SECREl^ENSITIVE NO FOREIGN DISSEM
YUGOSLAVIA:
An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to)
Prepared by the Office of National Estimates. CIA. Representatives of the Intelligence Community Concurring in its Major Judgments1
DISSEM
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Ill
Economic Policy and
Foreign Pol icy< . -
Defense Pol icy ..
PRINCIPAL INTERNAL FACTORS WHICH WILL AFFECT
The Nationalities Problem Thehe Army and theissident
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MAJOR EXTERNAL 39
USSR
The Communist Countries Western
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THE FUTURE, SOME ALTERNATIVES, ANO THEIR IMPLICATIONS... S9
A. B. C.
Variables
Domestic Alternatives
A United, Independent, and Non-Aligned Yugoslavia.,
A Divided, Independent, Non-Aligned Yugoslavia
A Disintegrating Yugoslavia: ilitary Coup
Contingencyapidontingency 2: ifficult Takeover.
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CONTENTS (continued)
D. isintegrating Yugoslavia: Collapse.
Contingency 1: Contested Secession
Contingency 2: Total Disintegration...
ANNEX A: YUGOSLAV MILITARY CAPABILITIES
ANNEX B; SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIESIS YUGOSLAVIA
1
WSOSwAVIA: AS INTELLIGENCE APPRAISAL
PRINCIPAL OBSERVATIOHS
has roved deepf1cu't trans'tlcn. responding to the passagelosed to inhave begun to shift into new patterns. Its economy,away from bureeucritle Socialist controls and toward eof authority, faces an accumulation of prcol ems policies, once firmlyntd but Ideologicallythe East, are moving toward greater contact witn the Wait. Andcompletely ard overwhelmingly dominates by Titoow anxiously trying to preparender histhe day when he will no longer be there.
principal question It, can Yugoslavia survive as awithout Tito? Bitter national antagonisms between Serbbetween Serb and Albanian, and so forthand strong regional
rivalries and resentmentsetween, for example, rich Slovenia and poor Macedoniaare once again vigorously expressing themselves. Inflation, foreign trade deficits, unemployment, and economicbetween individual republics are all on the rise. And, in the face of these problems, the principal national power centers, the top command of the Communist Party (ICY) and the federal government in Belgrade, sometimes appear to be indecisive. The future of Yugoslavia without Tito thus appears, at the least, to be uncertain.
C. Still, theretrengthational will in Yugoslavia which held the state together in the past and which promises much for the future. And Titourrently using all his awesome moral authority in his efforts to preserve the peculiar Yugoslav system. He is trying to anchor the system in law, in institutions, and in traditions. He is pushing the developmentonstitutional structure of politicaland of an orderly transition to it, even before his departure. He Is seeking means to encourage the lawful expression of regional and republican interests and toattern of political and economic compromise. He is trying to persuade the army,ruly national institution, to play an Implicitly restraining role in domestic politics and to serve, if necessary, as the ultimate guarantor of federal Integrity.
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And hettempting toount'y on an 'nternatlonal course which will help to ensureunity at home and preserve national security abroad.
the minds of most Yugos'avs,s still the Sovietconstitutes the most nenacing threat to that security. And,mind. It Is still this threat which provides Yugoslavia withincentive foringle, cohesive state Thisew years ago,o aiarnedumber ofthe Middle East and elsewhererowing threat fromand sought to maintain especia'iy good relations wUh Moscow. USSR's Invasion of Czechoslovakia3 seems to have endedTito's long-cherishedeconciUation with theapparently, are the old hopes for enlightened Soviet behavioran eventual union of Soviet and Titolst doctrine onterms. Largely gone too, apparently, are the old fearsof Western Europe (ever more Yugoslavia's major tradingand of the United States
consequence of this and because Moscowin meddling In Yugoslav af'ai'soviet-Yugoslav relations
are strained. The Sovietsot,everted tohostile policies. In part perhaps because the B'ezhnev leadership realizes that, at least so long as Tito 's act've, Yugoslavia cannot be intimidated (or seduced)eturn to the Bloc There are, of course, many reasons why Moscow would greatly we'comeeturn But there are also many constraints on its willingness and ability to bring it about: Yugoslavia no longerital Soviet national concern (as, for example, the other East European Commun-st states stillhe means available to the Soviets to further their interests Inny case quite limited; the use of military pressures wou'd be likely only to strengthen Yugoslav national unity and resolve; the actual employment of military force would in all likelihood encounter Yugoslav armedwhich might endure in guerrilla actions for quite some time; and an Invasion of Yugoslavia, even if successful, would severelyide variety of Soviet interests elsewhereis both the United States and China and in Western Europe.
F. It does not seem likely, then, that the Soviets will move militarily against Yugoslavia. But the threat of this will no doubt continue, andould become acute if post-Tito Yugoslavia were to be engulfed by internal disorder. The Yugoslav system will, in fact, renin
unsettled and threats of serfous disruptions will persist into the indefinite future. But thereood chance that over the longense of common purpose, buttressedense of common peril, will enable the hybrid Yugoslav system to survive essentially intact, even without Tito.
G. There 1s,reat array of variables which will bear on the course of Yugoslav national development, some international, others domestic. Ithus possible toariety of futures for Yugoslavia, in addition to the one perceived above as the most likely. The country could begin to disintegrate and be saved onlyilitary coup; or It could fall apart and descend Into civil war; or It could split into two or more parts, each seeking support, Including military support, from abroad. These and other contingencies are discussed inf this paper. But whatever the eventuality, itlear that the West and the United States willritical role to play In Yugoslavia's future. Belgrade's economic ties are now predominantly with the West, its political and cultural views are increasingly shaped by Western concepts, and Its national security is at least Indirectly dependent on Western strength and resolveis the USSR.
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INTRODUCTION
ountryainful historyroubled present. Its society is diverse, its economy backward, its location Its political system lacks tradition, rejects the precepts of both East and West, and moves in uncertain directions. And now time Is running out for Tito, the one remarkable man who has held the country together for the pastears.
But it is notitany of woe. Yugoslavia has, in fact,ertain strength through adversity. The Tito regime hasgreat external pressures and much domestic disarray. It has moved into new areas of political action and social thought, has substantially improved the economic well-being of most of the population, and hasentirely abandoned fear and repression as instruments of rule. Finally, it has won forosition of international influence and respect and even security far greater than Us size and place in the world would seem to justify.
But what of the uncertain future? Some deep-seated and bitter national antagonisms are once again emerging and finding ways to express themselves on the political scene. Relations with the Soviet Bloc are
becoming Increasingly uneasy. ense of common purpose and of common peril endure without Tito? Will Yugoslavia unity and courage persist In the event of renewed threatshe Soviet Union? Will, in fact, Yugoslavia outlive Tito?
II. THE YUGOSLAV SYSTEM OH THE THRESHOLO OF THE SUCCESSION PERIOD
more thanears the Yugoslavs have been feelingtoward the establishmentruly federal decentralizedgradually discarding some of the more doctrinaireavorreer, more open system. The process hasbeen accelerated by an awareness tnat the succession process
must be Institutionalized and the major features of the reforms enshrined in constitutional law If chaos is to be avoided when Tito leaves the scene.
social system which Belgrade has been buildingIt has labeled "self-oanagenenfs Incredibly complex. its featuresncluding those still in the planningarallel or historical precedent in political or economicelse in the world. The Yugoslavs themselves do not seem to
have any very clear idea of where they are heading. The room for confuslor and error is thus great, and judgments concerning the evolution and viability of the Yugoslav experiment nust thus be conditional.
The rjliticil SyeZf
Decentralization is the key feature of the Yugoslav political system. The country is movingoose federation of nearlyrepublics with the authority of the central government restricted mainly to conducting foreign policy, providing for national defense,andunified nationalhanneling funds from the richer to the poorer areas, and arbitrating regional disputes. All other functions and responsibilitiestogether with control of the bulk of the nation's material resourcesill be surrendered.
Decentralizationarallel Increase in the authority of elective organs of governmentoes farlat transfer of power from Belgrade to the republican capitals. Tito's blueprint also requires the exercise of considerable autonomybacked by adequate Independent financial resourcest the localt the level of the(opetina) and of the individual economic enterprise or Institution. Increased efficiencyot the only objective. Belgrade clearly hopes
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that the proliferation of decisionmaking centersnd their interplay
within and across republican boundariesill dilute the power of the republics and blur current 'egionai and national disputes
8. Organized pluralismthe participation of regional organs, federal bodies, and various interest groups (youth, labor, professional, and economic) In the process of government was introduced as anelement in the self-management system in the. This development has been accompanied by and contributediberalization of the political climate in Yugoslavia,emarkable expansion of freedom of speech and of the pressistinct curtailment of police powers. Yugoslav pluralism is still subject to many shortcomingssuch as Inadequate representation of peasant interestsnd still functions under clear restraints. But the trend has gathered considerable momentum andhort of major political upheavals in the wake of Tito's passingeems unlikely to be reversed. The long-term consequences of this cannot be finely calculated, in Belgrade or elsewhere,s safe to say that the passageonventionallyCommunist systemybrid form of Socialist pluralism will not be an easy one. inimum, the central authorities will continue to
be taxed with the problem of accommodating powerful divergent interests without. In the process, avowing the expression of these interests to intensify regional animjsifes and threaten the very existence of the federal system.
9. Titof course aware of this sort of problem, recognizes that the greatest test of the system may occur In the aftermath of his departure, and thus is determined torisis of succession. He has effected sweeping organizational changes and has provided for the devolution of his enormous personal power to collective bodiesof highly qualified republican leaders who seem to be dedicated to Yugoslavia's current course By bringing the "barons" to Belgrade and by bolstering the power of the collective presidency in relation to Yugoslavia's increasingly free-wheeling Parliament, he hopes to mute the inter-republican squabbling which reached such alarming proportions during the opening months To supplement these moves, he has sought enactment of an array of additional statutory safeguards designed both to restrain personal ambitions and to contain regional rivalries. The key elements In this program include strict limitations of tenure in high office, equal representation for the republicsertainbodies, and an almost check-and-balance division of authority both within and outside the governmental structure.
