ISSUES AND OPTIONS IN SOVIET MILITARY POLICY (NIE 11-4-72)

Created: 3/2/1972

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NATIONAL

INTELLIGENCE

ESTIMATE

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED

Issues and Options in Soviet Military Policy

7

NS 2B9

THIS ESTIMATE IS SUBMITTED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND CONCURRED IN BY THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD.

Tha fallowing intelligence organizations participated in tha preparation ol the estimate;

lite Central ImeltQtnce Aoer.cy ond Ire rnteCrrrc-oco otooAitoricro of lhem ol Slot* ond Defense, one Ike NSA

Concurring;

Ihe Deputy Director ol Cer.hol Intelligence

III Director of leetKoence ond ReseortK. Dcportreswlip Direcior, Detente Intelligence Agency Iho Direcior. No1*nol Security Agency

Abifo in ing:

Ihe AvvrtKin: Ce^ecol Monoger, Atomic EnergyiheDirector, Federal Bveou olond theiviwnl in Ibe Secretory ot ihc Tieotury. the lubjeel being outside ol their jini.dk'ion.

moteriol conlaint reformation oW within the mooning of the Oipionoge million or revelollon of which

National Defenie of tho UnitedSC,, thounauthorized perrohibited.

onouvT

t-lWpJ tradD.-tMlnlil

ISSUES AND OPTIONS IN SOVIET MILITARY POLICY

APPROVED FOR RELEASE CIA HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM

ISSUES AND OPTIONS IN SOVIET MILITARY POLICY

NOTE

Thil papereparture from previous4 in the extent to which it goes beyond strictly military and resource factors to consider Soviet military issues in thc context of overall Soviet attitudes and poh'cies. The first two sections of the paper outline the framework within which issues of military policy are considered in the USSR. The third, and main, section discusses the key issuesindicates various options and suggests what some of thc Soviet choices are likely to be. The table of contents on thc following page indicates, under three very broad headings, some of thc important questions Moscow will have to consider as it shapes its policies for the years ahead.

Thc approach here is thus quite different from that undertaken in the scries of military estimates on major Soviet forces and programs. Comprehensive treatment of that subject matter is available in:

: SOVIET FORCES FOR INTERCONTINENTAL ATTACK

: SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSES

Memo to Holders of NIE : SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSES

ARSAW PACT FORCES FOR OPERATIONS IN EURASIA

HE USES OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER IN DISTANT AREAS

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CONTENTS

Page

SUMMARY 1

DISCUSSION S

I. THE LINKS BETWEEN MILITARY AND FOREICN 5

II. SOME INTERNAL FACTORS BEARING ON MILITARY POLICY

AND 7

Considerations 7

.ind Military Influences on Decision-Making 6

III. ISSUES OF POLICY: OPTIONS AND PROBABLE CHOICES . 9

Kintl of Strategic Competition With tbc Unitod

Forces Facing Europe and China?11

Maintenance of Forces or Reductions in11

A Stronger Soviet Posture Toward China? 13

Capabilityore Fleaible Nudcavr Itcspoose in Europe? S

C Pressingrger World Influence?

The USSR and the Regions on iu Southern Periphery

The More Distant Areas

New Capabilities for Distant Operations? Whit Kind of Navy?

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APPROVED FOR RELEASEHISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM

SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS

Trie Fiamowotk for Decisiott-Making

A. The issues which the Soviels face in defining their miliiary policy are closely linked to their foreign and economic policieshole, and it is in this broad context that their choices will be made. Because of the general improvement in recent years in their relative international position, and especially because of their achievement of rough strategic parity with the US, the Soviets are more confident than ever before regarding the "relation of forces" between the twoThe Soviets recognize that the contest for international primacy has become increasingly complicated and less amenable to simple projections of power. They feel, nonetheless, that they can nowa wider range of options in military policy.

B Resource constraints on thc development of Soviel military forces and programs are relative, not absolute. The Soviet leadership would no doubt prefer to shift some scarcematerial,military production, or from research, development, testing and evaluationo the civilian sector. But the USSR would not be obliged, for purely economic reasons, Io forego military programs its leaders see as essential.

C. In the complex mechanisms for decision-making on matters of military policy in the USSR, the military leaders have an important

institutional and advisory role, but the politicalthehas the final say. One consequence of the whole process seems toendency toward thetrying to cover all risks, toward working deliberately along established lines, toward pressing for consensus to avoid strong opposition, toward minimizing the chances of error or waste. And to some extent the process makeshift of resources from one major military program to another,hange in the size and overall disposition of military forces.

The Strategic Relationship with lhe United Stoles

the sphere of strategic competition with the US, thethe Soviets have chosen, at least for thc immediate future,attempt to stabilize some aspects of the relationship throughThey appear to believeormal antiballisticagreement and an interim freeze on some strategicon terms they can accept, are within reach. Theythemselves, in the context ofirst-stagefollow-on negotiations on comprehensive limits for strategicweapons.

Soviets have strong incentives to continueeans of exercising influence over US strategickeeping thc competition inomplete breakdown intalks seems highly unlikely. In this setting, theeed to set some outer bounds on furtheractivities. lest these activities lead to US charges ofand possible breakdown of tlie talks. But there will almostbe strong countervailing pressures in the USSB to achieveinvolved in their ongoing programs, as well as to keep uppressure on the US and lo hedge against thc failure ofAnd in the eventituation of slalcmatetlie future, with little or no progress toward agreement onlimitations, the Soviels would presumably make suchto their forces as they judged necessary; they might hope,process, to achieve some margin of advantage withoutspiralling competition.

Soviets realize, of course, that what they arecontinuing with serious negotiations in SALT isatter of

oncling strategic competition between the two countries, but rather narrowing its focus. One important area where intense competition will continue no matter what thc outcome of the talks is that of. Moscow has for several years been increasing efforts andin, and apparently intends to continue doing so. Yet even given such sustained offorts in RotD, the resource savings realized by the Sovietstate of "stabilized parity" as compared with wide-range competition would permit them, over time, tovariousof funds and facilities to other military programs, or perhaps to the civilian sector.

