SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
CIA HkoTDRICAL REWEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN RILL
Security Conditions in the USSR, Poland, Austria, and Iran
THIS ESTIMATE IS SUBMITTED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND CONCURRED IN BY THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD.
The following intelligence orgonizofions participated in fhe preparation ol the
The Ceni'ol Intelligence Agency and the intelligence oigoniiotiom of theof State ond Defense, ond ihe NSA.
The Deputy Direcior of Central Intelligence
Th* Oiiector of Intelligence ond Research, Department ol State The Acting Director, Defense Intelligence Agency Ihe Direcior, National Security Agency
The Assblanl General Manager, Atomic Energy Commission Absfoiningr
The Assistant Direcior, Federal Bureau of Investigolion, ond Ihe Spcciol Assislonl luSecretory ol ihe Treasury, the subjeci being outside ot their jurisdiction.
SECURITY CONDITIONS IN THE USSR, POLAND, AUSTRIA, AND IRAN
SECURITY CONDITIONS IN THE USSR, POLAND, AUSTRIA, AND IRAN
This paper estimates the likelihood of incidents which wouldor seriously embarrass President Nixon during his planned visits to Salzburg, Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Teheran, and Warsaw. It concludes that in none of thc cities to be visited is there likely toubstantia! threat to the physical security of the President and his party. In no case, however, can we entirely ndc out the possibilityiolent actolitical extremist,ired assassin.
In Salzburg, the Presidentialicill have the protectionmall bid efficient security service and the goodwill of the greatof the populace. But various youth groups and the Communist Party are planning Vietnam demonstrations to which they hope to rally supporters from elsewhere in Western Europe, and we cannot exclude the possibility tliat an unruly situation might develop.
Large-scale demonstrations in the USSR cannot occur without the regime's prior approval, and thus will not occur at all. Anywill be carefully controlled. Though thc matter of Vietnam may cause some negative feelings, the average Soviet citizen can belo display interest, curiosity, and an orderly attitude toioard the Presidential party.
In Teheran, the government has had recurring problems withbut the Shah's security apparatus is tough, experienced, and capable of maintaining order in most circumstances.
In Warsaw, tlw security controls will be nearly as strict as in the USSR, and the people tvill be especially well disposed toward the visit. Indeed the great popular enthusiasm which tlie Poles mayfrom their enduring anti-Russian as well as pro-UScould cause the regime difficulties, perhaps in controlling crowds around ihe President, and perhaps in the tenor of Polish-Soviet relations-
ON SPECIFIC COUNTRIES
USSR (Moscow, Leningrad. Kiev)
1 Security airiiugcmi'iils (ui lite Pi evidential parly innmgmd, and Kiev will be supeivised at thc highest levels Ultimately responsible will be Ymiy Andropov.Member of the Politburo and Chairman of the Commitlee of Slate Securityost of tlve civilian and uniformed manpower directly involved will be KCB personnel, diawn in large part from thc Ninthwhich aho protects Soviet officials. Andropov will also rely to some client on the services of the Min-slry of Inierna] Affairs (MVD) which oversees routine policeSoviet security organisations are quite large and have long had the capability to monitor the activities of both Soviet citizens and foreigners; the KCB's ability to maintain internal security has. if anything, been st lengthened over the lasl lew yea ismen aie fully capable of handling large crowd* anywhere In the USSH and. ifproviding them as well.
But even thc large, efficient security ap-paiatu* of the USSR is not omnipotent. Under tlie Brezhnev regime there have been Isolated act* of public defiance by Soviet dissidentshe small protest In Red Square in'8 against thc invasion ofAnd in9 someone up-parctitly posingilitiaman fired shotsotorcade of cosmonauts and leading Parly officials, among them Brezhnev. Though we think such incidents highly unlikely, we thus cannot exclude thc possibility of some action in defiance of Ihe regime'sdcspciate set by an individualisplayarticular group of its Own specialSoviet Jews in Kiev or Moscow, for instance, might atlempt to dramatize iheirto emigrate. Or radical Arab students mi(Jit try to focus attention on their antipathy toivaid US Middle Eastern policy.
