SOVIET FOREIGN POLICIES AND THE OUTLOOK FOR SOVIET- AMERICAN RELATIONS (NIE 11-

Created: 4/20/1972

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NATIONAL

INTELLIGENCE

ESTIMATE

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL

Soviet Foreign Policies and the Outlook for Soviet-American Relations

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02

N!

THIS ESTIMATE IS SUBMITTED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND CONCURRED IN BY THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD.

The following irriettlgertce organizations participated in lhe preparation ol tho estimote:

The Central Intelligence Agency ond iho intelligence organicotions ol lhe Deport, menu of Sloie ond Defense, ond ihe NSA.

Concurring;

The Deputy Direclor of Centrol Inielligeice

Ihe Direclor of Inlelligence and Research, Oeporlmenl ol Store lhe Acting Director. Defense Intelligence Agency The Director, Nalionol Seeurily Agency

Th* Alsiiforrl General Manager, Atomic Energy Commotion Abstaining;

The Aisiitanl Director, Federcl Bureou ol Invest igosion, ond lhc Spcclol Assisiom to lhe Secretary of tho Treasury, rhe tub|ect being outride of ihcir |urisdklM>n.

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mission or revelation of which in

thii maierial contains information olfecii-jorfhc National De'eme o' lhe United States within the meaning ol lhe espionage IcuefTJSC,, the Irom-

manner lo on unauthorised person ii prohibited.

theillgenoe HOT

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICIES AND THE OUTLOOK FOR SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS

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CONTENTS

1

Pare

SUMMARY

I THE USSR'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION: PURPOSES AND

PERCEPTIONS

II. INTERNAL FACTORS HEAHINC ON SOVIET FOREIGN

Thc Stale of the

Eciwornic Strengths and

Internal

III- MAJOR ISSUES AND OPTIONS IN SOVIET FOREIGN

Thc Stralegic Weapons Relationship With Ihe United

Oiina: The USSR's Second

Detente in

Soviet Involvement in llie Middle

The Sovicis and thc Third

IV. THE FUTURE SETTING OF SOVIET-AMERICAN

Longer Term

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SOVIET FOREIGN POLICIES AND THE OUTLOOK FOR SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS

SUMMARY

The USSR's View of Its World Position

of recent years have given the USSRin its security and strategic posture, in its capacity toits adversaries on favorable terms, and in the prospects forgrowth of its international influence. The Soviets haveloore vigorous foreign policy and to acceptin many world areas.

attainment of rough parity in strategic weapons withhas contributed more than anything else to the USSR'sTlie Soviets have also been encouraged lo see the USloss of influence in certain areas, facing economic difficulties atabroad, and coming under domestic pressure to curtail ilsLargely on the basis of these considerations, Moscowthe US no longerlear international predominance,not appear to have concluded, however, that US power hasa precipitate or permanent decline. US economic, military,capabilities continue to impress the Soviets. Thus,may be tempted to conclude that the US will no longer beit once was and may therefore be inclined as opportunities

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occur to use their greater slrength nnd flexibility more ventwcsorncly. tliey can still see themselves getting into serious difficulties with the US if they press loo hard.

China problem is anolher factor which limits SovietIt has become increasingly clear to the Russians that Chinaof seriously undermining their international positions,off balance ideologically, und in the longer term, constitutingstrategic threat, ft unquestionably concerns the Sovietsability to challenge them in all these ways would be allin circumstances of Sino-American rappruchemeDt.

Domestic Political and Economic Factors

present Soviet leadershipcn notable for itsthis has resulted in continuity in the decision-making processmost of the seven years since Khrushchev's overthrow-.clearly emerged as thc principal figure in the regime and hasa vigorous lead in the areu of loreign policy; he now has aslake in thc USSR's current policy of selective detente.however,ollective process. Indeed, there arcsigns of stress over the content and implementation ofAndonsensusore active Sovietpolicy, in circurnslances of greater international complexity,increasingly difficult over time.

USSR has been able to achieve rates of economicare high by international standards and to maintain aroughly equal to that of the US. But lhe Soviet economy isin some sectors and it faces serious problemslow productivity, thc declining effectiveness of investment,lag. Economic constraints do not oblige the Sovietsmilitary spending, however. While an agreement oncontrol would relieve somewhat the heavy demands whichprograms impose on high quality human and materialof the sort now contemplated would not enable theto increase thc rate of economic growth appreciably.

Tho Strategic Weapons Relationship with the United States

K. We believe lhat the USSR has concluded lhat the allainmcnt of clear superiority in stralegica superiority so evident

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lhal the Soviets could be assured of successonfrontation and even "win" should they press the issue to nuclear war. say,irstis not now feasible. Nevertheless, there are no doubt those in Moscow who believe lhat it may still be pyssiblc toeaningful margin of advantage in strategic weapons which would give the USSR in-tTeased political-psychological leverage. The Soviet leaders must, at tlie same tune, reckon with the possibility that any attempt to gain such an advantage would look to the US much the same as an attempt Io move loward clear superiority and would produce the sameThe course they have chosen, al least for the immediate future, is to attempt to stabilize some aspects of the strategic relationship wiih the US through negotiations, and they appear lo believeormal antiballistic missile agreement and an interim freeze on some strategic offensive systems, on lenns they can accept, are within. Assuming sueh an agreement is reached, thc Soviets would continue serious negotiations on more comprehensive limitations. But the Soviet leaders are piobably not clear in their own minds as to where these negotiations should lead. They may fear that too com' pieliensive an agreement might involve disadvantages they could not anticipate or foreclose developments which might eventually improve their relative position And the more complex the agreement being considered, the greater lhe difficulties lhe Soviet lenders would face in workingureaucratic consensus Thus, iheir approach to fuither negotiations would almost insure thai these would be

Tho Sino-Soviet Conflict

H. Thc Soviets understand that their difficulties with China are in many ways more urgent and more intractable than iheir difficulties with the US and that, us Chinese military power grows, the conflictcome more dangerous. Moscow no doubt expects tlial the approach loation in US-Chinese relations will strengthen Peking's wternationa! position and will make China even more un-

'Cor " ol thrJ 1^ Cen. laiiiiiile M Ptiiipu'l. Ailing Dim Mr. ,

Orfrrw Inhlitrnr-rier. Davrtor. National Seiiarlt* Afaacv, ear Adia bar) P. Hoiinut. Oirrctor olnr ti f of rhr Navy; and Ma| Cen. George J. Kcritnii.mainni Ctnrl of Stnll.trill in mc.v llieir humo'cinjur*age li

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willing ihan before to consider concessions to the USSR, It has also occurred to the Soviets that the US may gain some increased freedom of maneuver against them and that Washington and Peking will in some situations follow parallel policies lo Moscow's detriment. The new US-Chine.se rclatioiLship could, in addition,ilitaryto the Sino-Soviet conflict seem to thc 5oviets an even lessalternative than before.

I. Sino-Soviet relations will not necessarily remain as bad as they are now. At some point, thc two sides might arriveodus- vivendi which would permit themoexist" more or less normally. But to obtain any deep and lasting accommodation The Russians would have to pay ii price Ihey would consider unacccptably high,ifting of military pressures, some territorial concessions, disavowal of Mcncow's pretensions as the paramount authority amongand acknowledgementhinese sphere of influence in

Asia.

J The Russians are likely lo want toider role in Asia in the nexl few years. Consolidation of lhe Soviel position in South Asia, with the focus on India, will be one feature ol this effort. The Russians will also continue to work to prevent an increase in Chinese influence in North Korea und North Vietnam. In the case of the latter, this will mean lhat Moscow will remain, staunch in its support of Hanoi's effort toavorable settlement of the Vietnam war. The Soviets will,urther objective of their policy in Asia, try to increase their influence in Japan, and an improvement in relations has already begun. Soviet prospects iu this regard arc. however,limited by Tokyo's greater concern for its relations with the US and China.

Soviet Policy in Eastern and Western Europe

K. Although Moscow has made progress in restoring order in Eastern Euiope. it has not come to grips with the root causes which have iu recent years produced unrest or even defiance of SovielRomania, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Many East European leaders still hope for greatei national tatoOQBarj ttd wider political Hnd economic intercourse with the West. The USSR's task of reconciling its efforts to consolidate ils hegemony in Eastern Europe

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with an active policy of detente in Western Europe can therefore only be complicated anil delicate. If it cumflhoice between erosion of their position in Eastern Europe and detente in Europehole, the Soviets would choose to let the latter suffer.

he USSR's security concents in Eastern Europe, its ownwetnesses, and growing preoccupation with the Chinese have turned il nwayolicy ol crisis and confrontation in Europe. At the same time, the changing pattern of US-West Europeanand trends within Western Europe itself have evidently convinced Moscow that its long-standing Europeana reduction of the US role and influencebecome more realizable than everonference on European securityfor Moscow one way of encouraging the favorable trends in Western Europe and slowing the adverse ones. The Soviet also hopeonference would open the wayefinitive and formal acknowledgement of the status quo in Cermany and Eastern Europe. Rejection of tlic West German-Soviet treaty by the West German Bundestag wouldetback to Soviet confidence in llie viability of its German policy and possibly of its wider European policy. We believe, however, that in these circumstances Moscow's inclination would slill|>rrhaps after an interval of threatening talk, to try lo salvage as much as possible of ihese policies lather than to reverse course completely.

M. The USSR's position on force leductious in Europe appears to stem mainly from its overall European tactics rather than from economic pressures or from military requirements related to the Sino-Soviet liordcr. Moscow has doubts alxmt the desirability of rediicmg its forces because of its concerns alsout Eastern Europe and about its miliiary positionis NATO. Wc believe, nevertheless, that Moscow is coming to accept that, assuming continuation of present trends in Bust-West relations in Europe, it could safely withdraw some of its forces from Eastern Europe, particularly from the large contingent iu East Germany. This does not mean the Soviets have decided on any reduction or soon will. But. if they should decide to move beyond their present position, tliey will presumably seein thoroughly exploring the possibilitiesegotiatedrather than acting unilaterally. On the other hand, if ihey should

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conclude lhal such negotiations are unpromising, they might make limited withdrawals on tlieir oun, mainly because they would fudge that this would lead lo more significant US withdrawals.