Miliiary Posfure Toward China and Europe 1

C. The Soviet leaders have necessarily emphasized the miliiary aspect of their containment policy toward China. They will have to meet growing requirements for air defense and ballistic missile early warning in the years ahead. On the offensive side, they will have to consider questions concerning the deployment of additional strategic weapons suitable only for peripheral attack, relying on dual missions for some of their existing intercontinental weapons, or installingweapons which they would not otherwise have deployed. With regard to their ground forces, the Soviets are likely at least to proceed somewhat further with their present buildup in thc border aroa, particularly by strengthening support elements.

because of the urgency they attach to thc Chinathe Soviets evidently see their interests in Eurasia as aby further movement toward detente with WesternSoviel leaders seem to be coming to accept that theysome forces from Eastern Europe, particularly some ofpersonnel in East Cermany, and still retaintrong posture against NATO, to intimidate tliepopulations, and to reassert control in Easternand decisively in an emergency.

this does not mean thc Soviets have decided on anyin their forces or thai tlioy are likely to make such ain tlie near future. They will presumably see advantageexploring the possibilitiesegotiated agreement on

' Dr. by S. CUoc. ih* DunHr of lOteOi trace andpertmeei! of Suit, Ma)Phillip B. Di-xiwn. vCW ot Sialf forepertrarnt of the Army;. On. Ceorro J. Korean. Jr, the Aniitant Chief of Staff. Inlelllfonce, USAF, dUaeiee Willi aoine of Ihe viewi eiprrwnd in thii lettIon. Theirl forth on

SLXREt-

mutual reduction of foiccs. But they may, if they decide anis not tn the cards, proceed to make limited withdrawals on their own. They might do so in part on the calculation that US force reductions, which could be politically and militarily far more significant, would surely follow.

Issues Concerning More Distant Areas

J. Thc Soviet leaders probably expect that, having attained rough parity with the US in strategic weapons, ihey will be able to exercise wider political and military options in distantthose in the Thirdthe next few yean. The USSR clearly intends to give particular attention to the regions on its southern periphery.

K. The USSR's existing capabilities for military operation inareas have developed largelyy-product of militarydesigned for other purposes. The Soviets now have substantial ground, air and naval forces which can be used to establish fhcir presence in distant areas, but their capabilities to use force at long range against opposition are limited. What Moscow must now consider is how much emphasis to place in the future on forces and equipment designed to fight in areas remote from thc USSR's borders.

L. The deficiencies of the present Russian forces in such matters as military air transport, integral naval air support, and amphibious lift and assault ships cannot be quickly or easily overcome. Yet as modest additions are made to thc USSR's capabilities to lift and land forces in distant areas, these very improvements will tend to strengthen tlie arguments for acquisition of further special purpose items. As tlie USSR further involves its policy and prestige in remote areas Moscow will have to consider requirements for forces to respondide range of contingencies, whether to prevent setbacks or to exploit opportunities. We believe that step-by-step the Soviets,without everecision on the general principle, will acquire capabilities which will permit them to employ combat forces in distant areas.

M. Obtaining the kind of bases abroad which would be most suitable forilitary purpose will be difficult for thein. They have so far succeeded in acquiring such overseas facilities where the host country felt urgent need for extensive Soviet support against an externaland Cuba. In most instances the Soviets will probably seek to acquire lesser facilities or arrangements, and reconcile themselves to thc limitations involved.

DISCUSSION

I. THE LINKS BETWEEN MILITARY AND FOREIGN POLICIES

L There are important elements olunderlying Soviet concept> ofpower and itshese derive pri. marily Irom geopoliticalut arc influenced by Ideology as well. Certain broad aims of Soviet military policy can thus be described today in much the same wayecade or more ago: (aj security of the homeland and of the world communist(b) protection of the 'gains of socialum" and more specifically maintenance of loyal communist regimes in Eastern Europe; (c) fostering awareness everywhere of Sovietstrength and readiness so as totrong foreign policy aimed at expanding Soviet influence.

hese constants notwithstanding. Soviet military policy has changed over the years in many of its aspects. The factors that have most visibly influenced tbesc changes inyean are the USSR's perception of its own powriis thc other major states of

the world, iLv estimate of the source and nature of the external threat, and the influence of science and technology on Russian forces and on the forces of potential enemies. The present mix among strategic offensive, defensive, and the various elements of general purpose forces is, forar cry from that whichduring Stalin's time, when the emphasis was on masilve conventional forces. This change, in tlie broadest Sense, reflects changes in the nature of tbe threat and in theof technology. It also reflects in part certain changes in the approach of Soviet leaders since Stalin's departure. Theretoersonal element in Sovietdecision making but tills now appears less important Uiau it once was; thcof risk ami gain made by tlic preseut regime contrast markedly with the impulsive quality of some of Khruslichcv's decisions.

ot only have developments in other parts of the world caused Russian assessments to change, but many of tlic mechanisms and circumstances within the USSR which help

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tu ihnpc policy have also altered. Thcbetween political, economic, and military interests (and among thc proponents of these interests) has changed. Progress (or lack of progress) in disarmament negotiations has become an increasinsrjy importantand the fotinulaUoo of tactics and strategy has bucomc more complex as the USSR has begun fully to play the roleuperpowcr-

n trying to achieve its aims, the present Soviel leadership, like Ui predecessors, has been intensely concerned wiih thcbalance ofSoviet terms, "the relation ofn lhe Russianmilitary power bulks large in theof foreign policy. This is true not In the sense that the Soviets arc irresistibly drawn to the actual use of force to achieve loreign policy objectives although on occasion tliey have laken that course(mt rather in the sense that they believe in the implied threat of its useay of affecting the attitudes and decisions ol other states. In giving major weight to military powereterminant of tbe conduct of states, the Soviet leaders do not measure such power entirely by thef missiles or divisions. They also fudge il in tho context of more general coiuidera-lions: they attach great importance tosocial-economic forces, lo tbe degree of internal unity or division to be foundtidversary states, and to tlte capacities of opposing leaders and their will to confront risks.

he Soviets have clearly become more confident than ever before regarding thcofetween lhe USSR and the US. Tliey have achieved what they evidently regard as rough strategic equality with the US. and their acceptance nf strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) has been based at least partly on the desire to have thc US

formally recognize this equality. Moreover, they have ample reason to regard theirposition tn the world as greatly improved since the low point ol the Cuban missile crisislthough Ihey face persistent internal problems, particularly in thc economic sphere, their posture and policy abroad have ledetterment In their relationsariety oi non-communist governments. Inter alia, they have largely repaired the damage to their interests posed by crises in the Middle East7 and in Eastern Europend the Soviets perceive that fhe world influence of the US has declined, that its alliances have been under strain, and that it has been faced with considerable internal' sharp clashes over external policies.

