REPORT RE REPORTED REMARKS OF SOVIET SALT DELEGATE TRUSOV DURING A DELEGATES' M

Created: 5/10/1972

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

Reported rimarks of Deputy foreign Minister Semenovelegates' meeting,elsinki;

In the course of all previous phases of SALT .both sides'had proceeded fron the premise thatand replacement of the armamentsted would'not be prohibited. In this connection, in addition to the proposals he had presented the day before, he would state that the Soviet side would consider it necessary to register in the Interim Agreement the right of both sides to modernization and replacement of older submarines by now submarines but without exceeding the number of modern submarines and of the SLUM launchers on these submarines,at appropriate levels for each side.

said that since we were engaged in working out an Interim Agreement the important things were not definition* in themselves, but the effort toituation which would in the course of work onand replacement lead to the result of increasing the numbers of heavy missiles by conversion from other types of missiles covered by the Agreement. This was evidently the main problem. As an example, he wanted to use the equipment on the table before us in order to explain the substance of the proposal tabled by the Soviet side (using ashtrays of two widely differing sizes, Trusov used the smaller toauncherightthe larger toaunchereavy missile]. He said that national technical means of verification would clearly distinguish between these two types. And when we said that in the process of modernization and replacement no substantial

increase in the dimensions of the light missiles could occur, it would be obvious that national technical means could clearly show whether or not any increase was substantial enough to bring the light missile into the category of heavy.

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loportad vc-narks of Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov and Soviet SALT delegate Trusovelegates' meeting, ay Helsinki :

Semenov said that he would commentayman once again, with tho reservation that he had not had the opportunity to consult with those of his colleague who were specialists. He wanted to speak because possibly he was the father of this misunderstanding, at least in part. At one time he had said he thought formulation of this question would not prove difficult but he could sec now that he had been imprecise, for we were evidently facing difficulties now which he had not expected. He had believed and continues to believe that the US side will appraise the situation realistically and that we will he able toutually acceptable solution,esire on both sides to do so. In connection with ARM limitation, at the proposal or at the insistence of the US side, the Soviet draft of Article VI in paragraphn undertaking not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ADM interceptor missiles, ADM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic.ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode. Now the US side wanted to make more specific the obligations concerning non-ABM radars, but if we were talking about non-ABM radars we were here touching on some other fields whose specifics we would then have to take into account. He had already noted in past discussions that in our negotiations wc had to avoid the temptation of dealing with defense areas other thgn those we were instructed to deal wi th.

Semenov said that Smith had once accused him of being too partial to artillery, to which ho hadas "the Cod of war." However, he would not touch on the question of artillery, otherwise he was afraid he would get in trouble. As for anti-aircraft, it would be correct to say that anti-aircraft defense docs not have asignificance for the US as it does for the Soviet Union. One might ask why this should be assumed, after all, terms wore to be equal for botli sides. But it was an objective fact that

could noc be ignored. In our negotiations wc bad to respect the delicacy of such matters. At the same time, the Soviet side "as not proposing, did not intend to propose, unequal terms on the question of large non-ABM radars. The Soviet proposal would apply equally to both sides and the terms would be equal too. Reflection on this matter led to tho conclusion that the possible solution would not create the risk of laying the basis for an area defense for the United States. He did not think that the US side believed this with respect'to the Soviet Union either. Furthermore, there was the obligation inhich clearlyerritorial defense, lie did not think it would be difficult to understand the great importance of anti-aircraft defense for the Soviet Union and it was impossible to ignore this fact in our negotiations. He would tell an anecdote. The Russian writer Saltykov-Shchcdrin tells the story of the arayority who received some document in which thereeference to the United States. There was something in the paper ho did not like, so he endorsed it: "close down America." Upon further reflection he added the words: "but, it seems, this docs not depend on us." Thus it was clear that wc could not'ignore the anti-aircraft defense question, lie would conclude that wc had to searchutually acceptable solution, thatolution could be found, ond lhat this would not mean in any uoy creating the basiserritorial ABM system. The Soviet Union was not afraid ofefense being established in the United States and he believed that the US side also would come to the conclusion that no such defense would be created in the Soviet Union.

Trusov believed that Minister Semenov had quite correctly said that the Soviet side was ready to search for mutually acceptable language that would permit the limitation of non-ABM radarsertain way, and at the .same time would not impose any limitations on the deployment of anti-aircraft systems. He would like to return to what had been said by Shchukin and had been emphasized in Shchukin's statcmcnt--that the Soviet side saw no connection between the potential

of non-AHM radarorks. dd it that tho Soviet ncnt of the leve by General Ailis there be no limi radar Smith had system. Thus we searching for mu

and the ARM radars named in the US the MSR radar being deployed at Grand ion, Shchukin had emphasized the thought sido could not agree to thes the standard mentioned on. Shchukin had not insistedn radars of the potential of the referred to as being in the Moscow would evidently have to continue tually acceptable language.

Garthoff wished to propose another approach toutually acceptable compromise on Article III of the ACM Draft Treaty. The alternative approach would be based on setting aside all existing ABM radars, operational and under construction, on the two sides, which could be retained, and thenadditional permitted radar deployments in the futureasis of precise equal opportunities. The result of this new approach would be to let the Soviet side have the large phased-array radars near Chekhov and N'aro-Fominsk and the four large mechanical-scan radar cooplexcs, balanced against the single PAR and single MSR at Crand Forks. In addition, each side could in the future deploy ARM radars within no more than four MARCs for defense of the nationalnd could deploy radars smaller than the MSR within no moTC than six MARCs at the ICBM defensearea. Finally, Carthoff said, hee to propose an alternative to the MARCs for ICBM defense: namely,imitationiven number of ABM radars with smaller potential than the MSR. Such an approach would permit locating such radarsore dispersed basis: We thought that twelve radars should bebut were prepared to consider up to eighteen. Carthoff then gave the Soviet participants the textraft incorooratmg the provisions he had (See Crinevskiy and Kishilovumber of questions for clarification. In addition, they both remarked that they did not think the proposition was equal, because it meant that the Soviet Union could not have any ABM radars as large or larger than an MSR at the Soviet ICBM defense area, while the US could have PAR or Doghouse-type radars at as many-as four complexes in defense of Carthoff noted that while that was correct, the Soviet side would have two very large radars at Moscow in addition to whatever it deployed within fourand the four mechanical-scan radar complexes to boot. The Soviet participants were still doubtful

of acceptability of an approach which would notthe Soviet side any large radars for ICBM defense. Garthoff agreed' that if that was considered anrequirement by the Soviet side there was littlt point in considering this suggested new approach. Grinevskiy said that he would, despite his doubt, of course report this new suggestion.

