REPORT RE REPORTED REMARKS OF SOVIET SALT DELEGATE SHCHUKIN DURING A DELEGATES

Created: 5/7/1972

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

lizooried remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Shchukinelegates'elsinki:

Shchukin said thai after yesterday's tabling of the Soviet draft of Article III of the ABM Treaty, the US and USSR positions on this Article had come closer to each other- Therefore it was necessary for us to exert every effort to overcome theremaining. As far as the limitation on dcployoent of ABM systems for defense of national capitals was concerned, the provisions in the two drafts were practically identical. At the same time, the Soviet side believed it superfluous tothe reservation envisaged in the US draft of Article III concerning dish-type mechanical-scan ABM radars. Considering the agreed principle ofmodern ABM radar complexes,there was no need to includeeservation. There were no other differences between the two drafts on theof limiting the deployment of ABM systems and their components for the defense of national capitals. He believed that given an additional effort thiscould begreed upon promptly.

Regarding MAUCs, Shchukin said that the concept of the Soviet side coincided with that of the US side in that for the purpose of defending national capitals the MARC concept would be used and that there would be six such complexes. Of course, the definition of the MARC concept required some additional editorial drafting work, cither in the Special Working Group ore meant that we should have more precise language than had been tabled so far, since tho respective formulas of the sides were somewhat different at present. The consideration he hadearlier was not intended to imply that for defense of national capitals any radars would beother than those which were covered by the MARC concept. Tor his part, he would like to ask thequestion: what was the reason in the view of the US side foreparate reservation on

RB.EASED AUfi_

Reportedr<s of Deputy Foreign 1'in

duringelegates' meeting, ?

Semenov sale chat the foreign policy course of the USSR, as guided by the decisions ofh Congress of the CFSU, was aimed at strengthening peace and international security and at ensuring an easing of tensions in compliance with the legitimate interests of states and nations.. The Soviet Union believed chat the cessation of the arms race and the normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States would constitute an important contribution to ensuring peace and detente. This was precisely what constituted the basis for the approach of the Soviet side Co the present mostmoment in the negotiations on limiting strategic armaments. it was obvious that we could poinc out that in the course of these negotiations the two sides had succeeded inumber of substantive differences between their respective positions and in workingumber of mutually acceptable provisions for the joint drafts of the Treaty on*the Limitation of ABM Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Thereommon understanding between us that for theof completing work on these two documents ic would be necessary in the nearest future to find mutually acceptable solutions to the remaining unagreed issues.

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT deieesie Trxsovelegate*' meeting, ey Helsinki:

In an effort to acconr.ocate the considerations expressed by the US side andiew to workingmutually acceptable provisions, the Sovietyesterday hadraft for an agreed statement on Article II of the Interim Agreement which stated: "The Parties understand that in the process of modernitat ion and replacement there would be no substantial increase in the external observable with the aid of national technical means of verification, of land-based ICBM silocurrently in the possession of therovision would indeed not ii-pede the work of modernizing land-based ICBM silo launchers which were referred to in the US statement oft was quite obvious that in the course of such modern zation theghc arise for insignificant changes in the external dimensions of ICBM silo launchers, observable by national technical means of verification.

Trusov said that, in regard to Article II of the Interim Agreement, the Soviet side had proceeded from the premise that the main purpose of statements made by the US side was to preclude the possibility ofother ballistic missile launchers covered by the Agreement into modern heavy ICBM launchers. the Soviet side approached this objective as follows: (a) it envisaged an undertaking by the sides not to convert launchers built4 into

elude an undertaking not to increase substantially the dimensions of ICBM launchers, observable by national technical means of verification; and (c) it took into account the understanding of the sides of precisely which types of missiles would be covered by theand the capability of identifying them withby national technical means of verification. In the light of these circuastances, the Soviet side believed it to be completely superfluous to include any kind of definitions of light and heavy missiles.

P.gpor.tsd rencrks af Soviet SAL? dalagGta Trusovsettng, Helsinki:

Trusov said that the US sice had expressed the view that theeezead co include provisions that would preclude the possibility or an increasethe number of heavy ICBMs byof launchers of other types of missiles into heavy ICBM launchers. The Soviet side believed that the obligations co be assumed by the sides not to.convert light land-basedaunchers and land-based ICBM launchers of older types built4 into launchers for land-based heavy missiles, "'ich* the information which could be obtained by national technical means of verification, would provide full assurance of compliance with theof the Interim Agreement. Ac the same time, ir. an effort to accommodate the considerations expressed by the US side andiew to working out mutually acceptable provisions, Che Soviet Delegation yesterday hadraft for an agreed statement on Article II of the Interim Agreement which stated: "The Parties understand that in che process of modernization and replacement there would be no substantial increase in the external dimensions, observable with the aid of national technical means of verification, of land-based ICBM silo launchers currently in the possession of che Parties." rovision would indeed not impede the work of modernizing land-based [CUM silo launchers which, were referredn the US. statement OfZ. It was quite obvious that in che course of such modernization che necessity might arise for insichanges in che external dimensions of ICBM silo launchers, observable by nationalmeans of verification. However, this would not in any way create the possibilicy of converting light and older land-based ballistic missile launchers into modern heavy ICBM launchers. It was the view of che Soviet side that the obligation provided for in this proposed agreed stacemenc would fully meet thechat had been presented by the US side on che subject of heavy missiles and their limitation.

Trusov said tha:, ir. regard to Article It of the Intcria Agreement, the Soviet side had proceeded from the pronise that the sain purpose of statements made by the US side was to preclude the possibility of converting other ballistic missile launchers covered by the Agreement into modern heavy ICBM launchers. Accordingly, the Soviet side approached this objective as follows: (a) it envisaged anby the sides not to convert launchers builti into oodern heavy ICBM launchers; (b) it proposed to include an undertaking not to increase substantially the dimensions of ICBM launchers, by national technical means of verification; and (c) it took into account the understanding of the sides of precisely which types of missiles would be covered by the Agreement and the capability ofthem with certainty by national technical means of verification. In the light of these the Soviet side believed it to besuperfluous to ir.clude any kind of definitions of light and heavy missiles.