The USSR's Position in the Middle Eosl

N. In order to protect iheir close political and miliiary ties with Egypt, the Soviets have been willing lo increase their directami to accept larger risls in the context of the Arab-IsraeliA full-scale renewal of lhe Arab-Israeli war would, however, be unwelcome lo the Russians and the present situation causes them some anxiety. There is thus some chance that Moscow will come to see the desirability of urging the Arabs toimited, Interim agreement which would diminish the dangeis of renewed hostilities, while still allowing lite Soviets to enjoy lhe fiuib of continued Arab-Israeli animosity. The Soviets are, however, unlikely to be amenable to an explicit understanding willi the US iimilitig the flow of arms to lhe Middle Easi. though they mightdvantage in some tacit restraints.

he. Russians are probably generally optimistic about their long-term prospects in the Middle East, believing that radical, anti-Western forces there will assuieontinuing role of influence ami eventually an even larger one. But tlie Soviets are uncomfortable because their present position is tied so closely lo the exigencies of the Arab-Israeli conflict. They liave also seen thai radical nationalism can occasionallyiolently anti-Russian turn and with increasing involvement ihey will probably encounter greater difficulty ina coherent and even-handed policy among tlie diverse andslates ol the area. In order lo put their position in the Middle Eastirmer foundation for the future, they arc likely to try boih to forge stronger political ties with theArab parties and to develop their diplomatic relations with the moderate Arab states.

Tho Third World

P. The USSR's policies in lhe Third World aie greatly affected by its urge toider world role for itself and by the need toib revolutionary credentials, especially against the ChineseIn addition to its strong position in the Middle East, lhe USSR

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has over (he years won forivotal role in Soulh Asia. It has also gained wider influence in Latin America. In Africa, the Soviel record is considerably more mixed and Soviet activities there nowelatively low priority. In the Third Woildhole, partly because of some serious setbacks iu the past, the Soviets are nowto view their prospects somewhat more soberly tlian they once did. Their approach is in general characterized by opportunismegard for regional differentiation. Nevertheless.virtue ofcquisition in recent yearsreater capability to use its military forces in distantcapability which is likely to continue tomay now believe its options iu the Third World are expanding.

Future Soviet-American Rotations

Q. The USSR has compelling reasons for wanting to keep itswith the US in reasonably good repaii. if only in order to control the risks arising from the rivalry and tensions which Moscow assumes will continue. It realises that the larger world role it seeks isexcept at the expense of the US. Whether the USSR will in particular circumstances lean toward sharper competition oi broader cooperation with the US will naturally depend on the interaction of many variables Crucial among these will be Moscow's appraisal of US intentions and its assessment of developments in the triangularinvolving the US. China, and itself.

H Progress in talks on strategic aims limitations might, bytlie USSR's sense of security, help to wear away some of its suspicion of US intentions. Rut problems in olher areas where the political interestsie two countries are deeply engaged may prove to beore intractable sort. Tlie conflict of interests in the Middle East seems likely to lie prolonged. This may be true also in Europe where the Russians have an Interest in ihe kinds of agreements which contribute to the security of the Soviet sphere but notenuine European settlement.

S. Whether the future willore meaningful modification of the Soviet international outlook seems likely to depend ultimately on Ihe USSR's internal evolution. And here the crucial question may be how the Soviet Icadeis deal with thc problem of adaptive change in

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Suvici .society, including the problem of economic modernization: by minimal measures or by serious reform. The entrenched bureaucratic oligarchy now in charge is resistant to change. Among the younger men in the Politburo who now seem most likely to take over from the aging top leadership there may be some who harbor reformist views. Bul Mich tendencies, if they exist, arc not now in evidence.

T. Thus, for the foreseeable future at any rate, Soviet policy, for reasons deeply rooted in the ideology of the regime and the world power ambitions oi its leaders, will remain antagonistic to the West, and especially to lhe US, The gains lhc Soviets have made in relative military power, together with the heightened confidence these gains have inspired, will lead them to press their challenge to Westernwith increasing vigor and may in some situations lead them to assume greater risks than they have previously. At the same time, their policies will remain flexible, since they realize thai in some areas iheir aims may be better advanced by policies of detente tlian by policies of pressure. Tliey will remain conscious of the great and sometimes uncontrollable risks which iheir global aims could generate unless iheir policies are modulatedertain prudence in particular situations.

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I. THE USSR'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION: PURPOSES AND PERCEPTIONS

I The underlying premises of Soviet foreign polity remain ml.ut despite the changes which haw affected Soviet society in the postwar period and despite lhe dramatic developments In tho world situation during these years. The Soviet leaders continue to conceive ofas being in the service ofnfnisl ideology and its promise of eventual

ui 'h.-I, tthilthndy

of doctrine does not prescribe particularin specificet of mind which sometimes distoits the perception of the Soviet policy-makers, tends to set limits on how far and how fast tliey can go in modify-ing established positions, andonstant factor in internal party politics These preconceptions argueundamentalof interests between lhc USSR and the US isand that an eventual convci gence of political, economic and social systems is oul of the question. Conflict In some

form is seenermanent feature nf the relationship, and Moscow assumes tliat the governing motis'e on each side is to gain ascendancy over the other. This means that tbe USSR is committed to efforts to magnify its relative powerariety of ways Yet, since the Soviel leaders consider thc outcome of the enduring struggle to he foreordained in hvor of Communism, they can also find justification in their ideologyolicy of gradualism awl low risk.

2 While the USSR's international behavior in practice owes more to pragmatic comtdera-lions of national in Iciest than fo revolutionary goals, for thc Soviet leaders to acknowledge lhat this is so would be to raise questions about the legitimacy of theft own rule and to lend credibilityhinese charges of betrayal. This helps to explain why thc Russians con* tinue to chase the illusion of international Communist unily and to stnififde against the tide of grosviiiR Cuminunisl diversity even while they incline incicaslngly to the use of uutruiiH-nts other Ihan Communist Parties in theiro gain wider influence abroad.

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Altliough Soviet foreign policyften seemed to be marked bydefenslveness.egree ofin more recent years it hasa new confidence and ambitionlit I; of confidence had severalCuban missUe crisis had born a and psychological defeat as evidence of Soviet inferiorityUS in strategic and conventionalIhc Soviet economy showed signsin serious (rouble; afterihc reconstituted Sovieta Icnglhy periodar in Ihc Middle East and itshad confronted the USSR withrisks and coils; tension with Chinafinally erupted into sharp fighting onand. in Easlem Europe, theIhrenti'iied hy developments ini

y the end of ihc decade, however, these dilflcultics must have seemed, from Moscow's vantage point, to have been overcome or at least made manageable and Ihe Sovietmade markedly stronger in many arras. Thi* has madeore active and more confident pursuit of fundamental foreign policy aims to secure lhe USSR's strategic position and its land frontiers; to reinforce Soviet domination in Kastern Europe; ami, to enlarge tlse USSB's world role

.'> At the beginning of, lhesee themselves as having at last made the gradeuperpower and believeentitled to all the rights and privileges of that estate. Taking into account lhcpolitical, uiilil.iiy nndctor* hy which il reckons internationalImI thc US no longerlear predortilnance. Tlie attainment of rough parity in strategic weapons with the US has contributed more than anything else to the

USSR's sense of having arrived. Thc USSB does not see ilseli as enjoying equality with thc US in such mutter* as alliance* or basingcmin-lor its forces, but tlse Russiansx-gun to moveariety of ways to establish Iheir claims lo equality with the USlobal scale. They base egpanded thm diplomatic tics around die world and have aequued conventional military strenglh whkh enables them to projectower into distant areas. And, while tho USSR stands outside the international financial structure, it. econoinic devetojimenl has enabled il lo open up wider polilkul connections through trade and economic aid. and. especially in some areas, through an active piogram ul military assistance.

G. The Russians have, at the same time, been encouraged by developments affecting tho US position, for. despite their anxieties about lhc Chinese, they see the UStheir only peer in strategic military power and as the mam obstacle to lhe spread of Ihcirin many parts of Ibe world. There fore, it has given tbeiroost to observe thc US in recent yearsoss of influence In certain areas, facing social problems al home and eeonomie difficulties al home and abioad. and coming undertn pressure to curtail its world role.

el, wc do not find either in vvlial the Soviets say or in their behavior evidence that they have concluded to their satisfaction that US power hasrecipitate ordecline. Suth judgments as they have reached seem instead to he highly tentative. There is evidence that ihey eipect the US economy to recover fiom its recent difficulties. Theyealthy respect for US military power .iml are frankly envious of USeapabililies and managementThey appear lo recognize also that while lhc central role of the US in thr Inlaw.

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economic syslem tan be aitource uf great political power and influence as well.

here are. moreover, many things about the American condi'mo and US policy whicli are perplexing to t)uch as they* would like to believe that discord within the US in recent years is explicable in standard Marxist terms of class conflict and thusthey sec thm matters are not so simple and that few of the US' dissidents arc susceptible to Moscow's influence. They are also troubled by the unpredictability, theas they say, ol US foreign policy, and they suspect that the official US attitudethem is basically more unfriendly than itew years ago. They recognize that the US is moving to free itself of lhe heaviestof the Vietnam war and may suspect lhat the US will on that account beosition to contest them more vigorously in other areas. Thus, whale lhc Soviets may be tempted to conclude that the US will no longer be ready to engage ihem in the same ways and on lhc same scale as previously, and they may be inclined as opportunities occur to use their greater strength nnd flexibility moreIhey can still see themselvesinto serious difficulties with lhe US if they press too hard.

espite the fact that Ihe Sovietstotrong military posilion in Central Europe, ihey do not now regard NATO as an imminent miliiary threat and they bdieve that turn instances in Europe are favorable to the advancement of long-sought goals, the consolidation of theirand ideological buffer zone in Eastern

"Three air .min ngns ChatMoscow

hsve durini!l Irw trail brpun lo leel handi-vapprd by iWnoiniiio -ln.it llie US Altrnipt* air being nude in rfrvrlop nxii"American it nil Ins, mint imdilily inntitule of the USA under Ceoc(ty Aibntov.

be reduction of ibe US presence in Western Europe; and the eontainmeiit of Ccnnaiiyower in Europe. Theof Soviel detente diplomacy in Europetbe aftermath of Czechoslovakia recom-mended itself to Moscow bothtepstabilization in Eastern Europeeans ol wuintng influence in Welti mat lhe expense of tbe US position Ihcre. Bnl this polity, closely interacting with West Ccrmany's Ostpolilik, has required Moscow to make certain concessions, as in Berlin, und Io relax Uk hostility toward West Urrmau "revtinchlsm"

hinahadow across the whole spectrum of Soviet policy. Though thcorder has been free oft has become increasingly, clear lo llie Russians that China is capable of' seriously undermining their internationalitions, keeping Ihem off balancenlly. ant) in the longer lerm, rontitlluting a. strategic nuclear threat. It unquestionably concerns the Soviets thai China's abilily to challenge them iu all Ihese ways would be all llie greater in circumstances ol Stno-American rapprocbemenl.

