Created: 4/1/1972

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible




This studyumber of judgments to be advanced, for the first time, concerning the KGB's role in Soviet politics.

The study confirms that the maintenance of domestic political security isfar and awaytho KGB's priority mission. Further, the KGB is not an invisible government,ulti-purposed instrument responsive to the Party's Politburo and especially to its General Secretary, Leonid Brezhnev. The KGBefinite force in the constant ebb and flow of policy/ personal competition among top Soviet leaders: the KGB's domestic and foreign activities reflect these tides, and in turn affect them. All in all, the KGB appears torofessional arm of the ruling Party, fairly well-controlled if not always well-behaved, and thoroughly enmeshed in the fabric of that Party's politics.

To some degree this statusonstant, reflecting the KGB's sonsitive powers and institutionalariable which significantly enhances this status at present is the stature and personal influence of the KGB's current Chairman, Yuriy Andropov. enior political figure in the Party, this study reveals him to bo tough, pragmatic, intellectual, and by Sovietelative moderate. Andropov is in essenceey advisor to the Politburo and effective overseer of the KGB who seems to enjoy Brezhnev's confidence, and who also seems presently content not to contest Brezhnev's primacy.

We wish to acknowledge the assistance whichof other CIA offices, the Clandestineparticular, have brought to the preparation of Its judgments have net general agreementbut tho inconclusive nature of availablecertain points necessitates that Judgmentsbo advanced cautiously. The paperavailable this study are welcomed and should be addressedauthor, [


opuciai kesearch Staff








Tho KGB and Khrushchev


5 Shelepin

Preliminary Brezhnev Security



Andropov's Relationship with Brezhnev . . . ndropov, Brezhnev and The Administrative


Andropov's Personal Influence on Policy . .

Andropov's Policy

The6 Hungarian

ThoB Czech

Othor Bloc

Views of the US

Preoccupation with Internal

A Moderate, Reformist





the Top

Leadership Protection:

A Brezhnevite Extra First Deputy Chairman:

New Deputy Chairman Chebrikov

Deputy Chairman Halygin


The7 Altered KGB Political

The Sixth Deputy

Second Echelon: ixed Picture. .

Tho Second Chief Directorate After Tsinev.

The Moscow

The Thirdof Reliable Cadres

The Leningrad

Status Quo in the Border Guards .SO

First Chief

KGB Party Committee

Republics: Slower Going for


Republic KGB Changes Sinceix Pre-Brezhnev-Andropovhe Administrative Organs Department. .




Pa tie


KGB Institutional Advantages for


KGB Reporting7

A Possible Antidote: Central Comnittee



Policy Level Protection of KGB7 Is the KGB Ever Out of Step With


Cases of Unexpected Policy4 The Dissidents, the Leadership and the7



Possible Limits to the Brezhnev-Andropov

Brezhnev's Independent KGB



Andropov's Early



Clearly, the political power of the Committee of State Security (KGB) in the USSR derives fundamentally from the fact that the CPSU hierarchy needs its support to remain in power. The KGB's most important function thus remains the control of the Soviet population on the Party's behalf.

There is alsoeadership consensus that the KGB must be kept firmly under Party control and never again allowed to become an independent force capable of being wielded by some Stalin against the Party apparatus itsolf. Within this very general guideline, however, available evidence Indicates that the issue of Party control of the KGB comes down in practice to the question of whose Party among the ever-contending Politburo leaders. The pattern is that those with the upper hand in the Politburo have sought to obtain the KGB's exclusive loyalty, while the dominant group's more transient allies, and especially its opponents, have tried to limit the ascendant faction's control of tho KGB sufficiently to protect their own minority interests and guarantee their political survival. While the post-Stalin KGB has never had the power itself toeigning Party headthat powerrerogative of the top Party leadership, no such Politburo decision could probably bo carried out unless the key men in the KGB were willing to guarantee it.

The question of who these key KGB men shall be is thus at all times crucial, and Soviet contenders for power see the manipulation of personnel appointments as the main battleground in the struggle over the KGB. Since control of key appointments is also the chief method used to ensure the KGB's loyalty to the Partyhole, the weighing of these appointments is the

most critical aspect of Party supervision of the KGB. Accordingly, each of the Party's most recent heads, Khrushchev and Brezhnev, has acknowledged the importance of the KGB to his personal political power by seeking continuously to oversee the most significant KGB matters himself. Bach has also delegated more routine KGB supervisory matters to lieutenants on the Party In the case of Khrushchev, this question ofKGB powers helped lead to his downfall, for such responsibility came to be so diffused that Khrushchev lost effective control of the KGB: indeed, two among the Party Secretariat lieutenants to whom he had delegated some KGB responsibilities, Brezhnev and Shelepin, were leaders in the4 coup that overthrew Khrushchevand they enlisted the KGB in support of the ouster.

Byy which time Shelepin had emerged as Brezhnev's principal rival for supreme Partyinfluence over the KGB hadajorin their power struggle. The outcome was in doubt untilhen Brezhnev was at last able to move directly against Shelepin's political support in the KGBr this took the formew KGB Chairman, Party official Yuriy Andropov, in the place of Vladimirongtime close professional colleague and political ally of Shelepin.

Beyond the fact of the endholepin-domlnated KGB, tho choice of Andropov wasathor accurate reflection of theeadership balance of power, which revoaled tho limitations on as well as the strengths of Brezhnev's authority at that time. Andropov has appeared torezhnev ally, but he is not dependent on the General Secretary in the sonseareer patronage client, and he seems to have relatively broad political support among Party leaders. Andropov's longest and closest career ties are to Suslov, the veteran and highly influential Party ideologist and foreign affairs specialist whoenior independent figure In the Politburo and Secretariatand whose support

was probably as necessary too the KGB as was that of Brezhnev and his close supporters.

Andropov's Chairmanship is significant also in the Implications of his own high position in the Party for Party-KGB relations. When Andropov became Chairman hearty Secretary as well as Chief ofentral Committee's Bloc Department (which handles relations with Communist countries). onth after moving to the KGB he left the Party Secretariat, but was simultanoously promoted to alternate membership on the Politburothe highest Party rank held by any KGB Chairman since Stalinist times. The primary consequence of Andropov's Party rank appears to have been more direct and continuous supervision of the KGB at tho highest Party level, probably principally by Brezhnov himself. Andropov has seemed sensitive to leadership wishes, especially Brezhnev's, anaWthe General Secretary has appeared to accept him as an important advisor as wellolitical ally.

Andropov's experience and broad politicalhad given him significant influence on foreign policyarty Secretary and Bloc Department Chief, and since becoming KGB Chairman ho appears to have kept this policy influence no less than 'his high political standing. He has continued to perform some purely Party functions, and it is doubtloss primarilyespected Party official, and only secondarily as KGB Chairman, that his opinions are heard in Politburo and other leadership councils. There have been many occasions involving Important and contentious policy matters, where available data do not make clear whether Andropov was acting essentiallyarty leader, or KGBor some mixture of the two. This suggests that his Party and KGB roles do In fact merge.



Andropov's personal policy views seem to be mixed. Two basic convictions emerge clearly which represent "conservative" aspects of his outlook. First, Andropov is one of the Soviet leaders who is most strongly committed to the struggle to maintain CPSU primacy in the Bloc and in the world Communist movement. This viewatural enough consequence of his many years of Partyfor relations with Communist countries. He is also unusually sensitive, again evenoviet content, to internal security matters affecting the Party hierarchy.

His KGB responsibilities have accentuated this defensive-ness.

If such views were the whole essence of Andropov's outlook, ho could simply be describedogmatic Party type in the tradition of many past KGB Chairmen. But Andropov's views are modified, sometimes sharply, by two other factors: his Intelligence, and his pragmatism.

umber of years Andropov has been closegroup of Party-apparatus intellectuals withor moderate views,

pave persistency empiias'j.acu nmn-upuvs

^realism" and have additionally characterized him as

reform-minded. Some of these observers havo been Soviet dissidents. Their continuing description of Andropovoderating influence in the leadership

Is eloquent in view of the KGB's important role over the

last few years in the Party's general crackdown on

intellectual and political expression.

The significance seems to be that Andropov is among those Soviet officialseel that the Party must reform to some degree to retain its pre-eminence, that the USSR cannot be run effectively without its intellectual elite, and that unimaginative and uniformly repressive tactics toward the disaffected are counter-


productive. Andropov has probably also been influential in determining the complex, and intermittently more sophisticated, mixture of internal security tactics the KGB has employed in recent years. It goes without saying that In any direct-confrontation between Party authority and reformist ideas Andropov can be expected to bo staunchly on the side of authority, although he would seem to prefer that the Party preempt reform where possible, and seek to head off confrontations requiring ultimate choices between orthodoxy and effectiveness.

Andropov's personal policy influence aside, the KGB itself has some built-in Institutional advantages which allow it to affect Party policy, since the Party is dependent internally upon KGB coercion to support Party rule, and externally the KGBenior position among Soviet foreign affairs organs. Sometimes the KGB may Influence the thinking of policy-makers through significant bias in its reporting. There is evidenceGB reporting from Prague was' tailored to an alarmist view of the erosion of Czech and Sotfiet Party control there; such warnings may have helped reinforce the prejudices and fears of the Politburo. In the Middle East, at least some KGB reporting has contradicted Foreign Ministry reporting by emphasizing the dangers, rather than the advantagos, that asolution would mean for Soviet interests in the area. In any event, by supporting or opposing the positions taken by different policy advocates in the Soviet leadership, such reporting on major issues can also have an Indirect effect on the balance of power in the leadership.

Additionally, any extraordinary KGB actions contradicting policies already determined by thc Party leadershipirect and drastic kind of KGB influence on Soviet power struggles. Such actions opposing existing policy appear to be rare. Most cases of KGB activity in apparent contradiction to established


Party policy are ultimately traceable either to shifting directions in policy Itself, or to tho Party's hawing levied on tho KGB responsibility for executing policios with which the Party leadership may not wish officially or publicly to be associated. Even on occasions when KGB activity has in fact been an embarrassment to the Party leadership, most such cases have involved KGB operations, properly coordinated in advance with the Party, which havetronger reaction from tho target individual or government than anticipated, and which have then unexpectedly escalated the affair into the policy sphere.

There have neverthelessew instances in which KGB activity appeared deliberately intended to sabotage existing policy. In the final months of the Khrushchev era, the KGB took actions which contradicted Khrushchev's policy of rapprochement with West Germany. These steps were probably undertaken at the instigation of the Politburo group then actively undermining Khrushchev's power. econd case scorns to have occurred inhen the KGB appeared to help start or fan rumors of an Imminent Shelepin takeover from Brezhnev, tho new Party head. This episode was probably an example of even more direct participationeadership power struggle by the Semichastnyy KGB than was its intervention against Khrushchev's German policy the year before. Such KGB activity contravening the policy or undermining tho political power of the Party's official head has only been identifiable In periodsarty leader or faction was still striving for, or already losing, ascendancy. Available evidence is incomplete, but It suggests that clear cases of the KGB working at cross purposes with the ostensibly dominant Party leader or faction areIndicative of periods of high instability in thc ongoing Party leadership power struggle.


There have been no discernible such cases,under Andropov's Chairmanship. Andropov's sensitivity to general Party interests is now the most important factor inhibiting the KGB from acting at cross purposes with leadership policy, just as Andropov's present apparent loyalty to Brezhnev as Party head seems to minimize the possibility that the KGB might connive with Brezhnev's leadership opponents to undermine his power.

There is no available evidence at present which casts doubt on the present or short-term viability of this Brezhnev-Andropov alliance. But Kremlin alliances are pragmatic and subject to change. Andropov's continued support is probably dependent on Brezhnev's success in maintaining his primacy without so alarming his leadership colleagues that they would place the threat of his power above their various mutual differences. Also, the very extent to which Brezhnev's power has now been consolidated, manifested in his increased confidence and prominence sinceh Party Congress ofasense created now risks for him. For Khrushchev's experience suggests that the further the Party leader has gone out in front of the collective leadership, tho more sensitive his colleagues have become to the potential hazards to themselves. While Andropov has neither the Party cadres patronage base nor apparently the motivation to build toward Party leadership himself, his basic outlook and broad loader-ship ties might under some circumstances attract himotential coalition of Brezhnev opponents.

For his part, Brezhnev has thus far shownsk4.ll in sensing the permissible limits of power. The General Secretary has also been successful in packing several key KGB positions just below Andropov with appointees closely tied to himself. Almost Immediately after Andropov had replaced Semichastnyy, in fact, Brezhnev began to fill the other most politically


sensitive KGB positions with now appointees more directly tied to bin by political patronage than is Andropov, and by7 or8 the political balance among the very top KGB officials had shifted sharply away from the old Shelopin group.

The most significant cases of Brezhnev patronage at the top level appear to be those of First Deputy. Tsvigun and Deputy, Chebrikov. Tsinev. Other important KGB personnel changes just under this very top level have continued to date. Changes at KGB Headquarters and among the KGB Chairmen of the Soviet Republics have also shown Brezhnev influence, though in general lt has been both less direct and less strong, and enclaves of some political ties to other leaders, including Shelepin and Suslov, appear to exist at those second and third level KGB positions.

Even if Brezhnev surmounts all the political hazards to his power, hisaises the possibilityuccession question in coming years. In the long term, Andropov's own preferenceuccessor to Brezhnev will probably be influenced by intervening Politburo retirements and other changes. In the near torn, Brezhnev's most likely immediate successor would be his general deputy Kirilonko; the relationship between Andropov and Kirilenko has appeared sufficiently close to make Andropov's support of Kirilenko probable. In the eventuccession struggle, Andropov might well soek to influence leadership thinking in advance, although he leaves the net impressionan far more likely to enforce than to challenge tho judgmentolitburo consensus once that emerges. And if he remained KGB Chairman at the time, he would be likely to seek to ensure that the KGB accepted the choice of the Politburo majority.


Should the short-terra futurehange in KGB Chairmen, whether causedew power struggleore orderly reshuffling of Party portfolios, or whatever, the choiceew KGB Chairman will certainly be Influenced by leadership political factorsas yet unknown, even to the major participants. One strong possibility common to most foreseeable political circumstances* however, is that the new Chairman would be another Party official ratherGB professional. In the meantime, tho KGB will remain an indispensable, highly politicized, and formidable Party instrumentwhose dangerous potentials necessitate continuing Party control.




The Stalin-Beriya Heritage

One of the lessons of the Stalinist era which all subsequent Soviet leaders have taken to heart, to varying degrees, is that intolerable excesses were committed against the Party leadership itselfbecause thc security organs were allowed to become the personal power instrument of one man, unhampered by any broader responsibility either to collective Party leadership or to "socialist legality." Since Stalin, there has been a leadership consensus that tho Stalinist police's power had been too dangerous for the Party hierarchy to tolerate again.

This lesson was reinforced by Lavrentiy Pavlovich Beriya's bid for power In the months following Stalin's death in urge of top state security leaders who had themselves helped direct thc massive Party, government and military purges of the, Stalin8 had brought Bcriya from the state security chairmanship in Georgia to head the entire central state security apparatus. Even after his elevation to the Party Politburo ineriya remained Influential In security affairs. Soon after Stalin's death Bcriyaerger of the then Ministry of State Security (MGB) with the uniformed police, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). He became head of the combined Ministry, which retained the MVD designation, undertook an extensive reorganization, and larded its personnel rosters with individuals loyal to him. His activities and apparent ambition to inherit

Stalin's power alarmed Beriya's Politburo rivals,. Malenkov,. Molotov. Khrushchev, who arranged Berlya's arrest ine was subsequently executed. The combined uniformed police and security services Ministry was again broken up inith the state security functions, foreign and domestic, vested ommittee of State Securityominally under the Council of Ministers but actually responsible to the Party Presidium and Central Committee.

The KGB and Khrushchev Politics

The post-Stalin leadership has therefore striven to ensure that the KGB remains firmly undor Party control, and docs not once more become an independent political force capable of being wielded against the Party apparatus Itself. Since the arrests of security czar Berlya and henchmen in the aftermath of Stalin's death, there appears to haveacit understanding that the upper reaches of the Party are toanctuary immune from the political arrests which the KGB is still expected to perform as needed against other Soviet citizens. As a result, dcupltu all the various purges and demotions that have occurred In the Party since Doriya's time, thore is no evidence that any Central Committee member haa ever boon arrested or imprisoned.

Also since Berlya's time,rofessional security officer has not been allowed toignificant personal power base in the KGB Independent of Party leadership patronage. But given these basic guidelines, the issue of Party control of the KGB has in practice, of course, tended touestion of "whosehat Is, which of the contending Politburo groups or lenders has been In wscendancy. The refurbished

ommittee's first Chairman was Ivan Aleksandrbvichorsonal friend of Khrushchev's as well as an associate dating back toervice as Lfkrainlan Commissar of Internal Affairs while Khrushchev was First Secretary of the Ukrainian Party.

has reported

Hearing in itovenior officer involved that Khrushchev used the KGB to gather "evidence" against his opponents, tho so-called "anti Party group" leaders Malenkov. Kaganovich and Molotov *

said that once

KhrushdJcv nau uunsoiiaaiea nis power ne bversaw theaspects of the KGB's activityusually through the Chairman. I

believed that another member of the Central committee Secretariat probably handled the more routine aspects of the Party supervision of the KGB and did preliminary work on important matters for Khrushchev.

The KGB is part of what in CPSU parlance is known as the "administrativethat is, the organs of coercion. Besides state security, these include the uniformed police, tho military and the courts The Party Secretariat supervises all of them through an Administrative Organs Department of the Central Committee apparatus. Evidence of who in the Party Secretariat assisted Khrushchev in thendn supervising the KGB and other administrative organs Is incomplete. What evidence there is indicates that Khrushchev reassigned this function several times and to various people, probably in accordance with his tactic of protecting his power by playing off his

principal Party lieutenants against oue another. Two Party Secretariat lieutenants sharing administrative organs responsibility under KhrushchevIl'ich Brezhnev and Aleksandr Nikolayevich Shelepinemerged as principal rivals for supreme Partyafter Khrushchev's4 fall, and their respective Influence in the administrative organs field, especially over the KGB,ey aspect of their power struggle.

There are some indications that during the later part of hiseriod of service in the Party Secretariat, Brezhnev had responsibility under Khrushchev for part of the more routine supervision of thc military aspect of administrative organs.* There is also at least one example of possible Brezhnev influenceGB appointment during this period, the transfer of Semen Kuz'mlch Tsvlgun from Moldavia to Tadzhikistan in about

of the few routine reporting clues to Secretariat responsibility for this sensitive and hence largely hidden Secretariat brief is press reporting on official occasions involving the administrative organs. Thus Pravda7 reported that Brezhnev had "recently"eeting of the Party Aktiv of Soviet Armed Forces in Germany which had discussed the Central Committee Plenum decision to remove. Zhukov from his Party and Government positions. In8 Brezhnev was the Party Secretary addressing the 4th Ail-Union DOSAAF (Voluntary Society for the Promotion of thc Army, Aviation and Navy) Congress. In8 Brezhnev and Suslov from the Secretariat attended graduation exercises at the Lenin Military-Political Academy. This kind of responsibility would have fit logically with Brezhnev's wartime background In military political work, andervice as Chief of the Navy's Main Political Administration.



But oneppointment in theorgans field of more general significance in which Brezhnev probably was Influential was that of Nikolay Romanovlch Mironov, brought in9 from the KGB Chairmanship in Leningrad to become Chief of the Central Committee Administrative Organs Department. Mlronov's early career closely paralleled Brezhnev's in both wartime army political work on the Southern and Ukrainian fronts, and in immediate postwar Party work inOblast.* Khrushchev of course relied heavily on Ukrainian cadres to staff key Moscow positions and undoubtedly approved the Mironov appointment, but Mlronov's early career shows more specific ties to Brezhnev. As events turned out, however, Mironov was killedlaneew days after the Khrushchev ouster, thus depriving the new First Secretary Brezhnev of an important source of potential support in his coming struggle with Shelepin for control over the KGB.

6 Mironov completed the Dnepropetrovsk State Univorsity course he began ineriod and interrupted for wartime political work in the army. 57 ho worked in the apparatus of theOblast Party Committee, and79 he was First Secretaryayon committee in the city of Dnepropetrovsk. Brezhnev was Party First Secretary of Dnepropetrovsk Oblast7 Mironov went into state security works of5olonel in the KGB's Third Directorate (counter-intelligence in thend about6 was named to the KGB Chairmanship In Leningrad.