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Ropc-rcad ranarks sf Deputy Foreign Hinimttr Semenov end Soviet SALT delegate' S'ncrukin and Trueovelegates' meeting, Helsinki:

Semenov seated that among the remainingwas che iasortant question of modernballistic missiles. Kith respect to thishad to face the difficulty that we had not yeton formulation of agreed provisions toit. On the other hand, this question hadwithin tho purview of the negotiationstwo Delegations, specifically during theoint draft text for the Interin Freeze The US side had repeatedly emphasized itsincluding submarines with ballistic missiles inoffensive arms to be covered by theAgreement. The Soviet Delegation hadpositions on this question both in Vienna and In so doing, the Soviet side hadthat in view of tha special place occupied bywith ballistic missiles in the overallstrategic armar.ents,ifferent approach wouldfor 'heir consideration Chan che approachoffensive armaments to be

among the weapons systems to be frozen under the Interim Agreement. This was an objective fact which one could not fail to take into account when working ouc mutually acceptable limitation*. iew to ensuring the success of our negotiations, che Soviet Delegation had already pointed out that for the purpose of ensuring international detente, normalizing relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, and curbing the arms race the Soviet side agrees to consider the question of including modern submarines with ballistic missiles in the Interim Freeze Agreement. Thisa breakthrough in the negotiations, ensuring completion of drafting such an agreement.

The Soviet- side took into account the fact that now there was agreement in principle between the sides regarding the approach to the question of including submarines wiih ballistic missiles and ballistic missile launchers on these submarines in the Interim Agreement. The objective situation demanded that this question be solved in an agreement inay as to take into

account the special position ol submarines with ballistic missiles in the complex of strategicarms. In considering this question, of course, the following factors also had to be taken into the fact that the geographic situation of our two countries differed, the existence ofwith ballistic missiles In the possession of US Allies in NATO, as well as the existence ofbases used by US SLBM submarines. All these factors had to be taken into account, for only then would inclusion of submarines in the Interimbe consistent with the principle of ensuring equal security and not providing unilateralfor cither side.

Proceeding from all the above and taking into account the considerations on that score expressed by the US side, the Soviet side agreed to the for the sides of appropriate limits on the numbers of modern submarines and SLBM launchers to be limited for the period of effectiveness of the Interim Freeze Agreement. Tt was obvious that in view of what had been said above, and in order to_ precludeerious strategic advantage for the United States, these levels could not be equal for the two sides. In working out appropriatefor the draft Interim Agreement, thishad io be duly considered. It was intended that during the period of effectiveness of the Interim Agreement cite sides would reduce the numbers of their land-based ICBM launchers by removing old missile launchers. An appropriate provision on that score could be handled in the form of statements by the sides to be attached to the Interim Agreement. The Delegation of the Soviet Union was prepared to discuss with the Delegation of the United States the practical questions involved in final working out of relevant provisions for the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Semenov concluded by saying that today he had presented some considerations of the Soviet side on the question of including SLBMs in the Interim Frcete Agreement. eeting the next day he intended to continue his presentation.

FI-3S

Smith said ch?.t, as he understood it, in the ex-char.gcs which had taken piacc between our autaori :ics.

on tliis questionnclusion of SLBMs in the [neerim Agreement, there scented to be common ground between us on the concept chat SLBMs would be included in the freeze and that replacement would uc effected inwith any increased production of SLBMs. That was his understanding of the limit of the common ground between us on this question. The considerations which Semenov had raised today involving geographic disadvantages, forward-based advantages, and the fact that certain third countries had submarines, were not acceptable considerations from our point of view. He wanted to state this at the very beginning of ourof this issue [and believed chat this fact had already been communicated to Semenov'sntil he heard further specifics of the 5oviet position, he would not beosition to provide any additional reaction- from our side.

Semenov said he assumed chat Smith would recall thac at past meetings in Helsinki the Soviet side had already expressed its considerations on these three factors Smith had mentioned. The Soviet side believed that these were objective and realistic existing factors and that they should be taken into account in working out an agreement. He had not intended to imply that Smith would share his views on thisut he had wanted to state that this was Che substance of the Soviet position which in their view should be ap-propriaccly taken into account inutually acceptable solution.

Smith said he understood that Semenov had made arguments of this sore in the past, and that Semenov had repeated them here today. Semenov knew they were not acceptable to the US side. He did not believe it would be fruitful at this stage of our negotiations if he were to restate why these considerations were not acceptable to us. We needed to deal with specifics and not resume debate on reasons already stated in the past.

Semenov agreed that it would be desirable toon specifics; in this respect he shared Smith's point of view. For his part, he also did not believe it useful to continue presenting reasons in support of the considerations which he had already presented in the past, because these facts did objectively exist in reality, outside and independent of our

Trusov said that the US si'ce had expressed the view that the Interim Freeze Agreement had to include provisions that would preclude the possibility of an increase in the nunber of heavy ICBMs by conversion of launchers of other types of missiles into heavy ICBM launchers. The Soviet side believed that the obligations to be assuned by the sides not tolight land-based ICBM launchers and land-bnsed heavy missiles, together with the information which could be obtained by national technical means of verification, would provide full assurance ofwith the provisions of the Interim Agreement. At the same time, in an effort to accommodate the considerations expressed by the US sice andiew to working out mutually acceptable provisions, the Soviet Delegation yesterday hadraft for an agreed statement on Article II of the Interim Agreement which stated: "The Parties understand that in the process of modernization and replacement there would be no substantial increase in the external dimensions, observable with the aid of nationalmeans of verification, of land-based ICBM silo launchers currently in the possession of theould indeed not impede the work of modernizing land-based ICBM silo.launchers which were referred to in the US statement oft was quite obvious that in the course of suchthe necessity might arise for insignificant changes in the external dimensions of ICBM silo launchers, observable by national technical means of verification. However, this would not in any way create the possibility of converting light and older land-based ballistic missile launchers into modern heavy ICBM launchers. It was the view of the Soviet side

that the obligation provided for in this proposed agreed statement would fully meet the considerations that had been presented by the US side on the subject .of heavy missiles and their limitation.

Nitzc had one question. Heifference between che two drafts in the description of missiles. IVe had spoken of nissile launchers of older types initially deployedhile the Soviet*pokc of iiiissile launchers constructedis question was: is chore any difference between these two formulas, is there any significance in chis dis Unction?

Trusov replied that he did not think so.

Semenov said he believed chat in working out the joint drafts thef this provision could easily be conformed co each other, because in fact theof che two sides was identical.

Trusov said that, in regard to Article II of che Interim Agreement, the Soviet side had proceeded from the premise that the main purpose of statements made by the US side was co preclude the possibility ofother ballistic missile launchers covered by the Agreement into modern heavy ICBM launchers. the Soviet side approached this objective as follows: (a) it envisaged an undertaking by the sides not to convert launchers built4 into modern heavy ICBM launchers; (b) ic proposed to include an undercaking not to increase substantially theof ICBM launchers, observable by nationalmeans of verification;) ic took intothe understanding of che sides of precisely which types of missiles would be covered by theand the capability of identifying them withby'national technical means of verification. In the light of these circumstances, the Soviet side believed it co be complecely superfluous to include any kind of definitions of lighc and heavy missiles.