Obviously Tito's personal commitment to the current political program has been crucial Few people in or outside the country doubt Tito's singular ability to decree important domestic political changes And standing well above the diverse ethnic groupsind of living national monument, Tito can suggest, or enforce, key personnel transfers or other modifications without rousing widespread suspicion that his ideas are prompted by any consideration other than the common good But Tito's will be an extraordinary hard act to follow. His priorof the emerging succession arrangements will surely carry some weight even after he is gone. But precisely how much, and in what practical detail, cannot now be said.
Even now, decentralization and the beginningsonstitutionally-grounded rule of law have raised major problems with respect to the role
and internal dynamics of the League of Communists of Yugoslaviahich has remained the locus of powerugoslavia. In conformity with the spirit of the times, the LCY has become something approaching aof nine relatively autonomous party organizations: lightly lower planetwo provincial and the military. On the other hand, while the LCY has long sincecommanding role" in Yugoslav society, Belgrade firmly intends to have it exercise a
central "guiding role*ong time to cone This, in turn, will require the central authorities to set the Mne on broad policy issues and exercise sufficient authority over regional party organizations to insure that independent behavior does not undermine the League's ability to functionadly-needed national unifying force. Clarification of the limits of republican and provincial party autonomyational Party Conference this fall.
nic Folia* and ProcUms
12. Belgrade's efforts to reform the Yugoslav economy, stalled off and on during, are again moving in high gear.* The system described as workers' self-management remains the core of the Yugoslav
With a, per capita great national product 'GUP) eatinatsd at0ugoslavia haa one of the leaat developed European economiesaboutar with Greece, considerably leea than tha; of Romania) andj, and about one-half that of Italy. Yugoslavia's six republica and two autenzmoue provincee present eharp contraete in level of development. The per oapita ON? in Slovenia, the richest republic, ia abouzS0ive times higher than that in the autonomous province of Koecvo, the noat backward area. Industrial output increased at an annual averageercent19S08Fheld bzo< by the erratic year-to-year performance of agriculturegrewate ofercent. Yugoslavia's economic reforms have gradually oriented the country toward Western markets, last year, aboutercent of Yugoelav trade was conducted with Western Europe andercent with the -Jnited States. The share of the Soviet Blocittle leae thenercent.
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program. This system is bew:-aeringly complex, but, as in the political field, decentral'zation is the key element By giving localand individual firms andhrough the Workers' Councils the labor forces greater authority over their own affairs, and providing themrowing opportunity to reap the rewards of their ownthe regime hopes to promote efficiency, modernization, and long-term growth. It also hopes to make Yugoslav products competitive In world markets.
In the period5ugoslavia restructured and liberalized its price and foreign trade systems, increased therole of enterprises and banks, and became the first Communistto permit foreign investment. These measures stimulated the play of market forces and helped to shift Yugoslavia's pattern of tradeaway from clearing account transactions with members of the Soviet Bloc and toward the West. For the next three years, however, progress in liberalizing the system had to be postponed because of growingpressures and other difficulties.
Reform talk began again in the fall The government decided to make further changeshe economicart of the proposed package of Constitutional Amendments affecting the organization
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and powers of the federal gove'nment Now adopted after lengthy debate, the new provisions are designed to move Yugoslavia 'artherocialist market economy. ct economic role of the federalhas been further reduced in favor of the republics and local Federal fundsnd taxation powersave beer sharply curtailed The central authorities will continue to channel money to theregions, but direct federal investment is to be phased out completely. In addition, the new reforms speciflcaHy prov'de for the protection and gradual expansion of the private sector of tne economy. All told, these changes haveuch freer systemnd one that is much harder to control
15. This latter point Is Important, for the Vugos^vs are still in the midst of one of their recurrent bouts with inflation, and with the balance of payments problemoth the result of efforts torapid rates of growth and unemployment. he cost of living rose byercent, and the hard currency trade deficit climbed1 billion. The balance of payments deficitespite an unexpected increase of0 million infrom Yugoslavs in other countries Total unemployment stoodercent even though morehousand workers were working abroad.
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And the situation did not improve during the opening monthsy the end of Kay, the cost of Hying was rising at an annua1 rate ofercent and the hard currency deficit was running at nearly twice0 level.
living standards throughout Yugoslavia haverise, the gap between the richer northwestern regions and theareas has tended to widen While some improvementrecorded over tne past two years, the per capita national income
of the less developed republics and provincesacedonia, Montenegro, Bosnla-Hercegovlna, and Kosovoell from two-thirds that of the more developed parts of the country7 to little more than halfhere isross disparity In regional unemployment rates. Unemployment in Kosovo inor exarple,7 percent, or about eight times thatlovenia. Partlyesult of the revival of old nationalistic stirrings, the poorer republics have becomeaware of their backwardness and bitter about progress in the north.
Foreign Potion
an uncertain fight for survival with the East, yetof Western Intentions and hostile to Western ideology, Tito
and his colleagues began9 toeculiar Yugoslav approach to foreign policy. By the, they had rejected passiveof the kind practiced by the Swiss, and were seeking instead toeading international role. At the saw tii*e, they refused to associate themselves formally with any of the great powers. Thus Yugoslavia, while it would not align Itself with any one state, would pursue "active coexistence" with all. And thusmall, backward, and vulnerable country, lying between two great hostile campsand following domestic economic and political practices disliked by bothwould stress certain elevated principles of international the obligations of the rich countries toward the poor; the sovereignty and equality of all states; the right of each state toits own affairs without Interference from abroad; and theof the use of force in interstate relations.
18. In time, as the Yugoslavs, with western help, overcame threats to their survival and began to develop specific lines of foreigno discovered common cause with the leaders of other non-aligned states and enteredareeristinguished senior statesman. By the, Yugoslavia found itself courted by both East and West, admired by most of the Third World, and accepted by the world at large as an
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Influential member of the international community. The Yugoslavs (and Tito) were immensely pleased by a" this and were inclined to view it as vindication of their views and, perhaps, as confirmation of their superior moral stature as well. In any case, Yugoslavia's effective emphasis on Third World politics and on independenceis both the USSR and the United States unquestionablyense of national pride and cohesion. This was especially useful to the regime in theecause the primary spur to unityear of theas then fast receding.
19. There have of course been elements of delusion fn Yugoslav policies and, when the issues get close to home and affect important national Interests, the Yugoslavs are probably no more prone to act out of lofty principle than most peoples. On the whole, however, Yugoslav policies have been consistent with the professed objectives of non-alignment. There were many times when Belgrade's positions on one or another International Issue were very close to Moscow's, and there were periodsmost notably the, before the removal of Khrushchevwhen Soviet-Yugoslav relations were quite close. Tito apparently still Identified himself more or less with the broad sweep of Soviet Ideology; was reasonably optimistic that the Soviets would one day
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recognize the virtues, for themselves,itoist course; and was willing on occasionfter the Hungarian revolution ofnd after the Sovietske the moratorium on above-ground nuclear testingo give the USSR the benefit of the doubt.
Still, even during the height of the Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochment, the Yugoslavs maintained an independent view. When Yugoslav policies resembled Soviet, this was almost always the consequence of their own particular appraisals, not the results of efforts to accommodate Soviet positions. Improvements in relations with the USSR, moreover, were usually prompted by Soviet overtures and changes In Soviet, not Yugoslav, attitudes. And on some matters of special importance to Moscow, including Its policies in Eastern Europe, the Yugoslavs often stood in open opposition.
Though it bears Tito's personal stamp, non-alignment has become an accepted feature of the Yugoslav system. It is seen in Belgrade as
the correct and perhaps only feasible course for an independent Yugoslavia. Ithought to provide great flexibility and bargaining power and, under conditions short of military confrontations, an acceptable degreeis both East and West. It is seeneans to enhance
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national prestige anday co gain access and influence in the Third World. And, finally, insofar as it reflects continued Independence from Moscow, it is thought to be an important model and inspirational factor for all of Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe.
It would appear, then, that only the gravest threat to national security would convince Belgrade to abandon non-alignment. But It is also true that in recent years, ever since the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, fear of Soviet intentions has been one of the majorconditioning Yugoslav behavior. In fact, it would seem that nowhere outside of Prague Itself did the events of8 have greater or more lasting Impact than In Belgrade.
The change in Belgrade's attitudes is all the more striking because,7 and the opening monthsugoslavhad been centered on Western intentions. Continuing squabbles with the USSRover the question of an international Communistand over Yugoslav efforts to rally "progressive" forceshe Mediterranean areaad little effectarming trend in Soviet-Yugoslav relations. On the othereterioration in Yugoslav relations with Italy, the coupreece, andost of allhe
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Arab-Israeli war were all interpreted by Tito as evidence of an American-led conspiracy against Yugoslavia and against all "progressive" non-Bloc
States.
But this peculiar viewhich may not have been entirely shared by Tito's lieutenantsid not survive Czechoslovakia and Its aftermath. Yugoslav hopes that the USSR would tolerate the Czechoslovak experiment (thoughtelgrade to be akin to Titolsm) and that this mightenerally benevolent turn in Soviet attitudes were crushed overnight. Fear that Yugoslavia (and Romania) might be next on the list for invasion raced through top levels of the regime and among the people at large. Once again, then, the USSR loomed as the prime enemy and national survival seemed at stake. And,he midst of this emotional hour, Tito's friends in the Third Worldhe UAR and Indiarefused to denounce the Soviets and rebuffed Tito's hinthird non-aligned summit be convened to consider the problem.
All this served to move Yugoslavia's political interests farther to the West. (Economically, the shift had begun5onsequence of Yugoslavia's growing dependence on Western markets and technology.) There was no dramatic break with the USSR, partly because
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the Soviets did not care to respond vigorously to the Yugoslav condemnation of the invasion, and tnere was no sudden wench in Belgrade's relations with the Third World. But clearly, priority was assigned at that time to efforts to strengthen and expand relations with theith Italy and the other major Common Market states, with Austria, and with the United States. At the same time, Belgrade sought, for the most part successfully, to Improve its relations with Its BalkanRomania, Albania, Greece, and Turkey.
26. There hastriking improvement in the United States-Yugoslav relationsnd particularly since President Nixon's visit last year. The Yugoslavs have become open and friendly, reluctant to raise contentious issues, and anxious to develop closer ties. Much of this can be attributed to renewed concern about Soviet Intentions. But, In addition, Belgrade seems to have reassessed the entire course of Itselations with Washington and concluded that American sympathy and support for Yugoslav independence Is genuinenot just an artificial and inherently temporary adjunct of the United States-Soviet relationship.