Grinevskiy then asked about the two bracketed passages in para 1 (bj . Was it' the intention that there be no more than eighteen radars within no more than six complexes, or were the two bracketed passages alternatives? Kishilov immediatelythat of course they were alternatives, and that the American side had earlier proposed six complexes with no numerical limit on radars. He strongly impliedombination of numerical limits on radars as veil as on complexes would be of no interest to the Soviet side. Garthoff said that he thoughtombination of limitation on radars and complexes could be considered, but sotraight limitation only on numbers of radars, which would permit more dispersed deployment or onlyarger number of radars. The Soviet participants seemed inclined to favor the six complexes. Grinevskiy recalled that in discussion two days earlier he. had suggested the possibility of eight complexes.

Garthoff thenecond alternative approach. If, as Grincvskiy and Kishilov hadmight he the case, the Soviet side considered that equality and mutually acceptable terms required the two sides to have comparable .large radars at the ICBM defense deployment area, the article couldfor that. The deployment for defense of the national capital could remain six MARCs for each side, plus the mechanical-scan radar complexes for the Soviet Union, and for defense of ICBMs the Soviet side could have one radar comparable to the PAR at Grand Porks and one radar capable to the MSR, and in addition each side could have cither an agreed

number of radarsotential less than the MSR, or an agreed nuobcr of MARCs with the radars of them under that sane qualitative limitation. He proposed twelve radars or four MARCs as sufficient, but the Soviet participants immediately objected that thistep backward, and that in keeping with earlier proposals and suggestions the level should be at least eighteen radars or six MARCs. Garthoff agreed that those figures were appropriate in terms of the discussions to date. He sugges-ted that perhaps the total could be eighteen radars or six MARCs including the two larger radars, with all other radars limited to smaller potential than the MSR. The Sovietsaid that this was too restrictive, that the minimum their side could consider would be the two large radars and six MARCs or eighteen smaller radars. Garthoff said that if such an approach were pursued.it should be clearly understood that the two larger radars on the Soviet side would be limited to equivalents of the American PAR and MSR radars, respectively.

Carthoff then gaveraft incorporating the points which had just been discussed (sec Garthoff and Crinevskiy amended the draft in pen, in accordance with the discussion outlined above, to substitute the"or.

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegates Shchukin and Trusovelegates1 meeting, elsinki:

Shchukin said that he would address the question of non-ABM radars that were not in the category ot radars referred co in the Aprilersion of the Soviet draft Cor paragraph (ta) Article VI of the draft ABM Treaty. He had noted the fact that the US side had substantially changed the language of the statement on Article VI of the draft Treaty. As he understood it, the US side was now proposing that in deploying the radars to which he had just referred, they could not beotential in excess of the smallest modern phased-array ABM radar operational or under construction on either side. For the United Statesadar is che one presently under construction at Grand ^rks, the radar known as MSR. The potential of this radar was stated by the US side to be less than three million watt-meters squared. Article VI of the draft Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems is designed to increase confidence in the limitation of ABM systems aftd components envisioned In the Treaty and also in compliance with the provisions of paragraph 2 Article I. The Soviet side sees no connection at all between the potential of the MSR underat Grand Forksimitation on the potential of those non-ABM radars, referred to in paragraph (a) of Article VI of the Soviet Draft Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems. This is further supported by the fact that, as far as h* knew, the radar to be used for defense of the national capital of the US. which is toojcto the MSR under construction for defense of ICBMs is planned toubstantially greater potential than the MSR at Grand Forks. The Soviet side cannot consider acceptable those considerations of the US side which would establish limits on the potential of non-ABM radars on the basis of the MSR under Moreover, the Soviet side deems it necessary to reaffirm its position on the proposal calling tor prior consultation in the commission to be established under Article XIII of the Treaty. Ho had in mind the draft statement proposed by the US side and was referring to its "last part, which he believed to be unnecessary.

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Nitze said he was confused about why the Soviet position had changed from what he had understood it to be last. It wns his understanding that wc had agreed that the standard mentioned in the statement would substitute for paragraph (c) of Article VI formally in the joint draft text, in brackets. tandard wns to be the smallest phascd-array ABM radar deployed' by cither side within modern ABM radar complexes.

Shchukin said that if he recalled correctly, at the present time the words "operational or underon cither side" were not agreed.

Trusov pointed out that Mr. Nitze had evidently referred to the language proposed by the US side. However, the Soviet side had not said that it agreed with this language. AcademicianShchukin-had pointed out that in the Soviet draft the reference was to the smallest radars deployed, but the words "under construction" were not included.

Nitze pointed out that inf Article II of. the Joint Draft Text it was stated that ABM system components under construction should bewithin the meaning off that Article.

Shchukin acknowledged that this was correct, and said that this meant lhat they would be included in the ABM Treaty and United under its provisions, but it did not say here lhat they wouldtandard limiting the potential of non-ABM radars.

Nitze wanted to make another point. Initially the Soviet argument had been, under the proposal tabled in Vienna, that the MSR at Grand Forks would require an. exception. The reason advanced for the need for an exception was that the MSR atrks had been initially designedomponent for an area defense and that it-was larger than appropriate for defense of ICBM silos and that it would in fact raise questions about whether orase was being createderritorial defense. "He would also like to point out.that intheiplans of the US Government

to date the MSH for defense of Washington would be equal in potential tot Grand Forks. Thus the distinction which Shchukin had drawn between them was not pertinent.

Shchukin said that when wc had discussed this question before, it had seemed to. him that the MSR type radars being developed in the US were those that had earlier been included in the Sentinel system. As far as he recalled, such radars were to be identical, both those to be used for defense of cities and other unprotected locations and those to be used for defense of ICBM silo launchers. Perhaps he had an imprecise impression of the potential of the MSR underat Grand Forks for defense of ICBM silo launchers, but such doubts had been dissipated by the statement made by Ambassador Smith. According to his information, the radar planned for defense of Washington was planned tootential greater than the MSR at Grand Forks. He asked that the following situation be hypothesized:adarost limited potential is developed for defense of silootential that is sufficient for that purpose. Would that mean that the'constructionon-ABM radar withotential or even larger potential outside the area of AUM deployment would create the threat ofa, territorial defense? It seemed to him that it would not. Therefore, the potential of the smallest radar within the defense systems of ICBM launchers could not be takeneasure for limitation of non-ABM radars located in areas other than areas of ABM deployment.