Shelepin's1 appointment to the CPSU Secretariat and subsequent sharing of responsibility for administrative organs, he would of course have worked closely with Central Committee Administrative Organs Department Chief Mironov. No information is available,

(continued on page 6)


Brozhnev probably could not have hadon the KGB or otherohen he was servingof the Presidium of the Supremeember of the Party Secretariat* Afterto the Secretariat inowever,again active in the administrative4 i 1 -


that Brezhnev's

the KGB.M*

Shelepin's involvement in administrative organs under Khrushchev was in many respects more direct than Brezhnev's, but it was alsoore junior Party level, Shelepin had succeeded Scrov at the KGBecoming the first Chairman since thehoareer Party official ratherrofessional state security officer. He gave up the KGB job upon his promotion into the Party Secretariat in

(footnote continued from page 5)

however, on the nature of their relationship, and there is an absence of earlier Shelopln-Mironov career ties such as existed between Brezhnev and Mironov.

Additionally, tne soviet press reported Brezhnev from tho Party Secretariat4 conference on crime, another administrative organs function, althoughGB one.


By May2 Shelepin's public activities indicated he had some Secretariat responsibility for supervising administrative organs, and he Intermittently discharged public duties of this sort up through Khrushchev's ouster.' Moreover, Shelepin's successor as KGB

Chairman, Vladimir Yefimovich Semichastnyy,lose personal friend as well as long-time associate.

Available coverage does not indicate to what degree

Shelepin continued to share Secretariat responsibility for the KGB ineriod, however, once Brezhnev had returned to the Secretariat and assumed some KGB

supervisory functions. At this time Brezhnev outranked

Shelepin In the Party

In any case, Brezhnev and Shelepin were political associates3 Both were key members of the coup group that ousted Khrushchev in

*In May2 Shelepin was the Secretariat'sat the 5th Ail-Union DOSAAF Congress. In3 Shelepin. Kozlov. Titov from the Secretariateeting of Soviet paramilitary units. In3 Shelepin and Titov represented the Secretariat at thc annual graduation reception of Soviet military academies.

and Shelepin's disparity in rank is relevant to the entire question of elative influence in administrative organs matters. Brezhnev hadull Presidium member all duringbsence from the Secretariat; thus on his return to the Party Secretariat heseniorhe termoviet leader holding simultaneousIn both the Politburo and the Secretariat, the two organizations exercising supreme1 Party power. Shelepin wasunior Secretary, as he did not achieve Presidium membership until



Gradually, in the, Khrushchev had apparently

allowed effective control of the KGB to drift from him,,

partly through overconfidence and partly because policy

problems and Presidium dissatisfactions had eroded

thc loyalty of the .Party lieutenants who were nominally

supervising the KGB on his behalf. Although policy

issues were Important in cementing the coup group that

overthrew Khrushchev, probably the overriding cause

was his arbitrary, highhanded, "non-collective" method

of operating. The isolation from his Presidium colleagues

caused by Khrushchev's high-handed style allowed them to

conspire without his knowledge to end his power.

Khrushchev's loss of effective control of the KGB as

a result of this isolationital factor in thc

coup group's plans and success.



A long series of complex and often Indirect political maneuvers transpired before Brezhnev, the apparent instigator and organizer of the'coup against Khrushchev and his immediate successor as Party First Secretary, began to emerge as the clearly dominant figure of the new collective leadership. Brezhnev's moves to wrest eventual control of the KGB from his principal Politburo rival, Shelepin, were an important element in this process.

With his4 elevation to full Presidium membership, Shelepin hadenior Secretary. For some time after the Khrushchev ouster, Shelepin also appears to have retained some Secretariat responsibility for supervision of administrative organs.*

Of equal significance for the Brezhnev-Shelcpin struggle, however, was the fact that within the KGB itself the key positions continued5 to be staffed by Khrushchev and Shelepin appointees whose political allegiances, in the most significant cases, wereto Shelepin, not Brezhnev. In terms relevant to

in5 it was Shelepin from the Party Secretariat whoonference of heads of Republic Central Committee Administrative Organs sections and Republic chiefs of the Ministry for the Maintenance of Public Order (MOOP).



Kremlin power struggles the most important KGBpositions would appear to include, in their approximate order of political sensitivity:

The Chairman

The Chief and Deputy Chief of the Ninth (Guards) Directorate, responsible for the personal security of the Soviet leaders and their offices, homes, travel, etc.

The First Deputy and other Deputy Chairmen

The Chief of the Second Chief Directorate (internal USSR security and

The Chairman of the Moscow City and Oblast KGB (noteadquarters position, but obviously closely related)

The Chief of the Third Directorate (military counterintelligence within the USSR's armed forces personnel)

The Commander of the Border Guards Troops

The Chief of the First Chief Directorate

(espionage abroad and foreign intelligence collection)

In addition^Chairraen of the KGB in the USSR's, l'l Republics outside the RSFSR and of other important RSFSR areas outside the capital, particularly Leningrad City and Oblast, are obviously the key provincial

jobsolitical standpoint. Collectivoly, the Jobs named embody tho more important command and control functions within the KGB. They also comprise the majority of what is known as theollective review and decision making body.*

As the incumbents of the first six of these politically most sensitive KGB positionsthe Chairman, the First Deputy and three other Deputy Chairmen, and the Ninth Directorate Chiefhad all been promoted into these jobs duringbsence from the Party Secretariat. There is evidence that four of the six additionally had political loyalties to Shelepin.

Chairman Semichastnyy's close relationship to Shelepin has already been noted. The First Deputy Chairman, Nikolay Stepanovich Zakharov, washrushchev protege. ong time Ninth (Guards)officer wno rose to become its Chief and arranged Khrushchev's security on numerous trips abroad, Zakharov was promoted1 to one of the three KGB Deputy Chairman jobs. Then, In he became Semichastnyy's

reported that

the collegium now consists oi tne KGB Chairman, his Deputy Chairmen, tho hoads of all Chief Directorates, the deputies of thc First and Second Chief Directorates and the Chief of the First Chief Directorate's Directorate "S" (Illegals.) important regional KGB Chairmen (presumably at least Moscow, Leningrad and the Ukraine,) aof the Central Committee's Administrative Organs Department, and various KGB specialist consultants as needed, f

It Is liKeiy xnar cnieis ot orner important KGB Directorates, the Secretary of tho KGB Party Committee, and the head of the Chairman's Secretariat remain

(footnote continued on page

First Deputy. Zakharov's Deputy Chairman job went to Sergey Grigoryevich Bannikov, who had been transferred9oon after Shelepin became Chairman, from the Chairmanship of the Turkmen SSR KGB toandeputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate. Lev Ivanovich Pankratov, brought into the KGBy Shelepin as another Second Chief Directorate Deputy Chief, and described

having previouslyartyai.aunder Semichastnyy inGB Deputy Chairmanship, f

has described

iwnniKov ana panKr&iov as among those KGB officers he considered most loyal to both Shelepin and Semichastnyy.*

as particularly allied He was, however, made Chairmanship, probably Party work In Beloruss MVD Chiefnd Belorusslan KGB after released from that Job

not mention the remaining Aleksandr Ivanovich Perepillt! with Shelopln andeputy Chairman during Shelepin's

in about Originally in ia, Perepelltsyn became Belorusslan

then was made Chairman of tho4 reorganization. Ue was in9 for "transfer to

(footnote continued from

Collegium members as they have been in the recent past.





othernd presumably spenteriod during the Khrushchev-Shclopln reorganization at KGB Headquarters beforeeputy Chairman,

Tho position of Chief of the Ninth (Guards) Directorate probablyensitivity in Partypowur struggle terms second only to that of the KGB Chairman himself. The Ninth Directorate is in charge of all the leaders' travel, providing drivers and bodyguards as well as vehicles and route and area protection, and of tbe security of their offlcos, apartments and dachas. Very detailed information on the loaders' activities and habits, and constant access, is required to protect them adequately. Thc Ninth Dlroctorato is soart of their dally lives that it onstant. Intimate observer as wellrotector. ery practical sense tho Ninth Directorate's loyalty is fundamental to the retention, no leaa than the seizure, of power. As of5 its Chief was Vladimir Yakovlevich Chekalov, who hadbeen Zakharov's Deputy when the latter headed the Ninth Directorate. Chekalov hadriend of Khrushchev's son-in-law Adzhubey since their World War II military service together.

5 Shelepin

Tho hazards for BrezhnevGB staffod with key officials of whose political loyalty ho was dubious wero probably underscored by5 Shelepiny tho summer5 numerous rumors were circulating In Moscow predicting early changes in tho leadership. Thoir content varied, but the most usual themes were that the post coup collective leadership was temporary and was proving too indecisive, andor, variously, "coming", impressive" andhelepin would replace Brezhnevpictured asypical functionary, not of First Secretary stature, and neither well liked nor respectod.




The ultimate source of many of the rumors was impossible to discern. Some, although by no means all, were or seemed to be traceable to KGB sources. Others were or appeared to be traceable to the Chinese, to Eastern European sources, or to the CPSU apparatus Itself. The atmosphere of the initial post-Khrushchev months, with its rather dramatic change from Khrushchev's flamboyant style to the more cautious behavior of his successors,atural breeding ground for this kind of rumor. 5 was also inime of uneasy political maneuvering, and Brezhnev was by no means confident of his leadership position. Some of tho Shelepin takeover reports probably simply derived from his spectacular career to date and his reputation for both ambition and competence.

Evidence that Shelepin wasower move ins limited. The very persistence of rumorshelepin drive to replace Brezhnev and their multiple sources, however, suggest they may have had some factual basis. That Shelepin himself was behind a large portion of the rumors seems plausible, though not prpveable, from their content, which was useful toholopin bandwagon situation. Brezhnev, Shelepin's most serious obstacle, was tho main target. The other qualified First Secretary candidates, Kosygin and Suslov, whose acquiescence if not support Shelepin would need in any bid, were treated relatively gently in the rumors, and reported as uninterested in the top job themselves, or too old or ill to aspire to it.

The slippage in discipline signaled by the prevalence in official Soviet circles, apparently including the KGB, of rumors so crassly disparaging the Party First Secretary and his political future itself demonstrated the intensity of the struggle for power in and the tcnuousness of Brezhnev's hold on power at this time. The pcecisc role of the KGB as an institution in initiating or fanning the

runorshelepin takeover is unknown. The KGB definitely did appear to be Involved to some degree however. 'To the extent that lt was, the episodease in which tho KGB's institutional political power was enlisted on behalfarty leader who was opposing the Party's official head.

In the event, however, Brezhnev was able after the fall5 to forestall any Shelepin bid by gradually encroaching on his bases of power and support throughout the Party and government hierarchy. At the5 Central Committee Plenum, the Party-State Control Commission, of which Shelepin had been Chairman, was abolished, and Shelepin wasull-time job in the Party Secretariat, relinquishing In the process his government job as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. For the next yearalf Shelepin continued to have considerable Party authority, but his activities were ncccs.sirlly less diverse than they had been and also more closely under Brezhnev's scrutiny.

Preliminary Brcuhnev Security Moves

It was to be some time beforo Brezhnev apparently felt that his overall political position was strong enough to move against the Sholopin men at the head of the KGB. however, Brezhnev took twosteps in the direction of eliminating Shelepin's influence and political power base In the security field.

Brezhnev closesd Party Congress,s hisprincipal rival Shelepin (left, first row) looks on.

Administrative Organs Supervision: One of these moves was quite direct. Sometime in6 Shelepin seems to have lost his remaining Secretariat responsibility for the supervision of the administrative organs, probably largely to Brezhnev himself. Sholepin has not subsequently been reported undertakingorgans related activities.

Although Brezhnev probably had sufficient influence by6 to have the Administrative Organs Department supervised primarily out of his own office, the Department itself existed In something of an internal personnel limbo during this period. Nikolay Ivanovich Savinkin, the Department's First Deputy Chief when Mironov died in had bocome its Acting Chief. This situation was to continue until shortly when Savinkin was finally identified in Pravda as the Department Chief. The fact that the Administrative


Organs Department Chief issue remained unresolved for almost four years Indicates that the Politburo was unable to agreeermanent solution earlier. It further suggests that Brezhnev was unable to work his will, whether that may have been to confirm Savinkin sooner or to bring in another client candidate,of his own.

There is no particular reason to connect Savinkin to earlier Brezhnev patronage. Whatever Brezhnev's and Savinkin's relationship may have been at the start of Savinkin's long term as Acting Chief, however, his ultimate designation as Chief suggests he had in the interim performed generally to Brezhnev's satisfaction.*

'Additionally, 6 personnel change in the Administrative Organs Department appeared possibly influenced by Kirilenko, whom Brezhnev had brought into the Party Secretariat atd Congress in April. Following the dissolution of the Central Committee's RSFSR Bureau at this same Congress, the Bureau'sOrgans Sector Chief, Vasiliyputin, moved into the Central Committee'sOrgans Departmenteputy Chief. This shift returned Laputin to where he had worked earlier, from at He had then been transferred to the RSFSR Bureau's Administrative Organs Sector inrew months after Kirilenko's control of the Bureau had' been strengthened in the wake of Khrushchev's2 general Party reorganization, an upheaval which had sidelined the influence of Kirilenko's several competitors in the Bureau. The timing of both Laputin's

6 moves so soon after advances inolitical fortunes suggests Laputin may well have had Kirilenko's patronage. To the extent that Laputin did

have patronage ties with Kirilenko, the letter's support of Brezhnev would presumably thus have carried with it

indirect Administrative Organs Department benefit to the

General Secretary from6 return to an

important post there.

The Shchclokov-MOOP Appointment: ore indirect maneuver, which nevertheless also had the effect of enhancing Brezhnev's and diminishing Shelepin's influence in the security field, occurred in connection with the6 restoration to the internal uniformed policeinistry at the All-Unlon level. hen the uniformed police had still been called the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), the overall All-Unlon Ministry had been abolished and its functions given to the various Republic MVDs. Decentralization had been followed2ame change to the Ministries for the Maintenance or Public order, n keeping with the emphasis at the time on police roles in fighting crime and protecting citizens rather than suppressing subversion. Now, inOOP Ministry was re-established at the All-Unlon level. Vadim Stepanovichhelepin man who hadGB Deputy Chairman1 and then16 Minister of the RSFSR MOOP, was the most logical candidate for the new USSR MOOP chief, and had been widely regardedear certainty for the post. After a two month delay, itself suggestive that the appointment was contentious in the Politburo, the post went instead In September to Nlkolay Anisonovlchetoran Ukrainian and Moldavian Party and Industrial administrator with no previous police experience but with extremely close career ties to Brezhnev." With the Shchelokov

attended the Dneprodzerzhlnsk Metallurgical Institute at the same time, Shchelokov graduating Brezhnev 8 Shchelokov became First Secretary of Krasnogvardeyskiy Rayon Party Committee in Dnepropetrovsk oblast while Brezhnev was headepartment of the Oblast Party Committee. The following year, when Brezhnevecretary of theCity Executive Committee, Shchelokov became

(footnote continued on

appointment Brezhnev succeeded in putting an evident mill Me at the head oi an institution which is In someounterpart to the KGB. Although in general HOOP's functions Involve the more routine aspects of police work, with the KGB responsible for the more sensitive or political aspects of internal security, there is close coordination between the two and some overlap. Thus the Shchelokov appointment was an oblique advance on Brezhnev's problem of KGB control.

(footnote continued from

Chairman of the Dnepropetrovsk City Executive Committee. Both men spent the war yoars in political work in tho army, serving together at least at its ond. InShchelokov was Secretary of the Party Committee of the Carpathian Military District; as of5 Brezhnev was identified as Chairman of the Political Administrationember of the Military Council of the Carpathian Military District. In the early postwar years both returned to Party work in the Ukraine, although in less Immediate proximity than before, Brezhnev serving70 as First Secretary of Dnepropetrovsk Oblast and ShchelokovH1 as Chiefepartment in the Ukrainian CP Central Committee. In just six months after Brozhnev had been named First Secretary of the Moldavian CP, Shchelokov was brought to Moldaviaeputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Shchelokov remained In Moldavia until biss MOOP Minister.

Semichastnyy Ousted

When the main blow fell, and Pravda announced on7 the appointment of Yuriy Vladimirovichndropov as Chairman of the KGB, there followed a flood of speculation on the reasons for Semichastnyy's ouster. Most of it centered on possible immediate causes, ranging from alleged Semichastnyy failure to be vigilant enough against foreign spies and internal subversion to assertions that an early spring spate of publicized KGB reverses in Europe and the far more significant propaganda setback of the defection of Stalin's daughter Svetlana Alliluyeva had sufficiently embarrassed the leadership to change tho KGB management.* Some of the proferred possible reasons may well have been part of the pretext used to Induce the Politburo to approve thc Chairman's removal. The fundamental motive for Brezhnev, however, was almost certainly his power struggle with Shelepin, which was to culminate several months later In the demotion of Shelepin to the Chairmanship of the All-Unlon Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU) innd his removal from the Party Secretariat, although not from the Politburo, In September,

as much.

xiiiov,ueinny ui rne uSSR Ministry of Foreign

'Apart from press commentary at the. New Peter Grose, see >



decri that that

xii oneiepin's was "too much


that the change effective nd that the Party man11

tcu an increase in suggested that influence,peculation."*

t ^r* tuc raiiy'fl ITUUU IU n 1

control of the intelligencearty may have thoughtbetter than Semichastnyy.

uiuiuuiuucnqus" nan ^ivifii up fliuuuu ammgyiA whoso members gave loyalty to the claque precedence over other responsibilities. The Shelepin clloue included Semichastnyy. under whom,

the KGB's efficiency had gone down, ncsupported one another's ideas and recommended one another for jobs. "Matters began to bypass official channels when they were involved,"

^ i r. :i.-

cApianiud, something must be done right away; there was an investigation, and the Politburo decided action must be taken,I I That matters had begun

to "bypass official channels" would of course havearticularly ominous threat to the official Party head and his supporters* Brezhnev could Scarcely have ignored the implications for his own powerGB whose top management was*-loyalival who was showing signs of acting outside the framework of official Party control procedures.

This last report also implied that the official excuse presented as part of the Politburo decision to oust Semichastnyy. whatever its particulars may have been, involved charges of inefficiency and inadequate results in both foreign Intelligence collection and the countering of foreign or domesticome version of the "shortcomings" that are an ubiquitous excuse in Soviet power-struggle-related demotions.

that while the cruai reason Tor BGWlCli&stnyyfs removal was his close ersonal and political relationship with Shelepin, the

in connection jnwise and un-

viiii vmcn ouuixuuht? tiiyy wasui professional decisions.*


Brezhnev doubtless approved and supported Andropov as Semichastnyy's successor, even though the now Chairman aid not seem to be tied to Brezhnev in the dependent senseatronage client. Andropov appeared to have significant additional political ties among the leadership, and these were probably almost as necessary to his KGB appointment as Brezhnev's own endorsement. In7 Soviet leadership power conte in which the General Secretary's* authority had definit limitations imposed by the independent strength of some of hisolleagues, an appointment as highly sensitive as the KGB Chairmanship doubtless required the supportajority of the collective leadership.

The new KGB Chairman whom the Politburo approved on7onsiderably more senior Partythan had been either of his two immediate predecessors, Shelepin and Semichastnyy, when they were

*Alird CPSU Congress6 the designation for the head of the Party had reverted to the old style of General Secretary, Instead of the First Secretary stylo adopted

**Also at d Congress the Presidium reverted to its old,ame of Politburo. Its function, the highest policy making body of the Party, remained essentially unchanged.


successively installed as head of the Andropov had been

a member of the Party Secretariat since

He had also been Chief of the Central Committee Department

had been First Secretary of the All-Union Komsomol at the time he becamehairman. Semichastnyy had been the Party Second Secretary in Azerbaydzhan.


for Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries (hereafter in this paper called the Bloc Department) for the ten years preceding his move to the KGB. onth after becoming Chairman Andropov was promoted to an alternate member of the Politburo, though at the same time he left the Party Secretariat.*

Andropov is the first KGB Chairman since Beriya tolace on the Politburo, albeit as aalternate member. To take this as evidence that the KGB has vastly increased its own institutional political power, however, is to overlook the fact that Andropovareer Party official ratherareer state security officer. The very seniority of Andropov's Party rank, compared to his two KGB Chairmon predecessors', and the apparent breadth of his leadership

involved in Andropov's move from the Secretariat to the Politburo was the leadership balance of power, probablyesire of Brezhnev and his supporters, and possibly others, to avoid demoting Andropov politically. Continued Secretariatwould probably have been politically unacceptable in the Soviet context, since it would involve the KGB Chairman's beingart of the organ which supervises him. Putting Andropov on the Politburo also had the effect of enhancing direct access to the Chairman by all Politburo members, not Just those also sitting on the Secretariat.



ties, servo to strengthen the Party's control ol the KGB, although Andropov's Politburo alternate membership docs have some by-product effect of promoting the political status of the KGB Chairmanship, as well as of Andropov himself.