Q. The Soviets do not now tegard NATO as an imminent military threat, and ihey see opportunities toore forwardlomacy of their own In Western Europe. Iu view of the changing relationship between the US and Western Europe, and of persistent West European desires for detente, tlie Soviets now see tliemsclvesood position tolong-standing objectives in Europe;of tlie status quo in Eastern Europe, and in Cermany, the achievement of greater. leveiage in Western Europe, andithering of Atlantic lies and thc withdrawal of US forces.

hile some of tbe USSR's concerns In Europe have eased during the past decade, tbc problem of China has grown, the Soviet leadership now seems to regard the rivalry with China as having become as intense as the rivalry with the US or more so. lnto thc requirement the Soviets see for keeping pace with the US and its ongoing strategic program, they must give appropriate weight io China's potential. In the nearer term they must take account of the emerging Chinese peripheral strategicmedium bombers, medium-range ballistic mis-

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and Intermediate-range, ballistic(hoy regard is directed primarily against them. The Soviet* alao mint;hinese attempts to huild political influence, even in Eastern Europe. Moreover. Moscow continues to face the threat o( being outflanked politically on the left by the Communist Chinese, particularly In thc underdeveloped world

Soviets" own increasingtho Third World has beer, paralleled bycapability to undertake newSoviet military forces which canIn distant areas have developedpart of tlie strengthening of theirposture. But such forces, togethercontinuing emphasis which Moscowits military assistance programs,enlargement of the USSR'i

Soviets are clearly aware thatto expand and strengthen theiroutside the communist camp willgo smoothy. Their detente effortsEurope could over time haveon their position in Easternhave been obliged to assumeand to accept some increaserisks in order to preserve theirand influence in parts of theworld, notably in the Middle EastAsia. Ihey have also found inthat nationalism and parochialare more vigorous forces thansupposed and not easy ones toother places they have beenthe ineptness or instability of regimessupported.umber of easesof aid has proven moreloss useful to Soviel aims than Moscow

'See An iter I.The Uses of Soviet Military Power In Distantated ISECRET.

had anticipated. For reasons such as these, ihe Soviets recognsre that the contest for inteniatlunal primacy has become increasingly complicated and less untenable to simpleinns of power.

espite this, there is much confidence in Ihc Soviet attitude, and on Iwo principal counts. First, tbc Soviets probably feel that they are free of any immediate threat to their national security. Tlie immediacy of lhe threat posed by NATO is seen as having diminished; the Chinese threat is seen as potentially grave but not immediately so. Secondly, byequal status with the US In stralngic terms, the Soviets believe they have earned at lasl an equal voice in world affairs. "There isinglo question of any importance" Foreign Minister Gromyko told the Soviet Party Congress last April, "wfuch could at present be solved without the Soviet Union or against its will".

II. SOME INTERNAL FACTORS BEARING ON MILITARY POLICY AND PROGRAMS

A. Economic Considerations

esource constraints upon theof Soviet military forces and programs arc relative, not absolute, and decisions on expenditures probably derive as much from bureaucratic processes and pressures as from carefully thought out political and economic decisions. For the most part, physical capacity does notonstraint; thc plantof Soviet industry existing or under construction is adequate to support high levels of output of land armaments, aircraft,and missiles. Moreover, given the great sire of the Soviet economy, an expansion of physical capacity could be undertakeneasily: even low growth rates increase available resources considerably Thus the USSR would not be obliged, lor purely eco-

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reasons, to forego military programs its leaders see as essential.

n thc other hand, the increasingcomplexity of thc military forces,with the growth of military research, development, lest and evaluationlus civilian space programs, hasapid increase in requirements (or highly trained technicians and managers and thc most advanced equipment and materials. Tlie military's first claim on these scarce resources has contributed to thc difficulties that the Soviets have experienced in increasing ma-terial incentives for the labor force. It has also contributed to thc problems ofnew technology into thc civilian economy and. to some extent, to the resulting decline in lhe productivity of new investment. Tlie interest of the Soviet leaders in SALT is inonsequenceesire to limit the economic cost of further expanding and strengthening thc military establishirsenLthe perennial problem of resource allocationajor issue in deliberation on Soviet national policy and is likely to remain so in the years ahead. But the same, of course, can be said of lhe US. To be sure, economic resources in thc USSR are more limited than in the US, but political and social controls are such that the Soviet leadership enjoys relatively great freedom of action in deciding how to allocate them.

B. Political and Military Influences on Decision-Making

ia Certain distinctive features of thesystem affect the way in which decisions on military policy arc made. Thepowerery broad range of matters is reservedmall collective in the top political leadership. The principle of close and relalively detailed Party supervision

* When (he term military HAD ii used in thisIt does not include civilian space expenditure*.

of miliury affairs is well established. The military, in turn, have become deeply involved in thc Party system.

Thc Soviet military do not. by any means,eparate political element and they do not view thc country's future in terms which are basically at odds with the concepts of the Party. But they do constitute an interest group which must contend with other bureaucratic interests, lhe presentleaders, unlike Khnishclicv. havelo avoid direct conflict with thein the area of the latter's professional competence. In the case of military programs, the members of the Politburo appear to call on the military to formulate requirements and recommendations. While they have machinery for screening and evaluating suchthey appear, in practice, to be heavily dependent on thc technical judgments of their military, advisers.

The military leadership is not, of course, always of one mind. There is ample evidence of rivalries in the past; these became acute, for example, when Klirushchev was trying to build up the Strategic Rocket Forces at the expense of thc general purpose forces, but Ihey have been evident on other issues as well. Such differences, though now muted, almost certainly continue. Yet the combined armsis strong, and since thc time ofthe military appear to have beenin working out their interna]andnited front. Part of the reason, perhaps, is that under Uieleadership the total militaryhave increased each year, which has made the competition for resources among tho various military coiilendcrs less keen than if expenditures were constant or diminislung.

Despite the insuturional power of the mibtary, and of thc scienlific establishment, defense industry, and other groups involved in detensc planning, the political

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Ihchu the final lay. Beyond llieir role in dctcnnunhg overall po-libeal-mUilaxy policy. Politburo memberi on occasion project themselves into quite narrow and specific matters. For the most part, how. ever, they must operate within the context of these olher forces, and not only take them into account, butfor lack ol effectively formulatedwhat they advise, The growing complexly of tho decisions lo be made, and the impossibiUly of Acquiring indopendenUy al) theneeded lo make them, impose thison Ihe leadership.

ne consequence of the whole process seems toendency toward thetrying to cover all risks, toward working deliberately along established lines, toward pressing for consensus to avoid strong opposition, toward minimizing thc chances of error or waste In many areas of weaponsand procurement, solutions seem to be devised more by building on proven approaches lhan by vigorously pushing Ihc stole of Ihc art. And to some extent thc processt more difficult lo shift resources from one major military program to another, or to change the size and overall disposition of military forces.

