CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL
The Uses of Soviet Military Power in Distant Areas
THIS ESTIMATE IS SUBMITTED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND CONCURRED IN BY THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the estimate:
The Central Inielligence Agency and lhe mir-Urgenco omemitoiicu* ol ihe Depart-rrtenii of Stale and Defense, ond the NSA.
Tho Deputy Director of Conirol Intelligence
The Director of Intelligence ond Rejeoreh, Department of State The Director, De-fenso Intelligence Agency Th* Director, Notional Security Agency
Tho Anhtani Gcrterol Manoger. Atomte Energy Commission, and the Asiisranl to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subiect being outsideurisdiction.
ffacing I' tli mjtates
w.lhin theIII. iTU.. th* Irani-
THE USES OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER IN DISTANT AREAS
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
II. DEVELOPMENT Off SOVIET INTEREST AND INFLUENCEAREAS
From Lenin to Stalin
Change of Policy after Stalin
The Instrumenls of Soviel Policy in Ihe Third
Setbacks and Achievements
EXPANSION OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER TO DISTANT AREAS 12
CENERAL POSTURE IN AREAS OF MAJOR.4
The Mediterranean nnd Egypt14
The Caribbean andIS
The Eastern Atlantic and West Africa 19
V. CURRENT SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR DISTANT
VI. LONGER TERM OITTLOOK: CONSTRAINTS AND
Miliiary O lalioaj
Political and Economic
Future Options and
CONTENTS OF VOLUME II
ANNEX A: SOVIET SHIP DAYS ON DISTANT STATION CENERAL
ANNEX B: PATTERN OF SOVIET NAVAL PORT VISITS
ANNEX C: SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
ANNEX D: INDIAN OCEAN OPERATIONS
ANNEX E: CARIBBEAN AND WEST AFRICAN OPERATION'S
ANNEX F: OVERSEAS BASE AND FACILITIES ARRANGEMENTS
ANNEX C: AMPHIBIOUS AND MERCHANT MARINE SEALIFT
ANNEX H: CAPABILITIES OF MILITARY AND CIVIL AIRLIFT TO SUPPORT DISTANT OPERATIONS
ANNEX I: SOVIET MILITARY AID
THE USES OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER IN DISTANT AREAS
This Estimate assesses presen. and prospective Soviet capabilities and intentions with respect lo using military forces in areas distant from the USSR. It is concerned with situations short of genera) war and with the Soviets' use of these capabilities to enlarge the sphere of their global operations and to eipand their influence among the non-aligned countries of the underdeveloped world. Accordingly, North Korea and North Vietnam arc largely excluded from the analysis. Thoy are. however, occasionally referenced since the substantial involvement in both has had implications for the subject of this paper. However, il is impossible not to refer io another Communist state, Cuba, because it hasentral factor in the USSK's unfolding role in Latin America and is an indispensable prop lo its naval operations in tho Caribbean.
While the Estimate alludes where appropriate to the militaryfor the US, NATO, and China of the USSR's militaryin the Third World, it docs not address Soviet strategic or general purpose forces as such, which are the subjects of other Estimates. And theumJi un ihc USSR's political purposes as on military purposes since it is clear that Soviet forces, advisors and assistance in distant areas serve both purposes, and as often as not thc former arc moro important.
A word of caution is in order concerning tlie use of some terms. Soviet involvement in Third World areas has different aspects in differentrequent manifestation is military aid. usuallyby some training or technical assistance to the recipient country. This form of aid is an important part of the total Soviet effort in the countries concerned; it docs not, however, amountmilitaryor "distant militaryhe latter terms are reserved for cases where Soviet combat forces or personnel are present or may be deployed in some numbers with some military capability of theiriliiary presence, in turn, is not limited to Third World countries; the most extensive military presence in distant areas is on ships at sen.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
setbacks and frustrations, the USSR has madein the last decadealf in developing politicalthe Third World. It clearly assigns great importance to itscertain parts of the Third World; is prepared to accept highsome risks to defend and advance this position; and hasthe size and flexibility of ils military forces which arcconducting distant operations.
have been several instances of direct Sovietin Third World countries (most notably,ut Moscow has generally preferred to use diplomaticand economic and military aid programs to promoteIt has, of course, been greatly helped by intensein many areas nnd by thc existence here and there ofof trouble and conflict which create eager customersgypt and India).
Soviets must feel that, over thc pasteats, theya great deal in thc Third World. They have brokenof containment built by the West and opened many areas toinfluence. They haveumber ofEgypt.largely or almost totally dependent on Sovietequipment and support. They have exposed many of thcthese countries to Communist ideas and techniques and haveclose relationships with military men who hold or may hold key
posiiions in their countries. They have established the USSR as the most influential great power in most radical Arab states, have gained acceptance of their right to concerii themselves closely with lhc affairs of all the Middle Kast and South Asia, and have extended their influence into parts of Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Africa.
D. Still. Soviet activities in remote areas have not met withsuccess and thereariety of circumstances which impose constraints on Soviet policies. Thc USSR has encountered manyCuban the Middle Easthe Arab-Isiacli war, in Africa (Ghana,nd in Southeast Asiaid programs have beena quarter ofillion of arms aid drawn has been repaid to date. The recipients of aid have oflen been ungrateful, most of them resist Soviet tutelage, and only Cubu has joined the Soviet camp. And in some areas, Soviet efforts have been complicated by the appearance of Uie Chinese as alternate sources of aid and as bitter competitors for influence.
a consequence of frustrations such as these, thecontinuously had to revise their expectations and adjustin the Third World. They have not, however, lost theirthe contrary, they arc now anxious to demonstrate lhat, as athe USSR has legitimate interests virtually everywhere.Moscow now has the ability to support policies in distantthc capabilily to extend its military presence in one form orbeyond (he negligible levels ofnd.
then, new multipurpose naval ships, better suited tohave entered the Soviet Navy. Naval infantry andshipping have doubled in size; the Soviet merchanttripled ils tonnage, and now includeships suitedneeds of military sealift. Soviet military transport forcesre-equipped wiih new turboprop aircraft with greaterrange, and civil avialion has expanded overseas. Commandcapabilities to support distant military operations haveimproved.
G. Not surprisingly, then, the frequency and extent of Sovietoperations in the Third World have picked up considerably. Thc expansion of the USSR's presence in the Mediterranean and the Middle East (including someurface sliips and submarines in the Mcditer-
rancan Squadron and someoviet military personnel stationed in Egypt) owes much, of course, to the Arab militaryut it is also evident that Moscow has for some time had military interests in thc Mediterranean (including the US Sixth Fleet) which extend beyond the context of tlie Arab-Israeli conflict.hese two sets of interests have by-and-large coincided, so that Egypt has been strengthenedis Israel and the USSR has not only gained influence in the area at the expense of the West, but has also obtained facilities for its Mediterranean Squadrons forwardin defense of the USSR.
USSR's increased visibility in the Indian Oceanonly its modest naval presence, but also ils civil air routes,for facilities for the Soviet fishing fleet and increasedtrade relations. As for the Caribbean, the Soviets are not likelyto use the naval facilities in Cuba for forward basing oflaunched ballistic missiles so long as they have reasonstrong US opposition. But they will probably continueUS reaction to different levels and types of navalfor example, deploying other types of submarines as well asand submarine tenders to Cuba.
Soviets have substantial ground, air. and naval forcesbe used effectively toresence in distant areas.enables them to support political forces friendly toand influence. It may make it possible in some situationsthc actions of others or to deter their intervention. Butto use force at long range to establish themselvesare limited.ubmarine or surface shipnaval forces in distant waters could be increasedpresent levels for short periods,ustainedrequire additional logistic support and ships to defend thatThc USSR still has only small numbers of naval infantryships, and it tacks long-range tactical aircraft andAnd the Soviets would need toubstantiallyin developing these forces tlian is now evident if they wereestablishing substantial capabilities for military actionin countries remote from their borders.
J. Indeed, the growth in (lie USSR') capabilities for distanthas not followed the course that might have been expected if the Soviets were interested principally in direct miliiary intervention in Third World countries. The expansion of their forces can, in fact, be attributed in targe part to other causes. Increasing Soviet naval deployments to distant areas were, in the first instance, in support of potential general war missions; once begun, tho USSR found in these activities opportunities to buttress its claimorld power role equal to that of the US. The growth of the merchant fleet has been in line with the increasing requirements of Sovicl foreign trade. Most of the transport aircraft added to military transport aviation arcto improve airlift capabilities in theater operations. Theof amphibious forces have improved but coniinue to be oriented primarily toward thc support of theater forces on the flanks.
K. Nevertheless, continued improvement of Soviet capabilities for distant action can be anticipated. Some of this improvement willy-product of the expansion of naval, merchant marine, and airlift forces in support of their separate primary missions. Naval programs now underway will,ring forth new surface ships andcapable of distant operations.
L. Soviet military requirements for foreign bases are more likely to grow than diminish. Prospects for Soviet antisubmarine warfare and strategic altack forces, as well as thc trend in increased out of area operation of general purpose forces, both point in tliis direction. Soviet bases in thc Third World arc not easily acquired but the Soviets have been seeking additional facilities ashore and the search can be expected to continue. In general, however, for political and economic reasons as well as military, tho USSR is most likely in thc next few years toradualist approach in seeking to expand its influence in the Third World. And Soviet efforts abroad will continue to be aimed more at increasing Soviet influence than at establishingregimes.