It Is not known who among full Politburo members voted to replace Semichastnyy with Andropov.* Andropov's early career, before his4 appointment as Ambassador to Hungary, contains no firm evidence of ties to any of the full members of the7 Politburo. (See Appendix.) He may well have developed good working relationshipsumber of them, however, during hisears7 as head of the Bloc Department. This Job entails extensive Politburo contact oven In the normal course of the regular exchanges of visits between CPSU and Bloc Party leaders. Even closer contact was Involved during the various crisis periods of the struggle for leadership of the world Communist movement that besot Andropov's tenure. More important, Andropov

*KuIl Politburo members as of7 wore Brezhnev, Kirilenko,'Kosygln, Mazurov, Pelshe, Podgornyy, Polyanskiy, Shelepin, Shelest, Suslov and Voronov.

One samizdat item reported that Shelepin was hospitalizedew days and therefore not present at theay Politburo meeting that approved Semichastnyy1 ouster (Political Diary. Issue) The validity of this report is unknown.





had served (or varying overlapping periods on thewith five Secretaries who wore alsomembers at the time of his appointment to'ii:'


Available evidence suggests that Andropov has been on consistently good working termsignificant portion of the leadership.

has Characterized Anaropov as aosoiui'ely 5evoTBa to tne party and sufficiently trustedajority of the Politburo that he was selected for the KGB jobeliable organizer, loyal, and likely to support the Party

Andropov's Relationship With Brezhnev

While there is no evidence of early Andropov patronage ties to Brezhnev, the new Party head would have had particular opportunity to take Andropov's measure during the intensive CPSU maneuvers within the Bloc and the world communist movement against the Chinese after Khrushchev's ouster. The focus of the

"Brezhnev had returned to the Secretariat in Suslov and Shelepin had served on it during the entire period of Andropov's time there, Kirilenko hadecretary since and Podgornyy from3 to April




Secretary and Bloc Department Chief ANDROPOV (front row. farith BREZHNEV and East German

leaders al East German 7th Patty Congress. Berlin.


Soviet effort, In which Brezhnev was deeply involved, was the promotionew conference of world Communist Parties. As Bloc Department head Andropov had obviously alsoey figure in this effort and accompanied Brezhnevumber of trips associated with It.*

0 Andropov accompanied Brezhnev to Bucharest for the Rumanian Party Congress; in6restigious Party and government delegation to Mongolia for talks on the Chinese problem; in6 to Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia for Party talks;

(footnote continued on


All indications are that Brezhnev has subsequently been satisfied with Andropov's loyalty and performance as KGB Chairman. Since the time of therezhnov has continued to consolidate his position, and by the period ofh Party Congress1 both his prestige and his real power had increased measurably. Against this general political background, it is highly unlikely Andropov would have remained in the KGB job without Brezhnev's continued backing.

Andropov's high Party standing has doubtless facilitated the personal supervision of the more important KGB matters which Brezhnev has found prudent, resulting in more direct and continuous General Secretary-KGB Chairman contact than had been the case with previous KGB Chairmen of lesser Party rank.

Andropov, Brezhnev and Tho Administrative Organs Department

Andropov's Party rank and direct contact with Brozhnev have also presumably affected the KGB's relationship with the Central Committee's Administrative Organs Department, which is itself probably directly subordinate to the General Secretary's office. Whileeneral sense

(footnote continued from

in6 to the Hungarian Party Congress; In7 to Czechoslovakia for Party talks; Intop in Warsaw for Party talks, to East Berlin for the East German Party Congress, and thence to Karlovy Vary in Czechoslovakiaonsultative meeting of European Communist Parties.


Administrative Organs Department supervision of the KGB may thus be even closer .than formerly, it is also probable that Andropov's own direct dealings at the level of Brezhnev and the other senior Secretaries limits Administrative Organs officials' personal contact with the current Chairman. Andropov's rank would suggest that Administrative Organs Department Chief Savinkin and his deputies would more normally deal with KGB Deputy Chairmen.

With this important new qualification inAdministrative Organs Department'srelation to Andropov's KGB neverthelessannear extensive.

| indicated pcpbtctwih uav eo appjOVe

an major administrative changes, including all personnel assignments, and would especially review those down to Deputy Chiefs of KGB Departments. The Administrative Organs Department could recommend improvements (usually after discussion with the KGB Chairman or his Deputies but sometimes solely at Khrushchev'snd received rather complete reports on the KGB's foreign activities."

There is no reason to believe that theOrgans Department does not continue to review closely all KGB personnol changes at the Deputy Department Chief level and above. It is not known however, what level of KGB appointments are also reviewed in the Party Secretariat. From what is known In general of the current Party leadership-KGB relationship. It would be conslstont to deduce that the Secretariat concerns itself especially with KGB appointments at the Deputy



Chief of Directorate level and above. Hard Information Is lacking, however.* Additionally, nothing Is known about which levels of KGB personnel changes are originally proposed in, respectively, the Secretariat, theOrgans Department, or the KGB itself.


At the time Andropov took over tho KGB, his longest and closest career ties among full Politburo members appear to have been with Mikhail Andreyevlch Suslov. They not only served together on the Central Committee Secretariat after Andropov's appointment to it inut, more importantly, Suslov was the sonior Secretary primarily responsible forrelations with foreign Communist Parties both during tho77 period when Andropov headed the Central Committee Bloc Department, and during the immediately preceding period4hen Andropov was Soviet Ambassador to Hungary.

ormer Party official who emigrated inas recalled that the Party Secretariat in that era routinely approved appointments of leaders, deputies and members of the collegia of state committees. (Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, The Communist Party Apparatus, ) If so. Secretariat approval would be required for the KGB Chairman, its Deputies, and the chiefs of those more important directorates who are members of the KGB Collegium. However, this acknowledged recollection is dated. Additionally, the KGB's sensitivity may well evoke closer Secretariat attention than do other state committees.


SUSLOV and ANDROPOVndalch the conclusion of one ot many Moscow visits by fraternal parties.omulkaeclaration for the Poles, Brezhnev signing tor the Soviets.

SIM 83


Ambassador Andropov to Suslov in Moscow.


leader in overall cnarge bf Hungarian matters, and commented that any important Foreign Affairs Ministry initiative or desire, for example, had been transmitted for approval through the Hungarian Party to Soviet

also said that Andropov usually accompanied the Hung' Party First Socretary or other Party Political Committee members on their periodic visits to Moscow.*


The events leading up to the Revolution Itself, of course, received priority Soviet leadership attention, and Suslov went to Budapest at two critical junctures in July and again in late

The growth of the Sino-Soviet split in the, and the Soviet sporadic campaigns3ew world conference of Communist Parties, required that Suslov and Andropovlose workingon problems of priority concern to tho Soviet leadership. It seems likely that Andropov would not have received the KGB responsibility without tho endorsement of the veteran and highly Influential Party leader who had been his primary supervisor forears, and whoso own fields of Ideology and foreign affairs are closely related to KGB functions.*

Moreover,7 there were indications that Suslov also had been delegated some portion of Secretariat responsibility for KGB affairs. In April,onth before the change in KGB Chairman, Suslov was the member of the Party Secretariat whooscow conference of administrative organs chiefs. Suslov's delivery of official Party greetings to the KGB at the7h anniversary

has served in the Party Secretariat continuouslynd in the Politburo continuouslyis senior Secretary tenure is far and away the longest among Soviet leaders.

session was opened by Moscow Party Firstand Politburo alternate Viktor Vasilyevich Grishin, and the entire Politburo attended. (The Cheka was the name of the secret police in Lenin's time, and it is still used on occasioneneric term for thc state security organs.)

was an additional sign that at least 7 he shared with Hrozhnov some supervisory responsibility for the KGB.

A Soviet llcntral Commits

rilfKSilonnrlim with

id that among those leading irect KGB connections Suslov has had thc greatest influenceJ he total accuracy of thia statement is open to some question, given the Influence Brezhnev has exerted in recent years in key KGB appointments, but it probably does accurately reflect an Impression in higher Party and Intellectual circles of considerable Suslov influent**


Since Andrey Pavlovich Kirilenko began in7 to emerge as Brezhnev's general Party second-in-command, Suslov has not been visibleossible KGD supervisory capacity. Krora what is known about Brezhnev's overall delegation of Party responsibilities, and from ono or two fragmentary hints in the sparse available reporting, it is possible that Kirilenko may now exorcise, under Brezhnev, some Secretarial authority over the KGB, When the next all-Union conference of administrative organs personnel was hold in for example, it was Kirllonko and

Brezhnev and his Party deputy KIRILENKO act os Ihc (rent bearers of the urn of ashesosmonaut who died in Soyuz II,


Dmitriy Fedorovlch Ustinov from the Secretariat who attended rather than Suslov.*

The origins of the Kirilenko-Andropovttsolf aroeginning with Kirllenko's appointment to the Party Secretariat atd Party

apparent involvement with administrative organs responsibilities datesnd has seemed primarily to involve the military sphere. Some KGBresponsibilities, are also, implied from his8 representation of the Party Secretariat ath anniversary of the KGB Border Guards.

**It is possible, although not documented, that Andropov had known Kirilenko in Rybinsk In the. Andropov

(footnote continued on

Congressowever, they have had increasingto work together, in6 Kirilenko began to share some foreign affairs responsibilities with Suslov at the senior Secretary level. This was especially the case through the9 convocationorld Communist Parties conference, and especially in foreign affairs matters related to Bloc Parties (then Andropov'snd to economic considerations, Kirllenko's own basic area of expertise. Their working relationship continued after Andropov became KGB Chairman in7 and Kirilenko began later that year to emerge as Brezhnev's overall Party deputy.

In sum, Andropov thus apparently has good working rapport with the head of the Party, Brezhnev, with his general deputy and most likely short term successor, Kirilenko, andenior and highly influential leadership "independent" who is not closely tied politically to the Brezhnev group, Suslov. These are the three most senior members of tho Party Secretariat.


At the same time, Andropov before histhe KGB had apparently also been on good termsand while Shelepin can scarcely haveremoval of his client Semichastnyy from the from his point of view Andropov was.probablymeans the worst possible replacement.

(footnote continued from

graduated from the Rybinsk Technical School of Water Transportationho same year Kirilenko graduated from the Rybinsk Aviation Institute. Kirilenko had thenarty memberndropov was active in Komsomol work in Rybinsk.



conversationsriend an evidence for the yes Semichastnyy as KGB impression that

consistent Shelepin booster in his doscribed Andropov -U Available

huvisui' or


irs since Andropov's replacement Chief, however, leaves the net Shelepin and Andropov are no longer understandablyas close as they once were.

Andropov's pprsonal Influence on Policy

Just as Andropov has retained his high Party rank since becoming KGB Chairman, he also appears to have retained much of the policy Influence that attached to his previous Party work. The degree to which the KGB may Influence the formation of Party policy, or engage In activities at cross purposes with existing Politburo policy, has considerable significance for the Soviet powor structure as well as the policy process. For, in addition to their intrinsic importance for policy itself, differences over foreign and domestic policy arc also frequently the medium in which the Soviet leadership power struggle Is enacted. Thus, anyKGB influence on policy formation affects not only tho substantive direction policy takes; the resources of the KGB are such that the power position of afaction can be advanced or undermined by KGB advocacy of or oppositionossible policy course, and even on occasion by KGB sabotage of established policy.



Influence on Party policy by the KGB as an institution is an ongoing possibility.* The fact that the present Chairman came to the KGB with greater policy influence as well as Party rank than previous Chairmen has, however, Introduced an additional factor into the KGB-Party policy formation relationship.

Andropov has retained some'strictly Partysince becoming KGB Chairman. On occasion, however, it has been difficult to tell whether Andropov was acting in his Party or his KGB capacity. This was particularly the case during8 Czech crisis. Analysis for8 period is additionally complicated by two facts. First, Eastern European Parties had been Andropov's Central Committee specialty. Second, the new junior Party Secretary overseeing tho Central Committee Bloc Department, Konstantin Fedorovich Katushev, had come to this responsibility from the unrelatedof automotive design and Party administrative work in Gorkly, arriving in Moscow Inr just as relations with the Czechs slid Into the crisis stage. There was ap in senior Party expertise on Eastern Europe which Andropov probably helped to fill during the crisis.

Andropov's entire background would suggest that his basic personal perspective remains thatarty specialist in Bloc affairs. It is moreover undoubtedly primarilyespected Party official and onlyas KGB Chairman that his opinions are heard in Politburo councils. Nevertheless, the very uncertainty about whether Andropov Is acting in his Party or his KGB

cWapter V.

ANDROPOV directly behind BREZHNEV ath CPSU CongreM.1

capacity which attaches to reporting on many of his activities suggests that his Party and KGB roles have in fact merged to some degree. With the most direct managerial access to the KGB's extensive resources, as well as to its reports, Andropov could not help but bring to leadership policy makingoint of view affected by his major current responsibility.

Andropov's Policy Views

Andropov's personal outlook and policy views are, however, difficult to pin down. Andropov elf-contained man. His speeches and articles over the years contain little to differentiate his position from the current topical Party line. Reported impressions of foreign Communists or diplomats, and even an

occasional Soviet official's comment about him, all offer no more than an occasional insight into his personal substantive views.

Two firmly hold specific convictions do however. One of those involves afor continuing leadership primacy of thothe world communistiewduring his long years In Bloc Partysecond amountsasic defenslveness aboutand security of the Soviet leadership,ossible political threat into cases ofdisorder. This hypersensitivity overto have been, not surprisingly,Andropov's RGB responsibility. All Soviet both these views to some degree; Andropovtoward the more Intense ondpectrumopinion in each case. Those are bothpositions in the Soviet politicalAndropov's case, however, these

are frequently offset by another fundamental aspect of his outlook, bis anparently pragmatic approach to problem solving and his admiration for competence and effectiveness. Additionally, Andropov's sharp and subtle Intelligence appears to be of the reflective and perceptive variety. Tho net effect omplex man, whose opinions and actions are not accurately suscoptlble to neat clauHlficatlon as "hard" or "soft."

The6 Hungarian Revolution

Virtually nothing is known of Andropov's opinion of Sovlot tactics before and during the Hungarian Revolution ofhen he was serving as Ambassador In Budapest, and little Is available on the specific role he played In executing them. It is certainly safe

to assume he felt the Hungarian horesy had to be controlled, especially Its extra-Partv and anti-Warsaw Pact aspects.

commented in discussing

1 to have told the new Hungarian -Janos Kadar of Soviet concern

raiLilat Andropov was probably one of the Soviets still opposed,o Hungarian Premier Jeno Pock. While still Soviet Ambassador to Hungary but after the supresslon of the revolt, Andropov is

alleged Party Fi

that Fock had been too closely tied to the revolutionary Imre Nagy regime, and warned Kadar to prevent Fock

from getting too much powerJH

that while serving in Hungary Auuiupuvhich as endured with HungarianDezsoNcmcs as


an intelligent and ideologically authoritative pro -Soviet Communist, who is both dogmatic and critical of Khrushchev's permissive period of leadership^

himself favorably


This impressed-wi

Andropoveen interest in Hungary, studying its history, cultural and economic affairs and oftenthe source about Hungarian loaders. Andropov seemed to him to think slowly and deeply, to be cautious in drawing conclusions, quiet and unassuming, yet to have great responsibility.!

8 Czech Crisis

Andropov's Hungarian experience probably sensitized him to an early recognition that effective Soviet control In Czechoslovakia, ecade later, was seriously threatened by liberalizing trends there. There is no reason to doubt that throughout8 Czech crisis Andropov remained opposed to trends within Czechoslovakia which would undermine Party control or, especially, significantly weaken Soviet influence. As KGB Chairman Andropov personally oversaw at least the broad outline of KGB activities In Czechoslovakia These included attempts, in the months preceding the invasion, to Influence or Intimidate Czech government. Party and security officials toward opposition to the "Praguend later to underwrite and legitimize tho Soviet enforced "normalization." It was also the KGB that arrested and assaulted Aleksandr Dubcek and the other Czech leaders during the invasion and brought them to Moscow,*

is no Information on whether the nature ofof Dubcek and the others on their way towas spoclflcally authorized from Moscow,the KGB detachment was loft to its ownthe exact conditions of custody until leadership realizedump governmentquickly be installed, and that thoy would havewith the legal Czech leadership.

It is not known, however, whethor Andropov supported or opposed the critical Soviet tactical decision to lead the August8 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. As only an alternate Politburo member he of course had no formal vote, but available information indicates that all the Soviet leaders were involved in the intensive debate and decision making at the various critical junctures of the Czech crisis.

Other Bloc Quarrels

had even lot difficulty.

Regarding Andropov's dealings with the Rumanians and the Yugoslavs, there isT that as Bloc Department Chief he more than the usual degree ol Sov


mean, unfriendly attit

At the time of7 appointment to the KGB,

:hat Andropov his country.*

And during the7 visit to Moscow of President Tito of Yugoslavia, Andropov was reportod to have used such harsh language that Tito at one point left the room in anger. Brezhnev subsequently managed to smooth things over between Tito and Andropov,

rany anu iraue union

Vukmanovlc-Tempo contain an incident suggesting that Andropov may have been out of step with Khrushchev in the strength of his opposition to Yugoslav "revisionlsi Vukmanovlc claimed to have asked Khrushchev at a0 encounter why the then serious Soviet-Yugoslav rift

(footnote continued on

Yugoslav on the new KGB

was therefore perhaps not surprising. He described Andropov as "thoroughly corrupted, servile, capable of anything, but wilyox.]-

Views of tho US Unknown

There is no good evidence of Andropov's personal policy views toward the United States. He did make reference to "peaceful co-existence" in7 speeches,ime when Soviet leaders' public references to this concept wore rare. His views of peaceful co-existence, and also presumably of the current policy of limited detento with Western Europe and negotiation with the US, however, are likely to be qualified somewhat by Andropov's long-held and now professional concern for the integrity of the Soviet Bloc and the security of internal Soviet

(footnote continued from

continued if Khrushchev really believed every socialist country should construct socialism in its own way. Andropov, also prosent, allegedly replied that the Yugoslav Party program clalmod that revision of the Marxist doctrine of the state look place in Stalin's time. Vukmanovic pointed out that the Soviets appeared to believe the same, considering the changes they had made in the state's role in the economy. Khrushchev nodded, according to Vukmanovic, but Andropov simply bowed his head. (Vukmanovic's version of the exchange may, of course, be somewhat self serving.)



political controls. Defensive preoccupations with the impact of any detente upon these Soviet Interests were visible in both7 speecheshis March USSR Supreme Soviet election address made before the KGB appointment as well as his Decemberh anniversary speech afterwardand the definition of peaceful coexistence presented on both occasions was hedged accordingly.

Preoccupation With Internal Security

Under Andropov's Chairmanship tho KGB has continued toost-Khrushchev leadership policy whose overall trend has been toward more rigid ideological orthodoxy and has involvod crackdown on all forms of dissent. Indeed Andropov's Chairmanship has seen an apparent upgrading of the KGB effort In this area.

One of the most significant de-Stalinizing reforms of9 Khrushchev-Shelepin reorganization of the KGB was the abolition of its Fourth, or Secret Political, Directorate that had been responsible for combatting domestic counterrevolution and subversion and for detecting and eliminating political dissidence among the Soviet populace. It had been especially notoriously associated with thc various purges of the Following the

*The emphasis given the political power role of the KGB during the Khrushchev era in Chapter One of this paper should not be allowed to eclipse tho very real substantivo changes made under Khrushchev in the direction of increased Party control over the KGB, and shifts of emphasis in its activities corresponding roughly lo overall do-Stalinization. In general, thc KGB's work

(footnote continued on



Andropov KGB appointment, there were various possible organizational changes upgrading KGBdissidents. An example was the March

(footnote continued from

as protector of the Soviet state and people from foreign "imperialist" espionage was emphasized, and its work in policing internal orthodoxy de-emphasized.

A number90 Khrushchev-Shelepin KGB organizational changes implemented the new look; abolition of the Fourth Directorate was one of the more important of these. Some Fourth Directorate functions continued however,


jrmi Second Chief Directorate (overall Internaland security.) ew Tenththe Second Chief Directorate was responsibleintelligentsia and Soviet contact with newsmen and delegations. Included: Soviet writers, artists (performingasembers of the press andmembers of the medical profession,of Foreign Affairs, the Union ofthe State Committee for CulturalForeign Countiros, trade unions, and theServicing the Diplomatic Corps (UPDK). TheChief Directorate component created tofunctions of the old Fourth Directorate wasSecurity Service, usually known simplyService." Some of Its components werefor various aroas of the USSR. Some responsible for nationalities,emigres, etc. i'"" -

cu num i

dissidence among Soviet intellectuals.* Then

eported the existence of



Directorate responsible for counterintelligence among Soviet scientists and intelligentsia, the latter category including all Soviet .journalists and members of the Writers

the new component

has Chief Directorate status, is designated the Fifth Chief Directorate, and was not established until thc first half Staff for the new Chief Directorate,

- was drawn from those Second

cniei Directorate components which had Inherited residual political dissidence counterintelligence functions after9 KGB reorganization, and tho Second Chief Directorate no longer has responsibilities in thisGB Fifth Directorate had formerly been responsible for political counterintelligenceumber ofministries and other organs not under the old Fourth Directorate's purview, but this old Fifth Directorate had been abolished9 at the same time as the Fourth. ourth Directorate exists now or has existed at any time during Andropov'sis not known; it is possible that the official concern for a relatively palatable KGB image, evident in recent years, argued for consigning the notorious Fourth Directorate designation to history.