Thc average Soviet citizen in all three cities to bo visited will most likely display interest, curiosity, and an orderly attitude toward the US visitors. This svould be the norm for Muscovites in the presenceistinguished Western delegation. Lenin-graders by temper anient might appear somc-
nunc restrained than thend tlic Ukrainian inhabitants of Kiev somewhat more diinonstialive. But differences intn these tlucc cities axe not kkdy to be pronounced TIse attitude of lhe populacc in all llutv cities may. of course, bo cooler, being iulUienced by recent developments in Uie Vietnamese situation and Iho officialpiopaganda treatment of ihem. Ij is possible that some smallt ions, led for instance by Victriamese student groups, would be allowed If so. Ihey svould be most carefully controlled.
large scale publicwhich could not occur without the regime's priornot take place. Theleaders, given their evident anticipationull agenda for discussions with the President, will want to make certain that thc overall climate for Ihe visit lemami calm and
responsibility for the security ol the Presidential visit to Warsaw probably will be entiustcd to Politburo member Fiaiicis/.eklose associate of Cicrek Szlachcic will be calling on various pails of Ihc Ministry of Internal Alfairs to provide uniformed and plain-clot tin personnel as needed lie might also drawight infantry force. Ihe Internal Defense Troops, subordinate to Ihe Minister of National Defense
oth forces were used extensively inID'O to handle riots in several Polish cities. Relations between the populace and the security forces, and perhaps among com ol the security forces lliernsclves. rc-main slightly edgy on that account But Cierck hasumber of officials believedfor the harsh ticatment meted out fo the demonstrators, and we do not believe
lhat Polish crowds will seek to use Ihcvisit as Ihe occasion for reopening old quarrels.
the contrary, wc believe thaipeople and the regime togetherthe warm hospitality traditionallydistinguished US visitors. Moreover,regime appears to be moreits predecessor in better relationsUS. Thc US Embassy in Warsawother indications of improvedrelations, Ihe cordial receptionsSecretaries Volpc and Stans] and to the crew ofin2
Ihc main security task olregime will be to minimize any anti-Soviet
overtones in too large an outpouring of populareliable source has reported that this is precisely the concern of officials within the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We have no indication that Polish officials believe that such public displays couldthreaten tin* physical securily of the Presidential party, although they may suggest that his expos tire he limited on Corpus Christi Dayhen crowds svill be large anyway.
expect no organized threat tosafety during his slay inAustrians are svelt disposed to theflattered that their country hasfor thc Presidential rest stop.join the government in tryinguccess The small butsecurity service has good sourcesall dissident groups (includingParty)eputation forfirm as it has to be.
will, hovi'over, be efforts lothe President on thc issue of Vietnam.
thc Cummuniit Pattyml,don of youth nnd student gtunps arc lihiniuijcduring the Presidents visit; (he iatlei may attempt touadipuii ters nt
thc Univcmity ofof these
organizations would be likely loig crowd from among Austrian! alone, but both are trying to rallyA men canelsewlicrc in Western Europe The Size and virulence of the demonsons may br thc greaterof (he intensification of hostihties in Vietnam; the clsanccs ol access to the Presi-dcut will obviously deium! uu wli.it public appearances he may make in Salzburg. Tin-Austrian security forces have had limitediu con trolling large ciowds. ondannot rule out the pussibility that an uiuiily situation might develop ni that some fanatic* might iry to take advantage of it. Yet the aim* of the demonstialius svould probably be to generate publicity favorable to themselves and tn embarrass the Picsidcnt rather than to menace him. And tlve pro-Moscow Communist Party would not want actually to endanger Mr. Nixon on his way to meet Sos-iel leaders
II. The Shall, firmly in control of Iran,ough and eiperienced security apparatus. The police, who have benefited from US training programs, arc capable of keeping onler under most cucuinstances, and are backed up by the Irunltin Aimed Forces which
themightlremist. an lmntan dttiident, or an Americani%cti to USn Virtual".
form the Shah's ultimate base of power. Thc mililaiy establishment is loyal to flic throne; its higher-ranking officers are hand-picked anil icrccned by tlie Shah for their fidelity to his person. And undergirdmg the wholeis thc far-flung nnd experienced SAVAK, the secret police, which has been givenauthority for the control of political as well as criminal elements. SAVAK has in the past demonstrated its abilily to uncover and cupc with threats to security.
here is now no os'crt organizedopposition to tbe Shah. Nm is there nut.iblc hostility among Iranians toward the US in general or Piesidcnt Nixon in particular. Members of one or anuthcr Arab extremist group might try lo slip into Iran to cause trouble, but the Iranian Government is alert lo thisomewhat greatersecurity thi'cat to the Presidential visit probably lies in the small groups of Iranian Kidicals svho in recent years have slcpped up clandestine activity against the Shah andarriedumber of acts ofilitary judge was assassinated hist year afler sentencing convictedn the past several months, the Teheranhas moved against such extremists, executedf them, and put on trialore youths branded as "Maoists" and subversives. Some tenet ists doubtless remain at large, but thc government's severe measures apnear to have dampened their activity and we do not think lhat they svill actually disrupt security during the President's visit. SAVAK appears to have many penetrations of extremist circles and svill be on maximum alcrl toany incidents.
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