Trusov wanted toew words on the subject of ICBM definition. The Soviet Side believed thac the sidesufficiently precise understanding on this score. At the sane time, taking aapproach to our negotiations, the Soviet side hadraft statement on ArticlehichICBM launchers referred to in that Article as being launchers for ballistic missiles capable of ranges in excess of the distance between theof the northern border of the European part of the continental USSR and the midpoint of the northern border of the continental US. In the Soviet view such language had the following advantages: (lj it best suited the subject matter of the Interimwhich envisioned freezing ICBM launchers, the definition wasoncrete nature in that it tookriterion the distance between the border of the European part of the USSR and the nearest area of deployment of ICBM launchers in the United States.

Nitze pointed out that our preliminarywas that this definition would resultilometers. Suchwould imply that land-basedcapable of hitting most of theof the continental US would bybe covered by the

Shchukin asked for clarification of"the words "most of the contiguous portion of the continental US."

Nitze said that this phrase was meant to describe moref the contiguous continental United States, thetates, excluding Alaska and Hawaii

Trusov said that frankly, he did not understand what bearing this had on the definition of an ICBM. Since we were talking about intercontinental ballistic missiles, obviously itatter of missiles that could reach the territory of the other country. Furthermore, he did not understand what considerations Nitze was guided by when he spoke of the Interim Agree-

a: being intended to Creese new construction of launchers Cor ICBMs of older types and for land-based fixed soft. ICBMs.

' Nitze wanted to put his point again. If onean ICBM asissileange of moreilometers, that would mean that any missileange lessilometers would not be considered an ICBM by definition, and that new starts for such launchers could be undertaken. Such missiles, depending upon where their launchers were located, could cover morefState territory of the United States.

Semenov said that this consideration was clear.

Reported remarks of Deputy Foreign Miniater Semenovelegates' meeting, Helsinki:

Semenov said that the Soviet side had expressed its agreement to consider the question of including modern SLUM submarines and their SLBM launchers into the Interim Agreement with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The Soviet side was convinced that agreement in principle between the sides on the approach to the solution of thiswould contributeroductive solution and would be of great significance for workingraft Interim Agreement in the short time remaining to us. Today he would like to continue presentation of some aspocts related to the question of modern submarines and the SLBM launchers on these submarines, and he would also complete presentation of the Soviet proposals. In the course of all previous phases of SALT both sides had proceeded from the premise that modernization and replacement of the armaments being limited would not be prohibited. In this connection, in addition to tho proposals he had presented the day before, he would state that the Soviet side would consider it necessary to register in the Interim Agreement the right of both sides to modernization and replacement of older submarines by new submarines but without exceeding the number of modern submarines

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and of the SLUM launchers on those submarines, at appropriate levels for each side. Semenov would also like to note that the solution of the question of including SLUM submarines and their SLBM launchers in the Interim Agreement, which he had proposedwould represent only partial compensation for the imbalance in SLBMs between the sides. Therefore, the Soviet side proceeded from the premise that this entire question, and above all the question of liquidating US submarine bases beyond US territory, must receive an appropriate solution in the follow-on negotiations, and in this connection he proposed that the appropriate form of recording the mutual understanding on that score be discussed with the US side. The Soviet side had repeatedly stated that the possession of SLBM submarines' by US Allies in NATOactor that could not fail to be taken into account by the Soviet side. This was an objective reality and, of course, we could not abstract ourselves from this fact. If during the period of effectiveness of the Interim Agreement US Allies in NATO were to increase the number of SLBM submarines in their possession over and above those operational or ui:dcr construction at the present time, then the Soviet Union reserved the right toincrease the numbers of its SLBM submarines. In stating this, he did not intend to insist that this provision be recorded as part of the text of the Interim Agreement, and the Soviet side was prepared to discuss mutually acceptable ways of solving the question of how such an understanding could be formalized. To accommodate the wishes of the US side the Soviet Unionfewas prepared to agree that the interim freeze agreement remain in effecteriod of.five years, unless replaced before the.cxpiration of that period of time by an agreement on'more complete measures limiting strategic offensive arras. There was no doubt that the Soviet proposal to include modern SLBM submarines in the Interim Agreement was constructive. The Soviet side believed that now it was necessary for us to focus our efforts on the search for concrete mutually acceptable language on this question, so as to complete work on drafting the Interim Agreement, bearing in mind that this document, together with the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems, could bo signed during the Soviet-American summit meeting.

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Crinevskiy and advisor KishiloveetingS SALT advisor Gartkoff,elsinki:

Garthoff noted that the Soviet side hsd dropped the statement from the US proposed agreed interpretive statement associated withhich explained that "new construction" of ICBM launchers meant construction of additional such_launchers. The US side could agree to drop that sentence, but only if the Article itself could be slightly reworded to make clear that the undertaking was not to startof additional launchers- Alternatively, if tho Soviet side wished to retain the agreed draftbout new construction in the Article itself, wethe additional sentence in the interpretive statement necessary. After some discussion, Crinevskiy agreed that it was clearer in English to speak about not starting construction of additional launchers, but he was uncertain about the effect in Russian, where it was awkward to use the word "additional". Garthoff agreed, but suggested perhaps using in Russian the word "new" modifying launchers- Kishilov and Grinevskiy thought that might be considered, but it might also be ambiguous with respect to not starting more launchers of an old type. The matter was not conclusively resolved, but it was agreed that- there was no difference except in terms of determining the best draftingiew to translatability.

Grinevskiy asked about the second sentence in theroposed interpretive statement concerning completion of ICBM launchers under active construction. Garthoff said that the US side was prepared to agree toentence, and he had one with slightly revised wording which he would propose after some other elements involved in the formulation ofad been discussed. Crinevskiy indicated satisfaction- Garthoff noted that the American side assumed on the basis of previous exchanges on that subject that the words "active construction" excluded cases of launchers construction of which had been initiated several years ago butong time ago. The Sovietagreed that "active construction" related to launchers on which in fact construction remained underway.

Garthoff noted that the Soviet formulation continued not to cover mobile Una-based ICBMs. In the US view, such mobile launchers should be included. Nonetheless, bearing in mind tha: Article VII provided thatof the interim Agreement would not prejudice the terms of limitations to be worked out in subsequent negotiation, and toutually acceptable solution to the matter, the US side was prepared to refer in the Article itself simply to "fixed" ICBM launchers. However, inase, there should be an agreed interpretive statement to the effect that: "The Parties agree that they will not deploy land-mobile ICBM launchers during the period of operation of the Interim Agreement." Grincvskiy said that the Soviet position with respect to mobile ICBM launchers had been clearly stated, but he would take note of and report the US proposal. He did not comment directly upon the use of the word "fixed" in place of "silo and fixed soft" as stated in the Soviet language, but he seemed to accept the abbreviated form.

