REPORT RE REPORTED REMARKS OF SOVIET SALT DELEGATE GRINEVSKIY DURING A CONVERSA

Created: 5/6/1972

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

In conclusion, Semenov noted that the Soviet proposals transmitted today were in line with the principles .it the basis of our negotiations and therefore could be regarded by the sides as being mutually acceptable.

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Grincvskiyonversation with US SALT delegate Parsonselegates' Helsinki:

I told Grincvskiy that listening to Ministereard indications of progress but even now questions occurred to me. Also, as no text of Article III had been read,id not yetopyext,as curious as to its substance. Did the Soviet side propose the same structure and substance with MARCs for ABM and ICBM defense? Grincvskiy replied that they had indeed taken our structure and accompanied MARCs for each, six in each case, but there were differences of substance we needed to discuss. hen remarkedad heard nothing about OLPAfls. onfirmed that his side was deferring this. oted that this was an important subject and wondered if they were leaving it to the last. Grincvskiy thought that was what might happen. emurred.

In passing, Grincvskiy referred to our last Group of Pour meeting in which Garthoff hadhange from the words "the sides" to "the Parties," in the interpretive statement to Article IX. Their side was agreeable to use*of "then both languages.

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Shchukinonversation uith US SALT delegate Nitzeelegates' meeting, ay Helsinki:

Shchukin said that their proposed language for Article III and particularly the provisionsICBM defense were subject to discussion. He said he thought we could deduce from theirstatements what kindolution it might hflft eventually be possible for their side to accept.

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reported remarks of sovietonversation with us salt advisor garthoff,elegates'elsinki:

j saidas not surenderstood full/ the Soviet proposal for limits on ADM radars in defense of ICBMs- as, however, quite sure that the US did continue to find unacceptable the idea'of an unlimited number of ABM radars. Kishilov remarked that they would be small ones. aid that the precise qualitative level was one of the points that was not clear in the Soviet text, but that in any event there was no need for unlimited numbers. Also,id not.understand the idea of having six MARCs with no qualitative limit, in addition to other smaller radars. Kishilov said there had to be equality; between the two sides, that the US side had proposed six MARCs, and that we needed to take account of the fact that the US has the large PAR and MSR radars, and there must be quality for the Soviet side. Kishilov suggested that if the Soviet proposal for unlimited numbers of smaller radars was not acceptable toe should say so. Also,"if some elements such as the qualitative level were unclear, we should ask about them in the meeting the next day. (Comment: It seemed to me thatwas hintingossible compromise under which both sides would have the right to cither two MARCs or simply two large radars, plus some finite number of less powerful radars.)

I noted that the Soviet proposal was alsoin specifying, even if indirectly, that the US ICBM defense location would be* Grand Porks, while indicating nothing about the location of the Soviet ICBM defense area. The US side had made clear its position that the Soviet ICBM defense area must be located east of the Urals. Kishilov again suggested that the US side draw attention to this problem at the meeting the next day. He suggested that there should be some way to satisfy the Soviet interest in specifying Grand Forks, and the US interest in having the Soviet ICBM defense area located in the non-European part of the .USSR.

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Kishilov asked when the US side would "take care of the Article XV problem (ABMe noted that the Soviet Delegation had several times recently indicated that it could not accept theadditional paragraph in Article XV, and had pointed out that it was not necessary even from the standpoint of the expressed American position. epliedhought my Delegation would address that question fairly soon.

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Reported remarks of Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov curing c Delegates' meeting, ay Helsinki:

The Soviet side agreed that the two sides undertake an obligation not to increase in the process ofand replacement the external dimensions, observable by national technical means of verification, of silo launchers.* In this connection, he was authorized toraft agreed statement on Article II of the Interim Agreement.

The Parties understand that in the process of modernization and replacement there will be no substantial increase in the external dimensions, observable with the aid of national technical means of verification of land-based ICBM silo launchers currently in the possession of the Parties.