Nitze said that, first, Shchukin had confirmed what Nitze had said earlier--that the MSR hadbeen designed as partystem for defense of cither cities or silo launchers. Second, both sides agree that within MARCs for defense of national capitals there.would be no limit on the potential of radars that could be built. Thus, whatever some articlesagazine said on the subjectossible future radar for the defense of Washington was not pertinent. Third, it soomed quite wrong to have vary careful constraints on radars permitted within ARM

deployment areas ami then also permit indiscriminate deployment of other radarsreater potential anywhere in the country.

Shchukin, replying to the first point, said that he had already confirmed that the radars originally developed for defense of cities, industrial centers and ICBM silo launchers were identical. In this lie agreed with Nitze. Secondly, he also agreed that in the discussions so far no limits of any kind have been proposed on the potential of radars to bewithin MARCs for ABM defense of national capital Third, he would like to say that the potential of the smallest radar deployed for defense of ICBM silo launchers cannot serveriterion that would limit the potential of non-ABM radars located outside agreed areas of ABM deployment. He was saying this because non-ABM radars located outside would not be defending launcher's, but other facilities, and therefore the limitation on their potential should be other than the potential of the smallest ABM radar deployed for defense of ICBM silo launchers. Finally, when he had said earlier that initially the ABM radars developed in the US,for defense of national capitals and for defense of silo launchers were not identical, he had meant that the solution for radars forming part of an ABM system for defense of national capitals should be higher, that these radars should be larger than those proposed earlier.

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Shchukinonversation uith US SALTtze,ay Helsinki:

I saidontinued to be unimpressed by the argument that hodc and Semenov had repeated that Large phased array radars were needed for SAMaid that with respect to the air-to-surface missile launchedigh flying plane, it seemed to me that that threat would be eliminated'if the high flying plane itself were vulnerable. Shchukin said that he agreed. He said that we, however,ifferential advantage in that our AWACS-type planes could fly over the oceans while they were, in part, surrounded by land masses which they did not control. aid that AWACS had nothing to do with high flying planes. If the planes were highround-based mechanical scan-diS'h radar could sec them better than could an AWACS; an AWACS-typc of plane was useful only against low flying planes, and as he had agreed with me the other day, large phased array radars were not useful in the low altitude regime because of the short distance of line of sight to the horizon at low altitudes.

At another point Shchukin commented that radars of the MSR and larger sizo were immensely expensive and that neither side would beew

reported rtutGrks of Soviet SALT de legates Crinevskiy and Pleshakovonversation with US SALT advisor Carthoff, Helsinki:

I berated Grincvskiy for the fact that his Delegation had permitted ours to labor several weeks under the mis impression that the Soviet side had agreed to the MSR as the standard forAR constraint. Grincvskiy said that his Delegation had always sought to workutually acceptable solution, and that it would continue to do so. aid that "the ball was now in their court". Keonstructive Soviet proposal. oted that we had raised the proposed level from one million to three million, and also resorted to the indirect reference at Soviet behest, although that indirect referent had eventually mislead us. (Minister Pleshakov who also sat across the table, listened to this part of our conversation, and interjected to say that the difference between one and three times to the sixth was not significant, and the Sovietsigher level.) Grinevskiy said that it would be necessary to raise the level "somewhat". Subsequently, Grinevskiy was more specific and said ic would need to be raised by about one order of magnitude.

Reported remarks of Soviot SALT delegate Crinevskiy and advisor Kishilovonversation uith US SALT advisor Carthoff, ay Helsinki:

Garthoff remarked, personally and frankly, that thereeeling that the Soviet side had. permitted the American Delegation to labor under the misimpression that there was agreement on using the MSRtandard for OLPAR limitation for more than two.weeks. Grinevskiy became very defensive, and said the Soviet side had never said thatMSR was acceptable as the OLPARe said that Minister"Semenov had already said that he might have contributedisunderstanding by saying that there was'.only an editorial difference remaining on the OLPAR" question, but the Soviet Delegation had believed and continued tobclicveutually acceptable.solution could be found. Moreover,.there '. had been uncertainty as to the potential ofNthc^MSR.

Reported remarks of Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov and Soviet SALT delegate Trusoveeting, ay Helsinki:

Trusov pointed out that onhehadraft for Article II ofAgreement and the drafttatement toto it. He wanted to draw the USto the fact that the totality ofin these proposals completelypossibility during the period ofthe Interim Agreement of covcrting launchersland-based ICBMs and launchers for olderland-based ICBMs constructedor heavy land-based ICBMs. Inthe USSR Delegation failed toreasons why the US side had raised thedefining heavy ICBMs at the meeting of May 7. course of all the phases of the negotiationshad understood and understand todaymissiles or launchers we wereas heavy. In the Soviet view there was.to assume that during the period ofof the Interim Agreement the sides wouldto know this. Hoavy missiles havethat clearly distinguish them fromof ballistic missiles. Thesecontinue to exist in tho future, too,if the sides undertake the obligation notsubstantially in the process ofand replacement the external dimensions,by national technical means of verification,ICBM silo launchers currently inof the sides. The Soviet sidethis statement, in combination with theprovided for in its draft of Articleprecluded the possibility of suchthat therefore .there was no need for any Trusov said that this completely fegSS

Tr-*ov *sid he agreed with Minister Senenov. As he saw it, the words "substantial" or"significant" or "insignLficant hadart of the arsenal of SALT, part of the language of'the documents we were negotiating here, believed that when we used these terns, wewhat the/ meant. As for definitions, in this case, since wc were engaged in working out an Interin Agreement the important things were not definitions in themselves, but tile effort toituation which would in the course of work on modernisation and replacement lead to the result of increasing the numbers of heavy missiles by conversion froa other types of missiles covered by the Aoreenont. This was evidently tne-main problem. As an'cxaaple, he wanted to use the equipment on the table before us in order to explain the substance of the oroposal tabled by the Soviet side [using ashtrays of two widely differing sues, Trusov used the smaller toauncherignt Missile and the larger toaunchereavy missile] He said that national technical means ox verification would clearly distinguish between these two tvires. Ande said that in the process ot modern!iction and replacement no substantial increase in the dimensions of the light nissilcs could occur, it would be obvious that national technical means

could clearly show whether or not any increaseenough to bring the light missilecategory of heavy. It was equally obvious insubstantial increase in the diameter of would in no way result in even bringingto the category of heavy missiles. Inthe definition itself was only ofj.

