DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Report
Policy Issues in tbe Purge of Lin Piao
(Reference Title: POLO
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POLICY ISSUES IN THE PURGE OF LIN PIAO
MEMORANDUM FOR RECIPIENTS
This study finds that the principaland still unresolvedIssue behind the momentous purge of Lin Piao and associates, has been the issue of civilian versus military control over China's political system. Although dramatic, differences over foreign policyfor example, whether China should seek improved relations with the US and/or the USSRhave apparently not been central to the purge. Certain differences do seem to have been present concerning the style and pacing of domestic policies; but, by and large, back of the political-military struggle for power, questions of policy have been weapons used to attack and undermine domestic adversaries, rather than matters of substantive difference.
In preparing the study this Staff has benefited from the comments and contributionsumber of other offices of the Central Intelligence Agency. Because of the still incomplete nature of available data, however, the study's views represent the judgments essentially of this Staff and of its author. Further comments will be welcome, and should be addressed to the study's
of this staff.
Hal Ford
Chief,pecial Research Staff
POLICY ISSUES IN TJIE PURGE OF LIN PIAO
Contents
Page
Introduction1
The Issue of Civilian Versus Military Control.
The i: of the Scale of the
The Issue of Foreign
The Issue of Economic
The Issue of Rural
POLICY ISSUES IN THE PURGE OF LIN PIAO
Summary
In very brood and somewhat simplified terms, the origin of the purge of Lin Plao's "conspirotorial clique" is believed to be the same as the origin of trie Cultural Revolution"ao TSe-tung's conviction that he would have to remove his designated successor as the leaderdisloyal opposition" in order to regain control over the political apparatus in China. Demons trating the difficulty of delegating power within China's political system, the Cultural Revolution and the Lin Piao affair have been in essence struggles for control of the political apparatus between Mao and his designated successors. Within this larger contexttruggle for power, policy issues become primarily weapons for use in, rather than the causes per se of. such struggle.
The supreme irony of the Cultural Revolution, undertaken in order to enable Mao Tse-tung to regain controlbureaucratic" Party apparatus, is that it ended with the creationew Army-dominated apparatus even less responsive to Mao's direction and control. ery real sense, the growing disagreement over the respective roles of civilian and military authority in the period71 reflected mounting friction over the roles of Mao and Lin in the new structure of power. When Mao first suspected and then became convinced that Lin was opposing his efforts to re-establish civilian Party control, the Issue of civilian versus military control became the central issuerotracted political strugglo wnich would lead to the fall of Lin Piao,
Although personal attitudes and impressions are hard to document, the record does seem to indicate clearly Mao's growing disillusionment with theof Lin Piao and the military apparatuseriod of time dating back to the springhen Mao issued tho first of many warnings to Army representatives serving in the new Revolutionarystructure to correct their defective work-style. In these early warnings. Mao characterized this work-style as "arrogant and complacent" and "crude anddefects which he charged had led the PLA-dominated apparatus to commit "mistakes" in the implementation of regime policies.
Mao's growing distrust of his chosen successor was manifested dramatically in0 when Mao decided to remove the post of Chairman of the State from the new draft Chinese People's Republic Constitution. Lin apparently interpreted this decision, which confirmed Chou En-lai as the de facto head of the government, as in effect disinheriting him as the successor. This helps to explain why Lin Piao (who saw Mao withdrawing his right to thehen Po-ta (who was vulnerable,ime when the policy line was shifting to the Right, as the exemplar ofnd four top-ranking military leaders (who viewed Mao's escalating pressure on the military apparatushreat to themselves) banded together "to prepare andurprise attack"as the Party documents explaining the Lin affair now assertat the Second Plenum at Lushan in
Since it was apparent that Lin was challenging him as the headowerful military organization, Mao was compelled to be cautious and circumspect in taking action against him. As the recent Party documents concerning the Lin affair point out, any action against Lin at tnis juncture without concrete proof of conspiracy would have
aroused opposition from military leaders and might have resulted in civil war. Instead, Mao at the Second Plenum
intensified tne continuing pressure on Lin's military apparatus bycriticize revisionism and rectify work-style" campaign which would dominate China's political life throughout the following year.