A Moderate, Reformist Image

Despite these indications of Andropov's strong emphasis on internal political stability and orthodoxy, there have nevertheless been persistent reports from

a position to have some

hat he is

Teel for Andropov's ouiiook, that heeformerelative progressive In the Soviet context.

7 Soviet intellectuals spontaneously characterized the Andropov KGB appointment I

as "a very favorab-,


Andropov as "an educated, intelligent and sympatheticouple of months later



:haV nuuiu|juv www-irrgirry-riuiaune,'iMoilkixy courageous, and had well developed literary and artistic tastes

LKncV Andropov

" and "humane" than the usual Sovietof

rainy wen in theas recalled him as more "democratic" Most author:



relativelyand flexible the change in Chairmen asood thing.

and characterized Semichastnyy as an old Stalinist and Andropov as reform-minded.*

reported thatssassination

It is noteworthy that reported Soviet charactor-zations of Andropovelative moderate have persisted in the face of what has definitelyontinuing overall crackdown by the regime and the KGB on all forms of intellectual expression and uolifical

VTTfl * J. J


attempt, rumors circulated in Moscow intellectual circles that Andropov would be removed from the KGB job six months because he was not enoughard-As rocently as the weeks precedingh Party Congress, rumors circulated in Moscow dissident

Andronnv would be removed at the Congross. indicated I

wasnjuubtf ui niwAndropov as a liberal by

KLH kcanoaros-; and said that Andropov had acquired a

iVUdU is IU

uauure on an attack was made on the lead car, apparently by someone among the Kremlin militia. Andropov's personal reaction to this most serious known threat to the leadership in recent years is not known.



sense of public opinion abroad from his Central Committee work with foreign parties. henumor that Andropov had once told the Central Committee that political trials are senseless things.*

This rumor of Andropov's allegedpolitical trials may be related to

Andropov is one of the loaders behind tho current more flexible policy regarding Soviet Jews.


dissident circles


that the failure of0 Leningrad trial of Soviet Jewish hijackers

o intimidate Soviet Zionists, and the unexpected magnitude of foreign reaction, had allowed leadership "liberals" toore flexible Jewish policy onontrolled emigration was the most notable feature of the new policy, and these leadership

| committed their personal

onticai prestige to it. "Asked to identifythis "liberal"that il

Pross dispatch by Stephens Broening, Moscow,

TzpOTieusame lime me existence oi pre'-Congress Moscow rumors that Andropov

would be shifted tc

full time Central Committee duties.

fiifl not tf*rffciTnTTii'*Tifr fin i a na


might be difficult for Westerners to believe, but that "we" feel KGB Chairman Andropov Is one of the "so-called liberals."*

Andropov's sharp intelligence iselevant factor in explaining the apparent contradictionGB Chairman who Is strongly committed to strictly enforced political orthodoxy, but who also wins favorable comments from what must be considered liberal elements in Soviet society. It is enoughovelty for Soviet intellectuals to find someone in the Party leadership, much less as KGB Chairman, who even understands the world of the Intellectual, regardless of whether he agrees with their specific points of view, that this in itself can be some cause for encouragement. That this tough KGB boss Iselative progressive within tho USSR, however, is of courseomment on the nature of Soviet leadership.

Overall Information available on Andropov suggests that realism and results temper his idoology, that he is comfortable with the more sophisticated element of the Central Committee's foreign affairs apparatus, and that hean impressed by competence, efficiency and effectiveness. It is thus probable that Andropov finds himself among those Soviet leaders who feel that the country cannot be run effectively without the services of its Intellectual elite, much of which is to varying degrees disaffected, and that uniformly repressive tactics toward the disaffected are counterproductive.

Iso included Shelepin in the group fa

toward Soviet Jews, adding that in his view Shelepin is using the issue of democratization in pursuit of his own political ambitions.

vtew of Andropov's

supportore 1lex1bio policy toward Soviet Jews, there Is no information available on Andropov's personal rolo in the nore complex mixture of repressive and relatively permissive tactics the KGB has in the last few years appeared to employ against actual or potential Intellectual and political deviations. Selected arrests, trials and harsh sentences have alternated with dropped legal proceedings, milder sentences and exit permits; enough open opposition has been allowed to continue to serve bothartial escape valve for protestheck against more covert opposition less subject to control. What is known of Andropov's personality and outlook and of his approach to Bloc Party deviations, however, suggests that he bears considerable responsibility for thc KGB's varlod, and, ore sophisticated approach.

Subtler methods and tactical flexibility In pursuit of eventual political orthodoxy, whether in the world communist movement or in domestic Soviet life, do not necessarily, of course, result In more real tolerance on either front. Indeed, such tactics may prove more formidable than crude, simplistic repressive methods. In any conflict between Party leadership power and progressive ideas, Andropov could be expected to chooso the former. His efforts, however, appear directed toward deriving the benefits of reform without its drawbacks by putting it to work under Party control and by avoiding, to the extent possible, those ultimaterequiring the choice between Party power and reform.






A. Restaffing the Top Level

Other koy KGB personnel changes began almost immediately after Andropov had replaced Semichastnyy as Chairman. Tho sequence of purges and transfers has roughly followed the political sensitivity of the jobs involved, with the more critical positions being filled within the year or so after Andropov became Chairman, and other key Headquarters and provincial shifts contin to the present time. Brezhnev's Influence in these KGB personnel changes has not ll-pervasive, but lt has appeared to dominate.

1. Leadership Protection: Antonov

The first KGB personnel change came shortly after Andropov was made Chairman. Not surprisingly, it involved command of the Ninth (Guards) Directorate, the organization charged with protecting the leadership. Directorate Chiefriend of the Khrushchev family, was replaced by Sergey Nikolayevich Antonov.

reporting had placed

Antonovinth Directorate Deputy Chief with the rank of Major Generalut his earlier career shows an unusual variety of KGB experience


enior Ninth Directorateuch officials are more typically promoted verticallyareer limited to VIP and related protection work. No information is available on Antonov career or patronage ties to any of the Soviet leaders. Given the high political sensitivity of the post of Ninth Directorate Chief, however, the approval of Brezhnev and the Party Secretariat to Antonov's appointment

that icf (

reported that Antonov attended an auvuiiuuu intelligence course at the KGB Institute, and then became Chief of the First Chief Directorate's First Department, responsible for operations against the US. 1 Antonov became Chief of the First Chief Directorate's Fifth (Mexico and South America) Department. In that Job Antonov traveled widely on TDY, visiting Latin American countries and also parts of Europe and West Africa.

Antonovac-Kgrouna in the beConcf Chief Directorate (internal counterintelligence). In3 he was posted under First Chiof Directorate auspices to the United Nations in New York, where he served underCouncil cover untilresumably working against American targets.

were undoubtedly required. Possibly Politburo approval was necossary as well, but there is no evidence on this point.*

2. rezhnevite Extra First Deputy Chairman: Tsvigun

Brezhnev's influence was more directly revealed in the third key KGB personnel change. Semen Kuz'mich Tsvigunirst Deputy Chairman almost Immediately after the7 replacements of the Chairman and the Ninth Directorate Chief.

On7 Tsvigun was released from his duties as KGB Chairman in Azerbaydzhan, where he had served since He probably wasirst Deputy Chairman at KGB Headquarters shortly thereafter, although he was not publicly identified In the job until Tsvigun had served In

^Information of theThai tne central Committee's Administrative Organs Department reviewed all KGB personnelwith particular attention to those at the Deputy Department Chief level and above.

It is not known, however, what levt

are also reviewed In the Party Secretariat. Overall information on current Party-KGB relationships would suggest the Secretariat may well concern itself especially with KGB appointments at the Deputy Directorate Chief level and above. Apart from approving the Chairman himself, the extent of Politburo involvement In KGB appointments is unknown.

07 Red Star article commemoratingh anniversary of thc state security organs.



unspecified KGB work in Moldavia during at least part ofirst Secretary stint

there. TsvigunIn Moldavia and gained membership in the Republic Party's Bureau during Brezhnev's early years in the central Party in Moscow, when Brezhnev's patronage in Moldavia remained strong. By7 Tsvigun had moved on to Tadzhlklstan as

KGB Deputy

April he wiih identified as Chairman. This transfer to Tadzhikistan

may be an example of an appointment in the state security sphere of administrative organs influenced by Brezhnev during his first period of service In the Secretariat.* Tsvigun's eloction 6 bothoting delegate tod CPSU Congress and to the USSR Supreme Soviet may also have been due to Brezhnev patronage. h CPSU Congress rumors circulated in the early spring of1 to the effect that Tsvigun elative of Brezhnev's. An associated rumor hold that Tsvigun might replace Andropov as KGB Chairman at thc


Congroas." This, of course, did not happen, but these rumors neverthelessidespread and apparently well-founded conviction in Moscow official circlos that Tsvigun Is Brezhnev's man. Anothor strong indication that this is indeed tho case was furnished when Tsvigun wasandidate member of tho Central Committee ath Congress. KGB First Deputy Chairmen have rarely held this Party rank.**

The Tsvigun appointment also marked the first time tho KGB has had two First Deputy Chairmen. Zakharov stayed on for almost throe more years, apparently functioning with full authority. Thc unprecedentedof two KGB First Deputy Chairmen throughout this period apparentlyolitical expedient for Brezhnev until Zakharov could be eased out. in abouthin was finally managed; Zakharov disappeared. 90 Associated Press story sourcod to "Russian informants" claimed Zakharov was no longor second in cotanand at the KGll, andumber of his underlings had also boon dismissed. Information is not available to confirm tho latter portion of this report, but Zakharov's departure from thc KGR must be presumed confirmed by his long complete absence in all reporting and his failure to gain

Then? in no lniormarion conTirming tne reiatlVo report; full information Is lacking, however, on both Brozhnev's and Tsvlgun's families.

last to do so was Konstantln Fedorovlch Lunev, KGB First Deputy Chairman39 and aprotege. He wasentral Committee alternate member ath Party Congress In

election eithereputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet0 orotingthe next year toh Party Congress. He had received both political honors in

His replacement, Tsvlgun, is the mostauthor of the senior KGB officers. Tsvigun has but one basic theme, vigilance against Internal and external subversion. He has been repeating this message with minimal variation since at leastr long before holding his present high position. All senior career KGB officers who write for publication stress the vigilance theme, but Tsvigun does it more persistently and crudely than most. He has also bitterly opposed artists and intellectuals out of step with orthodoxy, denouncing Nobel laureat Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn among others as "rejects of society." In general heodel of the repressive and unimaginative, but also shrewd and able, type of KGB officer.

A Moscow dissident whoesternbeforeh Party Congress thanay KGB standards, said ofDeputy (Tsvigun) is another matter. HeBrezhnev man. His succession woulduch

press dispatch from Moscow by Stephens Brocning,



3. New Deputy Chairman Chebrikov

The next important KGB appointment after Tsvigun's7 move from Azcrbaydzhan to Headquarters also showed Brezhnev's hand. Career Dnepropetrovsk Party official Viktor Mikhaylovlch Chebrikov was not publicly identifiedGB Deputy Chairman until Octoberbut he probably went to KGB Headquarters soon after his7 release from his duties as Dnepropetrovsk Party Obkom Second Secretary "in connection with his leavingew post outside the Ukrainiant is quite likely that heGB Deputy Chairman shortly thereafter. Two Deputy Chairmen Jobs had become vacant One Deputy, Percpclitsyn, died in7 after a long Illness, and another, Bannikov, was transferred in October to the USSR Supreme Court. Chebrikov's specific Deputy Chairman duties aro not clear,

on ctober9 listed ChnhrikovGB Deputy Chairman in reporting his presence among officials greeting Brezhnevelegation returning from East Berlin. The occasion for Chebrikov's press identification is somewhat unusual; KGB Deputies are normally identified In the press in connection with Chekist anniversaries or their election to Party or government posts. The context in which Chebrikov was surfaced served to underline his Party background and his tios to Brezhnev.

**On1 Chebrikov was noted in the Soviet press receiving an East German Border Guards delegation. He may thus supervise the Border Guards, but could of course have other duties as well.



Available Information on Chebrlkov dates back onlyhen, however, he was already Party First Secretary in Dnepropetrovsk City, in3 he moved up to the Dnepropetrovsk Party Obkom level as Second Secretary. Chebrikov's long Party service in Brezhnev's old stronghold of Dnepropetrovsk presumably means he has the patronage of the General Secretary, and additionally of Politburo members Kirilenko and Shcherbitskiy, both of whom also have power bases in the Oblast. Chebrikov's high political standing wasath Party Congress when he was elected an alternate member of the Central Committee.

Tsvlgun's and Chebrikov's Central Committee alternate memberships In one sense upgrade the political power and prestige of the KGB, since other recent KGB First Deputy or Deputy Chairmen had not held this high political rank. The important point, however, is that they are almost certainly Central Committee alternat because of their association with Brezhnev and his allies. Indeed, Chebrikov's KGB appointmentareer Party rather than state security professional backgroundaso of the state security bodies being "strengthened by cadres who are politicallyoal to which Brezhnev referrod in his report toh Congress.

4. Deputy Chairman Malygin:

Tho other new Deputy Chairman probably named7 was General Major Ardalion Nikolayevich Malygin. It is not known whether he has political patronage ties to Brezhnev. He has. however, been reported I

in Party work

be a :"

ra-malygin was "formerly" ^nd date unspecified) in Moscow.*


Although not identifiedGB Deputy Chairman in the press until the nature7h anniversary article by Malygin all but confirmed his KGB status, though this was not explicitly acknowledged. As of

Malygln was

iwi atC'aS well 8S

Deputy Chairman.

The fragmentary information available on Malyglnhe might have worked in the

MiPuaiiwr-u. years, perhaps since at least1


, he could of course have known Andropov from earlier Party work.

There has been no reporting on Malygln's possible KGB duties apart from supervising personnel matters. His infrequent writings have stressed traditional KGB themes of citizen vigilance against foreign subversion, with emphasis on the dangers of its more subtle forms and on Soviet youthrime target group.*

Knights of theomsomol' skaya Pravda,nd Komsomoiets Turkmenistana,



5. Brezhnev's Client Tsinev

officer Brezhnev receiving

ouble promotion of Goorgly Karpovich Tsinev is perhaps the clearest case of with career ties to top KGB jobs.


GK. TSINEV Or City Chairman

promotedGB Deputy Chairmanship

as ot ivnv Tsinev was Chief of the Second Chief DirectorateQ This Directorate Is one of the largest of the KGB's components, and its mission, internal security and is the KGB's most important one. 7 article by Tsinev on theh anniversary suggests he may well already have become Second Chief Directorate Chief by that time.** In

I'Slnev Was i'urther

of the Invisibleovetskaya Ros-slya,hich lauded KGB vigilance against foreign subversion in the USSR. Both the content and the authoritativoness of the article suggest Tsinev was writing as Second Chief Directorate Chief.



Born in Dnepropetrovsk, Tsinev 9ecretary in the city Party apparatus. Brezhnev wasecretary of Dnepropetrovsk Obkom, and Shchelokov, now MVD Chief, was then Dnepropetrovsk City First Secretary and thus Tsinev's Immediate boss. Tsinev served In the notorious wartime militaryorganization,ndostwar tour in Austria.* From48 he was Chief of the KGB Third (counterintelligence in the armed forces) Directorate's Potsdam office with the Soviet Group of Forces in Germany.**

cpunHo tnat as oiBinev was Chief or smersh in one of the Soviet armies, and by the end of themersh Deputy Chief of one of the fronts. From about6 until1 Tsinev served in Austria, during the last two years as Deputy High Commissioner. Deryabin said that Tsinevrotege of Viktor Semenovich Abakumov, Chief of Smersh until he was rewarded with the State Securityfollowing his successful political attack on Berlya, Malenkov and their deputies in Tsinev fell into disfavor1 when Abakumov in turn was ousted through Beriya and Malenkov's successful exploitation of

the "Doctor's Plot" against him. According to

Tsinev found refuge as chief of military counterinteiiigence in an (unknown) mililary district in tho USSR, with the help of Petr Ivanovich Ivashutin, who1 was Deputy Chief of the Third Directorate and Tsinev's colleague from earlier simultaneous service in Austria.

nev *:

(footnote continued on

TSlhcv'S earlier

j Ivashutin,

joule iniru directorate Chief This job and Bcrlya's downfall put himosition to aid Tsinev's


_,suggcst that Tsinev had retained his ties to Brezhnev, who in February of that year left the job of Kazakhstan First Secretary andember of the central Party Secretariat and an alternate member of the Party Presidium.

mm lrum auouTu to icaalbinev, who already held the high rank of General Lieutenant, was Second Deputy Chief of the Third Directorate and simultaneously head of its own Special Directorate, created0 and responsible for counterintelligence in the Soviet rocket forces and

(tootnolo continued from

career again if he so wished.

p. 5had indicated

Kironov, the futurev. genual Committee Administrative Organs Department, olonel In the Third Directorate as of when Tsinev got together with him and his wifeacation trip to Czechoslovakia and Fast Germany.

at nuclear weapons sites.n Tsinev nay well have servedime as Chief of the Third Directorate beforeover the Second Chief Directorate, although this is not definitely|

Brezhnev's patronage doubtlessole in Tslnev's various KGB promotions, and in his moreh Party Congress political honor of election to the Central Auditing Commission. GB Deputy Chairman has not previously been accorded this political standing, which ranks just below Central Committee status.

The7 Altered KGB Political Profile

Thus, by the advent of Tsinev as Second Chief Directorate Chief in7 or the political balance- In tho top KGB Headquarters Jobs had clearly shlftod away from the Shelepin team. Tsinevow Ninth Directorate Chief, Antonov; an oxtrn First Deputy Chairman, Tsvigun; and two new Deputy Chairmen, Chebrlkov and Malygin, replacing Bannikov and Puropolitsyn. Of tho old team, only First Deputy Chairman Znkharov and Deputy Chairman Pankratov remained at this level. Three of tho now teamTsvigun, Chebrlkov and Tsinevhad discernible career patronage ties to Brezhnev.

6. Postscript: The Sixth Deputy Chairman

In the four years since Brezhnev made this Initial cluster of clear-cut gains at the top level of the KGB, the group of Deputy Chairmen has remained fairly stable. Two further changes apparently responsive to Brezhnev's interests have already been noted: the further promotion of Tsinev from Chief of the Second Chief Directorate to Doputy Chairman innd the removal of First Deputy Chairman Zakharov In about There has been one additional appointment in the last year. Elections to the RSFSR Supremo Soviet in1 disclosed the existence of another KGB Deputy Chairman, Vladimir Petrovich Plrozhkov.

Although the information on Plrozhkov is limited, his background is clearly thatarty apparatchik rather thanGB professional. In February3 he wasecretary of the Komsomol Committee of Altay Kray, where he was subsequently an activist in the Virgin Lands development campaign. As of5 he had become Chief of the Kray's Party Organizational Work (cadres) Department. Plrozhkov had probably entered KGB work by

Nothing firm is kkown-et pirozhftov's political ties to the Party leadership, although his membership tn1 RSFSR Supreme Soviet, shared only by Tsinev among the other KGB Deputy Chairmen, suggests that Plrozhkov does enjoy some political patronage.



Apart from the unresolved question of Pirozhkov's political affiliations, the most notable aspect of the Pirozhkov appointment is that ithird new Deputy Chairman who had spent almost all his earlier careerarty official rather thanrofessional KGB officer. Pirozhkov joins Chebrikov and Malygln In this category. The trend evidences an apparent concensus In the Party leadershipeed to extend Party apparatus influence within top KGB management ranks.

Finally, If Pankratov, the last KGB Deputy Chairman holdover from the Khrushchev-Shelepin-Somichastnyy KGB, still retains thishere are now six KGB Deputy Chairmen: First Deputy Tsvigun and Deputies Chebrikov, Tsinev, Malygln, Pirozhkov, and Pankratov. This is an unprecedented number. The postwar years have normally seen four Deputy Chairmen (including the First Deputy), and occasionally five.

