NIE 13-3-72 - CHINA'S MILITARY POLICY AND GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

Created: 7/20/1972

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

national

intelligence

estimate

China's Military Policy and General Purpose Forces

TQE-SEeireT

THIS ESTIMATE IS SUBMITTED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND CONCURRED IN BY THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD.

Tho following ifiieJ'.-'oenct orgorvrofioni porlkipatml in fht propora'icn o> frW WtinKtt*

Tht Ctnvd MtlNgMCo Agtncy and MWlUsenc* oiooel lotion, of it* Deport-nenti of Stall andh. NSA.

CMnnrkp

The Dtfwy CHreclor of Central WeUhjtnw

Tht Dndc of MeJiigiAMwamM of State

TW DtMCW. MmAgwx,

Tho Dfroctot, Nattoxal StewtJIy Aowwy

The- Diftetor, Ol.ttion ol Intarnoilonat Utuvtf AtfoW, Atomic Enetoy ComniMkw

AbjraMrig.

The Aiiiiloni Dtrtelor. Fodtrat Bureau of Invntigelion, andSpttlol AuhtaM to lhe Soeretary ilfrtamry, thtbolng owlilde of thoir hjriidiclion.

CHINA'S MILITARY POLICY AND GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

IOP-OTCRET

CONTENTS

NOTE1

THE PROBLEM ft

ft

DISCUSSION 9

I. CHINA'S MILITARY 0

A Facton Affecting Policy

China's Perceived Tlatab and Asplriaow

IdeologyInternal Politic*

Economic ond Technical Constraints

The Decistoo.Mikiog Prooess

B. An Overview of Chinese Military PoHoy

C Future Issues

IL THE ARMED 18

Command 18

Tho Flexible Chain of Oxntoend20

and21

C Cround Force*

Orgaiuiotkxi. Equlprnerrt nod

ModrrMnetion

P*Uivr

Tru.ilng

PerajaJnarr Faroe*

D TaotfceJ Air and Air Defense roreai

Size and Eqeiprnen*

i.1ii

Air Defense

Bombing ind Cround Attack

Naval Aviation

Miliury Airlift and Transport

Fmdurttoe and ModernlMnan

Abcraft Backlog

Airflekss aad UwJonjraind Fadkttea

B. The Nevy

Sne. Equipmenttoymont

Production: Capnbittlas, Coob, and Achiercioeaa

Submarine*

Surface Fleet

Training

Undersrouiid Nenl PadliDes

UL STRATEGY, CAPABILITIES, AND PROSPECTS

Aoviet Attack

B. Defense Against AKack From the Bart

CDefense

I' Offensive Strategy aod Capabilities

E

Cround Forcei

Air end Air Defense Force

Naval Faroe*

Tactical Nuclear Weapons

ANNEX A: THE GROUND FORCES

L ORGANIZATION

IL STRENGTH

. M

27

31

31

37

37

51

53

14 44

47

56

4?

Han* vio

Jointly

IU. TRAINING

AmorAtUlWry

aS

Btakyal md

Sotom

Rccnrt Timdi a

OP CBOUND FORCE

FORCES

A Tlw MlIn

B Tko Production and Coortroetioo

ANNEX ii CHINESE COMMUNIST AIR FORCE

L

H. STRK.VCTH

Ul AIRFIELDS AND UNDERGROUND FACILITIES

il

Alt

.

BOMBING AND CROUND

75

VX THE NAVAL AIR

Mili'or>

ANNEX C; CHINESE COMMUNIST

I.

Handle. Via

MAJOR SURFACE FOBCE

IIL SUBMARINE FORCE

IV. PATROL SKIPS AND CRAFT

AMPHIBIOUS FOFCB

MINE WARFARE

YTI. COASTAL DEFENSE

VIIL AUXILIARIES

ANNEX D: MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENTPROGRAMS

AND DEVELOPMENT

GroundKacjiih Bod Development .

Miaule Rwoarth aad DoveJoptneru

AMoonitioal ftetearch and Development

Naval BoMrdt aad Deve-opracttf

OriantnUloo Ic* Military ProducbOB

Ideation and DWrlbotion of Produetloo Faciattai

Croand Forte- ProducOoa ProtJara*

Armored Vahlcfaa

Small Armi and AmmuniOoo

ArTllleryCrcw^ened Woaponi .

Communlcnltom Equipment

Biological Warfare and Owen teal Warfare- Capabilities

Surf bob to-Air Mlalka and Taotica) Mbaflo*

Naval Production Profframi

Suknatloti

Ma)or Surface UoiB

Patrol SKipa aad Craft

ArarpaubaOH SMpa aaai Craft

Aircraft Producticai propane

I lnhtor Programs

Bomber.

Tfnnrpot Aircraft

niiiM'hed Mlitllee

. 81

91

u

91M

ce

109

o

Ha-idle via

Jointly

THE PROBLEM

To assess Communist Chinas general military policy and tothe itrength and capabilities of theCommunist general purpose and air defense forces

CONCLUSIONS POUCY AND STRATEGY

military policy has been strongly tafluenced bytoeading rule In Asia and to gaina nujor world power, and by acute concern to deter attack orby the treat powers. Taken together, these considerationsChina toubstantial military establishment andthe heavy costs of rrwderrdzfng IU general purpose forcesdeveloping an Independent strategic nudear capability.Mao't Insistenceasic policy ol self-reliance andtechnical and industrial base have insured that tbemodernizing the Peonies Liberation Army (PLA) would beone.

primary concerns have been with the progress ofin China, and the long-term development of modernforces has taken place within the context of this overridingwilllngnef: to subordinate defense and purely militaryto the higher priority goals of politics and the continuingIn the Culturalhad an Impact onon combat readiness and morale, and oven onproduction programs. The PLA. invanguard role"revolution, has been drawn deeply into politics and has beento the inevitable rewards and penalties. The purge of Linthe top military leadership1 is only the latest, Ifmanifestation of the PLA'i continuing involvement inof national policy.

C The policy of the People's Republic of China with respect to the use of force has been generally cautious. It has limited the use of combat forces beyond China's borders to drcumstancej where Peering has seen real and imminent threats to Chinese territory or to vital Chinese interests. In, tha increasingly hostile nature of Sine-

ggsBata

Soviet relation* radically altered China'i strategic problems. Although the Chinese were careful not to show any sign of weakness, they were

at pains behind this brave front to control uie risks of direct military conhonution with either of the two superpowers, and, as might be

eipocted, their military stance remained' essentially defensive

strategy for defenseossible SovietMao's principlej of "luring deep" and "people!nof the much superior firepower, air support, andof the Soviet Union, the Chinese have chosen not toforces close to the border where they might easily be cutChinese strategy seems to be to hold back their key mainuntil the invading forces are overeatended and weakened byof local defense forces and guerrilla harassment. Inthe northern border legkns, the coastal areas of China haveconcentrations of population and Industry, and in theseChinese are preparedorward defense employing airforces. If an enemy force landed. It would be met at once bydefense and main force army units.

example of Peking's defense mlndednen andof China's vulnerability to attack from the air Is thethat has gone Into passive defense. Tlie Chinese ar-large portion of their newthose forinterior regions and have dispersed aome ofout-of-the-way valleys and canyons- Perhapsegreein the world, the Chinese are building civil defensefrom simple shelter benches aod bunkers to large tunnelslife-support equipment In some large cities. Largenow In existence or under construction atr so ofwill be able to shelter most of China's fighter force, andfacilities built or under comtructiori wUI be able toof tbe navy's easting subm&rioes and missile boats.

P. While the main focus of China's strategy is defensive, this is not lo tay that Peking has given no thought tninvolving offensiveIn anyilitary force which has been developed to defend against tbe superpowers inevitably haa aoffensive capability against leaser fees. China could, for eaarrrple, conquer all of Southeast Asia if opposed only by indigenous

forces. If Peking decided to takeonsiderable redeployment of lb force* would be required, as well as extensivend airborne training. Once these preparations were made, China could almost certainly take Taiwan In the absence of US militaryIf the Chinese were toajor attack against South Koraa, which we think unHkely, they could effectively commit as many asivisions In the narrow peninsula. In the case of South Asia, the Himalayas and the vast reaches of the Tibetan Plateau would severely limit China's offensive capabilities: long and difficult supply lines would prevent the Chinese from sustaining any offensive into India beyond the Himalayan foothills. But in any of ihese contingencies, Peking would be constrained by the necessity of providing for defense needs elsewhere, particularlyis the Soviet Union, and by the requirements of Internal security.

THE FORCES

C. The greatest relative weakness of the Chineseis the US and the USSRhe field of strategic weapons, and Peking has assigned first priority to ambitious and costly programs aimed atChinaredible deterrent against nuclear attack. After strategic programs, air and naval modernization has had the higher claim on resources; modernization of the army seems to haveomewhat lower priority.

H. Even so. the ground forces remain the dominant element. Tha site of the forceillion men, the Chinese Army Is the largest ground force In thehe toughness and discipline of the Chinese soldier and the quality of small arms with which ho is equipped are impressive. The Chinese Army for its sire and by US and Soviethowever, has relatively Htde armor, and Is only modemraly well equipped with artillery. Tactical air support for ground troops Is limited, and shortages of vehicles and transport aircraft restrict mobility and logistic support.on-nuclear war oo Its own ground against any invader tha Chinese Army wouldost formidable force. Ia those circumirancei It would be able to capitalize upon Its vastreserves, its ability toarge-scale guerrilla effort, and Its ability to use China's terrain and territory to advantage inrolonged war. In contrast, the Chinese Army would experience

JTOP WCgEtT"

HandleControl Systems Jointly

greet difficulty in trying to push very far beyond China'i borders against Ihe oppositionodem force. Here the weakneii in Irani-port, logiitics, firepower, and air support could become critical.

I. While Ita Inventory ofombat aircraft ii the third largest In the world, China'a equipment Is far below the standards of US or Soviet aircraft. Air defense is the primary mission of this force, withf thehinese air dlvbions aisigned to this role. The air defense system suffers from serious weaknesses because of its reliance onoutmodedery modest level of surface-to-air missile (SAM) deployment, limited air surveillance capabilities, and the lack of automatic da fa-handling equipment.

J. Chinas ground attack fighter force consists ofet fightersrowing number (currently)lgbter-bombenhineie-deaigned aircraft somewhat larger than butrhebout three -quarters ofr so bombers are obsolescent. The Chinese also have deployed aboutMB )et medium bombers, but we believe Peking intends to use Iheainly as part of China's force for peripheral nuclear attack.

K. The Chinese have Invested heavily in naval programs, and this effort is beginning to pay off. The fleet now includes aboutttack submarines.estroyer escortshat are equipped with cruiseboutnissile patrol boats, and several hundred motor gunboats and torpedo boats. The coastal patrol type vessels are prepared toiirnificant defensivehe larger ships and fubrnarirtes further enhance Chinese defensive capabilities but have not yet ventured any extended operations into deep waters. The Chinese Navy hasimited air defense capability, and Ita antisubmarine warfare capability ts rudimentary, Tbe Chinese havehnited seaHft potential, have no amphibious shipbuilding program and have conducted no large-scale amphibioos draining.

HtOSKCTS

eking! cautious attitude respecting the uio of force seems likely to continue for some time, partly because tlw Chinese see no advantage Inilitary confrontation with the vastly stronger superpowers, and partly because Maoist doctrine continues to bold that

revolution cannot be sustained by external forces. Wn do not rulehift in this generally defensive and cautious policy on the use of loroe as China's cor vent coal and strategic power grows and inin which nationalist sentiments may have gained ground at the expense of Maoism, But there is little In the current situation to suggest thathift would ba likely in thefew years.

M. We cannot foresee any weakening in the basic drive to develop Chinaajor military power. As in tbe past, however, progress tn modWnbatson and in developing military professionalism is likely to come Into conflict with Maoist political and ideological goals.because of China's limited technlcai base, tho modernization of the PLA will necessarily be protracted, and the process willrequire numerous compromises concerning the balance of effort between strategic and conventional forces, and between Dear-term results and longer-term progress. While the Chinese couldstep up their efforts at military modernization somewhat, they are much nearer tha margin of their capabilities than either the US or USSR.

N. Thus the outlook for the next fivene of continuing Improvement along current lines based an programs nowontinuation of this persistent effort toormidable military establishment Is unlikely to produce any spectacular breakthroughs or developments In the PLA. It will, however, permit Peking gradually to operate in the Internaticnaj arena with somewhat less concern for China's military weaknesses and shortcomings.

O The Chinese Army is receiving newer and better equipment-Including improved light and medium artillery, light amphibious and medium tanks, armored personnel carriers, more modernequipment, and increasing numbers ofwill gradually upgrade its firepower and mobility. Training Is being conductedarger and more elaborate scale, and there may be other changes Inmore attention to arming and training paramilitarywill enhance the military usefulness of China's virtually unlimited manpower. While these improvements will not be sufficient to enable Peking to project its forces much beyond China's borders against first data opposition, tho PLA should be able increasingly to

JO^SGftef

HandleSr/stems Jointly

contest an Invasion mote effectively and In somewhat more forward positions than is now the case, especially on the northern andfrontiers. In short, the already formidable defensiveof the Chinese Army will increase, and the prospect of engaging this force willore and more unattractive proposition for any potential adversary.

P. The outlook for air and air defense forces is one of substantial increases in size with qualitative improvement proceedingore modest pace. Peking may decide to phase out production ofighters in favor of. Chinese-producedvidently have not yet entered the force, but we expect this to occur in the near future. The availability of this aircraft would mark the begtamng of major Improvements In intercept capability, particularly as theould probably be armed with air-to-air missiles and be equipped for all-weather operations. TheabSe-designcd follow-on to theurrently being tested, may be available for deployment in die.

Q. SAM deployment will probably proceedaster rate than in yean past and deployment of the Chinese version of theay be supplementedow-altitude weapon during the period of this Estimate. Radar coverage will improve and espand, and new com-municab'ons equipment now becoming available will Improve the command and control of China's air defense system. Despite this growth and improverneot, however. China will continue toarge-scale attack by planes employing the latest equipment and technology.

K Theighter-bomberignificantin China's ground attack capability and is likely to be deployed in fairly substantial numbers. Peking may soon conclude that the cost of building and deploying theet light bomber Is not warranted and that production should cease. Although the Chinese will probably use tbeomber primarilytrategic weapon carrier, some will probably be assigned to reconnaissance and other rton-atrategic roles.

S. China's naval programs clearly attest to an ambition to become an important naval power. Production of attack submarines, destroyers.

TO^Kffe7|

Handle via

destroyer iseorts nnd guided-missile patrol boats is likely to continue to be ^ulntanual. The evidence suggests that China now haa one nuclear-powered attack submarine; if so. several more will probably enter the fleet during tbe period of this Estimate At this point,the Chinese Navy's level of operational experience has not kept pace with additions of new unia and advances In technology. Cfven the complexity of learning to operateeepwater navy, thisb likely to persist rhroughout the period of tha Estimate. Although thereood chance that the Chinese will begin to 'show the flag" tn foreign waters with soma of their newer units, there Is littleof theirajor naval presence In waters distant from China for some years.

T. China's nuclear program bas given first priority to theof high-yield thermonuclear weapons for strategic attack. But the Chinese have an obvious requirement for tactical nuclear weapoau, andhich was tested inould havetep In filling this tecrujicmentj

Ithus we feel that it is too early to conclude thatuclear weapon for delivery by fighter aircraft, ^ercbeless, we think It Hkely that the Chinese willactical nuclear capability during the period of thbomb Is the best candidate for an early capability. Somewhat later, toward the end of the period of thb Estimate, the Chinese willbe capable of deploying tactical nuclear rnissiles or rockets.

DISCUSSION

i CHINA'S MILITARY POLICY A. Focton Affecting Peaky

wctrrW Threat) ond Atpero-

mmm

om ol eleeaeota affectingilitary policy ilmlau lo those operating ia the dynnrtie part Sow ai (hen. tho legitime socb to prcetrr* taint nal security, to secure end pacify border regtora Inhabited bygroups, and to defend the borden ajylM' the prcwurea ol hoitileConcern with threat of invaelon from tho north ll older than tho Crest Wall luclf; concern overfrom the un only da lotundred ycei ornd Jut aa In Imperial China,eaders are determined that the lesser ctatei on China's periphery ihould harbor no heat Iknd ihould defer to China as the leading; cultural and political enCty In the ret*-.

1 In puna* of those cedi. the Qttoeae CeanownrBi have bete prepared to ec.pky their general purpose (orcea la ways coorafart with CHoeao hlrtory, but aboearol their llrortod reae-areesthe victoria* of 1MB, Chtaa'i leaden pro-

TC^eWftT

10

"Systems

Jointly

WhJe the present day kadWn of Chin* have not rooted" tneiresicei io lie eaten! of employing' direct militaryto enforce obedience on tha rulers of neighboring States, their support of armed in-lurrectioa in Southeast Alioiraliei aims. Bamva and Thailand are peihapa the dearest caws In point The CSii-neic have rnade it quite dear to the leaden of both countries that the price of diminished external uippost (or irxligr*ious gii(-rtjlmia conduct satisfactory to China on certata issues.

spirations loeading roie an Ana mwtve the potentialoJ-liilon wah the Japaneac. Recognition of this danger and the memories of past Japanesecause iha Chinese to regard Japan with suspicion tinged with Ihe fear thai tho Japanese will move one day lo realise their large military potential. While Pelneg grasaty iriflalea the Immediacy of this "threat* for propaganda purpose* mora ia little doubt tha! coucern over Japanactor of aoasain Chinese defense planning

Bv Thationaliits. withoutUS backing, would not pose any serious danger to the mainland Southeast Asiato Pekinghreat only in the contest of US tnvolvernont. and Ibtt concern has diminished with the continued redaction ei the US pretence there. Formidable geographic barriers would Inhibit Invasion from the aoutfa and south su I, even if the political andsituation there changed greatly.

T. Tfaa threats which meat tmsvodieteh'tbe Chinese are those they see hi the superior power of the US and USSR The risk of conJrcavtaooR* with these nationa are the product, in part al least, of Chinese aspirations which now extend beyond Asia to tbe world stage. In pn/tjcclar, the Chineseajor power and the deference which they conaider their due baaed oo China's pbvsi-cal and human resources. Its history and itscompliahmenta The Chinese also claimleadership in Ihe world revolutionary movement, and they offer their experience aa the model In the Straggle to escape cioenineaon by both the Tmperiahst" and the Soviet *re-visioaiit" camps We cannot discern any direct correlation, however, between Chineiepolicy andnore often verbal teat material) of worldChinese doctrine continues to hold that revolution cannot be to ita bed by external forces and lhat tdfrelUnoererequisite for revolutionary success. Peking hai been highly selective In rapport; ug Insorgont groups Bnce the Cultural Revolution, and has not hesitated to forego support for Insnrgondea where such assistance would conflictroader Chinese national Interest.

& Whet happened, however, waa that China's aspPationa and Ideological pretentions provoked tbe enmity of Ibe USSR aad left Chinatrategically vuhserabJe position in the pros soon of the two greed powers. Theimprovement Ln Shso-US relations has eased Chinese fearsossible US attack,otal reversal In their outlook is improbable given Chinree xenophobic terulen-Oe* and communist theoriei about what Impels 'capitalist Imperialist" powers. On Iha other hand, the PRC has bean Increasingly warned by the growing Soviet military power on the long Sine-Soviet border nnd have come to took upon Soviet "social imperialism" as the number one threat to Cheese eecority.

aLan together, the needs of Internalth- deterrence of great power throats and the support of regMnal and world-wide aspirations have canted Chins tobstenaaJ military establishment It heatbe costs of developing an ir.dependect

HandleSystems Jointly

nuetwr capability and nfide range of developmental andprogram* to support theof its general purpose forces

_ MecJogy aad Joremol robkshe writings of alao Tse-tong datafrom tha pte-lM revrduuonary period and reflect the eapersenoea of that era. Much of tha writing is concerned In one way orwith two great questions: how totrongarKuomlntang (KMT} and thebow to apply Marxism-Leninism In tha social, economic, and political conditions prevailing in China. In that prccee* of dealing with these crueaocen, Mao developed an intagrated doctrine, combining rnthtaiy strategy closely with poliucal, psychological, ecooomlc, and diplomatechniques

he key to Mao's thinking haa In the primacy he gives to politics; he is notwith military strategy or tactics as an end In itaelf butervant of the revolution. While power may come from the barrel of the gun. politics must command. The People's iJbesnitson Axnsy (PLA) as viewedevoto-tscctary vsusguard. it meat beur and moBvaiei and remain dote to the messes, the quality of theore important than the quality of the weapon. Warolitical notion; ft Is likely to be ppNracted whena suporioi fee, and the masses must be engaged (as militia forces) in support of tho main force units But the use of force Is to be avoided except where the odds anor where vita! totesests must be perfected; war at only one of several sotfjunsents of policy available, and diplomatic, psychobgscol. or economic means can be used to bolster an inferior strategicuniting with the weaker (or more distant) enemy lo defeat or deter the rnore imminent threat.

From the point of view of the Maoi't, much of the corpus of the revolutionaryremains valid today. Mao jtfflrotracted struggle ahead forIn terms of tbe further development of socialism in China, but also In tenna of tbe world revolution. And Ibe Chraew still see themselves in the position of tbe weaker power, committed to struggle with both the US and the USSR, bul obliged by drcuin-stances to deal with the immediate threat from Moscow by maneuvering with the US.

But the problems which face theCommunists as rulers of China aredifferent from those they faced in tbera with the result that manyexist between present day require-merits and goals and the doctrine of Mao Tse-tung,

he basic and all-pervasiveedits between the drive to promote the modemi tattoo of China and the Maoist goals of retaining revolutionary purity, egsJitarinnism, and mass participation. Mao wants toodem state while avoiding the fate of all successfulemergencenew class* of privileged bureaucrats andwho lose touch with tbo tnossas, fall victim to olitisrn, and drift away frompurity to revisionism. This ccetradiction has provided the source of much ol the tension in Chinese politic* over the pastears. Since tfao Maoists expect the PLA toevolisry role, it has bean at tbe center of this tension, and military policy hasthe dynamics of the struggle

he most recent and dramatic symptom of thb involvement was the purge of Llndesignated successor andofmost of the top echelon of the PLA. But this purge was by noirst occasion ha which loading military

INCUMBENTS IN THE POSITIONS OF MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF DEPARTMENT

OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

Te-hual September9

CHIEP OF ST AIT So YD

Oerc*er IBS

'era

Lo tut-ATog

S

i all

Supwber lOTl-fieami

figures hove fallen from grace in China. To mentionew examples, Fung Te-huai, Lin Plao's predecessor ai Defense Minister, was purged ta, Huang JTo-ca'eng fell tmao power as Chief of Staff the tame year.itcceasor was purgednd about half the senior PLA offleeri at theand regional leva] were purged during the yean of rh* Colberal Revolution.

he PLA's aovolrernent bt pcaltta had its origin* In tho period of revolutionaryagainst the KMT when the Party and army leaderships were practically Identical The Party wee of coarse soprano: Mao saw to ft that "the Party controlled theetidrronistratlve, and military functions were clowly interwoven.

s CcenmauiUt authority spread to allgreater specialization was required.and government bureaucracies grew,PLA, beginning Its transition from aarmy to an organizationto adopt the

fornu and practice!onvenr.orial military establishment These three elements of the

NovoBbsr itMB-AuauH Ilea Tins OVene-we (AenOf) Aeaeai laat-abeen IM

s

Timaiil in UTI-rnasae

power system became more distinctly separate, and official* tended to find their careersingle branch. This was tha period In which China sooght reooornic and military aaetttanoe from the USSR and strategic security in the Sinn-Soviet alliance. Under thla policyprogress wuquipping tbe PLA wth weapons current In World Warand the, and the basiso-mestlo defame industry began to develop. At tho same rime, the military establishmeo-gredually withdrew from its revolutionary po Lticnl roie under the guidance of Minister of National Defamo Feng Te-huai and took on more tbe colorationrofessional

ISowever. Mao was arguingKiim to complete independence fromassistance In matter! of both military orpnfMban and national defense strategy. Inreported words. "We cannot feed on meals cooked for tar, ot herwje. defeat will be our lot' Mini had arrived at these viewsomplex of reasons: disenchantment with Khruuxrev'i general line; theatOaeat* tendencies which be taw among bis ownand specific tears engendered by

vlct terms (ot military assistance andAll of these elements combined to produce the Creel Leap Forward, the purge of Fengnd the open split with the USSR0

lft Tbeec great events ihed Important light cm Mao's priorities. He refused to compromise on marten of principle with the USSR, and he was detotmined to push ahead on his own path toward hii rovohrtionary political and social goats In China. To do this, he wastoong period of strategic vulnerability while China worked tatuctaar deterrent oo its own, and he wea willing tolowdown in the rrtodarnf-zorion of the Red Army, rnearnwhlle relyingpeoples war" strategy for the detente of China.*

lw appointment at this time of Un Pteo as Minister of National Defense also signaled the beginningeriod tn which politics was once again to receive greaterwithin theof loyalty to Chairman Mao and political indoctrination were to take precedence over ccmvcnttonal military routine. This Is not to say that efforts to strengthen China militarily wereas soon as risible after the disruptions of the Great Leap were repaired, workon military production facilities and high priority was obviously given to research and development (BAD) In die field ofweapons.

he contradiction between Maoist po liricflJ goals and military preparedness emerged againebate arose over the nature and irmnuwneo of the threat to China consequent to the developing USin Vietnam. The issues In this debate remain obscure, but It seems possible that the then Chief of Staff, Lo Jul-ohrag, differed th some way with Mao tu to the Interpretation of Moo's call for "wars. however, (lie Maoist- were concerned over the general direction of Chinese society and were fn the process of doing something about it Campaigns were already underway aimed at rectifying Ideological deviations, at restoring revolutionary ebm to the Party and the state machinery, and at finding "revolo-tionary* successors. The PLA was to serve as an organtatiotMl model and it was vital to Mao that the military itselfighof Ideological purity and politicalLo may havearrow interpretation of defense readiness and tbe Maoists may have feared that his approach would require theof the PLA from political activity and possibly reduce the FLA'j politicalAlthough some defensive moves could be made in South China, other

14

CtcT

andhove touaadad tbe US threat. which was not is Matatt eyes imminent ta any event- And in tbe evert of en actual invasion,ne-honored tactics of "hiring deep* and guerrilla warfare would aofftoo.

o Jui-ch'ing waa panged at the endnd wtthia E> naeasths the Guttural Rsvoiuttoa buxff ape* tha scenenfl room for debate ovar much that lay behind this extraordinary development, but thefactor was that Mao had becomethai the Chinese Communist Party was loetng its taste for cetatanttng the daas struggle anal oaat bourgeois revfaaookm threatened the Maoist raedutson- Ha apparandy had coma to believe mat the top leaders of the Party were not carrying out his policies, wereto Until his power and usHuenoa, and were not to be bested

ee the neat several years, pollocs clearh/ essfoyed priority, although Military nre-grams continued Military as well as political channels of comrmialeetian were uaed to launoh and direct the mass movements of the Cultural Revolution. Tha Had Guards wereto take direct action in depoauqj. ooruarvaCve Pasty assd fUvTiuujeot cerVtal* Aa these actions began to render theof Party and government impotent, Ihe armed fdree* were left as Che onlyI red and cffocHve nation-wide authority. They were required to referee among the Red Guard facOora. reatorr interral cedar and as fB the adssssrslstiadve vacesosn kt thecf the government. Party, and economy. MUstary oftleort were appointed to run several government minis tries and they hoailod most of the Revolutionary Committee, which ran the provinces, cities, and factoriesB the Ninth Party Congress greatlythe promotion of rroflantty tacsthe Centra) Committee and the Politburo. This

Congress ratified the ntw Party oonstltutiorj which spedBed thai Mtntfler of NarioosJLbs Piao, the sop rnthary man, waa to be Mao't successor.