Minister Semenov remarked that even from the philosophical point of view_.it was .of no interest.

reported remarks of soviet salt delegate trusovelegates' meeting, helsinki:

Trusov said that since we were engaged in working out an Interim Agreement the important things were not definitions in themselves, but the effort toituation which vould in the course of work onand replacement lead to the result of increasing the numbers of heavy missiles by conversion from other types of missiles covered by the* Agreement. This was evidently the main problem. As an example, he wanted to use the equipment on the table before us in order to explain the substance of the proposal tabled by the Soviet side [using ashtrays of two widely differing sizes, Trusov used the smaller toauncheright missile and the larger toaunchereavy missile]. He said that national technical means of verification would clearly distinguish between these two types. And when we said that in the process of modernization and replacement no substantial increase in the dimensions of the light missiles could occur, it would be obvious that national technical means could clearly show whether or not any increase was substantial enough to bring the light missile into the category of heavy.

reported remarks of soviet salt delegate crinevskiy and advisor xisnilovonversation vith us salt advisor carthoff, ll helsinki:

Grincvskiy noted that the Soviet side continues to believe that the provision on no substantialin dimensions of silo launchers shoulda phrase modifying increase' as "observable with the aid of national technical means ofarthoff objected categorically.

Reported remarks of Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov and Soviet SALT delegate Trusoveeting, ay .Helsinki:

Trusov pointed out that onhe Soviet Delegation hadraft for Article II of the Interim Agreement and the drafttatement to be attached to it. He wanted to draw the US Delegation's attention to the fact that the totality of obligations incorporated in these proposals completely precluded the possibility during the period of effectiveness of the Interim Agreement of coverting launchers for light land-based ICBMs and launchers for older types of land-based ICBMs constructed4 into launchers for heavy land-based ICBMs. In this the USSR Delegation failed to understand the reasons why the US side had raised the question of defining heavy ICBMs at the meeting of May 7. In the course of all the phases of the negotiations both sides had understood and understand today whatmissiles or launchers we were talking about as heavy. In the Soviet view there was no reason to assume that during the period of effectiveness of the Interim Agreement the sides would not continue to know this- Heavy missiles have certain features that clearly distinguish them from other types of ballistic missiles. These distinctions will continue to exist in the future, too, particularly if the sides undertake the obligation not to increase substantially in the process of modcrnizat-ion and replacement the external dimensions, observable by national technical means of verification, of land-based ICBM silo launchers currently in the possession of the sides. The Soviet side believed that this statement, in combination with the obligation provided for in its draft of Article II, completely precluded thepossibility of such conversion and thathere was no need for any additional- definitions. Trusov said that this completely solved the

Smith said that we believed that at the present time we knew what the Soviet side wouldlight; missile and what it wouldeavyowever, as we looked into the.future we saw problems

in interpreting the words "light" andhe Soviet side had tried to help us with the wordn adverb. Adverbs wereslippery things. If he had to explain to his authorities what was meant bye would not know how to go about it. He recalled that at an earlier time in our negotiations Semenov had ifficulties with this uord. when wc proposed to use it in connection with transfers to third countries. At that time Semenov had said that he could not dis-tinguish between what was substantial and what was not substantial.

Allison recalled thatrevious phase of SALT, he had discussed this problem with General Trusov and had referred to possible developments in the future,.pointing out that it was notatter of current missiles; itatter of dealing with missiles of an in-between site. He would point outroblcn could ariseissile that would fallategory between the present categories of light and heavy.

Semenov said that ho would like to comment on this subjectayman. As Smith would recall, in all our discussions both sides had token the position that the Interim Agreement oust contain provisions that would have the effect of preventing deployment of heavy missilesuild-up in such missiles. As justly pointed out by General Trusov, in all the phases of our negotiations the sides had understood and doay specifically what missiles arc meant. An analysis of the development of the Soviet position would show that in many respects the Soviet side has moved to meet the wishes of theide; this would become particularly clear if a omparison were made between what the Soviet side had proposed initially and what it was proposing .' -now. If he had understood General Allisone were nowubstantially different question and this raised new difficulties in^ our talks:reeze was a. freeze and wc didommon understanding about frccring themodern', heavy missiles. On the other hand.-th*

would not affect ciodcrnion and replacement of strategic offensive arms, and in this, too, we seemed to have agreement in principle. The US would modernize its missiles and the Soviet side would do so also, and Semenov did not think that such actions would constitute actions outside the framework of the understanding existing between us. At the present.moment wc were talking about an Interim Agreement; perhaps it would be advisable to defer the questions arising in connection with the subject of discussion today for solution at follow-on talks, more.active negotiations, about which we alsoommon understanding. Of cours the category of possibilities was great, but now we had comparatively little time to enable us to go beyond the category of realities.

Replying to Smith's remarks on the subject of what was "substantial" or what wasemenov would say that Smith had quite correctly noted thatorn had also been used by the US side at one time. He would ask Smith if he had not noticedumber of ideas were migrating between our two sides. This was quite natural since wc wci'e engaged in an exchange of ideasearch for mutually acceptable Such solutions could hardly be found if wc did not engage in such exchanges. Personally, ho saw nothing wrong in ideas travelling back and forth between the two sides. There was no such thingational arithmetic, there was only one arithmetic, and in our negotiations it was essential for us to find common understanding on the principle of mutual acceptability. Both sides had to keep this in mind if we were to have agreement. He concluded by saying that perhaps he had not spoken too precisely, but, after all, he was speakingayman.

Semenov said thathilosopher he would like to say that in this caso General Allison was;,hot .

possession of the sides General Allison was trying to approach this matter from the other end, to determine whatight missile. tudent of philosophy Semenov hadreat deal of time learning to distinguish between concepts and learning to understandogical viewpoint what the substanceoncept consisted of. He therefore knew how toubstitution of concepts when he was faced with it; it wasewnot since the days of the Greek philosophers. He believed that we could hardly engage in suchif our work here was to be productive.