B. Thc Second Echelon: ixed Picture

Meanwhile, Brezhnev's transformation of the top level of the KGB has been matched by comparable turnover at the next echelon below, but hero the evidence is much loss firm on tho degree of success Brezhnev has had in inserting personal adherents In key Jobs. In part this may merely reflect the thinner political information available about lower-ranking individuals, at least some of whom are likely to be Brezhnev followers who have not had the opportunity to advertise tho fact inthe

manner of Deputy Chairmen Tsvigun or Tsinev. Moreover, at least two and probably three of appointeos are believed to have ties with the close Brezhnev adherent Tsinev; to tho degree that these appointments reflect any Tsinev Influence they are all the more likely to mean gains for Brezhnev.

On the other hand, certain portions of the KGBnotably the First Chief Directorateew of the republic KGB Chairmenapparently remain enclaves of some continued Suslov or Shelepin influence. In thc case of the First Chief Directorate, which deals with foreign operations, this mayecognized right of Suslov to be consulted on appointments affecting his sphere of responsibility. Thirdly, there is good reason to believe that at least one recent appointment represents primarily the desires and Influence of Andropov himself, and only secondarily the wishes of his Party superiors. There are probably other such cases; it would be surprising if the KGB Chairman were not successful in making atew important appointments favorable to his personal interests, as Semichastnyy and Shelepin did before him.* Also, it must be assumed that many of the apparent Brezhnev KGB protege's are satisfactory tond finally, of course, professional seniority is an Important factor in key postings, although less Important than politcal considerations. The present head of the First Chief Directorate, for example, was previously its deputy chief.

*At least two men who served under Andropov in Budapest when he was Ambassador to Hungary inow hold key KGB positions: . Kryuchkov, the First Deputy Chief of the First Chief Directorate, . Grigorenko, the Chief of the Second Chief Directorate. And as previously noted, one of the new KGB Deputy. Malygln, is reported to be a personal friend of Andropov.

The roster of key jobs at the second level of the KGB will be surveyed in the rough order of their sensitivity.* The most important such post has already been discussed; as noted earlier, the chief of the Ninth (Guards) Directorate, which shepherds the Party leadership, was replaced shortly after Andropov took command.

1. The Second Chief Directorate After Tsinev

The next most important position at this level, the prime Soviot Internal security Job of Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, became vacant when the Brezhnevite Tsinev moved up toeputy Chairman in It Is quite possible that Tsinev still supervises some KGB internal security andactivities at the higher level, and his Third Directorate background would also make someresponsibility for counterintelligence in the armed forces logical. Given the importance of the Second Chief Directorate's internal security mission, however, it is probable that Andropov personally shares its supervision, as KGB Chairman Shelepin did asQ

*The amount of information available on personnel changes in each of these KGB organizations is not proportionate to their relative importance. It is for this reason that much more detail will follow about appointments in the First Chief Directorate than in the Second Chief Directorate.




According Tsinev was succee1

uuluiiviloraie hoad by Grigorly Fedorovlch Grigorenko. Although Grigorenko's early state security career had been lo tho Second Chief Directorate, hie Job2 until at8 had been head of Service Number Two (counterintelligence and security abroad) In the First (foreign) Chief Directorate, Grigorenko his career ties with Andropov which go back to common experience of the Hungarian Revolution. He served an KGBadvisor in Budapest fron5 when Andropov was Ambassador tohether Grigorenko has additional political ties to tho Party leadership is unknown, but his political standing seems evident from his electionh Party Congress delegate The KGB Second Chief Directorate boss bad notolcgate tod Party Congress

GrigorenkootKed from the5 in the Sucond Chief Directorateeputychief. Within several months after returning to Moscow from Budapest rigorenko transferred Into tho First Chief Directorate. He headed its ('Misinformation operations, later renamed Department and then Directorate) until becoming Chief of Service Number Two In about

Thatwmcuemut'jou until he became Second Chief Directorate Chief seven years later Is suggested f

2. The Moscow KGU

Probably the next most sensitive job is that of the Moscow City and Oblast KGB Chairman, who also was apparently replaced by sometime late Mikhail Petrovich Svetlichnyy, the incumbent since9 Shelepin KGB reorganization, was then succeeded by General Lieutenant Serafim Nikolayevich Lyalin, about whom little is known. Byowevor, General Major Viktor Ivanovich Alidin had become Moscow KGBurther change probably reflecting the patronage of some part of the influential Ukrainian group in the central Party leadership.

Alidln's succession was implied by his election in February and March to the Moscow City and Oblast Party Committees andelegate toh Party Congress, when Lyalin failed of re-election or election in all three. Alldln was then Identified in the press as tho Moscow City and Oblast Chairman on the occasion of his olectlon to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet In ormer Chief of the Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate, Alidln's KGB career may go back as far1 .Q


o at leastHe probably remained in this position until moving to the Moscow KGB


The factor most pertinent to Alidln's receipt of tho Moscow KGB Job1 is his probable identity with Viktor I. Alidin, who as of5 was Chief of the Organizational-Instruction Department of the Ukrainian Central Committee.* It is thus quite likely that Alldln had early career ties to one or more of the Ukrainian leaders in the Politburo (Brezhnev, Kirilenko, Shcherbitskiy, Podgornyy, Polyanskiy and Shelest.)

3. The Thirdource of Reliable Cadres

The KGB's Third Directorate is responsible for counterintelligence in the Soviet armed forces, and thus shares with the Main Political Administration of the Ministry of Defense ultimate responsibility for the security and political reliability of the military. Tho Third Directorate has had three, and possibly four Chiefs. The rapid turnover has probably not resulted from political purging, but apparentlyfrom promotions or lateral transfers into other key KGB responsibilities.

A. Armstrong, "The Soviet Bureaucraticew York, Praeger, p.5 August5 Ukrainian press source. Alidin as the Ukrainian cadre specialist was then directly supervised by two Soviet leaders who have since risen and fallen: Khrushchev, who was then Ukrainian First Secretary, and Kirlchenko, who was the Ukrainian Party Secretary in charge of cadres. If Alidin remained in his job another year, he must have taken some part in the6 posting of Brezhnev as First Secretary of the Zaporozhe Oblast Party Committeean important step up for the future General Secretary.


As of

ptiii uonerai had headed the

the Chiefnine uirectorate was ieutonant Ivan Anisomovich Fadeykin, who Directorate Fadeykin had left East Berlin hief of the KGB field office there) {J If Tsinev

large and important

served briefly as Chief of the Third Directorateime before becoming, byead of the Second Chief Directorate, it would have been6 orhen Fadeykin loft for Berlin.

next definite Directorate Chief is not


ieutenant Vitally

irpuiieuunerai This Is almost certainly General Vasilyovlch Fedorchuk, whom

^had previously report4 Deputy Chief of the KGB'snit pecialhe designation of working level offices of the Third Directorate in thettached to the Soviet occupation forces in Baden,



articles and activities over the years Indicate he remained in the Third Directorate after returning to Moscow," I

TBTS "Tsinev

said he was sureood friend of


friendshiphave been partly responsible for Fedorchuk's politically important appointment to the Ukraine as KGBiniscussed below in the review of KGB republic chairmen, Fedorchuk's successor as chief of the Third Directorate


has not been idontiflod.

'Red Star on8hekistarticle by General V. Fedorchuk calledCheklsts' Combat Path" and clearly aboutactivities. In2 Genoral Fedorchukonference of militaryat the Frunze military club. Inf Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil. ho hadon the Cheklsts in the armed forces. Inissuef the Soviet Air Defenseeneral Lieutenant, co-authored anWeapons of Imperialists in the

4. The Leningrad KGB

A new Leningrad City and Oblast KGB Chairman was appointed sometime latehelepin protege, Vasiliy Timofeyevich Shumilov.* The removal of Shumilov followed close on the heels of the0 replacement as Leningrad Oblast Party boss. Tolstikov, who had appeared in the middle ando be allied with Brezhnev's opponents. It appears likely that Shumilov's removal, an apparent minor Brezhnev gain, was facilitated by the major Brezhnev gain, the Tolstikov removal.

There is, however, once again onlyie between Shumilov's replacement andcoterie. The new Leningrad Chairman, ins GeneralPavlovlch Nosyrev. Almost nothing is knownbackground except that he may have servedthe KGB's Third Directorate. He is possiblyor relatedolleague and friend ofthe. If so, ho is yet another caseman from this circleop job underAndropov's

following Shelepin into tho KGB0 as Leningrad Chairman, Shumilov had served under Shelepin

as Leningrad oblast Komsomol First Secretary3 and was then briefly Party First Secrotary of

Vyborg Gorkom. Following his removal from thc Leningrad

KGB Inhumilov has dropped completely out of


(TOOtnote continued on


5. Status Quo in the Border Guards

The Border Guards, intrinsically sensitiveclosed society of the USSR, have had animportance since the9 Chinese The Border Guards troops did most ofthen, and now patrol the uneasy truce thatSoviet-Chinese border negotiations. Soviet leadership has appeared satisfiedman who has commanded the Border Guardseneral Lieutenant Pavel he was still

in this position as ot Zyryanov has no known ties to the leaders but hasong and distinguished career7 in the border troops, and in uniformed state security troops in the interior of the USSR for ten years before that. Continuing Politburo confidence in him can be surmised from his

(footnote continued from


appointment with the rank of Deputy Minister to head the Soviet delegation sent in9 to open talks with the Chinese on border river navigation. He wash Party Congress dclogate

6. The First Chief Directorate

Personnel changes at the very top of thc KGB's First Chief Directorate did not come Then, strong KGB professional continuity in the Job of Chief was balanced with an Important influx of Party influence in the appointment as First Deputy Chief of Andropov's own closest long-time aide, Vladimir Aleksandrovlch Kryuchkov. Any specific Brezhnev influence would seem to be only Indirect, however.

The First Chief Directorate is rcsponslblo for foreign operations, including positive intelligence collection, counterintelligence operations and political action operations. Its mission is less closely related to the Party leadership's struggle to gain and keep power than Is the work of other, internal security, KGB components. Hence the First Chief Directorate's key personnel appointments are of somewhat less direct political sensitivity to the leadership. However, the First Chief Directorate can have an Indirect bearing on leadership power struggles through its performance. When its work is inadequate or embarrassing, the resulting foreign policy disarray can be used by opponents of thc dominant Party leader or faction as ammunitionolicy debate aimed at undermining the political authority of the current leaders. For example, in the period leading up to the7 Six Day war between the Arabs and Israelis Soviet intelligcnco services seriously miscalculated both the lengths to which Soviet goading would push the Arabs and the capacity

of the Arabs to hold out in thc war that resulted. Shelepin and other opponents of Brezhnev usedHast fiascoerious challenge to the General Secretary's leadership7 Central Committee Plenum.

Nevertheless, Colonel General Aleksandr Mikhaylovlch bakharovskiy, who had been head of the First Chief Directorate since sometime beforeemained its Chief under Andropov's repuntil

with Fedor Korlamutiiiuv.

period, as he had since

s Sakharovskly's First Deputy Chief.

reported that Sakharovskiy had tho reputation amuiiy KGB officers of being an individual who would tolerate no criticism or insubordination, did little work, showed no initiative, and was considered by many an ineffective head of tho First Chief

nave icpuiiuu mai aasnarovsKiy'S

the First Chief Directorate was

preceded by service7 as head of the state security Austro-Germanrief tour8eputy in the Scandinavian Department, and in theour in Rumania as an intelligence adviser. Returning to Headquarters Sakharovskiy in3 became head of the Advisors. Bloc) Section, where he apparently remained until taking over the First Chief Directorate later in the decado.

If this dubious view of Sakharovskiy'sstature was even partially justified, his survival untiluggests he has one or more highly placed patrons. Who that might be is

report-oun or oeiore1 Hortln replaced Sakharovskly as head of the First Chief Mortin'shadong one. hief since about he hadeputy


PirM Chid Oireclo-ate Chief

Directorate officer Chief of the

wouldogical initial guess (but onlyecause of his predominant influence for many years in foreign affairs. Suslov and Sakharovskiy are also close in ago; Suslov isnd Sakharovskly, according to clandestine reporting, is In his. Sakharovskiy wash Congress delegate In an Indication of his then continued political good standing.

It wasminer retired orpecial consultant The former seems the more likely'reported that Sakharovskiy

Is now has twice been seriously ill in recent years, and as ofas working only about oneonth.

Directorate and was its First Deputy Chief by

As of5 he was Acting Chief of

the Directorateerious illness of Sakharovskiy's.*

i iaa oeen promoTea to do Deputy under Shelepin, was one of the Senior KGB officers most loyal to the former Chairman.j |


If the report that Mori inhelepin protege

is accurate, it sheds additional light on the choice of Kryuchkov to succeed him as the First Deputy head of

the C


Kryuchkov as a

ota judgment abundantly supported

*Mortm once served in the Central Committee'sOrgans Department, probably in theefore moving to the KGB's First Chief Directorate. He hasumber of temporary duty assignments over-seas, but is not known to haveull tour abroad.

Las reported that rrom about3 Hortin wasleave from the First Chief Directorate to serve as Chief of the KGB's Intelligence Institute, Its advanced academy for Senior, especially First Chief Directorate, officers.

by tho two men's careers. They havo been almostclosely associated sincebout the time that Kryuchkov joined Andropov's Budapest Soviet Embassy staffhird Secretary. Kryuchkov remained in Hungary at least two years after Andropov returned7 to head the Central Committee Bloc Department. Byhen Kryuchkov was so identified in the Soviet press, he had himself becomo an advisorsector" (principal subdivision) in an unspecified Central Committee Department. This was probably the sector of the Bloc Department responsible for Hungary, for2 he published an article on Hungary.* Byryuchkov was probably chief of the Bloc Department's Hungarian sector.** Sometime during5 herincipal aide to Bloc Department Chief

Five Year Plan for Developing the Hungarian People'sryuchkov, Planovoye Khozyaystvo No.

3 Kryuchkov was described in the Soviet press as headentral Committee sector; thewas his travel to Hungaryigh level CPSU delegation. Kryuchkov published at least three additional articles on Hungary ineriod, mainly on economic

subjects and all characterized by their notably authoritative Party line.

s early as5 Kryuchkov had been described in the Soviet pressresponsible worker of the Centralather than associatedarticular sector.


Andropov look Kryuchkov with him to theto the Chairman's Secretariat. Newhave traditionally brought their own men very powerful and pivotal body,

oi. the KGB Secretariat Chief that he

nas nigner administrative rank than any of the Deputy Chairmen.Q

The appointment of Kryuchkov as second in command of the First Chief Directorate inserts Andropov's long time right hand maney role in KGB foreign intelligence collection and espionage. Mortin'sas Directorate Chiof probably means that the Brezhnev faction in the Party leadership cannot yet completely dominate all the key KGB personnel and it nay also represent some remaining Shelepin If so, the relative political importance of the First Chief Directorate's First Deputy Chief slot would increase. Kryuchkov has no known direct ties to Brezhnev. However, the decision toan with Kryuchkov's level of Central Committee apparatusand with his closo personal and professional ties to Andropov, ey KGB Directorate level operational command jobompelling illustration of the Party leadership's determination to extend general Party control further down into KGB management ranks.

could, of course, have additional patrons in the leadership, In the last decade he could also have acquired political loyalties other than to Shelepin.



If Party concern with First Chief Directorate deficiencies of the sort evident in connection withar was also one factor in the Kryuchkov appointment, it would underline the irony that this personnel change preceded byew months the most embarrassing incident in the Directorate's history. This was the1 British expulsionoviet intelligence officers, after the detailed revelationsGB defector concerning Soviet espionage in Britain had provided the last straw to several years of insultingly blatant Soviet intelligence behavior in the OK. The magnitude of the humiliation suffered by the Soviet Party and government in the British case certainly suggests that some First Chief Directorate policy and personnel changes are quite possible, whatever mixture of actual responsibility and scapegoat hunting these might in fact reflect.*

One First Chief Directorate Deputy Chiefhave been

um ran pusnxuii hi ATiuropov's instigation bylthough precisely when this occurred and whether it was connected with the Britishis unknown.!-his is Vaslliy Vladlmirovlch Mozzhcchkov, whom-Jhelepin had brought into the KGB from tho Central Committee Administrative Organssometime It is more likely, however, that Andropov wanted Mozzhechkov sidetracked either because of operational ineffectiveness or because of his ties to Shelepin, or both.

*The implications of the British expulsion are more fully discussed below in connection with the KGB's relation to policy Opp. nd in connection with its possible effect on Andropov's position ).

The KGB Party Conmit tee Secretary

Tho present occupant of one additionaljob of political importance is notis the Secretary of the Party Committee,the Party organization within the KGB. KGB officors are Party members, and the KGB'sis an additional important channelcontact and control within the KGB at allKGB Party Committee.

.has t'nujr an oniHST parryana its Secretary has the status of an oblast First

At the time ofd CPSU Congress rigorly Tvanovlch Vlasonko,ongress delegate, was officially listed as KGB Party Secretary. There Is no information on when he was first appointed, but

has reported that Vlasenko, a1 major

enurai, snri served in the KGB Party Committee as* ofyiasenko has not been noted since, however, He was noth Party Congress

nor re-elected to tho Moscow City Party Committee job he had previously also held. He has thus presumably been replaced as KGB Party Secretary. Nothing is known of Vlasenko's earlyor political affiliations, nor has hisbeen identified.

C. The Republics: Slower Going for Brezhnev

Changes in the fourteen republic KGB Chairmen have come more slowly than at Headquarters. They also have failed to show the degree of Brezhnev influence apparent in the Headquarters personnel shifts. Although we lack information about the extent to which republic Party first secretaries and members of their secretariats participate in the selection of their local KGB chairmen, it seems probable that these local hierarchies have some voice in the matter, and that this has been an additional factor diluting Brezhnev's influence in these appointments.

In brief, the picture is this; ew months after Khrushchev's fall and7 there were no changes among the republic KGB heads. In the first months7 preceding Semlchastnyy's7 removal, there were throe such shifts, two of which showed Shelepin at least holding his own and possibly making small gainseriod when in the larger context Brezhnev was placing him increasingly on the defensive. These apparent small steps forward for Shelepinin Lithuania and Moldaviahave not been reversed to the present day. On the other hand, since Andropov took over tho KGB, Brezhnev has made two apparent major gains among the republic KGB chairman: one in Azerbaydzhan inhe other, with Suslov's evident cooperation, in the Ukraine in Pour other shiftstwo In succession in Tadzhlkistan, one In Uzbekistan, and one in Belorussiahave left no clear political imprint. Finally, other republic KGB chairmen have been left totally undisturbed; their political affiliations are also unidentified, although ^t is conceivable that two long-term Shelepin-Semichastnyy holdovors In Estonia and Latvia may, like their neighboring colleague in Lithuania, retain some Shelepin sympathies.

The7 Shifts

The first7 appointee, Yuozas Yuosovich Petkyavichyus, has strong career ties to Shelepin and Semichastnyy;* Named Lithuanian KGB Chairman ino has remained in this post.

The second7 shift, in March, may also have redounded to Shelepin's benefit rather than Brezhnev's. Petr Vladimirovich Chvertko was transferred from the Klrgiz KGB, where he had been Chairmano the KGB Chairmanship in Moldavia. Brezhnev, who was Party First Secretary in Moldavia03 and retained considerable influence there in later

ecretary of the Lithuanian Komsomol Centralby Petkyavichyus was elected Komsomol First Secretary in4 and served thus until at least (Shelepin was All Union Komsomol First Secretary2) By at least3 Petkyavichyus had followed Shelepin and Semichastnyy's trail into the KGB; he was identified at that time as KGB Deputy Chairman In Lithuania, becoming Chairman four years later. His Party standing, however, is not what his predecessor's was; the former Chairman was elected tod CPSU Congresshereas Petkyavichyus waselegate toh Congress Petya-vichyus' durability might be accounted for both by the protection of the Lithuanian Party leadership, which has appeared cool toward Brezhnev, and possibly additionally by the patronage of Suslov, who presided over CPSU pacification of Lithuaniand is still believed to have personnel influence in the Republic.

years, night hnvo boon expected to be able early on to influence the selection of the Moldavian KGB Chairman. Moreover, Ivan Ivanovlch Bodyul, Moldavian First Secretaryas early career ties to Brezhnev and has in recent years been an outspoken supporter of tho General Secretary.* Chvertko has no known patronage ties to the Brezhnev group, however. Moreover, as in tho case of Potkyavichyus, this has apparently cost hin Party political honors which his predecessor had received. Ho was notelegate toh Party Congress, whereas his predecessor had been tod, nor was ho one of sovon Republic KGB Chalmen honored with election In0 to the USSR Supreno Sovlot rather than to their Republic Supremo Soviets tho following year. Chvertko' Moldavian KGB appolntnent may well have been tho work of Yurly Dmitriyevich Mcl'kov, who became Second

*The year after Brezhnev's arrival inaw Bodyul ontor Party work In the Republic after sonc hIx yoars there in agricultural administration.hen BrezhnevPSU Central Conalttee Secretary, Bodyul went to Moscow for two years In tbe Higher Party School followedear in tho Central Committee apparatus. hen Brozhnev wasecretary and had cadres responsibilities, Bodyul returned tb Moldavia as Second Secretary. Beginning Bodyul's speeches have contained deferential references to Brozhnev's leadership, and byh Party Congress period he had become one of Brezhnev's more notable public boosters.


mvtZlf T'*T

Secretary (traditionally the cadres position), in Moldavia inonth before Chvertko's move there. Mel'kov appears to have career ties with Shelepin and Semichastnyy.*

Chvertko's7 departure from Kirgizia was followed by the April appointment of Dzhumbek Asankulov to the Kirgiz KGB Chairmanship. Unfortunately nothing is known of his background or ties; he wash Party Congress delegate and remains Kirgiz Chairman.