U lo snld-lOSS, Chinese leaden forof reasons began to dampen downof the Cultural Revolution. ReactingSoviet invasSsa of CsectsosWick.doctrine, and tha Soviet :yu!dupbordoes, the Chinese leaders pveUgh primly. Military proficiency andagain wai striated, and perhaps moat.Vferae peograjnijfeajxiCbt*ty tn tha*

l>velopiaent

of strategic weapoos was Inserisified, the pto-doouon of military equipment for all arms and services far esceeded any previous periodtnesuded aaaary new msSar tomuinataUattorw and personnel shelters appeared thfoughout China, and military forest were relocated to strengthen the dafensea in thebortlering the USSR.

van sn that hastscne. hwtt. the Oav nate proceeded wth cmoaoc. Then was no rapid movement af troops to tbe vulnerable ons similar lo lhat which occurred the Korean war, and. once again, the tcagfat by polKical and cHploenatsc metre to wotafe the princt^eT" cswmy while attempting to make it cater through prspara-tlons for defease in depth that any Invading force would become bogged downostly and protracted struggle In China.

Economic ond TecAnjcoat this point we cannot be certain that the high priority given military programill eotrDftue at the same level, li Faking ocockadm that the approach to tha US baa aarved to leases tha threatovietight deckle to stretch out tome

Hondle via

procurement programs ond otherwise bold down on military espendleclro not lo place aa eaoeaslve military btuden on tbe economyreference for waging the struggle through political and diplomatic mean* would beantirrly consistent with Mao't past eiperience and practice, aad in thiihe would probablyeady ally in Chou En-laL

In any event, the eronoarnc costs of the Chinese msbrary effort ever th* years, aad In the recent peat tn particular,ertaintyoniscWabaa burden on rhe eoceaoeey. Much investment and production whack aright have contributed to China's industrial growth has gone instead to militaryhere it insufficient irJoretation to support any precise estimates ol the absolute levels of China's military eipendlturet or tho percentage of groas notional product allocated to national defense.

It is dear, however, that militaryaccountarge portion of activity In the advanced Induitrlallarger, foe example, than la the oaso In the US or USSIV The current level of militaryia passing hard upon China's limited technical base China's scientific manpower aad terhnetogtcal capabilities are Inefficient to support rapidrid* range of eaaiearon al once. For these reasons the process of mcdwnlilng the Chin me armed forces wig aceiaiarCy be pruts acted and will require nurrerosti compromise* Thesewin entail dacassoeas rsmcerosog the balance of effort between atiaiefJc aad eosv venliorial fcrcea. among the verioua branches of the eonvcntlonajnd between near-tern results and bnger-range progrees.

Th* Dee/lion-Atolinp ffocejs

tbo pnraginnhi above we haveattribute key developmenla and shiftspolicy to decisions by Mao Tse-tung. But we do not believe that Mao has made these decisions without regard to Ihe views of hfs colleagues In the Politburo, the military leadership, or the interests of thosefor the development of defense Industries and the basic civilian economy.

1 from nrveletiona during tbethat duringeng Te-huai there waawithin the Party leadership Onan extraordinary meeting of theAffairs Commission (MAC) of theCorarnlrtee^rrended by morethousandIn sessiontwo months. In this iaritance, itMao wu using the enlarged meetingforum totruggle againstleaders who opposed his growingto pursue oa independentthe USSR and to tost in theUS resolve and the reliability of

we cannot identify uTI the player* IrTtbe garneT or the critical elements, other than Mao's eoxtrrnous personal prestige, that allowed Mm to prevail on the key issues.

Moo's own prestige hail almostesult of the failures in tho Greet Leap and the excesses of the CulturalWhile he had succeeded in purging tho powerful mandarins of the party8e had left himself, or so it seemed, with

Handle via | c^nrK/

enemies and heavily dependent on the PLA lor support

t appeared we31 that the PLA had attained an unprecedented [leHiiai of power Lln Piao was both Minister of National Defense aad Mao's designated successor As early asthe Ministry of National Defense (MND) hadiven oootrol ot the sis key ministries responsible for defense production, end during the Cultsual Revolution the PLA sent Ul porsonoel to BU commanding positions throughout the administrative apparatus, the economy, the schools, and lesearch institutes. And aa tndketed above, military figuresabout half of tbe poattSCua In theand comprised someercent of tbe Central Committee, In these circumstances, it seemed that tho PLA hadominant role In key aectort of the economy and In the political life of the nation, Speaking through Lin Piao, the MAC. aad through Ha members on tbe ru&tburo. the PLA ecerecdoettton to influence strongjy. aT ant decisively, all national issues

t it too early to reconstruct fully tht precast or to identify ell rhe Issues Involved In the fall of Un Piao. But it seesni dear once again thai it was the resulttruggletwo years oehich tntsrnel Issues were of greater meaner* than any debate on foreign policy An issue of prioricontrol of theemergednd apparently Lrn and other military loaders, feeling their position Ihitoteiied, were unrcaponslvo to Mao on this issue This seems to havarimary factor causing Mao aod Chou lo marshal Chair Serosa, bring down List, and purge Lin's most important sup-portrrs.

t alao seems clear that despite hisof power and position during theRevolution, Lln Pbo did not succeed in melding the PLAonolithicwith unified interests Mao bad to have the oaopetatioo of other PLA leaden la order to rwrove Las and his earns colleague* aad to rmrvent any open displays of disaffection after the purge- It also seems Kknly that Chou En-lal, already at the head of tbo government bureaucracy aod tbe da facto secretary general of the Party, had bean estendiag has authority over the military establishment as welt

B An Overview of Chinese Military Policy

he picture ofopiawiuUt strin-tary policy which emerge* from that briefist owes something toChi cose InteretU and requirements, but the ermceptt for the use of force and the'incie lo-ietv owe awoh to tbe revolutionary experience of China's aging leaders. The long-term development of modem military forces hat taken place within thopriority given me achievement of do is attic revolutionary goals; at all times there has been Italian between pcaWoal and pro> fesUooal recfuirementa within the PLA.research and productioneen intttest In developing strong and modempurpose forces; some aspects of training, ory titration and irntotfl atadon sndyta ainterest in 'people's war" tactics Work on weapons for strategic useigh appreciation for the pnllaco] and deterrent value of tuck forcet. yet even tn this field grot tar rsaphttlt hat gone to PAD rather than lo hunied progrtuna for depam/sricnt. At thb stage, at least, tha Chinese view deterrence as something to be achieved not by military me ana alone, but In combination with skillful diplomacy and the ciuattoti of mast support in wurld optrnctL

hus Chinese military policy reflectsreat client internal debate And this de-

TCP

Hondle via

Systems Joinily

g)vun (he data conncollon between rain-buy policy nnd other domestic and foreign policy Inum. Involvof many Inlescai groups. Inituation, compromise so!ulions may be normal since no Single group or faction seemsosition to gain uncontested control over the policy-making rawest. We caneriodic debate over the aCooatloo of resources in China and the likelihood of shifts froni tint* to Hrrat in the pf'Vitus grantsd national defense. w* caaoct foresee anyIn the baste drive to develop Chinaatios mjateaiy power.

ST. After aotneeast of saHceftarx ef-sorts, various military programs era nowtrust Strategic missiles capable of naaeh-ing deep into tha USSR are In advanced stages of development or In the pro cast of deploy-tbe navy bt receiving destroyers arid which will giveeep-water capability, the atr defense network Is being upgraded through the rapid eapttusce of equipment inventory and the introduction of qualitative improvements, aad th* army Is now receiving greater qisanDties of modem and heavier equipment.

hese pi cap anaseneral onsare to deter any potential ttntekar and lo beosition to carryttrernitaad and psu-ttscred defesase of the main lend thouldfssL Bat tbsv ds net Jitrfy reveal at that stags, the estoarfytog cossupt watch may eats)uide te the future development of Choere forces.an be argaed that thti goal is the deveiopmentalancedoal would be consistent with present Chin eat emphasis on medium-range balhttic mtasllos and Intermediate-rangemissiles, naval construction, andair defense. But the Chinese are aha working on Intetuontlnentnl balhttic missiles, and probablyuclear-powered balhttic missileBN) aa wall. Theprocess of compromise by which policy apparently gets resolved iuggeits that deci-slons will oontlrruo to be subject to revision as power relationships shiftIt Is pertJcu-larly difficult at this relatively early Stage in the PRCs military deveJcpment to lit the various pieces ol China's military programseat explanatory framework, or to rationalize today's apparent prtcciBes andallocations tn terms of this or lhat grand strategy.

C. Future Issues

n tbo years ahead,esult of ongoing force developments, new problems of military policy will be added to the old For example, as the Chinese devetop their rust capability to deploy naval tercet on the high teat since the early days of Ming Dynastyh century) they will probably oorrtukr tha eiptoitition of this capability beyond its purely defensive role to support other foreign policy objective Belated to this would be the question ofhinese naval presence on the high seas In East and Southeast Asia misfit complicate reparians with Japan. And at soma point Peking may have to ponder the issue of how toaval presence at some distance from China.

o far,litary policy teems to limit the use of Chinese- ground force*China's borders to circumstances whet* the Chinese see real and imminent threats taitory or to vital Chinese intBiests. This policy seems likely to continue forpartly because of the presence cf hostile Soviet forces on the northern borders. But we do not rulehis boo as China's conventional and strategic power grows and in clrcumsttnces In which nntscrsdistmay have gained ground at the expense of Maoist doctrine. The occasion for poulhle aggressive action cannot now be foreseen, but

Hondle vtaConirol Systems Jointh/

roettftcottaT in rh* *outh or Intei-venttoo toennon of Influence for China In peripheral states wouldcoBtMcot withfrtttr KomMw

Ia the am of strauspe waapona.hinese, one* havingubstantial deterrent, will face wch issue* ai whether to punue the costly effort to achieve tome aort ol tecli-iolofjcal and numerical parity with tho US and the USSR, whether to give up nuclear teating tn tha atnacarphere, and whether to participate an effortJ to banal th* further growth of SUMespc armaoteoti.

And so the rttoeScroUatfcm of the armyt will require mereaaad proletiion-ahiation Moreover, the Party and govemmeni bureaucracies will still be made up of haman bangs who win tend to consider their ownret Th* inherent coorindlcUot*purity and militarytH rnost aiery ctastsau* to surface from Dm* to time. The PLA will continue to be et the center of these Moslem aad military policy will conUrru* to have to find it* way

inally,aking its toll on China's aging leaden. The question of the longevity of Mao and Chon B, of course, paramount But the patahag of leaser figures will aho beInaMtabry, new men with stew idea* on hew beat to arm and defend Chine will be replacing Che old guard of the Long March. How soon aad In what ways this transition will affect military policy Ii Inherentlybut any specula Eton about China's future must allow foe this Important element of uncertainty.

H THE AXMfD roses

A. Notional Corarnand Structure

ow political uncertainty complicates the analysts of virtually any aspect of Chinese affairs Is well demonstrated when altemptlitg to address questions concerning the lop echo-leea of China's military esesuSHibroentthe MAC of the Party Central Cosncnet-tre formulates policy aad en-rases supreme authority over tbe PLA. Although the MAC itlll edits officially, the latest leadershiphas at least temporarily upset this mechanism. Informal power relationships am probably at this point mere important al th* formulation of rltgkaal pofcey.

ao hlznsecf is cbsrrraan of rh* MAC ex officio, ln the past the Minister of Defense, as ranking vice-chairman, was the de facto chief, but rrsfonslbic to Mao When Ln Piao held thee* peats they provided ram with important crganiu Dorsal levers to buttress hat poarban ia the military and hence in his role as Mao'isuccessor. Sine* Lin's full, Yeh Chi en-ring apparently Is acting as the ranking figure after Mao on the MAC andcting Defones Miassrer a* well While be is aold seedier. Tab docs nots rmseh power as that once held by Ltn. Yeh Is believed to be close personally to Chou Ealal. Chou. who as Premier of the State Council and member of the Standing Corn-smtte* of tbe Politburo already wes iailuerrtlsj in miJUary srsattera, now seesns to beosi-bon to an art even more Irilmeoce oo military policy and the PLA.

n apparent ambiguity In the relationship between rhe Minister of Defense and the Prstsnier. On paper, at least, theMinister fa lubordlnate to the State Council and Its Premier, but the ability of tbe Premier to exert real control would seem to be limited by the direct line running from the Politburo via Its MAC to tbe Minister of De-seeee. The actual rase own step may vary with the strength and IsuToeoc* of the persoreuirjea trrvorvedi it may also be that the MAC nsr-riies primary reaponslbillty In ostabliahiivg tho

1

Syite

Une" no military policy while the Stale Council and lhe Premier oversee thet* the Ministry.iew of the importance to the national economy of the various national defense productionand research Institutes which come under the genera] direction of the Ministry of De-fense, the potential for conflict and strain between the State CouaciTi economic plan-nets and the Minister of Defeneo Means high. CoolTloU over priorihe use of national resources probably ar* resolved tn thebut thii does not rule out bureauiracGc Infighting at lower levels over resources and control of production ministries and their various weapon progiams-

he MND, which bt the fop rnmraesd and administrative apparatus of Chinasmlubbthrnent,hree-tiered oiunnrza-Uon. The Miiutter of Defense, assisted by Ins deputies, directs the work of the ministry. Below him are three departments;that oversee the major areas of PLA command and admlnlstrnttoo; tha Central Staff Department (whose chief end senior deputy chiefs were purged in1 and have nut beenhe General Polltioal Deportment (whose director Is in goodnd list General Huar Services Department (whose head was alaohe various service arms (air force, navy, artillery,osntttiito the third level in the rninUtry.

eflection of the origin andcornpositlon of the PLA, the ground forces have no separate rseadquarters.commanders of ground force service arms rank with the heads of the navy and air force, and theround force headquarters ore performed directly by the General Staff Department

The flexible Chain of Commend

ach of the three service* has separate cban-ieis of tornmand and commurucaOrjoa. WitHm the services, the chain* of ccensnend and control extend through geographic arte commands which consist ofilitary regions for the army.ir defense districts for the air force,ea fleet areas for the navy. Of the regional organization! of the thrsre service branches, those of the army are senior, and representative* of the air force and, where appropriate, th* navy are attached for Laura* purposes to the staffs of the military region commands

he geographic area cornrrsands of th* forces are rwpcaWbJs for adenaastoatton. training and dcpkiyment oforces within their territorial jurisdiction. In the case of theIh* military region commandsprimary resporislbshry for mass forcebut generally delegare respcnsiblhty for local forces to the subordinate military district (MD) commands.

htneae military organisation permits great fleribihty in thef command and control. Main force units of the army are subject to redeployment anywhere In Chin* ia accordance with the nerds offense as detajwamed by the MND hi Fetesr, ln limes of tmelon. Peking establishes direct channels of command with units as small as border checkpoati In the post. Pelting hat estab. shed special truest area commands corn, posed of elements of all three service* and has controlled these forces directly from tho crester. Peki-.j; may also delegare control to the curnrrnmden ofnc*ts, airdritnets, and fleet areas, or permit com-rnanderi of the operating units to eaerciao teo-tical control

et

via

Systems Jointly

Manpower and RecruitmentopiiliiUon ofhas an ample pool ol nwipower for IB armed forces. Bach year approximatelyillion males cone of age for militarycause the PLA probahty needs leas than one million ar* rceru'ts each year to maintain present faro* krveJs, the PLA can be veryProper ideological credeestfast and cs-celieut health are required of ewsryritten tests are not administered tothe inteOjgewce and educsvtKnalof prospective recruits, but navy and air lorn- recnilteri try to Induct betteryouths Into their branches. Somewhat under Rue percent of PLA personnel are women who are Assignedariety ofsupport specsaklea.

Over the rears, major changes in Chine'* political and economic conditioru have been reflected tnoescfipttonocra-Icriam! cam*ine when the eccoowty had been devastated by poor harvests and the km of Soviet aid. Lengthened Errms of service5rowing profcsslonalUm within the army. At that time the terms of military service were setears for the Infantry;ean for all other branches of (he ground force, the ab force and the navnl forces ashore; andears Ior naval fevers afloat During the height of tbe Cultural Revolution therene year moratorium on eorurtpttou and release from military service When conscrip-ticm resumed inwInitial name reported that the terms of military service had been reduced, poinbty by two years.

Pcporti on lerrrri of sesvtee8 have been contradictory, probably because main'nnd residenti have themselves beenby frcqnent changer in tbe military service terms. It appeals, however, that9 the terms of service for each branch once again were lengthened. Decent briefings of Western Dewssnen in China gave the terms of serviceears for theean for tlie air force,cars for the navy.

ofhe present terms ofare shorter than they were Inshorter terms support Mao'soldier* byservice to more of China'swould have been possible underadopteduring the mostcusncripbon season, which was tosoon after tlie fall oi Lin Piao andactual induction andwere apparently postponed.reflected an mirial indecisionamong those now responsiblemilitary affairs fo China.

the end of the Culturaland for two or three yearsnumbers of PLA officers andnoncoms ware ordered to assumeand Party propaganda dutiesand in local Party, governmentorganisations. In some cases,were able to put on two hats.they were drawn off from theirunits to carry out their newThis activity, in addition tolevels, force expansion programs,Introduction of sizable quantities ofinto the force inventories, putstrain on PLA leadership, and ledshortage of seasoned military cadresesult, Peking employed whatwere unusual measures to reduceof officers and noncoms. Theseincluded rapid promotions, theof civilians, and tho recallpersonnel. AD of this had aon the ground forces than onnavy or atr force.

22

via

irMy

Annuierbooghin assessing the current status of thehe cjijcetko ef saorale and dUci-pUne. Although we behe-re thai the PLA would respond readily to an external threat, thakrupsose that occurred nl the highest leveli of ccewnstnd and sutbotiiyth* Cultural ftevcranee end In1 must, at leail temporarily, haveil morale and paiitical confidence on down through the rank*.

ince the fall of Lin Pino in 1ST1 there hasark ad reduction of the role of the military pet sonnet In non-military activities This has been meet evident tn aconamlc ad-mlnleCratioa. where there ha*argecadres have letniised full time to their units and others have aur-rendred their military Status and stayed on at their aVtHanhere has been much leas ditrngageenent from politicalbxA probably reflects the unsettled balance af forces in the national leadership. Officer* in the top echelons ore probably sbU uncertain of thetr future* But at middle and lower echelons the situation has largely returned to normal, training bas increased, and more and improved equipment Is flowing to the foroc*.

C Groundetailed may ol lha

br cctnplMkm Fn Stt im 0* Ihk nifMl.

panan srtahlluunet* ef baa*

In* iwurorn wltb rupees is iha aiiiabar* ofraw was* sad Bear tuilm,and the eM ofcrrntv,nH ornspletlon ol the ttwty. It Mean

toonpmtar ionronitnr. tf*

Chnaass Arm, Naeseloisss.rrfct dan wuwoaly re-Haasssefot sf wars pta-amlried, dhcuVn of tha ntdaary pofuie ef tbs

CUbho around tones.

SB. Despite tbe rapid and impressive growth ef the naval end air force eosepeaaaaa of the PLA, the ground forces remain the dominant element In the cnganlmDonal struo-tnre the ntber service* rank as supporting arm* of the greased forces, aadt re siiihs cf all Chinese military personnel are assigned tn Ihe ground force* The estimated personnel strength ofiUor men makes the Chinese Array the largest ground force la the world. {Despite this, the proportion of tho Chines* population in tho armed forces is low about one-fcarrrh lha* of the US and USSJL1

n leviewlng tbe current assets and liabilities of the Chinese ground feccea, we art irrsprrooed by their site, by the tsjughness and discipline of the Chines*nd by the quality of small arms wrth which they hove been equipped Caeurvuiea Chiecord of many remarkably swift me reives through difficult terrain, sometime* at night. Otherowever, are less im-presatre. The Chinese Army for its stse and by US and Soviet standards has relatively litis* armor, has only been moderately well equipped with light and rnodinm artiDery. and has no heavy artillery. Tactical anfor ground troop* is limited, andof vehicles restrict mobility and VogUtrc support Inutastsnead areas ef (Sana where terrain and other factors do not favor conventional mechanised warfare Involving heavy artillery and tanks, some of theseweaknesses would be less sigmflearx It is also true, of course, that equipment deficiencies will be gradually reduced as rTfrtdfTTfi tand prucssreeaasst pro-grams proceed.

jai weiecT

vJo[

oystcms Jointly

lllm

u*

Ir^jBoJnM

AlQcn

Furamllitnyrmed Mflitii FraoOcua* orvl

Ctratrueue* Cofjt (Aimed)

CcrnbuEuppcn* IS StrvU. Soppori' 18

MM*M wn of KM ar dm pmUMB

AA] itsniiurL

Tw wdnliMrv. orrarrd. barureind

MerBalay ttnlU; abo mu'wW ItoM

ulrtWM (iK'liiui nalgncd to lln ur fax*

' IihmU aiUlkrr. nlii mt AAA unlu.

' SaM a* becaaaa' baaca.(a. IfW.it tW*wi*tmniinSmMkatatrrani.lt.

nrcvntunek.

ha combat capability nf tho Chinese ground force would vary conildeiobly with the piao* and nature of iurhuojeav nnd*ar war an its own ground against any irrradar.oar Arnry wqoUioat iorrrodable force Under thaaa occaanoaa Is tranaport aad lognttac weaknesses andIts raaatlvety low firepower would nota determined and effective resistance. The Chmeae Army would b* able to cant-talfrs upon Ita >ait manpower rssarvsa, allarge-scale rusrrula effort with tha rapport ef th* populace, and its ability to ate Cessna terraan and territory to icVintse* who*rolonged war.

BX. In coutrti t. tha Ountwt Artsy would as-perienc* gnat drffnutty la trying to pesh very far briaud Osnai reorders tgernT th* op-ponnoriodernere the wcat-nexset In tranaport. leapsoca, firepowsi and atr tirpport could bteomt crttmtl

ny attemptarge-scale- Invanon of the aouth Atfao aubecstfuaar* would beby the irnpkoaUo geography of Tibet and then Southeast Asia, the weakness of localtn the absence of large outside auialance) Ii audi that Chinese forces could surmount tha geographicfor extended ptaiatraliont.