The Soviet side proceeded from the premise that in the process of modernization tho sides might find it necessary .to effect certain insignificant alterations of the. external size of the ICBM silo launchers at their disposal, alterations that would be observable by national technical means of verification. It was quite obvious that such changes could not create the possibility of converting these launchers into launchers for heavy missiles.

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Reported reworks of Deputy Foreign Minister Senenovolegctes' Helsinki:

The Soviet side has closely examined the views expressed by the US sice on the subject of land-based heavyaunchers. In this respect the Soviet Delegation was now tabling new language for Article IF of the draft Interia Agreeoent.

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The Parties undertake not to convert launchers for li^ht land-based ICRMs and launchers for oleer types of land-based ICBMs constructed4 into launchers for heavy land-based ICBMs.

The Soviet side was convinced that the new language-in this Article completely precluded the possibility of circumventing the agreement by conversion of older types of ballistic nissiles into heavy land-based ICBMs. Scrrenov did not think that, in view of the considerations stated by the US sidethis subject earlier, there was any need for additional consent on the icportance of this proposal. The undertakings provided in this Article II and in the interpretive statement attached to it took full account of the considerations expressed by the US liuo on the subject of heavy nissiles and

their limitation.

The Soviet side agreed that the two sides undertake an obligation not to increase in the process ofand replacement the external dimensions, observable by national technical means of verification, of silo launchers. In this connection, he was authorized toraft agreed statement on Article II of the Interim Agrecnent.

The Parties understand that in the processerai:3tiop. and replacement there will be no substantial increase in the ' external di;ic;!Sio;is, observable with the

aid of national technics!f of land-based1ilo launchers currently in the possession of the Parties.

The Soviet side proceeded iros the premise that in the process of modernization the sides night find it necessary to effect certain insignificant alterations of the external site of the ICBM silo launchers at their disposal, alterations that would be observable by national technical means of verification. It was quite obvious that such changes could not create the possibility of converting these launchers into launchers for heavy missiles.

efinition of ICBM, but it was harder for his people to see any useful purpose served by the second sentence, and since thereommon understanding on the substance there did not seem to be need fortatement.

reported remarks of deputy foreign minister semenoveeting,elsinki:

Semenov said he wished to discuss questions concerning SLBM submarines and SLBM launchers eparate meeting Sunday. He did say that the Soviet side was prepared to consider including "modern submarines with ballistic missiles" in the Interim Agreement and intended to present its views in this regardiew to preparing appropriate Articles "and Statements". Smith asked whether Semenov's mention of "statements" referred to what we had called "interpretiveemenov confirmed that he had the same thing in mind.

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Reported remarks of Deputy Foreign Minister elegates'elsinki:

Semenov said thac the proposals of the US side which had been handed over onad been seriously and carefully studied in Moscow. In view of this the Soviet Delegation had been instructed to continue discussion of the draft Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to Offensive Arms and the draft Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems. In so doing, it was borne in mind that both documents

could be signed at the Soviet-American summit meeting. Today, in accordance with instructions, the Soviet side wanted .to table proposals on certain aspects of the Interim Agreement andew Soviet draft of Article III ofreaty. All of those drafts had been designed to accomodate the proposals the US side had tabled on May 3.

The Soviet Union considered it possible to include'in an agreement on temporarily freezing strategic offensive weapons, along with ICBM silo launchers, also fixed soft land-based ICBM launchers. In this connection, the Soviet Delegation was, toew text forf the draft Interim Agreement, reading as follows:

The Parties undertake not to start newof silo and fixed soft launchers for land-based inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as of July 1,

Semenov wanted to add to this that the Interim Agreement would enter into force on July 1,ut not earlier than entry into force of the ABM Treaty. In an effort to accomodate the wishes of the US side, the Soviet Delegation was prepared to proceed on the basis that tho two sides would in fact observe the obligations of both the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty beginning from the date of signature of these two documents.

