DCI HELMS BRIEFING OF CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES 1 MARCH 1970 - JANUARY 1973

Created: 1/11/1973

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rclby to Chile, ttr. Okiiw, tltM oy teetiiv^rsiren inwitim fronit Tsitt

do not prupeie to dUouit tbe deteUn of our activity there, other than to point out tbatfall vithlnutllae*n previcrjely told that CIA bad oo cooooftlon vitb

tbe nllltary Old* ClWkfft In

CcroramotMAoiiene* leuobter) Bui, In too election*6 by Use

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dcaocratic political force*. ould odd toot, intirv ofoflinooy, there it no referent* to prototype,tern Theily*Isairof wf natiOMl policy1 on of

existence of fenocrnUc force* lookup toward future electiccu. olffo content tliot thic uafortu/vel* leak, once efala, rtJiejof bw v* are, to provide tbecoeb delicateiU exposure end CO^ej^ilttate vno pot tbelr

faith in ovir secrecy endbo Blent be coftUnplnUrigelntlco-soip In tbeatter, or ccorse, for tbe Ccatret* toar* erory rafiiriceullyoittioo-AiOl veMtvOeve. bina viO. tnat, Kz<ould be very ntppr totL'o

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Colby: iMHie, Kr. QMnw, Ithestablisheduthorities of Ve United States gcvernatnt. the President and the national Security Council and iv reported to the Congress.

Abnureilt: lflht say,s not reported to me.

Colby: That nay be but, Mr. Chairman, andaveelieve theirthould be reported to the Congress in the aahner tut tM Congress rstulls^ a. nut is op to th* Congress to entrain* ox it shell be dor*. Too are comet that their coverl *ct1uns, by definition, art secret, But, they are nol denied. Suae yeara ago, therehrase called "tlMlltJlt Ocnial' HeI have proscribed Wat ohrese,o not believe that we can tell the Ararlcan people anhlnU we cai tell Ihe Americanrus-steten*nt and deep Other natters which have to be secret, secrot. o not believe w* can tell theot an untruth. I'd like to call onM Borosape. bcrotagt; to Say. In youryou iay that. Itt rang* anw.ily that the United States hat so euch infemstion that It takes public, whereas

our potential adversaries do not. It stem tone that the title of that Strang* VKMly, or the rtason for it, Ii cailad democracy.

Tivt string*un tills Is Wttite toxtety In khicn the legislator* and the pecplr decide what art the policies that v> ondertate,hink that thei ncnple o* whet is nv.ior.al policy exemplifies wg point. Kstio.-u1 policy on oatters ofg or act* ofOy tht CcmtHutlon Is su^poied to Si

: least In conjunction with tha legislature. It la not definvd sinply by tht

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eKecuttv*. And the easy assumption that MltOMl policy is anv! natterWhat ht, taken us Into all of the apt we've foaoht and all th*e'vttMt decaO.

I 0uss,an addpersonal note. which ny be waswhat oat of ordtr. it'* very difficult for ne to be here. Partly, because I'm very pleased that you've agreed to cone.hinkonderful thing that you have deciflerj to face your critics. On the otherrw up In your world. orld of CIA interventions and or ftnerfca. trying toorld orderis of the generation that was directed to fight in the war in Indochina. id friends who fought there. ad friends who resisted. ad friends "tho were drafted. Nil of -fry friend* and nyseif went through that agony. For Mny ofot of these question* got out of the realn of being policy or somthing that you would argue about and were seea as criminal activities. For Bin, of us, itnyuestion of what the United States was doing* but ituestion of crinet that were being cornittefi in our nee* that we had no way of controlling, no way of stating, bow tire re were five years of struggle in this country because of that, of denoirstrations of agony. And one of the great problems for people of nry generation was that-there were very good

people who ranpolicies.

Robert tlacnaraarav-sber of tht ACUI ana many of us saw ourselves in heir positions, and wanted to be in their positions, end were agonized at then that good ptople could be doing these things in our narr.fi. oes* the questionould like to as* you is to gatotion of the fears that you have, or tie fears that you did have in your youth) DCCsuSS, 'or n?t least cany of fy friends, wooUlly different war*iview. He havetotally different set of fears and of'ispirations which at least incluC? sot? cinifKl principlesaviorould like our country tc fellow abroad.

CclDy: hink. Mr,he eni-fer to that is Mat* If fee every other

Cprerrwwntoo*k to support ard defmd tfto Constitution ofStates. Hyof the ation of thotates ft onethe duly established legislative.'Judicial, end executive bodiesit. Ihe various policies of the United States, national policy is not an It Is one which depends upon an annual appropriation. It dependsjudicial review of the Constitutionality of both the legislation and ofactions. At one occasion, you point out the anomaly. ad thefollow tbe suggestion of one of the individuals who spoke at this panel ofnegotiate an end to that

I had the occasion, last su-mcr of being in the recer-tlen line whenes rate, was over here. And President "ixon presented r* to Br. Breshnev as the new head of the CIA. Mr. Breshnev recoiledseme mock horror end'askedangeroushe President reassured hisigreed with the treaty on th* limitations onar that had just been sijned.onsented to Br. Breshnev. in a? first effort touard tveplt diplcraety. that th* tore we know of eaeh other thee hath will ba. elieve that. Wat'selieve In working in the Intelligence profession to hopefally increase the artvledge of ocr leadtrsM? about the problems la the world. |

It Is clear that, thanis to some of the intelligence work of the past torrV fifteen years, we nowrcene nt which depends upon th* fact fit w. ee* rwito-the Soviets are complying with It or not. ltue'-lon ve were unetile to do uhsn our Intelligence was so that we had to ask for on-tbe-gTO'jri in?Wtionihat the leersad In n, youth ar* rery similar to the ones yog had. Hr. ftorojaoe. V? probably Paced the problarational tn-eel

and war it about tbe sane age,aced it egain.ln the Vtetnaw situationpent three andalf yean there working on that problem in the best wayould for ny country.

Unidentified eieaoer of the audience: kov tsany did you Milt

Colby: I'd like to answer thatidn't kill any. (Audience laughter) I'll tell you the answer to thathe Phoenix progravn was one part of the total pacification prog ran of the govemnent of Vietnaa. There were several other parts: Tbe development of local security forceshe neighborhood to protect the villages; the distributionillion weapons to the people of South Vietnam to use in unpaid self-defense groups-entureoubt that nany other government* would try or would neet with, the success that the Vietnamese did.

It alsorogram of developing local village and provincial elections and giving authority to the tlectad officials thereof. It gave decisions about teenoTile development progress in the localities to the local officiels. Thertariety of progress of this nature, including the tnducenent, reception, and resettlement ofletnenese who had served with the Viet Cong andone over to tho government'S side and were received and not punished for whatever they had done. It Involved the reception and resettlenent and eventual return tosecurity inproved, of hundred of thousands of refugees- And1 ft Included the Phoenix program which wan designed to identify the leaders of the Comsunist apparatus that was bringing terror and invasion to the population of South Vietner.

The Phoeni* program was designed and started in8 In order to bringof order'and regularityery unpleasant, nasty war that hadariety of things to improve lhe procedures by Which that vas run. procedures by whicn tht Identification of the leaders, rather than

followers, Mem the objective of the operation. By which tha objective nev lo capture n* -hao to kill, the meabtn of the apparatus. By which there were Uatlis pieced on IN length of Haa of detentions end the procedures for interroyatio*.

unidentifiedof Ihe audience: lew auay were killed while roe were over there?

,:ay. tified on thataid thai oter tmalf years of tho FhjtitU progreo thereOX captured; thereOO defected; and ther*0 killed, off those killed ware killed by regular andforcesy police and similar elements. The vast wajorlty of those killed ware hilled in Military combat, fire fights or ambushes, and swst of the ronalnotr Mere killed in police actions atleaptW to capture the*. The avsjor stress of the "hoeoU progre* was to encourage the capture for very sensible easy reatooi.

Tirst, our respect, not the tawuMsti, our respect for hesan life, where it can be gained (audiencend secondlyive captive has Information

ead body has none. (Ptnl SaXua)

Unidentified aweWr of the audience: oroer colleague ofshew questions?

Chairman: txeuse awinute, please. ilphtit stakes it tougher to shut ye* off If you say that1 wonderould Hb* to do is alio- the panelists their chance to question and then followingould like to ofTer tha av-l'ex* aa ooportiolty.

Unidentified newt*of the audience: Hr.ork in clandestine services.

ChtirsHh: now that. If you'd penult ne to do that I'd be very grateful

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Hansom Kr. Chairmen, I'd Ifte to ask V. Colby to conent lurther on thlt quest! ol tne statu ujry-aetho.-Uji of the Central Intelligence Agency to engage In covert operation. hat statute om and orer and over, and It does say whatd It says with regard to other duties and (unctions related to Intelligence affectl tne nit'** *- 'ty but it seeasouot acre flexibility In that and pe'Ucwlerli the wort "Intelltgeice"ser of th* tngllsh language would find In It. will you comment further oo whether you think that Is really en ideal itatanent of statutory authority that does not leave any ambiguity*

Colby: hink that history over the years has given that deliberately generalreat deal of content, ft great deal of content that has been ratified by the Congress and ratified by the eiecutive and*hasto, shall we sty. notlittle public attaatioA, and without any change being nude in it.