Trusov said he agreed with Minister Semenov. As he saw it, the words "substantial" or"significant" or "insignificant" hadart of the arsenal of SALT, part of the language of the documents we were negotiating here. He believed that when we used these terms, wewhat they meant. As for definitions, in this case, since we were engaged in working out an Interim Agreement the important things were not definitions in themselves, but the effort toituation which would in the course of work on modernization and replacement lead to the result of increasing the numbers of heavy missiles by conversion from other types of missiles covered by the Agreement. This was evidently the main problem. As an example, he wanted to use the equipment on the table before us in order to explain the substance of the proposal tabled by the Soviet side [using ashtrays of two widely differing sizes, Trusov used the smaller toauncheright missile and the larger toaunchereavy aissile]. He said that national technical means of verification would clearly distinguish between these two typos. And when we said that in the process of modernization and replacement no substantial increase in the dimensions of the light missiles could occur, it would bo obvious that national technical means

could elenrly show whether'or not any increase was substantial enough to bring the .'light missile into

the category of heavy. It was equally obvious that some insubstantial increase in the diameter of light missiles would in no way result in even bringing it close to the category of heavy missiles. In these conditions the definition itself was only ofinterest.

Semenov remarked that even from the philosophical point of view it was of no interest.

deported remarks of deputy foreign minister semenovelegates' netting, helsinki:

Semenov said he wanted to make the following statement: The Soviet side had already stated its position on the US proposal to freeze mobile ICBM launchers. He was now reaffirming this position and believed that in workingraft Interim Agreement in the light of theetween our Governments, there was no need to include such launchers in the composition of systems to be frozen. At the same time, the Soviet side had moved to accommodate the US side and agreed to include fixed soft launchers. He said that the solution proposed by the Soviet side fully met the purposes of the Interim Agreement.

reported remarks of soviet salt delegate grinevskiyonversation aith us sal? advisor garthoffelsinki:

Grinevskiy was quite firm in saying that the Soviet side was not prepared to include mobile ICBMs in the freeze.

Crinevskiy hoped we could make progress on Article and said that if we could simply drop the definition"heavy" missiles, he thought we couldeach agreement'. bjected that thispaH of the Article II

Reported remarks of Deputy Foreign Minister Semenovelegates1 meeting, Helsmkx:

Semenov said that the Soviet Delegation had been instructed by ttie Government of the Soviet Union to table today as an official proposal new language for Article HI of the draft Treaty on the Limitation of ADM Systems. (See Section U) -Me wanted to note that the new Soviet draft of Article III of the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems was prepared with account Cor the useful exchange of views between the sides which had taken place on this question. In addition, the Soviet Delegation had been instructed to transmit texts of draft joint statements on Article III of the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems on the following three questions: (a) on non-phased-array ABM radars, (b) on the magnitude of the potential of the smaller of the two large ABM radars referred to in paragraph (b) of Article III, (c) on the location of the center of the area of ABM systems deployment for defense of ICBM silo launchers. Semenov said he would like to read the drafts of these statements and handed them to Smith (Sec

Semenov expressed the hope that the new Soviet proposals would be closely studied and would meetavorable reaction on the US side.

Semenov wanted to make another statement. seful exchange of viewsbeen held on the still unagreednon-ABM large phased-array radars. Takingaccount, in an effort to resolve on athe difference on this question between the Soviet Delegation, onthe Government of the USSR, was submitting fora'draft joint statement of theon Article VI of the Treaty on theABM Systems which took into account thethe sides on thise.would like tohand over the draft of this statement'(see. - -

Reported remarks of Soviet SACT delegate Shchukinonversationelegates ' ay Helsinki:

On location of Soviet silo defenses in USSR, Shchukin said it was matter of prestige. There were those on Soviet side who thought it wasfor US to" dictate location of their

Reported remarks of Soviet SACT delegates Trusov and Pleshakovonversationeeting with US SACT delegate Allison, e lainki:

I Stated that the Soviet proposal put on the table today does not satisfy the requirement for specification on tlie Soviet side of an ICBM defense deployment area cast of tlio Urals (again used scratch pad and symbols to describe the point). sked rhetorically--how would we know,s to geographic location, .that the Soviets would not put the site in,

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Crinevskiy end advisor Kishilovonversation with US SALT advisor Carthoff, itf May Helsinki:

It was agreed that we would meet formally as the Croup of Four the next clay. in the American Embassy. The agenda was discussed.

Grinevskiy.asked, probably noc seriously, whether the American participants would, be prepared toArticle II[ of the ADM Draft Treaty. Garthoff said chat they probably would noc, although it nicht be useful to discuss the yet unagreedstatement, concerning the location of ABM defenses for ICBMs. eparate briefwith Kishilov, Carthoff derived the clear impression chac che Soviet Delegation expects and is prepared co compromise differences on this point by including an undertaking to locate the' Soviet ICBM defense deployment area east of the Urals in exchange for American agreement to loeace its ICBM defense in che Crand Forks ICBM deployment field.)

Grincvskiy also asked whether the American side would be prepared to discuss OLPARs. Garthoffdoubc. Both he and Parsons indicated that che Soviet OLPAR proposal seemed much too high. The Soviet participants considered thac their side hadecisive compromise move by coming down to the level, andit disconcerted that the American participants did not consider the new Soviet -proposalasis for agreement.

Grinevskiy expressed the strong hope that the US side would be given instructions permitting it to agree on the Article III provisions which had emerged from earlier discussions and now represented the position of the Soviet Government.

Grincvskiy raised the question of procedures for formalizing agreed interpretive-statements. e suggested that he still thought they should

refer to specific articles of the Treaty or Garthoff then again argued that it wasand could be troublesome to try to relate each interpretive statement to the appropriate since in sometatement referred to several articles; for example, the one relating to other "future" ABM systems. Grincvskiy said that he had onlyersonal view, and they would think further about this matter.

Garthoff said that it would probably be best to group together the statements relating to the Treaty, and separately those relating to the Interim Agreement. But they did not need titles, and did notovering record. The Heads of Delegation should initial each statement, after Ambassador Smith had read itglish and Minister Semenov in Russian, with an.exchange of agreed translations. Grinevskiy indicated his agreement with this suggestion.