III. ISSUES OF POUCYi OPTIONS AND PROBABLE CHOICES

A. What Kind of Strategic Competition With Iho United States?

IS. Probably the single most important issue of military policy now facing thcis iheir future strategic rekb'onship with lhc US. As Moscow clearly realizes, the US for yeais to come will be the only nallon with (hu capability to inflict such damage on (heo challenge its existence. But, in Moscow's view, the character of thc problem is no longer the same as it was; the Soviets

have finally caught up stralespcally and (he options they can now consider cover awider range thanhe broad alternate Hncs of action now available to them can nonetheless be indicated simply: to pursue the competition with the US intensivelyide spectrumiew lo achieving some kind of superiority, or lo find means of narrowing the realm of competitioniew lo maintaining something closo lo rough purity.

et, for the Soviet leaders, each of these broad choices involves various complexities. There is no easy way to define, in practical terms, what the most appropriate means is to assure continuation of rough parity, or even to specify cooiidently which weapons and forces on thc ooe side offset which weapons and forces on Ihe other. Such drtemiir.ations will quickly encounter questions ofasymmetry and will become increasingly difficult as technology changes and new programs arc totrcduccd. Thus there is ample room for differences within lheleadership and between leaders andon many particular questions, as well as on more general issues, and in theselhe tendency in Moscow will probably be to buildsafety factor" when they make iheir calculations.

urther problem centers on theMoscow feels it mustleast over Ihe longercope with the Chinese nuclear threat Depigment of certain types of strategic weapons against China maylo increase, or indeed actually increase, Soviet capabilites against thethus risk escalating thc US-Soviet competition.

'Foi diteimiocis ol lhc earlier dcciiioni im! pro-(iami that brought Uie Soviets to rough parity seeJ. "Soviel StraleafedatedOP SECRET, andnd IX of, "Soviet Farces for Itiler-continentalated, TOP SECRET.

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Thissure loore difficult problem over time as tbe Chinese develop increased itiatcgic capabiutics.

Beyond these considerations, there are uridoiibtedly some in Moscow urging that the USSR ma in lain the momentum that has brought II to rough parity. The Sovietwould no doubt be attracted by the notion that some margin ofatho appearance of some margin-could be established widioutew competitive cycle. And they mightthatargin, in addition to its possible military benefits, could be useful in political psychological ways to enhance the USSR's International position.

There are. on the otberumber of important factors which would deter Soviet leaders.uest for advantage, fromahead with programs and deployments so extensive asset tlie strategic balance. Thoy have shown themselves lo be sensitive to the high costs of such efforts, and thoy apparently recognize that major newon their part wouldew element of uncertainty in the arms race and risk triggering vigorous US countercflorts long before Moscow's objective could bo reached.

The policy course the Soviets have chosen, at least for the immediate future, is to attempt to stabilize some aspects of the strategic relationship with the US through negotiations The above considerations wit! probably lead thc Soviets toeed to set some outer bounds on furtheractivities, lest these activities lead to US charges of bad faith and possible break-down of thc talks. But there will almosthe strong countervailing pressures in the USSR to maintain enough deployment to achieve the goals involved in their ongoing programs, as well as to keep up bargaining pressure on the US and to hedge against tbe

failure of the negotiations Moreover, thewill continue to be hard bargainers. Despite their apparent desire forihe Soviets have emphasized in SALT that they will not accept any agreement that in their view, would compromise theirof equal security.

During thc more than two years ol SALT they have laid greatest stress onantiballistic missile (ABM)presumably because of concern that major US deployments would be destabilizing to their disadvantage, and probably also out of ato avoid the heavy new expenditures that any large-scale ABM deployment on their side would entail. However, they realize that any agreement would have to provide for some interim limitations on the furtherof strategic offensive weapons. They appear to believeormal ABMand an interim freeze on some strategic oflensive weapons, on termscan accept, arc wilhin reach. Tliey have committndin the context ofirst-stage agreement, to follow-on negotiations onlimits for strategic offensive weapons.

The Soviets have strong Incentives to continue the strategic dialogueeans of exercising influence over US strategicand keeping the competition in bounds. They would probably see politicalin permitting SALT to fad. Perhaps more Importantly, tbcy would see the said of SALT not only asseful means ofon full-scale arms competition, but also as possibly compelling them to return to such competition. They recognize that anarms race could be to theirbeyond Ihe matter of its very high coils, Ihey wouldanger that thoy could fallthe US and thus again be in an apparent, if not actual, position of strategic inferiority.

omplete breakdown In the SALT talks seems highly ossibility

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worthy of more serious consideration wouldontinuation of the talks over an extended period of time with little progress toward agreement on comprehensive limitations. Ifituation of stalemate developed in the negotiations, the Soviets would presumably make such selective additions to their forces as they judged necessary; they might hope, in the process, to achieve some margin of advantage withoutpiralling

Thc Soviets realize, of course, that what they are contemplating in continuing serious negotiations in SALT isatter of ending strategic compeition between the Iwobut rather narrowing its focus. There is one important area where intense competition will continue no matter what thc outcome of theof. Neither side has shown strong interest In limiting such HtVD, because of uncertainties aboutthc qualitative improvements which might result and also because neither side wants to forego thc possible advantages which might be involved.

Moscow has. for several years, been increasing expenditures and efforts onor military and space purposes; apparently it intends to go on doing so. The Soviet leaders are known to have great respect for US prowess; presumably they will maintain their own high priority asthat they won't again fall far behind in some important strategic regard.

Even given such sustained efforts. the resource savings realized by the Sovietstate of "stabilized parity" us compared with wide-range competition would permit them, over time, to consider various tradehift of funds could be made to provide additional or more modemarms for Soviet military forces infor foices to be used in

areas more distant from thchift of some funds and facilities from strategic military production to tlie civilian sector would also be possible.

B. Reshaping Forces Facing Europe and China? 1

respect to their military policythe most recent and pressinghas to do with theChina, and with thcscope of Soviet military deploymentsby lhatecond issuebe drawing Soviet attention Lssize and character of the Sovietin thc West against NATO willto make sense in terms ofof thc situation there and inthe detente policies It Is now pursuingMoscow's view of this latterbe conditioned by the requirement itmilitary deployments sufficient toover Eastern Europe, as well aslotrong Warsaw Pactto that of NATO.

Maintenance- of Forces or Reductions in Europe?