Orpoisitufion, Equipment unci Deploy, men!

he Chinese, whan referring to regular dementi of the ground forest, have always diitingulihed betwsen "main forces" and "local defense forces" The distmcticu between these two catrgorlet appears SO b* that main lores units are Islanded to ttrvs as the mure heavily equipped Mid mobile portSoa* of lh* an*y. That* ostra wosfd prtauaaaUy be avtfasble for oetaVwsnts* taywotre ta China. Ia car, trust, the local feres units would have en* tpecstdtted sttsttaaa at the tkufiaas nfarras, and than- eauapeatiBt might besphtw ard:rttdrsn.

tstSneOowi betweaa main fore* aad local dalanit units are derived from Mao's thvory of "peopls'i war" which emu.gel throe km vii of fighting tnitai guerrilla fce-oasocal delente units; tud main force

24

Hardle vfa|

Uruler thu concept tbe various type* of rbcee* ere intemeled to eootierate dceeJy in local operations ind. when occasion ihanends. mifcoa uniti could be trperraded to localforce ita Cm. In turn, local defense units could be redesignated and reassigned as main force units.

ome upgrading of the commandoft China's local defease forces betover the pest few years. Traditional? artnter which conatircie thehtlaghe ground forces, have been raaio force .mittocnrnartd structure separate from that of border dofense and othor local defense forcesibtnry regionhowever, some army headquarters, par-licolarry in southern and eastern military re tpcris. appear to have assumed control of the local defense mission that previously was under military districtheso armies now sxerclto authority over all local defense forces withinSr ataigned tones of defense. This awanstetoenthe command and control of local defense force* ia rhe areasas been Irnplenoented, but we are uncertain at this time a* to thefor the main force role of these par. titular armlet.

ldiough we are reasonably confident that we know of the existence and locations of most of Chine'i main force units, we axe aot so confident shout the local defense forces. The frequent cuspcrtal of local tsrsops into encampments of battalion tlsto or smaller

China. gcoeraUy cceociding with the main areas of pcpularJco. For the defense of Chase's frontiers, appro xiaiatelyillion soldiers are deployed io military regions bordering Mongolia and the USSB. andillion scatters are deployed in military regionsthe teacoestL* Compared to thesethe southern and western frontiers are lightly defended. In fact, to the west of the Peking Military Region, China's northern border Is also lightly defended.

fO*staagjcfeNr^ocBguxti theonttaulng fnilldup cf Soviet forces along the header have led to some repositioning of Chinese ground forces Tbe prtoopa] change began to take shape at the end9 and in0 when Peking shifted the center of gravity for Chinese ground forces slightly to the north. Thii was accomplished by moving five armies from eastern and southern China to positions along rail lines ID Borth-ocaitral Chins where they might be available to reinforce either the northern or eastern periphery. Additionally, some of those forces already stationed In the Peking, Laoehou, and Shenyang Militarywereale closer to tbe borders More rsscent evtcWncc abo shows that Peking is organizing ground force dement* toew army In the Peking Region and possibly two Others In tlie Sinkiang andBawjons at well However, meat of China's ground force* In the northern Regions remain well beck from the border.

hile the Chinese have been improving ground force defense capabilities In the north, they have not rrea^ecred the defense of then-southern and eastern pcnnctai New armies were established to replace armiee which moved north fron Kunming and Fuchou Re-

"Ihessflaa* pound troops tn the raaJag and Saeroaeiwe leelaeadboth f* was en She aaaaaspStsa aaat ceaseeaed be Ctftod to OnWi OWfcc-CWi a, th* Saaat

26

die va

System* Jointly

Recent Infornurtlon also suggests that forces In Cioioo Military Reg Ion may beIn ixyheil derjacn-eday to provide heavy defense for coastal areas, and the Chinese hava continued to build and Improve an estensivo system of artillery poatSont along the coast. The stntegkof the deployment patterns toround forces are discussed in Section 1IL.

A4ocfertixu*ran

uring the past few yean, Peking has continued its efforts to modtrnute the ground forceside variety of weaponswithin China. Thus far. bowevor, ihe Chinese ground force hat approached parity with other modern armies only in small arms. For astanspke. the Chinese have beenan2 nana carbineate of WO.COO to 5CO.CO0 units pec year. ASS mm recoil loss gunhi' nee* version of the Sovietre abo now In the hands of the Mope.

roducdort of heavier weaponslowermew more menouverebl* vatsksa ofun Held gun, andm Held gun have alto been Introduced into ground force units.

ew light amphibtous tank, which the Chinese may be calling th* Type-fO, atbeing deployed with forces in tbo Canton Military Region. TMs tank represents aImprovement over th* Soviett Is reportedly much faster than the Soviet amphibious tank and has heavier armorarger gun. The Chinese tank hai boon in Vietnam for the past three years, and it may hav* been tkmsooed to Improve Cfahaa'acapability In the south, the Chinese have alao produced another light

limited numbers; it iscaled down version of the Chinese Type-SB medium rank.ored personnel carrier (ARC; was placed In tasks prockseOooInhe Chinese may also bea new men) battle tank aod an armor recovery vehicJe-

Over the yean, at new production has turnmnad Onjsa'i Inventory of artillery aad aimer, the Chtoeso have nested new units, hav* raited the standard levels of emiipment for their farces, and have retired out-dated artillery and small arms from the Inventories of regular forces- Those weapons retired by regular farces are probably alkxetad to ultra of the militia and th* ProducCcn sod Con-stiurtinn Corps.

Although there are no firm inchesbons Ibat the Chinese areactical nu-ciear nurille they rsctaably hav* the capabtory to do to Tbe dcvek>prr*atapability to make nuclear warheads for tactical bombs' and missiles is Inherent In an active nucloar testing program such as China's. We believe thsrriora, that ia the eventhines* deci-ssost toactical nuclear system, there would be no technological or industrialo prevent tho development andofystem.

7ft In their modeasiitubon efforts, the Chi cese are also eapaochng and tapaovsig the communications and tranipcstanon capabiliry of the ground forces. Tha speed and capacity of mainline networb linking the MND with the rrajor military orsmmands have beenby tbe introductionrtodera rsreuc-prifster system. The newest tactical radio equipment In dts Chinese Army is of native design and production. This includes fusty traiislttoritcd high frequency (HP) radio lets.

'This li dUoaassd fcrtherestrains lbs au faros.

Tftf irrirr

tingle lidcliaml lunii'lvn, partiallyFM IranimltteM operating In very

v (VHP) rj.-l

VKF muiHehjanrwl nti (ar llne-ofigjfal and rropoeoalter communications.irlcfy of ceruipmentpphkttlcafrd capability in design and production

o* rarlaaaruyan ba tha cViroaatic pradactlon rata, the total aaaaaW of truck* In Qana haa dot* than doublede befernt that the aaocauty and kofiaOc aopport of tne groundill aaaahaaly aatpron attnacka become svaulabk. We cannot ten what proportion of the rational true* prodec-tiino tho army, but there It evidence tnat the nrlbtary establishment hai high pri-erity and la bene filling front tbe Increased production In addition.faery that many of the new trucks allocated to dvfl snore*uniti would be Incorporated Into the PLA upon mobilizationational

lthough the Chinese have always hailed the army as the mainstay of military strength, the modernizatscc program for the Chinese ground forces does not seem to have enjoyed the same priority as the extensive and costly programs underway for the air and naval forces. This situation probably results

sideraticcis. Toith rncMtty and firepower comparable to that of US and Soviet forces would take years and would add heavily to the economic burden unless thereiversion of resources from strategic waa pons, navy, and air force programs now underway. In Mao't strategy of -people'*hich evolved in tbe context of land warfare, weopont, although important, am not the decisive factor in warfare. Instead, the Chinese believe that an indomitable figbt-ing spirit Is the prime irgredtent for success, and tn waging -peopleshey eapect to lake advantage of the Mtatant attrition to enemy strength aa more and more roan are required Co maintain and protect the logistic hers of aa advardnghus, tbehave betas wfJhng to snake only cacdett progress in providing the army with seeders weopoea and acjurpatasat

a am we aspect that proourernesf ecets for ground foroea armament will onlygradually. If al all over the neat fewuring thla period, tbe relativeof funds allocated for ground forcewill probably txKitiuuo to fall as procurement spending for the air force and navy continue* to rst*.

PosnVe Defensor

n accordance with the national pcocy to develop and Lrrtprtm the capability of the PLA to withstand attacks by aa invedtig force, the armyt yean haaumber of prograrn* to provide passivefor ma*caiwnr.ssearures besadesnore inttiaiaiH tor the shs-pesaal tad safe storage of vehicles.t<raael ahartert has abonoted especially at around force headquarter* lather than al combat litstulktloni.

he roost spectacular development In ground forceowever, has been the construction of hardened fortifications In tbe shape of large ear thmounded structures. Work on all of th*nown facilities of this type began between early IBM andnd some are still under construction The orpmsc and labor Irnorvad In (figging, tumcling. baiueoing aad becUllBng thee* atiuctures bat been ceoudenb**-

SL Nearly half efuge structures are in the Ochiaa River VaBssy ccersdor ksrcbng boen Mongoit towards the Sh nag eh eng-toi Missile Ted Range and the Laochou-Sinkit,-ig rail hoe. Otheti ate oa the outseJfts of Pe-

ling, Tientsin, and Shanghai and at important railear Srah-chia-chiiarig "fd Cheng-chou In north China. All of tbfae kwter atnxtnnt ara on natnnt knot ot uajiaottatt for rorcaj ptaitttctg tsuund froaa tW tea.with moat of the large nvoemledare scocct of arrsaOer concrete (ortiftca-font, similarly ortentedotential Una of in va lion and capable of aocornrnodat-ing hghl artillery and automatic weapons. Several hundred of tbe smaller concrete rfruc-tirea have been sdessfined.

j lor Ihr purpose of rhaea facilities, there are many differing opiniona. Because we have teen gun barrels In some of the weapon shelters at tha tunneled entrance* of there mounded stnsoturea, it is certain thai some of them wfll tuttction, at least la part,eyond thai, the pf aeon re of die many smaller structure* in asaocaation with the large rrsounds suggests that both large ond amall itructures are being built as partommon plan for defenie.

evertheless, because these mounded sa-tctisret be In open terrain, their tactical utiStyodem mottle enemy invader ii ripen to question, and we an not yetthat we understand the reasoning which lie* behind thoir construction. Suchhas given rise to the luggottlon that there Installations were buOt to house corn-mead and cornmojstsadoM centers and that dse concrete pads ot) rh* Shanghai inouod portend the installationmall, peastble cruae, mUBIe,

n other likely areas for invasion, such as along the north-south rail line Into Inner SsVatgcaai. tha Chateau haw, built erfJkery pontioeis fat caves and tartrtab, takingof the natural retrain. Other notableof cave defenses are found In the areas around Peking, near tlie misille test center at Shuang-ch'eng-tzu. near Ururrschi, the capital of Stnbang Province, and along therrfnUirvNsnkingrairood corridor.

froininp

fter the hiatus caused by the Cultural Revolution, the tempo of military training for the ground forces began to pick opfar, aaoat of the known field trailers?,has occurred at Testimonial level and below, and the average Chinese foot soldier it

combat tactics and techniques.

Beyond this we have diffloulty In trrohi-ating the quality and level of twining fas the ground forces. I

.ire this uncertainty ami despite" tha fact thatold exercises involvedegree* of propauj*nd* work among the natal popuUtjoci, there is erjeugh tstforrratnas to establish that the ground fbrcea havethe level, complexity and frequency of military training. Tho focus of ground force training rearttina defensive; there Ii little-at> inchoate that China's ground force* are being prepared for out-of-coui-.try opera-tJon*

Poro military force I

h* seAhca andduefson aad Cco Uj-jCCIoo Corpsettacd manpower reserve for the PLA. In the case of each organization, there are atate-

gorteii of military rcadloesi and training, and at many6 nsUion mem ben of (bote oigaiE-nBoneillion rnihtiamenuttee ports Ulan corpscould be rooct-bwd cvocliy to luppcst tbe PLA by aiding tn lOglRks or rngsglng In guurriJU waifar*.

IIIU* unlrs tie found throughout Chins, but are concentrated In central and eastern Chins where meet of Ihe Chineieraids Tha Ingest cnncerrtrtHom of the Produccloa and Ccntfructico Corps, however, arohe border areas. As Qghrlos; usstt, she* aaasaaasb of both the nates and the Corps cesdd probsbly operste ageeast small lightly armed infantry forest but they are primarily railed for guerrilla acttom. More training and equipment would be neededunits of tbe Cram* or mllltla could be upgradedregular PLA

D. Text <or Air and Air Dsferws fortes

Sire and Equipment

ilh an Inventory of rnore than 4JM0 combatall lets and astrength of. China's air and naval air forces constitute Ihe third largest air fore* In the world. Tho Chinese abo have available foe atr defenseores of scan*urf*ce-to-aa morula (SAM) bat-latent andAA drrusaas All of these forces are growing rsptary aad are beingwttb dcmuutkslry producedhus, If for no other reason than their afxe, th* tactical ah* and atr defense torces of China constltut* formidable nghllng organisations.

any of the wesJrnesaes of th* Chinese tactical air and air defense fores* become arapareot when ccsnparrd wHh US or Soviet rare* standards In th* first pases, eaoet of Chfeaa't rm-arurry of combat pltnet ountfi of relativelyet aircraft Half of Chtnat combat aircraft are oU, and matt of th* rest were built from Soviet darrlgnt of rhabe Chtoate are aboihort of rrsnspori aSersft Tbes* facts mean that the Chlaess air and ratval atr fctrcet ar* relatively limited In range,andeather oparanng ctpabil-Rlas. Chlna't air detente rxgarrisatfans alto need better electronic end communication lyrtems.

nonu or cmneje ais and naval sj> roeao

kaval

ah

FOMX FOfCt TOTAL

Number ol rrcaswl .

. ioSsa

a**.

lanTMshaat

aaa

SAM

BstnsssdCtpwaUsaal AsuaA

Kld-IOTl

eoiute of limitation] Unpcecd by eouipertent, China's tactical air and ahrforce* are gftwrafry ceo fined e> atote. They are suited for operation within friendly territory with short supply linet. Ahhousjh tbe equipment of thete forcet doe* not ittatcb lhat of the US aad USSR, their strength greatly etcaed* that of other Allan naOont.

t In the past, ment aircraft areIn the tit air dtttrlct) adjacent to the eastern periphery from the USSR to North Vietnam. Far western CWra remaloi only tbtory darmded by constat aircraft.

Airir defense It the prrrrury mtaion ol the air aad naval airithf thahinese air chvUtton* being assigned to this role. The major shortcomings of Chlna't air defeat* tyttem are the look of high tpeed darahindKeg fsxuttkt aad the notable short-age ofnd all-wrarfaer Intercrpeon

n recent yean the Chinese havetheir air surveillancear-tfcukuh/ along the northern (order. New radars and improved verttona of old one* bow permit the Chinese to occatlonally detect vary high flying aircraft at distances In excessautical mile*ew Chinese radars also have ieipeoved the ttfJi Hasitad cerpafataty to ptcii up aircraft flying at altitudeseet

he Chinese rely onig-lOt. and about IB Sovlet-producei!t their primary weapons for air defense. Theave become the backbone of this Interceptorhey can btlerOapt maneavenmg subsonic and transonic targets at alDtude* up to0 feet andlimned erTcct) veriest against aon-rrwneuverlng targets up0 feet. Only the few Mlg-ais can effectively engage targets Tying above low tupetaonlc speeds.se can inTet-.ip' subsume target! up toC feet tnd aupanooic targets sp to0 feet The oldave little capa-biiity against modem high performancebut can engage subsonic targets at tow ard medium altitudes

ome of the Mtg Usew of the Mig-IDs which were supplied by the Soviets have an alloorttbat capability.!1

t he Ujuoese uwmrnmu! Air Force latiacaptot force would be only marglasury effective against attack* occurring at night ot in bod weather

lthough raost OilDese fighters are armed only with canrsoe, recent evidence Id-dicalcs ai "icresurd Interest ta sir-to-alr ma*-saet (AAMa).I

'Brcrm evlderieaft*of those Mis-IBs produced nsthta At put year or to have been aatdtfssd. That rr^dtBoausa appear, toeoaassdpstaform to anpeova rnaneu-venlility and ronftly In iaereue tori capacity-

ComVol System Jointly

Willi in Iho limitation! ot lit oquipointl, the Interceptor (ohm ippoars lo beood Mate of training and rrodinesa. The general air itanddown Irom Septemberroducedemporary lapee In training and efficiency. There la llndtadwhich lugg-tatihfneio iotratrptor pilots receive lam flight train'rag lhan their Soviet and US counterparts, and many CM-nee* pilots by ccrnparaoo probably air lew crpcrifmocd.

ICO Cw the grcuad. we have icWrifkdtr force aadrmy AAArseae units have been variously equipped3m weapons aad with fare-cwtrol radars Air force AAA units hareioaaly been the first to acquire larger guns and new flre-corSrolut arsny units have been npcclvlrqr. Improved equipmentthe past two yean. The atr force AAA units are deployed In fluid position! around ma'or cftiea, at Important military and Industrialand along coasts and holders where aerial incurtlor* would be likely. Most amy AAA appears deilepied primarily to provide mobile defeni* for troop frjrrrastlons. During recent years AAA baa Irtoraated notably In northern China, pnaomably aa response to Smo-Soviet lenslona

hina'i AAA drrMestt have gained vahrabl* com bat *ap*riawce in North Vietnam sndrs* la Lsot ss they have rotated ta and out ofrxmtriaa ta tup-port of Chines* logistic faeces There are two tn three AAA drvuttons in Laos at tbe present tlme.

he Oiinese have alto deployed abouiAM battalions. Tliene rue locatedew key ciiios and advanced weaponsAt yet there dots not seem toattern of cr>locstlng theAMs with roncentrations ofhese units can providehin defense, their rate of deployment hai incrcawd from about four per yearurrent rate of abouter year. The tystetnhoseIs thehrome vessioa of the Soviet SA-2,

o coordinsle air deferuergrscsle attackideinvolving hundreds of attacking aircraftat lowbe much more difficult and Is beyond present Chinese ca-pahfliHse. This would be particularly true if such an attack occurred at night or in poor weather and was accompanied by etleorivo electronic countcnrKssuretnder such crrcumstancet China would needdata-processing equipment to provide accurate, continuing evaluation of tbe move-meats of large numbers of aircraft. Thewould also need commurd cal ions of very high capacity to transmit Information quickly to controllers directing the air defense weep-out. Because the Chinese still lack most of thb necessary cquipmrnl, we behove that they could achieve effective control of interceptors. SAMs, and AAA only against limited attacks If the weather were reasonably good end if ECM were not employed.

rflreT'

Conlrol Systems Jointly

noek

Two Uulcpendent regtmooU indf thelvttloo* In the alt forte have beena bontbaog or ground attack roie Free of thaivisions aro eo/iipped with irjrht bccribm and the otbers with lighten and fightrs-bcenbert. One ofstdeperalent rcfjmeritf is equipped with light bombers aad ls tasked with providing tecsirma] nance and ECM as well at bombing The other iiuie-rsendent regiment is equipped withndedium bombert. The naval air force it equipped wilh nnivitiom of tight bombers.

Nearlyercent ofdd bornbers are. These fat light bombers are generally deployed well bock from the borders or In Important coastal areasrimary moston of defense against an Invading force. In any event, eiten-ttve forward deployments would be rarcessary before these aircraft oould bs used at anydsstance beyond Oana't headers.

The Chinese alao have deployed aboutet medium bombsn. Although these aircraft are suitable for conventional bombing, their deterrent valueorce for peripheral nuclear attack probably wll motivate Peking to limit the Tti-lfluclear attack role until China builds larger numbers of these planes.

The newest model in lh* Chinese in-ventory of ground-attack aircraft iaChinese-designed aircraft resembling thaf these new aircraft are now operational within the air force. The introduction ofith its irscreased firepower, vsnsUUty. snd range -eprescrsts th* greatest laiororctncM in the ground attack force since the uairaucm to Jet fighters in the snsd-lBOOa.

Although thelt aredeployed In ground attack units, indica.

lionsew role for these aircraft recently cense to light in connection with China's nn-clear teatj

lthough the ChhMie could na*rxarsbers to deliver nuclear weapons,not know whether they Intend toat

racket cf onlym which would atveauty Halt Itt laaafuheattrategic strike rule. The Chines* may rrspud theasas more sadtable for tacticalv of in-dear weapons. At far at we can teal,trainingrews hat erjaphsjited only canwjutiuDil tactics In eastcisas involving ground support or attaclii against naval units.

Jt^rs-eWTttrl

Handle via

emi Jointly-

Chinese tactics for employing right bombent, 1 ' " *"

aircraft to utc hfgMcw-Mgh attackn such minium, the aircraft fly toward Che target, at dtlrudet of HJ.OOOXO feet, descendower altitude before attacting the target and aacend once again (or thenight to baae. The lower Operatingnear the target reduce! tho likelihood of radar tracking and thus lowers the vulner-aHHty of lhe atUcldng rbrce. but It abo re-dueet the operating range of. The looVabceu we have of fsewdaagndicate lhat Chinese crews are reasonably proficient tn viaua! and radar bcrribing techniques.

n addition to Itsthe groundfighter force eonsrtts ofet fighter*lIOr-driven fighie'-bombers Training in ground attack technique! mcijdes frequent ttrafiDg and bombing prnctlce at target ranges. Sotne additional ground attack practice of this type also has been Included In the Ualriingw rntereavtor unit* during tbe past two years. Cround attack eaxrrate* rarefy icem to occur in close ccerdinerion with the training of ground forcer, however, and ground Attack units therefore may lack tactical flexibility under realistic combat cordittoe*

Norof Aviotion IH.aval aviationrimaryof coastal air defense but ahoharged with providing tactical air andlursport for surfacehis force consltti ofircraft orgnnired intohrtttora, tcvera! trdeprrvdent retp-merits,ew smaller units.f the aircraft are |et fighters and light bombers assigned to combat units. Thoare light transports, hcJicoptart, and aircraft used for training.

avel let fighters are concentrated at bate* near tbe Llaotung and Sha-.tmg Pe-nintuUt in the North Sea Fleet arm. near Shanghai In the East Sea Fleet area, and on Hainan bland in the South Sea Fleet area. Naval bcanben are deployed mainly near the Llaotung and Shantung PenoBiilai in the north. The primary responsibility to defend the coastal areas around Fuchou and Cantoo ta the southeast is left to the air force,ibr* Bits of ease naval fighter ckvtsleei could ope rate ia the northern Fuchou coastal area.

silt fighter dfvudons of theforce are equipped withTiThe lour botnberhina'sbe Tu-lfl.not yet been assigned toair force. Eapanslon andthe naval sir lore* will probably betha neat ftve years, and the aorruruihe newer types of aircraft will improveand firepower of the force.

Aifrfory AirUt and Transport

airlift and transport capabilitynaval air and air forces brsteasured fay US or Sovietof theatlgned to 1dl visionsndependentwith someediumelicopters. Theand helicc-ptert arethe ah- and naval air forces.of tha military transport aircraft are )ett-

of the limited capabilitiesregular transport units and Ihe ab-

j^

via

U

i Jointly

of training far rnejor airlift or airdrop oprrotijoi, we believe thai the Qilmae world probably limit their ilrllfl activities to tmsUt-senle special purpose opertiNms ibel would seldom, if ever. Involve units Urgcr than rcgi-rncrstsan).

Frocvdhn and Modernization

Prodixex" for the Chinese air and naral air loreei has grown steadily over die yean, and tho goal seemi to bearge air force based on domestic prediction ol available aircrafthe arrival of theIn tho air force Inventory further Indicates that tho Chinese can design and produce new aircraft.hinaecord high ofighters and bombers True total et-ceded all other countries cacept the USSR which produced. China's arudawtseu, however, was ccsdined primarily to older model Soviet ds> ligned Pghrers and bcenbert Furthermore.roductionfor nearlyercent of the total. Tht* rapid and Urge-scale production of old model aircraft areans toa high degree ol Chinese concern for the poasfbiltty of enemy attack

Most uf the Chinese effort an aircraft production has gone toward building fighters, although tho amount spent for bombers has increosed in recent years.1 China Is estimated to have spent tho equivalent of well over SI billion an aircraft procurement. Ahout two-third* of this went toward the produc-Hob of fighter aircraft Bomber rxcducOcw ec-cccnrrdoercent of thebudget, ami helicopter accounted for meet ef the renaalnder. During the years to come, we believe that Chinese espcudatatna for milrtary aircraft will con tint*igh level io help nsudemur and expand tbeforces and to at least poitialfyressing need for transports.

s steps to modernise their air fleet, the Chinese currently have under dcvelcmrnentighter of nativesmall transporturbine- powered helicopter. Although the Chinese could soon begin So produce the nowmalland will continue to build the MM hefi-copterollow-on version thereof, the air transport force wtH remain undetdcvelopcd during (he neat few years.

Afrcroft Backlog

here em marry uncertaintiesthe future saw nnd cornptedon of the air and naval air forces of China.or example, the Chinese suspended steadyof oewry producedircraft to operational units. (Deliveries may have been limited abo for Other aircraft, but tho relatively small numbers involved make this cKfftaiit tonstead, they allowed most of these planes to accumulate at productionor at nearby airfields. At year end the number of beekioggedimown* about half as targe as tbo operationalol those aircraft

he backlog ofegan to be reduced as deliveries increased innd now there are signs of an outflowi from the production plant. Manyhave been offered to eaplain whywere reduced lost year. They include delays caused by modifications on the aircraft, or by shortages of parts, support facilities, or pilots. It has abo bean proposed that political difficulties between the Peking leaderablp aid the nir force may have ledutback ofThere are difficulties with each of these rapUnatiocis, however, and none can

Control System* Jointly

offered with confidence- In any event, it mayear or so to eliminate die backlog.