Since the road to power in the Culturalof both Lin Piao and tne PLA bad been one of "giving prominence tohe central charge in tnls campaignthat an overemphasis on politics had resulted in "Leftist deviationism" in the implementation of Mao's policy line served to undercut one of the most Important justifications for Lin's and tne PH's continued right to rule. The generally negative response of militarythroughout China to this rectification ompalgn indicated moreover, that they were quite aware that It threatened their continued domination of the political structure. The struggle between Mao and Lin for control of tho political-military apparatus had reached an impasse, soon to explode in the bizarre sequence of events beginning with an abortive Lin-sponsored attempt to assassinate Mao and culminating in Lin's fiery deathlane crash in Mongolia.
If it is true that Mao even before the Ninth Party Congress suspected Lin of opposing Party leadership over the Army, there is reason to believe that Mao sensed this opposition firstisagreement over the scale of the purge within the Party. Thisisagreement not only over the extent to which the old Party was to be purged but also,orollary, over tbe criteria to be used in selecting new party cadres- The implications of the shift following the Ninth Party Congressto emphasize professional qualifications rather than revolutionary criteria in the selection of new Party leaders were clear. Many of these were to be old Party cadres who, having been properly educated andere to be "liberated" and returned to positions of authority.hroat to their continued exercise of political power, both radical ideologues and military leaders had
reason to Join forces to carry out what is now called an "ultra-leftist" cadre policy characterized cither bypurging of old Party cadres or "failing to liberate cadres on time."
The mechanism for carrying out this "ultra-leftist" cadre policy was theadres School, an Institution to which old Party cadres were sentefresher course in the study of Mao Thoughtas well as hard physical laborand whore through faithful performance of these duties they could demonstrate anew their loyalty toMao and Mao's revolutionary line. The flaw in this arrangement was that these schools were run by the PLA, with military leaders empowered to decide whether the old cadres had passed the test of political loyalty. The charge that the radical ideologues of the CulturalGroup and officers of the PLA abused this authority to prevent the rehabilitation of veteran Party cadres and thus perpetuate their own power is both credible and supported by developments at the time.
A highly dramatic and visible issue, the role of foreign policy in domestic political conflict in general and in the Lin Piao affair in particular, must be approached with great cure. Theretrong temptation, for example, to define a_ priori tho foreign policy issue in the Lin Piao affair in termsispute concerning the triangular relationship between China, tbe Soviet Union and the United States, with one groupapprochement with the Soviet Union and the other with the United states. In fact, it appears that Mao, Lin, Chou and the top PLAere all agreed that the Soviet Union constituted the gravest military throat to China and thatis the USSR were confined to questions of degree and emphasis.
The dispute concerned not so much which of the two great powers, Russia or America, China should conciliate,
but whether China should switch from theconfrontationist foreign policy posture of theRevolutionore flexible and pragmaticPiao is clearly on record as one of theof what might be called theof foreign policy which dominated China'sduring the Cultural Revolution. Sincepersonified the post-Cultural Revolution turnwhat might benationalist model" of the dispute over the issue of foreign policyreal senseispute between these two leaders,to enlist support for his views,
/Chairman Mao bached Chou through--qut IB OUThis struggle, providing decisive support
in the final showdown
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to opposi: the proposed visit a.
Lin based his opposition to President Nixon's visit not so much on considerations of power as of ideology, portraying negotiations with the United Statesetrayal of the Chinese and world revolutions. It seems fairly clear, moreover, that although Lin used the Soviet Unionounter In his argument against the Nixon visit, he did so moreesire to scorepoints or to strengthen his ideological argument than from any prior understanding with tho soviet leadership, just as Mao and Chou had earlier attacked policies with which Lin was directly associated asin and his military supporters were now attacking the Mao-Chou policy of negotiations with the United States as "too rightist."
With respect to economic policy, the central charge leveled against Lin Piao is that, whereas Liuhad committed the Rightist error in thef overemphasizing production at the expense of politics, Lin and his colleagues were guilty of the "ultra-leftist"
error ol overemphasizing politics at the expense of Mthough grossly exaggerated and distorted, there is an element of truth In this indictment of the military-dominated apparatus for having handled poorly the complicated task of rebuilding the economy following the disruption of tho Cultural Revolution. The end result of radical Ideologues and military leaders togetherthe Implementation of economic policy in the period following the Ninth Party Congress was an "ultra-leftist" tendency to go beyond Mao's policyendency expressed first In setting unrealistic goals and then in resorting to coercion in an attempt to achieve these goals.