Garthoff noted that two problems remained in connection with the definition conr.vLned in anstatement. First, the US side believed that the definition should state clearly that ICBM launchers arc land-based. Incidentally, the US side agreed with the Soviet suggestion to couch the definition in terms of ICBM launchers, rather than ICBMs. Grincvskiy said there was no difference in substance with respect to the term "land-based". Garthoff suggested that it was much simpler to use the term in the definition, and to omit it in the many other cases where reference was made to ICBMs oraunchers. Grincvskiy suggested that it would still bo clearer, at least in some cases, to use the term "land-based" in the actual Articles. Moreover, the interpretive statement would not necessarily appear together with the Articles. Turning to the second issue involved in the definition, Garthoff noted that the Soviet definition was not satisfactory, for reasons which had been indicated in the Delegates' meeting the day before. For this reason, the US side continued to believe that the definition it had proposed was appropriate. Grincvskiy did not accept, nor argue against, the American-proposed definition. He.-indicated that the matter was under study in his

Delegation. He did not propose the definition included in the Soviet proposal of Way 6.

After having run through the considerationsabove, Garthoff gave the Sovietext reflecting the points which had been discussed. (Sec

Turning to Article II, Garthoff asked why the Soviet side continued to Unit application of the Article to ICBMs, rather than to non-conversion into launchers for modern heavy strategic ballistic missiles in general. Crinevskiy said that his Delegation had always looked at this problem in terms of ICBMs, since there were heavy land-based ICBMs, and there were no other heavy strategic ballistic missiles. He said that since the recent discussion whore Garthoff had referred for the first time to SLBMs in this connection, his Delegation had again considered this matter and did not believe it appropriate or necessary to refer to anything but heavy land-based ICBMs. He asked whether the US side had or expected to have heavy SLBMs. Garthoff replied that neither side presently had heavy SLBMs, and it was unlikely that any would be deployed during the period of the freeze. Nonetheless, because of the significance of very large strategic missiles, the US side had thought it appropriate to use the broader formulation. However, since the matter was not one of current concern, and since the interim freeze related only to certain offensive weapons limitations, the US side was prepared without prejudice to future more complete limitations to agree in the interim freeze that the language of Article II refer to modern heavy ICBMs. Crinevskiy expressed satisfaction. Garthoff thenimplified Article II, which he wished to present in conjunction with revisedstatements associated with the Article. (See

Grinevskiy noted that the Soviet proposal oformulation to deal with the question of "modern" launchers in the Article II itself. Why was it necessary to have the second sentence of the proposal just advanced? Garthoff agreed that it would be possible to include the substance of the point in the Article,

although with some drafting changes from the Soviet formulation. Grinevskiy indicated thai drafting changes would present no problem. Garthoff repeated that this could be done, but that it might be useful first to consider other aspects of the Article, including the distinction between "light" and "heavy" ICBMs. Grincvskiy said there was no need for definition of light andP-Ms. Each side knew which ICBMs were light and which were heavy. Moreover, the Soviet-proposed article, in conjunction with an interpretive statement relating to not increasing substantially the external dimensions of ICBM silo launchers, would deal with the whole problem. Garthoff disagreed. He said that whether in an interpretive statement or in the Article, it was necessary tolear, common understanding of the difference between light and heavy ICBMs. Me agreed that we both understood the categorization of contemporary ICBMs,efinition was needed in order to deal with possible future missiles. Moreover,rovision on not increasing theof silo launchers was important to assist in verifying this provision, it could not serveubstitutelear definition of what it was that was to be verified. Crinevskiy continued to contend that it was unnecessary to define heavy ICBMs. Garthoff noted that the Soviet definition referred to heavy ICBMs only in connection with modern ones, and not inwith older types. Grincvskiy suggested that there was no need for such reference, nor indeed for any reference toerhaps ail that was needed was to agree not to convert launchers for older ICBMs into launchers for current heavy ones. Garthoff The question was left unresolved, with both sides agreeing to consider it further.

There followed an extended discussion of thestatement relating to dincnensions of silo launchers. Garthoff asked what the Soviet side meant by "externalnd why it was so specified. Garthoffhart which depicted types of missile silos, with and without internal sleeves, and asked the Soviet participants if they would point out what the external dimensionsilo were. Both Crinevskiy and Kishilov said they did not know, but agreed to look into the matter further for clarification.

Grincvskiy referred to the fact that the Soviet proposal included the qualifier "observable with the aid of national technical neans ofarthoff noted that the US side considered it unnecessary and undesirable to includehrase. Grincvskiy argued that both sides agreed that the agreement should be verified by national means. Garthoff agreed, and said that for that reason it was unnecessary, and it could be invidious to makeeference in an individual case. The US side indeed agreed that this provision, like all others, would be monitored by national technical means. If, however, the Soviet side had in mind in addition using the estimated performance of national technical means as an clement in establishing the standard for permissible increase in silo dimensions', the US was not prepared to agree to such an approach. Notional technical means would be used, but we could notituation where an obligation itself was defined in terms of performance of national technical means. Grincvskiy argued strongly for inclusion of the phrase, but Garthoff was adamant in opposing its inclusion.

Garthoff asked what the Soviet side meant by speaking of no "substantial increase". Grincvskiy argued that it was not possible to quantify precisely what the term meant, but he thought both sideswhat "substantial" meant, and it would always be possible to raise any question in the Standing Consultative Commission. Garthoff agreed that any question could be raised, but that it was surely in the mutual interests of both to reduce uncertainties and inquiries. He said he was not sure if both sides understood what the "word "substantial" meant. ifferent word had been used from the ono employed in the interpretive statement on test and training launchers. Grincvskiy and Kishilov both said that it made no particular difference whether the word used was "substantial" or "significant".

It was agreed that further consideration needed to be given to the termsinternal or externalsubstantialnd to the best combination of form with respect to what should be included in the Article and what should be left to an interpretive statement.

Grinevskiy asked whether the American proposal for including infhe sentence "Each Party shall not use covered facilities for fitting out or berthing submarines" was necessary.

Garthoff replied that it was, in order toto the effectiveness of national technical means of verification. Grinevskiy gave what appeared torepared response, arguing that the provision was unnecessary and inappropriate; unnecessary, because there was no need for such explicit mention since the subject was covered adequately by the agreed language inf the Article (relating to non-interference with national technical means, and non-use of deliberate concealment measures which impeded verification by national technicalnd inappropriate, because it was not proper to single out submarines for particular attention--such reference raised a' question about other systems not mentioned.