Airfttue. ond UrsoVvsyeW .CKtirrse*

he Chinese hove been cnrrying out an eatensivo program of airfield construction. Moreacilities have been built or Unproved during tbeears, and Chine will soon neveirficlrli cutable for operations by combat aircraft Somef tbeae tirfieJds appear suitable for sustained Tu-I6rom thesethe range of the jet medium bombers,ormal bomb loud ofpounds, could bring within natch meet important areas of the eastern portion of the USSR as well as Japan. Soul*east Asia, and northern India

he rapid growth of uadetgroundfacibtlea near the airfields ia another inv pvittnt feature of the Chlneeo program to build air Installations. At the present tune, aboutirfields, eoooetstretod In the east near the coast and behind the northern and touAeen borders, have ttridtrgroaaad falsifies capable of hc-usjng racer of0 fighter*.for several ursdergrouod facilities where light bombrrrs might be housed and one where medium bombers might be accommodated, cirneniioni of the entrance* to these shelters show that aircraft larger than fighters could not be protected

12ft Althcugh they would *fford rantactfononventional attack, theseabetter* alto have notableThe Chinese would be obliged to con-txnrrstte thrir fighters at fvwar fields In coder to use all of the laudet ground storage toand aircraft using these shatters would have to enter and leave oneme. Tbe tlrne requirements and difficulties Involved in traambling aircraft from thetr shelters would impede their responsetrp-acsd* earThese facta may explain why rhe Chinese usually park at least sotne of their aircraft In tha open rather than use undergroundfacilities to capacity.

t Tha Novy

ha Chuseae Navy is aot only tperwuag quickly but Is aboorce capable only of coastal defense to one that will have the range and flrefiower to extend Chinese influence Into the peripheral seas aad beyond. ThiseaOg awsratpKtrted prsraauOyuge prodsicOon program tor tubrnartne* and for misaile-equipped destroyers and deatroyerubrnaruve-launcbod ballistic mbtllelso under way.

US. With its force ofubrrsarinea, China already hat the world's third largest under. watar fleet Chine'sestroyers andeacorts form the nucleuseep-water surface force. Numbers alone, however, do not make an effective ocean-going force-Moat of the Chinese submarines and major turf ace combatant* are bated on tedhssology current bt the IJJOOa Thaw snap* hovenited air defense capablbty. aad their aatf-rubmarlne warfare (ASW)udt-mentory. The nsrvy has sn extensive mlnoloy-ing potential bulimited mines weeping capability. The Cntneae, however, have begun So *qulp snajoc surface units withmroSea- SbD greater irrmreivernent an China's deepwater capability will occur as new units of rrtoro modem design areas vorious types of teagoEng support thlpt arc added to th* fleet, and as theain access to overseas part fadfarkes. But tbe projection of ChJisea* naval strength farcoastal waters willradual process.

Jpfa-SPCRETL

Handle-syrhtm* Jointly

In perlhe need to gain eipetlcnce In longer-range operations. Ic ll nrrwrthctots poullilo rtiaeJ tne Chinese will. In the rest few yeers, tendrural vessel or two Into the (radian Ocean or esaewhcre to 'shoe* tbe flae>*

PStOriLE OP THE CHlNISt NAVY

Number ol rVnonMhcitimalaa Floal

Eaat aad SouthInventoryof Shlpsi

Dcrtrvym .nj DrMro>rr

faarslEMmWtn S3

!5

m Csabatts

Torpedo

TCJTAL

MtnafHSvimt SO

Ship, tod Craft

Lsr-Staejasapi-

Sbaja TuaV IS

Lastnut Ship. 14

I^adi* lUea.aaWaary (IML)

t a. east Craft'

Total Aa**IIUoui Stupa and Craft O

A^lllll.tM ISO

Turd

' Data not Inctsde prreonad aiilened id ih* naval

nWststes*tjSss* InststV rraUM paaeahrrbe. TW( the

lull riUasaet baeady at tkaaoMs.

lacludaa or* Out Ii probablyo-rrrd ind oneC-oU-RS.

' iin-.il -nli ta run orule mfealhii

'EvsS for os* LSM bath So Chens, al asa UI

'set boat) are aaraafly *sad far baaa MtesV. in rorem wrlka nW -est! ba ranted Is mmmm araea bv krjja abas* '* tha asaaaafaaaB ierea, hui aaeh laedaur. oft eosU carryaststs-brnun ol ISO "nop.files

Sure. Eovipraenl ond- In numbert of ship! and craft, the Chinese Navy ranis second only to thai of the Soviet Union. Most of Chinas navy, however, consists of small units whoae combinedwould put China well behindmarl-rinse powers. Thus, whetho fudged by ship typos, dep toyment patterns or trainingChlna'i navy atery large, well-armed coast guard with only the beginningagnedpwater oprxarions.

he North Sen Fleet bos the Isrgeit and moat modem ships in the Chinese navalThe East Sea Fleet hat tbe largest number of assigned unset aod ti second esay to th* North Sea Float in streugth.

uring the past tlx years the Chinese have been tsuring atepa toalance among the three Beats iu support fecilitKS and In msror combatants, submarines and mts-sile boats. This hatarticular effort to build up the South Sea Fleet which, in the pest two years, has construct nd and deployed submarine* for the first time sad hasumber of torpedo boatsew guided-inissilD boats, many of which were built In other areas ol China. Tbe North Sea Fleet has the fust operational euaded-mtssslein the Chinese Navy. Others are being built In all three fleet areas, and one unit will toon b* operation a! in south China Cuided-missilo dcsirrner eacorts are attached only to th* East Saa Fleet aad iochad* one unit ol th* Kuusj-tung-dais.

Hondte vio

Systems Jointly

oolf; ond Achievements

h* eornmuofto come to power InShanghai wee China'* only major center for shipbuilding. In racer* yean the Chinese have expanded and mndexntaed many ol their eststing tMpysrds and hava built aeveral targ* new racatVMa.leer arrxa nowotal ofunc* (aclbtiet fee naval oorsmucticu. Meat ef theas haUbea tend tnarda are turning outr* producing guided-rrusslena building destroyers. Inlo these building yaidi, thereajor facilities which ar* engaged principally In naval repair.

urrent product ion programs indicate lhat the Chines* Intend to make submarine* and mis*llo-equipped lurfaca units th*of their navy.

he deveSep-KDt of Ctswa'a subacute catoouctJontea bean arrxareamve. CcenXruetson ttrnes bar* been aeotastsed to as fittks aa oate year, and two new *se)or thspyerds have beecane operational and have launched submarines sinoehe oapablhtse* are growing atole that the Chinese could triple tbe sire of their submarine fleet within the next five year* If they bulk only the relatively simple ft-dau submarine* which now constitute tbe majority of the fleet. We berlrvs, however, that tha Chinese wu! rso duce more modern classes of tubmaimea. which wiG take tornyrr to build We therefore expect th*o produce at the rate ef aboutear, but even this could draible Outy 1BT7.

The prlBcipal aubenarVne hasesofort prodnoed by the Chan at* has beenaedlom-rtnge submarioe of Soviet drscgn. Inowever, the Chineseew tubnurrino that appears to be anon Ihe II class design. One unit It now operational, and It is likely that thisut the Ming rim vrlll. Id Ham, rapamlass in production.

ttackthe Han-dan -ap-petied at th* big new Hulu-tui yard In th* rcrthern Pchtl Cult Th* one Handsawteen to dsta It helkvsd lo b* deaigced for aaacfess**sguly because of Us ecstfguratJce and the ktrgs durraetcr of ta bul But it Is not yet certain that Us present power pesnt at actually nuclewr The appesr-tmce of frames and curved portions of large din meter hull ssctton* uu tilde th* ccsnSrucrioa sheds at Ku-lu-tao over the pail year or tomore Han-etas* units ar* being

HandleControl ipnani .

Control Systems Jointly

The Han-olis* could alio be built ooleul three of the four long building ways In the construction ball at the Huang-pu yard In southew launching dock would be rwjwlrwl

f the Kon-csaas tubmartn* la Indeed ttawsear powered. It represent* an outstanding achlcvernent tor nival research, dealgn, and production In China. Even Ifot nuclear powered,nn-clan submarineull which la of an advanced design, capable of high pcrfcrmacce under water and compatible with necater propuaboc.inimhai tubnaarina eases ahould provide the Ohfasate Navyong-range utidarwater attack capability and could prepare the way for tbe production of SSBN'a, tbe Brat of which could be completed

Wace fleaf

he factf Chloa'ittSkar neral shipyards are Uflrnti atmg en the peo-ductior of rruinle-ccnnpped aUp* and boats md tee lei the importancea* lit urritt bi Chinese naval planning and strategy. Duringbo Chinese producedon andiojt missile patrol boats, bringing their total Inventory of such boots up to about SO. Currant production cooetnur* at about tbe tame rote, EtTactive coverage of Chloa'i kingy rntstue boats would probablyale believe that thean meet thii production requirement within thefive years, and subse-picnt improvements In the force of mitarte bcott will probably he qualitative.

its Th* Lut>dtancUoWoyer tsartjear oimtanant, and li at the first [ndigonocnry designed comhatant env pkrying ileum turbine propulsion Th* Luta-clnai drstrnyert will not only increase tba mis-lile power of the fleet, but with their slse and

C5CC nm range, they wiD alao improve the oceaii going capabilities of theavy. Armament for this ship consists ofm guns and sti Inunohen for Styx-typo cruise aiiaiileiange of at leastun. One unit hot been compltrted and at least iu more ore under construction. During the rtext two years, the Chinese will probably produce Luto-cUtr dcttroyertbout the rate of three par year.

o rsMdernisn their surface fleet, the Chinese are abo txpatpptssg thetr existingaad tome ef their Jumojei escortsallot. Three of fear Cctdyyeaassand two of lour Riga-cats* destroyer escorts have bean cecrwjrted to rami le-arrrted ships. Thus, by meant of new prcdoctWxi and by eori'Wiion of older ships, the Chinese will have byorce of about Ifl rmssile-cquipped doatroyort and destroyer escorts.

MLha Butescort of tho diete IKiang-tung-cl*as wu launched at Shanghai. It was observed operating on several c- eosiona during1 No ether ihlpt of uu* dost have been observed under eonttructsoe, and addl-rJonal coasfructsoe raoy be del ayed wai triab and tests of the prototype isntt arepecial probbra could rust in th* testing of that watt because tt appear* toow xrattrik- ryttem which would be China's first shipboard SAM unit Th* ptxaenc*cw misslb lyatam li sugge*led by the arte and legation of circular hob* olxterved io the jcHi during conftrtsctlon. by the tlx* and shape of the twin arm launchers, and by the fact that security screens were set up around the thip while kt wot being fitted out. While thepointsAM In* tol latum, an anti-rubrrurinc or antlahip missile tyttem cannot yet be ruled cut.

he Chines* have producedew of the ssnrslasrie* reeded to support ccer.be! urctx in opentiore ewsy from theuem of the home port Although It Ii difficult to Identify ihipi intended tctsry for submarine support, we have identifiedeatt oneirine under, end the Chinas* have equipped two run bar Mi with tubman neuip-menf- Several ceher auuKsnc* are hecrueotly associated with rubmarrr.es. The Chinese, hew-ever, have not been producing long-runge oiien or cargo auxiliaries, and the navy hat no under, sy lepknlrhmeot capability.

of amphibious thipiHnuead. and the Chines* have sohttle to augsicct or replace theirof WorldST. LSM, andunits. They have built nearly MOObut thee* lutve been usedargeat euppfy boaU along river* andwhere their ability to unloadrhe beach it useful

expenditures fcr naval ifaiphave been rising rapidly. We"utlaya were nearly WOO million In.ne, may more than doublecasts reflect both an Increase inproduced aad the greater cornplesitythipt and their cqiipment. The**do not include coses for thefncilitiei.

Troaninp

n the past, the rratatag most fre-croentfy ecaerved ttnuushect th* Chinese Navy bas been that which is conducted by units of the naval coastal detente force. Most of the participating nulls have been gunboatstn intercepting target ships approaching the coast within the assigned aactar of the exercise Interception of real targetsraiding parties) hu alto providedasperience over th* years. Thosa tame coastal Forces occasionally conduct not;gunneryiring at sleeves lowed by oath* of the nsrra) atr force-US There it mo eh less training activityChina's submarines and major surface ships. Submarines are occasionally detected in training epejston* Involvingna anda:thane; Bat) ibcicipal* at targets in ASW rssaningonducted by elements of the mala snrfaceain surface forces also conduct limited ana-aircraft gunnery practice and entry cut patrobstrategic areas along the coast (such as the Hansen and rohal Strain area and the Shanghaio data, main fore* units have conducted Httle out-of-area braining ot pstroQing.

Itsta too etrrfy to ten what teeJtcs the Chines* have rJavlaad for their rwwrr de-veiopod mlssTle forces. We cotWder it likely, however, that the mis*lie fleet, particularly those untu of the snsln surfacein be used to enlarge th* areas of navaluojl* capability will Improve both lh*power of tho Chtneae Navy and Iti ability IO threaten major surface thlpt af an enemy.

W* tee, however, no evkaanc* that the Chines* Navy it beingttack any of rha arena peripheral toSouth Korea, or Southeast Asia. Beeauae the Chineseimited aoallft potential, sad because they have no amphibious shipbuilding program and conduct oo large-scale arrpbiba-cus trainingelieve that China it not ccntom plating major amp', rstout assault Operationa in the near future.

UnoVaerxmd Novo!. For the pastears the Chinese have been engaged In an ambitious and costlyto build naval bases withuu-

dor ground facilities. I

[When Iheie facilities

ore corn Dieted, limy should bo nble tonodatc ell of China's eilitlng lubtnartaca and missile boots.

he underground facilities are of three boricrlvo-ln tunnel at water level, and two types cf drive-through tunnels One type of drive-throughuilt above water level with rash connecting -he launching and clocking systems at both ends. There areumber of drive-through tuomeas busk at water level Many of dot drive-throughprobably base undergroundand support fanhtlc*.

hoae facilities built at water level will permit faster deployment and recovery of units and ore well suited for protecting navalIn an aloft itatua. All of thesefacilities will provide eaoellenlagainst Attacks by forces armed with conventional weapons. The ursderground raciri-tiesijc.it abo be effective for defense against nuclear altneV.

III. STRATEGY. CAPABILITIES, AND PROSPECTS

LSt The inrrwrngly kuatila aature of Sino-Soviet reasstsoo* throughoutadfcaOy altered China's strategic cambism. It not only undermltied the cV**ererst ef lect of the Sino-Soviet defense treaty vtsa-vH the US but created the additional threat of attack from the north and northwret. The actum between China and the USSR also left the Chinese with no friendly source from which to acquire the modern industrial pbnt and technology and the special materiab essential to theof sophisticated weaponi

n tlicsodicrurnsranccsof apparentthe Chfnese were careful not to show any sign of weakness; there was nodown of Peking's pretensions in itsdispute with the USSR, no obviousof efforts to undermine L'S influence and position in Asia, and no diminution bi efforts to gain statusorld power. Behind this brave front, however, the Chinese have been at pains to control the risks of direct military confrontation with tho two superpowers while moving resolutely ahead to strengthen their military capabilities.

he greatest relative weakness of the Chinese vba-vb the US and USSR was ln the field of strategic weapons. They assigned first priority to ambitious and costly programs that would in time provide Chinaredible deterrent against nuclear attack. China also hoped to discourage any would-be invader by building up its conventional forces and being prepared torotracted war. Afterprograms, air and naval modemtiation has had the higher claim on resources;of the army seems to haveomewhat lower priority. This ta consistent with tbe Maoist precepts for taking fullof China's vast territory and huge population torteople's war*

t it reachry apparent that ourcf Chinese strategy relics heavily oo Inferences drawn from what we percteve to be the geopolitical realities facing China and from what concrete actions the Chinese appear toking by way of weapon programs, troop dispositions, and other ranperetJoas. Asearlier, there is virtually no openor direct information available on Chinese military planning and thinking, aside from Maoist writing on "people'snd we have rehed heavily on analysis of force structure and deployments in the more detailedof strategy that follows.

Hondlo via

Syiiettn Jointly

oviet Alack

hina* strategy tor defenao against aSoviet Invasion foaWs Mao'i* of "luring deep" and "peoplesased upon giving ap rxxriwry,the rnaland rraobllixing Ihe orrttr*against rhe trrvnder.

Thend economic geography of China's north and northwest rtro well suited to this strategy. Tboostly arid, much of II Iind the population In iheae border regions is very ipani There arc practically no large Chinese cstac* or major nv dustrintile* of tbeborder, and tlie rjarcs: ranter center to the Mongolian border i> Pao-tou.iUa by ntr and moreiles by fcnsl-bln groundhus, tho Chinese could give up considerable territory In northernInner Monadia, and Sinklang wilhout any teiaaii Impact oo their powers to resist

Another factor encouraging the Chinese lolssoWtypc defense In the north fa that Soviei troops along the border have much greater firepower, air support, andmobility than the PLA. Should theattempt ti>rong defense close to the border, their forces would be In danger of being cut off and destroyed by superx* Soviet firepower and molality Peking has avoideddeptoyrnent. Barcpt laManchuria where at toast two divisions Ore withinile* of tho border, the nearest large amln force units lie well back, In most casus BOO mile* or more.

ew srnollorto rejsp'nieutal "ire forbeenctoscru- txrder along main lines of communication, 4ppercutly those are toa locnl-d'.fensi* functioit, delaying the enemy advance nnd making htmrice At key points cUonsrvr positions have heeo prepared. For example, the Chinese have dug caves In the mountain aides near tbe UrumchJ0 miles front the border) and lit tbe nountams above Chining oo tbe rail line from Moigoliailes from the Mongoliannd have built tho right mounded structure* at Shuang-cheng-tiu with accompanying cave* and bunkers. Thereto be sotne fried defense* on thecrtarian rail Hoe* leading from tbe USSR and from near the eastern border of Moogoho, but tmf are less developed.

If tlte enemy fought his way past theseurther line* of local defense would oppose him, end histupph/ould be hartnaed by goernMas drawn from the ranks of rhe militia and theand Contraction Corps. Command and conirol of these guerrilla *ct(vitie* would ptofe-ably emanate from military sobrfastrict* and local detent- force unit* of the PLA, wfth orders netrvg rebved by every availableof ccmmunicetJon.

L'rsder this strategy, key main force uniti would be bold bock to preserve their atrength. When tbe invading forces hadcur-ie ovorqlended and weakened, the main ferns* would be coe.imir-edstYsOalo destroy the enemy.

s the enemy was drawn deeper Into China, the Chinese would expect tho ttlatire >apablllty of their forces too-tarmined Soviet thrust could almost certainlyew hundred miles Into China. Wltttlict it could reach Pekingoot pointid, the Chiriese presumably would retreat southward, fortlier into tho interior and continue tlm war. The Chinese look back to thair eaptrtence in fighting both tbeBad the Jspancao Invaders andnefideocc that Maoist tactics can ultimatelyetter equipped force.

Corrlro! Systems Jointly

attack (rum the north, bewever, need nor oeecstsorlly come In lhe formassive ground force luvatlon,hen Sine-Sov lei tension weneak, Ihe Soviets hinleil broadly il the possibility of air strikes against China's nnckcnr weapons centers.ability to rcnel againsttrike is limited.onventional exchange, China's principal retaliatory capability would consist of medium and light bombers which would have Hltle classic* of pcnetraUng Soviet air ikrrnvc* and riaohliag Important targets Inumbers. Chin* coulderviceU air strike with Ms own rnic-lrar weapon* because of the danger ofevnstar ifurn of defense, China ha* Utile capabilityerson te bnmbers or sajalnst encedi nilcd multipleMeal of Its interceptorore loo slow and lack an all-weather capability, its air defense curim limitations system is noi yet ftdly mcaatanlxed, and it has only aboutAM battalions. No effort has been mftdn to concentrate air defame on tbe advanced weapon* facilities at the expense of other defense rcqidremeist*.

Kccofnrilisg Iheir vulnerability totack, the Chlriea* have been attempting to duplicate and disperse key ftci kites. {This is dlicuaerd In III C,) At Ibe same tftne. they are tryiag to lanprovo their airastainat arrack fron the ssurth, and therei tofntrm underway that will furtherthesover the peri id ollrrBttc active atr defense will play an in-creasing role In defense stratogy.

B. Defenae Aaalnst Attack From rh* East

contrast to the northern borderthe coastal area* of China haveconcotitrnHoiu of population nndof Clilna'i great (isdual/ial complene*ns numerous secondary centers are within

ISO miles of the sea. Here there are no great areas of sparsely inhabited wasteland to be sacrificed in order lo stretch the enemy'slines and Increase his vulnerability. Astrategy based on drawing the enemy inward would mean the immediate loss ofsegments of China's industrialand major concentrations of population. It seems clear that Peking does not intend to employ this strategy and that the Chinese are prepared In east China for a. forward defense.

navy would be involved infine of defense in the cast. Fifty orsubmarines could be used to meetfleet, but their main functionbo to lurnss enemy sea linesThe small but growing force ofdestroyers and destroyerattack approaching faces well outunder the cover of their ownaircraft (In future years,atmight be available to strike sornoatnemy forces near thebe mot by the rapidly growing forceboats and by numerous torpedoartillery, which the Chinesedeploy in fortifiednd, incruise missiles would abo come

an enemy force landed, ft wouldby both local defense and mainBut the Chinese ore also preparedin depth- For example, as farthe roil juiiotJons of Shih-chi*-chuang(which lie Inland0 miles, respectively) there arewith scores of associatedpositions, aprsarently designedtho enemy advance.

ubstantial number of bombers and fighters could oho bo committed to defense cf

JCja-fJfCt?tt

the cout. It the rtttncr.ce gained nit superiority cm the coast, the Chinese probably wouldubstantial portion of their aircraft to bases deep in the interior Tho nndergTosed storage facilities for aircraft and tbe dernoo-strntrjd capability of the Chinese tor rapidof lirrtclds would msks it difficult for sn attacker to destroy the air force on the grourtcl

C. Possive Defense

nother Indication ol Chinas defense rrundodness Is the Immanso effort that has gone Into passivedispersal aod shelter construction. The Chinese regime hns beenargo portion of Its newthose for detente-relatedInterior regions. Factoriessome strategic valuo tond to be dispersed In out-of-the-way valleys anddners Ulitv to detsjctioa end artaok.

erhapsegree unmatchedla the world, the Olnear- are building civil detent* facseUiee She. tee trenches by the thousands caJst in towns and around factories, sclsoots, and military tnstallabois. Under-ground shelters ranging from simple bunkers to large tunnels with sophistical tod life-support equipment arc being built In tho cities.

arge tunnels now in existence or under construction atr so of China's airfields will bo able to alsekor moat of China's fighter foe on Tunnels now built or under conitruotiao nt China's naval botes will be able to shelter til of the navy's raining submarines andboats

ecauseercent of the Chinese pop-ulation still rial das hi the ccursvyside. the everyday economy of the people is much less dependent upon sophiitkatod communications and trtuuportatlonhan is the case with other major powers. These factors harp to reduce China's vulnerability lo bombing, conventional or nuclear.

hina's energetic pnxgram of et*flalong with tha advanced state of Hi program of constructing shelters for aircraft and ships, suggests that itt leaders are not entirely bluffing when they say that, evenuclear aoeeir, sufficient stxertgth would be left tooOow-up mvsaaon tubjugate the oaboa.

D. Offensive Strategy and Capabilities

hile the main focus ol Chlna'ibt defensive, thb is not to any that Peking hasliought to contingeeitaot in which ofreastive opera bora beryond Its bordan would be necessary or desirable And in anyilitary force which has been developed to put up strong reaistancc against Invasion by the US ox USSR inevitablyaxirderabltt of tensive capability against lesser Ices. China's aimed forces aren moat cases overwhelndntniy eupertar to those of anyalong th) ptaiuUty exceptiog the USSR. Geography and the urge to preserve itscapabilities against tbe USSR and US are the chief factors limiting China'sagainst lbs Aden neighbor!.