Moscow's standpoint, theretoertain loss of force hithat Soviet objectives inthe maintenance of Iroop strengthlevels. Deployments remainarc now, for instance,1 East European divisions in EastPoland, and Czechoslovakia, opposite

* Dr. Ray S.he Director ot Intelligence aod Reirarch, Department of State, MaJ. Cen. Phillip B. Davidson. Assistant Chief of Staff for InleHii;ei>cc. Department of the Army, and Mai. Cen. CeorKcecgan.he Auttttot Chiel of Staff, Intelligence, USAf.will, ioiW> of thc view* expressed Inheir position il setat the end of tbc section on.

ehc Central Region ofet theclearly do not sec lh.insdves in irrirni-ncnt danger of NATO attack, even though they almost certainly remain distrustful of the US and West Cetmany, and ipceesiensivcthe long-term economic and political implications of the Common Market. Thc old "hostage Europe" concepl now has lessfor thc USSH isosition toowerful direct strategic threat lo the US. Beyond this, the Soviets may see tho retention of large forces arrayed against NATO asthc pursuit of their policy of detente toward Western Europe: Ihe Soviet military posture strengthens the stand of those officials in NATO countries who remain reluctant to reduce security ties with the US.

pposed to these considerations isconcern for (he internal situation in Easternconcern reinforced by the Czechoslovak crisisy (he persistent independence of Romania, by thc revival of national pride in post-Comulka Poland, and by the uncertainties (ond jierliapslooming in the twilight of Tito's rule of Yugoslavia. To some extent, Moscow's recent efforts to make thc organization of the Warsaw Pact and thc Council for Mutual Economic Assistance more attractivehe Eastmembers have been directed at con-taming East European nationalism by subtler means than the implicit threat of Soviet nuli-tary intervention But Moscow can hardly be confident thai it is making affective progress at this point or that nationalistic tendencies would be contained in the long run without an imposing Soviet miliiary presence. And running through Soviet policy ore enduring anxieties centering on Cermany and the belief that the Soviet miliiary presence in Eastern

present, these force. wMh their tsetses! air sueooit amount lo0 SovSel and soeneCO Eastersonnel

Europe servesheck on the reasscttion of Cerman power.

long as concerns of this sortleast some in thc Soviet leadershipfavor no reduction at all in theforces deployed in Eastern Europe andUSSR. Soviets of this cast ofthat lhe USSR's position in Easternis vulnerable to Western Influencesspread more easilyelaxedand they worry that even modesttroop withdrawals would whetamong the peoples of Eastcountries and among some of theas well. The further argumentosition of undimiruihedmilitary strength in Europe not onlya powerful deterrent to NATO, buthave useful political andon the West.

There now appears, however, to be an inclination in Moscow lo move away from this view. We believe lhal Moscow is coming to accept thai It could withdraw some of its forces from Eastern Europe, particularly some ofoviet military personnel in Fast Cermany, and still retain sufficienttotrong posture against NATO, to intimidate tbe East Europeanand to reassert control in Easternquickly and decisively in an emergency.

All ihis does not mean the Soviets have decided on any reduction in their forces or that they are likely to makeecision in Ihc near future. They will presumably secin thoroughly exploringegotiated agreement rather thanunilaterally in any reduction of Ihcir forces in Eastern Europe. They might see in this metay of giving greater momentum to political forces in the West which Ihey wish to encourage. They might also see ineans of insuring thai rhe US would proceed

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with withdrawals,elleans otthc kinds of forces thc US would withdraw. If ovanu develop so that aon mutual force reductions seems toerious possibility in tha next year or two, the Soviets ore unlikely to move unilaterally, in order to avoid giving away any bargaining chips. On the other hand, if they conclude that negotiations are not feasible at all, or that negotiations once undertaken would prove too difficult toavorable result, themay then make limited withdrawals on their own. They might do so in part on the calculation that US force reductions, which could be politically and militarily far more significant, would surely follow.

A Stronger Soviet1 Poslure loward China?

oncern about China isactor in (he USSR's view of appropriate policy and posture townid Europe as well as in its calculations regarding Its overall securityFriendly relations between the regimes in Moscow and Peking lasted forecade; mutual hostility has now extendedonger period. China's emergenceuclear power, tho events on Uie Soviet-Chinese frontier, the recent strengthening of China's defenses in the north, and thesigns of improvement in China's relations with regimes hostile toward orof the USSR, have stimulated Soviet efforts to contain China politically as well as militarily.

oviet political initiatives to this end have not, however, been overly successful For example, thc Sino-Soviet bolder talks probably have helped to keep tho border reasonably quietut they have not. so far as we can tell, lesolved any basic disputes between the (wo countries. Soviet proposals to enlist other Asian countries In containing China, through some type ol Asian collective security arrangements, have been received for

thc most part with suspicion or apathy.has recently made cautious newto Japan, but many key Japanese polilical figures seem to give higher priority to the future development of Japanese relations with the Chinese Unequivocal Soviet support for India in the war against Pakistan has gained the Soviets political favor in Delhi andChina- but it may also havestill more vigorous Chinese competition with the USSR all over the world. What is most certain of all is that Iherc has been no slackening of Chinese hostility toward the USSR.

In such circumstances, the Soviet leaders have necessarily emphasized the miliiary aspect of their containment policy. Although Ihe buildup of Soviet theater forces in Asia since theas been gradual, it has become quite massive In the aggregate. Sincehe number of Soviet ground force divisions opposite China has increased fromohe number ofo. and thc number of tactical nuclear missile launchers from aboulo

The prospect is that Soviet military planners will find It nocessary to makeprovision of resources for assuring Soviet military preponderance over Chinaong period. Duringhinawill deploy ballistic missile systems of intermediate and intercontinental range, and

'Atptcsm ihe Sovlrts amount, with their Uxlkat au support, toersonnel.he pace of the bcMcp hasnl Thc tsnphsaai01 has bee*building up tactical air faeces and army and front level service support. Ai ol (he endhe only field cixruutridon of four lUr rank iii thc Soviet ground Inreei wen tho commanders of the Ihree principal military distrtcU borderlog on China, although the newly appoint oil cocnmandei In chief of Soviet forces In Germany, by vidua of liH position, ihould be promoted lo thai rank in the near future.

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increase its capabilities for air attack along Ihu borders of the USSR and into key areas of the Soviet heartland. The Soviets will have to meet growing requirement* for air detente and ballistic missile early warning, but apparently do not now contemplateABM deployment beyond Moscow. They must also weigh tlie question of whether to deploy additional strategic weaponsonly for peripheral attack, rely on dual missions for some of tbeir existingweapons, or install intercontinental weapons which they would not otherwise have deployed. It would bo consistent with tbcuttitude of this Soviet leadership tosome strategic offensive units against China alone, rather than rely completely on dual mission systems.

n considering how much further, and how rapidly, to proceed with the deployment Of theater forces opposite China, tho Soviet leaders could conclude that tbey will soonoint where no further buildup will be required. The argument to justify this would be that tlie forces now in place should be sufficient to deter the Chinese; or that these Soviet forces would be able to contain any real threat the Chinese could pose in the near-term future, and wouldimited offensive capability. Yet it seems clear from the very scope of tho effort they have already undertaken thai thc Soviets appraise thc "danger" from Chinapecial way.and emotional factorsart in this; at the same time, there arc purelyconsiderations of some Importance. There is thc matter of the vulnerability of tho Trans-Siberian rail line because of its proximity to thc Chinese border. And ihere is the possible requirement for offensive Soviet aciion well into Chinese territory In the contingency of major hostilities between the two countries.

t seems likely, on balance, lhat tlie Soviet leaders will al least proceed somewhat

further with their present buildup, inby vtrenglhenlng support elements so as to improve their force structure in the area. The Soviets may, beyond this, feel the need to expand their ground forces,tronger strike force for operations in western and northern China and Manchuria, and in Ihe processora visible, andore credible, deterrent.the requirements of either alternative would be facilitated if the Soviets determined, essentially for reasons having to do with their policy toward Europe, to undertake someof present deployments in thc West.