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the whole of Yugoslavia's recent westward shiftwould seem to be qualitatively different from thesituation in the Twenty years ago. theprovided almost the only grounds for cooperation, and Tito,and ideologically, still conceived of Yugoslavia as athe Communist community; the Soviets and their allies were thenot the Titoists But this time, the relationship with the West
is much more broadly based. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia seemed to shock Tito out of his residual identification with Sovietand probably terminated any lingering hope he may nave had that the USSR could be converted to the THoist enlightenment In any event, politically, economically, culturally, and even ideologically, Yugoslavia has over the years grown much closer to the West and farther apart from the USSR. And this process seems Hke'y to persist in the post-Tito era. Whether, ultimately, something uniquely Yugoslav will survive all this ors many Yugoslavs fearhe country will in effect simply be absorbed into the mainstream of Western Europe can only be, ofatter for conjecture.
the Yugoslavs will continue to reject anyNATO, Belgrade is making it dear that it hopes soon to develop
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unobtrusive but relatively extensive mil'tary cooperation w'th 'western Europe, particularly with Italy Its interest in the strength of NATOnd of Its old Balkan Pact al'ies has even led 't to overcome its strong reservations about the current regime in Athens and to urge Bonn to sell weapons to Greece and Turkey.
29. Relations with the USSR have remained correct though strained throughout this period But, not surprisingly, the Kremlin has become increasingly annoyed with Belgrade's domestic and foreign policies and has been willing to say so, though with some restraint for their part, the Yugoslavs remain dismayed by what they bel'eve toegressive trend of developments in the Warsaw Pact and are disturbed by evidence of Soviet attempts to aggravate and exploit their Internal difficulties. Their commentaries on these matters have recentlyreat deal in volume and acidityif they continue at current levels, correct relations will be difficult to maintain. It is possible that 3elgrade, seeking to maximize the unifying effect on the Yugoslav population of
* Washing ton haa alao bean approached. Assistant Defenee Minister Dolnioar hasimited shopping list and expressed in-tereet in training Yugzslav officers in the 'Jnited Statee military eckoola ae well asariety of ether exchangee 2nd arrangements.
fear of Soviet intentions, nay now even intend to a'low an open deterioration of its relations wHn Moscow
AttiruJtsiaU Yugoslavia conceives of itself as an important political power in the Mediterranean world and has over the years actively concerned itself with the struggles of Arab states to remove the Western colonial presence. It was an ardentof the National Liberation Front (fLN) during the French-Algerian war, it was among Egypt's easiest and most vocal supporters, it declared itself wholly on the side of the Arjbs during and after the June war, and it has more often than not found itself opposing tne views andof the United States in the area Thus, while the Yugoslavs have sometimes urged the militant Arabs to proceed with moderation and warned them of the dangers of overdependence on the USSR, they have followed policies in the area which have frequently complemented or coincided with those of the USSR.
Of late, however, the Yugoslavs have begun to re-examine their Interests. They have not Dy any means become supporters of the United States. But they have become increasingly fearful that renewed Arab-Israeli hostilities mightnited States-Soviet clash; they
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become somewhat disi"us>or>ed by Arab disunity; and they have grown more and more apprehensive that the USSR wil acquire tooosition in the area Most of all, the Yugoslavs would now like to see the great powers withdraw from the Mediterranean, fleets and all. Short of that, however, they seem to be primarily interested in encouraging some form of rapprochement between the West and the Arab states, and they have suggested to Ca'ro that It would be in the Egyptian interest to work for this.
Defense Foliou
The projection of an image of military strength and the determination to use It has played an important role in Yugoslav defense strategy. Thus Belgrade has trad'tional'y sought to give the impression that an Invading force, no matter how strong or from what quarter, would meet with fierce resistance andven if initially successfulould encounter prolonged and costly partisan warfare.
In keeping with this andesire to bring the conduct of military affairs into closer harmony with the conceptelgrade began7 to consider plans for the development of
* cre detailedfilitary strength, see Annex 3.
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sizeable territorial forces and for increased emphasis on guerrilla warfare. This work was undertakenime when, as indicated, the Yugoslavs were on relatively good terms with the Soviets but were quite nervous about developments in Greece, Italy, and the Middle East. Thus, while no particular urgency seems to have been attached to theprogram, Initial planning assumed that Yugoslav defenses should be directed primarilyossible attack from the West. But the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in8 reversed thisand advanced Belgrade's timetable arly November, thehad refined its views and incorporated themraft bill for consideration by the National Assembly. And onugoslavia's new Nationwide (orefense Law was officially
adopted.
34. Under the new law, Yugoslavia haswo-tiered defense system composed of the regular armed forces (presently totalingen, and collectively designated as the Yugoslav National ArmyNA) and territorial defense units Only the latter force and the complementary civil defense organization are decentralized, with republican, local, and factory authorities given primary responsibility for the levy, training, funding, and activation of the component
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egional planning, supervision, and coordination falls to the republics, but overall strategy and control remains in the hands of the Presidency and designated military organs in Belgrade
35. Yugoslav strategy is now more clearly and openly based than ever before on the practical and deterrent aspects of the conceptnation in arms'. Almost everyone between the ages ofndsto undergo trainingilitary tactics, first aid, use of weapons, and the strategy of collective defense. Of these, men fromond women from ig toay be assigned to armed units.2/ If attack comes, plans call for temporary forward defense by the centrally-controlled
1/ The federal defense budget la basically confined to the neede of the regular aimed forces. Federal military spending has been increasing, but if expressedercentage of gross national productt has remained fairly constantittle moreercentS. See Annex A,-
y While maneuvers and exercises involving both regular and territorial forcee have been held at fairly frequent intervals over the past twouch more ambitious teet of the new system is planned for thie fall when mechanised unite ofill play the role of "the invader" in what promises to be the largest fugoelav military exercise since World War II. Full useerritorial unite 'new eaid to embrace nearly one million citizens under arms backed by another two million in civil defense organizations) will be made in the defense.
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and more heavily armed operational forces {assisted, where possible by the activities of local te'-Mtoraiollowed by the orderly and fighting retreat of these forces into the mountains. Theoretically, enough time will be gained to transport necessary government personnel and records into mountain redoubts to mobilize many of the country's more than two million reservists and to activate additional territorial partisan units. And once settled in the mountains, the retreatingarmy would cooperate with partisan units in continued operations against the invader.
36. Implementation of the new defense law has not been without Its problems, but Belgrade has demonstrated its determination to strengthen the effectiveness of the nation-wide system. It has donated military equipment worth moreillion to the program. It has rearranged its military districts to align their borders more closely withboundaries and has encouraged local JNA commanders to work closely with their counterparts in the territorial forces. In addition, language has been included In the latest Constitutional Amendments which declares that no one has the right to sign or recognize the surrenderor of all or any part of Yugoslavia or to prevent Yugoslav citizens from taking up arms against an invader Such acts would be punishable
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as treason. And the Croats have gone one step farther in their recently-adopted republican defense law by stating that no one has the right to invite the enemy's armed forces into the country or towith the enemy in any way.
37. Belgrade has also moved to revamp the traditionally aloof regular military establishment and to bring it directly into theof developments in Yugoslav society. To this end, recent changes have rid the military establishment of its more conservative officers, restructured and rejuvenated its Party organization, and given it broader representation in policymaking councils. All this has been rejectedarked change In the general attitude prevailing in top military circles. Initial qualms about the territorial militia seem largely to have disappeared.ew interest in the resolution of political, social, and economic problems affecting national unity (and thus bearing on military capabilities) has emerged. And while the militarygeneral loyalty to Tito has never seriously been questioned, ranking military officials now seem to be taking pains to stress that this loyalty extends to Tito's system as well.
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III. PRINCIPAL INTERNAL FACTORS WHICH WILL AFFECT FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
The Xaticnalitiee Problem
has the most complex ethnic composition ofin Europe. There are five main Slav "nations"erbs,Macedonians, and Montenegrins*umber ofminorities or "nationalf which the AlbaniansHungarians are the largest. Together, the facts of aand many centuries of occupation by the Austrians,Turks have given these nationalities widely varying culturesgreat disparities in economic development,istrustauthority. Different languages, and even different alphabets
In which to write common languages, have hindered communication between the nationalities andolitical issue in their own right.
political assassination and civil warthat no regime in Belgrade can long maintain effectivesolely through authoritarian means. But current efforts to solve
* Yugoslavia 'a total population ie8 million, of whichercent are Serb,ercentercentercentercent Montenegrin,percentercent Hungarian,ercent miecsllceoue.
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the country's problems through decentralization of authority and the creationelatively open society are by no means assured of success either. National self-assertiver.ess is rising and old feuds andare combining with new regional grievances. Party and government leaders sometimes seem unable to cope with these problems or are swept uphem and become partisans on one side or the other.
40. The three most volatile elements in all this are the traditional animosity between Serb and Croat, the struggle of the Albanians In Kosovo to free themselves of Serb domination, and the conflicting Interests of the poorer and richer regions. Problems of this character will surely plague Yugoslavia for years to come. The process of decentralization will proceed partly at the expense of Serbian authority and status and the Serbs are not likely to enjoy this; the Croats will remain especially sensitive to national slights, real or Imagined,e anxious to make conspicuous displays of their growing Independence; the Albanians will continue to regard themselvesepressed minority and may again (as they didesort to large-scale disorders; and most of the more backward areas will still feel themselves the victims of inequities and will still seek larger subsidies from the northern regions, which will probably become increasingly reluctant to provide them.
41. It is also true, however, that much of the surfacing of internal
antagonisms in Yugoslaviaatural by-product of progress toward a
freer and more decentralized society. Thus, to some degree at least, the recent upsurgepen conflicts between various group and regional interests can be viewedealthy development. Radical departures from the present systemsucheparatist solutiondo not now seem to hold much appeal for either the public or the practicing No single ethnic group seems at all certain thatould maken the worldeparate sovereign state.
42. Indeed, even in the midst of forceful expressions of regionalew willingness to compromise has begun to emerge. The Croats have recently begun toew awareness of the dangers of nationalistic outbursts and have quieted down somewhat. The Slovenian Party, which has long been openly dissatisfied with aspects of national policyespecially the diversion of Slovenia's wealth to poorer areaseems to be having second thoughts and recently committed Itself formally to the principle that Yugoslav security interests override those of the Individual republic.