ITS. To take the easiest area Brtt, If Peking wen to decide to directly invade with Its armed forces, it oould conquer all ofAsia if opposed by only local armed faroes.

n the osse of south Asia, the togittJc problems presented by the Himalayas and the sterile reaches of the Tibetan Plateau severely limit China's offensive capacaktias. Although the Chinese could mount en assault aexusa tke Himalayas using several divisions, problems with long and difficult supply lines wouldthem from sustaining sny offensive into India beyond the Himalayan foothllb. Thorn

TOP

arc, moreover, only threo airfields ia Ttbel bora whichir iimpiri msrtcoi could berw csher atrtlaaca la westerndomb-ng tttsck*he Himabyat,

hnre fact* limit China to deienje along the border ond to llntllud-obicctlve offensive action* like tho oneven3 effort It should bo noted, required months of logistic buildupemporary Increase In troop strength In Tibet. Thus,imited offensive action Into aouth Asia would of moat certainly be precededong buildup of supplies and troop* Chtna't strategy in the area appears to be defenttve. It calls onfy for maniaming sufficient strength ir Tibet to repel aad punish any rntnuaoo by Indian forces-

he case of Taiwan Is different IIdecided to use turned force to take theonsiderable redeployment of land, sea, and air forces would be required before launching an Invasion. In addition, extensive training and exraelacs of amphibious andforces would beictaaary.

nce the**bad been achieved,orce* cmald ahncst cartsaruy takr Taiwan Kt th* aba ice of US nuhtaryEvert In thil case, however, the operation could be quite costly ff thewere determined lo resist. But the relative superiority al the PLA will lucroaso during the period of this Estimtta

n Korea, th* rat/row width of the prsdratula limits tha number of troops that could be militarily effective in cnovbat Lo-guticbaaed on geographic Irrrri-tarscos and upon loecolng the Korean war suggest that if the Chinese ware to take the unlikely option of participatingajor attack against the aouth, they could commit as many asombat dlvialona to the attack.

lfll. But in any of these coo tin gen oes, Po-klng would be coeulrained by the necessity of providing for defense needs dsewhesr, pst-rlcukrly vts-aVvai lh* Soviet Union, and by the requirements of iUernal security.

E. P^ voeeii

he nest several paragraph* dxtcuat what we behave to be th* moat likely trend* in the dev**op*assat of tha PLA over the next five years. The judgment* set forth an* based oa infemsnac* drawn from what teem to b* Peking's Itmtegyeet it* military reqnlre-mentt, on an analysis of procurement andprogram* now underway, and on our estimate* coo corning likely advances in China's taehuiea] and ocooonic capacity.

hile these it admlitedly muchin making such predictions, there are abo factors that Impart some measure ofation's armed forces represent, at any point in time, the cumulative effect of past policies, and In China's case especially thereelf-iuataining momentumesist*at lo suddenIn tempo and direction. In th* first place, tbere ahetdyafoe and bur demesne etToet. they could doore, but they ar* certainly rnuch eiarti the margin Of theiran other the US or USSR. And at tht*rotsuVy be-cans* they have aaertflcsd to omch to fat where they are, th* Chin*t* caftan aoera to feel an unusually strong ecenpubion tohead with bnc standing prcspama to a* to retiree tcanethtng oo thuir crerry Irrveatmesit even when it means attentive production of ob-lotesiesit eemiprrsent Shifts In prVorltiet and emphases, of course, are postlble, but here too there are limit, to Pcuuug'i flexibility.

52

v'-a

ystems Jointly

technology and Industrial plant are still not wlfldcntly dcvotoped to permit rapid conversion to major now programs of great complexity Even st the Chinese soonl Keren! set of military poheje* they would only be in tho carry itago* of fruition toward Iho end of the portod of this Estimate.

Tot the reasons outlined above, wethat the moat bkoty rxosmeet for China's armedters over tho nest lew yean ss one of steady irruwovernent. largelyesult of pots-cteS and programs now underway. Although this essentially "straight line" prelection tug-grata that there may be few, if any, spectacular developments in the PLA over the near term, it decsonemoorJoo of Peojog's resolute effort to use its limited resources to bulormidable wui machine.

It Is possible, however, to conceive of circumstance* involving changes In Peking's pertsntioa of the threat, new Chinese lasdcr-ship,ramatic turn In world peh tics that might cause China to alter significantly the strategy nnd programs as outlined In tins- Indeed thcru oro numerousof events that could affect theof China's military estarslaAmoor, and the following is meant only to be uhssOsarve of the pcsnralities.

orurther opening to the US and an easing of Sino-Soviet tensions could encourage Peking to case back on the throttle rrtore or less scass the board It is eventhat at some point the Chinese would seek meaningful tripartite agreements on arms control with Moacow and Washington. On tlie otherorsening of relations with one or the ether of the superpowers could lead to shifts inlare-up on the Chena-USSH border,ata nee. could prompt the Chinese to greater efforts to upgrade andiu ground forces and border defense capabilities.elaxing of the tta-rtsodiale threat on the border rragbt result fa Peking'stronger focus on longer-term programs for the development ofweapons, especially If at the same time Slno-US relations hadurn for the worse.

t It more difficult to envisionnut directly Involving the superpowers that would greatly inlluence Chinas military offoals. China already has an awesomeover many of Its neighbors and has pro-grama in train that will widen the gap. With respect toolicy of seeking political and economic leverage Is clearly the meet promising road for Peking to follow. China's strategic programs, undertaken primarily for other reasons, kave their rrsutaage for Japan as weft But military programs pointedly designed against Japan would not only risk causing the Janarsctc to respond with their greatprowess but would quickly Impinge on uaportent Interests of tho US, USSB, and ether major powers throuihout the world

hanges stemrom declaitssss not directly linked to International developments are also possible, Chlni't mfltory planners miglit decide that thehould be equipped with weapons that are not tn inferior to those ef the US and USSB Iaat could involveback on producCon of obsolescentin favor of fewer but more modernand giving RADarger slice of the military budget. Coiicrctely, this mightuick phasing out ofubstantial increase ins and Mtg-Sit, and early serial produciion of theimilar more advanced aircraft. For llie navy it might mean early cessationau tulsmarine construe-boo In tovor of lhe new Vtrag- and Han el asses and greater efforts to master the techniques of operatingeepwater navy. For the

ground (orces, emphasis might be placed on tbe development of new equipment that would upgrade firepower end mobility tad efforts tootent arsenal of tactical missiles wilh appropriate modern guidance systems and warheads.

ut even considering the possibility of devclcT>menis such as the csmples just cited, there are factors which shape CruWt military policy thai are relatively fired. Whoever might bo leading China's moreillionwould atosMt certainlyg-powor status for the nation and would strive tothe rriurtnry gap between China and therom presentilitary policies would probably be at most matter* of degree rather than of kind- Tbe goals would remain similar and the means probably would not change drastically.our estimates of forces for the fire year period ahead essentially project rnescot potl-ciej. They do so in terms of ranges which allow for some of the uncertainties Involved,possible specdups or slawdowis in various programs.

. Tho ground forces are receiving newer and better equlpmecit Ibat will graduallytheir firepower and mobiliry^both notable wenknease* at present. While these fm-provemcnB will not be sufficient to enable the Chinese to protect large modem forces far beyond China's borders, the PLA thould be able rncreoatngiy to contest an Invasion rnore effectively and in somewhat more forward positions than is now tho case, especially on the northern and northwestern frontiers. In addition to the modernization program, there rnay be otherrnore atterrticoi to improvfng aad equipping militia and para-mlhtarywill enhance theof what trill Is China's main militaryvirtually unlimited manpower. Tinsassumes, however, lhat such measures do not run afoul of doctrinal dispute and aro not carried to tho extremes that Mao's policies have frequently been taken In the past

short, the already foroddablecspabJlitiej of the Chinese Armyenhanced, and the prospect ofBuKsive force willoreunattractive proposition for any

Air on of Air Defense Forces

outlook for air end ahis one of substantial increases in sire

Conirol Systems Jointly

quelitatlve Improverrent proceedingere modest pace. Chinaleatnahsng backlog ofighters to be worked Into rftariaonal units, and Ptkiog may decide to plioae out production of thii aircraft In favor nf Mig-Sll. Heretofore, Chinas In-rerccptori have been aubtonlc/iW luperjooic withew beang all-weather capable, nod oost are forced to rery on lockets and nuns for aerial weaponry, la all probability the CMncsetTJ be anned with reiasilea and will be equipped for all-wcathor

ho Chinese haveonaldorcble Investment In therogram, and wo would earner* da) aircraft to enter the force in crsnaktoabae numbert. At rareaent, however, we lack positive evidence thai aetata tatBaate Ron of thes underway.

If the Chinese haw delayed ottheroduction, program, they mightroduction pendingof the fleam-A. Thairototype of which it crurrently being letted, may be available for demabyataaU aa the med-lBTOa

At for other types of aircraft, theight or-bomberignificant cjuallt alive Imritovemeut In China's around attack capability. We cipect the Chinese to continue productiont for rrxttt or all of the pertcd of thi* Esdrnete. Tbereuestion a* to how much longer the Cluncae will continue to prcdueeet Ught bomber; triey may toon conclude that the cost of building and deploying more aircraft with tucb limited

iTanaKnTO LEVELS OF OPEMTtONAL MILlTARr" AlflCBAFT AND SUBPAtX-TO-AJR MISSILE BATTALIONS IN CHINA

ESTIMATE PROJECTION PROJECTION

l.tOO 28

0

11TE Or- EQUU'HENl

5

MH-1SV1T

Mtj-18

Mlg-31

FJ>

O

or ceeararabla model) Bombcci

D-88

115

17

TruiisorU

0

Llghl

HelirOplaet

SAM Botulfces

These ore esWaKs, not counts. tnfcrteattMoaOt^aste on theItvidenceracrata fee cke-asW traduction of Uiiht c* mtatum traospcrta Kay in: now lo InrenKfy would depend on pjichnset abroad.

Handle via | Conirol Systoms Jointly

" not warranted. Although lite Chinese will probably ooocMaw to insi the To-UJ jet snettusa bocaoeric an carrier, am will probafcrr be astignod to lecuanelanknce task* and tome may be producedanker vertical

19ft SAM deployment ii proceodlngaster clip lhaa in years past, am! lha Chinese are producing AAA io ccraaCksrabk quanti-ijts. Droioytm* of tho Hem vrraioo of theould be seoploaieatedow-eltitude weapon which could alto bocorne asaHablo during the period uf thit Estimate. Radar coverage Ii being ortraided, and new ceamnurtkations equipment now becoming available will improve lhe ccantnand andof Ghana's ear detente tyataaa. By the, the Chlneae wifl have an Improved capability for limited area defenae, they will, however, ttlllong way to go in pro-vfding adequate protection of lmportAnl targeti.

n sum, China's air and air de'-nae capabilities, eaeept perhaps in nesaerical terms, will ceasdaate tooor march (or the attack lores* of the US and USSR, and China will continue to be vuawaMearge-ecul* air attach that employed the latest equipment and technology.

Nerved force*

srrant naval shlrbuilaog protaaaM and the ItwsUmJ there tstttklog in ackhtasnal csas*truction capacsy clearly at-tettl to an amlaiion to becotnr on important naval power- Production of attackdestroytrt, and guided-rntsulc patrol bests It already substantial, tnd China will

AT MID-lBTi

projection for3

rftOJKTBD LEVELS OF OPERATIONAL COMBAT SHIPS LN CHINA

PROJECTION

rrpF cf ship

8*1

W

W

HewMini)

ESNi .

DallStie Mtath

iT>nr> ami Destroyerwinpem

Cuidod MlBIn

PMrctSfcl-etodKt-ont

MMilo Motor Cimbeals Toepnk- Potrs ..

1

Tt*tcoRb totjnilihackar poveiei.

ou dlisE-puntered fcnllntie mb>l> ibbmmro far iuoatt

OrenlOntJ unlit protected7 art aacltar-powmd

oli thrw sklpi may notinnhit ready tt tha Due.

jcit^fCTcfr

Hondld vie

haveany rubnwjinr building positions ii ibe Soviet Union if currently usraap At this pornf, addiTSoo*nits and adviKa in technology teem to betbe Chinese capability to operate tlietr navy to it* lull potential Given the toof leanuiig to operateeep water nevy. thil corrdJltan Ii likely to persist through-cot the periorl of this Cremate. Alrhough we brieve thereood chance that thewill begin to 'show the flag" with some of their newer units, there is httle likelihood ofa*(or nival presence In waters distant from Cbrnt for at least several years. In rhe mennrirae. tbe Chinese CeanMfat Navy's already Impresiive capabilityoastal defense, force will continue to grow.

rocffcof Nucfeor Waopons

inally. w* fJalak It lady that th*eaetkcaJ nocaear capability during th* period ef thisactical bomb Ii the beat candidate for an earlySosnewhatoward the end of the period of tins Ertima ta, th*UI protsabjy be capable of deploring tacetcalrnitailas or rock*ts. Similar tn th* case of their emerging strategic capability, the mast th* Chinese can hope lor in thil are*easure ofthough at,adly outaaatchad. tbe potsissioD of enrjugb soch weapons totronger enemy to desert from using hu superior capability.

JCuVftfCTJeTJ

jOj&jeellfiT

Handle-^yslerm Jo ot!/

THE GROUND FORCES

OBOANIZATJON

V* Mlniitr, of National Defense(MMD) li th* centre! eemtreJSng authority It* *JIforce* innd MND cotrtrol ouer themycoxsrited through th* General Stall Department Th* armi of the groundthertlllery. armor, chemicalnd signalat th* sarne level e* th* *ir force and aavy. but appar-ently have no sepantenstead the around force aim* arehrough functional Seadqoarter* within the General Stall Dspartmrsrt.

l For administrative and commandthe ground farces are orgnniwd intoegionalhe commander of each region la not onlyor th* admtn-ittrstksn. training, and readiness of all ground force* within his geographictkm, but is abo th* tanioroHry to ht> ares In thoaans incorporating pen-ban* of the coast, naval authorities maintain close contact with regionaleadquarters of the air detente district* are normally located near those of the military regions, nnd air fore* officers serve on the staffs of the military region commands.

htary region hn* on* or mora military district (MD) rssoanands hoe* geo-grapfalc limit* genenljyoboundaries MDs appear to bemainly for administrative matters, over-teeing local defense torces, maintaining internal security, and organising and trajcrrAg the railtlia. There are tern* exceptions to this rule, however. Th* Tibet MD. for easnrspte, appears lo wives potato duties ofypi. eel MD headquartersactical tustdquar-ters. Local defena*n the Burmese and Laottao borders andlong the Fukieo coast are commanded by army and military region headquarter* rather than by MD hesd-

i In recant years theavebeen taking *orn* step* to oritur* that cocrpcoeoo of th* army cnefesm mors descry to the categories of fighong unto envisioned by Mao Tse-euug an Ma theory of "piBpIrtccording tc that theory, the army should have two types of regular fighting"mam forces- and local desenae fcaues.-Main force units should be heavily equipped and be ready for acrvioa In any part of the country'. Local defense forces, however, should be organized and equipped to operateocalized area of the country. Local defense units would also work closely with available paramilitarymilitia and theaod Construction Corp* inr.-asion

o implement Mao's theory oforces for "people'sha MND ha*assigned the control of certain beal

60

Via

lyi

to tone armies Armloi aa astigned txcomo responsible for directing all lorces wsLhsa the* designatedf drtrow In-eressed irtsenon lo Hao'i *dbtarywa br th* bet EbU MDi andfetrlets aa weD at local deionaa lorca units appear lo ba worlring race- dlHgantly lo an-prove training and pceporedoeii lor war withto tba militia and Prcductlon and Con-Kruclioahe date relatUm <lo>olopnt between local defense com manor, and th* jiijar-iiaBatyn peacetune aaadd result bt bcrtar^rsardanaltd defcna* oprraiieni In event of war.

ND control of ground fc-ee organlu-Hr.'ii In Ihe field hot been facilitated0 by an Improvement In cotnmunkatloni.eplacing the aiaaua! Mone ifernradkoprtntrr ami la bar aarved to uraptov* th* speed and eeenrucy ofb*ow abb Bt aabUnrt taiwoui contact wtth all tactical headquartersgrarihio lh STRENGTH

VSth an estimated manpower strength of about throe moton, the Ctuneae Army It the Urgcst fa the world. Ourowever, are probably conservative, and the actual sfee of the Chinese ground forest could be large:.

oil ofrmies are main force fighting units. In addition, main force units

incli-tr iinir. vtdlery. anti jlrcn't .ir'.iujy

anatr aad sona* radroeed-ont infantry drrtaca* at well at signal,and combat *riglft**ring retrjtnanti. local didnmo forces conMst of all divisions ind regl-merit' tttigned to bordar defense or military internal aeourity dutiei and tome iod*pemleeit mli-itry units. These torces can beby itsciifcy auagned some* or by any of the varaauaf main fore* units An Inventory nf Chrna's ground fore* units It shown on the following page.

Handle via

Ira! Systems Jointly

CHINESE CKOlrKD FORCE UOTK AS*

The Chlncae pound force is, In or-ganiution as well as in numbers, primarily an Infanlry organization with relatively little hi the way of organic armor, artlCery or rnotor transport equipment Tha following table

ccraparaa the current ear. ma tod Javefa of equipmentersiiseuUrJve Chinese n> ranOy dfvMon with eeruiprneot saves, forand US Intantry dlvusooi

Ji. Scene Chinese military plartnerspreai for more heavy equipmentaster rate for tho ground forces. But the available evidence ruggrsli that the top ground force modernisationace which would not severely tax notional resources or interfere with other weapon programs. In the meantime, the amy Is well equipped by Asian stantlarrJs, and optimal use of availableartillery, and rnotor transport is assured by aivignmg it to specialized divisions and regiments which can be moved to support regular Infantry forces as required.

ut whether one Judges the Chinese Army by Asian or Western standards. in the final analysis the real strength of the Chinese ground force he* In Its manpower. Because of

S

Chinese latently

Soviet (MceorirrdWkalrr

ew

TRACKED

131

VEHICLES VEHICLES AP'.'ILLEIIV

3|SM

^Tjjii^tttr]

Centre! Systems Jointly

relatively lo* riroportion of rote under am sb Chsae. the MM) hat been tan* lo set iSliejtnt reoulrrr.wTiU for stttry Htto the armed force*.to lection ooMciot have produced an army noteworthy far Ut phytico! stamina, datctpline and irtativatsbtL

INING

he Chlncae preaa and radio com meet far more on the polllieal than the military otpcett of training in thu Chinese Army.rash, we can lei that po! iuctJ inckxtrhartsn fisr ChStseSc troop* la mtrrsive arid Irtvolves aubatuniial peri oil of Uwe.|

rom all of there *cufcc* we are able ita brae toicture of the extant and netware of training at past yean, bat It I* far more difficult to provide current aa ret* menti of this activity. Primary emphatlt of combat training traditionally has been at the Individual and small unit level, with each tmtt taoaahtg la> training to the capabdtbst and needs of its petaomteJ. W* do not know the total oiteiit and cane* nature of thla training, but ihe following types of exercises andhave been referenced: long dsatanoo Mrcfaet, Wrouaca. and racutstaso duebtug; bve fire In wah lag artillery, antiaircraftguns,allrmor training consisting of read march, firing, and aasauh fniiUu. combined anre battneaj; jcotwith the militia; ohetrucal and biological defense drills; nuclear defense; and, finally, map reading.

ll- the kaiut ceased by thr CuhunJ Revolution, the tempo of military training for tho ground force* began to pick upo far, most cf the known field traininghat occurred at regimental level and below, and the average CMaes* foot soadter Uwail (rained in lha tundaanentab of con-bat tactic* andmprovement in communications equlprnent and In command and control technique! (such at trlaervice nattoaal alerts) has beta rotable, and coro-inurwaOans rrartang and ocancnaad poet escr-etats of ili-rJiuo. army, and even regional hcadtjuartors level hava become Inctcotlngly contmon Thus we toe that the teval, compioi-ity,ecntescy of rniaouy training has in-atosed II tt also apparrat thai rhe feces of ground farce trolni:ig remains defendve, there la little evidence tn Indicate that China's ground force* an being prepared lor out-of-oouBtry ea^eraftors

Armor andocauie cf the special nature ef their equlpatent aad OperaUont, armor and artillery ousts require more training to maintain basic profietSncaas than do Infantry stoat* p

tlon about an nor and artillery trainingbatrhrtoby, it does permit the Judgment that China's armor and artillery units have at least enough proficiency for tho conduct ofdefensive operations.

^JClB^CneTT

AbheeM

IS. The three known air borne divisions of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) erain the Wuhan Military Region InChina. Personnel In these divisionsinairborne training rnxretscs. Those exercises are small scale, usuallyfeweraraerwiturs nod smallof cquipsienf. Chira'i airborne wis haveorafass airlift operations Proojucntly, during natural disasters, men and supplies arc airdropped to affected areas.

|Allhoufh tfteae rosier orxsaticra rippear tn Isavc beenarge, theof troops aid aircraft that havearo not known.

alculation of China's maximum air-lift apabil.ty -odd Kavvlodc bech dvil and military trsnaprsrta. If meat of the rrcliMry (lee* and part of the etviataa Fleet were mc<sl-itnd, one lightly armed division of0 men could theoretically be carrieda distanceautical miles (nn) in one day. An operation ol that sue, especially If it enrtausded Into unfriendly territory beyond Chinas borders, would present acvere cliffi-oilttct for tho imtoated Cliincso traiuport force- Art transport units would have to be brought under urn fled command and control, and important miliary and civilian air Inns-port rcrvicm would be neglected. MO trainingrsBMesae airlift or for an acccsnpoaying ftghter escort hat been noted. For these reav sons it rs unlikely that the Chinese would transport units of bfgeementalby air. Such airlifts probably would beto Chinese territory, to countries such as North Vietnam or North Korea; or lo poorly defended countries iucIi as Loot or Burma.

Biological and Chemical SO. Although the Chinese recognize theof biological warfare (BW) and claemical warfaretrong offensive and defensive capability with regard to these toxic materials.0 theDefense Corp* has been tasked with the responsibility foe the use of biological as weU as chemical agents within the Chinese forces. The Corps has staff repeeiccilatioo from army down to battalion level. Elite soldiers, known at "Chemical Defcnaoeceivennd aro cepilppod for all phases of CW and BW and for defensive measures ii eventuclear attack.

Chinese generally followIn tactics for the cmplcymcn;agones. Although the Chinesegrenades and land mines, artilleryto be the primary deliverychemical agents. The ground forces faaveof tube artillery weapons LargedssserrririBte CW agents. We betVovc thathave nt least two schools andcoflcsjo far CW training. CW-typehave been found at thoTest Range and at Wd-choa,nurthewt of Lnrichou. The fatality athowever, bas not been active foeyears.

Service Support

contrast to tlie situation regardingand combat support units of theground rorce, wo do have. videnoaservice support units (motor oransportengineers) ore highly tramed endeffective In their assigned duties. Byof their assignments, serviceacquire on-the-job traininglarity basis. The railwaydemonstrated In their cototructlon prof-

54

via

Conirol Systems Jointly

tn North Vietnam ond in Mulli-central Oun* that they arc among ll*ho world

Recent Trends in Training

MMsjsl

tihe apparent results cf rhe puree of Un Fieo as Minister of rhmmse was the iroinetllate terminal tern of theoed" sol-din and "Four-Coud" company rat hut syuems which Lin pioneered and promoted. In both aystcens, being good al potties was the lint and rueeceoaf criterion tor eucflence. Ai (hough Lin's rating systems are now defunct, it is most unlikely tlsal rtoliricu] training In the amj' will be ncgltotid. So long as Maoist coginj prevails, the army willkssssssstfc role to play which will require that Itsawareness and polligh k'Vil

Aufrfory

ince, cxaciacs have been obseivixi at army nnd military region level.

IV. OlSPOSITlON Of GROUND FORCE JNITS

S. Since late 1MB,esponse to the SOviot threat, souse of China's regular combat units have been shifted noriliw-rd and bland from the coast In the proetass. tLc Chineseto havetrategic reserve of tt least five anisic* In central China. All of the coastal military rwglons except Fuchou and raking Iaat coaebat cVeaoos. Even in these two reapers, the number of cocnfaol troops withine* of the coast went down dcapitu overall galiis for the regions. Despite those shifa, inott armies are aril! concentrated In nosllietu and eastern China where they are positioned to defend ngalnst attacks from the north or the east

M Two Millta-yandof particular Insportarsco bt an Bsscsstment of tbe disposition of ground forcehina.wo regions containf theonfirmed Chinesefrmoredsaarfy two-thirds of the army's Independent tank legtmenta. and more limn ono-thtrd of China's field artillery dlvlalon* and regiments- Adding to this list those herder defense and support iistttj which are also present, we find that about one-third of all Chinese ground forces are located in tba Poking and Shenyang Military Regions

V. lUasoas for this craensarjation areMuch cf the terrain is favorable for the use ol armor and arHllery, and both regions are vulncrtblo to Invasion from land and from sea. The seashore part of ShenyangChina's Industrial heartland, and the

Concentration ol Army Deployment.

Miliaryrm^stani kt av duatry Btdub bring tbe admlalaftatlvt

center of mt coamtry.

SB. Outside of (be Peking .ml Sbcnvirs; Military Regions, raotl of the rrrrsrirring errnkt are eOiieerstrated in central tad ensterr. China where tome are potttoned to defend the eoatt while other) trend ready forack up tares either on the ooait or along tha north cm (rentier. Only about onealxm ofrtnle* are round In the foitr military regions which encompwu tha weMcro half of China. Apart from tlie (act that waetem Chsm Ii relatively lightly popalatcd. iherc ore other reasons tor the teordty of men until In the west Chincto Iroopt in Sutktaiaj would bt jcj'edTiet {on*t% juccrodtft! Ui trutti*ij the rail line which supplies the regjoo The

Chinese arc, brrwcvn, turjranttnf their

is tbe teWfcwest,ne and possibly two armies have been placed In the Lanchou Military Region. Cover drag, nttort for at least II new tactkal units of al least regimental sire, and possiblyew army, have appeared In the Sinklang Military Region. The Himalayasaturul protective barrier In the too them pert) ol wait China, and to the south on the Asianthem are no states that threaten Chinese

mam,.