Statement ol the poihion of iKo Director otanil lloiaareh. Department ofAssiuaiM Chief of Staff for lntelU|*nce,of the Amy. snd the AssistantStaff,. USAF.

It is oar belief Ihst ibe USSR b) uWr Urehictsnt to wesken its military lorcei soued al Western Europe and chat Mctcow will coo-tinue to try lo pare ils buildup against China in such fsitii.ni as lo avoid substantial changes in iu European the iter forces.

We feel thai the diicusuoo laenoVfilatrs rhe decree ba which rheremain (a) concerned about entwineof lha NATO Powers hy Warsswand al the same time (b)reatemainiaintiiG the political andon Uie West arising ftotn awarenessSoviet mfJitaiy itmieUi inSovietsfsr havu evidently pacedajtair.it China so as not to teijuliein iheir

uiwapected new pressures oa tbe China border, further incren*ntal powrb in the Easito be mam era Ulr in terms of available Soviet resources.

In recent years Soviet policy toward NATO* HKJialliiiR of interest io mutual and balanced force ledudorn (MflER)develiTied very

dowly snd ravirnO> within the coolest ofdevelopments There is no >ijra rhat the Soviet attitude hai been driven by fmuurasIjom ilw buildup igauii! China Basically, policy on mutual force ledurlfcwu forms part of Soviet detente efforts in Europe. Moscow now appears to anticipate detailed negouatinnt on

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force reduction* OTilyean wcunty ttd HMI content to let It at inn uOw pace.

Of iDunr the poutblltty cannot be rulad out thai the Soviet Union maroment of iuhoosine elect lo make soma unl-lateral reduction.rawdown intended for polilical effect In the Weil andn opening (asnbrt for reduction! by "mutual"ould. however, be quite ouJl and no* very ii|nlf>catil In term of thehe Era*.

Capabilityoro Flexible Nuclear fiospome in Europe?

long wiih lhe question ol thesize of their forces, the Soviets are also giving some attention to the question of how Ihey woulduclear war with NATO. In the, they reconsidered their long-held view that war in Europe would involve theater-wide use of nuclear weapons from the start. Their doctrine now appears to provide that they woulduclear strike only when they had concluded that NATO would introduce nuclear weapons. The evidence with regard to present Sovietconcerning the magnitude of theiri espouse in this contingency is

suggests that the USSR's planning calls for Soviet forces to respond to the initiation of tactical nuclear warfareassive, widespread nuclear attack. In Such an attack, ground andforces of iho fronts would use tactical nuclear weapons, while the Strategic Rocket and Long Range Air Forces would deal with European strategic targets. As to the structure and training of the Warsaw Pact forces in Europe, they are directed toward the conduct of offensive operations "

' For further dUcuiuoa af Soviet auclear doetrlno. aeeWarsaw Pact Facet for Opera-nests in Emails',ECRET,. BS-M.

lhc Soviet posture amiEurope appear toertaintoward offensive action designedquick results, and toward generalwar. Thc Soviets may feel thatheater-wide nuclear responsepart would effectively deter NATOtactical nucleartoits own defeatonventionalmay also believe that theirto US nuclear attack would beeven in such circumstances.

They cannot be entirely confident of such an outcome, however, and manystatements and Iheir conduct Inindicate that Ihe Soviet leaders believe that general nuclear war wouldrave danger to the survival of lhe USSR Itself, as well as to civilized life on the rest of the planet. Concern on this score could inhibit them from political or miliiary actions in Europe which would threaten to lead towith NATO and, in due course, to all out nuclear exchanges.

The Soviets might sec certainintrategy of graduatedof the sort adopted in thc West. This wouldeadiness toore static tacticalreater emphasis on defensive and lesser emphasis onweaponry, and probably tlie acquisitionider variety of low yield nuclearA lew Soviet writers have discussed the possibility of waging war in Europe with tactical nuclear weaponsay which did not escalate into general nuclearhe Soviets' piesent level of tactical nuclear weap-

* It ishat thu consideration! of these writers, which are aanraaatd la fairly ceneral terms, are actually fceused on ths China theater. There the Sovietsear>uciear weaponry over tlwir opponents, whereas they dearly do not against NATO forcei.

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would permit them fo exercise someoptions shorttrategic strike. But evidently most Soviet military authoritiesthat it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to limit or conlrol nuclear war in Europe once it began. Their writings tend to evaluate NATO's advocacy of flexibleeither as misguided and dangeroussomeeceptive screen behind which NATO would maneuver Iore-emptive mass nuclear strike. In sum, then, while thc available evidencethai the issue of more flexible nuclear response is being weighed in the USSR, the same evidence casts doubt lhat the Soviets arc prepared lo adoptoctrine.10

C. Pressing for Lorger World Influence?

he issues of military policySoviet interest with regard to distantIhosc in thc Third World-are quite different in character from thewe have discussed above. Moscow's usual practice is to deal with the governments in power in these areas and to approach them by conventional paths: diplomatic tics,and technical assistance agreemaits. trade relations, educational exchanges,aid and training pacts. The Soviets have nol, of course, hesitated to employ clandestine or subversive methods when they thought these were useful. Until thehc military ingredientelatively small part of lhe overall Soviet posture and policy toward these regions. Since then it hasa more integral part, as the Sovieis have become involvedore consistent way in

" Wc do milherexamine, what choices lhc Soviets would have to contidrr. and what dechiun llwy might reach, in thc event of actual NATO use of tactical nuclear weapons. That subject is diseiused in NIEWarsaw Pact Forces for Operations

trying to project their military power directly into distant areas.

For the mosl part, moreover, this new tendency on Ihe part of the SovieU hasnot from the adoption of aplan, but Tathcr from the cumulative effecteries of incremental decisions made in response to particular circumstances in particular places. Their military presence in Egypt and their military aid rdationship with India are two importanfeascs in point. {See.hus thc broad issue al this point inview of gains made, losses encountered, opportunities envisaged, and risks foreseen in the Thirdwhether or not the Soviet leaders are proceedingore generallypolicy, one likely lo call for increased reliance on the instruments of military power.