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the Serbs seem to be developing more flexible attitudes. Although long accustomed to dominat'ng the 'ederal scene throughof key posts and organs 'n Be'g'ade, they have lately emerged as champions of self-management They now seem to accept the notion that Serbian interests must be defended and advanced in regulated competition with the other republics. This is not to say that Serbian nationalism has simply faded away. But Iteg'nnfng to find an outlet inexploitation of the opportunities offeredecentralized system and In vigorous defense of the ground rules against any weakening or "distortion" which would work to the advantage of the northern republics.
In the economic field, where decentralization has gone the farthest, Tito has been trying to promote commercial and financial linksncluding mergers across republican borders. Although the results so far are modest, such arrangements at leasttep toward dislodging Isolated local interests
The new constitutional amendments have been designed in large part to deal with the nationalities problem In the decentralized, post-Tito state. Painstakingly tailored to al'ow for almost every conceivable ethnic and regional sensitivity, they seek toeassuring rule
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SECRET
SENSITIVE NO FORC/GN DISSEM
of law and remove some of the uncertainties whichrc-sed national passions in recent months Po1*t'ca,,y, the most significant *nnovation is the establishmentc'ie^t've Presidency (temporarily modified to allow Tito to continue to serve as President of the Republic as long as he is physically able to do so). The new Presidency consistso) of three members from each of the six republics and two members from each of the two autonomous provinces These representatives are electedive-year term byespective regional Pa'i-aments. Elaborate rules prohibit the members f'om holding any other fede^a' or regional office and govern the annual election of the body's president and vice presidentntended to ensure that nocanominating position, 'mi'ar fomwla for equal representation has beenorce and is prescribed for the Federal Executive Councilystem of proportional representation Is to be applied to the ONA officer corps, senior military positions, and portions of the civil service. Finally, the revised rights and obligations of the federation, the republics, and the autonomous provinces are spe'led outonsiderable detail.
46. Still, the new system has inherent weaknesses which,the absenceeader of Tito's stature (one whose Influence would far
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exceed his Constitutionalou'd prove fatal 2 man collective Presidency may prove to be unworkable inimum. If it functions according to the 'ettc of the law, it will be extremely unwieldy and hamstrung by the rigidity of its own ru'es. The Constitutional Amendments are very specific about what it can and cannot do under both ordinary and extraordinary circumstances They also spell out procedures for resolving differences with and among federal and regional organs of government. But they are silent onresidency of this size,so many diverse interests, and bound by time-consuming rules of procedure, is to avoid costly delays and perhaps deadlocks in theprocess. (Perhaps because of problems like this the Presidency may In time come to be dominatedmall segment of its membership which would be able to function with some flexibility.)
47. The wayhich the collective Presidency evolves will bear heavily on how serious another potential flaw in the latest reforms
proves to beviz. the degree ot which decentralization limits the central government's ability to cope with national problems. Thebetween federal and republican powers has been spelled out but not as yet worked out through normal political processes. There are numerous provisions for overriding normal procedures and abridging local
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prerogatives if the federal authorities determine that such action Is required in the interests of national security or in order to avoid "significant damage to the social community". But such provisions will have little or no effect unless theregreement within the federal governmentecessary course of action and the courage to proceed
with it.
therehe question of what will be theof the new rules concerning regional representation at theon the level of competence of federal officials. The right manright Jobn the cabinet, in the army. In the foreign servicebe denied appointment because of his ethnic origin. By thethe wrong man might receive an important position onlyIs an available Serb, or Slovene, or whatever. The rules willbe bent from time to time, but the politics of bending couldbecome quite delicate.
The Economy
theory, the central government still possessesto manage the economy effectively. It retains statutorythe monetary system, foreign trade, foreign exchange transactions.
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SEjZRET 1SITIVE NOJOREIGN DISSEM
and customs duties; it can channel funds to the poorer regions through levies and mandatory loans; and it can regulate republican fiscaland promulgate binding laws over republican objections. But the mere existence of these powers does not guarantee that they will be used. The central government's current efforts to control inflationaryfor example, have been indecisive and unsuccessful.rice freeze enacted last November was neverage control bill was watered downhe face of trade union pressure; legal limits on republic and local spending1 were grossly exceededhe first half of the year; and the belated devaluation in January had already been undermined by domestic price Increaseself-defeating open debate last fall on whether or not to devalue. Decentralization has unquestionably made it more difficult for Belgrade to control the economy and to acteven when itegally empowered to do so.
50. Parallel with the decentralization of political and economic authority, conflicts of interest arising from regional economichave increasingly assumed the character of inter-republicand have made agreement on appropriate national policies extremely difficult to achieve. Sometimes termed "dinarivergent interests find reflection today in such things as the reluctance of the northern republics to share their wealthnd particularly their
DISSEM
hard currency earningsith the rest of the nation, and the espousal by republican officials of economic projects promising special benefits for their own area. Prolonged or severe economic difficulty could easily exacerbate these Inter-republican conflicts to the point of political crisis. The force of economic nationalism has been difficult foro to rein; the outlook for its being controlled after Tito's departure Is bleak.
51. The basic problems of Inflationary pressures, foreign trade deficits, and unemployment are likely In any event to persist, and this will mean continuing dependence on help from the West. The Yugoslavs are currently0 million In various forms of financialfrom the International Monetary Fundhe United States,umber of West European countries; this amount is to tide them over In the normal course of events, further requests for assistance can be expected. If Belgrade's dispute with Moscow resultedharp curtailment of Yugoslav trade with thec, orconomic developments in Western Europe prompted the sudden return of large numbers of emigre workers, such requests would probably be very substantial .*
* CEMA countries presently accountittle less thanercent of Yugoslavia'a total foreign trade- omplete cutoff of tradeelective reduction in the mere important items exchangedwculd have highly disruptive effeats on Yugoslavia's machine building,shipbuilding, chenical, and textile industries.
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The Army and the Party
52- Following the ouster of Vice President Rankovlcecentralization and reforms sharply reduced the powers and political significance of the Yugoslav State Security Service (SDB). Theof the Party and the military establishment Increased accordingly. These institutions are, of course, closely linked. Nearly all JNAand three-quarters of the NCOs are Party members. And reforms undertaken8 have given the military's Party apparatus broader and more direct association with the LCY Presidium and with republic and local Party organizations in the areas in which JNA units are located.
53. JNAighly-centralized organization, the only true national Institution leftugoslavia. While none of its leaders seem to entertain Independent political ambitions. Its behavior in the evento crisis will be critical. But the military establishment would be reluctant to intervene Independently In the political process unless it were convinced that the integrity of the state was in serious jeopardy. For oneonsensus on the proper course of action would be difficult to achieveuddled situation. Further, theleaders are aware that the JNA no longeronopoly of
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organized armed force. New territorial forces could in extreme circumstances elect to support their own republican authorities rather than the JNA command in Belgrade.
54. Belgrade's efforts to encourage the military toreater role In domestic affairs seem to be meeting with some success. It is Tito's hope that the military will be able to exert some restrainingon fractious local Party and government leaders. There 1s, ofertain risk involved In giving thereater hand in civilian affairs. But, on the whole, the army seems to be loyal both to Tito and to his system. There are no signs of the existence of anygroup of officers who would be willing to serve Soviet purposes; nor do there seem to be cliques of officers who owe their primaryto one or the other republic rather than to the Yugoslav state as such. (At the NCO and company officer level, Serbs and Montenegrins are still strongly over-represented, but Belgrade has long sought to eliminate regional prejudices by assigning these ranks to posts outside their native republics.) And Belgrade has now given its campaign to establish aballance of nationalities in the military hierarchy the force of constitutional law.
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contrast to the military establishment, the LCY has been in considerable disarray. Tito hasecent months managed to restore some orderrincipally through invocation of the Soviet threat but the fundamental problem of defining and enforcing the limits of regional Party autonomy remains to be resolved. Untils, the effectiveness of the LCYorce for national unity and stability will be severely limited.
Tito has exhibited considerable Impatience with the present state of affairs, emphasizing his belief that there can be no boundaries for the LCYrepublican, local, or any other". He has stated that the Party Conferencectober will be the occasionajorof the LCY. And he has threatened to purge tne more outspoken regional mavericks.
may attempt to do just that, but it seems more likely
that some of his tougher pronouncements have been made largely for effect. Most regional Party leaders now probably recognize the need for setting some sort of ground rules for harmonizing the activities of the component elements of the LCY. But none are likely to be willing to acceptentralized supranational Party of the type Tito sometimes
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SO
seems to have In mind. Furthermore, tt seems doubtful that, at this delicate stageugoslavia's politicalo would beto risk turmoil by carryingweeping purge of regional Party leaders.
compromise may eventually emerge which would leaveorganizations free to manage their own affairs but whichthem to honor certain general guidelines laid down by theorgans. olution might require the restructuring ofBureau and the expansion of its authority. This wouldto generate considerable controversy, but the alternativesto be continued and hazardous inaction or reversion toa course which almost no one now desires.
Dissident Elements
has for the past year or so clearly exaggeratedof Internal dissldence. It has emphasized the threatdomestic and externally inspired enemieseans to quietsquabbling and as an excuse for curbing the free expressionviews. Nevertheless, hostile elementsncludingprisoners (mostly so-calledurged Party
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and national militantsdo exist in Yugoslavia. Their numbers are unknown, but some have links with emigre groups abroad and others may have ties with foreign Intelligence services.
Though they could In certain circumstnaces aggravate existing national divisions and political rivalries. In and of themselves, these Individuals and groups would pose little threat to the Yugoslav system. They disseminate propaganda, engage in scattered terrorist acts, and within their limited capabilities, collect Intelligence information. But as the labelsComlnformists, Rankovicites, Ustasi, andheir past associations and beliefs have little relevance today Yugoslavia. Host are probably known to the authorities and could probably be rounded up quickly In the event of crisis. The necessary laws are on the books.
Yugoslavia has its share of outspoken and discontented students. There have been strikes and sit-ins and fiery debates. Nationalistic passions have at time run highparticularly among the Croats. But
the students are not in opposition. While critical of certain provisions in the new constitutional reforms, most of Yugoslavia's young support them In principal. Small extremist groups existncluding some of Haoist orientationbut their appeal and Influence is very limited.