Garthoff then said that on the American side the statements would probably be used separately in conjunction with other commentary discussing various aspects of the Treaty or Agreement. For cxampJe, in the message to the Congross there might be discussion of non-transfer, at which point there would be reference to the fact that there was an agreed interpretive' statement between the US and USSR, then providing the text. But the collectedstatements would not be handled together, and would not be annexed to the Treaty. Grinevskiy noted understanding, and said they would not bearthoff said they would not be published as an annex to the Treaty, but they would be considered unclassified and would be made public in the manner he had described, in the course of Congressional consideration. Both Grincvskiy and Kishilov expressed understanding and agreement that the statements would be available to each Government to use as they saw fit, including publicly, and attributing to them the status of interpretations agreed by the two Governments

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegates Trusov and Pleshakovonversation following a Delegates' meeting with OS SALT delegate Allison, ay elsinki:

In informal conversations following tho meeting of Delegates,old General Trusov and Minister Pleshakov that their numberor the OLPAR interpretive statement was too high. The US proposal for OLI'ARs ower aperture product not greater than the MSR gave, in the judgment of our experts, ample flexibility to deal with their air defense Trusov and Pleshakov disagreed. Pleshakov statedas an absolutely rock-bottom figure for the Soviets, arrived at after most carefuland probably not satisfying the views of all their experts. Iterious effort to compromise. Trusov agreed. (Conversation was without interpreter and conducted largely with use of scratch pad notes, figures and Plcshakov's limited English. ould observe, however, that Pleshakov's comprehension is fairly good in some areas although his expression in responseeak.)

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Shchukinonversationelegates' meeting,ag Helsinki:

Shchukin said he had had great difficulty in getting number ten million for Olpar standardby his delegation.

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegcteadvisor Kishilovonversation vithadvisor Garthoff, ay V'

Garthoff noted that Semenov had said that the Soviet side would have some new proposals ton the Group of Four meeting concerning the Interim Agreement. Grinevskiy and Kishilov confirmed this, and implied that these proposal* would concern bothnd Article II and their associatedstatements. Both said that they nowthat the size of the ICBM missiles was the most critical element, and Garthoff confirmed that. suggested that the Soviet side would be able to agreeay of handling the conceptheavy" missile, if the American side could reach agreement on the definition of an ICBM. Garthoff agreed toeal, but explained that while the American side couldew definition of an ICBM, it could not accept the definition which the Soviet side had last advanced. Grinevskiy still displayed general pessimism about the difficulties in reaching an agreement on Article II. For the first time, he suggested that the reference to dimensions of ICBM "silos", rather than to "siloastep back". Garthoff expressed surprise, and said that thishich he had described at an earlier sessionasore precise reference which should help to reach agreement. Grinevskiy"said it did not, but was unable to provide arguments except that the termo,launchers" was used elsewhere in the agreement. Garthoff replied that there was no reference to dimensions of silos elsewhere in the agreement, and that there should be no particular difference over the term. The American side could agree to refer to "silo launchers" if necessary, but there did need to be common understanding as to what was meant by dimensions of silos or silo*launchers. Grincvskiy's suggestion that thereifference making reference to silostep back" raised questions as to whether the two sidesommon understanding. He asked if the Soviet

participants were prepared to discuss further the diagram of silo launchers which he had given them earlier. They said that they might beosition to do so the next day.

Grinevskiy raised the question of procedures for formalizing agreed interpretive statements.

refer to specific articles of the Treaty or Garthoff then again argued that it wasand could be troublesome to try to relate each interpretive statement to the appropriate articles, since in sometatement referred to several articles; for example, the one relating to other "future" ABM systems. Grinevskiy said that he had onlyersonal view, and they would think further about this matter.

Garthoff said that it would probably be best to group together the statements relating to the Treaty, and separately those relating to the Interim Agreement. But they did not need titles, and did notovering record. The Heads of Delegation should initial each statement, after Ambassador Smith'had read it in English and Minister Semenov in Russian, with an exchange of agreed translations. Grincvskiy indicated his agreement with this suggestion.

Carthoff then said that on the American side the statements would probably be used separately in conjunction with other commentary discussing various aspects pf the Treaty or Agreement. For example, in the message to the Congress there might be discussion of non-transhich point there would be reference to the fact that there was an agreed interpretive statement between the US and USSR, then providing the text. But the collectedstatements would not be handled together, and would not be annexed to the Treaty. Grinevskiy noted understanding, and said they would not be "published". Garthoff said they would not be published as an annex to the Treaty, but they would be considered unclassified and would be made public in the manner he had described, in the course of

Congressional"consideration. Both Crinevskiy and Kishilov expressed understanding and agreement that the statement would be available to each Government to use as they saw fit, including publicly, andto them the status of interpretations agreed by the two Governments.

Reported remarks of Soviet SACT advisors Smolin and Chulitskiyeeting of the Editorial Working Croup, Helsinki;

Smolin noted that the reference to further or follow-on talks in three places in the two documents spoke of "strategic offensive arms" but, in the Preamble to the Interim Agreement, spoke only of "strategic arms." He suggested that to harmonize the two documents, the word "offensive" should be included in this Preamble. Shaw recalled that, on the eve of the conclusion of the talks last December, the Soviets themselves had taken out the word "offensive" in the Preamble. He personally saw no objection .to reinserting it, but said that he would have to discuss this matter with his Delegation.

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/(sported rencrks of Soviet SALT advisor Snolin at the nseti.ij of the Editorial Uorking Croupay Meinkil

In reviewing tha ABM draft texthe Soviets, Smolm noted that it had agreed to theproposed by the US. In regard to Article XIII,e noted that the Soviet draft referred to "each Party" rather than "cither Party" as given in the US JDT. Shaw said that the USprefers the use of the word "either."

On the interpretive statements, Smolin said that the Soviet Delegation agrcod to the idea of having all of them in one document in regard to each Treaty or Agreement. Ho noted the Soviet heading for this document which would road: "Agreed Statements by Delegations regarding the Treaty on Limiting Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems."

