Soviet Navalramework for Antisubmarine Warfare Strategy
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence1
Soviet Naval Writings: ramework for Antisubmarine Warfare Strategy
A major unsolved problem of Soviet naval warfare is how to counter the nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines and torpedo attack submarines of the United States and other NATO countries.
Soviet navalpublic andsome insights into how Soviet naval planners view the problem of antisubmarine warfare.
writingsetailed perception of the
submarine threat to the Soviet Union and its forces, and illustrate general Soviet views on the advantages and disadvantages of the variousair, and surface--of ASW forces. Moreover, the writings point to the major problems confronting Soviet ASW planners and suggest the existence of con-flicting interests and views within the Soviet navy
fche most promising solutions to ASW problems.
do not lend themselves directly to assessments
of capabilities and specific future force levels.
The differing purposes behind the variousadd to the problem of interpreting them. Many are obviously designed to bolster domestic morale and influence international opinion. Some Soviet descriptions of Western navies are straightforward
Note;This report vas prepared by the Office of Strategic Research and coordinated within CIA.
while others are veiled formulations of Soviet concepts. Still others appear to supportpositions on weapons procurement issues*
Nevertheless, certain constraints operate to assure that much of the content of the writings is useful from the standpoint of Western intelligence. There is, aftereed to inform Soviet professional naval readers accurately. In addition, there is the need to avoid claims that the other Soviet militarycould demonstrate to bo false, and to maintain some credibility with the readership. Many claims which seem extravagant are premature rather than fabricated. Finally, it should be noted that the open articles and the writings of lesseravailable to Western intelligence are generally in consonance with the highly classified Sovietacquired duringeriod.
This paperquotes extensivelySoviet naval writings of the past decade in an effort to discern the Soviet view of the Western submarine threat and to suggest the trend of future Soviet measures to counter that threat* ummary of the analysis starts on
The number in parentheses following everyin the text refers to the appended bibliography (beginning onf sources used for theof this paper. Not all of the writings listed in the bibliography are quoted directly in the paper.
Soviet View of tho Submarine Threat
Ballistic Missile Submarines
Torpedo Attack Submarines
Soviet ASW: Finding the Proper Combination
Balanced Forces and Operational Concepts
Major ASW Problems
A Soviet View of WesternBarriers in the Atlanticin the Pacific Ocoan
Newest Soviet ask Submarines 13
Principal Soviet ASW Aircraft 15
Elementsoviet ASW Surface Ship 18
Soviet naval writings depict Western nuclear powered submarinesual threat to the Soviet Union. Ballistic missile submarines are capable of striking targets in the USSR and torpedo attack submarines potentially can keep Soviet submarines and ships from performing their missions in aor general war.
Ballistic Missile Submarines
Tho Soviets recognized at least as early9 that the ballistic missile submarine would supersede the attack aircraft carrier as theseaborne threat to their mainland* In that year. Admiral V. F. Tributs, Baltic Fleet commander in World War II, wrote:
igh speed atomic-driven submarines which are armed with rockets are to replacecarriers. These submarines must also form the nucleus of future navies.
Since then, Soviet publications have printed accurate details on the characteristics of the US Polaris submarine, its construction program, forward basing procedures, and the various versions of thc missiles, such as the Polaris-to-Posoidon conversion program. Such information was roost comprehensively set out in an exhaustive technical and operational description of the Polaris system published in Moscow) ore recent book--submarines againstublished8 by N, I.ormer submarinethe ranges of thond Poseidon missiles atautical miles. aval digest article in) gives the maximum ranges of theso missilesm. These estimates reflect the Soviet perception of the large potential launch zones available to Western ballistic missile submarines.
* italia numbers in parentheses refer to sources, listed alphabetically by author in the bibliography beginning on
According to Soviet authors, the threatfromoolaris submarines operating continuously in the Mediterranean, Norwegian Sea, and western Pacific, within missile range of Soviot territory, ready to launch their missilesinutes after receiving the launch order.
The Soviets probably regard Polaris patrols in the Indian Oceaneal possibility as well. Classified Soviet papers90 referred to the Indian Oceanotential launch site for carrier attacks on Soviet territory. The ballistic missile submarine, having replaced the carrier as the primary naval strategic threat in Soviet eyes, could use the same waters. Inned Star) claimed that Polarishad patrolled in the Indian Ocean.