Chairnen; Congressman Harrington first; tht woman here the second fromI don't Mow journd then Hart Halperln and then Here Renin,

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Harriett*-: Nr. Co: By.ould, leturn to the country of tn* uvea. -problem basically Isouple of broade say at the outset that I'll SUftdave of two reading* of yewr ceatlnov an* enviously not finding itl* as you do day to day. Itery hard to have ern "politicalai Indeed usedl 'ni, la go to th* credit given you. was very candid discourse as far as tha Clft operation in

Chile. Let ate alto say.ay this onlyon't want to ba deterred fron

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hink in* central concernad with this all along is. that your historic intelligence gathering and evaluation role is oneot only endprs* but.MU, acceptegitime* facet of ag?ntyandUfkt, free a

1 iu--FOlcprriptctlw* of watching this unravel suggest that nybr It is thrchat you-peoplvbe going unless you want to witness tholeoratlon of your credibility overall because of what Is going on. Butalready indicated in your aOdenftro to your prepared marks,to address spec. fppJ in your testimony to Lwclenn Aprilne ot least get Into the question ofhin* is the fiction of was lwclen Medal, or were the tnforaujl earteri o* the Amrfstrwitwre that oversow, at least theoretically the CIA role Ml thte Chile, informed wit* that degree of specificity before April ZZ of

Colby: elieve tr. Nediiather recento that 'chairmanship, but over the yearsariety ofbal coanlttces and individual congress-and senators have beenwere nade aware at appropriate tines tn the period of our covert action activity. This was done according to the procedure set up at that eriodt each periodand as you know weound-up recap every now'- end thed one was ooe for the House cooaltue. Ihere had been preriovs total round-jp recaps for other coenltEeeS Ol the Congress well prior to t'ii tine, and. In fact, right after the coup

hurrin-jt-m: Veil, if It wasas By efori to obtainc yau on theAffairs SuS-Cowtlltee br'or* which youi1hethsr or not Were was the kind ol language you have chosen to US* indicating frank and substantive infomalion being given to the ccerr.ittee. ButBt rake thr point that Luciennas first given Iht eMfBBttWln of theprior loosely structured apparatus

at tnt Armed Services Cone it tee level on the House sloe, and It wet apparent to me. in tne "forty eight pages of your testimony, that the Information being given hi* that day was unquestionably being given to him for the first time by the very nature of the responses and by the very absence ot anything really short ofould paraphrase as being Colby monologueertainly Interested andegree end on occasion Incredulous and rafterl M i'i act, the audience es for a* that particular testimony consisted frankly of Hr. hedileober of the Congress, yourself, Hr. Phillips and Hr. Slatlnger,ould say that that really even falls rather short of what would pass for the dinansion of Armed Services Sub-Coanlttee oversight.

You've indicated in general, too. that your efforts, at least as they were reflectedhilean infer fron that generally.'were to keep the State Department informed at all tires of activities that were conducted in the carrying out of .fiat you characterized again todayirective given you by the executlYevbranchhe course of their Constitutional oandate. wis this particular situation that you have described in detail, either going back tos or with nore relevance to0 Allende period through the latter part of last suuaer, followedatter of practice in keeping informed various embassy department personnel in Chile during that period Of tim-? ake specific reference to fomer Aebessador Davis, toAssistantouty Ambassador Slatteraen, andariety cf other people who might bo loosely in tho category of those -ho would be.art of their* State Department discipline, responsible for letin Anerlcan affairs in genereT--JscJe Coupege, Ambassador Designate ta Greece; Charles Keyor.hink was his predeceisor in that role;Kr. Cory tho was the forner Jnbessador to that country. Do they fit within the purine of whet yoj have indicated? Vas an effort to keep Stats De^a'tnent ntrssnntl fnforro* of these operations that you were, mandated

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. Colby: nswer several Questions, Br. harrington. on the question of eporting to the emitters sod particularly your reference toeportlnt to the.Lattn ftne'lean Si^Coonittee of the Foreign -Affairs Ccmaittee.utlined in toner^ detail at that lino where ditcwisea itsome length, our reports to Congress rimti on three lewis: Then oocn . t*this oreoaperable exanplt. where wo can. without divulging our operational methods and secrets; we also report broadly in executive seiston on the substance of what is going on in tha world, and that particular hear lag that day was arranged for that purpose, to try o report generally on what was happening, andaid at thatas not prepared to discuss our operational activities in Chile at that particularas prepared, and so indicated in our conversation,as prepared toany operationalh the constituted sob-eonmitteas of tha Armed Services Committee or the Appropriation* Cconlttee,id so.

ecall It. Mr. Marringhin* thereouple other of thaOR the Aprilvent. I've forgotten precisely who they were and how long tbey spent there, but with respect to the question about clearance with State, the feparwent of State through the Deputy Secretary of State,ember of the Forty Coawltte* who consider* and approves the .artows covert action direction that we got or approvals that w* get.

ino state Department, at do the rest of us, handle thisery strictly ceooartaented bests Offering the nerd-to-know principle for tho reason for Uniting sharply who should and who should not knew. Well, obviously, each riepe-toent cetera that for itself. There ar* occasions In which that* ratters are held extremely tighrace avaiUblehep* to the principal cancemeC. There are other orcailo

Inbroader group of people, including the Ambassador and including others in the State Drptrtnent. are wed* available. * netust can't say right ncv,en* available to nhieh Star-fficer at this particular point.

Harrington: an. just try toittle bit further Into that question. Perhaps the more Interesting part of voorn wit* Hr. nedit and those other members whose names you OOr't uwecer thlt efterrow. -ho Bade hp tha aub-tommitte* on inUlUgencc oversight

Colby: enw*fr their names. I'm not sure If they were Mere. Harrington: ran to the netnod you used to operate in the furtherance of this hind of an activityeliave,ould roughly paraphrase It without being held to exactness inou indicated that It was usual', or customarily the case to Inform and to include Stat* Department personnel,ssume from that at. the reasonably ranting level, in the country tn which tna operation was to be carried out, first because it made relationships easier; second,egree it avoided problems of attempting to of necessity go around then; and third, andan infer that lhe method uf operation as far as getting approvals usually ran apoareatty son* sort of Joint chain of conveneould suspect that the CIA could take, at least as you describedreat deal by uay of credit in the initiation area rather then necessarily just beinq at the execution or the furtherance level. ay thatant to read, just for the take of not expecting that 1going to get anyjyjre directnessave had. statements made on three occaiions by three separata Individuals all.Of whom were directly concerned arllh Chilean policy on the pert of thlt country's government before corigressi&nalover tn* course of tie lest

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fair. -The first wis beforeae>lttee. ee Jure iHb of this year by Deputy Ambassador or Deputy Chief Slettere^n. 'Despite pressures to thend Iquotingtht United Steles government adhered topolicy Of non-intervention in ChlleVlnteraal effeirs during the Allende period. thet policy remains in force today.*

Let ra- reed secondly from leittuony given to theonnittee last spring. Again, given by former Ambassador Cory, quoting. 'I sild il was obvious Iron the historical record that we did not set In any dinner thatard lino.* This is with reference to Chile. "Ihe United States gave no support to any electoral candidate. Ihe United States had calntatned tha vest total herds off the military policy91 conceivable." And so on. her: the and let ee read one nore significant paragraph In view of your testimony. The United Steles didees to pressure, subvert,ingle ireober of the Chilean congressany timehe entire four years of lay stay. All of my instructions cane fron State In that no hard line toward Chile was carried out at any <tne."

1 could read the last of former Intar-Anerican fabesssoor Hoyer'a but itthe same lines. "The policy of tha government. Mr. Chat nun. was thatbe no Intervention ir. the political affairs of Chile. Me were consistent infinanced ro candidates, no polttlcel parties before or afterh

It is obviouseitpparent discrepancyscat they are stating as officials of the United States goveraent. and what you have testified toession before, as you call it. relevant house wb-cormlttee,ouldecldrop to this quote, If needed, the cedents from Senelor Symingtonqq tha; iwr* KtribuUd tc hlc In this mining's "Keshingion Post" indicating that as

twwbar of the Senate structure for oversight, staleoents rede by yourself caaeurprise tc Ma as to the degree of InVclvenent In this country. ay Ithink it does fend to nate the point both of the fietioa of oversight and uf IH. at least,f the troth on the partariety Of State Departawnt officials that have appeared before eo*gretilonal ccvwuteet over the court* of Che last year.

Colby: Hr.n prepared-to go into the CIA there inefore the proper coenutees. * prepared co go into the CIA operationsetail before any other menbers who are brought into the matter by the proper comalttees. m prepared to change our procedure if the Congress decides to set up the structure tn another way- Until one of thoseespectfully oust not geturther discussion about th* details of our activities there.

Aboureik: rierightuick point before w* go onuick question by Fred Bra af nan. It scansL* covert activities arc nevert advance with anycntnow of. how, if itiscussed with Urien Kedil or Stuart Syirlngbon. i'm not aware of It. hink this east recent Chilean thine Indicates that is the case. Tou say. Nr. Colby, that you are prepared to discuss the Chilean operation before any appropriate comite**that's over with. Kt are always talking about what the CIA has dort two or three years, four or five yean tn the past. ou think it night rotood Idea to discuss what you are doing now. at this time, even before th* appropriate cowitteei? Aidersonally/lould like to se* you go further than that If you are prepared to call what you oO cower: activities national policy, then shouldn't th. nation be brought In. If not on specific Mtters. at leait on the general principle ol whetner the nation approves of assetslnattor (audience applause)dots the nation approve of CIA soensored goverrcent coups, of nany things ofersonally (slight applajse)please hold- of nany things

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ot of Americans H'iWl'y disapprove of. If row don't wont to Ulk about the specif tc activity, the CI* will not evenabout the central principle of These thlncs. iaan wouliln't that be in appropriate Batter for public Delate to establish wfielhtr or notpecific Chilean operation or tbe Cuban

operation night be then national policy?

eg your pardon, Hr.hink that ny presence hem ajezgij. stratesm prepared to talk about covert actions, and I've talkedunch Of then.

Aooureik- an just Impose on the tm of the panel and follow this upColby: As for discussing future events, many of then cannot be predicted In the futureanter of our covert activities have gone onumber of /oars and Coring that nunber of years there have been periodic appropriations, see* of whichsed for some of these operations, and when they get significant enough, they mist be covered in the appropriations process. id state that to Hr. Redil In an openew weeks ago that there are no secretshat particular tub-comlttee or the corresponding lub-coenltue of the Appropriations Cornlttlt. noni.And thatesponsibility to respond to hisositive respon slbility to bring to his attention things that he night be Interested iniave undertaken to bring to the various eoenlttees our current activities so that they will be informed of what wo are doing.

Aboureik: Let' you this. Did th* Chetrman of the oversight committee knov infhilean operation*

Colby: TZflo-js of our Individual actionshile over the years war* reported at tha: tie* and In scrre cases before t'e funds vere eipended to the appropriate rAtlvtaSb of tht committees Involved.

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Aboueeik: how. are you responding specifically lot disclosurehe weekend?

Colby: Ho. I'm not mpcndlng specificallyon't want lo talk about trie individual operations. n girtngeneral principle. an't say thaty dollar tlut CU spool In Chile wai Individually approvedhairman,an say that th- major efforts were known to tha senior officials of th* Congress as establ1sh*d.