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegates Pleshakov and Crinevskiy and advisor Kishilov during asation uith US SALT delegate Persons and advisor Carthoff, elsinki:

Grinevskiy taontioncd that our colleagues on the Editorial Working Group had also been hard at work. Parsons and Garthoff said that they did not yetetailed report on the latest ncoting, but that they understood work was proceeding satisfactorily. Garthoff noted that there was one point which he wished to take up with Grincvskiy. Smolin hadinsertion of the word "offensive" in the second prearabular paragraph of the Interim Agreement, in the phrase concerning "the creation of more favorable conditions for active negotiations on limiting strategic [offensive] arms." Garthoff noted that in the parallel provision of the ARM Treaty, in the fourth prcambular paragraph, the same clause did include the word "offensive." However, rather than add the word into this passage in .the preamble of the Interim Agreement, the American Delegation proposed instead deletion of the word in the preamble of the ABM Draft Treaty. He noted that Ambassador Smith would like to make this change, and perhaps Grinevskiy would like to bring this to the attention of Minister Semenov. Grincvskiy agreed to do so. Grincvskiy asked whether Che American side had inossibility that further negotiations could lead to an ABM ban, and Garthoff confirmed that this possibility was in mind. Grinevskiy smiled and nodded affirmatively.

Grincvskiy suggested starting first with the ABM Draft Treaty, Article III.

An extraordinary argument of nearly two hours' duration ensued over the minor problem of reconciling the editorial differences concerning the appositional clause describing ABM radar complexes for defense of national capitals. The Soviet Delegation did not accept the simplified font'-Which Carthoff had suggested and the Group of l'our had tentatively agreed upon the day before. Tho gist of the issue was that the Soviet Delegation wished to describe "complexes" as the associated facilitiesradar or.m

of radars, rather than as an area within which radars could he deployed. Garthoff rejected this approach, since it could introduce an clement of uncertainty into the obligation, since "complexes" in the technical sense being employed by the Soviet side couldbe put more tiian ono in an area of three kilomotcr diameter, and in thatide would cither be limited to fewer than six such areas, or would have more than six suchither of which would not be situations intended by the two sides in agreeing upon six ABM radar areas, eachiameter of no more than three kilometers. In the discussion, Garthoff suggested the possibility of omitting reference to complexes, and simply referring to areasiven description. Parsonsimplified version along this line. But Grincvskiy persisted in arguing for some variation reflecting the initially expressed Soviet position. He said that the Soviet specialists who understood this question insisted,on the point. Garthoff suggested discussing the matter with them, and in due course Minister Plcshakov joined the group. Plcshakov and Garthoff discussed the questionime in Russian, and agreedimplified reference to "no more than six areas, eachiameter of no more than three kilometers." Later, however, another text was brought into the room, and Grincvskiy announced that the Soviet Delegation did not accept the formulation which Garthoff and Plcshakov had worked out, and insisted upon reference to complexes, lie said that the Soviet side had accepted the American proposal for ABM radar complexes, and wished to maintain it. Garthoff welcomed this remark, and said that since the Soviet side accepted tho American concept, there should be no problem in agreeing on any of the several variations which embodied that concept. Finally, after lengthy discussion, Grincvskiy agreedariant which Garthoff and Kishilov had worked out, reading as follows: "within no more than six ABM radar complexes, the area of each complexircleiameter of no more than three kilometers." This text was then agreed, ad referendum to Delegations.

Accordingly, agreement was reached on the whole of Article; III (see

Carthoff then noted that, as Ambassador Smith had told Scpicnov that morning, agreement of the American side to Article IH war* dependent upon reachingon the interpretive statement relating to locationUM defense areas, as well as on inclusion of SLBMs in the Interim Agreement. He added that, as Ambassador Smith had also indicated, the American side wasto state.that its deployment will be centered at Grand Forks. He then gave the Soviet participants the text (in English and Russian)raft statement that Ambassador Smith would be prepared to make in theof an agreed interpretive statement specifying that the US deployment would be west of the Mississippi, and the Soviet deployment cast of the Urals.

Grincvskiy accepted the draft with appreciation and without substantive comment. He did, however, state that tlie Soviet position remained that there was no need to specify east of the Urals and West of the Mississippi Garthoff remonstrated, and repeated that as had been discussed the day before, and as the US draft made quite clear, an agreed interpretation on that point was essential. Grincvskiy acknowledged understanding this position, and said that he would now take the matter up*further with his Delegation.

Grincvskiy asked if the US side had anything further to say about OLPARs. Garthoff replied in the negative, and said that he had nothing more to say at this timo, but would like to comment that he did not expect that the American side could agree to the 5oviet proposal, and indeed believed that tho latest American proposal on this subject remained the correct basis for agreement*; Both Grinevskiy and Kishilov again showed unhappinoss over this position. Grinevskiy asked whether the US Delegation had receivedfrom Washington responsive to the latest Soviet proposal. Garthoff said official instructions had not yet been received, but that unofficial indications had led him to make the comment that tho Soviet Dalcgation should be thinking in termsrobable American rejection of the Soviet proposal. Grinevskiy became quite heated in defending the latest Soviet proposalair and appropriate compromise, and as the rock-bottom Soviet position on the subject. Garthoffthere was no point in further discussion at that time, and the Soviet participants agreed.

reported remarks of soviet salt delegate grinevskiy and advisor kishilovonversation uith us salt delegate parsons and advisor garthoff, helsinki:

Turning to Article II, Garthoffext based on the previous day's discussion (see SectionGrinevskiy and-Kishilov immediately showed theirand dissatisfaction. They described the text as no advance, andtep back. They repeated the strongly held position of the Soviet side against including any definition of heavy ICBMs, whether in terns of volume of the missile, mentionarticular missile as the standard,tandard of being larger than the largest existing light missile. Grinevskiy said that the obligations in Article II itself were very important. In addition, the second obligation of making no substantial increase in silo dimensions observable by national technical means was very important. Finally, both sidesommonon which were heavy ICBMs and which were light ICBMs. There had been no differences on this question so far, and therefore no definition was needed. efinition might mislead.

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Crir.cjskiy and advisor Kishilovonversation uith US SALT delegate Parsons and advisor Garthoff, IS Helsinki:

Grincvskiy' mentioned that our colleagues on the Editorial Working Group had also been hard at work. Parsons and Garthoff said that they did not yetetailed report on the latest neeting, but that they understood work was proceeding satisfactorily. Garthoff noted that there was one point which he wished to take up with Grincvskiy. Sraolin hadinsertion of the word "offensive" in the second preambular paragraph of the Interim Agreement, in the phrase concerning "the creation of more favorable conditions for active negotiations on limiting strategic [offensive] arms." Garthoff noted that in the parallel provision of the ABM Treaty, in tho fourth preambular paragraph, the sane clause did include the word "offensive." However, rather than add the word into this passage in the preamble of the Interim Agreement, the American Delegation proposed instead deletion of the vrord in the prearblehe ABM Draft Treaty, lie noted that Ambassador Smith would like to make this change, and perhaps Grinevskiy would like to bring this to the attention of Minister Semenov. Grinevskiy agreed to do so.