M. If tlic Soviets should again involve themselves militarilyhird World country, as they have in Egypt, it would probably come about as an outgrowthoviet military aid program. Butleading to the establishmentoviet military presence in distant areas are unlikely to arise frequently. Virtually all 'rhird World
leaders are ardent nationalists and hence little disposed to inviting Soviet forces to be based on their territory. Only in exceptionalsuchompelling threat, would one of them beto accept that kind of Soviet help. Moscow for its part would have to make its own calculation of risks and advantages beforeit. Thc record of recent years shows the Soviets are capable of bold decisions when they consider the stakes high enough or dicir interests and prestige sufficientlyin Kgypt.
N. The Soviets may feel that with their attainment of roughparity with the US. they will in the future have wider options to project their influence in distant parts of the world. Given only aaccretion of forces useable in distant areas, there will be more instances in which the Soviets can, if they choose, try to use such forces to exploitif one or another government in the Third World should ask Moscow for assistance. The Sovieis will be inclined to exercise caution in areas where US interests are deeplybut even in these circumstances thc Soviets may calculate that an assertive policy will entail fewer risks to Oicrnsclves than in the past.
he USSR has been politically active in the Third World for many years,ew stage was reachedS when it began toajor supplier of arms to many Third World countries. Only since the, however, have the Soviets made aeffort lo project their military power into distant areas. This projection has taken the form primarily ol navalonly in the Mediterranean, but alsoesser degree in Ihc Indian Ocean and the Caribbean. It has also entailed, in the case of ttffypt (as in Cuba and North Vietnam) the introduction of air combat and air defense units designed to give direct militarybothelerrcnt lo Israel andefense in case hostilities break out.
growth of Soviet capabilitiesto distant areas fs in largoproduct of thefforts to improvemilitary postureis the US across
the whole spectrum of international power. The political impact of the Soviet presence In distant areas hasood deal to its novelty, ic. the absencelonialiitin the case of thc Middle Eail,umber of fortuitous developments. But Moscow by now considers its military aid ptogram and, in someilitaryas ins tm merits serving broad objectives in the Third World including its rolereat power. And it may expect that, with the attainment of rough parity with the US in strategic weapons, It will be able to secure for itself even wider political and military options in the future through thc deployment of military foices in distant areas.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET INTEREST AND INFLUENCE IN DISTANT AREAS
From Iciin fo Stalin
eriod of fairly vigorous Soviet political and propaganda activity in the underdeveloped world. The early collapse
of Sovicl hopeshe Bolsheviklake hold Iu Ihc West hel|>ed loattention In other directtoward areas adjacent to Soviclinch ai Turkey. Central Asia,Bul lhc promising relationssuch national revolutionary leadersAtalurk and Chiang Kai-shekPartly because of theseand partly because ol theof Stalin's policy of "socialism inSoviet interest receded. Throughthc Russians, though ihey dill notIhc field, tended to let it lie (allow.
lthough World War II enhanced the USSR's relative power in tho world, its main concerns were introng position in Eurasia, rather than in eitending military influence lo moro distant areas. "Die energies of its war-wary leaders were largelywiih tbe problems ot rebuilding the nation and securing its appionchcs byand by establishing Communist regimes whoever the army could teach. Stalin was reluctant to become committed militarilythe range of Sovicle was supported in this orientation by tbe military leadership, mostly ground force generals who thought of military power in terms of massive ground armies, with air and naval forces as closely supporting arms. Although Moscow made claims to pieces of Turkish and Iranian territory, these were abandoned in the face of stiff Western opposition, there seemed lo bo few opportunities, in tbe face of USfor the USSR to assert iuelfin areas not controlled by lhe Sino-Soviel bloc. Indeed, in thc postwar period under Stalin the only example of Sovietcombat involvement outside Easternwas their support to North Korea's air defenses in the Korean war.
5 Stalin was also ilow lo sec opportunity in thc wave of national revolution which was
breaking up the old imperialist empires. He underestimated the force of nationalism and wai doctrinnlly unprepared lo exploit thc end of thc colonial empires. To Stalin, the new nationalist leaders were still the lackeys ofe continued lo evaluate hii assets in thc newly or soon-to-be independent countries largely in terms of the indigenous Communist parties, wluch he frequentlywith contempt or distrust. He believed liberation could only come dirough proletarian revolution and thai, although these countries would eventually fall lohe limo was still distant.
Change of Policy after Stalin
he USSR's decision lo become actively engaged in the Third World emerged from Ihe general reassessment of policy conducted during the first year or two after Sibling death. Stalin's successors shared his view lhat the securily of the USSR was the paramount concern of policy and that the USSR's chief inleiesls lay In Europe, the Far East, and in the counlries along Ihe USSR's southern borders. But they concluded thai the USSR hadoint of stalemate with tho Weil in thosw areas and should therefore look elsewhere for opportunities. Moscow soon dis-coveied that the Nehrus and the Nassers, prrviously scorned asere after alltarlingrade and aid agreements with India definitely set lhe USSR on tho new path.he Soviet leaders set about establishing cordial tics with many oi Ihc non-aligned: they sent observers to the Afro-Asian conference at Bandung; Iheyeconciliation with Tito, one of the pillars of non-alignment; Khjushchcv and Bulganinuch-publicized tour of India. Burma, and Afghanistan. Tlie Egyptian arms deal in the same year, conducted through Czechoslovakia, marked the first key move in establishing the USSR In the Middle EtsL
Moscow alto (ook steps to strengthen the ideological base tor its actions byat thc Twentieth Paily Congresshat "socialism" could be achieved bymeans.
hc Soviet leaders, Khnishehevcame to see cultivation of the Third Worlday of circumventing USefforts and eventually of achieving an alteration In thc International balance of power in favor of the USSR and to the disadvantage of the US (the Chinese did not enter these calculations untillthoughin international affairs was commonly espoused En the Third World, many of the leaders there haiborcd suspicions and fears of the US, which they tended to identify with their former colonial masters. This gaveond with the USSR, which seemed free of the colonialist taint. AndoliUcal forms and economic methods had considerableamong nations striving for nationaland rapid economic development. In these circumstances, thc USSR could hope to turn the West's political flank and to render an expanding area increasingly inhospitable to thc West's political, economic, and military presence.
n the, tho advent of Castrouba and bis adherent* to lhc Soviet bloc, and of Kasscm in Iraq and lhc consequent weakening of CENTO, gave the Sovietsgrounds to hope for relatively inexpensive political gains. Ruoyed by Ihese events, and probably also by thc USSR's progress inits strategic arsenal, Khrushchev0 revalued upward the ideological significance ofThird World lo the global struggle. He identified thc "national liberation revolution', said then to bo under way there,ajor front in this struggle and declared that, thanks lo tl. tho world-wide triumph of communism
was now in view. This exuberance, no doubt partly genuine andatter ofpoliiical expediency for Khrushchev,igh-water point of Soviet
oviet theory with respcel to the Third World lagged behind practice, and both were marked by experimentation andRealpolitik usually prevailed butconsiderations colored Soviet behavior and introduced some tension into the making of policy. There was ideological convenience and propagandistic utility in viewing the Third World as the cradle of progressive lorces which would ally themselves with thc USSR againstut it was not easy to sanclion Ihe embrace of regimesby the "ooorgeoisftenmen, which in some- cases activelyCommunists.
o meet this problem and to justify the expectation that these legimes were on the road lo communism, such concepts asdemocracy" were used to describeas disparate as Cuba. Egypt, Syria. Ghana. Mali. Cuinea. Burma, and Algeria. This label justified support for leaders who. though not Commu nuts, could be represented as "progressives" capable of leading their countriesenerally socialist path
ike ili political expectations, Moscow's ideological optimism was seen in time to be exaggerated. It was noted not only that many Third World countries were slow to establish socialist economic Institutions and practices but that in many places movement was in the olher direction. Soviet eeonomisls beganhether, in anyeadlong rush toward nationalization and industriali/ntion wasood thing. By thehey wcic more often tlian not couching their advice to the Third World countries about development plans in terms of economic prao*
lii.itity rather Ihan Communist orthodoxy. Thii shift no douhlear that in-discriminate copying of Ihe "socialist model" of development, if it led to economic disarray, could bring discredit on socialist methods. While slrcssing that each country must base its economic development on its Ownlhe Russians, al Ihe same lime,"gainst hasty and indiscriminateof Western capital. This adviceign of Moscow's unwillingness to fool any great part of thc bill for economicin the Third World.
