Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Plcshakovini-plenary coating, elsinki:
Pleshakov said that, the Delegations had already agreedf the Draft Treaty on Limiting ABM Systems. This Article was of fundamental importance to that documenthole. As is known, according to the provisions of that Article, the Partiesnot to deploy ABM systemsefense of the territory of the country and not toasc forefense The Soviet Delegation proceeds from the premise thats,ully reliable guarantee against any attempts by cither side to circumvent the provisions of the Treaty being worked out, including use of theABM components contrary to its spirit and letter.
Pleshakov said that the general undertakings by the sides provided inrc complemented by the contents of other articles of the Draft' Treaty including the undertakings by the sides to deploy AHH systems within two areas only. The undertaking not to create the base for deployment of an ABM systemefense of the territory of the country is also complemented by the clearly definedmon ABM deployment areas, namely, that ABM systems would be deployed only for defense of national capitals and ICBM silos within areas, each of which would be circular andSO-kilometer radius. It was also necessary to boar in mind the specific quantitative limitations on ABM system componentshole, which* were contained in Article III. In addition, the Draft Article III also provides for constraints on the potential of the ABM radarsfor defense of ICBMs.
Pleshakov said that these constraints arc still one more guarantee that the limitations provided in the Draft ABM Treaty nro quite adequate to fully exclude the creationase for an ABM defense of the territory of tho country. It is perfectly clear that all these undertakings were very consistent withnd gave it specific meaning or content.
Pleshakov concluded that, in view of all the aforesaid, it was clear to the Soviet side that, regardless of the geographic location of ADMareas for ICBM defense, deployment of those systems within the framework of the limitations worked out in the Treaty cannot facilitate creationase for deployment of ABM systems for defense of the territory of the country. Raising the question of spelling qut the location of ABM deployment areas for defense of ICBMs seems to the Soviet Delegation to be unfounded. The Soviet Delegation was authorized to declare its objection to this US proposal.
Repartee remark! of Seviat SALT aViaeaae Plechckovonversation with US SALT advisort, Helsinki:
Pleshakov opened our informallena iy conversation by repeating most of the statements hec during the Mini-Plenary as to why there is no need to define the geographic location of the ABM deployment area for ICBM defense. He listed such constraints as the number of launchers andto be deployed, the limited number ofareas and the constraints placed on the BM radars for ICBM defense. He concluded that all of these constraints maJia ic impossible to dcoloy aABM SYS tea even if the two ABM deployment areas were to be located immediately adjacent-to each other. He placed the greatest emphasis on theto be placed on the IS ABM radars limiting them to less.
I disagreed with hin on several accounts. aide had, in my view, overemphasizedimitation on the IS ABM radars, if only because the difference in potential night be as smallatt. Pleshakov disagreed, saying that national means could not detectinute difference. The difference would besushchestvenno) and ny familiarity vlth tlio Russian language should permit me to understand what he meant by "substantial". sked if he could be more prccisc--would it be at least one order of magnitude less? Pleshakov said it might possibly be as ouch as one order ofbut more likely it would be about one half one order of magnitude less.
Pleshakov then said that another reason why there should be no cause for concern about any possibility of the two ABM deployment areas being capable of mutual support was tho factor of different types of targets being defended. In the caseA, the targets are soft targets, while ICBM silos are hardened. Therefore, the ABN components must be different in each case, lie declared that, if the two ADM deployment areas were to be of the Sentinel type, then there would indeed he a
possibility of creating the baseerritorial ADM system. The Article III constraints, however, do notenype deployment inasmuch as Live ADM componentsUM defense are greatly constrained. oted that there would, in fact, be no qualitative constraints on interceptors, consequently, his statement did not correspond to the permitted
Pleshakov replied that, given the number oflimited, the capabilities of the ADM radars were the determinant of the system capabilities. The levelnterceptors permitsefense of ICBMs against accidental or unauthorized launches, longer-range interceptors are adequate for this The US side has originated the proposal of defending ICBMs against accidental launches; the Soviet side would have preferred to defend only its capital against such attacks. The Soviet side would have discussed higher levels of iutcrceDtors which would be of the Sprint type.
Plcshakov then said he could personally assurethe two ABM deployment areas in the USSRbe in close proximity to each other. Hisfor saying so was that there were nonear Moscow. isagreed, referring toexchanges between the sides on thissaid he did not have personalSoviet ICBM deployment areas. He doubted,any of theilos near Moscow werehe doubted that there were large numbers
of them, in which event, the USSR would be unable toumber of silos equal to-those being defended by the US, by deploying the second site adjacent to tho NCA defense area.