II. In surveying tbe inlet national scene. Moscow thus sees much to justify confidence in Its security and strategic posture, in its capacity to engage its adversaries onterms in many areas and by various means, and in the prospects for thc long-trim growth of the USSR's international influence. It is no doubt largely on the strength of such anlhal Ihe Soviets have in recenl years begun loore activist foreign policy and lo accept deeper involvement in many areas abroad- But the Soviet leaders,rtmscrvative. also sec much in thiswliich is unfamiliai. unsettling, andrain on their resources.like these dispose thorn la proceed with some care.

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INTERNAL FACTORS BEARING ON SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

The Stole of Iho Ivadonhip

k- standing ol Mime leading figures has changed, the rinks uf the Soviet collective leadershiphole have remained remarkably stable (or the past seven years, as though immune to the corrosive effects of political struggle and the toll of age. Theof this stability lias been continuity in the decision-makingair degree of steadiness in the execution of policy,endency toward tncremrntal changes in policy rather than atwupt shiftt-

Thc Soviet readers are probablytliat this stability has served them well And it has. indeed, helped them to put their house in better order after the disarray of Khrushchev's last years by checking tliein thc rale of growth nl industrial and agricultural output; byense of continuity and sccuiily lo Ihe Paily andhureauem.ii's. and hy establishing an equilibrium of sorts among the key political Interest gioups.

However, these accomplishments haverice. One cost of stability haselay in the renewal of the leadershipto tbis is the fart that the average age of theull meinben of the Politburo. wiih Brezhnev and Kirdcnku 6S.nd Podgomy andt would be futile to attempt to predict when and how these men will end their political careers, Ixit that some or all of thc most senior leaders will have done so withm the nexl rive yean, if only for reasons of age or health,ear certainty. Tlie changeover. svhatevnr It causes, might upset thc carefully constnicted balance within tho leadership and give, rise to minf political conflict In which the posing of alternative policies might figure.

With the re-establishment of consensual politics. Soviet ioirign policy in the years im-

mediately after Khrushchev's removal became less eccentric and less reckless; It al-jo lost something in dynamism and invcntivenc-.s. An inevitable concomitant of rule by committeeertain slowness of response and flatness of style which gave this Sovieteputation fot mediocrity and unimaginative ncss Tins picture has changed considerably in recent years. Brezhnev has emerged publicly during the past Iwo or three yeans as lliefiguie iu the Politburo and the principal exponent of policy. This development has probably had something to do with lhe rcin-vigoration of Soviet foreignButat the top is stillollective process It needs to lie observed moreover. that Bn-zlinev holds his position not by right but on the basis ol Ihc support of hlv fellow oligarchs in thc Politburo and that the withdrawal ol this support, as In the case of Khnishchev. would almost certainly mean bis downfall.

Ricx.rulev's present prc-cirimcncv. is thereforetrengthulnerability. Because so much Is concealed iu Kremlinit Is Impossible to say with confidence what the present balance of his strengths and weakni'MCS is. It does appear, however, lhat on major issues of policy he must still workonsensus It is nonetheless dear lhat his personal prestige is linked to the success of the USSR's current policy of detente with the West and we believe it will be Important to him politically that the forthcoming US-Sovict summil give evidence that Ihis policy is yielding results.

Certainly, there is general agreement within the Politburo on the main lines offoreign policy and acceptance that this must be dcfiiud by thc principle of 'peacefulhich sets outer limits lo the conflict wiih fhe West. Yet, clearly there can be contention about the specific ingicdieiil* ofolicy and personal frictions arc bound

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to arise over the- execution of policy. Signs (hat thb ts hsdeud the cave appear from time to time, and it may be that maintainingore active Soviet policy, in circumstances of greater internationalwill prove increasingly difficult. Tin* USSR's Cerman policy seems likely toensitive issue ui internal politics, and any policy which gave Western influencesaccess to Soviet people would arouse misgivings, especially aiming Partyand security officials who have made careers of scaling off the Soviet population fiom alien influences.

olicy with respect to anus* negotiations and the deployment of Soviet forces abroad especially engage tbe concerns of the Sown military. Within the military there have no doubt been and may still be reservations about strategic arms limitation talksnd on questions ul weapons policy its collectivesvill be to press for maintaining the momentum of growth. Sovicl political leaders have recognized the military as an important inti'rest group and evidently consult closely with it on issues which clearly lie within its area of professional competence llul thechoice of policy clearly rests with the top political leadership and there seems little chance, in pieseni circuitistances,erious conflict of authority. Political controls over thr militaiy structiitc. which run from top toare evidently as effective as ever. There is, in anyroad identity of outlook between the political ami mahrary leader jthe USSR's security needs which serves to mini mire sciious divergences between them on tnajot questions of foreign policy.

Economic Strengths and Weaknesses lft Economic policy has alwaysrime source of political controversy within the .Soviet leadership. Int, Ihe issurt raised Iiavr largely (evolved around questions of growth tales and Hie allocation of scarce

investnicnt funds among competing economic gioups These problems lemain, though they nowore complicated form; while growth has been sufficient In support thc USSR's expanding International rolearger and more expensive militarythese enlarged demands make thechoices more numerous and moreTlius. choices must now be made not only, ai before, between heavy and lightand miliiary and civilian production, bul also between multiple categories ofiiiveslmcut nnd between domesticgrowth and the expansion ofactivity And underlying these issues Is the increasingly urgent problem of economic modernisation

he basis of the USSR's economic strength is its great natural wealth, which gives it self-sufficiency in nearly all important raw materials,abor foice alviut half again as large as that of the US. Exercising tight central direction over these resouices, the

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BOTuc jyowth which ate high by tMeinational standards ami toilitary effort roughly equal lo that of the US- It has also been able tolow but steady im-provenietit in the standard of living, allhough consumption levels are far below those in lhe advanced Western economies In somethe defense industries and some parts of heavySoviet economy Is in some respects as advanced and efficient as thai of the US. In otheras agriculture and consumer goodsthe Soviels remain woefully backward by

he regime hashecking, al least temporarily, the decline in the rate uf growth which set in iu theut tin- rate still has not relumed In the levels ufnd Ls unlikely to do so in thefuture This recovery has not been due

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higher rates of growth in industrialwhich have lernained rcblivery steady in recent yean, but to improved output in construction and agriculture Output inhowever, has been and will remain subject to wide annual fluctuations; there may. for instance,harp decline this yearof severe damage to the winter wheal crop. For the Kive Year l'lan period now- in, lhe regime is calling foi rales of increase in overall CNP andoutput slightly above lhe ratesive previous five years. The proportion of resources allotted to investment, consumption, and defense will evidently shift only slightly

lvese plans are indicative of the present cejnseivatisni of Soviet economic policy. This was shown also by the timidity of thereforms introduced5 and by the failure to follow through on even these with vigorous impleiiwntatIon Though the regime appeats to be unsure how to go about solving tls economic problems, It is clearly aware what these are: low productivity and theeffecliveness of investment, due mainly to an invufficieney of material Incentives, and to slusvness iu introducing advancedand modem managerial methods One sign of tliis official awareness is the growth in the USSR's purchases of agriculturaland consumer goods abroad and Itsin increasing trade with Western Europe and tho US. especially in order lo acquire advanced technology. Many of the industrial and agricultural products and much of the technology the Soviets seek can bo obtained in other Western countries, but the US would be the best source of some kinds of equipment, some licenses, and some agricultural products 'eg. feed grains) Inherent economicwill, however, set bounds to any growth in US-Soviet trade*

ospot* 'or US-Soviet trade are di&aitstd more fully inattached Annci.

lhc implications of Ihc USSR's ceo-nomie strengths and weaknesses for Itsposture and its position in SALT are of two kind* Economic constraints do not oblige Ihe Soviet leadership to reduce rruhtaiyal present rales of growth, theapable oi supporting current militaryand would even be able totep up In thc rate of military spending without an increase in thc share of resources dc solid lo military purposes. The amount of " which mi Id be lord by thfl hud ol limited agreement now on thc agenda in SALT would be relatively small. Tho rate of economic growth would not he appreciably increased if these resources were transferred entirely to investment projects. arms control could give (he USSRbenefits. This is because presentprogiams, by the demands they make on high-quality human and material resources, exacerbate the problems referred lo above-problems of labor productivity, mvestrneritand technological progress. And the Sovieis have good reason to expect llml, with an intensification of tbe arms competition, these problems would become even more marked.

Internal Dissent

he appearance and, even more, thc persistence in recent years of an activeprotest wliich has found some of ils most effective advocates within tbe USSR'sscientific-technical community has at* traded considerable attention in the West. Closely lelaled to this Is the growth fnconsciousness and assertimong non-Great Russian minorities-Soviet Jews, Ukrainians, the Baltic isationalioes and iba Modem-Turkic peoples of Central Asia. Tho regime has itself shown some jerisftivity to Iho impact of these developments on Its Inter-

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uniigc. Dm whatever (licit potential as future problems, these in.nnd stations of internal (fusion and atienalion for now have Utile relevance lor Soviet foreign policy; what relevance Ihey do have stems hugely Irom their impact ahroad. At hoine. lo Ihe extent tluil Soviet deusiiMi-makt-rvii tliciti selves with opinion outside (heir own small circle, whd' counts more is the mood ol Ihe Soviet masses, with whom the intellectual dissidents have few eomiections. In general, this broad popular opinion reinforces thein its conduct nl foreign policy, lor there can be liltlr doubt thai Ihe ordinary Sovietand non-Russianconsiderable pride in the USSR's world position-Ill. MAJOR ISSUES ANO OPTIONS IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLKY

y closing the gap in international power lie] ween themselves and lhc US. therelieving themselves of many oldlielieve that Ihey have widened iheir options in the pursuit offoreign policy objectives andtheir opportunities for gainingover Iheir adversaries. Yet, the struggle to "catch up" lor thc most pari jiosed fairly simple policy choices as compared with some of those which tlie Russians now Ince.