"The /mlrumcn's of Soviet Poficy in Ihe Third World
5 when die Soviets first began to distribute military aid. Moscow's usual practice throughout the Tliiid World has been to deal with the governments in power,Ihem by conventional paths:aid and training pacts, diplomatic ties, economic and technical assistancetrade relations, and educationalNative Communist parlies have not been priinaiy instruments of Soviet influence.
ntil lheirect militaryIn the Third World was thought toneither necessary nor desirable- The USSR apparently intended to have an active policy in the Third World, but at minimum cost in military commitment and withrisk. It was essential to Moscow'sthat embroilment in regional military conflicts and civil wars be avoided, and the Soviets tried toespectable distance from most such conflicts.
hc sale ol weapons to Egypt, though itar-reaching program whichcd olher Soviet dlart* to build up the USSR'i statureorld power in the Third World, was an act of politicalrather than deliberate militaryThere was no indication in tlie early
years lhat Ihe Soviels had any precisely thought out rationale for their military akl programs in the Third World other than the general belief that Ihis would help bind anti-Western new nations to lite USSR. Anycouldecipient, as long as it showed piomisc of lining up on the side of Ihe USSR in (he cold war. There certainly was noinhat the Soviets were embarkingeliberate program oflhcir militaty power into distant areas. Opportunistic political gains appearede lhe order of lhe day. as evidenced byshotgun approach in offenrig aid.
nder Khrushchev and the succeeding leadershipillion in military aid has been extended to the Third World ofillion has been drawnlitis figure represents about one-fourth of comparable US military aid to Third World states. Eighty percent of Soviet military aid has been directed toward countries comprising an arc running from the easternthrough South Asia, leapfrogging NATO and CENTO countries on tbe southern border of lhe USSH. More thanillion) has gone lo three radical ArabIraq, andof this.illion to Egypt alone Priorhe total military aid extensions had averaged only0 million per year.ainlyesult of the buildup in Egypt of an air defensemilitary aid increased0 million.1
Se'bocli ond Achievements
uringhe USSR encountered disappointments, complications and outright setbacks which led It to revise its expectations and adjust its tactics tn the Third World. With time Moscow had learned certain lessons and
'Thu fijui- riclvCes someillion of military aid eitrnded IB Kotlfc Vielnun ind IOA biHieo etch lo North Korea and Cube.
, "Soviet Military Aid".
its expectations lo tlie longer lerm. The USSR's presence had grown and ilshad spread but lite liberated countries had noi quickly gravitated into Ihc Soviet political and ideological oibtt, or even heen grateful. They had shown that thero were limits lo the amount of poliiical direction ihey would accept from the USSR. Many of the new nations were plainly intent on working both sides of theandas economic and military aid wereetl.
ven where Soviet military assistance was most substantial. Moscow could onlynot dictate, what uses it was lo be put to. In the case of Egypt ond Syria, Moscow had to contend both with the military incompetence of its clients and with (heir propensity for risking war with Israel. Soviet relations with Iraq, Algeria, and Guinea were fiequenlly troubled. In Indonesia, Ghana, and Mali the Russians had the ground cut out from under them by coups, lnevolutionary regime came to power which is at least as anti-Soviet as it is anti-West. In the most recent instance, in Sudan, thc coterie offriends and clients was nearly wiped out and Moscow's posilion was severely shakeniolent internal struggle for power. These experiences showed lhat nationaliim and parochial self -inter est were mote vigorous forces in lhc Third World than Moscow had supposed and not easy ones to harness. They revc.ilcd also that fn many places Lhehad no solid political base but were at the mercy of the goodwill or staying power of mercurial or ephemeral leaders.
IS. Wider contact hat often pioducedMany Egyptians dislike Ihe Russians as much, us Ihey disliked thc British earlier. There is ample evidence of comparable dislike (or al Icait ambivalence) among civilians and within the military in many other countries receiving extensive Soviet military assistance.
And these sentiments aie not always confined to nationals of lhe host countiy. Some of Cuba's and Egypt's neighbors take dim views of the Soviet presence so near their borders.
oreover, extension of aid has beenoflen both to Moscow snd to many of Ihe recipients. Despite thc favorable terms on which Moscow usually sells arms, mosthave experienced some difficulty intheir scheduled debt payments. Only about one fourth of the estimated totalims debt has been repaid. Egypt, Syria, and Indonesia have had tho most difficulty in meeting their payments and have repaid onlyndercent, respectively, of theirdespite the fact that they have been preferred customersarge volume of grant aid as well as generous credit terms. Indonesia alone accounts for about one-third of total outstanding Soviet aims Indebtedness. Finally, some armshave had great difficulty in absorbingequipment, in getting spate parts, and in some cases have complained about Its low quality.
egional complications and Ihcbehavior of third parties sometimesMoscow's expectations and made the execution of ils policy more difficult Iu such instances as Somalia vs. Ethiopia and Algeria vs. Morocco, Soviet-supplied arms were used in support of irredentist claims, whichmatters for the Soviets whoood relations with both parties. India's conduct was largely determined by ils dispute with Pakistan and its feni of China. In Latin America, having pulled backangerous strategic initiative in Cubahewere frequently handicapped or cm* 1ued by Castro's militancy.Lebanonn the Congond subsequently inWesl did not turn out lo be as reluctant to intervene ashad expected.
ver Ihe yean, Moscow has kept Its dis-tnnce from movement* directed againstregimes in the Middle East It has throughout maintained some reserve in itswith the Arab fedayecn and, on the whole, has been wary of involvement with guerrilla movements. It has, however, keptor<enumber of insurgent forces and has In cases, provided some support as in parts of Africa, where theso forces aim at thoof governments controlled byeg. South Africa. Rhodesia, and the Portuguese territories in Africa. It has done so partlyrder not to leave Iho field to the Chinese.
rom thenward, thealso had constantly to be on guard against being outflanked on the left by the Ghlnese-Despite Chinas rrsnoteness, relative paucity of means and internal convulsions, it laid claim lo tho leadership of thcnd thus goaded Moscowompetition for influence which the Soviets might othciwise havo pursued less actively. Chinaen able to keep varying degrees of competitive pressure on the Russians in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East, and thc Chinese challenge hasrime factor In propelling thc Russians toward deeper involvement.
he foregoing should not bc read lo mean that the Soviet effort in the Third World has been afrom it For all their problems, measured against tho position they held IS yean ago, the Soviets have madeprogress in developing their presence and influence in the Third World. Theyin brooking through tho ring of con-tainmenl constructed by Ihe West and inmany parts of the Third World to their own influence. Diplomatic and trade ties havo been gready widened und are now very nearly universalesult of militaiy aida number ofEgypt, Syria,
andare largely or almost totally dependent on Soviet military equipment and rely on the USSR for logistical and technical support Moreover, the USSR has, through its military-technicaltogether with its economic-technical assistance and academicmany of the nationals of tliese countries to Communist ideas andexposure which Moscow hopes will influence the institutional development taking place in the Third World. Also, It has established important relationships wiihparticularly military men who hold, or in the future may hold, key positions in their countries.
he USSR is thc leading great power In most radical Arab states and their principal source of diplomatic and military support. It has gained acceptance of its light lo concern ilsolf closely in tho affairs of South Asia, and has established ties of growing intimacy wiih India. In Southeast Asia and Latin America it has extended its relations and influence. Though they have suffered leverscs in pai Is of Africa, Ihe Russians, by cutting Iheir losses, remainosition to compete for influence on fairly even terms with both the West and the Chinese. The USSR can now look lo the Third World countries for substantial support in forums such as llie UN. And. during thisyearmany reasons, only some of which have to do with Sovietthe West has seen its military presence in many parts of the Third World whittled away, its political influence reduced, and its economic interests damaged or placed In jeopardy.
III. EXPANSION OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER TO DISTANT AREAS
uring tho last decado or so the USSR hu intervened militarilyumber ofareasariety of ways. In addition to lhcir deployment of offensive missiles and ground forces lo Cuba and air defense to
Cuba and Vietnam. Sovici Tighter pilotsin combal in the Yemenircquipmenl and combat personnel were dispatched to Egypt0 in response to Israeli air attacks; military supplies wereto Nigeria during the civil war, and Soviet destroyers were deployed to Cuinea0he continuing improvement of Soviet naval foices. accompanied by some expansion of airlift and amphibiousgive the USSR additional flexibility Inoperations.
esult of their activities in Cuba and in North Vietnam, lhe Sovietsariety of experience with respect Io distant operations. In Cuba they mounted anscalift operation and deployed an airsystem (run by theheof the Cuban adventure probablytheir caution about future deployments and also underlined their need forand increased air and naval capabilities. Through ihcir aid to Vietnam, the Soviets kept their hand in Southeast Asia, and gained valuable tactical and air defense experience which they have been able lo apply in both Egypt and tbe USSR.
hese military activities are closelyto Soviet political interests, yet they remain io many ways distinct. In manythe USSR's long-distance militaryand capabilities are an extension of thc general defensive and deterrent missions of the Soviet Armed Forces. (The Sovietto Cuba2 was. of course, an effort to Increase Soviot strategic attackSoviet naval ships were deployed to the Mediterranean pardy to counter, first, the US carrier strike force and. later, US missile submarines. Subsequent Soviel deployment in the Indian Ocean may have been undertaken partly in anticipation of possible future US strategic deployments In that area.