Ahourert: ould Ilk* to refer to the weekend disclosures of th* Chilean action, the Chilean operation by the CIA. was that specific action, wai the knowledge of that action provided in advance to the supervisingf th* Congress*

Colby: Th* action disclosed by hr.nter ow the weekend covered the period fron IBM to. elieveave answered Mat question in ny earlier answer.

Abourert: ender if yov would repeatnd cessultK It so thlt -Colby: That at various tines during that period, the major stepsbroughttie atteartlon Df th* chairman or appropriate members of various of these cejcesUlies.annot say that every individual instmee waa brought lo Mem, bjtf discussions between CU and senior metier, of Congress which brought Mar. up to bet* with the feci that Wis occurred, and was occurring.

Abowrtik: ent to have on*pecific oveitlon. If the newspaper storyStem tn We "KashWctont states0 was auWoriiedtee Chilean Congress aftfsftret lice wes faced with deeding abetu;en Allende and tne opjwsUipn candidate. Just for esanplt, didwer.-Sot?

Cotoy: Hr. Chairman, with great respect, that falU within the category of the details that 1'ai not going to talk aooot.

Aboureik: Is there anything la this story that yon would be able to either earn or detyT

toiby: ent nsteseber every deuil of the story, butight at tbe musstot.hink I've node ny position dearo not want to tail about the details ot our operationhile outside ot tho duly constituted corral tiers of th* Congress.

Chairman: Mr. Fred Branfman.

Branfman: Hr. Colby, putting slide various arguments over what actually happened in operation Phoenix and given your under standing of what did happen under it, if you were ordered by the President of the United States and the Rational Security Council to engage in such actions against either Americans or other people in other third world countries, I'd like to knowou would have any moral objections to it?nnd*r-tand where you aright have some legal or you don't think itithin your charter, butoral point of view, whatvould you have any noral objections to 1t7

1 mm partiolorly intriguedtatement ycu made when yem testified before Congressbout the An Tri sentencing procedure whereby Vietnamese ar* sentenced to haa yearsawyer, and you said you wouldn't want to ijf These legal standards (palled to Anerlcani, although they were beinj applied tot moral distinctionsoral point of vie*nderstand thet could mean different thinjsbul are there any moral implications to that? oral point of viei what arc the distinctions between what we do to Americans nnd Vletnariie end other countries?

lkt lo know whether, since Senator Symington told youvour confirmation hearing that "we are gettlnj pretty ski of being lied to"he's on the oversight eocmittee, do youif we don't want to take your word that there oreeisrnle the CLA is not now Involved in paramilitary activities In Cambodia, tf we don't want to rely simply on your testimony, nothing personal here but thereot of fooling that over twenty years CIA diiwors hove lied to Congress, even by people like Symington, do we have any moans to discover this* Do we have any way of nndlng out what you people are up to other than having to take your word for it?

Andust want to know if youhat your understanding is of the fact that so raany Americans are sick and tired of what they understand the Vietnamesethe CIA is up to. IBhether It is your infers tamding, as nine, that millions of Americans are opposed to any kind of assassination projrans. any kind of police programs, any lied of ettoaptl to overtbrov foreign countries or influence thepolitical practices in foreign countries in that if and when the CIA does this.t your understanding, as it is aim. that thia li repugnant to nit Americans aad. in fact. IS being carried out against the will of most Americans'

Colby: Hr.onsiderable degree of itofeity as to whether anyaneonopoly of norality. (outbreak from th* audience)

Chairman: I'd like to ask the audience, pleate, itown the proceedings hs-e. It's all right to be happy and everything, but pleaseerrwtt the question or the answer. ould be very grateful. It wouldreat deal. Please proceed.

Colby: With respeel to th* question (boyl the fee process under Vietnanese 1e*

dvice o'o standtould hope tha! Clears

will Wtre th* aenaflt of due process Including Ihe advlc* of counsel. As(omar

f the lor *yt*lf,ronotionel device, but I

think itery useful one. hWavsr, in Vietnon there were only two hundred lawyers.

, Httle hard to Vet advice of counsel fur every person arrested in Vtotnaa

under those clrtusistances. endariety of other activities were conducted U

try to inprove the legal and procedural aspects of the Phoenix proffrna.

As for the oyestlon of how to check onhink the front benches bare of the

pressuperlative Job of showing us and catching ut whenever they cao. hink

mat the various neftOcrs of Congress and the various staffas they travel

theyhance to ask our people what's going oo. Ibeyeel of

Wtse people. Tnereot of other people who are outte willing to bring CO'

th- attention of the public or to the appropriate authorities any wrongdoing by the

agency or an/ contradiction between what we are duly authorised to'do undsr our"

crnstitu'tlon and what we are not duly authorixed to do. hine,

that ary exceptional effort to us* CIA lainproper way srfll cone out, and I

have tailed lomployees,ave told thn that ft is ny conviction that

If iir.ybac/ tried to Bisuse CIA against the Anerlcan people that CIA would explode fro*

idth-'r.ould thinkood thing.

CUiraee: heaty

Stiin: hatot of people Vree say that ut really

t* the effort of Senator harrlngion toull investigation into the

C/iilfeifr thing, and we really encourage hln to continue" with

Herrissjo*; Ifcank you for the pronation, nancy.

Stti:: t tor* ataterots. The . of latin ica

!.n: hanf the comequr-rcei. foreign polity andrt:tor*. PV

[IA activities have led to th* overthrow of governments In Guatemala. Braill,now Chile, the OeUIH of which vow know better than any of os, Kr. Colby. Hi goal, the CIA bas infiltrated,ttempted to destroysocial, and economic lim of the people of the third world, fjtay -Mir- tie know that the CIA conducted the training of

foreign police in Texas under the auspices of the Office of Public Safety so that They learned to make bonbi and conduct terrorists actions against their own people. He to about your operation Phoenix In Vietnam which resulted in. you said0 people eurdered. and similar progreas elsewhere, tut all of these program won't wort, because ue are talking her* about> of the people for their

aTaTeaTi

osr indrpendtnce and self-deternloation. In Vietnam, the people ar* continuing to dsf the United Slates ulllUry and CIA apparatus; and, despite setbacks, the people In latin America ar* gaining strength every day. The united States, in fact, has bed to resort to the imposition of Faciit governments around th* world because of th*f the peoples nov amenl.

1 wait torief portion OfOOCumeet written by sorse organisations In Latin Antricahink represent the interests of the majority of thahere, and they are lendingstruggle against you and the CIA epperatus that you represent.

The peoples of th* world live under the permanent threat of the nott eggrettiv* irwialisu that has ever existed. They hay* not bean indifferent to the organised

genc:lde directed by yenkee imperialism wains' (he heroic pecple of Vletsee. his unequal war, whosetill nol extinjulshad.lBgeren: end treecher

character. imperialism has been fully exposed, but to this war ll has once

shown that in spile ol all of their miliary peaotr their jjrslfl 'Utfik

my,

y?'< confronted bypeople Prepared to fight and be free whatever the price. Tba '

Latin American people from the last century until today havetring of

BTilitary Interventions and unjust wars executed and fermented either by the (forth

e^tlsatlooa4

American imM forces or the Tn*re mis the plunder of Heii

the occupation of Puerto Rico, the Intervention In thefeVi Bay I

*i

of Pigs, and euny other acts that our America does not forgot andever forglv;;'

There is Shell, Esso and Standard Oil, United Fruit, and ITT. thocr.

. vith Paw SlMiton.xnrl.0uo kA Slraataa,

Secfcefeller and Mr. Ford, and there is theno*

olby, have left Indelible evidence of the oppressive and overpowering

I

polteies of the United States against the popular novtment la Latin America. There s now the conclusive awakening of our people that is setting Into nation millions and millions of people and is moving toward our true fndependence for thellumination for the unjust capital lyate* and the establishment of our troe

1 just want to say to ypu, Kr. Colby, that the best answer to allour policies the policies of the CIA. It fs going to be the will of the people who are going to win and that we know that yew will suffer eventual defeat, (audience applause)

Chairman: Hart Halperln.

Colby: Kay I,oint of personal privilege. Mr- Chalrtwi. Hiss Stein, you setdaid0 people were murdered. id not. Justified apparentder of Mr. Hltrlcne. on't see hew you can. Said that the ClA conducts genocide. It does not. You said that you hoped that the people wouldgree with youhlr* the foundation of our country is to itl people.i,inr the people of this United Statesoheir freedom protected.

thai roan: before going lo Mori Halperl" whoant lo follow op on that with one question. Is there anything that the CIA hu done oversellyou "OJld not do In tha United Stales? (audience outburst)

Colby: Hr. chairman, of course. h* are engaged everyday oversees in tryingthrough aecret( clandestine ooc'sltons. Hatters which ere kept

Illegal, ln the closed societies and countries thatart in and in some of tne other countries that we share this world with, thereot of illegal things, according to our standards, done overseas,hink thisatural aspect of the fact that we liveorld of sovereign nations, each one of whichrotect its own security.

Chairman: onder if you would answer tne question, what things would you do overseaswhat things wild you do here that you would do overseas andersa?

Colby: In the united States w*et of things which are perfectly proper and legal. Hearge number of employees out at Langley who do research, who Study, who learn what ia going on in the norld and try tn nek* the best asiaianent they tan out of it.

Chairmen: fiewse me. Im th* contest of what we ar* talking aboutllegal activities, what activities in the covert operation do you engagerseafthat you would approve ofhis United Stales,etter way to phrase the Qirertlon?

Colby: aid That, in ry prepared statement, that CIA milt do those things thata the United States. id not say that me had aoy authority lo commit errr.at inlateseny thildoany such ewthontj and we have given vary strict directions ta our people that tney win not.

*

I-.S-

i

i

t

Chairman: Bui you doactivities overseas (tigt would be crimes In this

pap

.

Colby: Of course. Espionagerime In this country. Chairmen: Other thanolby: Of course. Chairmen: Kalperlh.