These involve such questions as.

ttXMrJd Soviet rnlercsra be hellerathe kind of parity

with thc US in sfrofegicuJiicli note exMi or slxmUl the USSRertain margin of advantage;

ii rin Europe compatible uith Soviet aims tn either Western or Eastern Europe;

what ii r'ie most effective response lo the Chinese on lhe several leach nfmilitary, poll/leal, anil lileolorJ-al:

how far and in takmt places should ihe USSH pnmie an actUin policy ui com-pernio* uith Ihe US. China, or both; and.

in Ufjit of the forecoinii.he area of possible actommotlalioit with the US be-coming wider or narrower?

ifficult in themselves, these questions arise for the Sovietseriod offlux in the post-World War II pattern off enolitical and economicand of rapid technological change and widespread social dislocation vsllhui theindustrial nations. Tlie scene lacing them in the Third World is also in many ways more checkered. There, the Russians have in some cases, hy extending their commitments, both increased their influence and narrowed their room for maneuver. And. in much of thc nun-aligned world, they can probably look for increasingly vigorous competition from the Chinese.

Iho Strategic Weapons Relationship With Iho United Stoles

t some point duringt fewthe Soviets concluded that theyrough equality with Ihe US. tbeybioad choice cwncerning the luitlierllieir strategic weapon programs.push on in an attempt to establisha superiority to evidentcould be assured of success in aand evenay, by ashould ihey press the issue toot Uiey could sock to control theby negotiating agrtemciitsstabilize the strategicme persuasive reasons for believingSov,ets decided against pursuing lheon that it would be

i-noniiously expensive; that it wouldonespoii-ling effort by tbc US; lhal success in such an effort is probably, in any case, not at present technically feasible

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II lemaius unclear whether ihc Soviets believe ihey canliitd option, that of strivingeaningful margin of advantage.otic short of clear superiority.'

*Lt Cen. JanutiH! M. ftihpotl. AilltiR Dlredot. DctciHrncncy, believe* Ihsl the Soviets made llie ili'iuiun t'liiii-nun lo obtain amnrgln nl hdvnnliw in mililuiy tccliiilofty and stialeitlcpee* lhal the USSR Ha* naxluJeil Ibal the attainmentiiilcBkal now fembir |lo brhesrt, asort-

Oirr.e ili.nmi IOut lui nuiCJ.

of acH-antas* oauH be laooafiedaskALTIn any rue. ll* Soviets willthviirOiiiaini Iu provide ijuali-ijtiir impiovi I'-iiii to thc it sttatFDle lofeei.

Vic* Adm.ayh-r. the Director. Nal.onalii" >i'> lhat Ihere air ilirec course* of action open In the So*-els with rcipnt to ilialegic nuclear wtjjx*

fa)artrte foruritylhe US. TheyIhii option at any time

'bl To a nl sur* ilotili mffiiirDl

lo (tmn noil.lis iiVi.ntii. This i" ll -they are

(c) To teakm overwhelming'm So*Hi Union loubl malepre-emptive or mt'itna strikernhai vunr^r.

ia return Starr thn apUOB il

rovocative olUS reaction,iin allAo no! Intend it.

Bern Adm. Bad F. RocMnut. Direr tor ot NnvalJi'ikmtin. nlihc Navy, nnden. Ceiwrfec&an.iintaiK Chkf ol Stall,he SotsrU have made lhe decanon totrinatrful aiarpn of soV^atipr to tfii*f<. av anrO as Inmilitary andcaparaliuei. liesifnrd lo enhance uW USSH* pohraa! and psychoh>cKal leverage ntfaimt llw Tier World They note lhevidenceniiliiiiiing large-scale commitment ol nanPOH lo modem leicnec. mllilatily-icbtrd lech-iwloty. nndiiiuiu-devvlti|iniriit progiJim far beyond llnkw needed to assure routiti equably. Lachtoti anyuij evidencec*ehag oil of Sonrt MD oanUrbCmti srofianss. and cWoloytoonts. they bdan* lhat lhe Sonet leadrrrfMp ecaoadeei at-Uimrntmmai^in ol advantage in Inchand general pwpoM fonri to be einiaaiiirafly and leelir.ically IraOlllo find t* imriulneouite.

Ihcir ongoing programs of stralegic tone im-pruvemenls suggest that this could be llieir vfctw. We have no reliable indicationMoscow's thiiiking as to what woulda useful edge in strategict can be reasonably inferred, however, that thcie .uu some in Moscow who believe tb.it the USSR would gain, beyond Ihc benefits already conferred by the achievement of tough rqiiahty.rmoosriublc lead in one or more major strategic systems. They miglitthat this msigiu, even though Ilssignificance miglit be highlywould give thc USSR increased political-psychological leverage, partly because it could be takenign of the dynamic giowlh of Soviet power as well as of Moscow'stotrung interiialiou.il rule Such un argument miglit appeal Iu sumc within both thc politictd and miliuiy leader-ship, to the latterly because it would promise maintenance of the presentof arms growth Against these eotnidera-lions, however, the Soviet leaders would have to reckon with the possibility ih.it any attempt to gain advantage would look to the US much the same as an attempt to achieve stipeiioiily and svould produce lhe same counter.iction

he policy' course the Soviets have chosen, at least for the immediate futuir, is to attempt to slab)lire some aspects of lhe stialemc weapons relationship with the US through negotiations. Throughout SALT they have laid greatest stress on limitingmissile (ABM)because of concern that major USwould be destabilizing lo theiiand probably also outesire to avoid tbe heavy new expenditures that .my large-scale ABM deployment on their side would entail. However, tbey realize that any agreement would have to provide for some interim limitations on the further deployment of slrtilegic offensive weapons. They appeal

elieve thatoriii.il ABM agreement and an interim freeze on some strategic offensive

systems, on trims tliey can accept, are within

reach.

f. for some reason, an agreement is not soon arrived at, lhe Soviets wouldprohabiy want to avoidotal failure in SALT. Such an outcome would introduce new uncertainties inlo thc US-Soviet strategic relationship and the Soviets would have reason to expectesumption of muesliainod anuseven itsensue. This would entail heavy costs for the Soviets but ihey would Iiave no certainty tliat they would be able to stay abreast In the raco. Thus, there would be some risk of their losmg the strategic and political benefit! which they derive from tlieir piesent position of cqunlily. The Sos-iets would also have tothe possibility lhat the Ineakdusvn of SALT would seriously aggravate the over all climate of USSovict lelalions and contiibuie tu tin increase in into nalional tension gen-ceally.

uch signs as base emeigrd from SALT suggest that the Soviets see some chance that tlie negotiations which will follow any first-stage agreement will yield furtlier results Wc do not have any good idea, however, as to how far and liow fast they are prepared to go toward reaching agreement on comprchen-Sivr limitations. Thereood probability that the Russians themselves have not resolved these questions. There are many factors which might cause indecisiveness in Moscow and complicate the Sovicl leaders' task of arrivingorkable consensusay fear tbat too comprehensive an agreement mightdisadvantages tliey could not anticipate or foreclose dcvclopmvnti which might es-cu-tually improve their relative position. Further, they would expect thai the more complex thc

agreement, tbc more the US wouldosed lo press for modes of verification un aicoptable to them. The Soviets would pre-siimably expect that in negotiating the specific elements of an agieement difficulties would arise with lhc US over issues of asymmctiy and equivalence and over their deployment of weapons against China They and their military leaders might also find it hardake choices with respect to tlic limitation of particular on-going programs or dcvclop-meiital systems which have promise for the futtiie.

urther stage of negotiations could therefore will prove to be protracted and beset by frequent periods of slalcmato. As tlvc talks went on. the Soviets would do doubt proceed with certain additions to theirforces and continue intensive efforts in research and development and in the processi raise doubts in the US about their in-Iciitinuv US aclivities could raise similar doubts in Moscow. Nonetheless, we thinkict inclination will be to continue tbeBut thc Soviets are likely tnradualist approach, one, which svill enable them to discover through the negotiating process itselfore comprehensive agicomonl, and wiihuller stabilization of tlic US-Soviet strategic relationship, ison acceptable terms.

ClVhoi The USSR's Second Fronlhe Soviets find it hard lo acknowledge once and lor all thai thc Sino-Soviet rift is unbridgeable. They are. in any ease, loath to have it be thought that they are obliged because of their concerns to the Easi tu be more accotiin.odattng toward thc West. Yet, they seem to have recognized for some time that their problems wllh China aie in many ways nunc urgent and more intractable tlian their problems with the US- Tliey seem to

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also thai Ihc eonboth Ils gical power and ideologicalas likely as not to become more pervasive, und possibly more dangeious, as time goes on. This is so partly because of thc potential growth of Chinese militaiy power and partly because uf China's emerging prominence on die world stage. In their world-wide contest thc Chinese will sometimes lx- able to beat Ihc Russians at their own "revolutionary" game. And they will enjoy (as lhe Russians themselves long did) the demagogic advantages which thc weaker parly often has over the stronger.

In dealing with the Chinese problem, thc Russians have in recent years given highest priority to military measures aimed attheir land frontiers and establishing the credibility of their miliiary deterrent. This has led during the lasl seven yeaisassive reinfoicement of Soviet forces in the border area. In the course of Ihis, Soviet ground forces opposite China have been increased fromo someivisions, tactical aircrafto, and tactical nuclear m'ssile launchers from abouto. Emphasis during the past two years has shifted from the introduction of new units to the flesliing-out of units already deployed and to improvements in the support structure. Though this mayeveling-off of the buildup, -Soviet military planners willwantinimum to prepare their forces in coming yearsider variety ofdefensive and offensive, than theynow designed for. Further deployments and improvements are therefore likely. At the same time, as China's military strength grows, inci easing numbers of Soviet stralegicand defensive systems will need to be earmarkedossible Chinese threat.