2S. In the. Soviet capabilities for distant operalions wereow order. Moscow's basicoperations on Ihe Eurasianweapons procurement and forceThe Soviet Navy was large but Hi-equipped for distant operations: it lacked prrience, the. of Soviet shipslittle protection against aircrafl; and logistic support ships were not "available. Tactical air and naval infantry units were also equipped and trained foe continental warfare: tactical aircraft weie short-ranged, and Ihe naval infantry was structured for shore-Io-shore operations In support of the army.
ift capabilities to transport forces to distant areas by air or sea were negligible. The airlift forces, equipped primarily with light transports, had small payloads and ranges imufficient for operationstheof the USSR. Amphibious assault shipping was suitable only for shore- to-shore operations in calm seas. Th* Soviet merchant fleet was small, totallinghips;ew were suited for thc needsiliiary sea-lifl, as thc Soviet program for procuring large halch ships was just beginning in tbe.
uring the past decade, Soviet forces and eapabililies for distant operalions havo grown New multipurpose naval ships, better suited lo distant operations, have entered the Soviet Navy. Naval infantry and amphibious shipping have doubled in size; the Soviet merchant marine has tripled its tonnage, and now includeships suited to tho needs of militaryoviet military transport forces have been entirely rc-cquipped with new turboprop aircraft with greater capacity and range, and have received
' See Annex C, "Amphibious and Merchaol Mniue Sealifl CapsbiUUai".
several large new heavy transports; civilhas expandedommand and conirol capabilities to support distant miliiary operations have been improved.
his growth has heen magnifiedesultoviet policy of more forward deployments of its naval forces. In the last decade Soviet naval ship days outside of the areas close to the USSR havo grownnd port calls by Soviet naval ships in foreign ports have grownhundredfold.*
hc growth in Soviet capabilities for distant operations has not, however, liad the character that mighl be expected if lhe only purpose were intervention in Third World countries. In particular, the Soviets evidently determined they would not build capabilities for intervention against significant opposition ashore For one thing, they have notlarge numbers of naval infantry and necessary air cover. Moreover, iheir navalto distant areas arc an clement in the general expansion of the USSR'srole designed, like their strategic missile forces, to buttress tbe USSR's claim to international equality with the US. (Despite the sharp increase in days-oul-of-area per ship, the Soviets are still far behind thc US in thishe growth in ship-days on distant station has of course given Soviet navalsome experience useful for distant op-eiations. and il has had some political impact In Ihe Third World. But the more intensive exercise of Soviet ships on the open oceanumber of purposes, only some of which relate to capabilities foe distantIn thc Third World.
Airlift lo Support Distant Operation,-.
* SeeNaval Port Vbttf.
he growth of other forces whichto capabilities for miliiary operations in distant aieas is also largely attributablo to other causes. The growth of thc merchant fleet has been in line with the increasing requirements of Soviet foreign trade. Most of Ihe transport aircraft added Io miliiary transport aviation are designed to improve airlift capabilities in theater operations. The capabilities of amphibious forces havebut continue to be oriented primarily to support of fighting on tlie flanks of theater forces.
IV. GENERAL POSTURE IN AREAS OF MAJOR INTEREST
The Mecntorroncon and Egypt
he Mediterranean, especially Ihc Middle East, is the Third World area wherein the Soviets enjoy their greatest prestige and influence. Soviet objectives in the area are to gain predominant influence, and, as alo reduce Western, and especially USSoviet policy in Ihis area, has,since the Arab-Israeli warcquired its own dynamics and imperatives. Here the USSR has come face to face with lhe dilemmas as well as the advantages which stemubstantial military commitment. Soviet involvement, which has beenesult of calculation andesult of happenslanco, hasituation In which lhe USSR sees itself as having political interests worth defending even if this has meant raising Ibe level of military risk. Itregards the preservation of its lies wiih Ihc radical Arab states, and its presence in Egypt in particular, as of vital importance to its future ioIc in thc Mfddlc East, as an important element in itsrivalry wiihesser extent with Ihche Arab-Israeli conflict has been of central importance in Moscow's decisions on
ihapc and slic of iu miliiary presence in Egypt- The severe embarrassment inflicted on Nasser by Israel's deep penetration air raids in0 convinced Ihe USSR lhal its political standing with Egypt, lis own military picslige. and its facilities there requiredengagement in Egypt's air defenseong-term commitment to maintain Egypt's overall military preparedness.
his commitment has resulted in Soviet con*.truction In Egypt of one of the world's most concentrated air defense systems. (The importance of the commitment Is underscored by the fact that the commander of thehad previously been in charge of Ihe Moscow airver half of0 Soviet military personnel in Egypt arcin manning parts of the air defense system. Soviet pilots are (lying air defense missions from bases in Egypt. The Soviets partially or whollyumber of surface-to air missile (SAM) sites and anti-aircraft baiter! es.
oviet personnel fn Egypt also include moreaval personnel associated wiih shore support for the ships of theSquadron* and Its naval air ele-ment. andersonnel serving as advisers, training officers, and technicians with
all branches ol the Egyptian Armed Forces.
The commitment also involves thc Soviet Mediterranean Squadron which by ib presence
deters Israeli attack on certain Egyptian ports
and gathers intelligence on Israeli activities
'Sec Annex C, "The Soviet Meditcriancan Squid-ion".
The Soviets identify Ihcfr naval forces in Uieas the Fifth Ertorfroowever, it contains many more types and number) ol* iliiru lhan does the US naval organizationquadron. The US Sixth Fleet and die SovielSquadronimdar number of ihipi though differing In compoiition.
he objectives of thc Soviet military presence in the Mediterranean, however, go beyond Ihe USSR's role in the Arab-Israeli situation. The various activities of lhe Soviet Mediterranean Squadron are directedagainst NATO naval forces and thc Sixth Fleet in particular, emphasizing theof maritime reconnaissance, and capabilities for antiship and antisubmarine warfaicn these activities thcis an extension of Ihe Hack Sea Fleet's defense of lhe maritime approaches to thc southern flank of the USSR. The USSR is also interested in extending iU political influence as well as the range of iu naval operaUons into Iho western Mediterranean and is thus working to develop IU relations witb the North African states and with Malla.
esult of the expansion of the Squadron during and afler the Arab-Israeli warnprcocdonted demands were placed on Soviet naval logistic capabilities. Initial logiitic requirements were met byall replenishment at anchorages in international waters. Ai Egyptian reliance on Soviet political and military support increased, Ihe Soviets were able to secure morearrangements In Egypt Tho Soviets obtained the use of an oil storage facility in Port Saidacility at Alexandria which was used for maintenance and limited self-repair. Now Soviet ships and submarines are serviced by Soviet auxiliary ships at Port Said and Alexandriaontinuous basis for limited maintenance and repair, resupply, and cicw iter cation. They make more limited use of tho port at Mcrsa Matruh, which Is still being developed. Besides using the portin Egypt. Soviet uniu visit the Syrian portst.ikis and Tartui from time to time and make occasional port calls to Algeria and Yugoslavia.
he first contingent of Iho naval aviation aim of Ihc Soviet Mediterraneansix reconnaissanceEgypt inhc introduction of nir-to-surface missile (ASM)ircraft in1ew forward-bated element to Ihc Soviet strike capabilily against NATO surface forces, particularly the OS Sixth Fleet, in thc eastern and centralBy1 there were aboutSW. reconnaissance, .electronic warfare and ASM operating with Egyptian markings. Badger tankers could be deployed to Egypt, enabling Egyptian-based ASM-carrying Badgers to provide air coverage of Ihe entire Mediterranean The naval air squadron regularly uses Ihe Mersa Matnih Air Base, as well as tho Cairo West and Aswan Airfields.
We believe the primary mission of the ASM-earrying Badgers is to improve the Soviet antiship capability against the Sixth Fleet and other NATO forces in thcThe Soviets probably alto hope that the presence of these aircraft will serve to bolster their commitment to Sadat, and to bring pressure On Israel.
We doubt that Ihe ASMs now in Egypt have nuclear warheads (they are reasonably effective weapons against ships without suche cannot, however, entirelythe possibility that nuclear warheads would bcfor eiample, the Soviets concluded that Israel haduclear capability.
In the five mondvs prior to the June warhe Soviets maintained an average of onlyhips in their Mediterranean Squadron. Shortly before the outbreak of hostilities the Soviets began heavy reinforcement and at its peal* in7 the So>iadron consisted ofnits. This total fell off in die winter
l has since increased gradually until1 the size of the Squadron averaged SOships and submarines. The Squadron'shave grown as well as its numbers. The Squadron's tactical units carry out anti-ship and ASW exercises and extensiveof NATO forces, naval aircraft fry daily reconnaissance missions, and90 small amphibious assault exercises woreon Egyptian beaches. Thehas also developed into an arena for trying out new operations techniques with new unils such aslass cruise-missileand tho Moskva-class ASW cruiser."