Halperln: Mr.as encouraged by your sUtemtnt that you nowegitimate question whether we should, given our currect perception ofengage in any coven operations, hod then your additional sUtenentdo not think abolishing such operations,nderstood youajor impact either on current activities or or. the currect security ofStates. onder whether we can assume that that statement vas mattother things, the currect situation in Greece in mind. Specificallyo be the use. Greece may well beovernmentdecidesfrom HATO and eliminate American bases, would your statement still hcXd*elimination of covert actions would not affect the arrramt security ef the Do you believe that American Security interests require or justifyIntervention toreek withdrawil froti HATO ani has tha CIAthe fort* CoamK-.ee or do you expect that it would propose to tha Fortedesigned toreek government from carting to pouerto withdrew from tUTO and close American

Culby: aid in myo not think that covert actionstheof covert actionswouldajor effect mn our current activitiesmall portion of our tolal activity. id not thini It vould hove an Imed'ate adverse effect on the security of the Onltee states. Inatifferent questioi than sftetmer ary psetleuler situation might be in the met

Interest of the United State*. Oneally do not think It It very useful foe ': iw to discuss in this foru* whether any particular proposal should Be made or should net be Bade about an Individual covert action. hin* that exactly (alls within the catrjorj of those thingselieve, ifo coeoUct covert actions, should be conducted within those vary restricted circles In the executive and reported to those very restricted circles in the legislature which can enableto be done and still be kept secret.

Kalperia: ust follow that up with one point. nderstand yev correctly to say that while there Bightet advantage for the Intervention in

Greece, that you were not prepared to discuss, but nevertheless the statement that there would not be any major Impact on AjiitrtcoPi security if we did not conduct covert

operations would apply to all of the world including Greece?

Colby; Hell. I'm thinking, Kr. Malperln. of the fad that the current SUtus of

tha world is Sach that it does not look that we are on the brink Of ar, serious damage

lo |ur country at the monent. Thehink, will still stand whether any

particular covert art inn takes place or not. at this time. Chaiminr Mark Raskin.

Raskin: Kr.uzzled byonceptual questions. One was.threat* was. whose interests ware really being se-vrd laow you dt'lnednd along thosen the last generation as you know.

the Rockefeller fe.nlly, the Kei-on Rpckiifvllt/ fnr.iiy, been verydifferent form of intelligence activities o' the United States. Is It coingthe case tut Ihe CU. unscr you- direction, will continue to

various of thes-cerperallors abroad either as cover* or be

ISVOlvtC' arlrJS thrm inua*. Int. fiaaW. ho- do ro. UtwJ.ocs

4 j

m

the ipency intend to dent with the question ol conflict of Interest? Will that be mo* public to "Congress and the American people?

Colby; if Mr. Rockefeller is conflmed the Vice President of the United States, the CI* will respond to hi* at the' Vice President of the Unitedb-.ever th* authority that suggests sonethfng to us. we are restricted by oar legal authoritieshat we can do. and we are not el-en any privilege to engage la conflict of interests with anybody. id indicate in ny ccevfirwntion hearings,elieve le sllll hound by it, that if anybody asks DC to do son-thing whichnproper and outside the proper Haas of authority of nyo Qui te* prepared to resign and leave it. ?

UlkU: 5oes that wan then that theCentraler.ee Agency will not es* various of thef the Beeaefeller corporations, as cov*rs around the world?

on't believe thais*ful subject to discuss.et beck to ry responsibility not to talk about the operational details of ny agency.

Saskin: Let ne Just add on* ecreo that. then. Did th* Central Intelligence Agency use m,over in Ollla?

Colby: ould say9 not propose to discuss the details ofo not want to getituationay. no. no, no toooestions and then have to say no canter: because the answer is prettypoint. hink it ouch nor* usefulust say no to th* whole ran af

Cftalmen: Daniel

Ellsberg; ave two brief questions thit do not relate to yourr. Colby, end theran*. Ta* tin*crrett thet you

have testified publicly that the Centraldid have Information about th* lamlnemt overthrow of constitutional government in Chile whichailed to pass on to th* constituted onvernxcnt of ChlleT

Colby: oubtestified to thai publicly.

El'shens would that ba correct?

Colby: what Vestednet quite swr* right now. It'so seep up with the*, (audience laughter)

Elliberg: Mould you tell ut that now. If that's the case, sir? Colby: ill tell you is tnat sine* so eaich hason't have much problem saying it, weeneral appreciation of the deterioration of th* economy and political situation In Chile running Tht situation wet getting worse and worse.ariety of wayspolitically, economically, socially and all the rest, and that at varying times during that year, we had Information which indicate,oup night take place. On* did take place as yo. renemberht'endfhinkas. which wai an aborted effort end which was put doira right away, weeries of other reports Indicating various sUpi towardoup, me were not Involved with th* people who were leading anyorts, butid have Infonsittca about then.

Ellsbirg: Did you pais that-information, .sir. to the elected poAiernnent'of

Chile the constitutional government night be about to be destroyed by the methods you had Information on?

Colby; It's my responsibility to report such infoi-reUon to the authorities

B

l*f>

EUsberg: was ft passed on to your knowledge?

Colby: Itolitical action whether to pass that on to another country or no*.- Thatolicy decision for the policy leaders of our country.

Cllsberg: To your knowledge was that policy decision*naCeins It pasted on?

Colby: o not think so,annot say for sun.

uestloo, sir, isthis should rely on open Information in your capacity as director of Intelligence, I'd surehat is your best estiiaate of the number of people who have been killed by the present regime which replaced co-is ti tut tonal government over the last year? four estfeiate of the number that bev* been imprisoned, and of the number that have been torturedhat period?

ould rather not use exact numbers, because I'm mot sure of them.at the time was that, in the fighting that took place at the tine of thesoar-hereDOeople killed. It is also- ourthere were very few what you might call executions -i- very fev. There wwreto-.it that. Itot my responsibility, but thatact that happened.ntlitary government that broughtbout, howannot tell you.for sure.for the numberave no|

Cllsberg: Ho Idne?

Colby: o not hove an idea of the number that were tortured.

Cllsberg: Have you reed esttaates, for exanple bynternational."

Colby: ave read various papers on this subject.

disbar;: But your agency has not given you an estimate?

Colby: There njy uell be oneust can't recall it here at this mo-ent.

Ellsbere,: finally, on this tram, have you asked for such an estimate? *

tolbjr: sted for esiltsws about ths'other twoave not asied

j

fir thaton't attot of questions thatp In our intelligence tiilnc:;. Weather large and efficient group of analysts who serve up the answers to the obvious questions around thehey may well have mede an estimatem not familiar with right here,aid.

Ellsberg: ry sir. taat this wit not regarded as an obvious question in the govermwm. an make my eomjrent, referring directly to your renarfcs in tbe Ugh, of this last information, we now know at least tone of the people around the world who put faith in the secrecy of our government and whose survival politically inwn country depends on it. They are the present leaders of Chile, and thty are hot alone. That follows Immediately from both of your answers. o not take .satisfaction In that particular result of our secrecy.

Ir we went around the world to find the Other leaders mainly of closed socfties who rely oo our kind ofon't think there would bo much satisfaction anywhere. But perhaps that does relate again to your rowrk that yoo regard the'* leaks of that information to the fcrericanevelation of Representative Harrington's euremely responsible letter, which was Initially confidential, you regard that ai unfortunate. ope you are the only person in the rocoi who sincerely believes that. egard it not onlyortunate end essential piece ofersonally have nevereport and none was ever preicntefl'Hn my trial, interestingly, or any of the other trials,ingle lea* In the past t'fjnty years that did in fact injure the interests of the people of the Unitednow of none of the violations of this secrecy that has com to the American people thatot .either neutral or beneficial to the constitutional povernnent in thia ccjntry. and tttanpts to describe leaks such as psrhsps leaked by Kenry Kissinger on Seltrrioly serious are simple cover dories, bat thatetter

of opinion and yog nay knowcounterappen to have been eery influenced In ny life by an intelligence success of CIA forn nappy toow credit. That's not hard "to do Ot.c* lid*. Tour paper tried to direct attention, very understandably, to the Intelligence fide of CIA. but If you had followed the accounts here you would not haveritical commentthil conference on th* Intelligence siderrltlral coments could be made.

There are nany secret, closed locltlethe worldan't thin*aietne secrecy In nost people's opinion serves those Interests of the people of those countries or ours. This conference bas not yet produced criticism of attempts to penetrate the secrecy of those countries. Oee was very spectacular. The Ovschev secret sp**cJf6 which, since it was to th* credit of CIA they did herald and let it b* known that CIA hasil* I* the aegeliltton and publishing of that speech Itvery beneficial in its effect.

Thertine in ny life when ay wife asked eeoped to achieve by leaking, by revealing, information to the cHiieni of this country. She happened to believe throughoutas exposing nysell to possible attempts to kill ae by nonber* of the govemnent or attenpts to beat re up. which she didn't want to see. hought those war*.not dangers, from nyn the government with gentlemen .likeid not in fact believe that was th* way we operated. Parenthetically, She .as correct. Tbe nineo people who can* to beet ne up on the steps of the ' lpltolhis City en Ap-llho failed because they were the sane people whs had been sent to the Bay of Has. they didn't beat re ao. bet the ones who were lent to beaterery cai* foraer. experienced, contract employees of the Central Intellijence Agency paid for by ca"is*1gn funds. One cf then. Kr. Karllnei. IS ycu know sir. vis. at that tinr* ninth retainer from the CIA which he

renal net) on until he wtt later caught in theionth later, beint, paidsame funds. So the wasn't wrong.udgment of competence is another thinglent she was correct. However, ny answer to her as to why she said, itbatmost you hope to achieve by Boing this in the face of theseaid, .In my ownopeong period of time that this might have aeffects in our society f Xmschev secret speech

about Stalin's crimes hid on various communist parties around the world after 1PS6.

Br. Colby has told us. you have told us, sir. that you. to this day, findtrange anomaly that weentral Intelligence Agency and its intelligence sideo get things like this Rruschev speech in Russia whereas most presidential speecheshis country are free and. Indeed,,where the pentagon papers wultfoe acQutred for tenay. in* that Is extremely calnous that yoo findtrange anomaly. You told us you understand your oath to uphold tho.Constitution; you have alto told us by that statement that you have no conception of thi Constitution which you are swom to uphold. The facthat the oovernrantal, secrecy which threatens the continuation of American democratic institution, the survival of this 'country; It's not Russia and It's not Chile, it Is the secrecy of the united States government of which youart, (applause)

The'm going to ccriruntery specific proposal that you haveara Currentlycaking. The law to which you allude, which you have currently drafted and are proposing, very reasonablyuld appear, is designed to reduci that ancmalous difference between our society and the governnent of the Soviet Union,eplore and will resist.