Characterized as "Chairman Mao's new economichese guidelines were reminiscent of the economic strategy which had produced tho Great Leap Forward, only this time presentedore reasoned and moderate vein in an apparent effort to take account of earlierentral feature of these guidelines was Mao's callustained high rate of economic development to be achieved primarily by mobilizing China's huge underemployed labor force to carry out Leap Forwards in agriculture and medium-and-small-scale industry. In this effort to undertake simultaneous Leap Forwards in both industry and agriculturethe entire undertaking to rely heavily on political indoctrination and ideological incentivesthere was ample room for controversy in the allocation of blame when the effort began to founder in
Among the reasons for revising China's Fourth Five Year Plan at or shortly after the Second Plenumhe basic reason was that the attempt to carrypractical" Leap Forward had failed. Another reason for the change was the need to reverse the trend toward decentralization of economic and administrative power and to re-establish centralized control over the economy. hird reason, revealed by Chou En-lai in
ispute within the leadership over "guns versusas the difficulty which had been experienced in attempting lo shift the burden for the development of China's agriculture and local Industry to the provincial level.
In this debate over the age-old quostion of "guns versus butter" (which would be discussed in the press as the question of whether Industry should be developed with "electronics" or "steel" at the center), thereatural basis for alliance between the radical planners and the military. For to the extent that the ideological view of Chinese man (as willing to subordinate Individual to collective or national goals) prevailed, there would be more funds available in tho central budget for the development of advanced weapons and military industry. That such an alliance, whether tacit or overt, did in fact exist Is suggested, moreover, by tho content of the public discussion of this issue.
Another policy issue was the undertakingthe Cultural Revolution to reform China's rural This constituted an attempt toumber of the original features of China's commune system. This time, however, these radical reforms were not to be imposed from above by administrative fiat, but rather wore to be accepted "voluntarily"easantry whose ideological consciousness had been raisedesult of the Cultural
Rpvnln
The vehicle for the "voluntary" introduction of these reformsation-wide campaign initiated in the fall8 of learning from and emulating the model Tachai agricultural productionollective farm so advanced that it had eliminated private plots, merged production teams andystem of incomecombining both socialist and Communist features. Simply put, the problem facing the "leading comrades"
at all levels In carrying out the "learn from Tachai" campaign was how to persuade China's peasants "voluntarily to produce more and consume less in order to accelerate economic development.
That this campaign woh basedtopian view of human nature was demonstrated by reports of rising peasant discontent. Confronted with these reports andhreatened decrease In production the Maoist leadership was compelled step by step to abandon these radical rural reforms, so that by the Second Plenum in0 It had returned once again to the rural institutional system to which China had rotroated in tho. In explainlng^how this nation-wide "learn from Tachai" campaign (which clearly had the approval of Chairman Mao at the outset) had gone so badly awry, the basic charge against Chen Po-ta and Lin Piao concerning rural policy is not that they opposed Chairman Mao. as was the case in foreign policy, but rather that they encouragedwith evil intentthe "overzealous implementation" of Mao's rural policy guidelines.
Although other policy issues appear now to be largely settled, the central policy issue in the Lin Piao affairthe issue of civilian versus military control over China's political systemhas yet to be resolved. As the Party documents concerning the Linmake clear, Mao and Chou are quite aware that the task of regaining control over an Army-dominated political apparatus is much more formidable than the earlier task undertaken in the Cultural Revolution of regaining controlarty-dominated apparatus. Relying once againectification-and-purge campaign to accomplish this difficult task, Mao informed regional military leaders mureear ago (oven before Lin's abortive
coup attempt) that the time had come for the PLA to give up the political role it had played during tho Cultural Revolution and concern ItHelf with military affairs.
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The amount of progress achieved during the past year in returning political power to civilian Party leadership in Communist China is difficult to determine. Party documents indicate that more thanentral and regional military leaders have been purged as members of Lin Piao's "conspiratorialnd many more military leaders are missing- Nearly all of the key military region commands have, as Mao directod, made self-criticisms and expressed their determination"to respect, support andivilian Party leadership. Several well-documented meetings of central and provincial leaders in Peking in recent months,with the rehabilitationumber of Party figures, also suggest.that progress is being made in the civiliani-zation of China's political structure.