I asked what he foresaw as tho future course of the negotiations on this question. The Soviet side had been authorized to declare its objections to spelling out the geographic location of the ABM deployment area for ICBM defense. Ambassador Smith had received new instructions to reaffirm the US position.
Plcshakov shrugged his shoulders, and repeated the Soviet position and said "Bach side has its Cod; let the Cods decide this question."
Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Grinevskiy and advisor Kishilovonversation with US SALT delegate Ifaraons and advisor Garthoff,elsinki:
Grincvskiy ihen suggested, ersonalhe possibilityrade-off under which the Soviet side would agree to an OLPAR levelillion, if the US side would drop the attempt to get an agreed definitioneavy" ICBM. Garthoff did not reject this proposal, but was very reserved coward it, and after some discussion said that he was very doubtful about it, since the American side considered it necessary to have an agreed understanding on whatheavy" ICBM, and because weillion to he the highest level for such an OLPAR ceiling. Grinevskiy pointedly asked Garthoff to pass along chit suggestion, although lie again labeled it "personal**. Garthoff asked what the Soviet side Might regard as an appropriate reciprocal step in seeking overall mutual solution of differences in exchange for Soviet agreement to the definitioneavy ICBM, Grinevskiy and Kishilov both indicated that they did not think the Soviet side could agree onefinition. Grincvskiy pressed for some kind of trade-off that Garthoff might suggest, but he declined to smuggest any. Garthoff then asked what the Soviet side would consider an appropriatemove to reach Soviet agreement.to specify their ICBM defense as cast of the Urals. Bur Grincvskiy declined to make any suggestion or consider the question except in terms of some concrete proposalrade, and Garthoff did not suggest any.
Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Trusovonversation with US SALT delegate Allison.ay Helsinki:
I said that one of the important matters we should talk about was the question of geographic location for ABM system deployment--east of the Urals, west of theuestion which has beenong line. id notthe evolution of the current Sovietong time ago it appeared clear that both sideseed Cor precluding any disposition of two ADM sites which mightossible base for anABM system, but now the Soviet side seems to think thatrovision is no longer necessary.
Trusov said the Soviet side saw no contradictions between their present position and the understanding of the earlier position toad referred. Earlier Soviets in the context of unconstrained radars. He argued that qualitative constraints which wc had agreed to place on ABM components-- radars, in particular--for ICBM defense adequately precluded the creationossible baseerritorial ABM systcn. Radars of lessotential cannot, when restricted to one ABM deployment area, providease, independent of where the deployment area is located. Under present circumstances, and with the constraints currently agreed upon, there is no for cither side of deploymenterritorial ABM system or the base for one. He also repeated the argument that the US had not chosen Crand Porksit was west of the Mississippi, and the Soviet side feels it would be unequal to ,tic one side down with a Treaty obligation geographically restricting its choice of an ABM deployment for ICBM defense.
reported reacrke of soviet salt delegate trusovini-plenary meeting, helsinki:
Trusov concluded that the Soviet Delegation was instructed to state formally that the Soviet side cannot accept the US proposals on the definition of heavy land-based ICBMs, neither as missiles with volumes in excess ofubic meters, nor as missiles whose volume exceeds, the volume of the "SS-ll" in US terminology, nor as missilesolume exceeding the volume of the largest light missile the sides have. The Soviet side proceeds from the firmthat, for the purposes of the Interim Agreement, it is quite superfluous to have any definitions of heavy land-based ICBMs. The solution which the Soviet Delegation has proposed is fully consistent with the purposes of Article II and thehole. It is precisely on this basis that the Delegations should solve this question which has remained' unresolved for tooime.
Reported remarks of Deputy Foreign Minister Semenovini-plenary meting, Helsinki:
Semenov said thai Ihe sides have agreed on the provisions of the Interim Agreement which provide an undertaking by the sides not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of the Interim Agreement. In addition, the sides agreed that this obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices. Proceeding from this basis, the Soviet side confircs that che agreed text off the Interim Agreement, which speaks about the non-use of special concealment measures which would impede verification bv national technical neons, is adequate for the purposes of the Interim Asrcenent, including as it is applied to ballistic missile submarines.
Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Trusov duringini-plenary meeting, Helsinki:
At the same time, the Soviet side, in order to meet the considerations advanced by the US side,
raft agreed statement on this Article concerning the sides' understanding that, during the process o: modernization and replacement, there would be no substantial increase in the dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers which are observable by national technical means of verification. In referring to national technicalhe Soviec Delegation did not have in mind the properties of the verification means but the dimensions observable by them.
details about such procedures, including notification, anc sucn natters could be decided in the Standing Consultative Commission. He noted that such an approach had been addressed in the case of the parallel provision in the draft ABM Treatv. Grinevskiy argued that there was very little time left, and this did not allow getting into such matters of detail that could be assigned instead to the Commission.
Reported remarks of Soviet SACT delegate Grinevskiy and advisor Kishilovonversation with US SALT advisor Carthoff, ISelsinki;
Grinevskiy noted that the Soviet sice had not considered that i: was necessary to have snyprovision on dismantling at this time, so it had alreadyreat way by including anything at all, and that in the Nitze-Shchukin conversation to which Minister Semenov had adverted there had been no discussion of notification procedures--and innothing about "number, type and location" of launchers.
Reported remarks of Soviet SAC? delegate Trusovini-ptencr; meeting, elsinki:
Trusov said chat the provisions of Articlef the Interin Agreement provide for undertakings by the sides not to convert land-based launchers for light rCBMs. or for ECMl of older types deployed
nt0 lano'l>ased launchers for heavy ICBMs. This very precise and clear undertaking by
i possible increase
m the number of heavy land-based ICBMs throuchol missiles of the other types referred to in the text Oi the Article. At the sane time, the Soviet side,order to meet the considerations advanced by the Uc side,raft agreed statement on this Article concerning the sides-understanding that,p. process of.replaccacnj^ there would be no substantial increase in the dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers which are observable by national technical means of verification. En referring to national tecnnical means of verification, the Soviet Delegation did not have in mino the properties of themeans but the diaensions observable by them.
Reported remcrks of.Soviet SALT delegate ShchukinoKvsrsciio': with US SALT delegate llitzeelsinki:
Shchukin raised the question of procedures for SLBM replacement. He proposed that the deactivation of the silo launcher to be replaced by an SLBM should begin concurrently with the commissioning of the SLBM submarine containing the replacement SLBM. He gaveationalisation for this position the argument that once the dismantling process begins, 'the silo is no longer operational.
Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Crinevskiy and SALT advisor Kishilovonversation with US SALT delegate Parsons and SALT cdvisor Carthoff,ay Helsinki:
Grinevskiy and Kishilov took che initiative in wishing to start working toward an agreed cexcrovision on che subjccc of replacement and dismantling procedures. Garthoff noted that the US side continued to believe it shouldaragraph in Article IV. Kishilov said that was understood, and chat he thought there would be no problem once the language was agreed.
Grinevskiy objected strongly to the proposed sentence on notification of launcher replacement, which he said his Delegation considered quite unnecessary and fully coveredeference in the practically 2greed final senccnce on agreeing procedures in the Standing Consultative Commission. He also argued strongly; for specifying the timing for dismantling launchers to be replaced in the time that aSLBM submarine would become operational. This latter point became the main focus for che rest of the discussion.
The main poinc which Grinevskiy and Kishilov repeatedly emphasized was that there should be no required gap in the authorized level ofaunchers and submarines operational and under construction. Under the American proposal, there would-beap between the cime of launch of replacement submarines and the time such submarines would become operational. The issue was not* resolved, and it was agreed the Four would meet again later that afternoon co work further on this problem.
Reported remark* of Soviet SAL? delegate Crinevskiy end advisor Kishilovonversation with US SAL? delegate Persons and advisor Carthoff,, Helsinki;
replacement and disiaanclinc procedures, Carthoff said that on the basis of the short discussion athis Delegation had further considered this question, and he was nowosition toew compromise formulation. He then presented.the text oformulation:
Notification of SLBM or ICBM launchers to be deactivated and replaced by new SLBM launchers shall be given by the time of the launcheplacement SLBM submarine. Dismantling or destruction of SLBM and older ICBM launchers to be replaced by new SLBM launchers shall be accomplished within six months following the launch of the replacement submarines, or the date at which the replacement submarine becomes operational, whichever is earlier. Such dismantling or destruction, and prior notification thereof, shall be accomplished under procedures to be agreed in the Standing Consultative Commission.