*lnomsomol Secretary for Molotovskaya (later Perm) Oblast, Mel'kov was elected to the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee. (Shelepin was then Komsomol First Secretary, succeeded8 by Semichastnyy.)

Inonth after Semichastnyy had become Chief of the CPSU Central Committee Party Organ*Mel'kov, who had remained in the interim in Komsomol work, was identified as an Instructor in the CPSU Central Committee Party Organs Department. By early

el'kov hadektor Chief in the same department.

While nothing is known of Chvertko's background before his1 appointment to the Kirgiz KGB Chairmanship, that occurred during Shelepin's KGB tenure. An additional hint that Chvertko may be allied with Shelepin rather than Brezhnev supporters camepate of0 Soviet press criticism of the state of law enforcement activities In Moldavia, notably including one article by ex-Moldavian Brezhnev protege and current USSR MVD Chief Shchelokov, Mel'kov's Second Secretary predecessor in Moldavia. One of Shchelokov's points was the lack of effective coordination among the Moldavian KGB, MVD, courts and state attorneys. (Col. General N. Shchelokov, "Strengthen Socialist Legality, Fight Lawishinev, Kommunist Moldavil No. 2, .


Republic KGB Changes Since7

Since Andropov became KGB Chairman inive Republic Chairmen have been replaced, two of these more than once. Two of these changes appear to havo brought important gains to Brezhnev.

The first was the promotion of the Azerbaydzhan KGB deputy head, Geydar Alirza Aliyev, to thethere to fill the vacancy caused by Tsvigun's7 departure for Headquarters. Subsequently,nique post-Stalin promotionrovincial KGB officialirst-rank Party post, Aliyev in9 was made First Secretary of the Azerbaydzhan Party,

replacing the apparent Shelepin protege Veil Yusufovlch Akhundov.' onth after becoming First Secretary,

rose to power in the Azerbaydzhan Party very shortly after Shelepin and then Semichastnyy became successive heads of the Central Committee's Party Organs (cadres) Departmentnd inwent to Azorbaydzhan to serve with Akhundov as the Moscow Party apparatus* representative in the traditional Second Secretary position, Brezhnev's sharp change from understanding for Azerbaydzhan's agricultural difficulties at the5 Plenum to denunciation of Azerbaydzhan's agricultural shortcomings at the6 Plenum suggests that Akhundov had lined up on the Shelepin side during5 Brozhnev-Shelepin power struggle. Akhundov's eventual removal was presaged by the8 appointmentrezhnev-Kirllenko man,. Kozlov, as Azerbaydzhan Second Secretary.

Aliyevide-ranging purge of Azerbaydzhan officials. Although Aliyev has no known early ties to the General Secretary'se hasupporter of Brezhnev's leadership and policies, enthusiastically implementing tho0 Brezhnev-instigated agricultural program and contributing to the0 pre-Congress wave of statements by certain leaders boosting Brezhnev's cult and relative standing.

Aliyev was replaced as Azerbaydzhan KGBby Vitaliy Sergeyevich Krasllnikov, on whom no background information is available. Given theof the Azerbaydzhan purge of the last two years and Krasllnikov's election0 to the USSR Supremeowever, it seems safe to assume his good standing with the Brezhnev faction of the leadership.

The second apparent Brezhnev gain among the Republic KGB chairmen was scored when Fedorchuk, the chief of the Third Directorate and good flrend of Brezhnev's client Tsinev, was transferred to head the Ukrainian KGB in

It is likely that tho Fedorchuk transfer wasif not instigated by Brezhnev and his closer supporters plus at least Suslov. It probably was not agreeable to Podgornyy, to whom the Ukrainian KGB

'Aliyev's career prior to his identification5 as Azerbaydzhan KGB Chairman is completely unknown.

is not an automatic Party honor for Republic KGB Chairmen. Almost half of them have been elected In recent years instead to the loss politically pres-tigeous Republic Supreme Soviets. 1

Chairman incumbentitally Fedotovich Nikitchenko, had career ties. Nikitchenko's KGB career was preceded by two decades of work in the Party apparatus of Kharkov oblast, Podgornyy's'original political stronghold. The Fedorchuk appointment may also have displeased Ukrainian First Secretary Shelest, although this is less clear.*

] toldoray Into the Ukraine in the spring0 by Suslov and Boris Nikolaye-vlch Ponomarev, Party Secretary and longtime head of the Central Committee International Department, to chastise the Ukrainian Party for Ideological laxness, especially for allegedly failing to take proper measures against contamination from tho Czechoslovakian brand of counter-revolutionary The KGB shift soon thereafter thus may have been triggeredentral Party leadership decision to organize ideological tightening up in tho Ukraine. Thia crackdown may well haveretext for the Brezhnev group toember of the Tsinev-Third Directorate circle for an entrenched

onuivucnot neen

lhldrmeO. in advance about Nikitchenko's removal and Fedorchuk's arrival, and (b) considered the wholeersonal affront

indications of mu6urnyy

rather than to Brezhnev in the Khrushchev era, and of more recent generally cool Brczhnev-Shelest relations, both lend some credence to the latter contention if not the former. It seems most unlikely that Shelest,ull Politburo member himself, would not have known of the change in advance. Nevertheless!, if seems possible that Shelest did oppose thc move but was unable to prevent it.


Republic KGB Chairman who had ties to Podgornyy and possibly to Shelest, and whooldover from the Serov-Sholepin-Semichastnyy KGB. The Ukraine is politically the most important as well as the largest Soviet Republic outside thend wasogical targetGB personnel change to the liking of Brezhnev and his supportors as soon as an opportunity presented itself, in any case, Fedorchuk's arrival in the Ukraine has in fact been followederies of arrests and harassments of liberal intellectuals, dissidents, and nationalists. And although Shelest himself appears to have highly orthodox Ideological views, some Ukrainian nationalist Intellectuals of whom Shelest has been fairly tolerant as part of his struggle to maximize political independence of Moscow have been among the victims of Fedorchuk's crackdown.[]

Meanwhile, Nikltchenko was soon publicly listed as engaged In "leading work" in the USSR KGB, almost certainly in the Moscow Thiswhose exact nature is unknown, smacksop to Podgornyyetirement post for Nikltchenko,

the Ukraine's historic and economic importance, and the factargo percentage of the current top Party leadership have their roots in its complex and factional politics, the Ukraine's nationalist movement and various cultural digressionsajor and continuing challenge to central Party orthodoxy.

Deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet, signed to the pressctober.


Whether Brezhnev may have profited from other Republic KGB Chairman changes is less certain. The KGB Chairman in Tadzhikistan has been replaced twice in the last three years, but the political meaning, if any, of these changes is unclear. In8 Mikhail Mikaylovich Milyutin, Chairman since Tsvigun's departure for Azerbaydzhan five years earlier, left, possibly for KGB Headquarters.* Milyutln's replacement was Sergey Georgiyevich Sazanov, about whom nothing is known and who was replaced in turn in0 by Vasllly Tarasovich Shevchenko, another unknown. The latter, however, has sufficient political standing to have beenh Congress voting delegate.

Also uncertain Is the political significance of thc9 replacement of the Uzbek KGB Chairman, Scrgoy Ivanovlchareer security officer who had hold this job He was succeeded by General Lieutenant Aleksey Dmitriyevich Reschastnov, who appears to have come from Moscow.) eschastnov is, however, one of the seven republic KGB Chairmen elected to the USSR Supreme Soviet and thus has above average political standing.

Tho most recent Republic KGB Chairman shift, in Belorussia in removed Vasiliy Ivanovichareer intelligence officer who had held this post

0 announcement of Milyutin's removal from the Republic Party posts he had held in connection with the KGB Chairmanship stated he had left the Republic.

since9 Sholopin KGB reorganization. He was replacod by Yakov Prokopyevlch Nikulkln, another career security officer who was KGB Chairaan of the Bashkir ASSR as Potrov Is His removal nay well be another wecdlng-outhelepln-Semlchastnyy holdover, but neither the precise circumstances of his departure from tho Belorusslan KGB Chairmanship nor his fate are known.

Six Prc-Brezhnev-Andropov Holdovers

At least as important for Party leadership power alignments as these Republic KGB changes, however, arc the other Republics in which the incumbent KGB Chairmen have held their jobs for varying periods since as earlyne of these is Georgiy Stepanovichkrainianareer state security officor ofbreadth ofho has been tho

ounterintelligence officer before World War II, Yevdokimenko sorvod after tho war in Austria as Chief of the counterintelligence Second Department, responsible for CI activities against foreigners. etate security adviser In Hungary, oputy MVD Chief in Khabarovsk Kray, and Inhief of the state security counterespionage section within Soviet Military Intelligence (the GRU). 3 he returned to the foreign intelligence directorate as Chief of the Austro-Gcrman section, and59 he returned to advisor work, this time with the Polish Intelligence and Security Service,

As: Yevdokime'riKu waw oacx in internal security and counterintelligence work, as KGB Chairman in Krasnodar Kray in tbe Caucasus.


Chairman in Kazakhstan since His political affiliations, if any, are unknown. Yevdokimenko's political standing has remained good throughout Brezhnev's power consolidation, nevertheless; heelegate to bothdh Party Congresses and elected to the USSR Supreme Soviet * Also unknown are the political patronage affiliations of Leonid Il'ich Korobov, Turkman KGB Chairman since andareer Second Chief Directorate officer^ ]

The other four Republic KGB Chairmen whose tenure predates5 are in Republics characterized by especially strong local Party traditions of stubborn self-assertion, often contrary to the prevailing winds from Moscow. This is particularly the caso in Georgia, which has the "dean" of Republic KGB Chairmen. Aleksey Nlkolaycvlch Inauri has been Chairman In Georgia ever since thc reorganization of state security organs Into the present KGB in* Only slightly loss durable Is Georgiy Artoshe-sovlch Badamyants, who has boon KGB Chairman in Armenia since Tho KGB Chairmen of Estonia and Latvia, Avgust Petrovlch Pork and Longin Ivanovich Avdyukcvich, have held their jobs since1 and3 respectively, making then Shelepin-Somichastnyy era holdovers, although not necessarily current Shelepin supporters.

-Although Brezhnevormer Party First Secretary in Kazakhstan, he is not tho only leader with patronage there.

also has the "dean" among Republic Party First Secretaries, Vaslliy Pavlovlch Mzhavanadze.



Tho Administrative Organs Department

There is unforturnatoly much less information available on the political affiliations of key personnel in the Central Committee Administrative Organs Department, which helps supervise the KGB, than on key officials in the KGB itself. The obscurity of the political ties of the Administrative Organs Department Chief, Savinkin, were discussed in Chapter Two, as was the apparent association of one of the Deputies, Laputin, with Kirilenko. About the time in8 that Savinkin formally became Chief after four years as Acting Chief, Nikolay Petrovich Mal'shakov was brought from Ponza Oblast, where he had boon Chairman of its Executive Committee probably sinceo become Savinkin's First Deputyittle is known of Mai1 sliakov's caroor, and there is no real evidence as to who his patron in the leadership might


was relieved of his Penza Oblast posts in be vas identified in tho Soviet press as Administrative Organs First Deputy Chief in October.

is unusual to become an Oblast Executive Committee First Secretaryisible Party background, as Mal'shakov did; it is also unusual that he published nothing while there In this prominent a Party post. Three of Brezhnev's closest supporturs In the Central Committee apparatus and leadership have come from Penza Oblast, (Fodor Davidovich Kulakov, ull Politburo member as wellarty Secretary, who served there8

(footnote continued on)

(footnote continued from) Konstantin Ustlnovich Chorncnko, now Chief of tho Central Committee General Department, who served there5orgey Pavlovich Trapeznikov, Chief of the Central Committee Science (and Educational Institutions Department, who served there9. There is no evidence, however, of Mal'shakov patronage ties to any of them or to Brezhnev directly.



Tho.most important factors Inhibiting the KGB today from pursuing policy tangents contrary to Brezhnev's wishes, either on its own or on behalfinority leadership faction, are Andropov's sensitivity to the political implications of KGB activities, and his loyalty to the Politburo consensus. All Indications are that Andropov has taken any necessary steps to ensure that tho risks of over-zealous KGB operations' embarrassing the Party are minimized.

Information on precisely what kinds of KGB operations and activities require specific, case by case approval by the Central Committee apparatus or the Secretariat is unfortunately fragmentary, however.

has reported that all peacetime

perations conducted by the First Chief"V" (Executive Action, sabotage,related missions) require Central Committee approvalnot report on which Central

tee components might be involved, whether this includes the International Department or the Secretariat Itself in addition to the Administrative organs Department. The extreme political sensitivity of Executive Action operations makes Central Committee interest understandable. Central Committee approval is probably requiredumber of other categories of politically sensitive or risky KGB activities, but specific information is not available.

also said that it is the KGB

nairman nimseu wno Obtains Central Committee

While Andropov appears sensitive to the Party policy implications of KGB activities, however, it should also be said that the level of Andropov's Party standing does indirectly put the KGB's voice morebefore the highest levels of the Party While the KGB as an institution may not be more directly influential in policy making than it was under Semichastnyy, the fact that Its current Chairman is Influential in his own right almost certainly enhances its indirect Influence, filtered of course through the important prism of the Chairman's strong Party Instincts.

Moreover, there are some practical limitations on the control which Andropov, as the Party's principal and most direct agent, can exercise over the KGB. One is his lack of operational experienco; in some matters ho has presumably had to roly heavily on the professionals, although that necessity has probably also lessoned with his own exposure to operational detail. Another Is the sheer size of the KGB's empire, includingtaff employees worldwide. Also the Party demands on him that enhance the current Party-KGB relationship also cut Into the time he has for running the KGB.

KGB Institutional Advantages for Influencing Policy

Moreover, there are several factors built into the KGB's institutional position and mission in Sovlot society that either make the possibility of KGB policy influence more likely, or affect the probable nature of that influence.

First, of tho various organizations Involved in foreign affairs that feed information into the Central Committee apparatus and Politburo, tho KGB's information is probably the most complete, current and accurate. The same Is the case in certain security related, and hence

KGB Headquarter* Drtnhtnskly Square, Moscow

politically sensitive, areas of domestic affairs. The KGB thus has the potential advantage for subtleover events that accruesroup dominating the information supply.

Second, the KGBominant position in all Soviet missions abroad because of the relative numbers and positioning of its personnel. ovietis Chief of Mission in fact as well as name and

nowadays he and the KGB Resident normally cooperate

closely, and often also amicably.

has reporTcd That any conumi ouiweeu an HuieaBBawi

esident not resolved between them in the field is referred to and settled by the Central


However, the KGB usually has more Embassy diplomatic slots in Soviet missions abroad than either the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Military intelligence (thend this diplomat category by the very nature of its access accounts for nost of the significant political reporting reaching Moscow through the channels of the several agencies involved,*

KGB officers abroad often give the Impression that they take the ole of the KGB in foreign affairsatter of course and tend to equate general Soviet foreign policy interests with their own missions. Such an attitude may well from time to time create overall problems of perspective and balance in Soviet foreign policy. An illustration of this KGB attitude surfacedonversation duringh CPSU Congress

*Vhile Soviet missions abroadhole art? believed generally to be composed of% of Intelligence officers of both services, the percentages often run substantially higher for those mission slots carrying diplomatic rank and immunity. ariety of historical reasons as well as its senior power position, the KGB controls the great majority of the already high percentage of diplomatic slots providing cover to the two services. Allew diplomatic slots are in Embassies proper, rather than in other components of Soviet missions abroad. Most KGB officers under diplomatic cover contribute political or other reporting to their cover organization, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as to KGB Headquarters, However, their better political collection efforts tend to be in the KGB's behalf* and the many choice slots KGB officers occupy of course impinge on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs* chances of maintaining its own strong teams overseas.


Comment ins on rumors Ministry ot Foreign Affairs circles that the(Gromyko) and Defense Minister Grechko mightalternate members at the

noted that the foreign affairs community alreadyoice in the Politburo in the person of KGB Chairman Andropov, and remarked jokingly that in the final analysis foreign affairs wereatter of "security" in the broad sense.Q

Third, the KGB's basic mission of control can easily breed an automatic and literal repressive or defensive mentality that affects reporting, recommendations, and even the execution of existing policyeavy handed manner somotlmes itself producing policy.

Finally, the Soviets havo traditionally accepted more blurring of the line between intelligence collection and analysis, or espionage, and policy advice than would seem desirableestern context.

KGB Reporting Bias

One of the most basic ways in which KGBinfluence may affect policy formation Is through reporting bias. There is reason to believe that on occasions, some involving critical Soviet foreign policy


areas, KGB reporting has had its own slant, which has pointedougher or more defensive policy line than might otherwise have been suggested.


uui OUl HIK ri Rim HHVlKtirK


forwarded to Moscow out-of-context excerpts from Czech Ministry of Interior reports inay as toworst case" Impression ofand anti-Soviet activities in the Ministryf While no solid information is available on tho impact this reporting had on CPSU policy-makers, it probably fed the foars then already rife in the Soviet leadership that Czech Party control and effective Soviet Influence were being eroded.**

Middle East:

that within

ms-nmnnarp divisionoviet foreign policy circles on tho

**This is particularly likely in view of two important additional factors, Ono was Chairman Andropov's own probable sensitization, given his Bloc Departmentto indications of anti-Soviet trends in Also, both the Soviet Ambassador in Prague, Chervonenko, and his Minister-Counselor, Ivan Ivanovich Udalftsov, took alarmist positions in their reporting throughout the crisis,



advisability ofeaceful solution in the Middle East. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said

|was solidly behind Egyptian PresidentTorts1 toolitical settlement with tho Israelis, and its officials in the Middle Bast, especially in Lebanon, had been "slanting" their reporting to Moscow to reflect only those factors strengthening the case for


a political solution. I

the Middleon the other hand

to great pains to point out in theirully implemented politicalpose for the massive Sovlot Investment andin the area, allowing the Egyptians toa closer relationship with the West andundermining Soviet gains madehe intelligence version as"accurately.'Q Although there Isevidence, the difference ofmay also have existed between hisMinister Gromyko.


Finland: Tn addition.

[have reported'tnat there is no


hat the KGB, apparently boi. nd in Moscow, is one ol thcSoviet interest groups supporting the minority Stalinist faction of the Finnish Party, rather than the majority liberal faction.They have implied that some other Soviet official groups, particularly In thc Central Committee apparatus, are by no moans as strongly biased toward the Finnish Stalinists.

The United States: There are some indications that Fedor Ivanovich vidyasov, the former Chief of the First Chief Directorate's First Service, has longogmatic bias regarding thc United States. The First Service is the KGB's foreign intelligence reports and analysis component. Under the guidance of the Chairman or his Secretariat, it disseminates KGB collected foreign intelligence to the Central Committee and other regime consumers. , when Soviet-American relations were relatively friendly, Vidyasov, then stationed at the Soviet Embassy in Paris, was quite openly hostile to the US, and seemed to enjoy making cutting remarks to and about Americans and criticizing US policy. That he retained this bias was strongly suggested7 briefing he gave Soviet Bloc officials on the Soviet view of the Vietnam war. Vidyasov stated in this briefing that despite American efforts to convince tho Soviets of their desire to maintain the status quo and seek a

modus vivendl with tho USSR, the major American aim

remained the destruction of "international communism.1




nau ueen repxacea as Chiof of Service Number One by Andrey Semenovich Smirnov, who still held this position as ofQ Smirnov's early KGB career gave him extensive operational experience against American targets, and included an official tour in the US and attendance at an American university. Howover, nothing is known of his substantive views. Including his opinions or understanding of the US,**

[footnote continued from)

reported about thiseneral impression

that Vidyasov was rather phlegmatic, very quiet and polite, and slow and careful in reaching conclusions and making decisions.