Until such time as the identity of those holding the top positions in the new Party and government apparatus is known, it would be prudent to reserve final judgment on the outcome of this effort to return China to civilian rule. It would also be prudent, however, to recognize that Mao Tse-tung has demonstrated repeatedly his ability in the face of great odds to rectify and purge, if not finally to control, the political apparatus in China.
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POLICY ISSUES IN THE PURGE OF LIN PIAO
Introduction
4 Mao Tge-tung had lostcontrol over much of tha Party hierarchy eat up by hie nd also over the state administrativeiu Shao-ahi and his like-mindedtilised the Mao oult in theory and slighted Maoism inao was convinced that the people and Party rank and file were vith him but were misled by hie die-loyal opposition.
Edgar Snow, "Aftermath ofn The New Republic,
In very broad and somewhat simplified terms, the origin of the purge of Lin Piao's "conspiratorial clique" is believed to be the same as the origin of the Cultural RevolutionMao Tse-tung's conviction that he would have to remove his designated "successor" as the leaderdisloyal opposition" in order to regain "effective control" over the political apparatus In China. As Liu Shao-chl and Teng Hsiao-ping wero charged withthe Party and state apparatusorm of Rightist "revisionism" in thes, so Lin Piao and Chen Po-ta are now charged with corrupting the post-Cultural Revolution apparatusorm of Leftisthe end result In each case being the sabotage and failure of Mao's "correct" policies. As the latest and most striking exampleecurring phenomenon
V
in the Chinese Comr.unist political system, Lin and Chen are being used as scapegoats for the failure of Mao's Cultural Revolution policies.
Demonstrating the difficulty of delegating power within China's political system, the Cultural Revolution and the Lin Plao affair have been in essence struggles for control of the political apparatus between Mao and his designated successors. To Mao, the fact that the apparatus is not responsive to his directives and policy guidelines is evidence that his successor is attempting to expand his power base by creating an "independent kingdom." To his designated successor, familiar with Mao's political work-style, the fact that Mao then launches acampaign against his apparatusthe Party In the case of Liu Shao-chl, the Army in the case of Linlear sign that in tlmo he too will have to undergo this process of "rectification." This process,in coup plot document allegedly drafted by Lln'plao's "conspiratorial clique" as "bleeding toas twice in the past six years claimed Mao's successor as its most prominent victln.
It is in this context of mounting distrust and suspicion between Mao and his successor that the role of policy and policy Issues in the Cultural Revolution and the purge of Lin Plao must be viewed. Within this larger contexttruggle for powerwith Mao convinced that his successor is conspiring to take away more and more of his power, and his successor convinced that Mao is Intent upon disgracing and purging hirapolicybecome primarily weapons for use in the struggle, rather than ther sc, of such struggle. The struggle over policyoreover, has not Involved competing policies so much as charges of defective implementation of Maoist policies. Whereas Liu Sbao-chi was charged with sabotaging Mao's policies from the Right, through willful obstructionism, Lin Palo and
Chen Po-ta are now charged with sabotaging Mao's policies from the Left by carrying tbera to excessand with evil intent -
In sup. policy issues in the Maoist political system are concerned basically with considerations of prestige and power- To the victor in policy struggles (so far Mao) belongs the spoils of infallibility, to the vanquished the ignominy of political disgrace and almost certainly, In the case of Lin Piao, ddath.
The Issue of Civilian Versus Military Control
The Army... hae now taken pover in
ocal unite {of government]
By and by we want to pull the Army book from ite dominant poeition in the looal unite. But that oan only be done after we have found new leaders,Lin Piao, Speech at Central Committee Work Conference,
Thereertain uneasiness among some Party members about the power role inherited by the Army following theof the Party bureaucracy during the Cultural Revolution... Is thereendency for high military officers to become overlords of the Party? An 'army dictatorship'?