Garthoff noted with satisfaction the Soviet acceptance of the first two sentences off Article VIII by the Soviet side. Grincvskiy interrupted to point out that the Soviet side now agreed officially to the American proposalevised wording off the Article as well. Garthoff then asked why the Soviet side had not included in its draft the proposed final sentence off this aimore comprehensive agreement] has not been achieved in five years, this Interim Agreement nay.be extended by mutual

Grinevskiy "replied that it was quite unnecessary to note that two parties mightuture time decide something by mutual agreement, and, moreover, that it would appear that the parties were not even nowin their expectationore comprehensive agreement would be reached in five years. For that matter, Grinevskiy continued, five years was really too long; it should be two or three.

Grinevskiy then raised the subject of the draft agreed interpretive statement on test and training launchers. Heew Soviet proposal, based closely upon the previous ad hoc draft developed at a

recent meeting of the Group of Four. Garthoffew draft on his part as well, and several areas of overlap were noted. There was some discussion of whether the term "land-based" should or should not be used in modifying "ICBM". Garthoff objected that in the first clause of the Soviet draft it was ambiguous whether the term "land-based" qualified only ICBM launchers or also SLBM test and training launchers. Grinevskiy agreed to delete the word "land-based" in that clause, in exchange for American agreement to include the phrase in the next clause referring to modern heavy ICBMs.

(The text of the Soviet proposal, and the agreed compromise text which emerged from the meeting without any bracketed differences, arc included in

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT advisor Kishilovonversation uiih OS SALT advisoray Helsinki:

Kishilov acknowledged the awkwardness of the ofate of signature, an arbitrary specific date such as Julynd date of entry into force. He said that in practice there was not any real difference, but they hoped Semenov's suggestion of the day before wouldolution. As forf the Interim Agreement, they did not think that reference to date of signature for an in distinctionescriptive reference such as occurred at several othor points, was They had*not been able to come upetter solution than to suggest the. date of Julysked ifas any better than Junend Kishilov replied it .made no difference.

I berated Kishilov for Semcnov's recital ofconcerning SLBM forward basing, our allies, etc. Kishilov remarked that what had been said was "not new." greed, but saidad not expected it to be repeated again at this time. Kishilovalmost apologetically, that "instructions are instructions."

emarks of Deputy Foreign Minister Semenovuncheon conversation with US SALT aclegcte Parsons, Helsinki:

I remarked itoincidence that our big remaining problems were in Articles III, one in the ABM Treaty and one in the Interim Treaty. Semenov said he hoped this was not so as regards Article III of the Interim Agreement. This could be very simpleide agreement could express our more detailed understandings bn SLBMs. aid we awaited withmore concrete indications of their position and if it involved confidential agreements on theid not see how this was possible for us. The Congress, and the public, would expect to know the facts and this could be important for the agreements. Semenov said he expected to make their position clear la.ter today (and so he did).

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT expert Shelepin during a luncheon conversation with US SALT advisors Graybeal and Shinn, ay Helsinki:

There was an extended discussion of the words "external dimensions" in the Soviet draft agreed statement for Article II of the Tnterim Agreement. Initially, Shelepin said that this wording was used because only the "external dimensions" wereby national technical means of verification. However, after Graybeal pressed the point that "external dimensions" were meaningless in determining the size of missile which could be accommodatedilo launcher, making his point visually by useough diagram, Shelepin wonde'red whether there might notinguistic misunderstanding involved. Specifically, the Soviet words translated asuskovayaight designate only thepart of the silo so that the Soviet"external dimensions" might actually mean the same thing as "interior diameter" in our concept-Shelepin confessed that he was not an export in these matters but said he would bring this possibility to the attention of those who were.

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Crinevskiyuncheon conversation with US SALT advisor Weiler, elsinki:

Grincvskiy noted that the Soviet Delegation would be addressing the SLBM question this afternoon and said that he hoped that the mobile ICBM question would nottumbling block to an agreement. aid that with respect to mobiles the ideaituation under an interim offensive agreement in which the Soviets would or could proceed with the deployment of mobile ICBMs was just not part of the practical world andas sure he wasare of this. Grinevskiy responded that the Interim Agreement would beartial one and did not include various systems. He said that as far as the Soviet Union knew the US might be proceeding's, ULMS and also had Pershings in Europe that couldthe Soviet Union. aid he was mistaken about Pciishings and that the Soviet Union undoubtedly knewbout US plans with respect's* and ULMSd me to believe that he was merely making debating points dded that the Soviet side would have to face upolution of the mobile ICBM question if it expected an agreement to be reached and expected an agreement to be supported in the US. Crinevskiy replied thai, if the US had seriousto the fact that the Soviets had notay to deal with the mobile ICBM question, the US should make this fact clear, adding that silence on the part of the US Delegation would be interpreted as agreement. Crinevskiy then said that, speaking personally, he would cell me that the Only instructions the Soviet Delegation had on Dhis question were to continue to oppose inclusion of mobile ICBMs in the Interim Agreement.

S0

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT advisor Kishilovuncheon conversation with US SALT advisor Garthoff,elsinki:

Kishilov did not wish to go into the substance of the Soviet SLBM position at that time, but he did say that it wouldeneral provision for inclusion as Article III of the Interim Agreement, plus one or more interpretive agreements or"on the side". ide understanding with specific numbers might, for example, remain confidential. Kishilov also disclosed that the Soviet proposed article would notreeze date, but was couched in terms of levels (differing) of modern submarines and of SLBM launchers for the sides.

Kishilov remarked that the Americanapparently not delivered itself of all thehad intended to raise in the meeting Sunday I said that was correct, and that inhad not had time to mention one point of inclusion of land-mobile ICBMthe freeze. Kishilov replied that, as Iwas that mobile launchers shouldincluded. aid that thisatter ofimportance to us. Would we be ablea mutually acceptable solution more readilydealt with this matter in an agreed Kishilov said, in highwas some partial fallback in the Sovietthought that it could be helpful to makeinterpretive statement. aid thatove at the meeting of the Croup of

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Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Crinevskiu and advisor Kishiloveeting with US SALT' advisorelsinki:

Grinevskiy referred to the fact that the Soviet proposal included the qualifier "observable with the aid of national technical neans ofarthoff noted tha; the US side considered it unnecessary and undesirable to includehrase. Grinevskiy argued that both sides agreed that the agreement should be verified by national means. Garthoff agreed, and said that for that reason it was unnecessary, and it could be invidious to makeeference in an individual case. Tho US side ihdecd agreed that this provision, like all others, would be monitored by national technical means. If, however, the Soviet side had in mind in addition using the estimated performance of national technical means as an element in establishing the standard for permissible increase in silo dimensions, the US was not prepared to agree to such an approach. National technical means would be used, but we could notituation where an obligation itself was defined in terns of performance of national technical means." Grinevskiy argued strongly for inclusion of the phrase, but Garthoff was adamant in opposing its inclusion.