Grincvskiy said that the sentence on notification was certainly improved, but that his side continued to believe that it was totally unnecessary. Such questions were among those to be decided in the Standing Consultative Commission. Turning to the second sentence, he asked what was meant by the phrase "whichever isarthoff explained. Garthoff also noted that the formulation was now iu:terms of accomplishing or completing dismantling, rather than its initiation. The "initiation" of dismantling coulduite uncertain matter. The American Delegation believed that this new formulation should meet the interests of both sides.
Crinevskiy said that his Delegation would consider the proposal. He again objected to the first sentence. Garthoff said that the position he had been authorized to present was the one he had presented. However, he
thought that if the second and third sentences could be
t Bi!ht beto consider dispensing with tho first sentence. Crinevskiy expressed thanks, and said he would take up tho new formulation.
Later in the meeting, Crinevskiy was called from the roomew minutes, and returnediece of paper whichew Soviet proposal:
Dismantling or destruction of older ICBM andaunchers being replaced by new SLBM launchers will be initiated at the same time as SLBM launchers on modern nuclear replacement submarines become operational, and will be completed in the shortest possible agreed period of tine. Notification,or destruction will be accomplished under procedures to be agreed in the Standing Consultative Commission.
Apparently, this proposal was developed by other members of the Soviet Delegation without the benefit of the new US text. The Soviet proposal was changed from their last previous one mainly by the additionlause dealing with the completion of dismantling; "and will be completed in the shortest possible agreed period of time." Carthoff noted that the clause in question had boon borrowed from the ABM Treaty. However, ho noted the earlier discussion, and his remarks on the desirability of agreeing on the completion of dismantling rather than focusing on its initiation. He also noted thathad now been added to the last sentence. He said he would rcport^it, but urged that the Soviet Delegation consider the text which he had submitted. It was agreed that both Delegations would consider this whole matter further,
Reported remarks of Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov duringmini-plenary meeting, ay Heleinki
Semenov said that the sides have agreed on the provisions of the Interim Agreement which provide an undertaking by the sides not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of the Interim Agreement. In addition, the sides agreed that this obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices. Proceeding from this basis, the Soviet side confirms that the agreed text off the Interim Agreement, which speaks about the non-use of special concealment measures which would impede verification by national technical means, is adequate for the purposes of the Interim "Agreement, including as it is applied to ballistic missile submarines.
Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Trusovini-plenary meeting, a$ elsinki:
Trusov said he wanted to dwell again on the question of definition of light and heavy land-based ICBMs raised by the US side in connection with Article II of the Interim Agreement. Analysis of the considerations presented by the US side during the process of working out the agreed text of that Article demonstrates that the foundation of these considerations was *the inclusion of such undertakings by the sides as would preclude the possibility of an increase in the number of heavy land-based ICBMs as replacements for other types of land-based ICBMs covered by the Agreement.
Trusov said that tho provisions of Article II of the Interim Agreement provide for undertakings bv the sides not to convert land-based launchers for light ICBMs, or for ICBMs of older types deployed priornto land-based launchers for heavy ICBMs. This very precise and clear undertaking by
the sides, in itself,ossible increase in the number of heavy land-based ICBMsssilcs of the other types referred to in the text of the Article. At the same time, the Soviet side, in order to meet the considerations advanced by the US side,raft agreed statement on this Article concerning the sides' understanding that, during the process ofand replacement, there would be no substantial increase in the dimensions of la*nd-based ICBM silo launchers which arc observable by national technical means of verification, the Soviet Delegation did not have in mind the properties of the verification means but the dimensions observable by theo.
Trusov said that the Soviet Delegation had no doubts whatsoever that the undertaking not to increase such dimensions substantially, taken together with the provisions of Article II itself, fully solves the task of limiting heavy land-based ICBMs during the period of effectiveness of the Interim Agreement. He wanted to emphasize that the Soviet side was speakingilateral understanding providing equal limitations for the two sides and it proceeds from the premise that both sides will comply with the obligations assumed and not seek ways to circumvent them.
Trusov concluded that the Soviet Delegation was instructed to state formally that the Soviet side cannot accept the US proposals on the definition of heavy land-based ICBMs, neither as missiles with volumes in excess,ofubic meters, nor as missiles whose volume exceeds the volume of then US terminology, nor as missiles witholume exceeding the volume of the largest light missile the sides have. The Soviet side proceeds from the firmthat, for the purposes of the Interim Agreement, it is quite superfluous to have any definitions of heavy land-based ICBMs. The solution which the Soviet Delegation has proposed is fully consistent with the purposes of Article II and the Interim Agreementhole. It is precisely on this basis that the Delegations should solve this question which has remained unresolved for tooime.
Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Grinevskiy and advisor Kishihvonversation with US SALT delegate Parsons and cdvieor Garthoff, Helsinki:
Grincvskiy said that the Soviet side had nothing new to propose or additional to say on the subject of the interpretive statement relating to Article II of the Interim Agreement.
Garthoffolution along the following lines: neither side would replace current light missiles with new ones significantly larger than the largest light missile that either side currently has. In this connection, we couldide understanding that "significantly larger" wouldarger. Grinevskiy said that this appeared to be another variation of the same position which the Soviet Dele-ation had just rejected on instructions.' It was not iffereot from the earlier American proposals, and it was also not acceptable. Garthoff said that we should explore further the concept of ICBMs not "significantly larger" than the largest current ones. After further discussion, Garthoff suggested the following-for the entire interpretive statement:
"The Parties understand that any ICBMolume significantly greater than the volume of the largest light ICBM currently deployed by either Party would betoeavy ICBM, and that in the process of modernization and replacement there would be no significant increase in the dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers."
Grinevskiy said he would report this suggestion, and his Delegation would consider it. However, he was frankly very doubtful if it would be the basis for agreement. Again, it did not seem to change the essence of the long-standing American position which his side had rejected.
Grinevskiy and Kishilov both indicated that their Delegation was fircly of the view that there was no need whatsoeverefinition ofnd that nothing was needed beyond Article II itself and the undertaking on not substantially increasing observable dimensions of ICDM silo launchers.
Garthoff then raised the question of the American proposed agreed interpretive statement defining"operational and under construction". The Soviet participants acted as though they had hoped that this proposal would simply be forgotten. Grincvski rcitorated again that the Soviet side simply did not consider it necessary at all. Garthoff said that it now seemed to the American side to be more necessary than ever. Semenov had suggested that thereifference over understanding of the term "underut did not say what that difference was. This had surprised us, since the loading naval experts *on both sides had earlier--in fact, at Vienna in SALT VI--agreed on precisely the terms embodied in the US proposal. He could understand, even if not agreeuggestion that such an agreed statement was unnecessary. But now that it appeared thereifference, it became all the more necessary. Grincvskiy cautiously expressed doubt that Semenov would have suggested that thereifference of substance. He continued simply to argue that it was not necessary. He also argued that we were concerned only about final levels of SLBM launchers andso that the question was now irrelevant.
Crinevskiy"then suggested,ersonalhe possibilityrade-off under which the Soviet side would agree to an OLPAR levelillion, if the US side would drop the attempt to get an agreed definitionheavy" ICBM. Carthoff did not reject this proposal, but was very reserved toward it, and after some discussion said that he was very doubtful about it, since the American side considered it necessary to have an agreed understanding on whatheavy" ICBM, and because weillion to be the highest level for such an OLPAR ceiling. Grinevskiy pointedly asked Garthoff to pass along this suggestion, although he again labeled it "personal". Garthoff
asked what the Soviet side might regard as anreciprocal step in seeking overall mutual solution of differences in exchange for Soviet agreement to the definitioneavy ICBM. Grinevskiy and Kishilov both indicated that they did not think the Soviet side could agree onefinition. Grinevskiy pressed for some kind of trade-offight suggest, but he declined to suggest any.- Garthoff then asked what the Soviet side would consider an appropriate reciprocal move to reach Soviet agreement to specify their ICBMas cast of the Urals. But Grinevskiy declined to make any suggestion or consider the question except in terms of some concrete proposalrade, and Garthoff did not suggest any.
Reported remarks of Soviet SALT advisor Smolineezxng of the Editorial Working Crouo, 21 May Helsinki:
On the Interpretive Statements onnd II
Shaw, asked Smolin whether the Soviet sidewith the phrase "capable of ranges" in the US text. Smolin said that the Soviet side did not object to it, but its experts were adamant in retaining the present Soviet language. Shaw said that, if this understanding was completely clear, he could agree to retaining the present US text and the Soviets could retain their present text.- Smolin said several times that this arrangement wasand that the Soviet side understood the meaning of the US text. Shaw said that his agreement to this arrangement was contingent on approval from his Delegation.