You mentioned Is it nat reasonable that officials uho have signed an oeth of

Ellsberg: bell, it wouldtatute for classification under cfrcuastances orlet n* put it to you,uggest dra-ting for your law that any such agreement, even referring to contractual things such as Mr. Harquetti entered into, should alert ev*ry citizen of this country that he Is In no way being called on to conceal illegality or crlnlnal activity. Certainly officials do not understand that now. which is why, to ny knowledge, no member of your agency under your control, provided information to any law authority of the Illegal activity in which your agency and Its officials was going along with; an! I'm sure that in doing that they felt that thoy had no right to do so as contracts that they must keep secret those illegalities and trines. Any future ag-eenent on secrecy of any sort, even contractual prcvtdinj for firing, if you brea': It, and 1 certainly could hive been fired, there was no

jestion of that, should nake it clear in the futon; that it does not protect Illegalities- may find it psssibie to reflect that in your drafting,ilialon; one. I'm afraid. Since your levyour lewlet me put it positively.aw wouldid. Vpurlfl make illegal what Mr. Ksrc-eitl

'secrecy, as ypujseve andid and others here have, ba punished when theynjl oath. ook back on those papersnd you have signed and recall,idhileecall that there was nothing in thes that said explicitly you will keep secret any infornatlon you receive no natter what evidence it provides of Illegality, criminality, aggressiven oi* the Constitution. Under no circumstances will you re.ee! it even to courts or even to Congress under penalty of firing. If that was Implicit,hink your lav mould make that legal, your law would establish

did and whatnumber of other people here hire Cone The question ti oo ator not. Whet would the effect* be? It vould make us ejorc like countries There are alto other countries in the world. even til* England, that arehavesuchents. The country from which weevolution tofrom that sort of law. Usirst emencwmnt. England does sot anddoes not. Since we don'tow, tp

a conviction of aeourt of law. as go.ertww.nt lawyers understood. Therefore, they. in their words, to deitro, nc in public and to try ma In public.

how those words were said not bynot two retired cmployea* of CIA. they were said by then act ire officials of CIA. as part of the effort to get am. Poor Kr. hunt wai Hired by the numberseouest was tide by Mr. Young citing the authorityrlithmann and Kissinger tosychological profile by CIA. Tht recaest was made for Rr. .'elms then head of CIA whilehink, were head of Operations, made directly to Helms. Helms agreed to do this, and I'm quoting nowocumentead 'rr the first time three cays ago,ind extremely enlightening. Senator Baker's Minority Report to the Watergate Committee. This is the Bantam edition of the Watergate report with the addendum of Mr. taker's reportart toouple of paragraphs from that. Het of further Investigations In this,ish to propose precisely that those Investigations be carried on with you-coaperatiem, Mr. Colby, under subpoena and with contempt proceedings without yavr cooperation.

Mr.hen,etired erployee. agreed to this but said that It was extremely important that CIA involvoreni not be told. rofile ues th. provided. I'm going to make this factual thlrg brief. I'm going to ask for about three or four minutes here. rofil*rovided and did not do the Job. it wai rts.rdetl h, "r. Ytun; as unsatisfactory. he words. -Mr. [llsberg actec

fir*.

Out of patriotichich did not serve tie purposes end another meeting was sent back to CIAJ." As many people irow, later tne retiredr Hunt, went

H to Dr. Fielding's office,former psychiatristtMreat Oil of

. 1

CIA material> and with several.operatives, one of whom was on the

Current payrolliof CIA. Mr. Narllnna, currently reporting to ter. Me

are told by CIA, officials that h> did net tell hit caseafcl doing

but the actual transcripts of those conversations has been refused by CIA to Senator

taker.-

ad accepted the statements try Nr. Helns and Mr. Cushman thatnpt know what the retired employee was doing with that equipment. Senatorshows this very strong conflict bet-een thair testimony and the documentstestimony of other CIA officials. Someone hat committed perjury. It itwhy no perjury Indictment has come out or why no CIA person Is carrentlycurrent cover-up trial under process, but theish to quote isoad this paragraph onnswered people who asked ne did hrlms,CIA know what hunt was doing with theiraid no, there wasthat they knew who Dr. Fielding was although they had photographsname on then, but they didn't mate that connection at farnew andread that tnstiaoay. ead

-The tea tinnyfilm was developed for Hunt in CIA. It was of Fielding's office. It wet reviewed nothis is new to me, "not only was the film develoMd but it was reviewed by CIA supervisory officials before it was returned to hunt. One CI'. official, teens to be tho head of the Deputy Chief of the Technical Servicesn. who reviewed the fllr, admitted that be loond the photogripbs Intriguing and rKOgetiedo be of southern California." fain trees In then. "He ther.

ordered-on; of the-photographs to be blown op. The blow up revealed Dr. Fielding's naoe in tht parking lot next to his office. Another CiA official, tht bead of echnical Services, testified he speculated they were easing photographs, this was on Recent testltony has shown the CIA official who revievtrf these photographs. imediatcTy reported their content to Cushnan and bis assistoni in the office of the Deputy Director of CIA."

Againaid, one wore quoteould have still said that CTA did not know who the Fielding was in that photograph that they were providing for Huntead this paragraph on Sunday.

Cnalroan: xcuse re.

Ellsberg: ave one no re paragraph Senator.

Chairman: onder If you could make your point, because we twit to get to tht audience yet and allow theoe have several nor* panelists who want to ask questions and the audience hasesire to do so.

Ellsberg; The pointere. "Thereeeting onh"this 1s

one Itage 7SIhis book. n which both Howard .

Hunt and Cordon Lldoy participated. They told tbe CIA psychiatrist that Ellsberg had

Been undergoing psychiatric enslysls- Hunt and Llddy discussed with him their desire

to 'try Ellsberg in publie,"rende' him the object of pityrokennd be

able to refer to Ellsberg's 'Oedlpal complex.' The CIA psychiatrist was given the

njn* of Dr. Fielding as Ellsbnrs's psychiatrist. At the close of the

that's Jutipinj ahead. "The psychiatrist has testified that he uas extremely concerned

Hunt's presence ttrt retsarks, hs so reported this to his CIA superiors, both in

betting or,rior to the casing operation.j^

beCklsi tiithstad learneJ.of his concern and were autre.'

i4fcV

il

] think it can only be inferred from this. Hr. Colby, that whether or not Hr. Helms and Hr. frshman knew of the uses of those miterlals fro* the moment they handed ft over, fron the aa-ont of the casing operation, end before 1t. Tney knew thet, in the wards of Howard Osborne df your agency, "a* who. cltltmn end who IS currently under IndiCTneot, tens violellnj both tour statute and the laws of the United States otfwjrwlse, had been subject to atasing eoeratlon using your equipment which you did not take back, and was probably about to broken into for reasons your agency knew very well becauseas to provide dataefaming effort. In which your agency wasull effort. Mr. Huntiaison from the white House. Vow statement in this paper, loemrirlnj those events with

fatafa

this statement. The factetired CI* employee becctm involvedCO* illejll activity in the United States should no moretc.eliberately deceptive itataoent for which your presence here todayuppose, in part that is the purpose of It, to continue that cover story, at least that TS the effect of your statement.

The clear Implicit ion, legislative, that follows from that is that the Watergate investigation Is not over despite efforts by the current President to continue it. The proposals in this document for the continuation of investigation ot CI* involvement by uetcrgete Coartittee and other committees which are very precise, is shSlfi follow Immediately. Obviously that is not be:ausc of the unfimfJ done toas not indeed damaged. The attempts tu makeroken nan. as you Can set, failed like th. Bay of Pigs and like the attempt on the steps of the Capitol.

however and Indeed, it uculd be obscene to regard is criminalreek in toJ^rican tltiier's office ind take no criminal action against the break inht'lrrttUOt of a* Mf country, ofneutral country, Cambodia, with iM.n: tons

it*

of bombs. ery practical step, we con start with your cooperation in this natter, sinceee here on, "The CIA psychiatrist so purported It to his CIA superiors, bothemorandaeeting on Access to th*of both the psychiatrist and his superiors has been refused to thishe Watergate committee. ee also Colby letter refusing

access.

1 believe sir that youot to answer for. Hot very snich to ae, very little, but If what the Centra) Intelligence Agency officially was involved In sJiowlnglyertain point, can result in Investigations and prosecutions which will enlighten the Awrlcen public and.teduce the difference between this society or preserve the difference betweenhat yoo find so anomalousthis society end tne ones you operate against abroad, I'll be very happy to-be party to that.

Colby: Hr.ointed that anomaly outact. lso stated that

Ellsberg: Describe it as an anomaly, thatas drawing at'entlon to.

Colbyi Itact of Ufa. Itn anomaly that the world can have secrets of those that can destroy us. and it is necessary for us to penetrate those secrets to protect ourselves. o think that the existence of. this anomaly deal not. In na way.ermit it to be used as an accusationo not support this^Constitutit noro not understand It. nderstand itndsrstand ny

loyalty to it as well as you-

Ellsberg: We diseyree, sir. Wcifferent undent ending of it that is Wry clear.

Cclbj. fine. Kith respect to Senator Ba'.er's Investioalion, esetast to

cooperate with that Investigation. Me had twenty four of our agency witnesses testifyoluntary basis and answered questions under oath. We provided'seven hundred. CIAages of testimony. n prepared, at any tine, to go further with that Investigation If the Senate decides that it wishes to do so Unidentified voice: Why did you destroy the tapes?

id not destroy the tapes. The tapes were destroyedarteriodic process going backnd they were finally destroyed2 when Mr. Helns left, he destroyed the rest of then.

Etlsbtrg: The falsity of that statement, sir. is revealedis sUtnentish to point out one pore sentence including your noneenator Baker's report.

Colby; nswer the Other question that you raised? Tou referred to the presence ofcontract employees and so forth in the various kinds of Incidants that have cone up over the Watergate.

nisberg; PardDnurrent one, sir, Mr.