Grinevskiy asked whether the American proposal for including infhe sentence "Each Party shalljiot use covered facilities for fitting out or berthing submarines" was necessary.

Garthoff replied that it was, in order toto the effectiveness of national technical means of verification. Grinevskiy gave what appeared torepared response, arguing that the provision was unnecessary and inappropriate; unnecessary, because there was no need for such explicit mention

since the subject was covered adequately by the agreed language inf the Article (relating to non-interference with national technical means, and non-use of deliberate concealment measures which inpedca verification by national technicalnd inappropriate, because it was not proper to single out submarines for particular attention--such referenceuestion about other systems not mentioned.

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT expert Shelepinuncheon conversation with OS SALT advisors Craybeal and Shinrt, ay Helsinki:

There was an extended discussion of the words "external dimensions" in the Soviet draft agreed statement for Article II of the Interim Agreement. Initially, Shclcpin said that this wording was used because only the "external dimensions" wereby national technical means of verification.Graybeal pressed the point thatdimensions" were meaningless in determining tho size of missile which could be accommodatedilo launcher, making his point visually by useough diagram, Shelepin wondered whether there might notinguistic misunderstanding involved. Specifically, the Soviet words translated asuskovayaight designate only thepart of the silo so that the Soviet formulation "external dimensions" might actually mean the same thing as "interior diameter" in our concept-. Shelepin confessed that he was not an expert in these matters but said he would bring this possibility to theof thoseere.

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT advisor Kishilovuncheon conversation with US SALT advisor Carthoff,elsinki:

Kishilov said the Soviet position was firmly, against inclusion of an explicit provision prohibiting covered facilities for fitting-out or berthing even as an agreed interpretive statement. He saidrovision was not needed, given the general-.provision not to use deliberate concealment measures impeding verification by national technical

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Pleshakovuncheon conversation uith US SALT advisor Garthoff, Helsinki;

Pleshakov indicated that they now understood clearly the power/antenna product of the MSR radar. He noted that we had referred for the first timo to the receiver antenna area, since we were speakingtandard for other types of large phased-array radars. onfirmed that such was precisely the case. ommented that, as he no doubt knew, for the MSR the receiver antenna area and transmitter antenna area were essentially the sane, but that since this was-not the case with large bistatic radars, we did indeed wish tolear standard which would apply to them. Pleshakov said that the potentialadar should really be based on the product of power and transmitter antenna area, but he could understand that from the standpoint of judging by use of national technical means it would be appropriate to use the receiver antenna area. (Comment: This did not correspond to ny understanding o: the reason for specifying receiver antenna arca--namely, that it was the relevant parameter for gauging effective rangeadar, but since Pleshakov seemed to accept the definition we were seeking, andm not expert on radar matters,id not pursue this point further.)

I asked Pleshakov what the Soviet side meant in referring to certain radars for ABM defense of ICBM silos as "substantially smaller" in potential than the smallest currently deployed ABM radar. ssumed the latter refercn* is the MSR. Pleshakov confirmed the MSR as the refcrenf, and said that by "substantially smaller" they meant "smaller by one order of magnitude." He further commented that, in any event, therearge "gray area" in judging such things by national technical means. greed with the latter comment, but said that there should nonethelesslear understanding on thelevel to which the two sides wouldlass of radars, and his indication of what his side meant by "substantially smaller" was very helpful in that respect. Plcshakov agreed that there should be an agreed standard.

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Pleshakoveeting,elsinki:

Pleshakov said that with due account for the two drafts for Article III of the draft Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems tabled by the two Delegations, it now appeared necessary to state the following

Delegationsommon understanding on

the number and nature of areas for deployment of ABM systems,ne area for each side in which an ABM system would be deployed for defense of the national capital and one area for each side in which an ABM system would be deployed for defense of ICBM silo launchers.

equality in the size of areas of deployment of ABM system componentscircular areasadiusilometers.

' (c) equality in numbers of ABM l'aunchers and interceptors,o moref each in each area, both for defense of national capitals and for defense of ICBM silo launchers.

There was also convergence of positionsumber of other questions. In the view of the Soviet side this situation brought the two Delegations closer to the possibility of agroeingoint draft for Article III of the draft Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems.

for differences in views between thethey concerned the specific questionbe used for ABM defense of ICBMwould like to note that the Soviet side hadthe US proposal to limit the number of moderncomplexes in each area to six. Theconsisted in that the US Delegationfor protection of ICBM launchers ABM radars within

these complexes, which were not operational or under construction on the date of.signature of the AlW Treaty, shouldmaller potential than the smallest phased array ABM radar protecting ICBMs which is operational or under construction on the date of signature of the ABM Treaty. In substance, in so doing the US Delegation would provide for itself the unilateral right to have two larger ABM. radars, and thereby it was departing from the principle of providing equal terms for the limitation of ABM systems. In working out the draft Treaty on ABMs, the Soviet Delegation proceeded from the premise that one should not try to prescribe for the sides any single technical approach to theof ABM systems in defense of ICBM launchers. umber of different ways of solving this problem were possible, all of which would be fully consistent with the principles and aims underlying the ABM Treaty. The Soviet side had repeatedly stated itson this question. As the US side knew, they were refiectcd in the Soviet draft for Article III which stated that deployment of ABM radarsubstantially smaller potential than those used in modern ABM radar complexes within the areas of ABM system deployment in defense of ICBM silo launchers would-not be limited. In this connection, in the opinion of the Soviet side the doubts raised by the US side the day before were not convincing.

Further, at yesterday's mini-plenary meeting, the US side had raised the question of defining the geographic location of ICBM launchers to be defended by ABM The Soviet side in its proposed text for Article III had included an appropriate provision on this subject in subparagraph (b) of paragraphrovision that would solve this'problem. The Soviet side believed that the formula in that proposal was sufficient for purposes of the ABM Treaty and,. -moreover, it assumed that the sideslearof how an adequate number of ICBM launchers could bo protected by ABM systems.