Edgar Snow, "The Army and then The New Republic,
The supreme irony of the Cultural Revolution,in order to enable Mao Tse-tung to regaincontrol"bureaucratic" Party apparatus, is that it ended with the creationew Aray-domlnated apparatus even less responsive to Mao's direction and control. As indicated by Lin's statement cited above. Mao and Lin were agreed in the early stages of theRevolution that this dominant political role of tho Army wasemporary expedient until the violence
and disorder of the Cultural Revolution subsided and "new leaders" could bo found. To understand the most important of the many policy Issues in the purgen Plao, it is necessary to understand how Kao and Lin came toon the central issue of civilian vorsus military control over China's political system.
ery real sense, the growing disagreement over the respective roles of civilian and military authority in the period71 reflected mountingover the roles of Mao and Lin in tho new structure of power. Ah Mao turned away from the "destructive" phase of the Cultural Revolution (centering on the destruction of his opponents entrenched within the old Party and government apparatus) to the "constructive" phase of defining post-Cultural Revolution domestic and foreign policies andew political apparatus, he began to turn increasingly to Chou En-lai for advice andand to stress the need for rehabilitation of civilian "veteran Party cadres" as more experienced and expert in carrying out these complicated tasks. Sensing Mao's increasing reliance upon Chou En-lai and Mao's concurrent shiftore moderate policy linehreat to his position as the successor, Lin then be;gan to turn to tho Army (his other major base of power aside from Mao) and to Chen Po-ta (the archltoctumber of the Leftist policies of the Cultural Revolution) for supporttruggle for the succession. When Mao first suspected and then became convinced that Lin washis efforts to re-establish civilian Party control, the issue of civilian versus military control became the central issuerotracted political struggle which would lead ino the fall of Lin Piao.
Although persona] attitudes and Impressions are bard to document, the record does seem to indicate clearly Hao:'s growing disillusionment with the performance of Lin Piao and the military apparatuseriod of time,
dating back at least as far as the Ninth Party congress in the spring .As Party documents in explanation of the Lin Piao affair now emphasize, the sequence of events which culminated in Lin's abortive coup attempt began in9 when Mao issued the first of many warnings to Army representatives serving in the new Revolutionary Committee structure to correct their defective work-style. Mao in these warningsthis work-style variously as "arrogant andor "crude andefects which he charged (for example, in his9 speech to the First Plenum of the Ninth Central Committee) were responsible for "mistakes" in the implementation of regime policies. Coupled with this early warning against Army mistakes in policy implementation was the charge appearing in an9 Red Flag article
that these "leading cadres" In the new structure of power were violating the requirement of "collectivehat is, were slighting or suppressing the viewpoints of the civilian components of thesoCommittees, and thus were guilty, ascharged, of "one-man rule."
eries of articles published inao's criticism intensified with the levelingew and more serious charge against the PLA-dominated apparatus: that its defective work-style resulted from ideological shortcomingsourgeois world outlook. Anovember People's Dailycriticized this work-style as "bureaucratic, subjective andn contrast with Mao's practical and realistic work-style. in what appears in retrospect toignificantommentary in the9 issue of Red Flag refuted the argument that "so long as oneorrect main the question of work-styleinorince Lin Piao is now attacked for advancing this very argument (as he in factt appears that Mao and
Lin may already by tnc fall9 have had differences of opinion over the reliability and loyalty of the Army-dominated political apparatus.
Strengthening the view that the issue of civilian versus military control may already have surfacedignificant alteration at this time of the formula expressing command and control over the People'sArmy. Whereas previously the standard formulation had been "personally founded and led by Chairman Mao and directly commanded by Vice-Chairmaneadership of the PLA was now depicted (in the9 National Day editorial) as "founded and ledby Chairman Mao and commanded directly by Chairman Mao and Vice-Chalrman Lin" (underlining supplied)'. this change to call attention to Mao's directrole was short-lived and generally interpreted at the time as demonstrating heightened regime concern over the possibilityino-Soviet border war, itecently received Party document that this change reflected disagreement between Mao and Lin over the degree of control each should exercise over the PLA. According to this document, Mao in talks to responsible military comrades in August and early1 (on the eve ofabortive coup attempt) made thecriticism of his one-time "close comrade-in-arms" and chosen successor: "Lin Piao also stated that the PLA was founded and led by me but commanded by him. What he meant is that the founder cannot be the commander."