Moscow sought9 to use ils strengthened milliarv posture opposite China

to intimidate (be Chinese. Thu Russians took other step* to ihis ondythroiiidi foreign Communistthreat of nuclear attack) But if Moscow' was then riving serious considerationilitary solution, it evidently refected thischoosing instead to leiuporUe. This bas meant keeping alive thc borderfrom which, evidenlry, no agnremrnts haveincrease in trade, and holding open lhe USSR's offer ofeanwhile, the USSR has pioceeded withto isolate and contain the Chinese by strengthening its own position in ihoon China's periphery.

Despite China's weakness relative lo the Soviets, il has considerable capacity toIhc USSR's amhitions, undermining its position bothorlder and theCommunist state. Indeed, in much of Ihe underdeveloped world thc Chinese have better credentials than lha- Russians for tbe role of patron of small, weak nations and prophet of 'nationalmongartses. including ihose in EasternChina attracts both genuine sympathy and self-interested support for its struggle against Soviet authority And Maoism has wider appeal than Soviet Communism among thc youth of tho Now Loft.

Tlie brunt of Moscow's anger over the Washington-Peking detente has (alien on the Chinese. To some extent, this is becauserecognizes that its relations with (he US aretage. bu( It also reflects thc bitterness which China now Inspires inand probablyense of frustration at tbe rcofc'atronecade of political and military piesiuies against the Chinese have proved to be (utile The Soviets certainly understartd that Peking Is now likely to be even more unwilling lhan lieforc lo makelo them, and thai Chinese prestige nnd authority among Communists and under-

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countries may now be significantly enhanced. It has no doubt also occurred to the Soviets that the US may well gain somefreedom ol maneuver against them; that, in thc settingest hostileWashington and Peking will in some situations follow' parallel policies at Sovietand that the Chinese may be mi the way lo obtaining incicaxd WesternJapanese) industrial equipment and

hc new US-Chinese relationship couldilitary solution to the Sino-Sovietseem to the Soviets an even lessalternative than before But this signew Asian configuration has begun to emerge is likely to suggest toore active political Involvement in Asia. Theof many of tlse Asian nonstates toore even balance in their relations wiih tlte US. China, and thc USSR will probably mean thai Ihe Russians will find Irucr entree fur their diplomatic and trade missions and greater hospitality for naval visits. At thc same time, the Asian nations haveotable Lack of enthusiasm for the Asian collective security system proposed by Moscownilcheme seems likely to find wider appeal only if tbe threat of Chinese military ea|iansioue most profitable course lor Moscow may therefore be to concentrate on strengthening its bilateral lies with the established governments in the area. While Ihese ellorls will enlarge the Soviet presence in Asia and II* influence in certain countries, iu lhc nreiihole, the Soviet role will be limited by iho desire of most states to preserve their relations with other outside powers.

n both North Korea and Northlhc USSR's minimum aim has been, and will coniinue to lie. to prevent cither of the two smaller Communist states from passing firmly into the Chinese sphere of influence.

In Its policy loward the Indochina svar. the post-Khrushchev leadership has consistently taken great care to maintain solidarity behind thc North Vietnamese in iheir war aims and negotiating position Moscow would probably prefer to see thc elimination of the warajor issue In Soviet American relations, but it would still want tho struggle to end on terms that would assure final success for Hanoi's aims. In fact, agalmt the background of an improved US-Chinese relationship, the Soviets are likely to want to show themselves as staunch as ever in their support of Hanoi. They probably believe lhal their interestsChina would Ihi belt Served if in the long run North Vietnam achieved dominance in Indochina. It remains unlikely therefore that Moscow svould suspend mates ial support tu Hanoi or me its influence ihrrr- which is in any case limitccf-to urge the North Vietnamese to end (he svar on loss llum satisfactory terms.

Tho Soviets willajor concern for consolidating their position in India. They are also obliged to look moro Intently toward their iclallons wllh thc other great power in Asia, Japan. Strains in US-Japanese relations arising Irom economic frictions and the turn in US-Chinese relations give Moscow some encouragement. Bul the Japanese seem little inclined to prejudice future political amities with China or their security ties with the US for the sake, of better relations with Moscow .Moscow has reason to bein fact, thai the Japanese will now move rapidly toward tlie normaliration of their own lelations wiih China. All thehave been willing lo offer thc Japanese so far is partscipalion in the exploitation of thc mineral, oil. and timber resources of Siberia, an offer the )ai>aurve may find less tempting Ihnn thn prospect ol greater access to iho Chinese maikul. Il would appearthat, if tlic Russians hopa to make,in Tokyo, thoy svill need fairly soon to

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concessions on lhe old issue of the Northern Territories, though the Japanese may settle for something less than the return of all of the disputed islands.

Sino-Soviet relations willremain as bad as they aredeep and lasiing accommodationthc Russians torice whichconsider unacceptably high. Thisa lifting of- mditaryolemn disavowalpretensions as the paramountamong Communists, andhinese sphere of influence inat some point, thc twoarriveodus vivendi whichthem to "coexist" more or lesswould reduce the chances of majorhostilities, and perhaps leadan understanding on nuclear restraint.no doubt many among the Sovietfor whom the conflict with thc Westmuch more natural and permanentthe conflict with China, and therewho will sec steps towardin US-Chinese relations as requiringSoviet moves toward Peking. Ain the leadcrsliip in Moscow or theMao may, in any case, be followed byhigh-level Soviet approach to Peking.

Detente in Europe

coincidental!;', the only policiesIhe name of Uie principal Sovietbeen attached, the "Brezhnevand the "Brezhnev Doctrine" ofsovereignty apply mainly to Europe.embraced by these terms are, inrelated, in that detente in Europeby Moscow as part of Ihe processits position in both Easternand Western Europe Thc Chinesethough probably not at thisrucial

lactor, is, nevertheless, also an important strand in Soviet European policy And, where it concerns thc security of lhe Soviet sphere in Eastern Europe and thc future of Ihe Iwo Germanics, this policy isensitive issue of internal party politics and thus may be an area of policy more susceptible to lactical variation than others.

The Soviet Position in Eastern Europe.ecure posilion in Eastern Europe Moscow cannot face cither the West or China confidently, but developments8 and in Polandhaiears of Soviel hegemony had not actually guaranteed this security. Order has been restored in Czechoslovakia andand Romania and thc USSR have veered awayollision course But in dealing with these different forms of defiance thehave notat root causes, among Ihem thc tenacious East European nationalisms and the inability of Soviet-installed political and social systems to respond to thc presentneeds of those countries In theseleaders in many of these countries have tried to make lhe task of governing easier by tapping the forces of nationalism, of which anti-Sovietism is an inevitable by-product. The leaders of thc Czechoslovak reform movement tried toifferent set of answers and intioduced some of thc practices of social democracy, which in Soviet eyes are hardly less pernicious than nationalism. In any event, many East European leaders believe that with greater national auionomy and wider poliiical and economic intercourse witb the countries of Ihe Wesl they could better come lo grips svith their internal problems.

Among all Moscow's client states, Easi Cermany is likely lo remain for some lime to come its major concern. The East Cerman regime under Ulbricht's successors stilleeper sense of poliiical insecurity than any

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in Eastern Europe. Allhough Ulbrichtlvc year* loertain sense of East Cerman nalional identity, lhe regime is acutely fcniful of the expansion of contacts between llie two parts of Cermany and in fact oi any trend toward European detente.onsequence, Moscow, though hardly without its own anxieties, luund ittatrung arm on the East Cer-mans in order Iu cany Ihem through thcnegotiations and inlo the inter-Cerman

here are many places in Eastern En-rope where the Russians could be faced with difficult choices in the next few years. Intn ii.il problems and pressures for reform may recur in Poland and Czechoslovakia. Thc issueMoscow and Bucharest has beennot settled, und lhe Romanians can expect at some poinl lo feel the cold Soviet breath on their necks again, either in the form of polilical or miliiary pressures, or remains- from the Soviet point ofbanelul influence on the rest ofEurope It is,ense, unfinishedThe Sovietsoubt watching with keen interest Yugoslavia's current internaland trying to anticipate the situation which will unfold wlien Tito has left the scene. If it period of disarray ensues, thefor Soviet meddling would lieand. if ithance olro-Soviet regime. Movcow would be strongly templed to interfere in more direct ways.

he USSR has. since Ciecboslovakia.its efforts to improve itscontrol ovea- thc political, military, and economic affairs of the East Euiopcan states. These efforts, centering on the Warsaw Pact structure and lhc Council on EconomicAssistancereatter of strcngt her ting intra-Bloc discipline. Tbcy arc probably also designd to insure that man-

agement of the Bloc's approach in anyon European security and in dealings svilh the European Economic Community (EEC) will remain securely in Soviet hands.

he Soviets have made limited progress. The Warsaw Pact's political bodies aremore frequently than in thc past, and with the creation of Iho Military Council and the Committee of Defense Ministers, as well as tin expansion of thc Pad staff, some steps toward integration of Ihe Pact's militarystructure have been taken. Moscow' has. at the same time, sought to obtain furtlier levcruge, through CEMA and througharrangements, in tlie economicand Irade patterns of the East European countries. Though full integration of theBloc economiesistant goal, some East European governments haveshown increased interest in limited moves in that direction.

astern Europe remains, in manyillstone for the Russians The USSR's task of reconciling its efforts In consolidate its hegemony there svith its efforts to develop its relations with Western Europe can only be complicated and delicate Its aim will lie to limit the political and ideological impact of cipundcd East-West contacts and it is evident from its present course that the prevalent view in Moscow Is that this can be managed. But, if It camehoice between erosion of Ils position In Eastern Europe and detente in Europe. Moscow would choose to let the latter suffer.

bjectives In Western Europe. Beyond these security concerns in Eastern Europe, the USSR's own economic svcalnesscs and grossing pial ion-rvo_ Chinese.urned it away from the politics of crisisnnfronl.ition In Europe. At the samebe changing pattern of US-Westelationships and trends within Western Eu- /

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itselfinding-down of thc prolonged East-West confrontation haveconvinced Moscow that long-standing aims have IreCOme more realizable than ever before. It sees in these circumstancesto weaken NATO, tu secure thedivision of Germany, to reduce thc presence and influence of (lie US. and toits longer-term aim of establishing the USSH as the predominant political andpower on thc continent. These motives have, during the last several years, gained added force from two significantone positive from thc Soviel point of view, the other negative. Ihe recasting and rcinvigoration of West Germany's Ostpolitik, and developments within thc EEC.