hus, the expansion of the USSR'sin the Middle East owes much to the Egyptian military weaknesses exposedut it is also evident that Moscow has for some time had military interests in Ihewhich extend beyond the context of the Arab-Israeli conflicthese Iwo sets of political and miliiary interest* have by mid-large coincided, so lhat Egypt has been strengthenedis Israel and the USSR has not only gained influence in the area at the expense of Ihe West, but has also obtained bases for lis Mediterranean Squadron'sdeployment in defense of the USSR. Both purses have, al Ihe same time, been carried in directions which each may considerdie Egyptians toward dependence on Ihe Russians and the latter toward deeperia the Arab-Israeli conflict
The Indian Oceon
s in the case of the Mediterranean. Soviet activities in lhe Indian Ocean haveumber of military or quasi-miliiary as well as political purposes since they cstab-
'SeaWarsaw Pact Forces forlaECRET. Annex B, (or more dctaQod dbcaxiton of
a naval presence therehen?space and oceanographic opcrationi. lesling ihips and submafinesropicaland improving ASW techniques in an area in which Moscow may expect thc US eventually to deploy nuclear ballistic missile submarines. These operations also support the Soviet Navy's efforts to gain experience inoperations and prepare the way for the establishmentoro convenient transit route between the USSR's eastern and western fleet operating areas if and when thc Suez Canal is reopened. The USSR's increasedin tho Indian Ocean includes not only Its growing naval presence, but also its civil air routes, arrangements for facilities for thc Sovicl fishing fleet and increased diplomatic and trade relations.*
or short visits, Soviet naval units find more ports open In the Indian Ocean than in the Mediterranean. Ports used most often are in South Yemen, Somalia, and Mauritius. Both the frequency and duration of Soviet port calls in the Indian Ocean have generally increased '* But ihc Soviets have not obtained access to or use of facilities comparable to those availableypt or in Cuba. Although there have been persistent rumori of activity on the island of Socotia cast of tho Horn ofisit in1ualified observerthat there was no Soviet base on thehowever, thc Soviets continue to use tho nearby anchorage.
hore facilities along thc Red Sea. at Aden, or along the coast of the Horn of Africa would facilitate Soviet operations in the west-em Indian Ocean. The Soviets have helped with the constructioneepwater port at Berbera in Somalia and have been involved in cor.itruchon activity at Aden. The Soviet have military aid-related personnel in Aden and
Annex D. "Indian Ocean OpentSotn*.
" See Annex tl. "Pattern of Soviet Naval Port Viitts".
have used tho airfield there in lhcir recentlo India. While there is no evidence that they have applied for permanent facilities in Somalia and Aden, their relations with those governments are such that they mightavorable response if they did apply. They sought rights lo unrestricted access to certain shore facilities in India and have so for been refused, though some elements in lhc Indian Government apparently favored granting the request The Sovietsimilar request turned down by the Government of Ceylon beforo It was replaced by Mrs. Bandaranaikc's government They may make the request again, though in view of Mrs. Bandaranaike's campaign to make the Indian Ocean off limits lo major naval powers, she would bc likely toovietreceni Soviet assistance to her government in putting down insurgency. Forear. Ihe Soviets have been exploring the possibility of usingdockyardsegular basis for their naval vessels, and may secure limited access to some facilitiesurely commercial basis, butc Kuan Yew is not anxious lo concede Ihem anything Uke base rights.
he increased miliiary deployments in lhe Indian Ocean are an aspect of Russia's ambition io establish itselflobal power in general and an Asian power in particular. By shewing the flag in the area Moscow evi-dendy hopes Io accomplish several alms; to make Ihc littoral stales aware of the USSR's might;emonstrate thai the USSR hasin the area; and. Io warn itsthis case both lhe Western powers and lheil has military means cn the spot to support its interests. In presenttbe all-but-totalof British miliiary power irom East of Suez and uncertainty about Ihe future role of the US--Moscow may believe that It can accomplish these purposes withodest force and that many of the nations of the
will come increasingly lo ihink of friend-ihip wiih lhc USSR as an alternative lowiih tho Chinese or alignment with tho West
hc USSR has tried to male itself more acceptable wherever possible in the Indian Ocean area. The Russians probably believe lhat the Persian Culf states face an uncertain political futuie and lhat the withdrawal of the British presence will make possible some increase of their own influence which might enable Ihem to put pressure on Westerninterests in the area. But the main Soviet political interest in Ihe area is dearly India. The Soviet-Indian Friendship Treaty confirms this priority andwitch from tho policy, inaugurated in Tashkenthich attempted to put the USSRosition of greater impartiality between India and Pakistan. With tho trealy andneed for Soviet support against both Pakistan and China, the USSRtronger claim Io Indian cooperation in support of Its military presence in lhe Indian Ocean. It may be lhat Moscow also sees the treaty as the initial step in creating the Asian securityal containingBrezhnev first proposed
Ihe Coribboon and Cuba
fter the missile crisisoviet naval operations in the Caribbean wereuntilince then, they haveeries of probes whose precise objectives are not yet clear. Their navalto lhe Caribbean may havefor stralegic capabilitiesis the US. as well ai local ramificaUons.
aval support facility capable ofand provisioning tsnih nuclear submarines and surface combatants bas been established on an island in the harbor al Cicnfucgos, Cuba. The SovieU have stationed there two barges designed for thc collection
of effluent from nuclear-powered submarines. In peacetime these facilities would be useful for supporting naval units during crew rest and rotation and maintenance of Sovietand would permit more frequent and piolonged naval operations in lhe Western Hemisphere. However. Moscow has not used lhe Cicnfucgos facilities for support ofmissile submarines, evidently out offor American reaction, and the matter teems to be in aheyance since Moscow has reaffirmed its intention to refrain fromoffensive weapons in Cube.
9 pairs of Sovietival reconnaissance aircraft have flown six limes to Cuba, and Soviet surface ships andhave visited the island seven times. All hough lhe purpose of the visiu was mainly political, the ships were replenished in port andew occasions conducted basic ASW exorcises wtlh Cuban Navy ships. Cuba wouldaluable replenishment site forreconnaissance aircraft, and surface ships operating In the western Atlantic.
ther Soviet aims in the Caribbean appear lo lie similar lo the efforts the USSR is pursuing in other areas to enhance its international prestige and to improve IU overall operational eapabililies. Its activities serve to score points against thc US. toSoviet support for Cuba, and to strengthen die USSR's prestigo In Latin America. In recent years, trends in Latin America have been encouraging to Moscow. The Russians no doubt see in tho growth of radical nationalism with iu anti-Americanorce which promises to weaken the US position in tho area and to strengthen its own. The insUlUtionarxist-ledinnot an unmixed blessing from the Soviet point ofnonetheless cause Moscow to believe that, overumber of Latin American coun-
can be drawnro-Soviet ab'gn-menl.
The Eastern Atlantic ond Weilccasional Soviet naval operations oil West Africa started as early7 the Soviets carried out an afloat submarine support operation for three nuclear and two diesel submarines off the Cape Verde Islands, proving the ability of the Soviet Navy toa submarine group in the central Atlanticeriod of six months.he operations of Soviel ships off the Westcoast have been related to politicaloviet surface ship task force patrolled the Chana coast in the spring9 to effect the release of two Soviet fishingthat the Chanaian Covcmment hadIn0 two destroyers were divested to Cuinea at the invitation of that government after theincursion into that country, and at least one has remained in thc area since.
V. CURRENT SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR DISTANT ACTION
oviet miliiary potential In distant areas is no: limited to current deployment in those areas. There is also thc question of how much and how quietly the Soviets, withcapabilities, could augment lhcir presence through rapid deployment of additional naval forces oc quick reaction forces, or through shipments of increased amounts of military equipment.
A. Naval Forces
iven their tolal naval inventory, the USSR could, for short periods of time, increase considerably the number of combatantsin certain distant areas. Tlie specific number would depend upon many variables, including the place, purpose and desired
length of thc deployment, homeland defense requirements, and the international political climate. By drawing on all Tour fleets. Ihc Soviets could assign to distant operationalajor surface combatantsong range, general purposeover and above forces alreadyIn distant areas. These units could bc used lo reinforce current Mediterranean. Caribbean, and Indian Ocean deployments or lo support other distant operations. However, current Soviet logistic support forces arcto support greatly expanded and sustained surface naval operations in farareas.
hile fresh waler, provisions, and. In some instances, fuel are available to Soviet combatants in many foreign ports, any logistic support system depending upon such ports can be disrupted by even minor changes in the polilical dimatc or the mood of foreign suppliers. Probably with Ihisind, lhe Soviets have, in large part, continued to ic-plenish al sea or at anchor from navaland merchant ships, even in the eastern Mediterranean where facilities are availableAllhough merchant and naval support shipping have been able to provide for lhc needs of the forces currently deployed, the Soviet Navy is short of certain types ofrepair ships, and supplywould be needed for moredeployments.