Paradoxically, the concurrent decision to begin de-emphasizing the "cult of Mao Tsc-tung" wasign ol tension between Mao and Lin. As credibly reported at the time, Mao made this decision to have fewerread, fewer slogans chanted, and fewer of his pictures used at9 National Daybecause he felt that "anti-Maoists" could exploit these practices for their own ends. In view of the fact
that Lin Piao had been the principal sponsor and beneficiary of Mao's cult, Mao's criticism of theimplementation, not to mention disloyalof his cult appears to have been directed, at least, in part, against Lin.
It was at just about this time, inoreover, that the Central Committee launched an(reportedly under the direction of Chou En-lai) of"ypermilitant Red Guardwhich7 had engaged in conspiracy to seize power and9 generally symbolized the extremism, violence and Leftist excesses of the Cultural although perhaps intended morearning to Chen Po-ta and other radical ideologues at this stage, many of the charges of "ultra-Leftism" leveled against" group at this time. their "desire for instant Communism" and their persecution of "veteran Partyould be leveled subsequently against Lin Piao and his military supporters.
inal indicationrowing divergence9 between Mao and Lin, the recent Party documents purporting to explain the Lin affair charge that Lin's conduct and behavior toward Mao changedthe Ninth Party Congress in April of that year.riticism remarkably similar to one made earlier against Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping for theirin the period preceding the Cultural Revolution, it is charged that Lin "isolated himself, and took no notice of, nor did he seek the advice and opinions of Mao Tse-tung." In fact, this changed relationshipmore, it is believed, hange in theand attitude of Wao who, as noted above, turned away from Lin to rely increasingly on Chou En-lai and to espouse more moderate policies following the Ninth Party Congress. Feeling himself "isolated" from Mao,
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Lin then turned for support to his other major source of power, the Army. In this way, then, the largerof civilian versus military control wasersonal struggle between Mao and Lin for control of the structure of power in China.
Mao's growing distrust of his chosen successor in the fall9 was manifested dramatically in0 when Mao decided to remove the post of Chairman of the State from the new draft Chinese People's Republic Constitution. Lin apparently interpreted this decision, which confirmed premier Chou En-lai as the de facto head of the government outranking Lin Piao in both of Lin's government positions of Vice Premier and Minister of National Defense, as in effect disinheriting him as the successor. Although Chou, to whom Mao had turned more and more in the year following the Ninth Party Congress for advice and assistance, had in some ways alreadythe de facto successor, this action suggested that Mao intended in time to designate Chou as his de jure successor.*
*Zi is interesting to note that following the purge of Lin Piao* Tung Pi-wu has onoe again appeared regularly in the position of "aoting Chief ofosition in which he was identified briefly in9 and then not-again till This suggests that Lin's interpretation of Mao's0 decision was correctthat it was directed not at the office but at the nan who was supposed to inherit that office.
Following this momentous decision, twoinet the stage for the dramaticwhich would take place between Mao and Lin at the Second Plenum in August. First was the movement instructing
the PLA to study Mao's thought on Party-building,onf the Party Constitution"tho article which specifies civilian Party leadership over the Army. The second was publication in theuly Party anniversary editorialew set of criteria for
selecting Communist Party members, which differed sharply from those advanced by Lin Piao in6 at theof the Cultural Revolution. Lin on that earlierhadoyal Maoist (one therefore entitled to Party membership) as one who eagerly studied Mao thought, attached great importance to political and ideological work, and was filled with revolutionary zeal;0 editorialoyal Maoist as one who was loyal to Marxism-Loninisra-Mao Tse-tung Thought and to Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary linethe combination of theory withho trusted the masses and practiced collective leadership, and who, after making mistakes, was willing to conduct self-criticism. By omitting any reference to Lin's three criteria, redefining Maoism in less Leftist terms (Mao would soon tell Couve de Murvllle in October that hend continuing to attack (Indirectly) the "arrogance and complacency" of PLA representatives serving In the new structure of power, this editorial helps to explain why Lin Piao (who saw Mao withdrawing his right to thehen po-ta (whoime when the policy line was shifting to theas the exemplar ofnd four top-ranking military leaders (who viewed Mao's escalating pressure on the military apparatushreat tobanded together "to prepare andurprise attack" at the Second Plenum at Lushan in
This attack, contained in speeches by Lin Piao and Chon Po-ta, was directed at those leaders (Kang Sheng directly, Chou En-lai indirectly) who, inthe new State Constitution, had deleted the post of Chairmanrovision extolling the "genius" of Mao
Tse-tung. By so doing, Lin and Chen charged, Kang and Chou had revealed their opposition to Mao's leadership and Mao's thought and, accordingly, should be criticized and presumably purged. attempting to use Mao's name, prestige and position (in Lin's proposal thnt Mno should become the first Chairman of State under the newin order to win majority support, the strategy of what would come to be known as Lin Piao'sclique" backfired when Mao rejected both the proposaltate Chairman (reminding Lin that on six earlier occasions he had told him "we do nothairman of thend the view of "genius" which Lin and Chen had propounded in their speeches. Choosing this overt test of struggle in an effort to protectand his military structure of power, Lin was forced to retreat on the political battlefield (withdrawing the minutes of his speech and dissociating himself from Chen Po-ta) and to turn from openly-declared political combat to the clandestine plottingoup d'etat as the last actesperate man seeking to reclaim by forco what had onco boon granted to him and then takon owayhis right to rule China as Mao's successor.