"omimovwiB in (lie-American Department of the state security foreign intelligence Directorate at the time of4 arrival in Now York, whore ho attended Columbia Univorsity and was simultaneously an employeeoviet trading organization* He left the US6 to become Deputy Chief of Soviet intelligence's North American operations section. mirnov was Karaganda, screening Japanese prisoners of war for state security agent material. 0 to at least

intelligence American Department.


A_ Possible Antidote: Central Committee Men Abroad

In recent years an increasing number ofof tho Central Committee International Department have been assignedegular tour in key Soviet missions abroad, with high diplomatic rank. One important reason for this trend is undoubtedly the apparatus' desire to strengthen its hold over all aspects of Soviet life. The placing of Party apparatus representatives in Soviet missions abroad, tasked among other things with reporting on foreign affairs independently and directly to the Central Committee, isurther extension of direct Party activity and influence in the foreign affairs field. In addition, however, the creation of this special network of representatives in the field implies Central Committee recognition of the hazards for its best foreign affairs interests that may be created by reporting bias in other subordinate institutions such as the KGB. Certainly one of the techniques the Soviets have traditionally employed to counteract possible reporting biasedundancy of reporting channels.*

*The description of therepresentation inSoviet mission abroad!

detail on this extension

duties and tives abroad.

mure generanzea view ofprerogatives of Central Committee represcnta-

Cadre Interchange

Another potentially important, if indirect, factor in KGU policy influence is the presence of former career state security officers in key Party jobs. While new work does alter perspective, at least part of the outlook and personal ties of an earlier profession can often be expected to remain. elective review of KGB officers transferring to significant Party and Government posts suggests that both in numbers, and in the level of influence the jobs carry, KGB movement into the Party and government is less significant than have been Party transfers into senior KGB ranks. Some KGB cadre movement into the Party is nevertheless demonstrable.

Aliyev: In recent years, the most important caseareer KGB officerirst-level Party job occurred outside of Moscow. This involved the Party First Secretaryship in Azerbaydzhanp which9 purge of an apparent Shelepin supporter went to the then Azerbaydzhan KGBA. Aliyev. Aliyev was a prominent Brezhnev supporter, and this political connection, rather than any KGB influence, was clearly responsible for his elevation. KGB service constitutes Aliyev's entire professional background, however, and can be expected to have had some influence on his approach to his new responsibilities.*

Bannikov: In those portions of the Party-povern-mentpparatus concerned with Soviet domestic affairs, the most prominent exampleormer high

*Sec also discussion of theyev change on


KGB official now in politically important.areer state Security officer who servedGH Deputy Chairman from2 until his transfer in the fall of7 to the USSR Supreme Court, where he lias since been a Deputy Chairman,

Brezhnev presumably had Strong personal reasons to wish Bannikov removed from, since ho has been

reportedto have been one of

Shelepin's most loyal KGBnd since his removal wouldacancy torezhnev client could be (and was) appointed. The leadership is also likely to have deemed it useful to have an experienced KGB professional In the higher judiciary ranks, particularly Since the KGB from5 on had been reacquiring through government decrees some of the investigative and other formal legal functions it had lost during Khrushchev's de-Sta1inlzation. This factor may have providedseful rationalization for Bannikov's removal from tho KGB.

Sitnlkov: One example olGB officer who went on toarly foreign affairs position with policy Influence is Vasiliy RomanovichGB Officer of rather broad first Chief Directorate experience, Sitnlkov was reported

ine pi1 iui

>rmatton Sector of the Central Committee's International Department."

experience, Sitnlkov was reported! T o have served5 uniJ8 as the Chief of the Infoi


earlywrri-vier a* deputy Chief of the state Security Residency in Berlin,ervice in the Same capacity in the Vienna Residency, with responsibility there for supervising Anglo-American

(footnote continued on page lis)


Little is known of this sector's function, but it lo include preparation of analysis of for foreign Communist Parties, and theof propaganda with other Communist Parties,intelligence analysis for the International Twice 5 Sitnikov, using theemi-official channel to convey intended to reach the highest levels of the The first occasion concerned Vietnam,na.

Ui llimov returned toU to become an advisor

(capacity unknown) to Andropov.Q

In addition to any general problem of policy perspective that might result from the transferGB officer to an important Party Central Committee position. Sltnikov's career also ore specific source of possible difficulty. This involves the different outlooks required for positive intelligence analysis and for disinformation activities. (Disinformation, or mis-

(footnote continued from)

operations. After service in an unknown capacity at KGB Headquarters, Sitnikov was posted to Bonn in9 under Counselor of Embassy cover, ank Suggesting he was the Bonn Resident or Deputy). press exposureGB officer apparentlyort his Bonn tour, and he returned to KGB Headquarters in July After serving in thc earlys Chief of the NATO Section of the First Chief Directorate's "Disinformation" Department. Sitnikov had become a Deputy Chief of the KGB First Chief Directorate's Service Number One (foreign intelligence reports and analysis).


information, is the KGB's term Tor operations of various sorts designed to confuse, mislead, deceive and thereby undermine foreign governments and intelligence services, and also on occasion foreign public opinion.) No information is available on how successfully Sitnikov made the mental transition from distortion to objectivity* but his Case may be symptomatic of some overalloess in the Soviet Intelllgence context between misinformation and information, as well as between operations and intelligence reporting and analysis, and between execution of Party policy and formation of that policy.

Rumyantsev: Another important policy officialrobaDie intelllgence background is Vadim

Petrovich Rumyantsev, whom]

strongly suggests was an lrregtugwuvif tour in SyriaJ"" Rumyantsev has served inCentral Committee apparatus on Middlesince atnd as chief of thet iona1 Department's Middle Eastern afs Sector sleastr just prior to the June War. on Soviel policy in an area in whichhave a large political and economic stakebeen particularly significant dur ingas sector chief. Regarding his Specific li Is known only that Rumyantsev hasroup of anti-

ZTonTsts in the UPHU apparatus, who arc dedicated to the discreex. removal of Jews and Jewish influence from the Party]


Vladlmlrov: The previously mentioned Central rrommittoe representatives serving tours abroad are normally Party careerists. There is at least one current case, however, of oneecent KGB past. Viktor Mikhaylovich vladimirov. Counselor of the Soviet Embassy and Central Committee representative in Helsinki sinceareer KGB officer and was known to have retained this status as late asQ Available information on Central Committee representatives abroad does make clear that once in that status they report and are responsible to the Central Committee, however,

Policv Level Protection of KGB Interests

There is considerable evidence that the KGB con Eiders it extremely important to be able to guarantee its officers abroad, and in some cases very important foreign agents, that if they are caught and imprisoned by a foreign government the KGB will sooner or later, in one way or another, get them back.-* The probable

**The problem does not arise in the case of KGB officers caught in flagrant espionage who have cover positions involving diplomatic immunity. They are merely declared persona non grata,asic reason diplomatic cover is prized. The problem can arise for KGB officersT.rt I'. , nn^-r'v< cover of official Soviel government organizations) Residencies abroad who do not

(footnote continued on page IIS)


condition attached to this promise Ir that the captured officer maintain relative silence to his captors during interrogations, trials and imprisonment. It has sometimes taken years, and the ultimately successful methods have varied, but the KGB ha*emarkably good record at retrieving captured officers.*

The politically important point, however, is the level of the Soviet Party and government leverage, both personal and policy, that has at times been brought to bear on foreign governments to release KGB officers.

(footnote continued from page)

have diplomatic immunity; these include most Soviet commercial representatives, at* well as news correspondents and support officers assigned to diplomatic missions in service capacities chauffeurs). Any KGB Illegal officer, GB officer using the documentation, background and complete identityitizen of some-country other than the USSR), arrested abroad also, of courwc, faces imprisonment.

most usual technique has been an exchange of prisoners, sometimes direct KGB Illegal Resident in the US Colonel Rudolf Ivanovtch Abel ilot Francis Gary Powers, or the April 4 exchange or KGB Illegal Resident in Britain Konon Trofimovlch Molody, alias Gordon Lonsdale, for British businessman and intelligence support agent Groville Wynne), and some-tines indirecturiyGB Illegal held by tho Government of South Africa, ollection of West Gorman citizens omplicated three-government swap necessitated in part by the lack of Soviet-South African diplomatic


Two cases, one involving the British, one the Americans, illustrate that retrieval of captured KGB officers is

Politburo policy, and one, moreover, for which even top leaders are willing to go to considerable lengths.

The pawn in the British case was lecturer Gerald Brooke, arrested in the USSR in April tried, and sentenced to five years' imprisonment for the allegedof "ami-Soviet literature" within Lhe Soviet Union. The KGB officers whom the Soviets wished to retrieve were John Peter and Helen Kroger. KGB Illegals supporting the Portland Naval Base spy ring; they were arrested with the rest of the ring inonvicted, and sentenced toears in prison. The British government several times turned down the Soviet proposal that Brooke be swapped for the Krogers, on the grounds that the offenses involved were incomparable both in intent and gravity. Meanwhile, reports accumulated of various forms of ill treatment of Brooke in prison, each of which escalated outraged public opinion in Britain and the resultant pressures on the Government. The Soviets continued to hint through various channels that their handling of the Brooke case was dependent on exchange of the Krogers. equest by British Foreign Minister George Brown to Gromyko at the7 United Nations General Assembly session that he again look into the Brooke case, Gromyko told the British Ambassador in Moscow in October that it was "part of a biggernd he "had exhausted himself on the matter."n In8 Prime Minister Wilson, during his stattr visit to the USSR, raised the Brooke ease with Podgornyy, who replied that Brooke had

been legally convicted and the Soviols wished to do nothing to implyn tho end the British Oovernment succumbed to a rmtncoviet threat to retry Brooke on "now ovidonce" involving more serious espionage charges, and in9 exchanged tho KroKers ior Brooke. Reportlng to the House of Commons, Foreign Minister Michael Stewart cited three reasons for the exchange: that there were humanitarian considerations involved, that tho Krogers had by thenubstantial porLLon of their sentence (eight yoars), and that the exchange would remove an obstacle to improvement of relations with the USSR. The last was certainly not the least of the reasons.

Thc pawns in tho Amorican case were several;

the KGB officer the Soviets wished to retrieve was Igor Aleksandrovich Ivanov, arrested while under coveroviet trade organization chauffeur in New York in3 in connection with his role in the case of Johnutenko, an American electronics engineer -hose firm was supplying tho US Air Force's Strategic Air Commandlobal electronics control system.

Butenko was subsequently convicted of espionage related charges. Ivanov also was convicted and sentenced toears in prison, but was released on bail to the ens tody of the Soviet Mission in Now York. He remained at the Mission's Long island estate lor years while his case was appealed. Various American citizens arrested in the USSR were, at one time or another.

offered in exchange for Ivanov.* At least twice the Soviets Htfltod officially that the Ivanov caseajor obstacle to improved Soviet-American relations, ineputy Minister of Foreign Affairs summoned US Ambassador to Moscow Lwellylan Thompson specifically to tell him that the case was an "additional element compiicating Sovlet-American rela tions t which anyway leave much to be dealred.'j n7

Soviet Ambassador to the USDobrynin. stressing

he spokeold Undersecretary of State Foy Kohler that the case had an importance for Soviet-American relations far beyond its intrinsic importance, and whatever the "special services" might think of it, he was Hure lvanov's detention negatively influenced decisions in fields of real importance to the Soviet-American In1 lvanov's

*Thfl first was Yale University Professor and Soviet affairs expert Frederick ttarghoorn, arrested in tho USSR in November Tn December4 the Soviets offered up an American citizen, Peter Landorman, entence in the USSR for vehicular manslaughter. No erson than Podgornyy implied to Ambassador Foy Kohler In6 at the Utter's farewell call that two American students. wort ham and Gilmore, then being held in the USSR for stealing the statue of a bear and alleged currency speculation, could be exchanged for Ivanov, In November7 the Last Germans entered the affair, and offered to release an American named Keinauer arrested in East Germany and accused of espionage. There were various other threats and blandishments.

bail was extended to permit him to visit his ailing parents in the USSR on Condition tliat the Soviets guarantee his return to US legal jurisdiction when next required to do So.

Is the KGB Ever Out of Step with Politburo Policy?

A central aspect of tho question of KGB influence on Soviet policy formation concerns instances in which KGB activities have appeared to be, or in fact were, at cross purposes with Party Politburo policy. Hard evidence in this area is sparse. Analysis is additionall considerably hampered by the fact that the KGB isassigned tasks by the Party which appear toofficial Soviet policy but which in fact reflect obverse facets Of official policy with which themay not wish to be associated publicly or officially

The circumstances under which the KGB is most likely to act at cross purposes with Politburo policy in fact, rather than simply in appearance, involve periods of high instability In the ongoing leadership power struggle. Ono such period, of course, was the latter months of the Khrushchev era, when much of his power had been eroded and there was growing opposition among his colleagues to both his continued personal primacy and many of his policies.

A mustard gas attack on West German counteraudio technician Horst Schwirkmann duringourist visitonastery outside Moscow wasGB operation motivated mainlyesire Of Khrushchev's Party opponents to undermine his rapprochement policy toward the Federal Republic of Germany. Khrushchev's son-in-law Adzhuhey hadell-publicized goodwill tour to the Federal Republic in July, and Khrushchev himself was Scheduled to travel lo Bonn to meet withdwig Erhard early It is unlikely that the KGB acted on its own in disrupting the detente atmosphere with an action as


provocative as the operation against Schwirkmann. It is far more likely that the KGB acted at the behest of Khrushchev's now coalescing Politburo opposition, in which Brezhnev and Shelepin, the two members of the Secretariat charged with KGB supervision, were of course key figures. (Khrushchev was overthrown a littleonth later).

Khrushchev returned to Moscow only the night before the Schwlrkmann incident, following a nine-day visit to Czechoslovakia.


reported vich

puzzled by the affair

andniy conclude someone was trying toKhrushchev's GermanAn about-face in Soviet public statements onident lent credence to this view. Oneptember Tass reported that the Sov iet Government had handed the Westritten denial that the attack on Schwirkmann hadecond official Soviet note, however, delivered to the West Germans onctober, expressed "regret" that any incident had occurred which threatened to harm Soviet-German relations. Ambassador Smimov added orally that two West Germans held in the USSR on espionage charges would be released before Khrushchev's tripoodwill gesture. The course of the Soviet reaction


strongly suggests the incident had occurred without Khrushchev's knowledge or approval, and that he had even had difficulty afterward in arranging an official acknowledgment and apology,*

Cases of Unexpected Policy Consequences

A more common phenomenon in KGB activities which appear to work at cross purposes with leadership policy involves, however, not lack of KGB prior coordination with the appropriate level of Party authority, but rather both KGB and Party miscalculation of the likely level of policy consequences.

There have been a number of such cases of Party and KGB failure to anticipate thc level of foreign response to KGB operations, but by rar the most notable one to date resulted in the1 expulsionoviet officials from the United Kingdom for espionage. The British pointedly and publicly noted at thc time that the insultingly flagrant level of Soviet intelligence activities in the UK was inconsistent with

*A rash of incidents, most notably theeptember search of two American and one British Military Attacheshabarovsk hotel room, appeared to demonstrate stepped-up KGB harassment of Western officials in the USSR in the summer and early fall Thiscampaign could be interpreted to suggest that the Schwirkmann case was but the most notorious exampleattern of KGB activity inspiredesire of Khrushchev's Politburo opponents to curtail his bridge-building to Western Europe and North America. There is, however, no proof that such an explanation is correct.

Soviet policy professions of desire for European detente, and specifically for the European Security Conference sought by the USSR. Tho revelationsofector from the London KGH Residency were the immediate catalyst; other evidence of especially blatant Soviet behavior had been accumulating for several years and two official policy-level protests had gone unanswered.

The KCD itself bears responsibility for any details of crass operational behavior that may havo contributed to British outrage, as well aa for falling to prevent the defection. But the Party, not thc KGB, authorized auch basic matters as the percentage of Intelligence officers to be assigned to the Soviet mission to the UK, the general guidelines for their operational missions, and the decision to ignore thc two British protests. Tt is not surprising thai neither the Party nor the KGB anticipated anything approaching the magnitude and seriousness of the British action. Reactions of Western governments over the years* to the discovery of oven serious Soviet espionage efforts against them have been generally isolated and and often also considerately discreet. Damage and embarrassment to the Soviets has seldom been grave. The Parly had thus come to count on the KGB being ahle toelatively high level of worldwide espionage activity within acceptable limits of political risk, and the Party apparatus had authorized KGB activity accordingly.

Such cases of embarrassing but properly coordinated KGB activity can thus be ruled out as examples of KGB actions in violation of Politburo policy, luaving the Schwirkmann and Shelepin-boom cases of4 and5 as the only two examples of such, actions identified with reasonable confidence. If similar examples wore to be found during periods of relative stability in the leadership, this wouldore significant sign of

the existence of KGB power independent of Party control than such activities during periods of great leadership instability and Conflicting Signals to the KGB from their Party overseers. The overall picture does not suggest that the KGB has such independent power. Thus, in contrast to the period immediately before Khrushchev's ouster (the Schwirkmann case) and immediately after (the Shelepinhe periodaselatively stable one in the Soviet leadership. Brezhnev and his supporters have continued to consolidate their power, apparently including establishing effective control over the top levels of the KGB. There is no available hard evidence during this recent period of KGB activities contradicting Politburo policy.- This appareni harmony even includes two areas abroad in which the KGB has displayed probable reporting bias, Czechoslovakia during8 crisis, and the Middle East,

possible exception concerns the9 leak of an official transcript of the KGB's interrogationoviet While this may possibly Indicate the existence of some dissident sympathy in the KGB, the evidence is not conclusive and in any case, would al most suggest isolated KGB officer disaffection instead of institutional flouting of Party policy.

* *


8 KG

that the KGB engaged In ruthless but standard operations designed lo maintain, and later restore, effective Soviet control over Czech Party policy and its extension into other parts of the power structure,

(footnote continued On page)


The Dissidents, the Leadership and the KGB

Nowhere is the KGB's relationship to policy formationdifficult toas in relation to the Soviet dissident movement, because in few areas of present Soviet political life are the anomalies greater. The overall trend5 has been definitely in the direction of less intellectual and artistic freedom in the USSR than was generally the case under Khrushchev. Nevertheless. Inconsistencies in officlal treatment continue to crop upr

inuod from)

In the Middle East, Soviet military Intelligence (the GRU) is known, however, to have gotten out of step with Party policy on occasion. In9 two GRU officers in Lebanon attempted toebanese Air Force pilot to steal forirage III-E ebanese Communist Party delegation's visit to th* USSR the following October Lebanese Party leaders told CPSU Secretary and InternationalChief Ponomarov that while they understood the need for intelligence work, episodes like the Mirage affair had unfavorable effects on the Party. Ponomarev repliedserious error" had been made in the Mirage incident, an inquiry Into the affair1 ing 3 , andrr^ uoi; Id be noon(

Tho Politburo makes overall policy on handling intellectual disaffection and also decides key cases,-The KGB has probably the heaviest responsibility for executing this policy. Quite apart from any inconsistencies there may be in KGB execution, there are enough different, changing, and contradictory forces at work within the leadership and among the dissidents to account for the resulting maze of anomalies.

Among these forces are:

(1) The recognition by many Party leaders of Lhe

importance of the talents of the intelligentsia* in making Soviet society function effectively,eluctance Lo risk their total suppression or alienation;

A minority view in the Party hierarchy {more prevalent at the second and third levels than at the very top), that the Party must renew its own ideas to survive as the ruling elite;

A contrasting majority Party apparatus view that Party orthodoxy and control

must be maintained even at heavy repressive costs;

reported, for example, that of the sinyav^kiy-Daniei case (arrest, conduct verdict and sentence) asdecided at the Party Politburo level.

of course applies much more to the Lechiitcal than to the artistic inLelligentsia.

Some degree of reluctanco, nevertheless, throughout the spectrum of opinion, toeturn to the worst excesses of Stalinism;

A related desire that the post-Stalin Party appear respectable, and hence an emphasis on legality of form if not always also of substance;

((i) The apparent willingness of someParty loaders to use the dissidents' causes where possible to embarrass their political opponents, with minimal commitment to dissident positions;

of the dissident problemthe ingenuity of the Partythe uncompromising moral stature of

a Solzhenitsyn or, in another sense, the sheer size of some minority populations agitating to emigrate);

Leadership sensitivities to foreign public opinion on some issues, especially when foreign policy interests dictate

Great variations among the dissidents regarding their willingness to compromise with authority for limited artistic, or political gains; and

The belief in many official quarters that

a combination of repressive and permissive tactics furnish a lightning rod to what might become more serious protest, and allow the Party and KGB to monitor movements thai, driven underground, might become more elusive and dangerous to authority.


There are many examples of the variedthese conflicting forces.