B. Quick Reaction Forces
hould requirements dictate, anyide variety of Soviet army, naval infantry, and air force units could be transported by air or sea to distant areas Ef landing and docking facilities were available. Thewhich might accompany such units would depend on the situation andavailable. However, certain units of the Soviet fotces do. by virtue of their function
or cquippagc, seem more likely than others topcd for use in distant areas. These in-cludo airborne divisions, naval infantry, and tactical air units.
hc USSR airlift for military personnel and supplies is furnished by Military Transport Aviationhe Soviet Unions military airlift capability lias Increased In recent years to satisfy expanded objectives and missions. Still, the force has no Urge all-jet transport! andew large turboprop aircraft inet-powered aircraft similar to the US CU1 is. however, being flight tested.with the US military airlift, Soviet forces have about one-half the capacity, less ability to fly extremely long distances, and cannot react as rapidly and effectively to situations in tha Third World because they lack an overseas support infrastructure.
f essentially all VTA aircraft were used, they could airlift two airborne divisions with alt supporting equipmentistance of. and return, or land themistance of.ituation Involving opposition, the Soviets could probably airdrop assault elements of these divisions. In theseoviet airborne divisions use parachute rocket deceleration devices and are estimated to have an effective capability to drop heavy equipment.
ho VTA could without refueling0 tons uf supplies. and return or It couldonsistance. The Soviets have conducted successful airlifts of armsumber of countries in the Middle East. Africa, and South Asia Thein rho Peruvian relict airliftowever, indicates that currently the Soviets
See Aim II. Xapa&litiei of Military and Ovd Airlift to Support Distant OtM-ritlons".
are ill prepared for large-scale operalions over thc Atlantic or Pacific,
ome portion of thc Soviet civil aviation fleet (Acroflol) could also be mobilized for airlift purposes. If all serviceable heavy and medium transports in Aeroflot were made available (unlikely because of othercargo alilift capability would Increase byercent and troop airlift more than double- Although transition from civililitary role would requireewAeroltot aircraft generally are not well suited to military airlift. Most arc not rear loading, havingather smallopening and cannot admit large vehicles. Moreover, some of these aircraft need airfields with longer and more durable runways than those required for assault-type transports. Nonclhelcss. thc Soviets can utilize their civil airlift in much the same ways as the US uses commercial airliftsupport Its operations in Vietnam,
he above represents maximum Soviet airlift eapabililies. Considering primaryand requirements the Soviets wouldmake available only aboutercent of the medium and heavy transports in VTA andercent of selected Aeroflot medium and heavy aircraft for an airlift to certain distant areas.orce mightrom VTA. plus over,, and passenger carriers fromThc VTA component could airland in one week two lo three paratroop regimentsen each with all their weapons, most of their combat supper! equipment, andadius. from Warsaw Tact countries. Provided fuel andfacilities were available al the finaland at intermediate points not more than. apart, this force could moven the worldather longer period of time. The Aeroflot component could carryeek's0 troops with band-
carricd weaponsroopsons ot suppliesistance of.
lic capabilities cited presuppose theof optimum conditions. Thesewould bo reduced Io some degree by any kind of opposition. For one thing, since fighter escort from thc USSB is limitedangeistant situations Involving airsvould require fighter protection be made availablo. Moreover, even withoutthere would be the problems ofand staging rights, advance basennd the emplacement of maintenance facilities and adequate stocks of fuel.
Amphibious Forces '*
he naval infantry is organized intolanding teams designed to playroles oa the flanks of the ground forces. The Sovielsheoretical capability for lifting someanding teams to distant areas, if all existing long-range amphibious shipping were used. However, mosl of the shipsand most of Ihe naval infantry unils arc based in four widely separated fleet areas, all of which are well removed from potential Third World trouble spots except the Middle Bast One landing team is on station in the Mediterranean anti one of theoviet LSTs (lank landing ships) is deployed more or less continuously in thc Indian Ocean.'1 As much asercent of the amphibious shipping ts piobably combat ready, thc remainder being involved in braining, refit, and maintenance re-quiremcnts.onsequence, aboutlanding teams from din Northern Fleet, 3Vi from Ihe Bailie. 2Va from the Black,rom the Pacific Ocean Fleet could bc sealifted Io dls-
" See, "Airtphihioos and Metchanl Marine Soalift Canabilliiea".
" Two LSTi were involved ira th* Sonet iho- ofto Cuinea in talend at oftitl there.
tant areas on short notice. Transit would bcm. per day (aboutnots).on the rircumitances, coves us well as naval escort might be required.
he Soviets thus haveimited long-range seaborne assault capability. They can, with the forces described,istant theater and in certainthey havo tho capability to carry out small-scale, unopposed landings. However, against significant oppositionorce would have little utility since the navalare lightly armed, lack staying power, and have no organic close air support
he Soviets have substantial bomber forces that could conceivably be employed in distanl areas. There arcBear and Bison bombers andison tankers in Long Range Avialion that haverange to reach many Third WorldIn addition, Ihey could use some ofedium bombers in Long Range and Naval Aviation. Some could be refueled in flight, while others would have to bo staged through forward bases. In considering whether to use these strategic forceshird World situation, Ihe Soviels might havo to decide whether lo divert them from their primary missions and also to calculate thc possible risk of escalation.
ince tactical aircraft lack both the range and air refueling capabilities of heavy and medium bombers, long-range fighterare contingent upon ferryingor securing suitable staging bases.of currently operaUonal fighters woulderies-ile hops, depending upon (ho lypo of aircraft, wiih more recent models having Ihc longer ranges. These distances preclude fctrying across lhe Atlantic or Pacific. In an unopposed situation,
present support system would probably permit deployment of upactical alr rcgimentsircraft) in one day from bases within thc western USSR to Egypt and Syria by overflying Turkey and Iran and refueling in Iraq. If Soviet fighters wereto stage through the southernmost Yugoslav bases they also could reach the Middle East.
Soviet practice has been totactical aircraft either byaircraft or by ship rather than torange aircraft or aerial refueling.that within oneimitedof tactical aircraft could be transportedreassembled in any part of thethat the necessary overflightaccommodations had beena few fighters and helicoptersto Ceylon in this manner.where time is not critical theprefer to send disassembledby ship.
C. Merchant Marino Scalift"
in US experience, support fornew deployments of ground andwould have to come from thesince transport aircraft are-carrying the large tonnages required.is true of rapid supply lift ofand supplies. Abouthipsrequiredoviet motorized rifleand its equipment. The actualtankers and cargo ships required forsupply lift depends, of course, oninvolved and thc rate in tonsat which deliveries are required.turn, depends on the number and typeunits to be supplied, thc natureactivity (whether they are in combaton training or standbyhe pre-
" See Ami's C, "Amphfbiovj and Merchant Marine Seilil) Capabilities'*.
positioning of ships such as tankers, and tho feasibility and desirability of obtaininglocally. But distance Is probably the major faelor. For example, it would require almost three times as much shipping toiven tonnage per day to Cuba as to Egypt-Reaction time is another factor, inasmuch as many of thc ships particularly suited forscalift would probably be at sea carrying civilian cargo at any given time.
he Soviet fleet had fewerhips and totaledilliontonsn the followingears, it was expanded lo morehips totalingillion DWT.5hc Sovietships ofillion DWT. Their fleet nowhips1 million DWT. While vessels of the Soviet fleet are fully utilized intbey could be valuable adjuncts tooperations lo tlie extent that the Soviets' chose to divert them for this purpose.
Any large scale diversion of merchant ships for military sealift operations would be at the cost of some curtailment of the USSR's foreign trade and to its balance of payments. The Soviet merchant Heel Is generallyat capacity in normal trade activities- The USSR's tanker needs arc so great throughout thc year that il makes tankers available to noo-Communist charteri only in the course of tetorn voyages to the Soviet Union. Except when ice makes certain northern Soviet ports inaccessible, most dry cargo ships are occupied In moving Communist cargoesull-time basis. It is doubtful, however, if thesemostly economic, would inhibit the Soviets from utilizing part of theirfleet for military purposesigh priority in tho Third World.
n sum, thc Soviets have substantial ground, air and naval forces which could be
used in distant operations where (here is no significant opposition. Against opposition their capabilities arc more limited. Against aor surface ship threal, Soviet njtval forces fn distant waters could be increased substantially over present levels for short periods,ustained augmentation would require additional logistic support and ships to defend that support. Soviet amphibious forces are primarily designed for operations on the periphery of the Soviet Union and their capabilities across open oceans arelimited by the small numbers of naval infantry and amphibious ships available The lack of long-range tactical aircraft and aircraft carriers virtually precludes distant intervention ashore against air opposition moreow hundred milesase where supporting fighters are deployed.
y contrast. Sovietsea and air. In situations where they have beenbeen used with Increasing frequency to support Soviet clients in the Third World and the Soviet Union's ownforces in Egypt In addition, of coiiise, tho appearance of Soviet naval units in distant portsymbolic value in demonstrating Soviet ability to project some dementi of militaiy power anywhere in Iho world.
VI. LONGER TERM OUTLOOK: CONSTRAINTS AND OPTIONS
vents not now foreseeable could serve cither fo stimulate or to dampen SovietIn the Thud World and in developingmeans to support its political aimsore active involvement might result if developments within the Third World itself seemed to offer new opportunities or tfhad reason lo believe that thc risks of involvement had greatly diminished. If. on thc other hand, the Soviets were toumber of cosily failures in the Thiid World, if there were serious conflict on thc Sino.
Soviet border, or if there were severe political or economic complications at home, they might considerably curtail their activities fn Ihc Third World
n general, however, the trendteady expansion of Soviet capabilities for distant operations seems likely to be sustained. Emphasis may be on both extending therange of operations and onlogistics and air support for IheseThe momentum of overall military growth will help to carry the Soviets in this direction. Moscow will also bc seeking in this way to add to its international prestigeand to win greater influence in the Third World at the expense of both tlie US and China. In proceeding along Ihis line,thc Russians will be confrontedumber ofmilitary, and political.
he uses to which the Soviets can put thc distant action forces they now have, or will acqutie in coming years, will of course, depend on the kinds of situations which will confront them. Soviet military involvement in Ihc Third World hu so far been mainly by invitation, as in Egypt. And the Russians have succeeded in avoiding direct engagement in hostilities on any substantial scale. This may be tho most frequent pattern in the future as well. Where this Is the case, intervention would present no great problems for theeven if their capabilities for distantremain as they arc today. But forof analyzing Soviet capabilities and limitations, comidcratkin must also be given to the requirements the Russians would need to meet in order to conduct operations against significant opposition or to plan for such
id planning, Moscow musl alwayshat deployment of these fotocs against significant opposition in the Third World may carry risk of escalationajor conflict. In some circurmtances. control of key points on the sea and air routes from Soviet bases might bo in unfriendly or potentially unfriendly hands. In any sizable militarybeyond its periphery, the USSR would have some problems of support andand in case of major opposition, these problems might be formidable.