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Shchukinonversation uith US SALT delegate Hitzeelegates' meeting, Helsinki:

Shchukin began the conversation byictureapital defense deployment area and illustrating thereby that the Soviet side wish six MARCs in addition to the four locations in which they today have mechanical scan-dish radars. He also made it clear that they do not intend tomore than an aggregatenterceptors/ launcherseployment area. ade the point that, in my view, the word "deployed" meant not only those deployed in the future, but included those which had been deployed in the past. For greater certainty of clarity we had proposed using the word'"have." In either case,elieved ancovering the mechanical scan-dish radars would benecessary in Article III,

We then discussed the question of thethe ICBM defense deployment areas. aidmust have language making it clear that theirbe either east of the Urals or at leastof the European portion of the Sovietwhich,emembered it, he hadVienna. Shchukin said thereroblemto how such an area would be centered. that it was not our intention toay which would include launchers'Grand Forks field. Shchukin said that was

ifed remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Crinevskiy and advisor Kishilov during a conversation uxth US SALT advisor Garthoff, Helsinki:

Carthoff opened by suggesting that theturn in the first instance to Article III of the ADM Treaty, lie noted that the only difference in the lead-in'ofas the US use of the phrase "ABM systems or ABM components" and the Soviet use of "ABM systems or their components". He asked if the Soviet side had any preference. Grincvskiy said that the Soviet side continued to prefer its formulation, since that was the standard formulation used in the other articles, and it seemed quite clear. Garthoff agreed to accept the Soviet formulation. He then noted that thereifference between terms in referring to the deployment area for defendin the national capital. The US draft referrednational capital defense deploymenthile the Soviet draft referred to "an ABM systemarea for defense of the nationalarthoff said that tlie Soviet formulation seemed clearer, and agreed to accept it. Garthoff notede Soviet draft used the verb "deploy" with respect to launchers and interceptors, while the US draft used the verb "have". Carthoff suggested that, particularly in view of the discussion the day before, the word "have" would be preferable. Grincvskiy noted that there might be some components which were producedactory, for example, within the ISO kilometer circle, but he believed that neither side meant to include such components. Carthoff agreed, but said that he thought this point was dealt with by the next change he would like to suggest. The US text referred to interceptor missiles "on or in the vicinity of ABMhis phrase was absent in the Soviet version. He would now like to propose inserting at that point the words "at launch sites". The sentence would then speak aboutaunchersnterceptor missiles at launch sites, clearly avoiding the possible case Grincvskiy had mentioned. Grincvskiy accepted the suggestion to include the words "at launchnd agreed to consider further the possible use of the verb "have"

Grincvskiy suggested chat it was unnecessary to include the reference to retaining operational mechanical-scan radars, since they were not included innd the article simply limited MARCs. Garthoff rejoined that this was not the case, since the Article involves an undertaking not to deploy ABM components -except as specified, and the older ABM radars and ABM components. The US side would have no objection to deleting reference to the mechanical-scan radars if the Soviet side preferred, but he wished to note that this would mean that the four existing mechanical-scan radar complexes would need to be dismantled- Grinevskiy asked, in some agitation, if this was an American proposal. Garthoff replied that it seemed tooviet proposal -- the US draft spoke about retaining currently operational mechanical-scan radars. After the discussion had continued for some time, Grinevskiy said his Delegation had not considered the full implications of the way the article was drafted, and they would reconsider the question of including the clause about mechanical-scan radars.

Garthoff further noted that the Soviet side would be retaining certain existing radars at Moscow into the equal number of six MARCs for each side, and that the US would retain the existing two radars at Grand Forks, in additionroposed equal number of six MARCs for each side for ICBM defense. objected strongly to this attempt to equate the two. Kishilov said that we had long ago agreed that the Soviet sideave the existing mechanical-scan radars in addition to an equal number of MARCs. The Soviets had moved to meet us by agreeing to place their two large existing radars at Moscow in the six MARCs, although their earlier position had been six

MARCs nlus.those tworadars. Under thosethe US could hot have two large radars at Grand Forks and the 5oviet side not have an The definitions inere readily conformed, except for the US reference to ICBM

fciiscs west of the Mississippi and oast of the Urals, and Soviet proposed language on centering ICBMin the immediate area of ICBM silo deployment. (In addition, the definition of MARCs hinges in part on resolution of the ICBM radar divergence.) argued that the Soviet formulation on centering the ICBM defense at the place where such deployment is most advanced could be interpreted as denying the USSR any such ABM deployment. Moreover, since the US deployment at Grand Forks had already substantially occurred, there was no need to attempt to define it in this round-about way. Grinevskiy confirmed that the objective of the Soviet language was to tie the American deployment to its present location in the Grand Forks ICBM field, since otherwisecircle would permit such deployment being made midway between the Grand Forks ICBM field and the next nearest .American ICBM field, thus providing coverage for many more than ISO silos. Garthoff noted that the language, of the provisions must apply equally to both sides, and the Soviet language would mean that the USSR could not deploy its ABM components midway between ICBM fields, which we understood was necessary to permit*coverageilos. Grinevskiy agreed. He suggested that we try to find some way to satisfy the concern of some people on his side that the US might take advantagerovision permittingwhich could cover the larger number of silos, while preserving opportunity for the Soviettoumber of silos comparable to those at Grand Forks. He suggested that perhaps we could refer to Grand Forks for the United States, and east of the Urals, for the USSR. Garthoff indicated .that lie doubted that would be acceptable.

Garthofflightly revised version of the US proposal for an agreed interpretiveon OLPARs. He noted that it referred to the smallest phased-array ABM radar "operational or under construction by eithern the date of rather than "currently being deployed by cither side". Grinevskiy did not seem to find any objection to it. Garthoff noted that the new formulation also

included, the phrase which had just neon aereed for, "within an ABM system ('enjoyment area for defense of ICBM silos". Grincvskiy nodded, andno objection. Finally, Garthoff noted the refer once to Article VI rather than merely Article VI. Again the Soviet participants registered no Grinevskiy said that they were notosition to discuss the* basic substance of the statement at that time. Me did, however wish to raise one drafting point from his side. His specialists'did not like our use of the phrase "objects in outer space" rather than "spaceince the American language would include missiles transiting space, and they were covered by the provision concerning Article VI ince Article VI as also listed as an exception, there was no practical difference in this case, but the Soviet side continued to prefer what they regarded as the more precise term "spacey which was meant such things as meteorites, and artificial -

Garthoff noted that agreement had been reached to use the Soviet suggested shortened form of Article VI 'The US side would, however, like to change the English language version of the formulation from "early warning radars for strategic ballistic missiles in the future"n the future radars for early warning of strategic missile attack". Garthoff thought that this would not require any change in the Russian language text. Crinevskiy said he had doubts about the wordnd wondered whether it was necessary to make any change in something earlier agreed. Garthoff again said that there was no change required in the Russian; the Russian lancuage text used the phrase "warning of rocket attack".. Kishilov also noted this latter point. Grincvskiy said he would take the new formulation, and thought there would be no trouble if the Russian text was unchanged.