Thc Soviets now have substantial ground, air, and naval forces which can be used to establish their presence in distant areas. This capability enables them to support political forces friendly to their policies and influence. Il may make it possible in some situations to pre-empt the actions of others or to deter their intervention. But Sovietto use force al long range against opposition arc limited.

Indeed, the growth lo date in the USSlVs capabilities for distant operations can be attributed in large part to Soviet efforts to meet quite different rr*niircments.Soviet naval deployments Io distant areas were, in lhc first instance, in support ofgeneral war missions, for example,US strategic forces at sea or developing sea-based strategic forces of their own. Thc growth of the merchant fleet has been in line with the increasing requirements of Soviet foreign Irade. Most of thc transport aircraft added to military transport aviation arelo improve airlift capabilities in theater

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The capabilities of amphibious forces have improved but continue lo be oriented primarily toward the support of theater forces on thc flanks. The USSR has recognized, however, thaty-product of these activities, il would have more and more opportunities to buttress ils claimorld power role equal to that of the US.

n the military planning side, theare now facing questions of thekind. Should they place much greater emphasis on forces and military equipment specifically designed for use in areas distant from Ihe USSR's borders? To what extent should they be looking to forces trained and equipped to fight in distant areas, aswith those more suitable forpurposes? Should they concentrate on items Uke bigger and better air transports, or increased amphibious capability? What kind of navy will they require in the years ahead? Howroblem will they have arranging for basing facilities?

here are many reasons to believe that the Soviet leaders are considering thesemore seriously than diey haveThey probably expect that, havingrough parity with the US in strategic weapons, they will be able to secure foreven wider political and militaryin distant areas over thc next few years. They are showing themselves more disposed to support potentially friendly governments, whatever their polilical complexions. They are demonstrating an mcreasing willingness to try to replace the declining Western presence in various regions, an interest which is all the greater when this can serve to block theexpansion of Chinese interests. And they seem to be particularly optimistic about the progress they havehope lothe Middle East and South Asia.

The USSR and Ihe Regions on ilt Southern Periphery

The USSR's conclusion of friendship treaties with Egypt and Indiand Ihe extent of Soviet military involvementin Egypt,oviet intention to give high priority lo the regions on its southern periphery in the years Immediately ahead. Moscowong-standing interest in these regions; the amount of attention it is currently devoting lo them may also rellect its recognition of the uneven results of its efforts in some areas more distant from its borders.

The Case of Egypt and theThe Soviet presence in theand thc Middle East (some SO surface ships and submarines in the Mediterranean, and0 Soviel personnel stationed in Egypt) has come about partly because ofSoviet tendencies but principally because of features peculiar to thc area. With regard to the particulars of the case, the USSR's deepening involvement owes much to the urgent need felt by thc Arabs for military support against Israel, and to Moscow's desiro both lo Increase ils influence in the area and toore forward defense of the USSR againsi strong Western power in thethis situation is not preciselyelsewhere in the Third World.ore general plane, however, the Soviet-Egyptian relationship does show how amilitary aid program, and increasingly strong common Interests, can develop over timeubstantial military presence, and liow the Soviets can make bold decisions once they consider the slakes high enough and their imerests and prestige sufficiently engaged.

"ore detailed account of thlt Subject, teeThe Uses of Soviet Militaiy Power in DlstaniatedECtlET..

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These aspects of Ihe relationship conceivably might reappear in the USSR's future relations with othei Third World countries.

Unquestionably, thc Soviets see both pluses and minuses in their military relation-ship with Egypt. Some aspects of the Soviet presence there are of benefit to Egypt rather than the USSR, other aspects arc quite the reverse. An ill-considered Egyptian move against Israel couldew conflict in which Soviet forces would be brought under' fire; Ihe risk of full-scale hostilitiesS-Soviet confrontation would be appreciable. Moreover, thc Sadat government often exhibits more independence of Soviet counsel than the Soviels would like to seclient state. On the other hand, thc Soviets haveong-term working alliance with the mostin variousArab country. The long-term advantages to their standing and influence in thc Arab worldhole may be important.they derive tangible military advantage for (heir own military posture in terms ofbasing arrangements for their ships and aircraft

India and the Indian Ocean. The main Soviet political interest in the area is clearly India. The Soviet-Indian Friendship Treaty confirms this priority andwitch from the policy, inaugurated at Tashkent inhich attempted to put the USSRosition of greater impartiality between India and Pakistan. With flic treaty, and with the USSR's subsequent material and diplomatic support for the Indians in the war against Pakistan. Moscow must feel ittrong claim lo Indian cooperation in support of ILs military presence in the Indian Ocean. It may be that Moscow also sees the more intimate relalionship with Indiairst step toward creating, overultilateral arrangement opposing China.

here is no reason to suppose that India, foi its part, has become eager to helpowerful position in that area of the worldrecent treatythe Indians now want to scrap non-alignment entirely in favor of all-out alliance with the USSR. For one thing, if any power is to dominate the subcontinent, they hope and expect that it will bethat Pakistan has ceased tootent rival or threat-Nevertheless, India remains needlul of Soviet material support and of Soviet backing to deter and counter any Chinesemore so because of strains in the relations with the US. These factors will make for dose Soviet-Indian relations.

Soviets are no doubt consciousis considerable potential formany points along the littoral of theand its contiguous waterways,Sea. thc Persian Culf, and theThe Soviets probably believe, forthe Persian Culf States face anfuiure and that thc withdrawal ofpresence will make possible somein their own influence. Withsome states in thc eastern readies ofOcean, competitiveness with tbcwillactor affecting theBut they will certainly not want toembroiled in each and everythe whole region. In some cases they.their interests best served by anconflict. In oilier cases, the Sovietslhat their clients in this area can,circumstances, engage inrelatively little danger of therebymajor power reaction againsidius Ihe Soviets have supportedbut have restrained Egypt's.

Places on the USSR'sIn seeking closer relations withof other states to its south, thchave considerable success in some cases.

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very much in others. Iraq and Syria,threatened by relatively powerfularc likely for example lo be receptive to friendship treaties with the USSR andtrengthening of military ties, beyond thclevels of military assistance. Hut as Soviet relations develop further with the Arab states, particularly In the military field, both Iran and Turkey are likely to become increasingly resentful and suspicious; neither is likely, in any case, to place itselfosition oflesson thc USSn. Even if Moscow shouldositive relationship with the lihiiltoin Pakistan, the embitlcrmcnt of many Pakistanis over Soviet support ol India will constitute an enduring problem In the

The Mote Distort! Areas

For tho most part, Moscow docs not see thc countries of the Third World whfch are farther removed from its borders as nearly so important to iu security interests. Soviet policies toward suchAfrica and Latin America, forto beand selective.