JS The Chinese are abo known to have SO divfcsootegiments with special ic-.rnrvMbUvtan for border defense or Internal aecurity. Thesu unitsunc* element of the local defease force atruetsr* along thef thj oourcry. Addsional dismasts

66

via

as cavalry ortn Ian try uniti (see Is lie oonire sotne responsibility tor border defers*.

ther dtrreots of the ground forte, such at signal aad ootnuot eogirieerlng regi-menli. ore ratheritpenod among allilitary regions. In contrail, railwayunits appear only in tbo Choughs, Lanchou, raking, Shenyang and WuhanAlthough motor transport regiments are found ia everyi. more than SaH are locatednd too' hwett China where rail bees are scarce or non -eustrnt.

V. PARAMILITARY FORCES A. The AalfHIa

n addition to regular mlllUry fotcea. China hat etsrolktd vast numbers of Its esthete* {pchipa at manyillion) in thehe mOlrti has moSocosHy been or-ganrsed into three categorvet oidlaory, baste, and trilled. The ordinary militia, whtchthe vast bulk of Ihi* body, receives very little military training. Only the armedestimated to have five mfUoncould be mobUited qu icily for combat In time of war.

3R. In TBccntourth category hat ippetrol The Chinese have begun to organtre the moat highly qualified and rtllobl*of lite armed and basic militia Into what they call Independent militiahese units, organised by the Jtten (county) armed dcparriiirnts. may be designed to serve inas armed units capable of operating ony-where within the rsttea or posaibly eves ahe-whsre. It hat recently been reported that large Dsmbart of techeachen, have been created It has also been reportnd that many militia "di. iiions" ore being eitabllihed througlscut tbo country. We do not know tbe site of these reportedursttt. bet they are urihkcjy to contain raot*housand nam.

inimal within the mlhno. Individual weapons are available only toof the armed and Independent mill lie. Tha principalrc rifle* (retired from PLA imvntoncs! end hand grenades.ew cases, agfat leatasn* gun andieces, as well aa small caliberweapons and even boiookas, have been noted with the militia. Over the years,for the rnfltna has been particularlyad ia their tralmng most militiamen rarely fire stare than two ot three practice rounds per year.

ilitia training come* under thuof MD coenuavods In conjunction with local defense force uniti of the PLA. Meet trafatasj. however, it provided internally by the mihba organhatsoes thinansVei. Tbe rrubria is partly tttfted and lorgdy commanded by former PLA personnel. Under the current terms of tmlitary service,ol-dicrt are released from active doty each year. Thee* aa-tcacSect form the nuckro lor the militia, and their experience enttarscea the rraa-tary cj[nihilities idation

lthough militia units edit throughout China, they are rnoal numerous in the densely populated areas CapaUllbe* of the militia eveningle category vary,pen the trecfoency and scrlcuanesa of military training. Al the present time, the militiain patrolling borders and coasts,In maintaining internal security, and may be c. pi We of repelling tosaD partiet of In-truden or tsrvoclers. Because of its dispersal and minima: armament, the militia by itself would be enable to halt advancer by largerell armed Invaders.

TCd^ffCtET^

handle-Sysleavi Jointly

Urge pool ol* partially trained civil. Ian: and fonnor aoldiera that make up (he militia wouldaluable asset In time of war. lixtoed, the mllltta Itacto reserve for China't armedilitiamen would aim be available to provide logistic support to regular PLA units and to heron an invading enemy In addition, some armedndependent militia units might tobe upgraded to local force status and be fncoipornted into the regular PLA thwith Mao Tse-lung's theories of "people's war".

For the past several years. Pelting has itietted the Importance of improving oTganh smrion, training and ideology within the militia. The limited available Intelligence suggests that tho improvements that have occurred have been uneven, aod that the militia still apparentlyong way toin training-fce/ore it arrproacrvn the goal ofully-trained and wen-equipped titlten army that can respond efficiently to theof national defense.

B. Tho Production and Corowruehon Corps

Production and Comtructionanother poramilBnry adjunct to theof the Production andare now found in every militaryIhe total number of Corps membersupwards of four rrrillioa, of whom nota third have had prcvforis rofBtaryTho rMjority of Production andCorps ii>einbeesrilp now probablyurban youths who have been "tentthe countryside.

3ft Leadership poslljons within the Corps are mainly filled by active duty and retired PLA officer* which permits the Corps to provide fts own rnaitary training. Except for tbe atirtod units (variously designated asguard, armed, or militiaeapons are scarce within the Corps, anddrflb frequently Involve the use of dummy weapons.

The Production and Constroctloo Corps bat certain things in common with the rruTitia: its personnel spend much of their time inwork rather than in militarynlit hovo il if furrnt categories of readiness; and its use in wartime would to some degree parallel that of the miUtia. But tho keyu that the Production and Conitruc-tioo Corps cornet under tho direct sdmisristra-tion of the PLA This means that the degree of regimeeHaBOo and control over the lives of Corps morn ben It greater than that of militia-men who aro administered by civil authorities. Because of tbe location of Production and CorutructSon Corps Installations and because of personnel selection procedures, ivicnihership In the Production and Construction Corps consists mainly of IndMduals who are tepa-rated from their famines and dependents. This fact means that Production and Construction Corps members could bomore readily and quickly to perform full timeduties in eventational emergency.

Although the Production and Construo-tion Corpa isation-wldo organKtation, the largest eooceatratiens of units and pee-aoonel occur in tbe border regions where tbe state Is using the Corps to develop agriculture and industry and to strengthen China'sposture by fsrrphnting large numbers of loyal Chinese along Ihe borders. TheTable shows the estirnatod range* ofand Corrstruction Corps manpower in each of the military regions of China:

iiccauw of the slxe sad nature of the Production and Construction Corps, It could probably musterorce of one million partially trained personnel If required fordcfcaic

HondlsCorttro" Syite-mi Jointly

TOTAL nilvWL

Handle via

SyHutm jointly

chinese communist air force

ORGANIZATION

The Chinese CornmaniB Ait Force jCCAF) consists of tometvitlons, too Independent lighternemedium bomber regiment, onereconnaissance regiment, teveral inde-pendent transport regiments,umber of small, unidentified combat andunits throughout China

The CCAF ll beadedommander In chief in Peking, who exerts operational and administrative control over all air unto andommand and control Is eierted throughit districtsimited number ol air elements assigned directly to air force head (pouters in Peking Ah* districts, in turn, usually are divided fnto one or more sub-districts depending upon the arte of forces they* control

A command center for air defense,In Peking, coordinates and con Dob all air defense operations through staffs in the air district heudcpiaiters. ihese staffs directbyr control and warningenti-oirerort artilleryurface-to-air missisesnd interceptorsupolfed by both the air and naval sir force.

Air force bomber divisions are subordi-oato tn art district headquarters or to CCAF headquarters. Independent bomber and rocon-narasnncc regiments are controlled directly by air Force headquarters tn Peking. There Is no known tactical air command within the CCAF. Control of aircraft in ground attack opcrutioos probably is accomplished by the an district or suMirtriot headquarters in coccdirution with the military region or military district headquartcrs-

II. STRENGTH

& The CCAF, with anersotinel, hat shoutetet light bombers, and someet medium bombers. And aboutntiquaiedndiston engine bombers arc still in service with the CCAF, Aa in the past, most aircraft are deployed in the tax air districts odktoent to the eastern periphery from the USSR to North Vietnam. Far western China remains only thinly defended by mtcrcepfor aircraft.

he Chinese are modernising thetr air force with domestic prcduelion ofet mediumet tight bomben,incioding tbe rtiedlftedj, and probably Mlg-Sl fighters. Because the Chinese are reluctant to retire older models from service, the already luge air force continues to grow.

The CCAF hatransports, most of which are old. light piitcei aircraft supplied by the Soviets or captured from the Chinese Nationalists. Tbe transport force, which Isundent/engthargo country with Rich large military forces, is beingslowly by purchases of foreign trana-port aircraft and by domestic pcoducooo of theound medium helicopter.

The bulk of the air force is assigned to air defense. Thirty-tix of theUvialoos are

T

72

nolo via

withilh Ugh* bombers, andith trawporla. Tbrrt) of the CCAF dlsli one are believed to have amiirtqn of air dsecnis.p.-euently a^rimary function of (roundThe typical drvnion la the air forceesjiments. each competedcerdsat aircraft

ti. In addition to ita aircraft, the CCAF haaAA dlruuoos and aboutAMEach SAM battalion occopies one SAM are. SAM aad AAA una provide aa tra-geatsMI lassjHMl toafssssj mm-tccting adm narrative and industrial centers, advanced weaponda and other rrultrory facilities from air attack

III. AIRFIELDS AND UNDERGROUND FACILITIES

he Oitnese haw hulk or improved rnoreiritstasears. VVhea all cnustrvictm proaeets identified so far are completed. Chine win hav*irfields ru itabio for opera Oct is by combatAi many as half of these aiifMldiate occupied only occasionally byaircraft, or are uruKcupiod Some SO of the alrfleldi appear suitable for niatalnedot raedeurn bomber rsueatteeii. andre susreHe for IIH fst It jit bomten Afherngh the CCAF IS Urge and growing, airfield capacity Is mors thantn accommodate present and protected aircraft Inventories.

It The luge and eapeoiive effort lo afford physical prexecHim against air attack for ihe military rsUblHhmcnt snoludes nirdsrsrrnind sstsausfls fantastic* for aircraft Uoderpousd parting areas have been comthtsd or ere under eonetructloa a. abouthiraea* lie-field i. When all of these pmjoott are eorn-pieiod, enough space will be available to *e> eommodala most of China's fighterfor several undergroundLight bombers might be housedwhere medium bornhers might be>mh>Aval

sheftres show thai aiecrsft fcugsr then fighters could not be protected

he Chinese probably will not use the underjeround ftclUties to their Ulcere deal capacity, aler normal pwnsKme con-diboen. To do to they wouM have to eooaoo-dafe their fighters at fewer bases They would alsoarge degree af enmbet readi-nets by iricreasing the amount of lime which would elapse before their lighten could react to tn atr attack Although the Chinese have provided roars than one entrance to nearly bQ usderBTOuad pasting saetlstset and are building airemate runways adjacent to many, it would rate much longer ta scramble fighters from the underground radiiliet than from revetments above ground.

IV. AIR DCHNSf

he Chic est hove achievedhough uneven, asaprnirrriiis'i ia nearly all aspeats at their air oVrense system. The air control and warning syitem hai beenby Ihe Initial deployment of longer range carry warning (EW) radars and by fra-provemcoU In lowaLrJtsdc coverage New and rnore effictrat methods of eornmunksstrorts are gradually beans; developed and teLoSucrd into rhe opesaHcnal forces The rtts andof tha iriterceptoc force is growsvg, and

deployment of SAMi""panding faster than in rx-eviour yean.

eneral Improvement! have net been suffidem, however, to overcome the cW> ftcUncles of Chrnet* air defense- when irseas> orod against those of the US and USSR The number of an. weather Interceptors haslittle,ny, during the past two years, and air defense commurncaiiurts still are not rapid and efficient enough to cope with large-scale air attacks. Although the inventory of fighters with iomc supersonic capability is large and expanding, moat cf the mtetceptcr force still it fully capable only of Intercepting subsonic targets flying0 feet Only the small element of Mlg-Slt Is fully capable of high-altitude intercepts of supersonicThis deficiency wiD be remedied when and if Msg-Sis are produced and when and if theWnese-dcsigwd dekra-wtng Interceptor, colors into serviceew years.*

Ak Survetflcmc*

he Chinese air surveillance rsetweek ha* radars deployed atite*the country. Thit network providescompletedetection and conllnuout tracking of high- and medlunvaltituder tho entire country and out toautical miles (urn) from the border. Law-altitude coverage Is limitedaitan deep along the cottt, and fartherit is limited to the vicinity of trope* tant cities, Industrial and military ceo tort, and to some areas along the Sirio-Soviot border.

ir mrvdlktnce and ground-contreflod mtercept (CCI) copabfhtiei were improved by the intrcduetion of modeb of Chinese radars, five of them vert tan of Soviet air

prifirtninee ihiSKltiMka nlccmbtt

areiaChina's Bnnre': and Dtweaspaeotrieawsiors Prea-smi' drfenie radars, which entered service5hese radars Improved the capability of the air defense system to resist jamming and to track highOne of these radars, designated Odd Lot.obile system which apparently can be use either tor GCI or ts tn acquisition radar for SAMs- Another radar, designated Flat Face, has improved Chinese hisv-altitude Hacking capabilities.

incehe Chinese have beeneries of several new types of radars in northern, eastern, and southern peripheral arras- These radars, deployed In varying number! and oorrsbmatibn io at leastocations, apparently are designed to im prove loaf-range bacatog-l

hina may have an atrbome BWin the developmental stage which will supplement the ground-based KW network.

Even an urscphrsbcatedw radar, however, would be orefal in extending the range cf surveillance seaward thereby increasing the warring tone of the air defense system. Another possiblefor the radar might boracking aid bi an ocean impact area for long-ranga inter-continental ballistic mitti

lft The Chinese have tho Scan OddIntercept (AI) radar used oendnterceptcct. The Chlneie have made tomehat radar, ap-parontly to Improve iholr ability to acquire and track targetsaclcground of clutter. P

Interceptor force in the CCAF aad the Cbi-nesc Communbt Naval Air Force (CCNAF) are equipped withM. and aboutkg-El ja fighters. Tbe inicrctpfcci are coacewtrated inastern air cfatrica ett ending from Marcburia to North Vietnam. The estimated numben of interceptor aircraft, including those in the naval ait force, within the sir dlsblctsare given in the Table below:

lthough the Chinere have developed and apparently are evaluating severalcommunication- systems with increased capacity, none Is prenent-ly used widely In the air defense system. |

Weapon Systemshe Chinese rely on interceptoras their primary weapon for air defense. The npnrotaiTiatelyJvitiont and small number of other units which make up tho

4c0

SO

.

m

m

Lanchni ..

.

m

..

aotio-

Inehdet abatt SOO MlflVlTinrd asaefc.

'Dan cat txtud.j ctaenad alhat* and pectlUy mora anybean eallwjted abdnetid

IIIUcnll unlit.

ll Irrteacefttor Jivision- now have St least one regrrrtent of,ewwo itsrhrietaa of theae aOctrnft Mlg-ili atfj are deployed in frnall riernbers orfthew Limn, io that the capability to intercept tupcrionic targett flying at high altitudes re-ma let small Theten live deploymrhi of Mig-Is* In northern, rait era, and southern Chine has improvedbility torncct targets, hewer.

tiTU

Handle vlo

Chincse plioti probably have7 to good combat prolidoney. bat tlie averageinterceptor pilot probably would profit from more frequent training la live Intercept*.

hina. SAMy US liitiljgwiri Theopy of rh* eerllcst rnodel of the Sovietystem. The CUosse beve snedt-Dcd the missile guklence radar, probably lo improve US performance against electronic coantcrtneosurei; tbey may slsa have made some modification ol tbo missile itself.

he tare ol SAM deployment hatcharing the peat two years. Only an average ofattalion* per year were deployed during the latae believe tbe rate he* now reached aboutear, andoveool ot torr*eployed SAM bsrtelaoaa a* China The leeelerated de-pioreoers suggests that rhe Chinese have opted fee eotenslve depfeyntoM of theather than limit It In anticipationoBjwon system

t one SAM tlte In the Peking area the Chinese have built tome type of protective shelter! for two launch petitions and theguidance area, potsibty In on effort to rsrovidc tome degree of prottsctioo against conventional air attack. They are expected to crJipkry sirs! lor metsutc* at ether tiles.

he Fekattg aadf areas are the meet heavily eWcrded.otal of It SAM bs tUl en. wooed Pekingear the entrance ol th* Pohal Coif.AM units each defend Shenyang. Shanghai. Nanking. Wuhan, Canton, mtng, Cheugtu, Lanchou, and Kokoew other SAM uniti are tea tiered In key loca-ttont in th* interior and near the peri| hery.

lthough Use into of deployment has increased. Chlaa'i SAM defenses remain thin for toountry. Coverage I* eatcntive only in the Peking-Pohai Culf areas, and even thereot yet complete. We believe that the Chinese will continue or possibly increase the preasel rate of depkrystcnt over tbe nest few years At the present rata of stenter year, tone ISOarm ben* would be ihtcatyad bymphata on providinget* rxoOrctioc for lespotlant esttea, tn-datstraal areas, aad aSlttary facuioea it *s> pectrd to crattlBu*

V. CONVEhOlOlJAl BOMBING AND GROUND ATTACK

lthough offensive capabilities are growing, tlie present composition andof the eonveMSoDOl bomber forcesthat tbey ore oriented toward defense of the mainland. The bomlscr force* consist ofircraft, including tomeet andtopellur-driven mediuml-td Jot tight bombers, and about SO aged Tu1 propeUer-driven hgbt benaben

et

he medium bomber force akaacet esr-it nlyrimary mieriai of srraiespc arrack, but It alto Is suitable for convfuitooaJ bombttig missfcm* Because of thetr valueeterrent, lienvevee, the Chinese probably will limit theiruclear attack role until more of these aircraft are available. At the onlyaircraft capable of linking at distancesm, the medium bombers, probably icvuk) be targetad against ttraieglc areaa In the Far East and In the central USSR.

light Bombers

he primary mission of light bombers it tactical offense and defense within China and, secondarily, to aeatby peripheral areas.1 over the years haw* been da-ployedattern rutted esore far defense ef ibe mainland than for perfahaial ctrereire operarkins The range capability of thesewiih normal bomb loads0 pounds largely limits tbelr activity to the mainland and Immediately surrounding arena.

here atelrflrUs Inwhichcould operate. Bylight bombers at airtstaa* ckcuestharden, the Chiltti could ip-eer-i'

target arret as Mongolia, South Korea,Suutheast Asia, and snsal parts of the Soviet Unun aod est end their operationt from western China Into northern India.

33.

I have provided indications of Chinese tnettet and strategy for light bomber unlit. The usual attach profile for the Il-SSsigh hm-high mrssioti They fly toward the target at aa airraids at tOJXO to tttra sect, descendower akstnde to mate their attack, and rhan ctuob back up lo IO.CCC0 feet. The krwer altitude near the target reduces the lilehhocd that the bombers will be detected but reduces tha operating rndtui .ii the aircraft. Results of trainingrefhoted |

|mdicata BW OH crowt are reasonablyvisually and withthey have no equipment for ajtesnafx guidanca ofesuusass.

e do not know whether the Chinese intend lo* to deliver nuclearA Ilsalon weapon orbertnoatielear weapon may be available which could baby8 Trainingrewa has consistently emphasised conventional tactics in aiwciaes involving cround support oragiinst surface ibrpa and submarine*

Ground Artock

imited resourcesecision topriority to air defense have combined to Impede the growthtrocg Qsfonr ground attack fighter force. The Chinese, however, have taken several atepa9 to strong then their capability for ground attack. The measures include the introduction ofJ tighter-bomber, tha formationifth ground attack dMstcsx. and at least aincrease to ground attack Ossnrog among aoras interceptor uriita. The ground attack force nowircraft including about BOOls, andWorld War IIlitei'

s beoorning China's prlasery cooventional ground attack fighter-bean bar, andotential for delivering tacticalweapons. This aircraft resembles the Mig-lU butreater nnge-payload oapa> bility, aod its ehnabyvnent is mating thesrnrsnveraansl tn the gsound attack force since the eerovcrslon to let fighters in the. The estimated performance capabilities ofround support role are given InX on

he pattern of cherrved traonng fndi-cntea thatf aO pound snack division! cencentratearrow range of bombing and strafing teohruquea. Limited in formation |

indicates that these units ara stalled In basic ground attack maneuvers and ginuscry, De-aptts these basic skilk, the face of older fighters hot serious deficiencies. Tbe greatest may bo shortcomings In tactical flexibility re-

from an apparent failure to conduct eaterauve Joint trnlnicaj wUh grourd force iinitsi. Anotherha fact of neviga-boesl aidsetwlc MMmW system on China's older fijjhten DrpkyracM* fa odeileg to the firepower, vertatihry, and ranee of the force.

VI. THE NAVAL AIR FORCE

heind-baaedIt) primaryhe air defense of ports and other important naval irutnllatsems alongileeccoaflryinclude atSlshlppiei:lri-time reeocreattsinco and. anet recently, anti-(ubmanne warfare (ASW) The air force li pnmarUy responsible fee the Mr dafcnei af aome naval intra Nationso> those near Canton, however, and the CCN'AF would generally need Iho aid ef the CCAF fa the eventargv-tcale attack.

or air defense, the CCNAF has somegBOeenuoe of the necessity for close cooperation, navel fighter smtts come under the operational centre! ef the CCAF daring coastal air detente operations but revert So naval control at ether tkwes CCNAF eh da-reosc capabOitlat >r* adequate to counter an attack by onv of the Allan tattoos etuept the USSB. They would not be capable of defend-Inguttained ntlnekodern, well-eqitipned nir force The ability of the CCNAF to provide protection of naval forces ai tea would be limited to about iCO mr- Nor* of the mere advancedl tighten bat been aasigned to the CCNAF.

he Kght besnbat force, ccnaatrngs capable of csss-ytng oat torpedo hear* hag and ttrafing areackt against lightly-detetidcd. tsow-awing targets at sea. For several years, CCNAF bom bos appeared refectant to venture out over vroter, but overwiiior operations increased

Tlw introduction of en nntiship nir-to-surfaee mtasltanto the CCNAF would greatly enhance Its anlbhlpping Ciipujdlti.il. Tlsere it no evidenco of an active program in China which we can dearly identify as ASM-retired, aaaough the Soviets heaped lo build what may be aa ASM mppoit facility ol the Sh-aagchengeru atrtwid ta theasaaM activity aad the gtM there ef pot-asblerates nifjsili that the Chancre are atO itSeresand tn cawriotsaig an ASM foe tlWr air force II they aSould do so. ecrployrnent aa tn aiiliahip weapon woulditpcal step. Ifeapon were devrt oped, Tu lit could be transferred to the CCNAF to serve as list carrier.

Maritime patrol and nvetwaierflights ore curried outight bornbert and byadge andolt sea pianos. j

lln^MarcS

adge ik-craftASW-reUted operations In the Teflow Sea,in ascent ofm from land and In cctt-^rnctaoo with surfacebaa* activities appjrerraj are port of rhe Marlal Chin en at-terept to develop oa alrbam* ASW eatpafssTaVy.

tha advancet made byare not startling, they rks raMnr toand contieued Increase Into defend important naval areasattack end toodest aircenalsiliry in offshore coastal wetert,

TfliVeWct^rf

Abo evidentimited, bat reel, arttisbip capability and the beginnings of an airborne ASW forte.

/VW.fon, ai'iif'

mall military airtft forceof eoeneedium immcofti, SIS liadM transportsehcccteri, arid le orgsn-Ltedransport division! and atndependent regiments. Tho Chineie olio havernniportielicopters aivgned to general support and disponed tn irnall elements throughout (he country.

Most of the transport of air cargo and airborne support of Chins'i rnfhurry force ts provided by one atr lores drvuaon ofub naedlum tramports and someight tranaport* deployed in the Wuhan Military Region. The Chinese use the

or prtoniy cargo Flights within and outside China. The light to iu poets are used

for routine air transport and in support ofoperations

Bippoet to the Pecplo'iArmy heedquartsri and CCAF bcad^jb prerrided byh Dtvuaon, whichthe Posing area and ts equippedmedium trsnarporta.ightelicopters. Most of its aircraftto cany passengers rather than bul*

he continued emphasis on rsroductlon of combat aircraft during the next few years probably willreat Improvement tn the airlift capability from domesticOnly one model of small feed-wing transport andodified MI-4appear destined tor series production in the near future. It is possible, however, that the Chinese wfll produce copiesoviet turboprop transport such as the AN-Z4 or

4fi. In the meantime, the Chlnast willadd to their transport capacity through purchases abroad. They have recentlyaevsralight transport! from the USSR and have taken delivery of four IMSl long-range trarupcrti. Two marc of these are on order, and aegctlatsoni are proceeding for several mora Tlw Chinese have also shown Interest In buying more British Trident fetnd most reoendy havs beenvenous ttoesng transports, tsvaudnag evaa. Some of these aircraft would probably be used le civil aviation.

elicopter lilt capability fa betigby tlie acquisition of Soviet Mi8 Hook heavy helicopters. Thes the largest operational helicopter in the world, curries aboutrooejaiosnaal load of about 9rk short tons, andadiusre. The Chinese have purchasedurbine-powered MM Hip medium helScopteri from the SovieU and are negotiating for the French Sopor FrsloQ heavy helicopter.