Naval conscniction programs now under way couldS provide increasedof surface ships and submarines capable of distantthe order ofdditional cruisers.ore missile-armedanddditional cruise-missile and torpedo-attack nuclear submarines. But if tho Sovieis continue to retire older classes lliere will bef any. Increase5 In the total number of major combatants in the order
of battle. There willontinuing deficiency
in naval support ships.
hc additions now beingsealifl and airlift forces will improvecapabilities for distant operations.are acquiring distant amphibiouscapacity to accommodate about onebattalion landingear.shipping tun ii ago which could besupporting distant operations will(although this increase willgrowing foreign traderespectirlift capability, lliehave abouteavy transportsand the firsteavymay enter service wiihhus,5 Moscow will havedisposal greater capabilities thanrapid delivery of military aid or fora military presence quickly InThe Soviets, however, do not
appear lo beigh priority toa distant assault capability.
he Soviets have not as yet come upolution to the problem of air cover for distant operations. Except where they have aircrafl deployed, notably in Egypt, theirin this respect remains extremelyTcsls of refueling bclween fighterhave been reported recently, but several years will be required before operational ferrying would beery largecombatant, has been reported to be under construction with an estimated initialcapability. It Is too early to estimate what the function of Ihis new ship will be. It may carry helicopters. Or it may be designed for fixed-wing aircraft Or It may not carry aircraft at all, If it isfor fixed-wing aircraft or largeit could Improve Soviet capabilities for ASW, fleet air defense, or landingthe latter two would add appreciably to capabilities for distant operations.
he increasingly forward posture of Soviet strategic forces againsi NATO carriers and ballistic missile submarines has resulted from requirements independent of Sovielin the Third World, but the twoparticularly when it comes to theof bating. It is still uncertain how fax the Soviet Waders have committed themselves to the concept of foreign basing. We do not know whether they planned to seek shore base facilities all along or whether the need for facilities has simply grown wiih theof operations. But this factor is clearly one tho Soviets will liave to tako into account in planning for operations in distant areas. In areas dose to home bases, simple rotation of ships is practicable, but as distances increase tbe number of ships required to maintain relation increases rapidly. Floating bases or replenishment at sea can accomplish routine
or minor maintenance, but forof prolonged deployment, shoreare important.
oviet military requirements for foreign bases ate more likely to grow than diminish. Prospccti for Soviet ASW and strategic attack forces, as well as the trend in increased out of area operation of general purpose forces, both point in Ihis direction. Soviet bases in the Third World are not easily acquired andthem would depend upon politicalin areas notorious for politicalMany states in Ihe underdeveloped world want Soviet arms assistance and, incircumstances, might want Soviet aupport in more direct ways against an adversary; but none likes thc derogation of sovereigntyin the granting of assured facilities, and none is as peculiarly dependent on the Sovietscircumstances have made Egypt.the Soviets have sought shore facilities of various kinds In several countries, In addition to those they already have in Egypt, and the search can be expected to continue.
Polilkol ond Economic Contide rotions
oviet efforts abroad will in general be aimed more at increasing Soviet influence with existing governments than atCommunist 'dominated regimes. This is not to say thai Moscow would in no case assist or welcome such an outcome, which might,being ideologically satisfying, appeal to the Sovietsay of establishing someof direct control even at some cost The urge to obtain such control is likely to befelt In those areas, like tho Middle East and tho Asian subcontinent, where tho USSR's interests and prestige aro substantially engaged and where its military commitment is considerable. But few, if any. Third World countries are willing to become satelliles of the USSR, and Moscow, for ils part, would be mindful of the political and economic burdens
of supporting additional dependents. And, (hough Communist regimes would In many instances be dubious assets for the Sovieis. (hey would, nonetheless,trong claim on Soviet support
here areas such as thc Mediterranean and Caribbean are concerned the Soviets may recognire lhal by pressing too hard on US or Weal European interests tltcy could jeopardize lhe USSR's detente strategy. This Is not lo say that the Sovieis will pull back from positions won In such areas, but Only (hat there are important factors making for prudence In how far and fait they try to go. Various domestic considerations may also incline Moscow to take care not to over extend its commitments in the Third World. High riskof which helped to bring downcan be rroUltcalh/ damaging to individual leaders. Moscow will, because of lhe many other demands on its economic resources, tend to be frugal but ft will find the fundi toils Bctivilies when it is clearly to lhe USSR's advantage to do so.
he Soviets are probably conscious of the tenuousnessosition which ison relationships with the individualThey will seek ways in coming yean tonore durable foundation for iheir presence in many parts of Ihe Third World by overt and covert courting of potential "es-tablishment"the educated elites, younger military officers, and civilas well as by developing organizational tics wiih indigenous "progressive" parties.
rezhnev has declared that the USSR si reedy to solve the problem" created by the greal powers" naval deployments In areas "far from their ownow ever,thi: ?ould be only on the h'rit of Soviet equality wiih Ihc US. The Russians arenot, at this stage, prepared to enter into formal undastanding with thc US on mutual limitation ol miliiary forces or arms assistance
Third Worldin order lo reduce Ihe risk Io themselves of poliiical conflict or military confrontation with the US or toosily competition. But in someparticular, ihose in which the Chinese are alsoRussians, may from time to time, find it advantageous to follow policies which happen more or less to parallel those of Ihe US and aim at preventing the outbreak or worsening of local conflicts. Regional security arrangements, as in Asia, in which (he USSR played the part of principal sponsor but not sole guarantor might commend themselves to Moscoway oftrong political role at minimum military risk.
Future Options ond AUernot'rvet
ome of the constraints described In lhe foregoing paragraphs may, of course, noi hc permanent. Committee rule in Moscow could, for example, give way lo the dominationingle leader who, either because hc feltof his position or was eager to showmlglilore venturesome policy. Whatever the nature of tho leadership, it has not been and will not be immune to over* confidence, miscalculation, or opportunism. And by the very fact of its presence in distant areas, the USSR fa more likely to encounter situations in which it will have both theand the temptation to make its weight felt.ituation might arise, for example, if thc Russianshance to influence the outcomeocal conflict or power struggle or toeslern response byhow of force on the spot In cases where Soviet forces were near at hand and Western forces were not, one or another of thoin Ihc conflict would be moreto look to the Russians for help, while thc Russians svould see less risk to themselves In acting,
arked movement to the left among Third World coiuitries generally or the emer-
genceramatic opportunity such as might be presented, say, by the collapse of IhcIn Saudi Arabia or in Ethiopia, might persuade Moscow that its politicalhad greatly widened. And Moscow's view of its prospects might be considerably altered if it came to believe thai the US wascommittedubstantialof Its international role or had become deeply reluctant to get involved in localespecially where thereisk ofwith the USSR.
While the Soviets wiD, we believe,to be careful in accepting risks, they no doubt also wish to have wider options than in thc past The Soviets will be inclined tocaution In areas where US Interests are deeply engaged, but oven in thesethoy may calculate that an assertive policy will entail fewer risks to themselves than In the past Instability in the Third World engendered by conflicts between radical and traditionalist elements, between regional states, or between those stales and (he Western Powers will in coming years offer Moscow numerous opportunities to test these
In any event military assiltanco willa major instrument of Soviet policy. Thc Russians may resort increasingly to (he use of airlifts in critical or fast-movingeans of chsmat/ing its assistance. And In situations where the Soviets havean important stake and Iheir friend or client has reason to fear air attacks, they might dispatch air defense equipment together with personnelan it as in Egypt. In somethis could mean the participation of Soviet personnel in hostilities.