Reported remarks of Deputy Foreign Minister Semenovuncheon conversation with US SALT delegate Parsons, ay Helsinki:

ehearsal of our respectiveon radars under Article III of the ABM Treaty and mention'of OLl'ARs, Minister Semenov said that their requirements had to take into account modern air defenses. Aircraft equipped with modern missiles required sui.table radar deployments for defense.

i

I asked Semenov if they had thought aboutfor the Standing Consultative Commission. The Treaty specified some things in Article XIII but others hud to be worked outocation, meeting date, duration, etc. Semenov said that these things could be settled upon ratification of the Treaty. epliedad thought we needed to look at them sooner as the Commission was supposed to exist'when the Treaty came into force.

Reported nemarks of Soviet SALT delegate Pleshakov during a luncheon conversation with US SALT delegate Allison, ay Helsinki:

Plcshakov asked-my opinion of' the latest Soviet proposal for Article III of the ABM Treaty. aid that there appeared toood deal of commonon much of the language and provisions of their latest proposal and the US proposal. There were, however, <two major problems as regards the latest Soviet proposal; namely, limits and constraints on ABM radars for ICBM defense and the location of the ICBM silos to be defended by ABMs in the USSR. Minister Pleshakov ignored the ABM radar problem. In regard to the question of the geographic area of the Soviet ICBMs to be- defended by ABMs, he saidareful reading of the Soviet draft article would make their views perfectly clear.

Reported remark? of Soviet SALT delegate Pleshakov during a luncheon conversation with US SALT advisor Garthoff,elsinki:

' He had an inconclusive discussion about the mechanical-scan dish-type radars at Moscow, in terms of whether it was necessary to make specific reference to them in the text of, but we agreed that this wasatter of drafting, and that it was difficult to deal with it without having texts before us.

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Pleshakov during a luncheon conversation with US SALT advisor FitzGerald, ay Helsinki:

During the luncheon for the Soviet Delegation,alked briefly to Minister Pleshakov. sked why the latest Soviet proposal for Article HI of the ABM Treaty had omitted the words "at sites" when it had been included in all the earlier formulations. Unlike Col. Anyut.in, Minister Pleshakov said the words had been deliberately omitted. He went on to say that-the reason why the words had been dropped revolved around the fact that the sides havo agreed to deploynterceptors and launchers within each ABM deployment area. He then askednew what the Soviet side meanslaunch site",hat is deployed within an ABM launch site. aid J. assumed it included the launcher, interceptor for the launcher, command and control equipment, the necessary handling equipment, plus storage facilities for interceptors. Plcshakov said the latter wereart of an ABM position; consequently, if the words "at sites" were to be used one could get around the clear intent of both sides to limit the number of interceptors available. For this reason, he thought the words should not be used in Article III. Minister Semenov's departure prevented further discussion of the question with Minister *leshakov.

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT advisor Kishilov during a luncheon conversation uith US SALT advisor Garthoff, ay Helsinki:

When. Kishilov askedaw as the principal remaining problems,eplied: terms of SLBMin the freeze, and radars for ICBM defense. In the latterent on, the US side did not agree to unlimited numbers of ABM radars toBM interceptorseven when the potential of such radars was substantially (Kishilov had observedadthis latter question with Minister Pleshakov, sitting on the other side during the luncheon, and suggested that the Ministerad had, he was sure,seful exchange.) bjected strongly to the Soviet approach of agreeing to six MARCs with no qualitative limitations on radars deployed in them, plus quantitatively unlimited radars of limited potential. ointed out to Kishilov that the Soviet side was retaining four major non-phased-array ABM radar complexes at Moscow in addition to the six MARCs available, to each side. uggested that we could similarly make an exception for the two large American radars at Grand Forkshe PAR and the MSRnd add to them some equitable equal radar structure suitable for supporting morenterceptors. This could be six MARCs with qualitative restraints on the radars within them, but perhaps we couldan alternative route thativen number of radars, rather than complexes of three kilometers diameter. Specifically, perhaps we could consider twelve radars of less than MSR potential for each side. In this connection, we could consider the Soviet proposal for radars "substantially less" than the MSR. Kishilov immediately objected to the idea that the American PAR and MSR could in any way be regarded as an equivalent to the older non-phased-array radars around Moscow. He said that if we wished, wc too could have four older non-phased-array radar complexes at Washington. But it was quite necessary for political, as well as (by implication, rather than for) military reasons for the Soviet Union

to have the right to have two large phnscd-array

radars such as the US has. Apart from that point, Kishilov expressed interest in the proposition that each side might have, say, twelve radars rather than Six MARCs. He said that in such an approach he was sure that the Soviet side would not be prepared to limit these radarsevel "substantially smaller" than the MSR; it would have to be the level "smaller than" the MSR. aid that with the right for each side to have two largeo take, for the moment, Kishilov's variant of my suggestion -- hought it more appropriate to consider twelve radars for each side of which two would be large and the remaining ten smaller than the MSR level- Kishilov said thac this proposition would be considered, but he doubted if he wouldesponse beforeat best, since Monday and Tuesday are VE Day holidays- in Moscow.

T remarked that the Soviet side had onceexplicitly to defense of nationalinquired why they had conducted the strangeinto obscure and indirect identificationnational capitals. Kishilov notedhis

matter of the past, but said that frankly the reason was that there was some indicationertain Republic capitals in the USSR togiving this different protected status to Moscow,

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT advisor Anyutinuncheon conversation with US SALT advisor FitzCerald,elsinki:

During the luncheon for the Sovietsked why the Soviet side had omitted the words "at sites" in the latest proposal for Article III of the ABM Treaty. oted that they had consistently used the words "no morenterceptors at sites" in all previous formulations of this article. Anyutin reacted with considerable surprise and said that he had not realized the words had been omitted. He took the view that it wouldimple matter to insert the words "at sites" since it was the intention of both sides to deploy no morenterceptorsaunchers. (Comment: Minister Plcshakov's different reaction is reportedeparate Mcmcon.)

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT advisor Surikov and ezpert Obukhovuncheon conversation uith US SALT advisor Leard, Helsinki: i

Xoard inquired why the Soviets had not accepted the US language in Article III of the ABM Treaty "cast of the Urals and west of the Mississippi" with reference to the location of the ICBM defense deployment area. The current Soviet wording was vague and did not make it clear where the Soviet ICBM defense deployment area would be located.

Surikov responded that the Sovietsetter solution but understand our problem. They willaddress the issue soon. Obukhov also confirmed his personal understanding of the problem and the fact that they planned to further address the issue.

Original document.

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