SovietSuzdalevhave also recognized the Arcticossible Polaris patrol zone. They have kept abreast of US and UK under-ice operationsnd probably tako the ballistic missile threat from that quarter seriously.
Admiral S. G. Gorshkov, commander of the Soviot navy, has frequently pointed to the US Navy's growing share of the total US nuclear strike potential. Ho wrote in Pravda) that over one-third of
ticx.USstrato9ic nuclear weapons was in the us Navy. He made the came assertion7 Naval) and predicted the percentage wouldto one-half The latter estimate was repeated in the same Soviet publication9y one of its editors, naval theorist Rear Admiral K. A. Stalbo. This overstated estimate of the US naval threat seems tonavy line" in the USSR. It is possible that Gorshkov and other naval leaders were only lobbying with tho Politburo for funds and forces for the ASW, tho strategic attack, and,the anticarrier missions.
The Soviets aro awareand follow closely the evolution of US thinking and funding for an
undersea long range missile system (ULMS) tothe Polaris and Poseidon systems. riter in Naval) recently stated that an ULMS is certain to be developed. To date, however, theof the available writings have not yet focused
on the threat of an ULMS and the forces necessary to counter it.
Torpedo Attack Submarines
The Soviet navy regards Western nuclear powered attack submarines as the greatest threat to its own ballistic missile, cruise missile, and torpedo attack submarines.
With regard to the threat to Soviet ballistic missile submarines. Admiral A. T. Chabanenko of the Soviet General Staff wrote
Atomic submarines are now considered by the United States, England, France, and others as the most effective means of combating missile-carrying submarines. Theirconstruction now constitutes the most characteristic trend in theof antisubmarine forces of the navies of the largest powers.
Regarding the threat to other Soviet submarines, naval theorist Captain 1st Rank Ye. Hamayevthat Western nuclear attack submarines would be positioned in barriers to keep Soviet submarines from reaching the open sea lanes where they would attack Western convoys. )
Suzdalev's Submarines Against) makes explicit statements of Soviet perception of Western ASW barrier strategy. The book asserts that this strategy was worked out in US and NATO exercises in the early Sixties. Suzdalevdepicts Western submarine barriers in thc Atlantic (see top map onhowing theof submarines stationed off the Kolaubmarine and ASW aircraft line between northern
translation of legends:
D geographic narrows (stra)ts)
<3iZ3 asw aircraft carrier groups '
*t shore-based aircraft
' fixed hydroacoustic system tor
long range detection of submarines
Maps reproduced from Submarines Against Submarine! by NX Suxdalev
- 8 -
Norway anderies of submarine, ASW aircraft, and ASW carrier group lines at tho Green-land-Iceland-UK gap; ASW aircraft patrol lines fron Newfoundland to West Africa; and submarine, ASW aircraft, and ASW carrier group zones in the western Atlantic. ap of the Pacific (see bottom map on page 8) shows submarines off Petropavlovsk and Vladivostok, backed up by ASW aircraft patrol lines, and submarines, ASW aircraft, and ASW carrier group zones in the eastern Pacific. Suzdalavetailed discussion of the tactics used by Western submarines in patrolling their zones and theused in assigning patrol zones. He notes that tho US submarines can lay up toines each off Soviet bases.
Two additional US uses of attack submarines have been noted by Soviet authors: trailing and
escort. Regarding US operations, Admiral Chabanenko notes that:
arge number of training exercises is being conducted in which atomic missile-carrying submarines are regularly assigned to act as the "enemy.- Methods ofsearch and lengthy concealed tracking are being developed with particular care.
Suzdalev mentions the possible Western use of attack submarines as escorts:
n the interest of safety of their tmi SSBNs, the Americans propose to use atomic attack boats for search and destruction of those enemy submarines that aro in the same patrol areas as their SSBNs. )
In this situation. Western submarines wouldounter to Soviet ASW submarines.
Although Soviet naval writers recognize both the western ballistic missile submarines and attacknilitary threats to contend with, their asw literature is concerned chiefly with countering
the Polaris. They apparently believe that if the more difficult Polaris problem can be solved,dufenso of Soviet ships and submarines can also be managed. The writings do not indicate that specific ASW forces are earmarked for use solely against either ballistic missile submarines or torpedo attack submarines. In this connection. Admiral Chabancnkohe operations of the antisubmarine forcestruggle against all submarines."
The importance of the anti-Polaris mission of Soviet ASW forces was emphasized by Naval Digest editor Rear Admiral Stalbo:
The content of Soviet naval art has been subjectod to extensive review. Naval art has been reinforced now by such now (in principle) types of combat action as delivering strikes on land targets with ballistic missiles and combat with atonic missile submarines for the purpose of defending one's territory from nuclear missiles launched from these submarines. )
destruction of NATO ballistic missile
submarines at their bases by Soviet missile strikesersistent theme throughout the late Fifties and early Sixties. But now that tho Soviet navy is expanding its operations in the open ocean, tho Soviet theoretical discussions emphasize operations against tho missile submarine at sea.
Soviet ASW: Finding the Proper Combination of Weapons
The dialogue carried on in Soviet naval writings among the proponents of different ASW weapon systems provides clues about the future trends in Soviet ASW weapon procurement. Submarines, surface ships, and naval aircraft each have their advocates. The argumentation which has appeared in open or lesser classified writings has been low key, however, and most authors evidently accept the efficacyalanced approach to ASW weapon procurement.
The leading proponent of theis Admiral A. T. Chabanenko, a The pronouncements of Chabanenkospecial attention because he probablyASW effort. From2
fleet "jhe commanded the Northern Fleet, the Soviet fleet with the largest concentration of submarines He was identified4avalh!
J'" enera! Staff-tho only admiral bought to be currently assigned to the General Staff. He is
nvolved lnlanning for ASW forces and strategy. Many of his published writings deal
redicted that Polaris t by special atomic submarines with
S?7 ^le-carrying submarines of theSw he operational features of tho ASW submarine in terms of the attack submarine versus ballistic missile submarine encounter:
n duel situations the multipurpose submarine will havo advantages over the missile-carrying atomic submarine, it willreatert will beimes as fast in changing the depth of submersion, and its dimensions will be less.
The future tense is taken to mm that none of the submarines in7 Soviet order of battle met
rhlh tl0n- to
Chabanenko, an ASW submarine had to be quieter,
Btafee: "hording to the lerminoloau III iYiSSH navi*>submarine* IAaII Udsubmarines because an be
againstta. he VS Navy,submarine* are called attack submarines."
faster, deeper diving, and more reliable, and have better sensors than earlier Soviet models. With these improvements, Chabanenko continued;
here are great opportunities for the further development of atomicsubmarines and for sharply increasing their operational characteristics. Therefore, we can expect in the nearonsiderable increase in the number of multipurpose deep sea submarines.
Chabanenko's ideas along with those of Admiralormer Baltic Fleet commander, may be partially embodied in the latest generation of Soviet torpedo attack submarines such as the nuclearlasslass (see photographs on, Kharlamov emphasized the virtues of the deep diying attack submarine when he wrote about the US submarine program
The submarine with the greater operating depth can maneuver more freely in the vertical plane, which, on the one hand, increases its attack capabilities and, on the other hand, offers improved capability for fuller use of the tremendous water depth for protection. Thus, theof deep diving submarines is opening up new possibilities for the further growth of the atomic submarine fleet and improvement of the tactical operational capabilities of various types of submarines. This is the reason wo can expect the appearance in the naval forces in the near
futurearge number of deep-diving submarines, )
th ?harlamov,elievos that the attack submarine offers the best means of countering ballistic missile submarines, although he does acknowledge some ASW capability for aircraft and surface ships. Other authors take the view that the effortsalanced force of all three
Newest Soviet ASW Submarines
Thean enured ihe fleetight of these nuclear powered torpedo attack submarine! are now operational and production coniinuei at the rate ot about two each year. The operations, estimated characteristics, and performance ollass lowest that it may be intended primarily lor an ASW role. Ms maximum submerged speed isnots and it may have* powerful low frequency activets operating depth is ateet.
air, surface, and subsurface--are necessary. Most authors agree, however, that the submarine is the best single antisubmarine weapon available.
Chabanenko, impressed by the high promise of the attack submarine in ASW, neglected to mention its disadvantages. riting about Western attack submarines, displayed no such In his view nearly all the disadvantages of the attack submarine stem fromlimitedfor underwater communication. Communication problems curtail the effectiveness ofubmerged submarine with other submarines, surface ships, and aircraft. The other major shortcoming of the nuclear submarine is its high construction cost.
Chabanenko does not rule out joint operations by submarines with the other ASW forces. he writes, in any joint ventures, "atomicsubmarines are to play the main role." n this, he echoes those nuclear submariners in Western navies who would prefer operatingand thereby avoiding the command and control headaches involved in joint ASW operations.
Soviet naval aviators predictably take issue with the emphasis on attack submarines. They arguealanced approach to the ASW problem,ubstantial contribution from land-based aircraft. Their writings accord with the current upgrading of the ASW component of Soviet naval aviation, where every now combat aircraft entering the fleet isprimarily foras the Mail and May aircraft (see photographs on.
Of the three branches of Soviet navalantiship strike, reconnaissance, andASW branchelatively new creation, having been established in the early Sixties. This is attested2 article by Major General of Aviation S. M. Ruban alerting aviators to the impending delivery of
new ASW technical3 statement by Ruban and Colonel N. Antonov that Soviet ASW aircraft have an anti-Polaris mission in the "open,4 article by Major General of Aviation P. P. Nevzorov calling ASWnew branch." )
Soviet views of the advantages and disadvantages of ASW aircraft are explicitly set forth in available naval writings. The proponents claim the aircraft can search large areas rapidly, arrive quickly in aarea, track and destroy submarines, and operate independently or in conjunction with other ASW forces. They admit, however, that the aircraft cannot fly in bad weather, that their endurance is limited, and that they have to rely on other forces or systems for initial detection.
Open press descriptions of long-range air ASW operations often start with theaoutontact area in responseall from other forces. The initial means ofis not stated. In the contact area, the aircraft uses sonobuoys to localize and track the submarine. Attack is by air dropped torpedoes or depth bombs.
A comprehensive Soviet description of ASWin Western navies concluded that NATO aircraft are effective against diesel but not nuclear(S) The conclusion mayudgment by the Soviets of their own current capabilityas the problem is basically the same for their naval air force.
The requirement for oceangoing surface ships in the Soviet navy, questioned by Khrushchev during the late Fifties, is now firmly established. Theirin countering nuclearotherbeen defended by the navy's second-in-command. Fleet Admiral V. A. Kasatonov,9 paper on the role of surface ships. ) He points out that the design and construction of modern
surface shipseaction to theof nuclear submarines, and that today's surface ships are capable of seeking, pursuing, andsubmarines in the "open regions of the sea as well as in their coastal waters." He continues that their detection and destruction capabilities are being improved constantly, thus increasing their overall ASW potential.
Kasatonov and others, including naval aviators, entertain high expectations for joint ASW operations of task groups which include ASW helicopters. The use of helicopters, according to Kasatonov,increases the area investigated in joint actions with surfacend "hinders evasionubmarineurface ship is directed to it by
But ASW helicoptero not
replace surface antisubmarine warfare ships. The combating of missile submarines requires their joint action."
In4ajor General of Aviation Nevzorov praised the concept of multiforce ASW groups, including helicopters, to operate at sea for extended periods because ASW cannotne-shot effort." inaptain 1st Rank V. G. Yefremenko,ide-ranging article entitled "The Development and Perfection of ASW Forces and Tactics forointed out that surface ships "have everything necessary to organize the control of various types of ASW forces and means. Therefore, definite success is expected of them in antisubmarine warfare." He also noted that in tho West hydrofoil craft and air cushion vehicles are considered useful in ASW.
On the other hand, submariner Chabanenkoa pessimistic view of surface ships inthey are handicapped by difficulties in detecting modern submarines, and are vulnerable to attack from submarines and aircraft; therefore, they require
additional forces for their combat support." e stated that ASW surface shipsole only in areas where shore-based aircraft can protect them.
Elementsoviet ASW Surface Ship Task Group
patrolling tho approaches to bases, escorting coastal convoys, and defending amphibious assaults.
In this clash of ideas over surface ships in ASW, Kasatonov's point of view hasualified victory. The construction of just two Moskva class ASW helicopter cruisers suggests that theof the ASW task group (see photographs ono date is undergoing intensive high-level evaluation. The combined forces concept appears to have the organizational advantage of uniting surface ship and aviation officers behind it. However, in none of the available literature isesponse to Chabanenko's criticism of the vulnerability of ASW surface ships to aircraft attack.
A harbinger of an expanded future for Moskva type task groups may be the commendation that Defense Minister Grechko awarded to the Moskva Additionally, the multipurpose detroyer and cruiser type ships entering theKresta, Kanin, Kashin, and Krivakequipped for an ASW role and all are fitted with surface-to-airossible answer to Chabanenko's criticism.
Balanced Forces and Operational Concepts
A widespread appreciation for the necessity of the proper balance of ASW forces emerges from Soviet writings. The impression given by the writings is tnat no single force element or strategy has been found which offers hopeolution to the ASW
and that several avenues are to be followed
The Soviet navy evidently regards the nuclear-powered attack submarine as the most capable ASW weapon At the same time it believes that effective ASW in the open ocean requires the contributions of aircraft and surface ships along with diescl sub-
l writingsiew that,if they are toroper balance of ASW
forces, they will have to increase the numbers of surface ships and aircraft as they continueASW capable submarines to the fleet. This movementcorrect combination") and "rational proportionality" (Rear Admiral N. Piterskiy) ) is gradually replacing the general emphasis on submarines and shore-based antiship imposed on the navy in the Khrushchev years.
Some Soviet commentators realize that the scope of the Polaris threat is so great that large numbers of countering forces are necessary. In view of the vast regions to search, the "main efforts of the navies during the initial period of the war may be directed at the search and destruction of submarines at sea." This will involve "significantof ASW forces. This solution, proposed by Captain 1st Rank P. V. Nikolayev, demands "numerous forces and means," ) Another commentator asserted that ASW requires "considerable personnel and material, part of which can be deployed inin areas of possible enemy submarine operations in order to detect, track, and destroy them at the proper timear has broken out." )
These ideas invite comparison of Soviet operational concepts for anti-Polaris strategy and anticarrier strategy. First, with respect to the proportion of force levels, no prominent Soviet naval leader has stated that small numbers of forces will suffice against Polaris. In contrast, Gorshkov has asserted that relatively slender but potent iforces can handle the carrier threat. Second, although high level naval officers have discussed preemptive attacks against aircraft carriers, thereoticeable reticence on the subject oftactics against Polaris.
A hint of preemptive thinking against Polaris is found in the recent book entitledescribing the so-named large scale naval exercise of According to the book, combat against ballistic missile submarines was one theme of the "uni fied plan" for the "Ocean" exercise, in onea "Southern" or "enemy" ballistic missile "SUbmar
was localized by long range aircraft from the Northern Fleet.
For several hours the crew kept the "enemy-submarine under surveillance. Contact was steady. The buoys were functioning efficiently and clearly. The command headquarters of the maneuvers did not give orders to destroy the submerged "Southern" missile carrier. It had its own reasons for this.
It may be speculated that the exercise playlong "hold-down" maneuvers, in which naval headquarters had the option to attack or withhold attack on the Polaris, as directed by broader Prolonged tracking of this sort would be essentialreemptive strike.
The present impossibility of locating and of prolonged simultaneous tracking of all or most Polaris units suggests that the "hold-down"in Exercise "Ocean"ighly artificial testtrategy for the far distant future if ever. The naval writings reflect the Soviet view that the primary difficulties in countering Polaris are the unsolved problems of underwater detection and communication.
Major ASW Problems
One Soviet critique of ASW in the us Navy ended with the following judgment:
espite the great emphasis the US navy is placing on this, it is generally felt that the ASW problem remains unsolved. As before, the problems involved in search, detection, andof underwater targets are still considered highly complex. Until they are solved, other ASK developments lose much of their significance. )
Yet the Soviet open press frequently discusses in extensive detail the fixed and mobilesubmarine detection systems used by the US, with full knowledge that the USSR is far behind the west in this field. It is clear that initial
detectiontumbling block to ASW in the Soviet navy.
Soviet statements in the early and mid-Sixties tended to emphasize close-in detection systems. For example. Major General of Aviation4 article stated:
It can be assumed that given modernany technically developed country canubmarine detection and identification system along its coasts. )
More recently, statements have hinted that the Soviets recognize the advantages of submarinesystems beyond coastal waters. Colonelnokhin, an advocate of aircraft in ASW, argued in0 that "the possibilities for antisubmarine aircraft operating in conjunction with stationary detection gear, installed near coasts, in straits and narrows are still increasing." (l) For initial detection of submarines. Captain 1st Rank Yefremenko in his article last October suggested fixed arrays of hydrophones and large buoys having acoustic and other means" of detection. ) The trend of statements suggests that the Soviets intend to apply underwater detection techniques in combination with antisubmarine aircraft in "narrowuch as the Sicily Straits and around the Kuril and Japanese islands.
The writings reveal only one hopeful avenue forhe neardiesel submarine.escribes "hidden search" tactics of conventional submarines which, operating on battery power, are extremely quiet sonar listening"Their cruise speed under water in carrying out antisubmarine searche states, "isnotsays." ) in
hia description of US submarine exercises, attributes similar views to US ASW experts on the detection capability of the dicsel submarine. These ideas may help explain operations of Soviet diesel submarines in the Mediterranean and suggest an ASW mission for thelass submarine.
The Soviets recognize that command andcommunications are the keys to effectivetactical use of tho balanced forcessubmarines. The main difficulties arecommunications, identificationfriend ornd distance(DME). If these arc overcome,be more fully integrated into jointopposing submarines. Suzdalev is?)communication problems handicap Westernand goes on to say, "When thecommunications are perfected thebe able to conduct mutually supportingother ASW
Another facet of this problem is tho two-way communications link between the submerged submarine and shore headquarters. Tho Soviet chief of naval communications. Vice Admiral G. G. Tolstolutskiy, has written that, in the drive to centralize command and control, reliable long-range communication with deep diving submarinesajor problem, Soviet statements suggest that underwater communication and submarine detection are theand development problems with tho highest ASW priority.
Soviet naval writings define the submarine threatualballistic missile submarines and torpedo attack submarines. The Sovietsat least as early9 that ballisticsubmarines would supersede the attack carrier as the primary seaborne threat to their mainland. They Bee the threat emanating from Polaris submarines patrolling continuously in the Mediterranean,Sea, and western Pacific. In addition, they regard the Arctic basin and Indian Ocean as potential Polaris launch sites. Western torpedo attack sub-marinos deployed in forward barriers are soon as opposing the Soviet navy's main long range forces operating from bases in the Northern and Pacific Fleets. The writings suggest that Western attack submarines may also be used to trail enemy ballistic missile submarines and defend friendly ballistic misailo submarines.
Although Soviet naval writers recognize both the Western ballistic missile submarines and attack submarines as military throats to contend with, their ASW literature is concerned chiefly with countering Polaris. They apparently believe that if the more difficult Polaris problem can bo solved, antisubmarine defense of ships and submarines can also be managed.
A widespread appreciation for tha necessityroper balance of ASW forces emerges from Soviet Writings. Submarines, surface ships, and navaleach have their advocates.
Among the proponents of the ASW submarine is Admiral A. T. Chabanenko of tho Soviet General Staff. He points out the advantages of the quiet, fast, deep-diving nuclear-powered ASW submarine. Its chief disadvantages are the difficultiesin communication and joint operations with other friendly forces and its high cost.
Soviet naval aviators argueore balanced approach to the ASW problem,ubstantial
contribution from land-based aircraft. Itsclaim the aircraft can search largearrive quicklyontact area,destroy other submarines, and operateor in coordination with other ASW forces. of naval aviation admit, however, thatendurance of aircraft is limited, theirgraded in bad weather, and they have to
rely on other forces or systems for initial detection.
ships, including the navy'sofficer. Fleet Admiral V. A. Kasatonov, argue that today's surface ships are capable ofnd destroying nuclear submarines in the open ocean and controlling coordinated ASW
thers,XPQCtations for joint ASW
ttvl Inch OUps Wnlcn incite ASWkva MijJw tflSkon theIf Submarine advocates
c^abi!iMl ipS arCinto
0 Allowed simultaneously.
wllnon ubmarine as the most capable ASW
SS^S'thJ hSS Sameiew that effective surface Ihini9 2eaS re<*uiresontribution S and aircraft as well. To implement
Jncrease the numbers of surface
C"ftheyadding ASW-capaoio uubmurines to the fleet.
fnr"cognize that communications oSiSSSSSi and control are the key to effective qin clvf^1USethG balanced forces dUficult?ry *ubmarines- he acknowledged cl ommunications arc over-
teimt tacticsully migrated into j inc tactics against opposing submarines. Another
stumbling block is the two-way link between the submerged submarine and shore headquarters. Soviet statements imply that underwater communications and submarine detection are the highest priority research and development problems related to ASW.
Soviet writers recognize that large numbers of pre-deployed ASW forces would be needed to cope with Polaris threats. Although Soviet naval leaders have written about preemptive tactics against aircraft carriers, there is noticeable reticence on the subject of preemptive tactics against Polaris.
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ilh.ivu 1Original document.