CHINESE COMMUNIST NAVY

ORGANIZATION

Tho Chinese ComrounUt Navymnia ofan (eoelisdlrsg tha naval tarnd Is headed bycom-raanuVr in chiefdauertcri ka Peking. Direct frto him are the dare* fleets, eachpecafle gargnaoaac area ofh* North. Sea FleetfananW* fee the enajthne from the Northorder ioasjrwa acathroughly the shoreline washed by tbe Yellow Sea The toil See Fleet parrels fromegrees north latitude to the Pokten-Kwanglung border al the southern end of th* Tehran Strait- Tho remainder of tbe coast-line, to Ihe North Vietnamesehe resrsontibllHy of the Soulh Sea Fleet. Each fleet is essentially self-sufficient and, although Intcrflcet eterclsot are rarely observed, the forces In each fleet carry out similar tinning, thus making it possible for th* CCN toand rnaicrntrtte it* force* in th* eventon tact

Operating lores tn each fleet oraaattsabenarineala lurtaccotor torpedo boatwecrSnjg force, aa aaapaanaoaeaval coastal defensen aunnary forte. AD snipe arencite tha operational ecsstrol of the fleet cTmmaodet. Naval *lr force units are alto hated tn each fleet area, wiih control ocecised by thetn chief through the naval district eornnuinder.

II. MAX* SURFACE FORCE

3 There are fiveof major surface combatants operational In the CCN; The Cordyy- and Lutaclassquipped with tntishtp mists leu, and thend Klnngntng-clati deitroyai escorts. Mecent photography piggotti that two Rlgat have been converted to carry sntlship mittilet, and the Klangtunfl may be the CCN'i first iurt*ctvto-air miaille (SAM) ship In all there areajor surface unit* presentlynearly evenlymong tbe three fleets. Missile equipped thrpt are pri-manlyhe Neath Sea Fleet, thhough It to anticipated thai all four of the East Sea Fleet's Rlgas willise rrSniie cenvmsem. andJw are trader eenatrwnaon fes all tare* fleet areas.

The principal ttsongth of th* Chines* rrojee ttsrfsca force baa ta the anashtp offaa-atve power of las swhssQe thlna. Tbe SS nautical asfle (not)maaile, an adaptation of the Soviet Styi, can elfr,lively cat-range tbe naval weapons of any other Asian naval fesce,

Th* newest Chines* major combatant*-the Liitn andhave anendurance ateed ofim. Thisaiked In-ceeete over the fWMO-mll* Cordyyilo Kinngnnn. Despite (hit Increasedrange, ihere Is aa yet no sign that the Chinno Intend to undertake distant oVp'ey-menu The potenrlal. however. Is being Jo-reJoped.

ft Major weokneBOS of the mo|or surface force ir^ude inadequate air defense, poor ftnllRihrnarine detection equipcieol snd only margins! aritBubmeruiohe CCN appear* to be making an effort to upgrade ils anti-aircraft capability with the deployment of what may be its ffrsi SAM unit.

imilarly, ASWender obstacle. Tbe Chinese have generally relied on obioles-cent aoraan of Soviet design installed aboard thetr warships during30 pssrlod. The beat eoosr range reported te datahinese surface unit fa abont two nm. There It no direct evidence on the sotuu* being Irv stn'ied on new construction destroyers, hut ihe Crsneae aro installing what appears tondtrVwaonaraWt-eVtssgnoduo-hrrOs active sonar on some of thetrIt wouldogical step toimilar syttcm on surface warships, and there are trxllcationi thai the Chinese may he doing this ranges ofonar probably would sesaasn laaashed to several aawnt Tha oapahdi-tsaa of Chares ASW aiaaponi are coe.srttmt with the partorrruuic* of their sensors. The CCN stockpile includes depth charges,weapons wtth irorrimum ranges ofO yards on the newest con bat-anb, and ctjeokoscenl Soviet-designed ASW torpolcce.

6 The Chinese have also been haaviryon Soviet design coocepts fornaval guns. During the past year,two modnrra caliber guns, apparently af indigenous Chinese design, havo appeared. Theillimeter (mm) gun on the Lota destroyer,un oo tha ScedeCs, while theX mm gun on the Klaagtung appears to bo wholly of native design- Neither provides any signifi-csnt Increase in capability; in fact, tha Utter atocnewbsf dated design, appaisnbyaerosMks-deek errsrsmiHoa supply and mutual loading.

sum, the capabilities of thesurface foecet (all far short ofby the navies of the majorAgainst even rsodarttntfy dame airmissile attack, their defenses wouldASW cope Mil tie* arecope with modern submarines.mator surface forcesalvahlecoastal patrol units and, to fact,oastal defense role. Further,more Important, the existence ofmodern surface comlsatantj is anpreset go factorountryto great power statu

UtVAARINE FORCE

more than SO units,he worlds thirdof the force is composed of W- andmedium-range attackby the Soviets hnn China ceased in thewtth II units serving beastthan someelet* have bean butt

end contractionlasi ballistic rmailc submarine was completedrobabh/ from components provided by the Soviets., this unitr major overhaul during which seme or all of the original missile-launchingwas removed. Following the yardit operated frequently, probably Intraining activity. During the past year,lass was sighted at Hsiao-plng-rao Naval Base with two new missilehinese intention to use this submarineest platform for aballistic mitotic.

IL Ia addition tolass program andlass oceivcrsloo, there are two other submarine programs In progress at Chinese shipyards. Satellite photography inubmarine under construction at (ho Wu-cb'anguhan which at fust was believed tolsss.

At least two shipyards arc building the Ming, and two additional shipyards, bothcompleted and more modern, cook! also Join the program. Construction rate for the Ming could reach as many asnits per yearurrently only two units have been Identified. Both were launched1 and may now be operational.

ost significant for the future of the Chinese submarine force fa the Han-class.an la an Indigenous Chinese designtreamlined hull end sail planes. Only one unit has been launched, but omen may be under comtniction at Hu-lu-tao, China's most rood-crn diipyord.

|The streamlined hull design, sail planes and probable single screw of the Han-clasi are conristent with nuclear-power submarine design and suggest that the Kan-class is nuclear powered. This alsowiih Chinese statements made In theuclear submarine would be built There fo evidencehinese nuclear propulsion research and development (BAD) effort has bees. umIst way since tbo, although only fragmentary infor-rrntJon it available on tho program. China Is known to have imported much of thematerial and technology toarine reactor plant

But the evidence is not unerruivoesu. Tlic Han-class was Inimcned at Hu-hs-taoIn0 oritting out period of about eight months, ft conductedtrials late in the summery the end of October, it was again seen at Hu-iu-tao and there were no signs of any rnoblerns resulting from the trials. By hue2 it had been transferred to the Hsuvc^dng-eso submarine base, most ukely to conducttrials before joining the fleet 'lhat short fitting out time and apparent lack of initial problems would be unusualirst nuclear submarine.

Whether or not tbe Han-clan fa nuclear-powered, the appearanceub marine with an advanced hull design Is further evidence of Chinese intent to expand their submarinecapabilities-inimum, the Han-class farototypelass of nuclear-powercdhere are indicationsecond unit of thor yet another new class of subtnartno will bo launched at Hu-lu-taoroduction

eh

could quickly reach several units per year.

espite the siw cd Its submarlno force, thobility to conduct aruishippingrackot rated highly.

I In oon sequence, (he Chineseforce has probably attained onlybasic standards of proliaiency inoprritions and currently posesthreat to naval forces operating hiocran

he Chinese submarine, force has, for all practical purposes, no ASW capability against modern, quiet submarines. Although Improved sonars are probably being Installed on nerve and converted units, theie irnaon at best probably inflectlight Osmose imprrrvrrncot oc Western and Sovietof (he lOSOs. Conserruendy, Chineae subertarinaa are liable to be detected at greater ranges than they couW detect theiruccesaful ASW action by present units, tlwrcfire, could almost certnlnly result onlyhance encounter, end then only with eomidceablo luck.

hai picture may begin to change roe-whsil as tha llan-cfam becomes operational The technological advance Implied by the Hjrvclais suggests that the Chineae could haveignificantlyspsitsr for uso in llsctr new submarines. |

IV. PATROL SHIPS AND CRAFT

ithsses, somef which arc rrcssile-oejuipped, the OChTs minor aurface force Is probably Its moat ]iro-flcfent component Units exercise frequently and often in company. Occasional Nationalist incursions bctp to keep the force ready for action. The cspabllitiea for the minor surface forces are being upgraded by the addttioa of new units, many of which are mistb-ccn-figurad. There aro preaontly two classea ofpatrol boats under tonstruction in Chinese shipyards. Construction is ocsitmulng at the rate ofoar year on Soviet-designed Oaa-ckaas huge folded rrusnle petrol boats equipped with four Stys-typc anrishrp mimic* Inhinese-designed missilethebeing built. This boat is slmilar to tho Soviet Kornar, and carries two maul lea. The Chinese have alio built'one unit ofnew dan rhaenlargedof the Cub. with four Stya-type ktunehers. Others may follow this prototype Overall mla-tHo boat construction could be as high asnits par year.

welve Hainanlarge iiilwrtarlne ofaaicnen corutructed to date and the prtsgrara appears to be conmsntngace of about two each year.eet andons dUpktcnrncnt, tho Hainan laChina's largest nativode-rignod coastal patrol craft and ia thiscceded at sets only by terne of theging patrol escortsMost af the PFs are captured foreign units of World War IIV

Handle via n

supplement! the ASW capabilities of the major surface force, but id sensors and weapons, like those of the larger ships, have eitrvmely limited range.

The Hue mean hydrofoil motor torpedo boat provides tho Chineseigh speed torpedo boat carsability.f these units were constructed (itscludingor esrport) before corrstrucaon stoppedho Huohwaa isooveantlonal hydrofoil. It has foils forward to provideat high spaed, but lhe rtcrn planes on the surface. Itntfihfp teanedoeswin machine guns andop speed of somenots. Several Shanttmg-classmotor gunboats wcro also cortstructod in on apparently uniajcccssfiil attempt toore heavily armed hydrofoil craft. There aref continued Chinese efforts In unconventional hull forms for combatants.

On lhe whole, the capability of coastal patrol forces to carry out their defensiveappears otcellcnt. Tbey are, however, far ton effective as nn adjunct to the majorforces for ASW. The Chinese seem to be making littler effort to upgrade tho ASW equip-ment on these ship*.

V. AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

I* CCN has somemphibious ships. Those shipsift capability of about two infantryisen) for short haul operations. This capability could bo sup-plernerited bymall landing craft and thousands of miscellaneous boats and Junks. In unopposed port-to-port operations, the Chinese merchant fleet could transport aa00 hoops. During peacetime the amphibioua force Is used In rcattino river and coastal transport duties. Ex-orcisesew ships occur from time tq time, bul no large-scale amphibiousore carried out- While the Chinese are producing some landing craft suitable forlift, this const ruction It not sufficient to alter significantly tbe character or capa-bilirjas of the force.

ith adequate air nippoct, the Chinese Communists could probably successfullythe offshore islands, providing they were prepared to accept heavyinding on Taiwan, however, woulduch more difficult and complex operation. Theshould have ample warning as the Corn-munists assembled their invasion fleet, and even after the invasion Beet got underway It would take aboutours tt> transit the Taiwan Strait. The Communists would, of course, have to maintain air and navalof the Taiwan Strait, and they would have to depend heavily on air power for fireof the landing force because the CCN* naval gunfire support capability ft inadequate lotrge-sctlegainst aoiast The CCN has practically no capability to carry out distant, large-scale em-phlbious operations.

VT. MINE WARFARE

he waters off China are suitable for mining for durances varying fromiles off Hainan Island toiles off the northern coast. The Chinese are well aware of tho efficacy cf mine warfare; almost all naval vessels arc capable of laying mines, and the CCN mine stockpile is probably very sorgo. The Pecptei rVepublic ofown varieties of moored contact and bottom influence mine* from tho USSHbey ore rnobnbrycopies of several of thesehe only known indigenously designed mine it anine whichepth ofoeet

to

y uuf/rwfitimj lit nival (oiaei with ow af ihe thomawb af availablehe CCN could impboi farnldahle rasfssraildlr* caaatsl deJenac forces, these fi**d* cooid aMplhcaadv hamperopcrar-onsnrrtleaisn, an ffivader couldoneldeni ble delay whilecbaoneli far assault craft

he CCN mlnetwwplog force iitoo imail ia elfoailveryeter* mined mining ofleniive II hai only wmeiuuor units. In chidingf the oceek-gcdrrg3 cliu Moat ofreacting aa patrol craft, but retaia thetr mJrvjsweep-oghhrsufh tbe Ctn-nrieeed foe auVktiorat!* hipa of ihit type tie currently hong bulk, and rhe program ray ham been rurTarjored. Only one irurmwcvper of indigenoui design hat beenliogle Wooaung-eiasi MSM, fust aeeo Inienyun-cfau* trswlen have bten built which iccm suitable for eaiy ton.orilon to minesweepers. No large wcoden-hulled mine-oounierautature units hove been3 minesweeper? are capable of tvreeptng acoustic and rnagsirsbe ciines. and all minesweepers are frtlnd lo iweep moored osbms

VU COASTAL WHNM

he Chineseyatem cf dlgbtlyommunication and observation postt (COPt) for aeawaid lurveillance. Tbe COP organization, as an Inlegral part of the coailal defonte system. It reuponilUe for vtrual and ruder (racking of Intruders The CO Pi areconcerned wtth rurfeeeut fame have an air anarch capability aa weB. The posa are strsaespraDy Boated on ofl-troee ishaade or peasataesa hand farnerJcoi

I _ _

oAd early warning perimeter. The

COPl report to filler ceo ten whichart of the aboeo-baied arm of the Naval Coaitel Deferoe Force, subordinate to the fleet eorn-macder The first commiaidar retaeaa control of patrol veaeals which mvcatlgnt* targatjby the COPt.

upplementing tbo COPt and patrolare coait artillery batteries and four guided rniiiilr Mlrs. one of which ilCut- batteries are strutted al most ports and on many offshore islands

hr Chineseumber of Samlet (SSC-2B) coastal defense cruisefrom the Soviets priorome ofmile range missiles are deployed, the remaindar laving been used up In BID test programs The Chi new apparently are notrhe Tiwl rt. They here, however,two cruise -marries, one of which re-semblei the Sodo Styi while the other appears to be some two feet longer. If this added length Is used for fuelIt would Increase thernile range of the Styi There Is evidence that thai lengrr must* is being deployed to coastal defense attet

via, auxiiiahies

heuiiliary farce, although it hot been eipanded rornewhat In recent years, fs still Irwdnquate to support targe-ecale or Open-ccntn eonsbst opcrsuoni In distant wsrtess. Than arc aa shrps now under crav sCucncn luitahle foraval force at sea in extended cperaticru. None of the CCN'i oilers Is configured tor underway re-pleruihrnent, and there are no ipccially de-aigncd ammunition ar stares repltniihmenthe order of battle- The auiiliary teste dosa have ens small tahraejtns lender,CO-ico Taehih. first ehtsrvedhe Tachih ia probably capable of providing mtermedltto- level repairs and of rearming

TOr^wagff

Hurdle via

Systems Jointly

MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION PROGRAMS

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

L Daring ike past lev sawn. WMmbate IndVcaled that tmpcrttrK changes have occurred ta the ergs at rationalfor science and technology in China.

These reporta,r"

thai the Slate SeierrtiTic and TechiicJogical Commianon was abooshed ka ItWO ard that some acsenrtfic and lechastaoapeal (SsrT) bts-reaui were resubceoinaiedisery of National Defense {MNP).

i with any state-spcrisored activity In Crsina, ultimate authority over tha organs lor military science aad technology rests with the Feektfauro of rhe Central Caissssattee. Party peecy for China's rralaary fUD ta eiasaassaadhe MND through lhe MillUrty Allans Corr, rnauton ef the Party. The MND la believed to direct military BAD mainly through the National Defense Scientific and Technological Ccmmliaion (NDSTCJ. iratltutej under the various services of the People's Liberation Army and tho many research acidemias of the Ministries of Machine Industry. The MND also ckrectry operates sotne RJrD faclhties sock as She Arsdearry of Mlttary Medical SeSwacea. In addition, scent universities aad eoaVtgaa, such at the Peking Aeronautical Eaghtaerlng College, may itill be controlled directly by theNDSTC.

n alternate line of authority overT ealrts ihiough govern men Irunning from the Stat* Council to the MND. Although ihli channel has appeared inactive in the past, It may begin to assume neater importance because of tbe fall of Ins Puss endOcitras and the ecnecetntact rise of Chou aW-lta who beads rhe State Coaxal

4 China aapcrei let SAT attf-surncleccy and has made creditable progrctt toward this goal. The Chineseowever,that they stillong way to go in this field, and they clearly intend to make Ihil use of available foreign technology to compensate for gape In their own production ti pant It tie* and to speed up the pracew of acquiring modern weapon systems.

& In carrying eat rational progress of RAD. tbe Chinee* have aistgned the ragheat

priority to military fliialssanent work. Tha inatt intense ef frets have beenuclear weapons and strategic mtssilea, but In the but few yean devetopmnnt work on militarynaval vessels, and tracked vehicles also has Increased markedly, and development and deploymentide range cf electronic equipment haveace-

Ground Force Research end Development

fflaUa*qvett

hasnomber of lestwith land arsratntciita,mportantordnance is located near rvl-ch'eisg,rrdlcf rwxlheait of PcsVii.'. Al that1 mil Don square feet ca flcor spareolaxated for stops. trchweaitrwwnsj acfcccJs, RfcDcap*is testHittellotkm Is theol several military facilities Inol Pal-rh'cng. Tho iimgo liesor armor and artillery firing andtesting of baDlstlcs and mitrslittssa,Iks of all calibers, armor materialsIrrtlkaocea. aad poatibry naval

Motile Rasearch and Devetopmeni

Chi nolo have snsdoIn space nnd ballistic mttsllnry,bt as ycl oo firm evideiwi lhat ais under way soand-

|The Chinese

are, nevertheless, bcjfcovcd to have lheto devs'lop missiles si least comparable to theoilet orhich the Soviet Union gave tn China dining lhe. If ttrch missiles aiu developed, Peking would probably Intend to oqnfp them with nuclear warheads. Il I* alto likely that the Chlnera are developing and testing small tactical rroo-illtjrii rockets with raitges bstVrwautical tsoes at Poi-ch'eng-

Chinese have made limited implements to the caitrlngChina'a version of die Sovietystem nndlso beew system)

t

94

die vio

Systems Jointly

he CWneee version of the Soviet Fenadar rtssixiatcd wilh Iheystem Ii known ai Cln Sling. It apparently provides erihsmced electronic counWr-cc*iriter-niMuoics capabilities and Piay have other imprcA'emcntt aa well.|

i la espectcd thai tha Chinesetrbcb In fisr-her Imrsrove thetr ground-bssed SAM CApabthtSes. Such effects could lead to developm-mtow-altitude, short-range system which could becomeduring the period of 'husogcr-iwge. fc.gl.cr-altitude system may be developed later.

f the presenceAM system on the Kianctuog-class destrojvr escort is lonllrmed. this would indicate that the Chineserogram.

Aeronouticol Rateurch and Developmenthen tha Chinese, wtth Soviet eesHt-ancc, lint imdestook to establish an air force and on aircraft Industry In tho, aercciauttcal faculties were established atoniversitisa. and Osiniag schools were organ-rod in the cities where aircraft factories were located. China now boa throe contort of higher education for training in sterooautical engineering, tha aeronautical colleges at Peking and Nanking sod the center at the Northwest Industrial University at Hsiao. Each of these IrnHroriotis haa small subsonic and tursetsoeac wtssd tuaoefs primarily for instructional purposes, end all reportedly have flight research dapartments withtr-cralt aislgiied for their use. Thora are indlcn-ttona that each nahool has been assignedeifsc areas of research rrstpewsnuahry.

IS. Annthor research fooillty, possibly mb-ordlrsato to the Institute ol Mechanics. Is aduoeot to the aircraft factory cn Sheaiyang, Itedium saod enntinnous-flu- sub-sonlo wind tunnelu person io gas dynamics facility with tha capability olspeeds betweenndhis fadkty could be used to teat scale narjdets of suporacoic aircraft and guided missiles. The Ch'nng'hsin-tlen Missile Dm'clopment Center abo has research facilities which could be used vary eft actively for senruitsca! rraeorco. The facilities Indude blghapced blow-down

tin nebirutunnel lhat could be "toil for tcatlng aircraft and rather aerodynamic models at speeds ranging from high subsonic lonew wind tsmnet may he under eornSrueticn at Ms-liu-wan. arar Qwesjta

Ifisugrarnr for aircrafi pro-porsron have bum weak, out to ovuroom drdicknclcs the Oilnrae airarge Irxility al ring-pa In Kuokuliow Piovince. No facilities loi hlgh-nltllude testing have bora Idontificd at Ping-nn. but ihey may bo added later. Another jut cuglirt loit facility wasi deed (Il til under nnitruollnn at Yuan-ling in Hunan Province. Some reports ahn suggest that an antdenefktd facility tnia nrrolvtd in hSgfHemeeratun- naetal-hrglcal rcacs-ch in uauweuce with yet engine devceex

he Chineae now have throe aircraft tutirrg progrnnuetmall itdiispart,urbiaw powered hee-copter. Tho fighter, dmt

Intelligence ConmunHy,

II is poweteT

pyi IJUll Jl PJtyjillhe Mir,-II. The Chtneso prabsbty will reenilre several years to complete testing of the Hsan-A. aod the first Operational modelscould not be deployed priorhe

ew until Urirapott air oral t.od tho Nan-A,

Thepparently haa two redprcaallsaj engiDra and probablytsesndadlow-os to ike Ah'-i. which tte Oabese pmlwsd al Plantuntil lSftS Testrtg ef the NarvA isobath/ will require

hrce?ja, wwis kfnel ^vod'jc toti ctt?v*

rncncT'rg irtortly thereafter.

SO An MM Hound helicopter TOdHtod bv initalktkrnasrlatne engine |

causeelicopters rue normally powered by reciprocating engines, this modified airoraft may represent the developmenthinese -designed tmblno-powcrod helicopter.

Novnl Research ond Development

Zl. With the objective of reaching self-sufficiencybo design and conilroction ofChineseto reform and espand then* shipbuilding industry ii tha, during the period of their first Five Year Plan. By the aiid-iOSOt, they hadumber of Jrutflotee and bthonli foe ihin research and design, shipyard design, and shipbuilding.

ver the years, ft has become increei-iDgly evident that China's efforts laave been focused on worships. For eaample,

c nnd well equipped ship ir.odel toting

cotnples atiles northwest ofppears to have been builtfor testing models of naval tails; It could, of course, also be used for merchant ship development

uringlmost all material and technical aid to the Chinese ssnpbulldingcame from the USSR. China relied primarily on sources In other countries during the following decode for some naval eoonpo-ncsrt Imposts. In recent years, however,some equipment that was apparently designed lor use ir. maritime ccostrucdon pic-

TO.

Hcmdls via

hu boon purchased aluiuid, there have, been no conflrined importt of naval ship components.

he Chinese are beginning toophisticated lovol In naval design andThey are no longer merely emolaOrig Soviet design practice* but are alao irieorporat-ing US aad native eorutepb. as is indicated by tbe Kin-data submarine and ne* eombataots.

hhoogh the greatest achievements of Chloa'i naval ReVD programi have been tn hull design, we behove that wori la also being done in enveloping new and Improved weapons and clextrocisci (or lhe navy. I

much RAD workoccuri at production facilities as well aa within schools and Institutes subordi-aate to the appropriate osniatries

fl. PRODUCTION

Organisation for MilHory rVocuetson

nco the central allocation of the economy! resources has been determined, the MND exeicises considerable control over tbe defense Industry sector of Ihe economy ta ao-coccUace7 mandate of the State Coencfl That control ia eararessed through the National Defense lrxbsstry Officehich had been established by Ad6 to oversee defense production In the Second through Seventh Ministries of MachmoThese ministries and the NDIO control all significant ilcforue-oricotcdwee pons, aircraft, electronic arpirprnent, ground force armaments, ships, aad aaasnci.

y0 local NDIO ctTtccs were probably present al all military region and district headquarters. These local offices probably pros-ids liaison while tho production facilities continue to be directly responsible lo the appropriate controlling ministry in Polcfng.lso evidence suggesting that military control of the aircraft Industry was further cutisolidated between0 and1 and that cSeteroe Industriesiffected by the Stateofhe fall0

localion and Distribution ol Production Foeilirses

ZS When the communists cease to power In Chinaost of the nation's industry was concentratedew major centers: In Manchuria; In principal cities on or near theTientsin, Shanghai,and Canton; and in particular centers in theand tbe Siechwan Basin. Since that tune, bowcer, China's leaden haveosassrjou* policy of dispersing and decOTtraUaing ibdiotry.

everal sources confirm the Intention to concentrate new defense production facilities in the interior, Kvrricfaow and Honan, foe ex-ample, are two areas whack are gainingindustries for the first tJane. Even fa established industrialhere leerns toreference for building new facilities in the formerly non-Industrial areas outside the mafcrr ratios

eking's program for decortication wUJ eventually have three advantageous effects upon China: dispersal of industry will make China lets vulnerable to enemy attack; It will help cose the problcras associated withurban

d it will ittmulate the deveiopaneot of reaources Idsron Al the same time, however, the remote location of many of the neweret ease transport coats and the ensti of feeding and housing Industrial pet' sOnneL

RET

Groond Force Prrsoucnono date,roduction prosrarru lor ground force equipment have been defib-ornts end relatively unimpressive. Although these progremi have mainly produced copies of convrsntsonal Soviet weapons, ihe Chineae have more roceody begun to produce aa in-cress.fig number of oign.

