TOP1 n imi nTfTiii'n. usy
WO DISSEM ABROAD/C
Pakistan's war in the West--A' LackTi stre Effort?
Since the beginning ofax-ecember/ India hasakistan while holding the Pakistanis length along the western border. The
in the face of overwhelming odds and no ciance of winning. The Pakistanisca gras
Pakistani ctory in East at anus Pakistanis
io east seem to have fought about as well as icld out for as long as most obse vers expected
ith almost now have
ffsetting gains in the west
oted final defeat at Dacca,ve no slgni-
the the cast to jrformance in rvers expected strategy tohe offen-
2, Although there probably was tanis could have hoped to do in off the Indian victory, their pc est has bGen less than most obst uggests the absonco of an OveraJ scute the two-front war. Except
mill only the
sivq at Chhaaib in southern Kashmir, Bakiatan's
tary actions have been primarily [defensiveow feeble attacks atces along border with India.
theffensives ast distracting ast Pakistan.
a bargaining Pakistan or
3. Most observers had expected taniis wouldumber of vigoroJ in the west, with the intent ofhe Indians from their offensivedditionally, the Pakistanis were exj octed to try to gain some significant territoryakistan in the disputed Kashmir area for use asgainst Indian victory in East
apsrade-off againsts of East
Mandatory Renew Doc 9_
suit thea de
4. Assuming this was, in fact, jho overall Pakistani aim, then Islamabad has disrtlaved littlen attempting to achieve it. The"mainof Pakistan's largely defensive rjosturo in
est has been to facilitate the lAdian strategy
ining victory in East Pakistan wljile fighting ensivo action in the west.
5. The Pakistanis staged air strikes against Indian airfieldsecember, precipitating thendian drive into East Pakistani But the
e impact. This is especially trie because *ir raids did not catch the India is unprepared, not as massive asd seem to
Pakistanis did not follow these strik large-scale offensive and the air str litt1
had little effect on Indian mill
the were have
liber, Pakistaniby larger. Such Indianall but which cvonthe Indians territory he small uld Islamabad re in the is diminishing ue to growing -and tho Pakis-the end of |si stance. None
6. During tho daysecs roili:ary actions have been overshadow harder-hitting Indian military moves, tactic; havedeprived fcht,heir: small gain in southern Kashmir, now they may be losing. In any case, already hold sufficient West pakistaihey can use as trade-offs for Pakistani gain in southern Kashmir accept Newalleaae-westf. Pakistan's ability to wage wa at -
much faster rate thantages in such necessities as POL
n Islamabad's lcult to
t damage on
of hostilities, ility to engage
tanijo probably cannot continue beyoiv Uiin month without massive outside a: is iln prospect.
, . lun.iiqino 1
the capacity to inflict signific Indians in the west at the outsc did not. They also had the capal tie down larger numbers of rndia have.
had the but and tho
The seeming lack of fervor ecution of its war effort is dif .ain. Although outnumbered on th thojwestndian troops to tani troops and in the air by some '2 fighter aircraft, the Pakistanis aim
no Ii i mwH
NO DISSEM ABROAD/CON1
E ONLY 10
Indian drag seems char hers
8. Islamabad almost from the beginning seems ftvo been put off by the larger nunbers of an personnel and equipment it has had. to face, akistanis certainly have not ra :lied to the challenge and seem to have placeds throughout tho war thus far. Islamabad to be left with no response sho
aid Mrs. Gandhi
je that she has mot the "enemy" aid they areOriginal document.