I ' eported on tho Politburo's

detailed Involvement in the Sinyavskly-Daniel case also reported that the leadership was divided on the advisabil ityrial.* The9 USSR State Prizes for art and literatureew controversial names as well as many orthodox figures. The abrupt downgrading and trailing off of the0 trial of Leningrad Jews for attempted hijacking, and the subsequent steep Increase in officially sanctioned Jewish emigration probably involved leadership dlIferences as Ihu ons of ilom-stii problem

reported in uariynar rne pnywiciKT

and foreign opinion.

1 reported fir

anu uuispuRen advocate of Individual rights, Andrey Sakha is protected from direct punishment by the fact that thousands of his scientific colleagues have let il he known they would respond by simply ceasing todverse Western reaction to0 confinement of geneticist Zhores MedvedevGB mental hospital probably played an important role in his early release.**

IILl.l I

ipecuicaiiy that Shelepin had been th proponentrial, with Kosygin, Suslov, Secretary Ponomarev (the last citing the effect on foreign Parties) and originally Brezhnev opposed. Brezhnev was later won over to approval of the trial. Whether or not this tally of individual opinions is correct, the suggestion that differences existed probably is well founded.

Embassy, uly0

Medvedev's brother Roy was finally granted a

requested interviewGB officer after Chores'


Against this background of cross-currents in the leadership on the dissident question, KGB tactics to cope with the dissident problem have included the standardlx of harassaents, arrests, provocations, KGB agents' posing as dissidents or sympathizers, residence searches, confiscations, telephone taps and audio surveillance, misinformation, etc. Additional tactics have been especially tailored to the complicated and politically volatile nature of the problem. Some intellectuals have been rewarded with limited freedoms for submitting Kraccfully to regular reporting and generalized guidance. This practice predates the Brezhnev-Andropov era, and

Sed ^y tllc PartvoU as by the KGB.

Jreported having been told byexample,

nirT rn ia ie iwa or'vaiiy ruriy jecretarymade "controller" for the poet Yevgeniymeant Yevtushenko wan required to seefor a discussion ol his activities.


said he learnedtha(

t Andrey VoznosoiWiy nan asler" a KGB General who was an assistant to the Second Chief Directorate Chief.rj

Confinement to KGB-admlnlstered mental hospitals of dissidents against whoa legal charges cannot easily' be brought increased sharply beginning

(footnote continued from)

release, and reported seeing the officer's desk covered with Russian translations of critical articles on the case from western media.

reasonably accurate, although conservative,1 estimate listednown cases of such confinement.

(footnote continued on)


Mounting worldwide protest against this practice, however, caused the Soviets to become publicly defensive about it in"

Another kind of official sensitivity to bad publicity occurred in connection withh Party Congress in Tho dissident Vladimir BukovSkiyestern newsman in Moscow lhat he had been approached by the KGB about discussing withossibleof dissident activity until after the Congress, presumably to free the Party leaders of potentialfrom this quartereriod in which they desired public harmony to enhance the Party image.**

(footnote continued from)

together with probably several times that number as compared to two known cases


arch1 | [ Bukovskiy reportedly said the intermediary indicated Andropov desired primarily tooratorium on dissidents' contacts with foreign newsmen until after tho Congress. At the timo, Bukovskiy went on, the dissidents were still seriously considering the idea but hadet of countor-conditions should be presented Andropov if the meeting took place. (There is no indication that it did. Bukovskiy himself was arrested just before the Congress.)


told aThat

tecum months the huh has been ottering early release from prison and even the hope of emigration to imprisoned dissidents who will refrain from so-called "anti state activities" on their release. (Amembassy9| |

Recent events in the Bukovskiy case have provided one of tne more graphic illustrations of the KGB's tactical mix of Shifting methods in response to internal and external political pressures. In September1 an American correspondent who had twice met Bukovskiy was interviewedaptain of the Moscow KGB's component (under conditions strictly in accordance with provisions of the Soviet-American consularfter giving hisnon-damaging testimony, the inquired after the status of the case, and the KGU captain readily replied that they had not yet discovered anything against Bukovskiy, adding "it depends on witnesses.These exquisite legalities at tho more visible level notwithstanding, Bukovskiy himself had meanwhile been transferred to the Serbskiy Institute of psychiatry near Moscow, and became another prominent symbol of Soviet abuse of psychiatric medicine, public protest of his prolonged investigative detention by family, friends, other dissidents, and foreigners was followed in November1 by BukOvSkiy's return to prison preparatory to trial on charees of anti-Soviet activity.

A leadership decision was apparently taken to make an example of Bukovskiy's continuing uncompromising attitude toward authority, foranuary2 he received the first public trial Moscowissident since the show-trials of the. The long KGB search for appropriate witnesses alluded to in the September1 interview with the American correspondent seems to have been successful. Bukovskiy was charged with anti-Soviet foreign contacts and other activity aimed at undermining and weakening Soviet power under Articlef thc RSFSR Criminal Code. Convicted, he was

tate Telegram eptember

sentenced to the maximum seven years prison and labor camp Internment and five years of exile, likely in his case, In view of his very poor health, to amounteath sentence. The Soviet press used the occasion for renewed warnings of the need for vigilance In foreign contacts, and official circles simply ignored domestic and foreign protests.

Shifting Party policy and tactics aside, however, there are at least two instances involving dissidents in which KGB activity appears to have been an lo Party policy. The instances have very different implications* One was the appearance in the9 issue of Khronika theprominent of the samizdat umconsorcd underground press) puhlicationsf of wnat appeared to be the actual transcript of the9 KGB interrogationoviet engineer In Tallin with the evident purpose of or declaring him insane. Detailed reports of the KGB interrogations are not unromon in samlr.dat literature, but tho leakage of an actual vcroaiimclearly damaging to the KGB's image would suggest the possibility of some dissident sympathy in the KGH itMclf.

The other instance is an example in the dissident field of a routine KGB operation, undoubtedly Party-approved in general terms, being suddenly escalatedigh policy level by unexpected complications. riend of Solzhenitsyn surprised the KGB on1 in the act of a large scale search of the author's home. The search party reacted in standard low level KGB style, beat him severely, and threatened him with the loss of his job or Imprisonment if he talked. The friend ignored the throat, and Solzhenitsyntrongly worded letter to Andropov and Kosygin* (the KGB's nominal supervisor), demanding a public explanation of the attack and punishment of the assailants for their illegal activities. Less eek after the letter

was written, it surfaced In Western newspapers. ShortlyGB colonel conveyed to Solzhenitsyn an unprecedented official backtng-off in the form of an "explanation" that the attack had all been aon the part of local police, (not security personnel), who had boon staking out the premises for a reported burglar and mistook Solzhenitsyn's friend for the auspect. Several raiscn tculat tons apparently snowballed in this episode in what is clearly an ongoing campaign to harass Solzhenitsyn whileay effectively to neutralize hin. One involved the search party's unimaginative reactionudden turn of events. Another was the level and skill olesponse. hird was the speed with which the letter of protest surfaced In the West, facing the Soviets with n further escalation of the damages while Ihey probably were still debating an appropriate response to the original embarrassment. The result was the transparent but face-saving gesture of the KGB's "explanation." The episode illustrates how delicately balanced is the ongoing Party-KGB-dlssidcnlituation which will probably continue to give rise to occasional serious official embarrassments.




The current relationship between the Party hierarchy and the KGB reflects what appears to be the general balance of power in the Soviet leadership. Brezhnev's dominance has increased in the last few years in the KGB7 as elsewherebut it is not total, First Deputy KGB Chairman Tsvigun and Deputy Chairmen Chebrlkov and Tsinev arc but the most prominent examples of new key KGB officials with patronage ties to the General Secretary. There remain, however, KGB components, albeit of somewhat less importance to Brezhnev's power position, in which his influence has been felt slowly or not at all. The First Chief Directorate and the Republic Chairmenships are examples. Brezhnev's strength in the KGB illustrates the preeminence which the General Secretary's colleagues in the Party leadership acknowledge as clearly his. Bat it is also reflective of limitsartership independents, Brezhnev's opponents, and even many of his current allies, have apparently joined in imposing on Breehnev's effort to pack the organs of power with his protege's.

Possible Limits to the Brezhnev-Andropov Alliance

The present KGU Chairman is himself an exampleunior party leadership colleague of Brezhnev's whose continuing political support of the General Secretary is probable for the near term, but is also subject to lessening or even withdrawal in altered

SIT Jo"1

political circumstances, There is no present evidence that Andropov is other than loyal to the General Secretary, and Brezhnev has certainly appeared to have confidence in Andropov and to include him among his close circle of advisors, Nonetheless, pragmatic and transient alliances are characteristic of the Kremlin world. Furthermore, there are specific factors in the Brezhnev-Andropov relationship suggesting some potential limitations.

Andropov's ties to Brezhnev do not. as we have seen, go back very far, The only promotion Andropov owes to the General Secretary is his last one, and even this is highly likely owed also to other Politburo members, among whom Andropov seems to have hroad general support. The KGB .job does carry with it considerable power. It also brought Andropov an alternate membership in the Politburo. On thc other hand, the KGB Chairmanship is an exposed job, carrying with it great potential lor politically dangerous embarrassment and for making political enemies. Andropov might have had a less risky career had he remained in the Secretariat and earned growing iniluenco and an eventual Politburo seat in foreign affairs and Party ideology, perhaps in due coursesome of Suslov's functions when Suslov died or retired. Whether Andropov welcomed the KGB responsibility is not known. What does seem clear is that although Brezhnev is his current boss, and Brezhnev could seek to relieve Andropov of the KGB post if displeased *ith him or unsure of his support, nevertheless Andropov's long-range political position is probably not totally dependent on the favor of the General Secretary, Andropov is probably more an ally,unior one.lienL oi" Brezhnev's, and that alliance is dependent on Brezhnev's continuing supremacy.

The two men Seem to approach their work ays , Brezhnev appears to be highly skilled in protracted and often posiT.on de m;i, rivals' pcraonn*


support. On substantive policy matters, at least until recently. Brezhnev was often cautious, even at times indecisive to the point of seeming insecure. His positions appeared frequently to be dictated more by his colleagues* consensus or stalemates than by his own strong convictions. Since further consolidating his political power0 however, Brezhnev has taken firm substantive policy positions more authoritatively and personally lhan earlier, and he has preempted much of the platform of others in the leadership. Brezhnev apparentlyhrewd political intelligence, as many seem to have underestimated to their cost, but imagination andexpertise do not appear to be his strongest suits. His forte is the process rather than the content of politics. Andropov, on the other hand, seems significant^ Ly less political in the sense of ambition for personal power. He Seems more substantively oriented than Brezhnev, and may well be more interested in having influence on the content of decisions, and on efficiency and effectiveness in carrying out given programs, than in the power struggle ocr se. Even in greatly changed power circumstances, Andropov would seem more likely to support another General Secretary candidate than build toward the top post himself. He may well be extremely ambitious for the kind ol power that comes with behind the scenes influence and responsibility, but there is no available evidence that he is ambitious lOr the power of the General Secretaryship. His degree of career specialization in foreign affairs has also kept htm out of the line of progression through the domestic Party apparatus, including especially cadres respons ibi 1ithat has traditionally led Lo the top Party post.

In any case, the possibility that: nI might ha ve limits is mo- c kely to surface in any serious way in connection with future eventun1 it ies re la tedippage in Brezhnev's power.

For tlie moment, that power seems relatively secure and Andropov appears content to keep his political loyalty

largely with the General Secretary, while remaining

on close working and personal termsroad speclrum

of others in the leadership.

There are also at least two presently identifiable specific factors, however, which could affect the future of thc Brezhnev-Andropov relationship. One involves the1 embarrassment over the expulsionoviel officials from the UK and the simultaneous British public linkage of Soviet intelligence activities to Soviet foreign policy aims. it has already been noted that the responsibility basically belonged to the Party leadership which had authorized the level and general nature of intelligence activity in Britain as elsewhere. Moreover, the level of British reaction was so with universal Soviet postwar experience that the Party's or the KGB's failure- to anticipate it is scarcely surprising. Nevertheless the damages, including risk to an important European detente tactic and to Soviet prestige, were grave enough that the matter could be made an issue in leadership infighting.*

"^Quite apart from the embarrassment of worldwide exposure of such massive and crass espionage, the Soviets suffered the humiliation of having the British block in advance all channels to effective Sovietby threatening to escalate their own reprisals still further as necessary. On the purely operational level, of course, KG8 losses were also very serious. Operations againsl all English-speaking targets were at least indirectly affected as well as the major direct losses incurred in UK operations.

Should (Ins happen, scapegoats could be sought with little regard to real responsibility. Andropov could conceivably bo among the camiltles, though all available evidence on his power position suggests this unlikely. Demotion of Andropov, however, vould signaleneral and cumulative loss of political confidence in him on the part of Brezhnev and his close supporters, orad coalition of leadership independents and Brezhnev opponents. The British embarrassment would be but the visible excuse for an action taken from broader political power motives. Any such action would also suggest some generalized Shift in the present leadership balance of power, of which Andropov's standing would be,

The other fcic tor wh ich makes fu ture project ions of the elose Brezhnev-Andropov re la tionship hazardous withoutdetailedp on itBreehnev's ownon. The very extent of Brezhnev'sower consol-ida tion. which has been manifested in his increased conf id-ence and prominence since h Congress, now thrusts the General Sec re ta ry intond of potentskyuathrushchev's experience ^ugges ts that the further the Partv

Leader is out in front of the collective leadership, the greater the likelihood that varying objections generated among the several and shifting groupings of Brezhnev's leadership colleagues might cause them to find common ground, either to curtail his independence or, in extreme circumstances, to challenge himnituation the attitude of any KGB Chairman would, of course, be crucial. hairman with Andropov's breadth of leadership relationships might be attractedsooner rather thanoalition of Brezhnev opponents olitburo majority,

Bre'ehuCv's Independent KGB Checks

Brezhnev has carefully taken out several additional insurance policies on Andropov's loyalty and support in the form of KGB Deputy Chairmen with independent patronage ties to the General Secretary.

The most senior is First Deputy Tsvigun, who has tics to Brezhnevort different from Andropov's, and whose views appear to be far morestically "conservative." The phenomenon of the CPSU's most senior Secretaryeputy with strong and independent ties to himouble check under an important official

*Brezhnev could of course remain sensitive to signs of incipient significant leadership opposition and take measures to head it off. He has to datekillful sense of permissible power and policy limits. The point here is that as individual power increases this balance becomes harder to sustain.

who is also his own appointeeine-honored Soviet practice. It has at least one KGB precedent in the Khrushchev

Furthermore. Brezhnev seers to have at least two additional independent KGB supporters in Deputy Chairmen Chebrlkov and Tsinev. Each seens to have ties to

Brezhnev separate from the other's, and also separate

from Andropov's and from Tsvigun's. The net result seems to be that Brezhnev has at least four direct.

important, and mutually distinct channels ol influence

into the KGB.

A ftor Brezhnev

The most likely short term successor to Brezhnev would seen to be Kiri Irnko, Ills general deputy and closest ally. Andropov's close relationship with Kirilenko suggests Kirilenko could count on the support of Andropov and the KGB if the succession occurredairly orderly fashion. Kirilenko might possibly also be able to count on Andropov's support if, as seems less likely. Kirilenko's succession to the General Secretaryship were precededreak with Brezhnev.

Khrusncnev nauLunev to be the KGB'seriod, partly as a

reported thatFedorovich

Deputy Chairman in the check on Chairman Serov

Kirilcnko apart, Andropov's or the KCU'h possible support of longer term potential Parly chiefs is much less predictable. Shelepin's age, abilities, ambition, and past opportunities to garner broad Party support make himossible Longer tern candidate to become Party head. Shelepin might well distrust Andropov after the events of but their eventual roalliance is by no means inconceivable. Furthermore, Shelepin appears to retain at least some measure of quiescent political support in the KGB itself. Its extent and significance is unfortunately not ocasureablo. since neither the Identities of many key middle management KGB officials (Directorate deputies and Department heads for example), nor their political ties are known.

Too little is known of Andropov's relationships with other possible eventual contendersthe now senior Secretary Kulukov, for exampleto judge how Andropov or the KGB might line up in connectiononger range power bid involving any of them. Moat significant of all, the field of possible contenders will change as new faces are brought into the Party Secretariat and Politburo in the next few years. Any Party Secretary who shares some supervisory responsibility, under the Party head's direction, for the administrative organs obviously would have an inside track in lining up potential KGB support for his political ambitions.

Finally, It should be borne in mind that the KGB's present role in Soviet politicsa marked but fairly responsible one is in important measure the product of personal factors: at the moment, Andropov the man. and his relaIlonships with Brezhnev and other lenders. The mix of future KGH Chairmen and CPSU General Secretaries may well significantly change the KGB's stylo and influencea reminder that the personal equation persists even within the eollerlive of Soviet bureaucracy.




Born une4 in the Nagulskaya railroad settlement of Stavropol Kray in the north Caucasus area. Andropov joined tho Komsomol in Aftertwo years as a telegraphist and apprentice film mechanic he attended the Rybinsk Technical School of Hater Transportation in Yaroslavl Oblast,iles northeast of Moscow, graduatinR In For the next year or so Andropov workedomsomol organizor and official in Rybinsk.

In7 he became Third Secretary of the Yaroslavl Oblast Komsomol Committee, and8 the sane Committee's First Secretary. He joined the CPSU in Following0 formation of tho Karelo-Finnish Republic, Andropov was named First Secretary of its Komsomol Central Committee. After 1 Nazi invasion he worked until 4 as an organizer of partisan bands and an underground worker behind German Lines. The locale was presumably along tho Finnish frontier; [



urpansk" during Ihe war. He has the "Partisan of the Patriotic War, 1st Class" medal.

Alter serving4 to January7 as Second Secretary of the Petrozavodsk City Partye in the Karolo-Finnish Republic, Andropov was made Second Secretary of the Republic Central Committee. He remained in this position until not only surviving but joining in a late9 and early0 purge In the Republic. Three weeks0 Republic Central Committee Plenum. Kupryanov.

Karelian First Secretary sincendropov led the critic ism of Kupryanov's leadershipetrozavodsk City Party aktiv meeting, accusing Kupryanov ot corruption and nepotism and ofalse picture of Lhe Republic's economy at 9 Party Congress. Productionappear to haveeal reason for Lhe removal of Kupryanov and numerous other Republic officials, as subsequent press articles revealed seriousment in9 fish and timber plans, although there also appears to have been some truth to the nepotism charges. Andropov additionally accusedJ and olleagues of acquiescing in Kupryanov's behavior. The purge was occasioned by an unpublished CPSU decree, and Kupryanov's removal was possibly presided over by a representative from the Central Committee apparatus, but the Moscow purger's identity and the purge's possible connection to the power struggle of Stalin's lieutenants remain unknown. Kupryanov's early career had been in the Leningrad Party and tied to Zhdanov, but Kupryanov's survival in officeear following Zhdanov'sH death suggests the Karelian purge may not have been connected with the Leningrad purge touched off by Zhdanov's death. Andropov has no apparent career ties wiLh the Zhdanov group.

An early patron of Andropov's may have been Otto Vll'gcl'cnovich Kuusinen. an "Old Bolshevik" and founder Of the Finnish Communist Party who made the USSR Ins permanent home afterervingomintern Secretary until the Comintern's dissolution inuring the entire existence of the KareIo-Finnish Republic, , Kuusinen was the Chairman of its Council of Ministers andember of its Party Presidium and Bureau. In the latter positions he would have worked closely with Lhe Second Secretary Andropov.

Andropov was transferred tn1 to Moscow to the Central Committee apparatus, serving as an instructot and then as headepartment sector, winch Central Commit tee Department is not known; his previous provine ia1 experienceecondosition usually carrying cadres responsibilities, suggests it may have been the Cadres Department. Who in the Party Secretariat may have sponsored Andropov's transfer to Moscow is also not discernible. (Kuusinen did not olitburo member until and was dropped the next year following Stalin's death; he did not ember of the Secretariat until his return to the Politburo, known then as the presidium, inhrushchev ally in the "anti-Party" crisis.)

While in Moscow. Andropov attended the Central Committee's Higher Party School, but his osting as Minister Counselor to the Soviet Embassy in Budapest prevented Andropov's completing his higher education, In4 he took over as Ambassador in Budapest.

After Andropov returned from Hungary 7 to become Chief of the Central Committee Bloc Department, his work would have again involved some association with Kuusinen, in addition to considerable contact with Suslov. Beginning in0 Kuusinen was, within the limits imposed by his advanced age, a frequent Politburo* Secretariat spokesman in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Although he dealt primarily with international Parties on this issue, he had some Bloc Party responsibilities as well-In. for example, he led the Soviet delegation to the Hungarian Party Congress, To some extent Khrushchev appeared to use Kuusinen, more closely and consistently allied to him.ounterweight Lo Suslov's Influence in foreign party affairs,

Original document.

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic: