, the A-aises, but it is not known whether series pro-
* In addition then arouciwpowcrad balllitlc mtulle submarines (SSBNs) which have mm ASW potential although they ar* tottery to ba bond'mi.iig In olhrj than their itralegtc alt*ck role.
d notion is Intended.Iassruise miiiile type, and is believed to have newThe mission oflass is unknown-it couldind research vehicle or tlse prototypeew ASW submarine dass.
II. ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE WEAPONS
SW weapons In use in the Soviet Navy consist of acoustic homing torpedoes, standard depth charges, small, rocket- propelled charges (the mu'tibarrd unit) fired In salvos from surface ships,ew rocket-propelled depth charge (probablyudearon the Moskva-dass. Although these weapons apparently wotkimple exercises, their capabilities against evasive Western tactics and counterrneasures are Dot known. In addition to these ASW weapons, thoalso have mines which are believed to have ASW application, including aluminium and rising mines which apparently wereto combat Western nuclear submarines.
III. THE SENSOR PROBLEM
nvironmental conditions limit theof sensors Inubmarine and pose one of the greatest obstacles to the development of an effective ASW capability. To be effective, the sonar, the most widely used sensor, must discriminate the noise of the target submarine (or the returning echo) from its own internal noise, the platform's noise, and the ambient noise of the sea. ln the activeonar's capabilities are degraded by sound energy reflecting from the ooean surface and from the bottom, by sound energy being scattered within the ocean, and by sound energy absorption In the ocean.
be advene effects of some natural phenomena can be reduced by using sonar
whichs at loun frequencies (usuallyower-frequency signalin lessjit.on of sound in the ocean than higher-frequencyarge acoustic array is required, however, to obtainaccuracy and high-power levels at lower frequencies.
eniors. There is nothat thi* Soviets have produced acomtic Or noil-acorntic detection devices useful for long-rangem) detection ofsubmarines. The Soviets have nota large-scale acoustic underseasystem such as the US SOS USthe Soviet fixed acoustic detection devices are passive systemsange of aboutm against quiet nuclear submarines and up tomnorkeling diesel
Surface Ship Sonars. The presentof the Soviets" ASWa major factor limiting their ASW capabilities. Aboutercent of themajor ASW surface ships have old modeloHz) whichetectionf onlyards, even under the most favorableercent of the ships are equipped with sonars of theoHz range with arange ofards. These Miliars are not of low enough frequency and high enough power to provide long-rangecapability.
Fewer thanajor Soviet ships are equipped with the latest sonarsHz) with range potentials similar to those ofoperational Western sonars.Hz hull-mounted sonar is installed on tho Kanin andestroyers and probably on the KrivakHz variable depth sonar (VDS) is Installed on some Petya escort ships, the
- Moskva helicopter carrier, and tho Krivak
' RaofM given here ar* Torectioo (rauW than redfltoctton or tracking) under good conditiOni.
destroyer. The VDS enables the Soviets to fill gaps in sonar coverage resulting from layers of varying water temperatures.detection range under good conditions would be0 yards. Other new sonars employing frequencies InoHz range and with sufficient power lo achieve substantial improvements inranges are installed on the Moskvacarrier and possibly the KrivakDirect path ranges of00 yards and first con verge nee zoneom) are possible with these sonars.
3
Submarine Sonan. Despite steadySoviet capabilities with submarine sonan remain inferior to those of the US. Aboutercent of Ihc Soviet generalsubmarine forcelasses) are equipped with old model sonan which are relatively ineffective as their power levels are low and they use highonotherercent of the general purpose submarine forceIasses) are outfitted with sec-orsd-genention sonan which feature improved active and passive operation,nd greater pjwer. These second-generation 'sonan aro estimated to achieve passive detection ranges less than ooe-half those of rnodern US submarines.
Soviet submarines which have become operationalercent of the attack and cruise-missile submarine forces
ndequipped with active sonars of ehe ihird generationfa frequency. Thii frequency provides potentially long detection ranges. Soviet passive ranges arc nowto be oue-lmlf those of modern US nuclear submarines. Some of this difference in capability probably results from the high level of noise generated by Soviet submarines and possibly from poor signal processing.
Dippingipping sonar,by theormone helicopter,in active or passive modes. In the active modo the dipping sonar can probably obtain detections at ranges ofards- In the passive mode it probably obtains detection up toyards. This sonar has abo been observedew small surface ships.
Sonobuour. The Soviets have beenpassive sonobuoys since atmproved electronics and acenistic systemobserved in recovered models, have not substantially increased sonobuoycapabilities. For example, there is noof Soviet development of low frequency analysing and recording sonobuoys, despite Soviet recovery of low frequency USand their understanding of lowacoustic propagation as evidenced by their publications. Soviet failure to exploit this technology may reflect shortcomings In signal processing,aulty assessment of USquieting efforts. It is believed they haveew sortobuoy with acapability.
Magnetic Anomaly Detection. Soviet ASW aircraft, except possibly the Bear F. and some Hormones, use magnetic anomaly dc-
i lection (MAD) equipment for targetlocahza-Hon and for limited area search. SinceMAD equipment inhe Soviets have developed several systems. The
ay and at least someail are probably equippedew MAD system. Ihe May aircraft operate their MAD at higher altitudes than earlier patrol aircraft, andevidence from helicopter operationslhat Ihe new MAD system hasombined path through water and air, ahoul twice that of the earlier systems.improved radius is estimated to be0enough lo justify small area searches by MAD equipped aircraft. Higher operating altitudes and similar area searches have also been noted during recent Mail aircraft MAD operations, suggesting that some of these older aircraft may have been refitted with the new
nfrared Wake Sensor. There is some circumstantial evidenceewnds well as possibly the Bear Fmay be equipped with an experimental dotoction device, possibly an Infrared wake sensor. These aircraft have conducted searches at altitudes beyond the ranges of the most recent MAD systems. At the present time, however, Soviet technology has probably not advanced sufficiently to support more than the developmentasic Infrareddevice-
adar. Soviet airborne surface search radars are capable of detecting surfacedat ranges of up tom and exposed masts and periscopes of submerged submarines up to aboutm- None of the Soviet radars Is capable of reliably' detecting wake effects from, or trailing wire antennas on, submerged submarines. Aircraft carrying the latest Soviet airborne radar, the Weteye, apparently make some limited area searches,ewand radar Isflight testing in the Northern Fleet area.
GCCRCT
ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE OPERATIONS AND TRAINING
u terms of measurable operational anil exercise activity, (mlleal ASW accounts for the bulk of all Soviet ASW activity.
oastal Operations Most Soviet naval exercises involve short-range forces and occur near fleet bases. Approximatelyercent of Ihe ASW exercises in the Northern andFleet coastal waters include offshoreforces and other short-range forcesof long range deployment These exercises usually involve coastal forcesby ASW aircraft, both helicopter and fixed wing, as well as major surface forces.
Major Exercises. Almost every year the Pacific and Northern Fleets eachajor exercise dubbedDefense of tbe Homeland" exercise. The ASW aspect of these exercises has grown to include what probably are combined ASW barrier and search opera-Hons off north Norway.
Although the Soviets apparentlysome exercise time in0 exercise "Okean" to ASW defense In ihe oceanto the USSR, over three-fourths of tin- defending forces were principallyin anticarrier and antishipping
In major Northern Fleet exercisesbout half of the defending surface forces performed ASW activities In the area of their submarine barriers. Also, ASW patrol aircraftthe first time in anhour on the-scene coverage.
At Sea Ship Defense. The five foldIn Soviet operations to distant areas such as the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean5 has Increased navalfor fleet defense from submarineSoviet ships operate most of the time
either In small groupships or in-dependent ly jnd must rely on their own de-fense capabilities. Combatants generally do not use ASW screens defensively (screen type formations are used lo broaden the width of offensive ASWlthough the Soviets do practice escorting of merchant aadgroup convoys.
In the Mediterranean, for example, where thcru are normally aboutombatants, the Soviets generally do not employ ASW screening forces even during exercises. They have, however, practiced forming surface ship and submarine barriers across the Sicilian Straits and to the south of Crete to seat off the central and easternfrom submarine attack.
The four Soviet ASW aircraft previously stationed In Egypt had practiced fleet defect* slve roles against their own submarines both In airborne ASW barrier operations and In general reconnaissance missions. In addition, they participated in limited joint ASWwith Soviet surface ships in the eastern Mediterranean.
and Control Procedures^
[Soviet navaland control is capable of providing the communications and command structureto perform ASW tasksT
3
J
3,[
J
in; radical problems of on-sccne con-(rol of distant ASW operations differ only in Ihcir complexity from coastal and sea Bp-pruadi ASW operations. In the Mediterranean command and control of these task groups is (he responsibility of the commander of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron, except when Ihe commander of the Black Sea Fleet is present there. In either event tho effective commander of the Mediterranean Squadron might also bc involved in directing anticarrier or other naval operations.
V. TACTICAL ANTISU3MARINE WARFARE, CAPABILITIES AND OUTLOOK
lthough tactical ASW is simpler inthan strategic ASW, the Soviets stillenerally effective defense for their ships against Western nuclear submarines. Modem submarine weapons have effective ranges well beyond the potential direct path ranges ol almost all Soviet sonan (low frequency sonan being the exception).f
'J
or the future, the Soviets haveand probably are continuing towith low frequency sonan which will extend the possible detection range and accuracy of their systems. These new sonan mayottom bounce andzone capability. Variable depth sonan, to aid in detecting deep running sub-
marines, are believed to be under furtherThe Soviets also continue to work on hydro-acoustic devices, and they may haveew or modified sonobuoy into their inventory.
The Soviets are improving theof the shipbotneormone ASW helicopter. Anticipated continued effort on perfecting the autohover system of thrwould allow an nll-wcalher and night airborne ASW capability which has not been noted up to now.
Although better detection capabilities continue torimary consideration of naval research and development, the Soviets also are aware of the high noise levels of their submarines, and they will attempt to improve on the engineering aspects of this problem. The Soviets are continuing to experiment with new weapon syi(cmj as well asdeployment of existing systems. The ASW weapon system associated with the Moskva-crass helicopterbe deployed in the future on other combatants. The Soviets probably will continue to improve the performance of their ASW torpedoes as well.
Despite these continuing efforts to build ships which can defend themselves against submarines, state-of-the-art limitations remain, and the Soviets have little chance foran effective fleet defense over the next five yean or so. At least during this period, improvements In submarine weapons and the development of even quieter Westernwill probably continue the' advantage of the submarine even in the face of expected miprovernents bVSoviet ASW tactics, weapons, and acoustic sensors.
b. Director, Defense InK
Original document.
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