,

hinese Industry is now producing arointed vehiclesale ofnits each year. The cuibuIsOVs effect of thisrate will be to provide the armyarger, Improved armored striking force. The mainstay of Chlneso armored vehicle produc-tJao has been theodlum tank {CMaa's improved version of thehich is being producedate ofear.he Chinese

ew APC This amphibious tracked vehicle of nativerobably being producedate ofear, but (he annual production rata may double during the next few years.

nother Important addition to thefamily of aru-ored vehicles inhe new aanpiiitaajus tank which the Chin saa may have designated as thehai tankignificant Improvement over the Soviett Is roportedly much faster than the Soviet arrsphibuxis tank and bas heavier oratorrges gun. Theof theuggest that ft will probably be used in roles of tactsron-naUsance or infantry support This tank bu alto boon noted in an assault role InOverhead photography, however, has not inebested widespread deployment of that tank, and we therefore beSicvc that the Type-

CMrstst-chuianed armored personnel carrier is nrcostsly amohlblous. It carries aspht Mwooarsh rat man crew. Armedm anUelreraff machine pun, rt waloht snoutons7 feeteet wida,tet hkjh. It is equipped with tn Infrared nlehtviawsrsj light. , ah

COMPARISON OF AMPHIBIOUS TANK CKArUCTr3uTr.CS

Engine

Hrisntvi

Mattmum QfectSvu

Armor rVreemtJou

Sceondr.ni AnnamoM

Armor TLikneM (rfsll/Tlmst)

ors

ortnpoaee

V-l! (DtereJ)iles Permmaches

S laches

ecs

Dtewl)U. ParmmB-mo. MC Ircbea

It being produced tnear.

Saw If Armj and Amrrrwnrrioa

Total annual production of small arms an Cbtse ia estimated to bo oboct KC.Ouv anils. Prrbaps two-thirds of (bis erasnatsanroust aaaaokt csarbens. known aahai improved weaponarger maga-sirre load and an automatic (meg c* nubility Reports from tbe field Indioato thai thes aa effective weapon.

Thend itt variant, thefar less than one-quarter of Cfilna'i annual small anw pro-duetion, and wlout machine guns and2 mm pistol make up the remuinder. Tbe eventual termination ofieecam may slacken demand for Chinese mail arms ha Southeast Asia, but the Chinesertnding domesticrovide aasaB arms for the greaHaat armed drsnanta wvdnr, the rnilftSa and the Jvodexooe and Corsttrucrioo Corps. Ahhough taking wiH probably oootlnoe te eaport soma small arras, dceriertic requirements wiU fr*nde thereosonduotioa ievel over the nest teueral years.

Relatively bids Is known about thecapabilities of Chinese munitions plants. Evidence accumulated during tho past two decades shows that rnorti thanactories hare been Involved in the manufacture and assembly of ammunition Inigh degree of specialisation among these factories is mdiratod by the fact that as many as seven separate plants may be aavoSod tn theand assemblyingle typical artillery round- Despite tho burgs number of plants carrying on specialisedo havs oidy JdcnHfted one mator tadHtyt Pai-yln (nearhigh explosives for military use. {There are several small plants which also produce higheports indicate that the Chinese Army usee arnmunltlon sparingly In training, but the ground forces also haveQuantities of munitions In war reserves. Peking, moreover, has exported largeof munitions to Vietnam.

Most of the ammunition produced fa China has been copied from that of tbe USSR, an! little has been done so far to produceconventional munitions such as duster bombs and mass nattcrablc mines. Wo expect, however, mote development in their arras during the neat few years.

Arri'ieryhe firepower ot* ground force uniti wu unproved with the irSreductiae of heavier (SS mm)m field gunnd an Si mm rrcofilea0m field gun hot the longetl range of any artillery piece in tlie Chinese Inventory.m gum and ISfi mm gun-lttwltei have been replacing coder weapons.

naeuvcrability nppenn to be an im. poitnnt nnisideratioi In live production of artillery and crew-served weapons In China. Among tke four slsea ol AAA weaponam prcdtactJoa. theasss touts account fur more than rwc-rttths of the total annual output- Chlneta industry also produces ti.ur litre of mortan, tint tho00accounts fee over half of the annual output rVoduction of the RFC" grenade launcher9 aad the con. timied prcdiacfsoc ofrenade leincbertm rochet Launchert are alao indicn-tort of China's desire lo equip the army with highly mobile weapons.

nunicofrom fqvipanenl

n the past the bttffc oftaaanary taclionl radio equipment has corsststed of ain-plitiide modulationow-dowct high Ireepietscy (HF) and very high frequency fVIIF) sett coplrd from US proeotype* dating back lo Worldt easier. Later modds indiKicd Chinese eaoUa of Soviet Racrves equipment One of these copses provloctl the army with its first frequency modulation (FM)ybrid unit consisting of transit tort and vacuum tubes.the Chinese has* been manufacturing fills* trantistoritrd cquiptrsent of thetr owa drttgn. For field army use, tho Chinese are expected to retain their present types of simple communications equipment augmented by setae addWctsal sets ol native ootign3 Thereafter, equipment having higher power and affording prrsel channel selection and wider frequency coverage may begin to appear.

BjoJoo-co' Wc-fore cvsd CWtcol Worror* CopobifrfJet

hineufficient number ufscientists nnd facilities tooJogval warfare (BW)umber of rrcducOoi lacicrsoi for htanaa aadvaccines could be directed to produce infectious disease crgnnlsms for use In DW. Currant Chinese reaeaich In genetic manipule-ttorx otlhuar btology. laVlin iirchocl-ogy, aad htblotpoa] staaeriafc for crop pest control could contribute substantially to such on effort.

"ithere Is no evidence that the

I

Chinese are crltoctlng BW-related resources

towordi the product text of BW agents Wc do Know, however, thai the entire army hat been tnttruotad In methods of defense against BW agents. Chinese defenses against BW attack, however, am weak. Protective equipment is icadoqiatr. and the ursdetgrouod defensegaeeruly lacks filtered ventilation, thus leaving the system highly vulnerable to BW attack.

lie proehsctioa of chemical warfare (CW) lease agents as well srlthio Chinas capat-Ll-et- Tbe Chinese cram-teal industry it already preducing significant quantities of phmsjeew and hydrogen cyanide for civilian purposes, and this production capacity could be coa vetted to military use sboald th* aeed arise. The Chinese have abo syiithctiied small amounts of C-ype nerve agents for

0

ltU

*

okw oi

t it.tti

tin*0

hhi.ao.ooo

YwoU

a^brl;

t.m

MM

1

M

Ml

training and testing purposes, bulo evidence to Suggest either pilot plant Or lull-acide prediction of any of those ngwta. There are In China at leasthemicalonis insecTtcldes, some of which are closely related to certain ofype agents. Only those, however, chat produce the orgiiiotldophosphonii insecticides could be readily converted to produce CW toxic

o believe lhat the Chinese soilartillery to be tho primary deliveryFor CW agents, and the Chinese Armyariety of tube artillery weapona which could be used to disaeenioate CW agents.m mortar ii rsatttrrularry suitable for tone agent dissemination, but multiple socket launchers such asm could also be used In CW.

Siirfoce-fo Air Missiles ond Tactical Missiles

sustaitier sections ofissiles areat the Shenyang Airframe Plant Tne booster engine for this missile Is manufactured at the Taf-yuan Explosives and Solid Motor Production Plantonstruction of several new buildings ot rhe ShenyangPlantrobablyto greater SAM rrreehictlon P

| ana to increasedoi SAM units

we OS yet Ivavo no tirm evidence trat the Chinese arcalonemissiles for their forces.the Chinese were given an unknown number of tactical missiles by the Soviet Union in thend have the technicalto develop and produce tactical missiles, we Iteve subsequently seen neither thenor the forces to justify the assertion that the Chinese are now producing cheat own version of taeocal missiles.

Noval Production Programs

hina's rising production of naval ships in recent yean at due to two factors: shorter coMtruction tunes and expanding shipyard capacity. Much of this new capacity is only now beguming to be used, and the ei pan si oncilities is continuing. The growth ofis illustrated by tbe foot that, during the past five years, China has about tripled the number of medium-range submarines under construction. In the years toreater proportion of production will consist of complex and sophisticated ships which wiD take longer to assemble. Future increases ID production, therefore, win depend uponuse of shipbuilding facilities,of advanced ahlpbjilding technology, and the corrrplctian of additional building ways now

c.

he Chinese ore building iheirat the following shipyards: at Hu-lu-tao in the North Sea Fleet area; at Wu-ehang andho East Sea Fleet area; and at Huong-pu an the South Sea Fleet area. If China's tubrrsarine building ways were used exclusively tolasshe Chinese could probably produce more thanear's time. We believe, however, that the Chinese will probably cease buildinglass submarine and will concentrate on

ET

TQTt-^fRET

S

Jointly

unlti of Ihe Ming end other rnore supMttlcaicd classes. Then Will fake longer to build and will prabsUy Until the cororfroc-rion rateoar dating rhe period at* thit Ese.

1 tbo Chinese launched two units of the new Ming-clots submarine. Those ships appear tohiisese-dcsigned variant of the Sovietfamroduction limanoMhs for these Rot two units wai almost rurfot rfaai ofaw antra. rVrttndnary aasetSDU-nts suggest that the Ming-class mat-have larger engineering spaces and slightlyhabit ability duo to on increaso Inhull diameter. Tbe enlarged engineering spaces probablyhange to tha Ming's propulsion system. This mightietel-eJectric rhtva tyttem instead of tha direct drive used onkua sutaruulnes. Otherincfude osjog three rype XT) ?JXO honKpower engines instead of the two now foil ltd Onlass.

SO- The moat advanced submarine yetIn China It tlso single unit of the Hon-class which flnt npreoredH ansX Tho hull design of the Han-oloas Is similar to that of the rat eat US classes of nuejesu-pmvered mtciarii.es While there is no clear indxatxm of the type of propulsion plant installed hi the Han, the Chinese are doing research in naval nuclear propulsion, andropulsion plant could most effectivelyull with the configuration end sure of the Han. If China's Han unit i) nuclear powered, it woule'ccpulsioa and huO design for developingissile-currying nuclear submarine ns wellleet of long-range attack submarines.

Mofor Surface Unas

urface unati consist of destroyers and destroyer escorts Of these, the Luto-class Ridded-missile destroyer (DDCS) ft China's largest combatant This ship it being produced at the Lutnhung-boand tbe Tuog-lang (Canton)

D-lu

ESTIMATED CHARACrentSTrCS OP ailNHSE-DSSlCMED SUBMARINES

Cfct.

Full Load DMolaewneot

(LomjToes)

LensuVBswn

fees)

SraoeeWry

ASW AnasrnM ,

Deetreelea .

IVcoslsea/TeUl llorwrowee

...

robaMe il-Sroh Torpedo Mm

rJoown

rsncwn

rtaewn

.N .

Modem rtardrop hull destsn. lid-swurerd dMr* punat. ProCoUyijlt setew.designed br aurJcsr pmpulsion.

Probable Sl-lneh Torpedo

Tubes UrAnewa Mattel Uokrawn

Dioel Etecrr^/Buuralrd

bst KedluarraTos mbraarloa.

via

Systems Jointly'

ate ofnits per year. It Is of native design but reflects sumo design Influence of the Soviet Kodin-cbs* destroyer Although the tuts and the Kotlm arc about tlw same size, the new Chinese ship has many distinctive external reatutes ond is noteworthy os China's first issrhgenously designed ship employing steam turbine propulsion. Armed with tsvo triplen lis Hp cnslsc-missile launchers and having twom dual, purpose gun mounts, the Lntojowerful worship by Asian stondrvrds. Its air defense capability is supplemented bymweapons nnd bynunon tbe superstructure, and at least one unit has been seen with on early warning radar.weapons include two rnnltfpte-tubowaifaro (ASW) rocket launchers, four depth charge moitnn and mine raita.

he newest main surface combatant Jn Use Chinese Navy is the dicsd-powered Kiang-hngesros destroyer escort (DE or DEC) which was launchedhc main gun armament on (his unit Is two twin dual-purpose gun mountsm) and four anti-aircraft mountings. The evidence Indicates that the Kiaugtungissile system now to the Chinese Navy. Photography shows two canvas-covered tsrin-arm launchcrt abouteet In length. Although these launcher* couldmall ontujhtp missile or an ASW missile, tbey appear most likely to be naval SAMhere is insufficient evidence at this time, however, toirm conclusion as to the type of system Involved, Although only one unit of the Kiangtung class has been completed, the Chinese could produce several

TABLE DJV -

ESTIMATED CIURACTE1UST1CS OP CHINKS- DESIGNED DESTBOYEItS AMDSCORTS

Oms

FuUt^luniMU

(long

(Feel) Main

inieionl .

ASW Ann Mont

fJectrontis

Piepuli^ci/Txs! llcrsepmei

nanuses

DDCS

Lasts

ao/a

SO mm Dual Pupa* Cun (Tata Haaatsd)

4 Twini >>

ii" AA

Hi*

ilii i I IVxk*t

La aae heranes Chun Marian

I'akiwse

ssssnaaal aaaaaaaatsnott asaaft* tawaaW nf-.mip. riliarSaalac-tronlr sajgasj

DEsirejtrniE Lonmassd UU

2 Pcealble SAMun Dad-Far-

osslbb Twinm AA;

Mfca Boll.

Btxtatoptblauachars Dnknoan

0

Pesslhta Kna SAM-enuijurd C'l-ra's iarspft

Xlangtung DFj each year beginningha llu-tung Shipyard and ana In (Its Canton (ica are teeikely cact to build the**

m}pt,

PotrcJ Ships and Croft

4 lhe Cbineee begin prcdaeiag aTO loot rrycliufcU-eiji-pped FT boatUarlgnetedse Folia are actually only fitted forward on thla natlve-ilrulgncd palrol boot, but ipeeda In eaeeit of SO knoti have been reported. Tbli (aaai irupple-laenli the rapidly nglog torpedo boat* Hill In tbe Chinee* Inventory The Ihcbwanagh-*poed PT-type craft for cpwacicni ta coaatalnd doe* act appeal to hev* an cceon-goiag capability Tha Cnfatat have produced apprcaaDiaielyhwao uaitt and hav* npcrtedfo Albania Production, however, was term toutedhe Huchwan wu built ol the Hu lung and Chlu-hifn Shipyard! In Shanghai.

M. Thai mtlnetay ofatrol touad-ron* haa been tbe Sestnt-baJ-daat ana gun-boatnd next than BO unlit have been produced Knee itt fin! appearance In rh*he Shanghai la alto aaartgetd boat Production haa tapered offtk of about SOr8tiiretil rate of abouthe Shanghai It being built at two ihtpyordt in Dalren and at the Huang-pa yard (Canton).

d ibm the Cranea* prodticed the* futl Haieae-ctaa! tatxiiariue ehaaeioot native daritptrd step wet prchablyio mharx* Beet capahilitiee for ASW. Annua, production rate of tbe HaiutneUii tubchaaen it around twoear, but the Chineee may double the rate at which they produce lubcbater* by tho.

Tbet* thlptprcduredolCblu-hiinard al Huang-pu.

wo dor e* of xoauV patrol beet*erlet prooWfon atrre-de-algned Hoku and the Soviei dec gred Om Tbe tmalku cf thet ited-hulled beet rUmlar to the Soviei lomtr tod can lea twoumber of the Ota-olatt boatt liave bean built wUh folding maatt, apparently to allow tbe thlpt to be tare) lo rucraaaL

eeave abo btah aof th*au and mt loatl oneThe new Hota-ctatt representsvaralon cf the Soviet Ota-elaatpatrol boat. Bothartlet, bat tlie Hole clanmore tea worthy The Hoku varianteeerr than liebe

nj jpped with hvdrcacrh tiroJar to th* Hu ebwaa PTH, andecordmit rncaiat on th* item. The Wu-hu and Chla-haln Shipyardt are I"boutoearotai are being produced annually by the Hu-tuDg Shipyard andard In tlie Canton area.

AataAibwjtttandb the peat, the Chawae have dco* Dtde to renew or enlarge their aging fleet of landingIn fact, the only landing thip ever built by the Chineseediumthip completednd no other* of thatpresently under eooatYuctioa. If the Chin at* with to rnatatata thetr proteet earjabaary for amprtibtoaeowever, tbey wifl need rtt^aearnaatt for th*ir fieri oftripeufaiou* thlpt. moat of which are almcttears old

Handle via

Systems Joint)/

Tha situation of Chinese landing craft is very different China nowledanding craft and has produced now onesto of needyear. Production of near landing craft was iplficantty reduced during the second half1 and1 at the Chung-hue Shipyard in Shanghai Indicating that tho Chinese may withiiiitnin the number nf their landing craft atnits. Perhaps one of the reasons why (hehave boon active to building kndlug ciaft rather than lending ships is the fact that the craft aro being aacd as supply boats in rivers and coastal arrashallow draftoffloading ciiectiy onto shores and beaches.

lie Chlnotc hove constructed at least three daises of landing craft suitablo forlift operations. The most Important Is Che Yunnan-dots leading craft,oot unit of indigenous design. That ohue LCU accounts for mora than half of the eatlrruuod annua] production rate for banding emit In China, We believe that aboutnits of tho Yunnan-class were built lastecond Chi nose-designed LCM known In the Intelligence Community as the rachin, ia In current product ion.8 the Chineae werernsfl binding craft of their ownand had oported sevrral of these to Tenia iua_

Navalhinas first oottshlp missile was theriisaile designed and produced in the USSR and given te the Chinesehis rraanle was rawer Mended for ahfp-board uae- Although rraatttl dWeme missile sites firit nppoercd in China8o hove no evidence that the Chinese, over built tbcii awn Samlets. Instead,

Peking probably deployed Samlets that were built in tha USSR. In the meantime theworked to developn oapability to produce the Styi-type cruise missile foras well as huvd-ocsed uae. (Styi-type mini let produced in China are now designated by Iha Intelligence Community as thehinese production of this missile began at tho Nanch'ong Airframe Plantnd more recently there is evidence thatmay have betgun at the Shenyang Airframe Plant

he pace of the crurar-eriissiie program cruickorwd3 when the keel of the first Luta-class gufcled-missile rtnatroyer was laid and the Chinese began to equip oldtypes withaunchers There are now seven of those units equipped with launchers, and in additional eight willbe equipped byhe number af building pcsSrions for Ore class missile boats has at least doubktd (nowr mote)nd the Hoke-daw mtsiiU boatlories preduction at two shipyards. Alsotyx crates have been observed at the two operational missile boat bases which have underground boat storaga fecllltim.

e believe that the Chinese may now be priducng moreissiles each year. At least half of thti prcduction is pr>bably lor the forces afloat to provide ior an5 or so shiptwatd Uuochars boing stldad each year over tbe nets! five years.

n etorigatcd version of theretchod- Styi) missile was first notednd it is believed thai the extra length of thil missile will raovide increased tango andreater payload as well This ssatshle is apparently being deployed at coastal defense sites in Chinaes^ace-mesil for the Samlet

CHffT

Handle- via

iro- Syilemi Joint!/

D-VTI

CHARACTEWST1CS AND PERFORMANCE Or CHINA'S AXTWHIF(SAMLET)'

fafmm 08

oer-liPanada HB

opltolAc In Ride With

MUrTiff^lH*

rrter

Statable UqaNl RocreV Tirbc4t(

RATO

Cw^rr DCCS. Lota DDCS. Cearsl Drew Stttt *

Ran DCCS. Co PTFC.TFC, Ka-er PTC, ItOWpTC

Production Pro promt.

OS- The ptodtttrfion of aircraft ia China reached Its highest level1 when moreircraft of all types weie produced. The Chinese now ere prodiictng )et fighters, jet bombers, trainer aircraft and hetopton at five eli'tantu plants. Two Chrnese-ckssliptedlargo Jet fightermallbeing tested. Tha Chinesewapbasiie production of light or aircraft, and ippioiia latelyercent of the aircraft built1 were lighten Proouction of fUed-iving irniisports oeascd with the tetml-aatioe of ANB. production

FlorVer Programs

ho largest aircraft productionien to far by thej for the Soviet-aengncdave been prociuced tt SJienysng Airriarne, and production reacheder monthoref these aircraft rnoduced0 have modified wing plarrforms which would allow Improved maneuverability at lower albfrittcs and possibly provide Incrcesod internal fuel capacity.

acquiredd lentthe Chinese began product ton of thoFobbed irserceptoe0t This soate^ttienloo effort lhat probably begantho aeouhitinn ofSuviet Union

Chinese escorted about It

Mltj-fjlj to ABwmjj;

their

rhhwar export of aircraft to early pn^uctJon run Is surprising but not

to the Chinese Communist Air Focce, oast* doubt on tho current status of Mig-liOf couraa it isthat Mtg-llf have boon produced since last Scptosnocr but have not boon da*!voted to operational units.elay or suipcnskio oiroduction bas occurred, tha Chinese may have decided to forego tho Mig-Sldevelopment of theoreinterceptor which could be available in.

he Chinese also began seriesof the F* rightST-bombes la hue IM ornd tha production rata ts aboutonth They have now produced rnoref these aircraft, andave boconia tipLvaHortal in tho air force.hinese-designed lighter resembling thehe advantages ofver thereater range and payload cepabil-.ry

bo Chinese also are-rainer at Crasngtn Airframe. TMs tandem seatodification of the Soviet single seal design, was firstin photogiaphyeview ofindicated that trulncn have been present since atbe start ofroduction atugcestj that the Chaaeac tril soon end therogram there, probably within the next year or SQ An altemMlve might be to shift Mig-Ucoowhare. possibly lo 5Jhenynogtermination ofroductioo.

Bomber P'ociromi

Chinese are producing theyet medaim hnmber and theyet light bomber The first copyot produced atear Ibian raroduction rate it about two aabout SO had been produced byhe Chinese began producingHarbin Airframebeproduction rale is estimated atotal ofSi hadby tho ond

Transport Afrerarr

s pcodecoon of ganeralairrraft bat declined sincethey wens producing behccmfrsi.and primary trash art. Presentlyareoardhelicopters,f which hodat Harbiny tho endThe current production rateononfh. The plant thatboth transports andatbegan productioo offighter-bomber0

Air-taurxfVed Mucins

Chrneto irtocsptcss arewith cannon, but recent evidenceChina Is Increating depae-yrneot ofnumbers ofquippedlor carryinglur-to-groundShenyang Plant II!0]

Trior tame variation of that vehicle, and the evidence Indicate! that AAMi ore ivalbblo lor Mig-lw ibtmnpm. No pradaotloe faculty fbc AAMi haa been kjeoo&ed.

o'fon lo develop air-to-eurfac* mUallea (ASMi) bul Ihey piobably will follow the Soviel lead and orentaally equip tSdiilt audi mbuilaa. ASMi may ba rnnl against nation shlpj or ground targets

Bodor,

B mtor farihtia for tha production of oar-surveillance and fire-control radari have been Identified. These fadlltea are located al Nankins, Wu-ch'ang. Chcnipu, Hatn,and Sha-ahih. Although time plants ap-perendyprovidr ideauatt capacity for Chiiwa omli adcittoeal facilities may be dispersed ebewboe In tha country. Moat of thacapacity for radan was completed with Soviet atwtanc* before tha Sino-Soviet split, but the Chineae built at knit two radar plana and expanded three other* during.

DISSEMINATION NOTICE

hu document wot iMtminalod by the Central Intelligence Agency. Thiior the inlorevrllon and tne ol tha recipient ond of pariani under hi) larjdleilontted-to-bnow bo ill. Additional eaienlial dhjemino-ion nay be avrhorood by lha lolow. log officntiheirorta*nn<

ol aatelliQeriir and Seioo'eh. for Iho Coc-on-wii of Stale

Detente tntellgento Agency, lor lhe Office of tha Secretory of

Oe'eme ond tit* orpnttftotlen of ih* Joint Chtefi of ShH

Outf of Staff foreportment of the Array, for the

Dapciimenr of the Amy

Chief of Novel OperaWnie Deporrteeet of the

Navy

Chief of Staff. Intelligence. USAF, for th*f the AW

force

I. Din-dor. Civilian of Internotionol Security Afftrfrt, AEC

, (or the federal Bereae ol Irrveirigotion

of NSA, forNoticed . Agency

I. Special Abouopi ta lhe Secretory of lhe Traatury. for lhe Department oi the Treawry

j. Deetlor ofifke of Nalionol fcirr.otw, CIA, for any other Deportment or Agency

riTT^piunenl rroy be reloned, or aettroyed by burning in accordance with apdkobf*ar returned lo lhe Ceelrol Intei'ioenee Agency by arrangementiBl>faMof Notional faaflaotai, OA.

When ih'i document ii dnaaynateid ceteieai. fee cvcraaoi radplenti may retain iteriod not inf'aaeyeo'-* of tho period, th*e deifroyed. rei.-rdcNe.jhe forworatng agency, or per-mhilon ihoeM be reooeilnd ef roeean it In acoaraonce with2 June

The title ol thh dbcianenl when vieo teporolely frora fee tenatL

DtSTItlBU'lON; White Heme National Security CouneB Deportment ol Slot* Daporlrnonlera* Atomic Energy Commlulon federal Buriae of irweihocfton Deparrewnl ol tho Trauiury

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