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IV. MAJOR EXTERNAL INFLUENCES
The USSR
The Soviet Union has haduarterentury in which to learn to live with an Independent socialist Yugoslavia. But the adjustment has been difficult. The Cominfonn break8 still rankles; Belgrade's assertion of absolute sovereignty still enrages; and Tito's eccentric road to socialism still bewilders and dismays. Moscow knows full well that Titolst Yugoslavia Is there. But it has never lost hope that someday, somehow, ft will go
Various Soviet leaders have sought in various ways over the years to solve the Yugoslav problem. Stalin, outraged by Tito's defiance, andhreat to Soviet dominance elsewhere in Eastern Europe, did his best, short of military Intervention, to bring downo regime. Khrushchev, apologizing for Stalin's behavior, offered Tito Russian aid and friendship, and then tried to push or pull Yugoslavia back Into the fold. The present Soviet leaders, the victims, perhaps,
of collective Inertia, have tried more or less to do the same sort of thing for the same purpose.
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Brezhnev regime, however, has not approached the Yugoslav problem with much visible enthusiasm. It seems, in effect, to be less interested in Yugoslavia than either Stalin or Khrushchev, less given to extravagant gestures of enmity or good will, lessto engageolemics or to deliver exhortations. It seems to understand,ay that Us predecessors did not, that at least so long as Tito is in command, Yugoslavia cannot be intimidated or seducedeturn to the Bloc.
This is not to say that the present Soviet regime has given up hope of future successes. All of the current leaders were mature men and many of them occupied senior positions when the Comlnform break occurred. They perhaps did not approve of Stalin's subsequent policies toward Yugoslavia, and could not have been much Impressed with his accomplishments, but thereery little chance that thiso and his actions any more appealing to them. On the contrary, Tito's departure from the Soviet bloc and his subsequent departure from Soviet doctrine must still be remembered in Moscowainful Ideological and political shock.
If, for one reason or another, post-Tito Yugoslavia should come to re-embrace the USSR, Moscow's pain would be greatly eased. The
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validity of Its view of the "socialist world" would be enhanced and reaffirmed; its political position elsewhere in Eastern Europe would be strengthened, perhaps especially so in the case of Romania; Its strategic postureparticularlyis Italy and the Mediterraneanould be improved; and Its long, frustrating, and debilitating quarrelajor heretic would at long last have ended In triumph, not only for the USSR but also for those Soviet leaders who could claim to have broughtbout. The whole Titoist episode could then be dismissedemporary aberrations was the Stalinist era within the USSRthe fault not of the Soviet Party and the Soviet system but of one evil or mistaken old man, Josefo.
67. But if there are many reasons why the Soviets night devoutly wish for Belgrade's return, there are also many constraints on Moscow's willingness and ability to bringbout:
Important ass in the Soviet view, Yugoslavia has notlace of high priority In the Soviet scheme of things since the mid or. Over time, Moscow has recognized that the Yugoslav problen has become, inroblem of foreign policy, still intertwined with but distinct from the problem of intra-bloc affairs. What happens inside Yugoslavia
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and what Yugoslavia does for itself internationally are not (as they are, for example, fn the case of Czechoslovakia) vital concerns of the USSR. Thus there are major self-imposedon the risks the USSR would be willing to run and the costs it would be ready to pay for the accomplishment of its objectives in Yugoslavia.
he means available to Moscow to further these objectives are in any event quite limited. reat and nearby power, one which, moreover,imilar ideology andumber of areas similar international objectives, the USSR exercises some political leverage in Belgrade. But Soviet Influence is by no means compelling and does not seemule to exceed that of the United States and of the West European states. Moscow does not seem to have any particular assets within the Yugoslav establishment and cannot count on any substantial body of opinion even vaguely sympathetic to the USSR or to the Soviet variety of communism. Soviet economic leverage is not greatspecially In view of the probable Western willingness to help in times of Yugoslav neednd Moscow has often foundo be an Ineffective Instrument of pressureny case.
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DISSEM
-- The Soviets could of course seek to apply military pressure against Yugoslavia, but the risks of backfire here are substantial. The Yugoslavs would alnost certainly unite In resisting such pressures, and they would turn to the West for political support and material aid. This of coursehat happened in response to such pressures during the Stalin era. In most circumstances, If the Soviets Invaded Yugoslavia, they would encounter organized and irregular armed opposition. Moscowlmost certainly aware of this probability; It would,fmimum, have to allow for the possibility. (Seeiscussion of Soviet capabilities against Yugoslav forces.) It would also have to allow for the possibility of strong Western reactions.
Evenoviet military operations against Yugoslavia proceeded successfully, and without Western military reactions, an invasion of Yugoslavia would severely, perhaps Irreparably, damage Soviet interestsariety of fieldsumber of areas. It would greatly complicate United States-Soviet and Sino-Soviet relations, hurt the Soviet image In the Third World, and riskastern Europe. Moreover, closer to home. It would instantly jeopardize Moscow's large investmentts current policies in Europets driveind of rapprochement, Its
wooing of West Germany, Its desire for trade relations embracing much-needed Imports of technology, and, above all, its efforts to reduce the continental presence of the United States. West European hopes that the USSR wasesponsible, even benign power, survived the Invasion of Czechoslovakia, partly because that campaign was rapidly executed and bloodless and because Moscow was acting within Its own sphere of Influence. An Invasion of Yugoslavia might not be quick, would probably be bloody, and would certainly take Soviet troops far beyond the boundaries of Sovietized Europe.
68. The USSR's current policies toward Yugoslaviaurious mix of these objectives and these constraints. Moscowgenerally cordial relations, encourages reasonably extensive economic and trade ties, keeps ideological disputes fairly subdued, and permits Party contacts though these are infrequent and restrained. Moscow presumably hopes through these means to retain some degree of influence in Belgrade, to thwart the influence there of the Western powers, to keep its options open during the succession period, and to avoid the uncertainties and problems which would flowharp deterioration in relations.
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SECRET SENSITIVE NO FOftflGN DISSEM
SECRET SENSITIVE NO FOREMN DISSEM
At the same time, the Soviets persist in petty subversion, engagenfriendly semi-covert diplomatic activities, andgray propaganda against the Tito regime. They presumably hope in this way to keep their hand in internal Yugoslav politics, to encourage pro-Soviet sentiments among discontented elements of the population, to create difficulties between Belgrade and the West, and to beosition to exploit any new opportunities which might open for them during the succession period.
The extent and effectiveness of Moscow's espionage and covert action efforts against Yugoslavia are difficult to determine. The Yugoslavs imply publicly that these efforts are massive and claim privately that the Soviets were involved in the Kosovo riots8 and have collaborated with hostile emigre groups of all colorations. Such charges, which have also included allegations that Moscow has been busy trying to recruit supportersilitary and student circles, have generally lacked specific details and are probably exaggerated. We lack evidence to sustain them.
There is, however, clear evidence that the Soviets have engaged in various informational activities which have angered or distressed the Yugoslavs:
-- Inito and Soviet Ambassador Benediktoveated exchange over the behavior of Soviet Embassywho were offering assistance to Yugoslav enterprises in financial trouble. arge number ofrimarily In remote areasad been so approached. And the Soviet officials involved had been combining offers of money and technical assistance with considerable corrnentjry or the advtnttgtl of the Soviet way of doing things.
-- Soviet and Soviet-sponsored "informational activity" in Yugoslavia had grown to such proportions by0 that Belgrade instructed its Embassy in Moscow toirm protest. Apparently the Kremlin was unimpressed. The Soviets have persisted In their efforts to reach even the remotest villages with their books, films, and other propaganda materials, and they haveto reject the suggestion that they scale down this program to match Belgrade's modest effort in the Soviet Union. In June of this year, the Yugoslavs publicly warned that the maintenance of Soviet information and cultural centers In Yugoslavia Iswith the principle of reciprocity.
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In material Intended for both domestic and foreign consumption (including broadcasts beamed tohe Soviets have combined general criticism of Belgrade's heretical practices with emphasis on Yugoslavia's current political and economic ills. They have made liberal use of carefully selected quotations from significant Yugoslav documents and pronouncementsIncluding some of Tito's speechesto illustrate how black things really are. And, accordingublic Yugoslav protest, the Kremlin is now employing the services of disgruntled Yugoslav emigres to confirm Its derogatory assessment of the Yugoslav scene before Soviet audiences.
Finally, some Yugoslav journalists and politicians have openly asserted that Moscow's campaign to blacken the Titoist system and to draw certain parallels between developments in Yugoslavia and pre-invasion Czechoslovakia are Intended to create aatmosphere in the USSR and Eastern Europe favorable for military intervention.
72. Soviet involvement with hostile emigre groupsroups which can work among the more than half million Yugoslavs living abroad
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atter of the gravest concernBelgrade Yugoslav accusations that Moscow has encouraged the revival of Cominfonnlst exile activity would seen to have some substance. So too would charges that the Soviets are working with various ultra-conservative and fascist Yugoslav emigre groupshe West. Specifically, the Soviets apparently collaboratedstashi unit based In West Berlin early this year in floating rumors and surfacing circumstantial evidence of links between top Croatian officials and Ustashi elements. Bloc diplomats in Belgrade are reported to have been active In spreading such "gossip'1. Zagreb openly accused the "Serb-dominated" federal security apparatus of complicityonspiracy directed against the Croatian leadership. In the end, Tito had to Intervene to calm things down,
73. Partly because of their genuine concern and irritation over Soviet meddling of this character, and partly because their suspicions of ultimate Soviet Intentions are likely to grow as the succession period draws near, Belgrade Is likelyinimum to keep the USSR at arms length. It may be. in addition, that for their own good reasons, Independently of whatever actions are taken by the Soviet Union, the Yugoslavs will make it very difficult for Moscow to maintain cordial relations. Belgrade has already raised the spectre of Soviet
intervention this year to help dampen domestic controversy and may be Increasingly tempted to do so as time goes by.
The Soviets have so far managed to curb any impulse to respond vigorously to this sort of thingtrong denials might only feed Yugoslav suspicions. But they could not turn their cheek indefinitelyajor Yugoslav campaign stressing malign Soviet intentions. At the same time, It may become more and more difficult for Moscow to overlook the implications of Yugoslavia's current quest for military assistance in the West. Thus, while the Soviets probably hope to be able to maintain the present pattern of their relations with Yugoslavia, at leasto goes, Belgrade may make it increasingly difficult for them to do so.
The Soviets will In any event wish sooner or later to adjust their policies toward Yugoslavia to take account of Tito's departure. They will wish to exploit any opportunities offered by the succession period and may look for candidates to support. They may, in addition, seek to add to any confusionelgrade in the hopeluid political situation would work to their advantage- (Certainly the stability imposed by Tito has not.) But, Initially at least, the Soviets
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NO
are much more likely to react to specific events in Belgrade than to participate in them. Thus the general outlines of present Soviet policy are likely to be preserved until Moscow has some notion of just what the new circumstances in Yugoslavia are. lear trend toward internal anarchy might provide the Sovietsighly tempting opportunity to intervene directly on the political level. And the outbreak of civil war might prompt them to intervene militarily as
well.
The Communist Countries
76. Itn article of faith in Belgrade that Yugoslaviahowing the way for all the Communist states of Eastern Europe. It is true that the Yugoslav socialist experience has from time to timeearing on eventseveral of these countries (Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia) and that Yugoslav Independence has served to encourage those East Europeans who seek their own sovereignty (most notably, Romania). Because of this, and because Belgrade's diplomacy Is directed toward the quiet encouragement of East European nationalism when and wherever possible, Yugoslav-East European relations havepecialistinct flavor all their own. In some capitals, they are treated more or less as members of the family,
as eccentric cousins, perhaps; but in others, they are regarded as black sheep and are thus shunned and despised.
77. nania is, ofase apart. The Yugoslavs are treated in Bucharest as brothers. Ceausescu has reservations about Belgrade's domestic policy, but he recognizes that Yugoslavia's survivalnited and independent state may be critical to the preservation of his own nationalist course. Thus he can be expected to continue to foster his country's special relationship with Yugoslavia and to do what he can to impede or weaken Bloc pressures on Belgrade. Hungary has made an effort to maintain good relations with the Tito regime and hasestrained but sympathetic interesthe general thrust of Belgrade's reformist course. Kadar is no doubt aware that any dramatic Soviet moves against Yugoslavia might seriously reduce his own freedom of maneuver. Poland has also sought to expand its relations with Belgrade. Although this trend seems to have begun during the final two months of Gomulka's rule. It has clearly accelerated since his fall. Eaet Germany has been much less friendly, more openly critical of Yugoslav "revisionism". Pankow's representatives in Yugoslavia apparently have sought, moreover, to influence Yugoslav Journalists and officials with bribes and gifts, to develop contacts
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and sympathizers among Yugoslav workers bound for West Germany, and to distribute films not cleared by Yugoslav censors.
The key factor affecting Yugoslav relations with Bulgariahe Macedonian issue. Belgrade looks on Sofia's refusal tothe existenceeparate Macedonian nationalityotential threat to its territorial Integrity. It is clear that the Bulgarian leadership will be alert to any opportunity to loosen Belgrade's hold on the region In the post-Tito period. Indeed, the Yugoslavs claim that top Bulgarian leaders have said as much. And Belgrade has drawn attention to the fact that Bulgarian pressures in Macedoniancluding subversion and espionage as well as propagandaave tended to peak when tensions have been unusually high between Belgrade and Moscow.
Foro-Yugoslav hostility proved useful to Moscow (Inter alia assisting in the isolation ofut there hasreat Improvement in relations between Belgrade and Peking since the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Yugoslavs view this development with cautious enthusiasm. They surely hope that in the event of major Soviet pressures Peking would seek to aid Yugoslavia, at least by issuing the kind of bellicose statements which might give the Soviets pause.
In any case, Improved Sino-Yugoslav relations have brought an increase in trade and in transportation revenues. But China is far away and, as demonstrated during Foreign Minister Tepevac's recent visit to Peking, neither the Chinese nor the Yugoslavs yet seem certain of the nature and the limits of the relationship.
recent restoration of diplomatic relations betweenYugoslavia may have been encouraged by Peking. Butfriendship Is still fragile, resting primarily on aof Soviet intentions. Ideological differences remain as sharp
as ever, and Itikely to take some time before expanding trade, tourism, and cultural exchangesroader community of interest and temper old suspicions. In the meantime, developments In Yugoslavia's ethnically predominantly Albanian province of Kosovo will continue to constitute potential sources of friction between the two countries. At the same time Yugoslavia's more liberal attitude toward this minority will help to contain the friction.
Weatem Europe
NATO Pouera. While still sometimes disturbed byproblems dating from wartime, Belgrade's relations with theand with most of the other developed nations of the West are
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sECRjrr
SENS/TvE HOISSEM
nowigh level of cordialitynd they are basedolid foundation of mutual interestubstantial economicense, there are ideological ties as wellnd not only with like-minded Comnunist groups. In its quest for friends in the dark days of thendwhen all detachments of the Communist movement were openlyelgrade sought out and cultivated socialist and socialist-oriented political partieswestern Europe. Personal and organizational ties thus established have been continued, extended into the trade union field, and carefully nourished. And they have contributed to official and popular sympathy for Yugoslavia in many countriesarticularly in the Scandinavian states, Britain, and West Germany.
The present state of these relations, and the utportanoe which Belgrade attaches to then, ie reflected in Tito's recent travels. Prior to last fall, the Tugoslarj President had visited only four countries in Western Europeand these trips were widely eeparated in time. But last Oo'.ober, hard on the heels of hosting President Sixon, Tito toured fiveEuropean countriesall members of SATO and the Common Market, isit to Italy, scheduled for Deoember but poetponed because of an untimely resurfacing of the Trieste issue, finally materialised in March. And onh of that monthhe day that other Communist leaders were gathering in Moscow forh Soviet Party CongressTitowith Pope Paul VI for alnost an houralf.
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SBCHT
SEN/flVE NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Thus, at this juncture ost-war evolution, the overall Western attitude can be ciara'terized as one of friendly concern. It is generally agreed that while not ideal, Belgrade's established posture andadvantageous to Western interests. Conversely, Itccepted mat these interests would be gravely threatened if Yugoslavia's current course were reversed or Belgrade were again to fall under Soviet domination
Individually and rol'ectwely. the NATO powers disposeumber of potentially effective meansositiveon the course of developments in Yugoslavia. They range from economic assistance and political support to vague hints that NATO would not countenance an extens'O" of Soviet power to the shores of
the Adriatic. Loans have been Payments have been rescheduled. Yugoslavia has been included under the provisions of the Common Market's preferential tariffs for developing countries In one way or another, all the NATO powers have pitched But because of the special nature of their relations with Belgrade, Bonn and Rome merit Individual discussl
Germany isoremost trading partner. ever Increasing hordes of West German tou'-sts travelYugoslavia. ugo<iav workers are now employed in West
Germany, their rights and social benefits protected by official protocol. Last October, Tito became the first Communist Chief of State to visit Bonn. In view of the bitter heritage of World War II and the break In diplomatic relations7 restored in8he current scope and warmth of Yugoslav-West German relations is And now Belgrade's appreciation of West German economic potential has been supplemented by its favorable assessment of the Brandt regime.
85. The FRG's interest in Yugoslavia as its firstndong time, onlyfoothold in Eastern Europe has been sustained and reinforcedrowing economic stake in the country and hopesthe potential broader ramifications of Belgrade's independent and reformist course. But at least one potentially troublesome problem remainsugoslavia's claims for indemnification of the victims of Nazi concentration camps and medical ex perirents. Negotiations on this subject were begun In May, but the two sides are still far apart. In Itself, this would be of little significancet tookears to get to the talking stage. But the issue has spilled over Into another and more pressing matter. For the Westn effort to get Belgrade to scale down Its demands, have made theirpart of the stabilization assistance package which they are
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IVE
OISSEM
offering the Yugoslavs. The pressure on Belgrade to yield Is great, but both sides seem to be standing fast and the ultimate outcomencertain.
Since accommodation on Triesteugoslavia has had no serious dispute with Italy. Relations have gradually become warmer and more extensive. For some years, the Italians were Yugoslavia's most important trading partners, and while recently surpassedhis regard by the West Germans, they still hold second place. Tito has proclaimed that the Italian-Yugoslav border "is the most open In the world". And, even more than in the case of the West German-Yugoslav relationship, both sides haverowing determination to strengthen cooperation in all fields, Including military affairs, since the invasion of Czechoslovakia.
But there were temporary setbacksugoslav-Italian relations7 and the winter0 when Belgrade took umbrage at what it construed as signs that Rome still coveted lost territory in Yugoslavia. And since rightist elements seem to be becoming more active on the Italian political scene, it is possible that Irredentist stirrings may again cause difficulties in the future.
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88. The Neutral European Statu. Belgrade has long sought topecial "kindred spirit" relationship with the Scandinavians. Buthen the State Treaty established Austrian independence and neutrality, Yugoslavia's northern neighbor has occupied first place among European non-bloc states in Belgrade's order of foreign policy priorities. Recent highlights in the evolution of Yugoslav-Austrian relations include the state visits exchanged by Presidents) and Jonas, their meeting at border ceremonies inlurry of defense consultations which began shortly after the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Yugoslav interest in Austria has declined, however, as the prospects for militarywith Italy and other NATO powers have improved.
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V. THE FUTURE, SOME ALTERNATIVES, AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS Key Variable*
Change and disarray will continue to confront the Yugoslav leadershipariety of serious problems. The destination of the Yugoslav regime, said toew and superior kind ofs vague and uncertain, and the route toward ft uncharted. None of the forces released by the Titoist reformation Is likely to prevailtruggle. Separatist sentiments are likely to weaken the federation; various considerations will probably operate to diminish the power of the LCY; and economic forces, increasingly decentralized, will almost certainly encourage non-Party institutions toarger role in shaping national policy. Thus the Yugoslav system will remain unsettled and chances of serious disruptions will persist into the Indefinite future.
But beyond these rather gloomy near certainties, the Yugoslav future remains Indistinct. Therereat array of variables which will bear on the course of Yugoslav national development, especially during times of trouble. Not the least of these will be international
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circumstanceshe attitudes and actions of external parties, and the ways in which the Yugoslavs perceive them.
Yugoslavia* the European heartland, standing
between East and West, between Central Europe and the Balkans, and facing both the Alps and the Mediterranean. Historically, events in and affecting Yugoslavia have touched Europehole. And, especiallyhe past quarterentury or so, the status of Yugoslavia has come to involve the stability and security of the continenthole.
-- Both NATO and the Warsaw Pact have invested heavily In Yugoslavia, though it belongs to neither, and both sides have come to understand that the current balanceurope would be changed If Belgrade were to adhere to one Bloc or the other. Further, Itlmost certainly recognized In Moscow that for these reasons, among others, direct Soviet interventionugoslavia would be viewed in the Westatter of grave concern.
* Indeed, NATO haa in effeot ao warned. The Communique of the NATO Ministerial Meeting cf8 (following the Soviet invasion of Csechoelovakia) urged the USSR to "refrain from ueing force and interfering in the affaire of othersserted that NATOa could not remain indifjerent tc "any development which endangers theirnd warned that "any Soviet intervention directly or indireotly affecting the situation in Europe or in the Mediterranean would create an international crisis with grave consequences". It was perfectly clear at the time that the 'Jnitea Statee and othere werethemeelves tc the problem cf so-called gray areas in Europe, and that they were greatly concerned about the future security of Yugoslavia and Austria, and,cewhat different context, Romania
as well.
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-- The West European members of NATO would in fact almost certainly regard direct Soviet intervention in Yugoslaviahreat to their own security. They would conceive of
the problem in NATO terms, even though the fortunesATO member were not formally Involved, and they could not imagine an effective response without full United States participation. They would thus see in the Soviet moveest of their own resolveest of the United States commitment to European securityhole.
-- oviet move against Yugoslavia would have unsettling implications for the remainder of Eastern Europe and the Soviets are presumably aware of this. All of the USSR's allies in Eastern Europe, except perhaps Bulgaria and East Germany, would be reluctant to see this development occur. Romania, in particular, would Interpret any Soviet action against Yugoslaviahreat to their own Interests. Romania would refuse to cooperateoviet military operation against Yugoslavia and could be forced to only if it were itself invaded. The Hungarians and Poles would try to avoid participation, though their willingness to resist
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DISSEM
Strong Soviet pressures would probab'y be Quite limited. The
Bulgarians, for thilr pa**t, might participate with some enthusi-
asm, particularly if they were a'lowed to mcve into Macedonia.
In the short term, assuming Soviet successes, most of the East European countries would be cowedoviet invasion of Yugoslavia. But the history of the area suggests that acts of this character do not intimidate indefinitely, that,act, the sources of discontent are in the longer term magnified.
-- Of lesser moment to the Soviets, though still an element in their calculations, would be tne reactions in the Third World. Here, responses would no doubt vary widely, depending on individual assessments of seU-'nterest. 8ut even if there were no general outpouring of concern and regret, suspicions of Soviet intentions would surely be strengthened and the policies of states which were truly uncommitted might be affected in subtle but substantial ways.
Dcmeatia Altarnativea
side from International variables of theiscussed above, there are any number of somber eventualities within Yugoslavia itself and.
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within these, an endless array of variations. Four possibilities, intended to serve only as plausible illustrations, are examined below. The first reflects our estimate of the most likely of several The others,arying degrees, all carry more disturbingfor Western interests. They are, we think, less likely, but at leastheir rough outline are by no means out of the question. Contingenciesore optimistic natureuch asigh degree of internal unity and stability, or open alignment with the West not occasioned by Imminent attack from the Eastare not considered here.
A. nited, Independent, and Non-Aligned Yugoslavia
92. Yugoslavia is troubled today and will sorely miss Tito tomorrow. But the Yugoslav systemhole has withstood the attacks of party factions, the stresses of economic crisis, and the importunities of separatists. The army continues to provide support for national unity, and so, inadvertently, does the USSR. While Tito cannot layixed path for asuccessor regime to follow, he may haveattern andeliance on the empiric and the experimental, which his successors would probably want to imitate and which, in any case, they
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would find difficult to aband:n Ow the 'mg term, then, theof theecure;without Tito, has asu'^ing essentially intact as
a hybrid system.
93. This alternative, then, isinear projection of the current Yugoslav situation, complete with some degree of Internal disarray. Nationality frictions and economic difficulties persist and sometimes flare. But with some adjustment, the present division of authority among the federation, republics, and municipalities proves workable, and timely economic assistance is forthcoming from the West. The post-Tito collective leade'sMp manages to overcome itsshortcomings, limit Us Interna1 differences, and govern the country relatively effectively. Fear of Soviet Intervention continues to condition the attitudes and behavior cf the leadership andalike. In this atmosohere, potentially pro-Soviet forces remain marginal and isolated. Additional reforms move the economy farther toward market socialism. And, unless the Soviet threat becomes so acute that Belgrade is forced to seek alliances in the West, Yugoslaviaits present posture of "on-a'ignment,
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ReacticK. whi'eworst case" situation,this outcooe frustrating. Despite Soviet hopes and machinations,succession leadership has passed its initial test. Thusfaces the indefinite continuationnd perhaps aggravation --
of the problems long posed by Yugoslav behavior. The basic Soviet attitude becomes increasingly hostile and Impatient. Armed intervention remains unlikely, but the Soviets Intensify pressures on Belgrade across the board. They step up efforts to exploit Yugoslavia's internalstall in economic negotiations, delay certain deliveries of goods, and refuse new aid. They maintain or intensify gray and black propaganda and continue their cultivation and support of Yugoslav dissidents at home and abroad. They encourage Bulgaria's claims to Macedonia, increase pressure on Romania to withdraw from close association with Belgrade, and try to stir up Yugoslavia's lingering territorial, minority, and political differences with Western countries.
B. ivided, Independent, Non-Aligned Yugoslavia
situation could emerge quite rapidly after Tito'scould developonsequence of gradual deterioration. Ethnicconflicts mountoint where national level policymaking
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breaks down fn many areas. The weakening center is unable to agree on remedies. While the integrity of the state and its Western-oriented non-alignment are not called into question, the federation is radically deprived of many of its remaining functionsnd these accrue to the republics, which pursue their own economic policies and even begin to act in the area of foreign policies.
Contending republican elements begin to seek political and moral support In the West, vying for favor in Washington and various West European capitals. Extensive economic aid Is also sought as the economy begins to suffer the consequences of division and disruptive internal competition. The Western states find themselves faced with confused and conflicting requests, are hard put to respond effectively, and are not least tempted to proceed unilaterally.
Soviet RtttOticn, The Soviets are generally encouraged by this turn of events, seeing new opportunities for themselves, new problems for the West, and perhaps fewer problems for themselves in Eastern Europe. They are thus anxious to insure that the liberal-minded Belgrade regime does not succeed in restoring its nation-wide authority. They pursue the kinds of policies discussed above, but with some major theyore friendly overt posture, offer sympathetic
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secIet
sensitiveissem
DISSEM
commentary (instead ofnd extend impressive offers of economic and technical assistance. They hope in this way to reduce fear of Soviet intentionsnifying force and to persuade substantial numbers of Yugoslav citizens to favor closer cooperation with the Soviet Union. They step up efforts to cultivate party and state officials and work harder to blunt or turn back Western involvement. But they avoid choosing sides (as, for example, between contending republics) unless forced by events to do so. Soviet military Intervention remains unlikely.
C. isintegrating Yugoslavia: ilitary Coup
Contingency 1: Rapid Takeover
98. The situation described aboveeteriorates over time. Serious disorders, including clashes between ethnic groups, erupt. Civil war threatens. The central political leadership is unable to reach agreement on how to handle the situation. Displaying considerable resolve and unity, the JNAperhaps with the complicity of some Party leadersseizes power in Belgrade, the republican capitals, and other major cities and succeeds in restoring order relatively rapidly. Martial law is established, but the junta preserves the decentralized character of the economy and effectivelyestern-oriented (but still officially
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non-aligned) foreign policy. The shock of fratricidal bloodshedobering effect on the Yugoslav political climate, but disenchantment with centralized military government grows. The West maintains Its ties but urges the formationiberal, non-military regime. The Junta presses preparations for the restoration of civilian government along pre coup lines and steps down.
99. Soviet Reaction. Moscow views the unfolding situation with mixed emotions. The Soviets hope that the logic of martial rule will spell the end of Belgrade's liberal heresiesand that theirefforts to cultivate friends in the JNA will now pay off in an eastward shift in Yugoslavia's foreign policy orientation. On the other hand, they recognize that neither of these developments may come to pass. Thus, Moscow watts the situation out and attempts to woo Yugoslavia's new leaders with offers of assistance. Once the junta's Titoist domestic and foreign policy intentions become clear, the Soviets adopt an openly hostile attitude, but continue to eschew military intervention.
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Contingency t; ifficult Tzkesver
Acting under the condlt'ons outlined above, the JNA seizes power quickly throughout most of the country and seeks to impose harsh central rule, perhaps in collaboration with elements of the Party. But it meets with determined resistance in Croatia. Martial law is declared and Belgrade seeks to impose federal control over the entire economy. The junta mounts scattered small-scale military operations against the Croats. Itenophobic attitude and declares its determination to resist external intervention from any quarter. But it also calls for badly needed economic and military assistance from both East and West. Some West European states, alienated by the character of the junta and profoundly distressed by the prospect of major bloodshed urge Western disengagement. Others, fearing Soviet involvement, favorsupport of the Belgrade regime. After several bloody incidents the Croatian leadership comes to terms and nation-wide order Is restored.
Soviet Reaction. Moscow is encouraged by the early moves of the new regime. It decides that disunity within NATO minimizes the chance of Western Intervention. It adopts an openly friendly attitude toward the junta, declares its opposition to the Croat separatists, and advises Belgrade of its wi'llngness to provide extensive economic and
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military assistance. The Soviets follow up promptly when such aid Is requested and take advantage of the opportunity thus presented toincrease their presence in Belgrade. They avoid overplaying their hand, counsel rather than command, and try over time to ease Yugoslavia into dependent status.
0. isintegrating Yugoslavia: Collapse
Contingency I: Contested Secession
Croatia goes through all the formal motions of secession, proclaims its Independence, and announces its intention to become, inember of the Western conrounity. Slovenia provides moralbut does not formally declare Itself an ally. Belgrade refuses to recognize Zagreb's action, but federal forces seeking to march on Zagreb are turned back and suffer severe losses. Both the government and the military establishment suffer from severe internal divisions. Believing that little or no help for subduing the Croats will be forthcoming from the West which has been generally sympathetic to the Croatian causeand taking advantage of their majority position in the truncatedfederal Presidency, Serbia, Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Montenegro appeal for direct Soviet assistance in the name of the Federation.
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Reaction. Moscow decides thatheseinformal Western comm'tment to fugos'avia no longer exists, thatwill be divided over what options remain, that the invitationrump Yugoslav Government Is legitimate, and that in general theare too promising to pass up. Some Soviet troops arethe Belgrade area, and these then move north with elements of thebattle is joined with the Croats, the main body of the Sovietsweeps in from its staging areas in Hungary and seizes thecenters. These are garrisoned by the Soviets. Mop-upand maritime patrols are 'eft to the JNA
Contingency 2: Total Disintegration
and ethnic conflicts lead to clashes betweendefense units of adjacent republics. The fightingleadstate of civil war. Both the central government andestablishment are too divided to restore order. As theworsens, some JNA units desert and join up with republicanmutiny and refuse to fight. Yugoslavia ceases to exist. Montenegro suffer reverses at the hands of the northernappeal to the Soviet Union for assistance. This actionand Slovenia to turn to the West for help.
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OISSEM
Soviet Reaction. Moscow wishes both to exploit the passing
of the Yugoslav Federation and to bring an early end to fighting near
Warsaw Pact borders. Taking note of the fact that entry of their troops into Serbia and Montenegro would be unopposed and therefore swift, the Soviets determine that NATO would not try to counterove However, hoping to minimize risks, Moscow quietly lets NATO know that it would be Interestedrade-off: Croatia and Slovenia under western influencexchange for the remainder of what was once Yugoslavia under Soviet influence. In line with this approach, the Soviet military response to the Serbian and Montenegrin appeals istailored to meet the minimum defensive requirements of Moscow's new clients without overly exercising Western concerns.
It is clearll the alternatives discussed above that the West and the United States mayritical role to play in Yugoslavia's future. Belgrade's economic ties are now predominantly with the West, its political and cultural views are increasingly shaped by Westernand its national security is at least indirectly dependent on Western strength and resolveis the USSR. Belgrade, while firmly
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committedolicy of non-a'ignment, recognizes that Western (especially United States) political support and economic and military assistance were crucial to Yugos'av survival In thend, and it is well aware today that such aid could become vital once again. Belgrade feels reasonably confident that such aid would be forthcoming, that the West is In fact morally bound to provide it, and that it is, in any case, in the West's own interest to help preserve an independent and united Yugoslavia. It also fears, however, that NATO might be slow to moverisis and that there is no Western commitment, moral or otherwise, to defend Yugoslavia in the eventoviet attack.
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ANNEX A
YUGOSLAV MILITARY CAPABILITIES
military personnel currently on activef which0 are0 air forceground forces. (There are also0 frontierYugoslav military establishment is second only to the Polishamong East European forces.
Yugoslav ground forces are organizedrmored and
9 Infantry divisions,umber of independent brigades and regiments equivalent to aboutore divisions. Yugoslav ground force units are generally deployed near the land borders, and normally areatercent of their authorized strength. It would take upeek to bring them to wartime strength, at which time they would number. Since total ground force reserves are estimated atillion, substantial numbers of reservists would be available to replace losses in existing units, to form new active duty units, or to serve with activated territorial and civil defense forces (already said by the Yugoslavs to numberillion).
SENS/lVE-NO fORe/GN OISSEM
equipment is available for al) existing ground force units. Tanks are of both Western and Soviet manufacture, but the more modern ones are all Soviet, including small numbers of the newest tank currently in the Soviet inventory, The Yugoslavs themselves produce trucks, light and medium artillery, chemicalmaterial, signal equipment,mall number of armored personnel carriers.
The Yugoslav Air Force consists primarily of Interceptor and ground attack aircraft. Of theighter interceptors in the inventory, more thanre late modelll-weather interceptors and the remainder are day fighter6 Sabre jets. The ground attack force contains about4 Thunderjets andndigenously produced jet and propeller-driven aircraft. Ground-based air defense forces include eighturface-to-air missile (SAM) sites plus anti-aircraft artillery (AAA). Replacement parts for both Soviet and United States aircraft are limited. (By way of comparison, Bulgaria alonearger and generally more modern combat air force,ore extensive SAM system. Soviet tactical
air forces in the Carpathian, Kiev, and Odessa Military Districts and in the Southern Group of Forces alone number ombat aircraft.)
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ANNU A
SENSITIVE NO FOBEIGN OISSEM
The navy consists of one one operationaloastal patrol shipsncludingSA-class large guided missile patrol boatsand numerous other patrol, mineamphibious, and service craft. The emphasis placed by the Yugoslavs on large numbers of small ships seems appropriate in view of Yugoslavia's highly irregular coastline. There are believed to be0 or more naval reservists. The Yugoslavs now build small submarines and units up to patrol boat size and are capable of constructing larger conventional submarines and even destroyers. But the Yugoslavs remain dependent on the USSR for sophisticated electronics gear, sonar, steam power plants, and optical equipment. The Yugoslav Navy would be unable to cope with the Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean which currently averageubmarines!ombatants, andupport ships.
Although Yugoslavia has received about two-thirds of its post-World War II arms from the West, the USSR has been its dominant supplier of military equipment during. The Soviet Union has sold at5 million of arms to Yugoslavia, accounting for most of Belgrade's arms purchases1 and for its major modern weapons systems. The most recent arms agreement with the USSR was reached5 and expired Sinceelgrade has
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OISSEV
sought to reduce its dependence on the USSR for military equipment, and has opened arms negotiations with Britain, France, Sweden, West Germany, and Norway. French helicopters and Swedish torpedo boats have already been acquired and the Yugoslavs may be seeking Mirage aircraft from the French. The Yugoslavs have expressed little interest, however, in acquiring Western tanks, which suggests that Belgrade will continue to seek such items from the USSR, or, perhaps, approach the Chinese.
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/
:ORj*GN DI
A M
SENS] NO FOR/ON DISSEM
Major Military Equipment Delivered to
Units
Manufacture Manufacture
Land armaments
Armored personnel
Artillery and heavy
Self-propelled
Naval ships
Large guided missile patrol boats
Patrol
Aircraft
Propeller
Jet
Propeller
Guided missile systems
Surface-to-surface,
Surface-to-surface,
Surface-to-air 8
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NO FORE EN OlSSEM
orale and training apparently are good at all levels throughout the Yugoslav Armed Forces. Much progress seems to have been made in subduing ethnic animosities, partly through politicalconducted before and after conscripts are called to active duty. The average male in service is physically tough and has the capacity to remain effective without, by Western standards, adequate food and Western military observers believe that the Yugoslav soldier adapts readily to military discipline, is adept at improvisation, and handles weapons efficiently. His military training programual objectiveo prepare him for defensive guerrilla-type combat and for conventional defensive warfare. Training for both objectives appears to be intensive and thorough.
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sens/Five
NO FORfIGN OISSEM
Yugoslav Defense Budget
Year
Defense Budget (Million US S)
Budgetercent of Federal Budaet
8udgetercent of Social Product
a/ Estimated.
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SENSITJfE NO FOREIGK OISSEM
ANNEX B
SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIESIS YUGOSLAVIA Soviet Requirements snd Considerations
A full-scale invasion of Yugoslavia woulduch more difficult undertaking for the USSR than the Czechoslovak intervention In that instance, Soviet and allied forces surrounded the victim on three sides and were backed up by short, secure supply lines They invaded with overwhelming strength, quickly occupied the entire country, and successfully forestalled any resistance on the part of the Czech Army.
Hone of these factors would hold true for operations against Yugoslavia. The Soviets probably would be confined to only two major land routesne from Hungary toward Belgrade and Zagreb, the second from Bulgaria toward Nis and Skopje. (They could not count onfrom Romania.) They would have little hope of surprising their enemy; there are no large, ready Soviet forces adjacent to Yugoslavia (as there were near Czechoslovakia). Moreover, Moscow wouldto allow for stout Yugoslav resistance, both from the armed forces and
a large portion of the population.
ANNEX B
3. Deployments for the Czech Invasion resultedorward shift of Soviet forces from primary reinforcement areas in the western USSR andore favorable position opposite the critical NATO Central Region. Conversely an invasion of Yugoslavia wouldignificant southward shift of Soviet forces from the western USSR and thus would weaken the over all postureis the NATO Central Region. And prolonged resistance could force the Soviets to maintain
large forces in Yugoslavia for some time.
4. For the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the ratio of Soviet and allied divisions over combat-effective Czechoslovak divisions was moreo 1. Assuming that the Yugoslavs would have enough warning to bring most of their own regular ground forces to full strength, the Soviets would have to assemble an invasion force of someivisions or more in order to achieve the same ratio. The Soviet planners might settlemaller ratio by allowing for the superior mobility and firepower of their own forces and the ability of the Pact to achieve air supremacy over Yugoslav territory. Even so, the Soviets probably would have to commit the four divisions of the Southern Group of Forces,oivisions from the Carpathian, Kiev, and Odessa MDs (many of which would have to be augmented by reserve personnel and additional
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SE
ANNEX 3
equipment, such as general purpose vehicles drawn from the civiliannd one or two airborne divisions (to be used mainly to block the retreat of Yugoslav forces Into the mountains).
S. In addition, the Soviets might press intoungarian divisionsulgarian divisions,otal Warsaw Pact forceivisions.
fuaoaLav Strategy
Yugoslav strategy appears to call Initially for conventional resistance beginning near the borderontinuous front. The Yugoslav ground forces would conduct large-scale rear guard actions (with the aid of territorial and partisan units behind enemy lines) to enable major government and territorial defense forces to regroup in the more inaccessible parts of the country.
There can be no doubt in Belgrade's mind that the Soviets could commit sufficient forces to take the major urban areas of Yugoslavia. But such success would still offer considerable scope for Yugoslav armed resistance, particularly if the regular forces retreatedintact to the mountains, where they would be supplemented
by large partisan forces. The Yugoslavs publicly claimillion foreign troops would be needed to completely "pacify" the country
B3 -
ANNEX B
8. The Soviets would have to take account of possible foreignary reactions, particularly if Yugoslav resistance were prolonged. The greatest chanceonfrontation with NATO forces might come In the Mediterranean if the Sovietslockade of the Yugoslav coast to prevent arms deliveries.
Original document.
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