What was new and important for thc Soviets in the Brandt government's Ostpolitik, as compared with thc Ostpolitik of theGovernment of the Federal Republic of Germanyas that it included ato affirm the inviolability ol theborders ol Eastern Europe and lo accord dc facto recognition to East Germany. Brandt also acknowledged that in seeking anto the East il was essential for him to work first through Moscow rather than with the individual East European governments. Tins in Moscow's viewromisingAs Oilpolilik unfolded further the Soviets probably began to see the possibility of richer rewards in the future; lhat in time they svould be able to bring pressure on Ihe FRG's domestic and foreign policies because of ils vested interest in maintaining Ostpolitik. and perhaps gradually compromise or loosen the FRG's securily lies with the West and especially die US.

But the lencwed movement loward West European economic integration, most clearly signaled by the prospective entry of Britain into the EEC,orrisome devel-

opment for thehe Soviels have feared thut the EEC svill evolveight and exclusive economic community and that they and fhe East European countries svill be putaigauiing disadvantage indealings with it. Another concern Ls lhal lhe governments of West Europe svill begin to move tosvard political unity astoward common foreign policies and common defense arrangements. Moscow's obviousisituation in svhich it can deal with the West European states separately rather than through the medium of NATOolitically cohesive European Community In this way it can better promote frictions between Western Europe and the US and among the West European states themselves. Tlie Russians hopeind opportunities in this regard, for example, for playing on Franco-Germanivalry which they have already shown some skill in

onference on European securityfor Moscow one way of encomaging favorable tiendi in Western Europe andadverse ones- Thc Soviets have always be-lieved that the organizing theme of such ashould be "Europe for thchemselves included, and, though they have given up Iheir efforts lo have thc US and Canada excluded, they still hope that the conference svill give birth to permanent pan-European bodies which mighl come lo serveou ntera ttraction to thc Westernand the EEC. More immediately,Moscosv svould expect the conference to constitute further acknuwlcdgemcnt of the status quo in Eastern Europe and, through East Germany's participation, further de facto recognition of thc division of Germany. By strengthening the momentum of detente and easing Wesl Europe's securily concerns, the conference might alio serve to depriveEurope of an incentive to political unifi-

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and tnililary cooperation. As ato (tie iccurity cewference. the Soviets are licJding out to West Europeans theol East-Wesl cooperation in the anas ol trantpottatinn, power, communications, and environmental control, and the luie of access for their manulactnres to tlte Soviet market (though tho possibilities in this- latter urua are limited by an absence of reciprocal Western demand for the products of the East).

5'J. Tlse Soviets have, of cooise, beento make some ttmccssions of their own in ordi to maintain the momentum of detente With respeel lo Berlin, for example, for the sake of advancing (lieir policies toward West Germany and yarning some increasedof Eastovereignly, thc Russians have accepted the loss of some of the leverage wluch Berlin'* isolation gave tliem in the past They may conve to believe at some point that in in.illng further coiwusaioiu in Europe they would be in danger of Riving away too mnch-Thcy will also be sensitive tu the danger of ideological contamination from anyiitcieasc in East-West communication. And the Russians may move more slow ly on detente If they encounter difficulties in maintaining strict discipline among thc East European countries; some of these want lo move faster ihan the Russians do in broadening contacts wiih the West, nnd others, like the East Cor-mans, will insist on moving at thc slowest pace possible.

he West Geiman Parliament's viand on the ratification of the FRG-Sovict treaty will provide Moscow with an early, possiblyrucial, lest of the soundness of its German policy. It will give the Brandtsome assisunce in promotingof the pact. Rejection by thesvould be treatedrievous insult by Moscow, and it ssould. in fact,low to its ralher fragile confidence in tlic "healthy forces" in West Germany. But the Soviets,

recognizing thai Brandt Is working with the slimmest of majorities, have reckoned wllh the possibility thai tbe Irealy might run into trouble, and mayartly insulated against the shock of an Initial defeat In this rase, the immediate result would probablyisplay of Sovicl anger, which would convey the implication that tbe entire process ofdetente was endangered,ear indication that the agreement on Berlin was up in the air This might then be followedause pending developments in West Germany. Much more serious questions would naturally arise in Moscow if, in tho newwhich would almost certainly ensue from defeat of tin* treaty in fhe Bundestag, tlie Brandt coalition svos replaced hy acommittedarder line toward the Soviets. In these circumstances, the Soviets mighl still he inclined to try.ecessary delay, to salvage as much as possible of their German poKey. fot its own sake and for the sake of their European positionhole. But strong anti-German impulses might by tl.ro base been revised and the issue become embroiled in Kremlin politics. There is the further possibility that Biezhnev himself,of his close personal involvement, would suffer political damageetback tu Ostpolitik.

orce HedudioTu in Europe. Theposition on mutual forceappears io be primarily

an clement in ils overall European tactics. This consideration, rather than economicor force requirements connected with the buildup on tlie Sino-Sosiet border,accounts for the moro forthcomingon Ihis question adopted by the USSR in ihe lasl year or Iwo Thus. Moscow may have concluded (hat an expression ofNATO proposals on force reductions would hasten ihc conveningonference on European security and in general eonlrib-

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utc lo Ihc impression thai Moscowworking In earnest fur solutions to European problems.

oscow has so far given littleo( how it intends to play its hand on force reductions. It has said lhat thc result of any negotiations should be such "as not to be to Ihc detriment of Ihe countries takingnd it evidently intends to resist strongly the notion of asymmetrical reductions It Is opposedloc io bloc negotiation,because in its view such anmightilt to the vitality and organirational cohesion of NATO ami hasr contrary effects within the Warsaw Pact. The Soviets would prefer to see the US and lhe USSH become the principal parties to further discussions, partly because this would arouse anxieties among the US" NATO allies, and ihey wdl probably try at the upcoming US-Soviet summit meeting to discover whether they can move matters in that direction.

oruiderations of this kind haveto do with the tentativenrss of tho Soviet position on MBFR and the slowness with which it has unfolded. These may nlso be alcributablc to Soviel doubts as to whether negotiations are desirable in the first place and perhaps to interna] differences inSuch doubts probably revolve around concerns over the potential effects of force reductions on lhe USSR's control in Eastern Europe and its military posilionis NATO. As long as concerns of ihis sortthere svill he some rehictance in Moscow to carry out any reductions al all ll will be contended that the USSR's position in Eastern Europe is vulnerable to Western influences which would spread more easilye tared political setting, and thai even modes! Russian troop withdrawals would whel nanonalist aspirations. It may be further aiguedosilion of undiminished Soviet military strength in Europe not only Servesower-

ful deterrent to NATO but alsoseful political and pyschological impact on the West.

e believe, nevertheless, that Moscow is coming lo accept lhat. at Miming continuation of present trends in East-West relations in Eurnpe. it could withdraw some of its forces from Eastern Europe, particularly some of0 Soviet miliiary personnel in Eastand still retain sufficient capability tourotig posture against NATO, to intimidate lhe East European populations, and lo reassert control in Eastern Europe quickly and decisively in an ensergency. This does not mean the Soviets have decided on anyin their foices or thai they are likely to makeecision in the near future. But it they should decide to move beyond tneir present position, they will presumably .see advantage in thoroughly exploring the possibibtiesegotiated agreement rather lhan acting unilaterally in any reduction of tbeir forces. They might see thisay of giving greater momentum lo political forces in the Wesl which Ihey wish to encourageight also sec in such aneans of influencing the pace and scope of US withdrawals and thus of preventing the sudden opening upilitary gap inEurope which they might fear the West Germans would move to fill.

n thc otherhe Sovietsthat negotiations are either notor not feasible at all, or that negotiations once undertaken would prove too difficult toavorable result, Ihey might thennit til wilbdiawats nn their own,for poliiical effect. They might do so in part on thc calculation that US forcewhich could be politically andfar more significant, would Surely lollow.

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Soviet1 Involvement in the Middle East

oscow has gone far toward rcaluung IU histonc.il goal ol establishing ilscll pei-mancutlyowei in Ihc Middle Easi .md tin- Mediterranean. In oidei to do so, itxtensive uniimitmetit* torabs in then conflict with', and in the prucess a. ;nt-srn*,i I'lll.I At Ihti stage, the USSR's clue political andties with Egypt arc crucial lo its whole position in tlte Mi ii East, and in order to preserve these, as well as the military Iscne-hts which they themselves derive from ibe use of Egyptian facilities, thc Soviets have been willing to increaso their direct involve-men! and lo accept larger risks. But thebase almost ceilainly nut given thc Egyptians an open ended commitnvent. Iu gen-eml, thc Soviets aim at giving lhcreater degree of miliiary security aud saving them from further humiliation at Ihe hands of Isiacl. and thus fortilying Cairo's bargaining position, while forcslidling tlieof major hostilities.

ull-scale renewal of (lie Arablsnieli war would Ih* unwelcome to lhe Russians on several counts Tbe war would undoubtedly go against tlieir clients unless they themselves were pieparod to become directly involvedizeable scale.ouise would cany withigh risk of escalation and thereforeevere US counteraction. It wouldalso arouse great anxiety iu Europe and thus damage Soviet detente strategy there. And in thc face of these posalltilities sharp divisions might arise within lhe Soviet Icailei-slup Against this background, thc Russians must view the present situation as fairly fiagile and experience some anxiety because of the famousness nf the ceaselire and uncertainty aboul President Sadat's readiness to hew closely to their lead. The Soviets have sought thiough thc Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of May

u gain some increased measure ofover Egypt's military policies and actions.

fii It may be thai the Soviets anticipate and aie prepared to liverolonged penud of stalemate. They might leckon that, il political and military pressures aiemaintained, Israel and the US can eventually be brought toolitical vcttlcniiiil which largely meets Arab teims Rot Ihey cannot he confident of such an oul-eome. and. in view of lhe present hazards in ihe situation, there is also some chance that Moscow will come lu see the draliability of mging the Arab slates mainly concerned toimited, intciim which doe* noi provide fur the return of all Israeli-orx upied territory, lhc Soviets might believe thattep would diminish thc dangers uf renewed hostilities while still allowing Ihem to enjoy the fruits ol continued Arab-Isi.ieli animosity, and. in addition, give them the benefits of passage through the Sue* Canal.