Q% The Mediterranean. The Soviets willproceed with efforts lo improve theof their NATO-oriented operations in thc Mediterranean. To this end, they will no doubt take measures to enhance the capabili-
ol their Mediterranean Squadron without necessarily increasing its size significantly. There will probably be some increase in num-bers of aircraft for reconnaissance, ASW, and ASMS. They may also acquire additionalfor the servicing of their ships or aircraft on Egypt's Mediterranean coast, in the interior of Egypt, and along the Red Sea.
he Soviets will probably try to eipand their operations in the western Mediterranean. Access to shore facilities in Libya or Algeria would greatly assist these efforts. But thc gov. crnmcnts In these countries, despite theirto accept Soviet military aid, aie only slightly less suspicious, if atf thothan of the West Their determination to limit Soviet Influence appears firm, and unless thererastic change in these regimes, neither Libya nor Algeria is likely to assist the growth of the Russian MediterraneanTho Russians may also hopo eventually to obtain tho use of Malta's facilities for their nnval ships as well as securing tho denial of those facilities to NATO forces. But the Malta Covcmment, under Mintoff, is probablyinterested in movingosition of non-alignment While it would, if its ccceiemic position permitted, be glad to see NATO go. it docs not want to replace NATO with the Russians.
gypt's willingness to permit anof the Soviet presence will depend in great part on how much it needs active Soviet support in thc Arab-IsraeliSince one of the major aims of the Soviet military presence in Egypt is to prevent the Israrlis from innicting further humiliation on theubstantial and probablySoviet involvement in Egyptian airIs'ome of th*defenses are bring turned over to Egyptian personnel. And the Russians, who want to limit their direct Involvement in tho Arab-Israeli conflict, will probably continue to try to main-
lend of political and military pressures in dealing wllh this confrontation,
he Indian Ocean. There is apotential for turbulence at many points along the littoral of thc Indian Ocean and its contiguous waterways, the Arabian Sea. Ihe Persian Culf, aod the Red Sea. While thewill certainly not want to becomein each and everyin some cues, will see their interests best served by an easing ofis notto conceive of circumstances arising in ssdiich the Russians wouldhow of force andhreat of in'-rventicmexpedient and low in risk. At all events, they will continue to seek such political profits as they can fiom "showing the flag*.
he reopening of Suez would facilitate Soviet naval transit operations and probably lead to some increase in deployments in the Indian Ocean. But the USSR does not need to undertake much larger deployments ia order to keep pace with its competitors so long as the Wcslern naval presence remains small and the Chinese presence non-existent Themight, In time, however, become more active in the area as an outgrowth of their interest In East Africa, and possibly Inwith missile testing. This could result in some increase in Soviet naval activity, though it would hardlyarge increase. In any case therobably seek access to facilities in thc Indian Ocean.
he Soviets probably would increase their operations in the Indian Ocean moreif it became, or they anticipated that it might become, an area of increasedof US forces. They would besensitive to deployment of missileand would probably undertake some ASW of lort in response. But Ihc Russiansdo nut tegnrd the Indian Oceanikely theater of major naval combat; in case of hos-
tilitlcs with the West, olhet naval theaters nearer to Europe would be of far grcaierimportance
Within the neat coupleIhe Soviet naval presence in theis likely to become continuous,illtothe US, toother Caribbean nations, and toasthe US has lostnaval role in the area. Aspermit, the Russians will probablyflag" more widely dsewhero In
think it unlikely that theattempt to use tlie naval facilitiesfor forwaid basing of theirballistic missiles (SLBMs) sothey have reason to anticipate strongThey may, however, argueare entitleduid pro quo withforward basing of US SLBMs. Andprobably coniinue to probe USdifferent levels and types of navalby. for example, deploying othersubmarines as well as missile ships andtenders to Cuba.
may also seek to acquireelsewhere in Latin America,to lest the limits of US tolerance atol this process. We do not believe,that thc USSR svould attempt toLatin America, Cuba aside, the kind ofnaval facilities it now has in Egypt.action besides being provocative to theoffensive to Latin Americanprobably be considered unnecessarypolilical and military purposes. Atlime, the Soviels may find it possibleccccjs to shore feeiUtO* Wand minor repairs; thebe able to negotiate with Chile andone or two other countries for themaintenance facilities for its naval vessels.
Some Latin countries will be receptive to such exercises as port and airfield visits to "show theoscow may also find customers for its arms, and some governments willing to grant overflight and landing rights.
Africa. Unlike thc other areaswe have no evidential base tothat the Soviets have an interest Inair or naval support facilities in thisIn such facilities, however, wouldThey might come to want accessfacilities to support naval operationsSoulh Atlantic and to support transitsfrom the Indian Ocean. Air facilitiesAfrica could be useful for airinto LaUn America or
is by now conventional wisdommilitary capabilities of great powers arcor automatically translatable intopolitical influer*ce--especiallyThird World. Recent history has manyof small and relatively weak slatesdefying (or at least refusinguch largerof overwhelmingly superiormodern world tends to lookon intervention by Ihe great powers;Issuesargemallwhich mighl once have led lo ato war or the threat of it, havedecades been resolved orot simply endured without violence-that one side in sueh disputesmilitary superiority has oftenlo do svith tho outcome, because inneither party was actually willingto war and both sides knew it Oneof course, that often deterred thcfrom using force was that thecould count on aid and supportgreat power.
But if these considerations have madeood deal of independence of action on the part of some small states, thoy have not precluded thc use or threat of force in many areas at different times over the part quarter century; for all that its use is widelymilitary force Is not yet obsolete or Irrelevant to international politics, and no government's words and actions speak louder or more clearly lo that effect than the USSR's.
n any case, the essential question here is not whal we think of tho limitations onpowerolitical instrument, but what the Soviets think. There Is considerablethat they have some respect for the climate of international attitudes described above. They may occupy an ally likeor menace another Communist slate like China, but they have for some time avoided saber rattliig threats against small neighbors like Tuikey and Iran. Thoy can use gunboat diplomacy, as they showed off the coast of Ghana last year, but in general, when thoy want concessions from countries in the Third World, they have been more inclined to bargain than to threaten, and they havebeen turned down, even by states heavily dependent on them They may drive hard bargains with clients in the Third World like Egypt "nd Syria, but lhe record shows they doso do the clients.
nd In thc few cases where thc USSRlear military presence, as in Egypt, the involvement probably appears to the Soviet leadorsixture offering both benefits and liabilities. To the host country, the balance sheet may be reversed. Thus, access to naval facilities and the ability to slation various air units in Egypt arc no doubt seen by Moscow as military assets; by contrast, the need to re-equip Egyptian forces after their shattering defeat and the subsequent decision actively to commit Soviet personnel are probably viewed
as involving risks and expense even if justified on the other side of the ledger.
he problem of balancing costs and risks against gains in the Third World willlo confront the Soviel leadenThe record of tho pastean suggests that they are cautious in ihese calculations, but it also showi they are capable of boldwhen Ihey consider the slakes high enough or their interests and prestigein Egypt, Sovielin Egypt is lhe most notable example ofoviet aid program developed over timeubstantial Soviet military presence. IIoviet propensity in recent years for making greater use of its military resources in lhe Third World.
e have in this paper offered detailed judgments on capabilities and limitations offorces for conducting assaults In distant areas of the world. Direct assault, however, scents to be the least likely form in which the USSR would make any attempt to interveneistant area. Tho Soviet Ceneral Staff would appear to share this judgment, for the USSR does not appear to he developing rapidly tho kinds of forces which could carryajor operation against significant opposition far from home.
ast practice suggests that any future Soviet involvement would more likely come about as an outgrowthoviet military aid program. What kinds of circumstances would favor the transition from an aid programituation of direct involvement of Soviet forces?
some compelling circumstance, most likely an external threat, would seem tcrerequisite tootential client into deep dependence on iho USSR. Most Third World politicians arewho prize their countries* independence, and who would be inclined to accept So-
forces on tlicir territory only in citrcrnc circumstances For Castro, the compel)ircumstance was fear of invasion. Forit was Israeli air raids.
thc Soviets, the venture would have toolitically promising course oi action. The needy client should not be in such desperate straits that he was beyond effective help. On tlie other hand, Moscow's stake in theterms of amountsinvested and the eitent to which the Soviet Union's prestige and world position were involvod in hisalsoactor in decidingourse of action,
Soviets would almost certainly have to look, at the prospective course of action as one which did not put the USSR itself in jeopardy. After all, even Klirushchev'sdeployment in Cuba would appear to have been undertaken on the assumption that thc risks were manageable.
opportunities to use the client's territory for Soviet purposes may bc part of the calculation of costs and worth. The chance to deploy missiles in Cuba was no doubt more important to Moscow than the political goal of saving Castro. In the case of Egypt, basing of naval units and aircraft appears to haveecondary, but still, important consideration.
he combination of circumstancesto fhe stationing of Soviet forces tnareas has, of course, been rare, and it is likely to remain so. Itemarkable series of events, coincidences and accidents toexactly the right combination in Egypt
Nevertheless, In recent years the Soviets havereater propensity to think in terms of using lhcir military resources in the Third World. In particular, the Soviets have been quick lo use airlift for emergency deliveries of assistance to favored clients. Moreover, the line between aid programs and theof Soviel personnel in foreign conflicts seems to bo less sharply drawn than we might have thought five yearswe saw Soviet SAM sites in North Vietnam, the curious interlude of Soviet pilots flying combatin lhc Yemen, and the Soviet advisors in the field wiih Egyptian units.
he USSR's interests in expanding its power and Influence around tho world have been made abundandy clear. The Soviets can be expected to continue to exploitin Third World areas. Fuiure decisions about Involvement in particular situations, however, will no doubt bc made case by case and in contexts not easy to predict. Several things, however, seem clear: the Soviets are not mounting an all-out program to acquire large-scale distant action capabilities on any urgent basis; they are steadily increasing their naval forces and improving certain auxiliary capabilities which ejve them moro capacity for limited distant action than the negligible levels ofnd; Ihii trend is likely to goleast in terms of developingor not they are actually used; end givenradual growth of forces applicable In distant areas, opportunities may arise to use these forces for political effect-particularly if one or another government in the Third World should ask llie Soviets for such assistance.
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