Turning to the Interim Agreement, Grincvskiy asked if the American participants had anything to_ suggest with respect to Article I. Garthoff said that they did, andew draft text to the Soviet (sec He noted that it confirmed acceptance of the interpretive statement defining ICBMs, and accepted the Soviet proposal for July in the basic Article. This acceptance of theate was in the context of the understanding that there would of course be no new starts of ICBM construction between the present time and Julynd further had in mind Minister Semenov's remarks of May 6. lie noted that in the second interpretive statement the date of signature was retained, because that seemed more appropriate forescriptive passage,

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Grinevskiy expressed satisfaction at agreement on the Article and the first interpretive statement. He questioned the roferencc to date of signature in the second statement, and said that his Delegation thought that it should also be July 1, in conformity with the agreed date in the Article itself. Garthoff said that his Delegation had considered this question, and, as he had explained earlier, believed that it was more appropriate to refer to an on-going activity such as was described in the in.terprecive statement by reference to date of signature; the Article represented an undertaking which could be best described in termsarticular date. Moreover, in similar descriptive passages concerning existing activities or installations date of signature was the agreed formulation in the ABM-Treaty, for example with respect to identifying certain radars in Article HI, and also in one of thestatements associated with Article III. After some further argument, Grinevskiy said that he could accept the American proposal. Accordingly, full agreement was reached onnd the first two associated interpretive statements. Both sides indicated no change in their respective positions concerning the proposed .additional interpretive statement on land-mobile ICBM launchers.

Turning to Article II, Garthoffext based on the previous day's discussion {see Grincvskiy and Kishilov immediately showed their disappointment and dissatisfaction. They.described the text as no advance, andtep back. They repeated the-strongly held position of the Soviet side against including*any definition of heavy ICBMs, whether in terms of volume of the missile, mentionarticular missile as the standard,tandard of being larger than the largest existing light missile. Crinevskiy said that the obligations in Article II itself were very important. In addition, the second obligation- of making no substantial increase in silo dimensions.observable byechnical means was very important. Finally, both sidesommonon" which were hca'vy^ICBMs and which were light ICBMs. There had been no/differences on this question so far, and therefore no definition was needed. ef initionmight I

Garthoff said that as the Soviet side knew, for more than two years the American side had said in every way it knew how that it was essential tolear common understanding on the subject ofeavy ICBM was. He did not understand how the Soviet participants could describestep back" reference toubic meters as the threshold defining heavy ICBMs. The day before they had said that from the standpoint of the Soviet side it made no difference whether the definition were in terms of greater than the largest light missileolume ofubic meters. Under these circumstances, the Americanpreferred to revert to the formulation ofubic meters, since itore precise standard. Moreover, the Soviet participants should appreciate0 cubic meter standard would in fact permit modest modernization of existing light ICBMs, all of which were below that level. Accordingly, it could hardly be describedtep back from the Soviet standpoint. He could understand that the Soviet participants might, from what they had previously said, not regard that particular formulationtep forward; perhaps fron their standpoint ittep to'the side. But from the American standpoint itorrect and necessary definition. Garthoff then asked if, in his comments, Grinevskiy had deliberately used the word "substantial" in-preference to "significant." Grinevskiy said that he had, his side preferred the wordarthoff said that his side preferred the wor-dbut felt that it needed to be further considered, and that although the term remained without brackets in the text he had just provided, he wished to emphasize that this wasentative matter. He asked if Grinevskiy had meant to describe the substantial increase in dimensions observable by national meansingle statement of the obligation; that is, was "observable by. national technical means ofstatedimiting qualification on "substantial increase" rather, thanescriptive phrase identifying .the method of verification. Also, did the Soviet side regard the inclusion of that phrase as essential. Grinevskiy said that itualifying clement of the sentence, and the Soviet side did consider it.essential. Garthoff said that, as he had saidthe American side considered it not acceptable

to useonsideration as an.n defining the very terns of the standard being established.

Garthoff then asked what Grincvskiy had meant when he saidefinition could "mislead." The American position wasefinition was necessary precisely in order tond we did not sec how it could "mislead" to make clear just what obligations the sides were assuming. Grincvskiy repliedengthy diatribe repeating familiar arguments such as the fact that throughout our long negotiations there had alwayslear understanding as to what constituted heavy 'ndefinition was not nocossary. Garthoff replied that without agreeing with those considerations, he still did not seeefinition could be nisleading. How could the establishmentlear standard such asubic meterside? Grincvskiy responded by saying thatide wanted toissile ofubic meters.that if Grinevskiy was proposingubic neters as the standard, he thought he could agree. Grinevskiy replied that he did not mean that. Garthoff remarked that, in that case, it wouldiolation; but that obviouslyide would do in that case would be to advise the weapons designers as to the limit they would be permitted. Grincvskiy said it was necessary to allow modernization, and both sides knew what hcavv missiles were.

Parsons asked whether Grinevskiy was saying that light missiles would remaincy arc now, and heavy missiles would remain as they now aro. Grinevskiy said that he had only wanted to say that both sides know wbat they are talking about when they refer to light and heavy missiles.".

Garthoff asked Grinevskiy what wouldifference on understanding of whatmissile was at some time in the future. that the matter could then be taken up inConsultative Commission. Garthoff askodwould not be better to decideuestiona side had taken steps which the otheras not consistent with the agreement. if wc were not able to agree in two yearshow would the Standing '- 3

ide had clearly

thought that something vaseavy missile and the other thought differently. Garthoff remaned that the US position on this matter had certainly been clear and consistent throughout tho two years of negotiation. Grincvskiy again said itubic when Carthoff

thatubic meters was unacceptable, as the Sovipr Delegation had said earlier. Therefore to rciStr"

anrUnaCCCptabichis latetep

. that perhaps the matterdiscussed by Delegations. Garthoff agreedthat would betnat

Tho debate resumed in familiar terms At one

tmtus viUany missile aboveubic meterseavy ICBW

Grinevskiy said that "the Soviet side win take that

into account." It was not, however, clear as to

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