ul apart from the question of whether the Soviels svill encourage the Arabs lo move In this direction or what the terms of any agreement might be. they would be muchto insure that they have, and are seen toajor role in any deliberations affecting the Arab-Israeli conflict. They also svant to insure lhat Iheir Arab friends' continue to look to litem for political and miliiary sup port. This consideration seems likely, in the Soviet vicsv. toersuasive argument against an explicit understanding with the US limiting the flow of arms to the Middle East This is not to say, however, that Moscow would not see in tacit mutualeans ofpiralling arms race which would increase the unennti oil able elements in the situation, might draw the Russiansore dangerous military involvement, and would be fairly cosily.

lthough thc Aiab-Isracli conflict has contributed greatly to the growth of thc Soviet role in llieli- East. Moscow no doubt aims atosition in whieli neither it* military presence in the Mediterranean norpolitical influence Iu the area is <lr|>rndcnt on the exigencies of that conflict. Thewill probably want, besides solidifying tbeir position in the Arab world, to further enhance the capabilities of theirnaval forces and will probably try to expand their operations in the Western'Hie Soviet! may also hope in the long run to gash an influential role in tbe Middle East oil industry. The pursuit of thev-varioiis aims will entail, in addition to efforts to consolidate the Soviet political and military position In Egypt, attempts to strengthen ties with tin- other radical Arab states, probably involving in some cases treaty relationships as well as continuirrg emphasis on military assistance. It will also mean fui-thcr cultivation of the moderate Arab states of the area

be Russians arc probably generally optimistic about their long-term prospects among the Arab nations of the Middle East. They are no doubt right in thinking that the existence of radical. anli-Westcm nationalism will continue to assureole of influence in tbc area, they may believe, beyond this, that these forces will spread and willenable the USSR to establish itself as Ihe dominant power In the Middle East. But Moscow nonetheless lias cause to feel some insecurity In its present posilion It has seen that radical national is in has on occasioniolently anti-Russianas in Libya and the Sudan ll has some sense of the difficulty ofoheri'iit and even-handml policy among the diverse and quarrelsome states of the area and of staying aloof from tbeir rivalries and ft-alouiies And, morethere is unceittunty in Moscow as to whether ihe link* it has foigeil wiih ruling

parties in thc radical Arabthe ASU in Egypt and the Raalh parties in Syria andenough to withstand tbc vagaries of Arab publics

The Soviets ond lha Third Worlduring roughlyears of activein llie Third World, the USSR has gained, besides its present strong position in tbe Middleivotal role in South Asia and wider influence in Southeast Asia. Latin America, and Africa. For llie reasons suggested in thc preceding section, the Arabasi wilt surely continue lo be an area of priority interest for (he USSR Other areas close lo thc USSR's southernTurkey. Iran, andremain, as they have long been, of special concern to Moscow. The Russians may also become more active In Asia in the next few sears as part of their effort to cheek the spread of Chinese influence But the view pri-valent inecade or so ago thai the entire Third Worldertile field im Soviet exploitation has since given way, partly uitder lhe Impact of some serious setbacks, to rnore sober calculations in the more distant areas, such as Africatin America, where Soviel securityare not so closely engaged and thc USSR cannot so readily bring its miliiary power to bear, this earlier exuberance seems to have faded, in those areas Moscow Is now much more likely tn respond to suchus occurareful, case-by-casc basis

iewedaval and maritime medium andegment of the Third World, the Indian Ocean and ils littoral stales may iep-resent for Iheind of geopolitical unity Otherwise, though their presence in the areahole has giowu In recent years, Ihis vast areaide range uf intciests for due Soviets and widiin it they areariety ol more or less distinct regionalSoviet interests and aclivillus iu the

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Ski and Persian (lull area* are, thm. largely art outgrowth of Soviet aims in tbe Arab Middle Last generally. The growth of thc USSR's political presence In South and Southeast Asia and itj nasal presence in Ihe Indian Ocean also serve its Chinese pokey. India is Important to Moscow as alo China in Asia,ometimes anti-American Influence, and in its own right as the dominant |xiwer in the subcontinent

OS The Soviets no doubt see their position in South Asia as having been considerably strengthened by the outcome of the Indo-Pakistam war They have moved quickly in the aftrrmith lo establish themselves inThey will certainly work to insure that Iheir lies with India remain firm and durable. There are sure to he irritations in thenonetheless, and serious frictions may even occur in time- The Indians would not welcome an overly assertive Soviet presence in thc art-a. The Russians for their part wdl not want their position in the area to be linked too exclusively to Indian policy. Althoughis likely to be faced with increasing demands for aid, it will he leluelant to assume any very heavy burdens in supporting thedevelopment of India or of the many other economically backward countries nf the region Rroadly speaking, this will probably be true also for Ihe Indian Ocean areahole As for the Sonet naval presence In the Indian Ocean, we would expect over limeoderate growth, though this rate might be increased If there were any significant Increase in US or Chinese activity in the ocean."

frica seems likely toelatively low* priority for Soviet policy for some time lo come The Russians will, however, be

'Solhe Vmtect Military

alnl 15 LVtv-iilie-t

iipaphs 4M9ST.ore clientin of tlx poli tn-nlnililnry of tlic SuvkI pretence in the ludlal Of*"

watching closely the activities of the Chinese, and to tlse extent that Peking seems tommg iiifluence among "progressive"Moscow saill considernlchmg programs. Al this stage, Moscow Minis willing to leave to thc Chinese aprofocl tike the Tan-Zam Railroad hut will piobably offer more competition Ifactivity greatly expands in sub-Saharan Africa

n Latin America, the rise of radicaland the electionanrist-led government in Chile are viewed in Moscow as promising trende The Soviets will be alert forrtunities to encourage anli-US liends and lo extend their out* influence In the urea, with continued emphasis On Ihc expansion of diploma Iii1 tics with the Latin AmericanSoviet cultural and propaganda activi-tics will jirobably also grow. The USSR's trade with latin America is not likely to increase substantially in the near future, thoughmayumber of openings for the sale ol aims. The Soviets may. in addition, muve gradually to show Iheir navallin American waters beyond thethey nowmall but virtually continuous presence. However, thc Russians will probably take some care to keep their mdilary activities in thc areaevel which will not prove provocative cither to the US or the latin American stales.*

hough characterized by opportunism and regional differentiation, tlie USSR'stn the Third World is, at the same time, broadly conditioned by ils urge toidei world rote for itself and by llie need to protect iti revolutionary credcntuils- The USSR's acquisition in recent years ofgreater

'WbeRoteao.atedECRKT. formore eilemiv* trratmeat o! ihu uibtact.

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of miliiary instrument* which can be used in distantthese support Ihe overall miliiary mission ol the Soviet armedseem to Moscow lo give' it wider options in its pursuit of theseobjectives. Tins capability enables thelo support political lorces friendly lo their policies anil may make il possible in some situations for them lo preemptof others or lo deter iheir intervenlion.

Hu| llie Soviets are limited in tlieirto use force at long range lo establish themselves against opposilion The growth of these capabilities bas not followed tlie course that might have been expected il the Soviets were building Ihem specilically for direel military intervention in Third WorldNevertheless, as. in the years ahead, tho USSR further involves its polky andIn remote areas, it will have to consider requirements for forces to respondide range of contingencies, whether lo prevent setbacks or lo exploit opportunities. Wc he-heve lhal step-by-step the Soviets, perhaps without everecision on the general principle, will acquire capabilities which would permit them to employ combat forces in distant areas.

In ihese circumstances, lhe Russians willlowing need for shore bawdin foreign countries- They will, however, face difficulties in meeting tlieir future needs in this respect, particularly because most of lhe countries which are geographically positioned lo offer the kind of facilities lhe Russians might want will be reluctant, on political grounds, lo do so. Few axe likely lo believe, as Egypt and Cuba did. that Ihey hateeed for Soviet supporthird-party threal as to warrant the granting ol basing rights. We do not rule out tbc establishment of other facilities in Third World

especially il comparable circumstancestlie force of nationalism will remain an unjiediment in most cases.'

IV. THE FUTURE SETTING OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS

The preceding paragiaphs havea number of ways in wliich tho broad selling ul US-Soviet relations has beenin recent years- The Soviets evidently believe thaionsequence of these changes their intranational position relative to that ol line US has been streagthened. thoughituation of considerable flux. The continuing overriding necessity ol avoiding nuclear war with tbe US will for some time to comean important constrain! on Sovietund the uncertainties stemming from Ihe shifting pattern of internationalmay act as an inhibition on them. At Ihe same lime, because of lhc USSR's urge to enlargeworld role, its relationship with the US willharp competitive edge.

The USSR has compelling reason* lor wanting to keep its relations with the US in reasonably goodertain level of amity Ls essential in the first place to tho

l communications on issues af-feeling tlie bilateral strategic relationship It is abo useful to Moscow to have open channels for tlie discussion of such issues of common concern to llie mpcrpenven as nuilevr non-proliferation and for crisis management in those casus where conflicts bclween olhercontain the threal of escalation to gen-eialvursoning of relations,ould create complicationsinonduct of lit policies in Europe and toward

apatalines for dnlaot milnmrf actio*ottrt Uni-kme about thea oari are dealr with con.The Uses olilltJiyiiuniatedKCBCT.

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Rising tension with tht? US wouldave undesirable internal consequences (or thc Soviet leader* lo lhe extent that il generated miliiary requirements which would add todrains. Il may be lhal in the present phase the Soviet leaders regard normal and continuing contact, perhaps includingmeetings at the highest level,areful management of the mnlli-faceted Soviet -American relationship.