Cuba and. in different ways, Chile, are special cases. The Soviets will almost certainly continue to provide Cuba with high levels of economic and military aid, along with demon-sdative political support for tbe CastroRelated to this, the Soviet navalin the Caribbean now seems to becontinuous and is likely within thc next couple ol years to become larger. For the Soviets, those increased naval activities will also serve the purpose of showing that the US has lost it* exclusive naval role in the area Beyond this, thc Soviets will probably "show the Hag" more widely elsewhere in Latin America and, in the case of Chile, will stand ready lo provide new increments ol economic

and miliiary aid quickly il the needs of the Allende government became urgent.

New Capabilities for Distant Operations? What Kind ot Navy?

As indicated, existing Soviet capabilities for military operations in distant areas have developed largelyy-product of miliiary programs designed for otheras well as offensive. Now Soviet policy makers need lo consider how much effort and resources to devote Io military forces designed principally for use at long distances from the Soviet Union.

A key question concerns the rapid, long distance it .importation of troops andmilitary airlift. Thc USSR'sairlift capability has iucreased somewhat in rcccni years to meet thc demandsnd missions. Compared lo US military airlift, the Soviet military have about one-half the capacity, and much less abilily to fly extremely long distances.the Soviets cannot react as quickly and effectively lo situations far from their borders because they lack an overseas support

Soviet Military Transport Aviation (VTA) will probably be expanded within the neat several years. No large all-let transport has yet become operationalet-powered aircraft similar lo thes now being flight lestcd. There are also indications that the Sovieis will make an even larger )etsuch un aircraft would probably beIn both cargo and troop or passenger carrying versions. New aircraft will probably begin lo enter the inventory by tha-

lhe Soviet Navy is Urge and modem; it has aheadyiable instiument forating Soviet military power in distant areas. Its main combat power is in its large

force of ships equipped withmissiles and in its submarines. These ships are foundegular basis in all of the world's seas and Soviet fleet operations are basedrowing body of open ocean experience. The present Soviet fleet cana wide variety of functions in distant areason-enmbat situation. It can show thc flag anywhere in the world; it canhow of force in support of an allied state; it can provide escort for Soviet merchantarid it can reconnoiter and conductagainst potentially hostile naral forces,

oviet sealifl capabilities consist of merchant shipping and amphibious assault lift. The first is made up of non-combatant vessels which require some port facilities to handle cargo. The second is designed to land combat forces either in ports or across beaches. Byarge proportion of theirmarine lo military use, thc Sovieis could project large forces to great distances.thc Soviets will have to increaseof amphibious ships if they are tosignificanl capability for distantagainsi opposition.

robably the most glaring deficiency of tlie Soviet Navy for conducting distantashore against opposition is its lack of integral air support. At present, lhe Soviet fleet must depend on land-based aircrafl to provide long-range reconnaissance and alr strikc capabilities and to supplement fleet airecond, though less seriousis die lack of specialized ships for amphibious operations, such as assaultplatforms, ammunition ships and largo Iroop and equipment transports.

hese deficiencies will not be quickly Or easily overcome. Yet in manyontinuing improvement of Soviet capabilities for distant action can be anticipated. Some of this improvement willy-product of thc

expansion of naval, merchant marine andforces in support of their separate primary missions. Naval programs presently underway will,ring forth new surface ships and submarines useful for distant operations.

eyond this, there is the issue of whether or not the Soviet Navy shouldea-based fleet air arm. Recent statements bySoviet naval officers provide indications that the subject of aircraft carriers is now being discussed with renewed interest. They imply thai no decisions have yet been made but that Ihere are concepts for small,TOLcould serve missions particularly suitable to the Soviel Navy. To develop anfleet air arm would take time, perhaps Ihe rest of the decade. But if the Soviet leaders become convinced that their forces for distant

operations should be designed for assault

capable of landing and supporting troops againstthey probably will decideajor expansion in their now very limited fleet air capability.

In any case, as modest additions arc made lo the USSR's capabilities to lift and land forces in distant areas, these verywill tend Io strengthen thefor acquisition of furtheritems. As thc USSR further involves its policy and prestige in remote areas Moscow will have lo consider requirements for forces to respondide range of contingencies, whether lo prevent setbacks or to exploitWc believe that step-hy-step thc Soviets, perhaps without ever making aon tlie general principle, will acquire capabilities which would permit them tocombal forces in'distant areas.

The Question of Ooses. The Soviets,for years made propaganda capital over US bases abroad, arc facedilemma. They rcaliw that bases outside of Ihe Soviet Union have become important for them if

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hey air- to compete successfully tn thearena Tneir unsatisfactory experience with airlift during the aftermath of theearthquake probably pointed this up as much as any single recent event. They must, however, obtain these bases without making themselves tnrRcts for local opposition and the same types of attack which they themselves mounted.

Up to this point, the Soviets have acted with greatstablishing facilities for their naval and air power in foreignNaval units have used exposedin international waters for routineTliey have made use of foreign facilities for certain types ofgypt andong-range air movements have been facilitated by routine requests for tanding rights, fuel, and servicing. These have not involved the airlift ol large miUtary contingents.

The military requirements of the Sovirts for more elaborate facilities on foreign soil are clearly more likely to grow than diminish. Obtaining tho kind of bases abroad which would be most suitable for their militorywould be difficult for diem. Tlieinstallation and maintenance of any sort of overseas bases is highly dependent on the fortunate coincidence of favorable geography and political circumstances, as in the case of Egypt- The Soviets have been searching for

such favorable circumstances elsewhere and they can be expected to continue to do so.

Of the countries which could offer both the location and tho kind of facilities thcmight want, few would be politically willing to grant bases. So far, such facilities as tbe USSR has acquired have been granted in return for active support of various kinds to states which felt an urgent need for it against what they perceived as clear externalEgypt and Cuba. Wc do not rule out theof other facilities in Third WorldIf comparablethe force of nationalism will remain an impediment to thcof such facilities In most cases.

In such foreign facilities as they have or may get, the Soviets will probably accept the need to disguise their activities under the cover of indigmous installations. Or they may simply have to settle for cooimercially-based arrangements. If they hope to support anyeries of possible military activities, they would see great advantage in arrangements permitting their stationing of forces abroad not only to service air and naval units but also to provido security andresence for political purposes. Such arrangements will, however, be extroinely difficult to come by, and In mosl instances Uie Soviets willseek to acquire less ond reconcileto the limitations Involved.

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