Colby: tot ne finish my phrase.ay. Nr. Ellsberg. And the presence of one individual. Mr. Martinet, who had worked for usull-time bastsong tine during the sixties, and7 we terminated that relationship andetainer relationship ofonth with Mr. Martinez so that he could continue to report on certain things in the Klani areathe Cuban exiles

Mr, Martinez obviously did not liveonth. Kor, did tie expect hie.expected him to do other things end he apparently did so and some of then And apparently some of then ucrc

Kith respect to CIA's knextedg; of the events surrounding the break In to Dr. Fielding's office. It is true that some of.-our equlpnent'wes used in that regard.

uA

_end It ii true that!hotograph* of that office, not because of tn*is handled, ^and on* un criticize thist's easy tilth hindsight, tk* factt tn* various individual pieces of information ear* pot la different conpartotnts In th* agency and the? were not put togetherelieve it net too- tine in January or February, when Dr.e ceno out andei jour psychiatrist and then the brrel in and ell the rat of It. Th* -hole thing was put together et thatnd -hen it his put together re reported uhat we haoe had already offered to provide all that Infornatlon to the appropriate autnorlties prior to that tine.

with respect to the question you raised about theouldpoint out that that law would not apply to you. Dr. Ellsberg, because thatthat it applies only to inforaatlon relating to Intelligence sources anddoes not apply broadly to classified material which Is. what you ire accused.

[lltherg: Am you aware that officials of. go-rtrraaeM used th* cords, 'Intelligence, intelligence sources andepeatedly ehirlag my trial?

Colby: e aware of that,ay that this lawarefully designed so that it will not applyhird party but only to those of us who take the obligation toecret of sone importance to our country and secondlx^het it Isbefore any prosecution or Injunction can be obtainedthat the povemnant suit goudge and justify that that classification Is reasonable. ontest that any Judge trauld issue such en authorization. Injunction, or go onrosecution, if the matter leaked were the factrine or the fact of tone, illegality. And It is precisely for that reason thatrticular i'rovljiostlen Into the lawgree with youot of Ihlacs ths;

!

dd "ot send people to Jfttl foe Just because theytamp oa then.

hink that there era tome tecrctt, some pood secrets,aid tn my statement.

that deserve protection in the interest of our country.

lUibe-e: Sir. tha purpose ofhink there has to be,ay. onequoted free* this report with your raae tn it. to test the honesty with..v jporting as thlt date In our history the Involvement of your agency

this affair. Senator Baker lays. "Our investigation In this area elao produced the fact thet contrary to previous CIA assertloni, tha CI*igorous in-housa

I

Investigation of the Watergate vaatter starting, almost InncdiaUly aftar the break la.executive sets lea testimony of personnel security officer no. 1) As one eaanber of the security research staff stated, they warntate of panic. In ISoveabar and Oeceroer? the eaecutlve officer to the Director of Security was specially assigned to then executive Director Comptroller Colby, toery secretive investigation of several natergtte related Betters. The Executive Officer to the Director of Security was Instructed to keep no copies of his findings and to mate no records." nteresting footnote.to.your assertion of all the documents that CIA turned over.

Colby: ive that Instruction.

lllsberg: "He did Ms own typing and utilized no secretary-" (Ixecutive session testlnony of the executive Officer to the Director o* Security) Olderser work In your office for thlt purpose, sir!

Colby: There uessecurity officer assigned to help aw to gather together the infornatlon aboV. this incident, and he's the gentleman you are referring to.

tllsberg: And mere hit findings turned over toitr or thetef'

9

it

Colby: Ibc finding* and the question becamethe Question between Senator later and myitis wit. .eip.ct to additional papers refers to certain papers which we die not aute available to Senator eater but we did Bake available to our oversight cociittees. And. i- the lineave talked to you about earlier today, the e_ ten which get into the details of oar legltinat* operational activities,ean legitimate ones, were not turned over outside the proper oversight committees.

CWIBlW: Excuse ote. eel ly have to aove on. Dick Barnett Is Hr. Colby, I'd like to askeneral prfnciple question. do you see any national security Ureal that would Justify anyat this time in any third world country,efine roughly asin Asia, Africa, andno conceivable capacity to

endanger the American people here in the unitedre there anyoperations in those areas that you see at this

Colby: There are sane. yes. ould not like to go further into detail about It, but there are seme, yes.

olic* up on that and

Colby: By security of the UnitedO not oean that the cepitoltomorrowem the position of the United States Inand in the world'

sk you toittle bit more specific about that?

Colby: 1'a. really not trying to play manes with you. Voat I'm trying to say

here is that there are certainhich today are not en imediate danger to th*

United Stales but If allowed lo grow cmerious problem end consequently a

problcci to the security of the DMiftf

Jirrett: Aid you cannoteneral exsmple of those threats?

Colby: Well, in line with ay disinclination, to put it mildly. Co talk about ourould rather not do thathis forun. o this regularly In the proper forumentn authorised to. (audience outburst)

Chairman: Mr.

erman; on inal does not concern details but doesatter of general policy. tateaent, phrased really by Dean Rusk sore years back,ch he refersasty struggle of the back alleys of the world, and thereiore explicit stateaent In the "New .York Tines* some years ago. Thtyerson who was referred to as one of the best Informed men on the subjecton't know who It was, as Stating that when we catch one of then,oviet or other foreign agent, it becoaes necessary to get everything out of them and u* do it with rw holds barred. Row. I'd like to ask you In the light of those statements. If you can conceive of or know? of any situation in which torture Is. justified. Also, if you were aware that torture was being practiced in the Phoenix prograo, and If so. or If not but eterely suspected it. what you did?

Colby; elieve that If you'll look at1 testimony with respect to the use ofaid,till believe, that It Is wrong; It is, secondly, ineffectual, becauseou wnt to get ti' intelligence you use bad mterrcsatlon ret rods and you will learn what you want lo hear rather then whet is the truth. And that unless you use sensible interrogation natters, and that doas not-Include toituro. you are being foolishrofessional way aside fros being lanoreligher level.

Colby; I'M. Tou rrjy recall in that particular sat of records that thereirective issued by Jtacv headquarters,rafted, which called upon any* advisor of thend this was thousands of Americans, and particularly the Phoenix advisors, that if they found any ^propriety of torture, assassination, or so forth, they nere not just to turn away and walk away and pretend It wasn't theirs. They were required to do three things. They were required not to have anything to do with it; they were required to go to the officials who were involved in It .end object to it; and they were required to report 1t. id see such reportsook then up with the government*of Vietnam,n awaro of occasions when punishment was given to the Vietnamese officials Involved.

Slatterman: Wasolicyant to emphasize that I'm not stating Itact. I'm Just earnestly Interested In your views here and answer. Was olicy to use torture in th* nationalorget what you call it) Detention Center or you know that building In Saigon. Wasolicy to use third degree nothods. torture, what have you, to get valuable information?

Colby: ho.

Unidentified voice fronhink beying, (applause) Colby: ih* gentleaan asked ee what the policy was,ay thet was notolicy. In fact the policy was against 1t.

Unidentified voice from audience: ould Justersonalas in the State Oepertnent during this tire and we didn't get anyfficial reports of torture. We did read the newspapers, and there were effort*

to get out very specific telegram about that and attempts to make It veryhat none of those things should happen,an tell you that ft was Irvnsnsely difficult to get out those program*. Some went greatly watered down in terms of what we should do about It and .how It will be taken up. and there were reports that Justice was meant for thefiennral. too. by ambassador Bunker at times, but that was sort of my Impression

f-rf.

Colby: That nay be your impression. I'm. speaking of my own knowledge of whatid. id Issue such directives,id folio- then up with the govermant,o know that pon1trw*ots were given. ; ScpvDle: fir. Colby, Just one quick question, the time is late, but the agency on theink, has had many kudos and wax people have thought tiiat their work in the intelligence collection and analysis field has bean very useful end worthwhile and one which. goverrment really seeds. On the otherhinks obvious, not only from what's going on here today but OJherhat the agency has comereat deal of criticism because of Its covert operations and activities, and you, yourself, have said that you don't think stopping them would have any major effect on national security or the operations of the agencyhole at this tire. ould like to asl. whether. In view of that,hink really one canase that these covert operations are interterlp-ey with the legitimate intelligence collection and aisalysls operation by the effect Uiey arc- having on the attitude toward the agency, wouldn't itood Idea for the agencynce end for all, to divorce itself frOT. these covert operations?overt operations run bs continued,hirl, thereeel questiontner they should, let's put them In soae^othcr agency or putn sore other

place, but let's gett heve OA oo the joh that it really ought to b*

i'i can do in the intelligence collection and atalysit are..

Colby: id. Dr. Scoville. wasr ileal of the world slteetion and our nalictial policy. we are mot spending ouch ol our effort or thlt kindroblem, me are keeping our musket and our powder dry la the clout, end thliivert u* fro* -he major functions mo As to theI > the! there cenegitimate need for this Mod uf operation. on't heve any bureaucratic feeling about -nether It should or ahould not he In CIA,now Ihet various considerations have been given over the years as to whether It could be run scmnwhsre else, and It has been generally believed that It Is Impractical to do then anywhere else.

StQVillc: an't believe you couldn't out-those peopleeparate agencyColby; o know that there was an attempt when it first started in the early tKO't to run iteparate institution within CIA and this led to enormous opereilorel difficultiesvjBWr of countries becauseonflict of connection between the intelligencehe ecttxi people.

SceriHe: m familiar with that but on the other hand times have changed; and. as you pointed oet. the valo* ana tue usefulness of these operations has no. dropped way off and rtsratlally what onn is dj.r; Istandby capability and. in view of kt ii.tertirra.eeand not interference because II doesn't occupy nwen of**your llne because it doesot of your tine. You era having toopmifth mfce th* kind of th.n3 you are hiving to do today, and its Interfering with

eortly of the agency and haw it's looted at in terns of the information it

i

predusm,hink it iseal harr to the agency,onder whether pir shouldn'tewat that.

.sir-

espectfully disagree with you ooirnan: liell Shoehan.

KT. Colby, Oft* question an your stetruant that sone o* thefis Mould* this country, la view ot that lUtartat, wouldthe activities oversees If CI* officers were nade Subject to federal lawscountry for their activities overseas as, for eieeple.n subject to Ml natter where they serve? Or could CIA

ay to operate overseas within the Units of federal lamas it's told It rwst operate within the limits Of the OCIUT

Colby: Tow ar.ery conollcatcd legal Outs Hon. The Tici Is thil IfOfficer oversetsrtaae against the United States ooverrueot, Bebe punished in aon> fashion or other)hink thereertainthat he bears to United Statea1 lea* oven while he Is servingIIvery murky legal problem,hink that an SaaeHcan CIA agent Isfree of United Statat law once he leaves these shores.

Chiinsan: John Karks.

'.ivtmi Kr.eleive yonthe flelinltloeioorort

a secret iccemntlun Into another cotoitry'a Internal eJfarle. of covert action lociudcurflhry, subversion, eaattanhl of lempttemt au^Aerltyttee tad lb* rational Security Coanell. you imel thoae,*in tbe aca of natiocnl

Cileyi hinh, :ir.h> nan of an atcalo buoh ie Justifies InOfBiaouriiy,hinkfrom therej csa do Lireasceehief toetaenSltjr of aelfe one Oftaa

rtl't* rtvetcx'OrtU reef for aece fctret of actios. i an imnewaamfAleai n a. kittle mti it.rrfWE. tu; t'sere

as

.is tsral to conduct actions in self defense in such regard. Harks: But fn peace tinea tine such?

Colby: There are lots of fine points in this argumentrankly would think that this is not the forum to discuss *the finer philosophical points. ave basically answered your question.

Chairmen: Congressoan Michael Harrington.

Harrington: ad two very specific questions to go bach to. On th* question of the congressional overs lent function which you regularly find yourself retreating to when ft comes to carrying out yourntil yesterday afternoon was Senator "tennis given the substantial kind of briefing of the kind that WES given

Con;ratiran fledif that you are aware of during your ten-ire of head of the CIA On the question of our operations in that country on the covert side?

Colby: Senator Stennls. as you know, was out forear after the attack on bio, and during that tiae heouple of briefingshink night hove covered that problem. rankly would rather let Senator SteiwHs speak to the problem, but he was out of actionesult of the attack on hln.

Harrington: And again In the sane tine frame of your tenure as Director ofdid you, prior tenform or brief Congressmen Kedri in the sane or with the safe degree of specificity that characterised your briefing to hln on that day%1th motet to the covert operations Of the CIA fn Chile?

Colby: ried to fceeo Congressman HeCtl fully advised. hink that we obviously go into greater detail on any particular probier. as Itore and noreroblem, ue did brief thatI can't say right no* when arS in Khlt depth at any one tinsav?-'tried to keep the ccoralttees Informed Of

I

our operation. avo responded to an/ question* that they havt at to further information,eally ought to let them decide whether they have been adf-avately Infonaed by ee or not.an: David Mis*.

Wise; Rr. Colby, backresident Eisenhower denied thot the CIA was engaged In activities against the governnenl of Indonesia, and earlier than that Secretary ot State Dulles said that during the tine of the uprising in Ouatonala that the situation was being cured by the Kuttemalans theatselves. At the tie* ofe were told by thethateather plane that drifted orer the border. Al the tie* of the bey of rtgs, Adlel Stevenson, who wasresidential candidate, had te He to the whole'world byover Story Into the record of the United nations,hink he always regretted. More recently wa havo tUtament by high officials of the government that there was no Intervention in Chile.

esent being Had to by the ooverncwt.onder ifand 1'a surfother citizensoswjtr if this lying doesn't make the Cost of covert operations too high; andnderstand you to say earlier that there will be no tore lying about CIA operations?

Colby: hink, Mr. wise, talking about what happened Infl seeve tried to Indicate that tlnri have changed. Were they have ehenged. and we are trylnj to adjust to the new -orId that we have hare and that we are trying to respond to the African people ana to the Aoeri-an Constitution in the form that IS (unacted of us at this tine. Ve are endeavoring to do that. and.id Say,bellruiar.m/ tell the fourteen people en untruth. ay, on occasion, have Xien* nittm secret and no* wrtlon It.rievetot feasible

ir w* cv-rtat (fcrlflmfat'tc un thepeople or Ms leyTOentetlves an nntruth either In open or tn naial.

:r Then doesn't that mean logically an and to covert Ho> can you hava tKon tf you don't lta about theaiT

Colby: Because you don't hava to talk about then. And you don't have to leak about the*.

Chalraan: Nark Pas tin.

in: ust hare son ihert questions. Ar*ine ulth attecptlng to readjust your policy? Ar* you prepared to hare the budget of tn* CIA stated, both theand the covert tide publicly -In tbe federal budget, and secondly, are you prepared to send other people who represent the agency and tha agamy point* of Vieu to go out and tndeed debate In town eeettngs In different district* of the nited States oe the utility or (he efficacy of having cov*rt operations so that indeed you find out what, as Congress thould, the new nood of tha fanrlcaa peopl*nny view you will find that what you have been dolngis utterly Insulated. That you havo been operating In the eontoatolitical andy of a,ouolitical and economic oligarchy that has nothing at all to do with tht peoples wishes and needs at this tie*, (audience applause}

Colby: With respect to th* budget. Hr.ave Men asked this cjoestioiotal figure for tne otsget.are said thats*ingle figure on* yearine would noterious security proolerr. But that.ou conttnuec! Iteu years, you could draw trend lines. Vow would irwcdletety arouse the question, why did It go up, why did It go dom. what Isode up of. and you very quickly would be into tne detail of It. This natter was debated in the

on ths fourth of June e' tl IS year, anf it vas turned dan-.tne ideeasr.ol* of SS to

o* appearing around theave appeared inm-fter uf places. Various of our other officers have apoeared Innurbtr ofumber of our officers have attended associatione spoken in Los Angeles, Chicago, and Hew Tor*ariety of plates, and the aasuer is yes within tbe Units of the tine available me are prepared to ua out aei Ull to the America* people and that'sa trying to do right here.

y. He hove two more panelists' questionsFred ftranfnann and tort Halperin. At that time unless somebody Is really insistent on the panel. w* Mill go to the audiencehile to get torn* Questions from then. '

irst.

Irenfmenn: Tell me. while you ware VIetnan. was it the frequent practice of the South Vietnamese "atlonal Police to carryoutere many peoplepeople shattled in tiger cages on Un San Island? Ard.nderstanddon'tonopoly, nobodyonopoly on morality,hink w* would liko to know what your oorality is. What li the distinction, are there any things that you have doneietnam that you would not do elsewhere and would not do herelr/t,oral point. nderstand th* legal problems. What Is your morality?

Colby: orality is to try to helpetter world and nota eerf*ctr.

hrsnfmann: Was it the practice of the national police to torture

Colby: The second answer to thai question is that It was not the eomon practice. l>ot of adv'.ior; around and throughout the police and throughout the other si-ut tares In Vietnam. There -ere exceptional casesalfl Inrepared 7 Thtj- werexcept tonal, ard tgtinst policy, but they did*

I've Mid tAat. And tne answer to vowr question, were Here ttetr cages on Unland. tne answer Ii yes. Mere there shackles tn the tiger cages? Ves. Those tiger cages were built during the French time and have been used ever since.

Irenfmaae: Hr. CelBy, youust violated -hat you justittle anilethat you weren't going to Ita) as Director of the CIAnto* that this CM now be perfectly well denomtrated to your or anybody else's satisfaction Watet common practice to be tortured in Vietnam, and acre that you know it and you have Jest lied after sayinginute ago that you wouldn't. hink it's disgraceful, (audience applause) Colby: espectfully disagree.

Chairman: o to Wort Halperin, Cpn^resvaan Harrington has asked remission to be neusco. He has to catch an airplane to his district. ant to thank him very nue" for his appearance here. [audience applause)

Chairman: Wort Helperla.

Halperin: onder if youapleln to us by whet authority and by what criteria you decideroperly constituted body of the United States Congress is to which you have to ers-e- questions. The Senate Watergate Canalttee ws established byot unanimous vote of the Senate of the United States end directed to Investigate Watergateand related natters. enber^of thatember ot that cornlttee asked your agency for information, and yet youold us that you gave him -hit you worr.rd to give him and drew* at information thai yov would onlj provide to duly constituted and authorised cemittees of the United Steles Senate, now, es faran tell, thatuly authorised cemlltee authorises tot info-nation. As farm aware, the Senate cf the Urates States he. never voted that the Armed Sertlces Cmtnlttct or tr* ciriitUt are th* only comi tteea whleh should get that infomaiion. ^

onder IT you cow Id ftplain writs that gifts you the fight to sty thit Wisis suthorlied and thit the Watergate Coamittee Is not.

Colby: Imerely follouing tht precedent established by the Mouse end Senate orer soarears.

h r tIf you' '1 eiieuse ne. the Senate Watergate Committee was never established before.

Colby: orreet that there Is no specific reeoletlon of either the House or the Senate that tats up those particular committees, but la thes those sjbccnrnitlees of theCaenittee and th* Armed Services Committee of the HoA.tr and of th* Semeta were established as our proper oversight and review committees. And the practice grew up. overears, "that we would only speak to those and not to the others. Thereeries of reccnwivdations presented to the Senate and to the House over those yearshange In thatach of those suggestions was turned down, so that the standing arrangement then continued.

Ka'perl*: tut. with ell respect, that's for thepolicy of whet youtell the* generally about your operations,on't understand whyarticular area by an overwhelming vote of the Senate requiringaid^er. By your logic, the 'BI and *vrryof the goverrrawtin

many cases only answering to their appropriations committee or their authorisationsteeiiould have said to the Watergate Committee, we're sorry, we're the FBI and ae only answer to cur standing ccnoittees. These other groups understood that this is en exlreordt-ary situation; that the Senate had overwhelmingly authorized this e'treordinary investigation, and thato ne to supersede twenty five years of practices without aof the United States Senate, In requiring the agency to

tr

rauoaa to the Questions of that cobs ml*.

Colby: It It ti rearsueeer of *otrs reconisenetag change uhicb were never got.

Hllperln: lilt sever authorising the practice, sinply failing to change It. Colby: Th- "ht. Thf fact 1s. however,m prepared at any tine to change mis process. At any tine the Senate and the Routeo do so. not giving anything away; I'm ratrely reflecting the Coostitution.

Put the Senate directed every (snifterevery part of tha executive branchto answer the questions of the Watergate Corolttee. And now you *tp saying, no, youpecific resolution telling you to answer the*.

Colby: n sternly sayingill ccrply to the any the Senile warts to arrange the oversight of the operational aspects of the intelligence business. Therepecial legislation which indicates that the Intelligence earsfncsiery special business. n Charged in statute with the protection of intelligencesources and nelhods against unauthorized disclosure,n prepared to changeceoure at any tint the Senate and the house dlterertna to do it. Until thatave to follow Both the tradition of the House and the Senate and the specific directives .of the statute Itself,

Chairman: One noreDie* lamei a the panel.

Carnet - Br. Colby, do you consider the covert operations in Chile to riTP

uccess?

Colby: hink that that falls into the category of nol taltlog about It Is hard (eodience laughter) to say whether it Is sucteiifelwithout talking about what they were. hey were one thing,successful. If they mere anitnerthe,

-

Barnett: w not Asking you to connect Oft the opt ration** I'm asking you tot on th*-results. Let ne put to youhink based on informationave tht results were, endould like your evaluation as to whetheruccess.

Colby: would pertiai . you * Barrett, by sayingeiterate that our policyhat time was to loo* forwardictory6 of tlie diweratic forces through elections.

eiult of the activities

Coloy: ita. notesult of our activities. The coup had nothing to do with our agency.

earnet . The failure to withhold Infornatlon which you had from the constitutionally elected gwerment, veilltary dictatorship which has repealed,two operations of reforms in Chile, hasysten of reforn which has evolved under conservative and christian democrat $wvrm*nt, Utituation today fn Chile hfiere larfie parts of the diddle class are considerably worse off than under the regfe; that succeeded ft. Weeg/ira so itwowpetent that ve have tens of thousands of people literally that are on the brink of starvation, forhink the United States and yuur agEivty in particular* nust bear some responsibility.

Colby: Vith dueisagree with you because our appreciation of the situation in Chile and the analyili of the situation in Chilethat the couphile, the nflltery coup, was brouon about by the policies of thter^iint, which so nixed up the situation In Chile that the military decided to act against th* goverivient. Uowt we did not Ivava anytninj toary

t$maChile, esdr> not think thathi' the multl th* moltCI* or th* Uni'-d

Hfloerin: *r* you really siying. In line with the policy of candor that you lay that the agency is atteeipttng too tell us that the activities of the agency in sopport ot hostile pros: 'n ofn support of direct support of arwd nationalist giwpshile, did notirect effect

on the atmosphere which produced the coupT

Colby: aid that our policy was to encourage the democratic forceshile to sustain themselves in lookingictoryhe elections. Thet ie whet our policy that <ui what- activities were aiated it.

stalperln: Slave you.esult of whated Ineview of that part of the agency that devalopt plant for eacojragiiv] deoccrecy In foreign

countries?

Colby: Me have not given any aillitince to Chile since the

chalnran: Kr. Peek. Colby: Other than certain fundset n* correct that (audience laughter)other than very limited iteais that were con*]tenants made prior to tha coupothing to do with the period after the coup and will have nothing to do with the period after the coup.

Pea: Kr. Colby, your tie tenant waa the CI* wet not directly Involved in_Jh*

tpjeaa, however, you have adaiitted thate activities before that, but Ish't It

true that tho Centralncy is not the only agency of oar govtrnent

involved in covert activities? Isn't It true that ageus of the Defeni- Intelligence

were directly involved in the overthrew of that gcverrrant? Isn't it true

.the: krlitUrv. officers of the unitedaverw*ntarty severalflcf the cow at an Air force bale In Argentina,cross tie nojntalnE. in

hi

which they did toast to tho success of the coup? Isn't It true that stents ofDefense Intelligence Agency wee* acting In the Port of Valparaiso during the coup, helping to direct the police end military operations and rounding up suspects for Internment during that period? And isn't it true that these sane agents of the Defense Intelligence Agency, undercover as Defense attaches in Santiago throughout the period of de-stabilization in Chile, were tc. rtij aorttng for the Central Intelligence agency!

Colby: Our attaches of any foreign country are known as attaches. They, by reason of the structure of the Defense Department, they report to the DIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency. That doesn't make them agents. It makes them officers In the United States Amy or Mary or.aaletever ft It.

Peck: Just the same as agents of the Central Intelligence Agency?

Colby: hink they are officers or enlisted men In their respective services. That's "hat they are. There are some civilian employees of the Department of the. Army, Defense, the navy and so forth. They are overtly known as that, and that tht answer to your basic Question Is that the other agencies do not conduct covert actions.

Chairman; taw, from the audience. I'd like to ask If you would ask onequestion. Please be brief because therereat many people who nansbut stateo before you ask the question and go ahead and ash 1t. Paul Sacklow. go ahead.

Sacklow: Ky name IS Paul Sacklow, and I'm sort of uniQu?hint. because

Bill Colbyre from the DEP in the clandestine services. It used to be called

DEP. Thereouple of gentlemen here yesterday from the DE" area, my old

ob Beyers andoy. teb used to be in chargt o'n Vittnan,

ss

Cerbodia. and Laos,go. Ton McCoy sal out inwith Colby withother prooram. both were very brmientguys, and the conference hashink very politely and usefully to present the CIA attitude on what weto do here, to clarify this. Bet, In looking over theidany other person fron CIA and the clandestine services who had aon Vietnam and what went on in Indochina. represent thai, and

I oppose Hr. Colby,espectfully ask hin again to please declassify all of the documents I've asked hin to declassify Including five of ny own memos to Richard BHsell.he Deputy Director for the clandestine services and about forty otherntelligence disseminations, in which you. Bill, are deeply involved and sent ln,yourself. ant thoseYou have desanitiied them. You have butchered then. You have destroyed then, and you have node me lookill not pemit that. sir. hink this conference has made an unfair evaluation in the kind of invitee that it has fade. Vou have notI have not. been invitedI can* here. ound out about it by accident. Colby hu been invited; Ton McCoy has beenill lleyers has been invited. Sore other spools hove walked tn here

aul, please. If youuestion, go ahead and ask It. If you went too Itelse. We've got many people who want^to ask Questions here. It Is unfair to all of these other people. on't think that you ought to be unfair to them.

Sacklou: All right, sir. Do you want ne to stop now'

Cft.iman: Ko^ld you please ast your quPstion or step, one or the other.

Saeklcw: ent. under the Kjrenburg Ming that has been worked out by the Jui-ciclonder ho* Kr. Colby oscs noro! actions.

you. res^ono. nol jml according to the comtttutnd not Just accordinglaws that hava been pestvd, butoralnu under thahow does heunan being raspond to the tramardojs butchering anddestruction la Yietnen. Soota Vietnam. Tathodlo. and lams. Mowo aabeing respond to that? I'd likeir.

Colby: espondndicated at one point with great concern for the hunan lite sacrificed in southeast Asia andelieve was started by the attenpt of the north Vietnamese and their Ccraunist Allies to take over South Vietnam.

Chairman: ism.

ro-ter: Bary Porter. Kr. Colby, you addressed yourself early oa to the

question of American CIA involvement In Laos and Justified it by referring, to the

allegation that the Worth Vietnamese refused to hove the troops leave Laos after the

una secret arry

ir. igw. This would inply that the United States CIA was not /

involve* with supplying with guns and other equipment and neierlel to arsea' Clamdaatsme

taos before, fcw. I'd Ilka to ley out those facts andear either confine ar

nVny the*, first of all. IS it not true that the CIA forces were already Supplying

(inaudible) It the tiro? ol the tease fire in Laos at the time of the Geneva neettngi

And in that period folloulng the sane, theLao oajger of

the sri-PMtitctoelition coverrn-nt Censncec' it asorder the

hat the united States ceased Its unitaryecoxoic aid through

ho -ere ensconce* la bases within Ufft]edlpll ]

That undo, the eaprnoamart the Fernet lavaight tojor questions

tft-hsforeign policy. And that,tact. continued those supply

<*sv

ti;>ly OjOeretloss against Uv? decandi of tht thty end them. ThSe

toot place overays and that.oniinjing that supply operation hadao

a plant shot down by the the Chinese government, itself, mde 1t

cUtr that they would personally help the Vietnamese to maintain their troopsuntil. withdrew how, do you conflrr

Colby: ill sayidrogram of assistance to the tribesmen In Laos Thisrogram which was run by CIA and was alio participated in by. military. Al the time of the Gemeva Accords In IW, CI* ceased Its supply and withdrew Ita people. The military withdrew Iu people. Ha did leave same people In Uos forut not for paramilitary purposes. Afterhen we were throughI'te forgotten the nunber but It was In We neighborhoodeople who Checked but through the International control Checkpoint. The north Vietnamese withdraw.emember.was something en the order ofr bO people, leavingehind. Thattself did not change things until they began to attack some ol the people of the Naos up In the country. At that point, in order to respond to the attacks nade by those forces Illegally In taai. CIA was asked to and didrogram cf covert supply to those forces

to protect themselves against the north Vietnamese Incursion.

Oamdmatimr-c

tw.tr: Ire you saying that the United States did not supply

ter the Geneva meeting?

Colby: eny that CI* did anything before thay were provoked te It and

requested by the people in Laos to help defend themselves against the North

IHlRiiwjtt incursions agehem.

It Is th* morO twitted by USt the US fid,tupply tte days ifter the Im aeetiag.

D>lby: respected the freneva lejvwent pnMslons- I'm not sure ut*at the fO daysight at the *cnent. He respected the fcenevi Accords agrwttent at that tlae and were only lediolation of thwreater vMotatlou by *. %l* muiarew-

Porter: Un you answer ye* or no. Ma* tht CIA wrrylng on the wipply operationthettet Uor

Coltty: Hv. gainst the dmmmto of thef certainly, end Ufctlr tor th Victnwe el tiestheyKertii Vletoaese eHles end they vertttvcklng the Ktvo

Porter; Old yew sayid carry on the cjperetion?

Colby; efensive iwesivre loalntt violations of the Gerevi Accorc* try theao and the North vietnamte,

Untor: I'm Susan Cantor. Hr. Colby, jou said that theot involved In the nmtary cove that took plice In Chile.

Original document.

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