7fi. But continued political iivjilry involving some amount of tension is implicit in theivergence between the US and the USSR over the oidering ol international relations and the USSR's refusal to underwrite stilnlity.Europe and the USSR itself It is also owing to the fact that Ihe larger world role lo which the USSRis unrealizable except al the expense of tbc US. Tension with Ihe US, at the same lime, has traditionally been used by tlie regime to mobilize and control the Soviel population and to sanction its monopoly of power.

hether, within tliese broad limits, lhe USSRarticular circumstances lean Inward sharper competition or broader co-opera non with the US will naturally depend on lhe interaction of many variables. Crucial among these will be Moscow's appraisal nl US intentions, and, in particular, the extent to which it will be able lo overcome thcthat the US aims at using conciliation as an instrument of political and ideologicalwithin the Soviet sphere. Civen their present reading of comparative strengths, there may. on the olher hand, be instances in which the Soviets will take US couciliatortnetsign of weakness.

he Sovieis will also attach great welghl to tlieir assessment of developments in the rriangular relationship involving tlie US. China and themselves. Their aim obviously bm, in general, to prevent flic two olher sides of

Ihe triangle from combining against llieconsequently Moscow may nowit can no lungererioussvith either of th* other tsvoconsideration now seems to giveincentive to "iiormali/e" its lelationsUS. bm it will also have an incentivetoelations with China towhich will deny the US Ihethe Sino-Soviet eonfliel now giveslonger term is therefore likely toof emphasis In tbe USSR's approachUSn accordance svtlh itsof the balance at any given limecalculation of the comparative costsrelations wiih either

rogress in talks on strategic armsespeciallyirst-stage afltcement leads onroader stabilization of Ihe US-Soviet stralegic relationship, may. by Isuttn ss-ing Ihe USSR's sense of security, help to wear away some of the USSR's suspicion of USThese talks seem likely to be less vulnerable to tbe influence of external factors lhan oilier aspects of US-Suvirl relations. But, hy lhc tameositive outcome in SALT svill not irect and immediate impact on olher aieas of thewhere the requirements of mutual self-restrainl may seem less urgent lo Moscow Problems in other areas where the broadinterest* of both the USSR Hod the US aie deeply engaged may prove lo beore intractable sort. This may be true in Europe, for example, where the Russians have anin tlie kinds of agreements which con-tnbute to the security of the Soviet sphere but notenuine European set tit ment so long as tlieyood chance of bringing about changes to their advarrtagc. Similarly, In other areas their cnneerii for theol Iheir world position is greater than tlieir interest in broad undertakings legulating US-Soviet rivalry.

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Negotiations with icgard to control of conventional aims will encounter additional difficulties arising Irom the asymmetries in tbc US and Soviet geographical positions and forces well as delicate questions for both sides concerning tbe crotseqiseoces of any agreements (or rrlatsons with allies and friends. For these reasons, tlie US may find it exceedingly difficult to obtain acceptable terms from tho Russians wiih icspcct to force reductions in Centinl Kuiope, aimsin the Middle East, or control of naval deployments Piacliee has shown, however, lhat some military related problems which are largely bilateral In character are amenable to solutiuns which help to reduce US-Soviet friction. Understandingstaining toin space. Ihe control nf bacteriological weapons, and incident* at sea axe examples of this kind

longer-lVm Prospects

SI. These ohservatioin are not meant to suggest that we see tlie USoviet Union which will bv permanently intransigent and unfulfilled in its international ambitions. To say that tbe Soviet policy is at |iieseutorwaid phase is not Iu say that it willso. There is much that is tentative and experimental ubnttt this jxi'ley und il can be questioned how long It can bo sustained before Moscow would lie in danger of overextension. As noted earlier, developments in Germany or Eastern Euiope could cause Moscow'spolicy in Europe to founder. Conversely, because of its economic needs and tbegenerated by the Cruraroblem, thc USSR may come t'< regaid detente in Euiope as indispensable and worth tbe cnuceSMuns leaiuied to maintain it The Soviets might, in the same way, rotnc to seo tbe need for more flexible forms ol political, economic, and militaiy coups-ialion in Eastern Europe and

uivcimgthe barriers In comunmicu-tion between thc states of Easlcen andEuiope.

Si The USSR's efforts to extend itsand influence in the Third World will OkM up against nationalist resistance and will inesilablyertain number of setbacks. Limitations on Soviet icsoiiices will alsoearing no Soviet activity iu lhe Third World, especially if, as seems possible, expenditures tlieru in corning years yieldpolitical returns. Certain otherul an essentially unpredictablesevere worsening of the Sino-Soviet conflict,onvulsion in the Soviethave an even more significantun the direction of Soviet foirign policy. Rut whether goals arc altered or not, itsuit the USSR, lieeausc of Iho complexity ol its Interests, to have an uncontrolledenvironment. Chances are that with timeider involvement, the USSR will discover more frequently than hitheito ainterest with tbe US in containing some of die causes uf international tension and in seeking the bases lor limited accommodations.

hether thc future willore meaningful modification of theutlook and behavior seems likely in die end to depend on the USSR'sI- the most crucial question may be how the Soviet leaden deal widi the piobleim of adaptive change in theirp.uticnlaily wiih Ihc problem of economic moderniratiun: by minimal measures or by serious ii li.iu The entrenched and self-per -petu.ituig bureaucratic oligarchy now in eiuige is icsiitanl to change. Among thc men in the Politburo who now seem moat likely to take ovci from thc aging Brezhnev. Kosygin. andthere may be some who will eventually reveal reformist inclinations. Rut Mich tendencies, il Ihey exist, are not nuw iu evide-iiciT. The present Politburo is, by and

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an Old dutrd presiding over the preser-vationystem which mutt seem to lis members to have served the Soviet Unions and iheir own personal interests well. Tliey bic disposed to change itliltle as possible and Ihey will attempt to stimulate economic giowlh and technological progress by resort ing to traditional methods of discipline and persuasion supplemented by modestof tho economic structure und such technical assistance from abroad as they can obtain

W. But, in view of the USSR's ambition, inlernational goals, this may not be enough Confronted by economic frustrations and faced, perhaps,rowing cleavage between itself and its educated elite, nationalistand loss nf popular elan, Ihe regime might move in the direction of severe remrs-

sion. It is possible that repression would bringeneral crisis of the system in which if was recognized that llie Patty was no longer capable of governing effectively. In thesetbc Soviel military imgbl fair on llie lad. uf maintaining national unity. Whnt is perhaps more likely Inituation isew generation of Party leadersore limbic disposition would begin to emerge Such men might see in Ihe USSR's interna!ause fur seeking greater international tranquility and Ihe elimination of many uf thc sources of international tension. They might, at fhe same time, be less ready h> respond to the old doctrinal shibboleths and less inclined to see an incompatibility between Soviet national interests and increasedmid economic stability in tbc international

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IET-AMERICAN TRADE

Tho Soviet* have long resorted io lhe import of Western equipment and technologyy of helping to compensate for their technological lagis the developed West Dursng the hut Five Year Plan, Soviet imports of Western machinery And equipment went upevel0 million1 bdlion. Dccaiise there hasharp upsurge in Soviet orders for Western plant and equipment since tbe endt is expected that imports will continue at this high level throughout thc current Five-Year Plan. Soviet needs are particularly acute in the electronics, tde-commumcations, chemical, oil. gas. andindustries.

ho USSR's inability to generateexports to pay for Imports from the West has caused it to suffer hard currency deficits in almost every year of the past decadeor example, Soviet imports from hard currency countries, amounting7 billion, exceeded exports0 million.hen llie USSR stopped selling gold. Soviet deficits have been financed in the main by credits.esult. Soviet long-termhas climbed rapidly, rising abovehe growth of this debl lias also ledharp increase in debt service charges which now lake up about one-fifth of the value of Soviet hard currency earnings annually

f this trend continues, the USSR will havearge share of lis future export earnings for debt service and its fleti-

bihty in trade with the West will he reduced. Recognizing this, thc Russians have attempted in recent trade negotiatioai to arrange that payment for sought-after Western equipment would be tied to deliveries of the products from the installations built with Western credit. These eftorts have produced gas-tor-pipe contracts with Austria. Italy, and West Cetmanyoviet-Japanese wood-fui-rquipmcntumber of proposed contiacts are on (he same order, amongji-foi-pipe ileal witb France, andnd pas for-pipc dealsun

t is estimated, however, that Ihc growth In Soviet exports to the developed West will slow drastically in, principally Ih-cause of the short supply of Soviet products saleable in the West, most notably oil. TV USSR thus will have to finance increased mi-ports by other means or ration its imports more strictly- Thc USSR has added considerably lo its gold reserves5 and now produces more0 million in gold annually. Tlierr are indications that the USSR may now be willing to part with some of Its gold to pay for Imports- If so. it could continue to inqiort more than itut if Ihe Soviets choose, instead, to ration their imports more strictly, imports of highly prized Western equipment and technology will, nonetheless, beto the extent possible, though there svill probably be greater emphasis on importing technology rather than equipment. Although consumer goods normally would be among the

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toi'f import) arc curtailed, Sovietf iinpioscmenl in thcdiet may limit Soviet options in this sphere. Indeed, kosygin lias indicated that the USSR is pirpaicd tnillion tons of feed grains from the US in theears, which would mtail an outlay0 million to SI Ixlhon.

5 The annual level of US-Soviet trade has remained0 million.his trade represented onlyercent of East-West trade turnover The Soviet interest in raising this level rests on both economic and politicaloscow needs Westernand cquipmenl hut it also wants the US to demonstrate willingness to deal with it in this area on equal, non-diserimiiiatory terms. The USSH for its part has indicated ato resume discussions on outstanding economiche lend-lease debt, ll. USSR wants to obtain from the US. on the otherelaxation of export controls, government (EximbanV) guaranteed credits, and most-favored nation treatment on tariffs foe Soviet export*.

ith the lowering of trade barriers, US exports to thr USSR could well increase from1 level ofillion to pet-hapsSHOO millionhc bulk of Soviet imports would be in live machinery and equipment category. Tho USSR has madeong list of expensive capital equip-

ment it desires from themanufacturing, deep well drilling, automatic oil transfer and storage, oi) refining, tolling mill, off-the-roadomputers,data transmission, and numericallymachineil considers the US equipment and lechiioiogy in many of tliese categories to be superior to all others. Many of these Soviet needs thus might befrom tbe US if credit terms can be ar-tanged, although some wilt be purchased from the US in any case

7 Soviet imports would be considerably in excess of exports and the USSR would stillargo trade deficit just as at present,S exports to thu USSR exceededby0 million.5 die US surplus would be substantially higher because most Sovid export* would noiarket in tlie US for the nexl few year* at least. Any large orders Irom the US would leadis.;i- increase in Soviet indebtedness. The USSR's ability lo seoite long-term credits from the US will thusrucial bcanog on expansion of US-Sovtet trade. Barterwould alto mitigate the debt.Arrangements involving thc repayment in product* for assutance in raw materialssuch as those made wiih other Western countries, are also being proposed to Ihe US and some may ho. the pioposed gas deal.

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