In an effort to solve problemsonstructive spirit, the Soviet side expressed its consent to the Delegations' making an agreed statement on Article I

of the Interim Agreement in the following wording:

The Parties understand that the ICBM launchers referred to in Article 1 of this Agreement are launchers formissiles capable of ranges in excess - of the distance between the midpoint of the northern border of the European part of the continental USSR and the midpoint of the northern border of -the continental USA. The Parties further understand that land-based ICBM silo launchers under active construction may be completed.

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USSR.

In the view of the Soviet side,tatement fully took into account the considerations expressed by the US side and was completely in line with the objectives of the Interim Agreement. It was based on the existing real situation, because it dealtthe specific distance from the nearest area

(CBM launcher deployment in the US to the continental

The-Soviet side had closely examined the views expressed by the US side on the subject of land-based heavy ICBM launchers. In this respect the Soviet Delegation was now tabling new language for Article II of the draft Interim Agreement.

The Parties undertake not to convert aunchers for light land-based ICBMs and launchers for older types of land-based ICBMs constructed4 into launchers for heavy land-based ICBMs.

The Soviet side was convinced that the new language in this Article completely precluded the possibility of circumventing the agreement by conversion of older typos of ballistic missiles into heavy land-based ICBMs. Semenov did not think that, in view of the considerations stated by the US side on this subject earlier, there was any need for additional comment on the importance of this proposal. The undertakings provided in this Article II and in the interpretive statement attached to it took full account of the considerations expressed by the US side on the subject^of heavy missiles and

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their limitation.

The Soviet side agreed that the two sides undertake an obligation not to increase in the process ofand replacement the external dimensions, observable by national technical means of verification, of silo launchers. In this connection, he was authorized toraft agreed statement on Article II of the Interim Agreement.

The Parties understand that in the process of modernization and replacement there will be no substantial increase in the external dimensions, observable with the aid of national technical means of of land-based ICBM silo launchers currently in the possession of the Parties.

The Soviet side proceeded from the premise that in the process of modernization the sides might find it necessary to effect certain insignificant alterations of the external size of the ICBM silo launchers at their disposal, alterations that would be observable by national .technical means of verification. It was quite obvious that such changes could not create the possibility of converting these launchers into launchers for heavy missiles.

Taking into account the wishes of the US side, the Soviet Delegation was now also tabling new language forf Article VII/VIII of the Interim Agreement.

This Interim Agreement shall remain in forceeriod of five years unless earlier replaced by an agreenent on more complete measures limiting strategic offensive arms. It is an objective of the Parties to conduct active follow-on negotiations with the aim of concluding such an agreement as soon as feasible.

The Soviet Delegation was convinced that the now language for paragraphrticle VII/VIII, took full account of the proposal tabled by the US side on May

In conclusion, Semenov noted that the Soviet proposals transmitted today were in line with the principles at the basis of our negotiations and therefore could be regarded by the sices as being utually acceptable.

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT advisor Zishilovonversation uith US SALT advisor Garthoff,elegates' meeting,, Helsinki;

I noted the inclusion of soft ICBM launchers, but failure to include mobile ICBM launchers. said that the American Delegation hadradeoff including soft launchers but not mobile ones. eplied that Kishilov knew full well that this was not the position of the US Delegation. eminded him that when he had earlier told me that there had been some such suggestion from the American Delegation, Ambassador Parsonsadassured him and Grincvskiy that this was not the case. Kishilov smiled, and said that he recalled that very well, but that "the damage had been done" and it had not been possible to persuade others that the American side considered inclusion of mobile launchers essential. Now, continued Kishilov, the matter had gone much further. I replied that the American side continued to believe that it would be inconsistentreeze of all other ICBM launchers to allow deployment of mobile ICBMs. said we would have an opportunity to discuss this subject further; eplied that indeed we would.

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