Since it was apparent to Mao that Lin washim as the headowerful military(he subsequently referred to this struggle at Lushan as the tenth major struggle between opposing "linos"two headquarters" in the history of the Chinese Communistao was compelled to be cautious and circumspect in taking action against him. As the recent Partyconcerning the Lin affair point out, any action against Lin at this Juncture without concrete proof of conspiracy would have aroused opposition from military leaders and might have resulted in civil war. Instead, Mao at the Second Plenum intensified the continuingon Lin's military apparatus bycriticize revisionism and rectify work-style" campaign which would dominate China's political life throughout the following year.
As tho latestong series of rectification or "line" struggle campaigns considered necessary whenever
thereasic change in policy line in China, it is important to note the similarities between the "criticize revisionism and rectify work-style" campaign and its predecessor, the Cultural Revolution. entral feature of both was to transfer responsibility for the failure of the preceding policy line from Mao who had originated it to tho political apparatus which hadIt. The strategy for both was toew "class enemies" at the top primarily responsible for the mistakes committed in carrying out the previous policy line, accusing them of formulating and spreading aideology which then corrupted the work-style of leading cadres at intermediate and lower levels of the apparatus. Whereas the Cultural Revolution had,ime when the policy line was shifting to the Left, attacked Rightist "revisionism" and the resultingwork-style of the Party apparatus, the objects of attack in the campaign initiated at the Second Plenum,ime when the policy line was shifting to the Right,orm of Leftist "revisionism" and the resulting work-style of "arrogance and complacency" of the PLA-domlnated political apparatus.
Within this largerommon tactic In both campaigns was to identify the "class enemies" at the top either singly or in small groups at different stages, working upwards to roach the number two man In the Chinese Communist leadership held ultimatelyfor the conduct of tho political apparatus under his control. According to recent Party documents on the Lin Piao affair, Lin was not deceived by Mao's initial tactic of focusing exclusively on Chen Po-ta (attacked as an "ultra-Leftist" and "politicaln the early months of this latest rectification campaign. early as the winter, Lin sensed that he would be the ultimate target of this campaign and by springis suspicions hardenedonviction, he was already engaged inesperate coup d'etat as preferable to the certain fate of political disgrace which lay before him.
Although primary responsibility for the failure of the preceding policy line was assignedew "class enemies" in the central leadership in Peking, leading cadres at the regional and provincial levels (the civilian Party First Secretaries in the Cultural Revolution and the military leaders who dominated the political apparatus following the Cultural Revolution) were also held partially responsible for the mistakes committed in carrying out the previous policy line. This responsibility resulted from ideological failings which, in the period preceding tho Cultural Revolution, had caused them to deviate to the Right by overemphasizing production at the expense of politics and, in the period following the Cultural Revolution, had caused them to deviate to the Left by overemphasizing politics at the expense of production. The three-fold remedy for this latest error of "Left deviation ism" was, by means of the "criticize revisionism and rectifyampaign, for leading military cadres: o remould their thinking (by studying Mao's philosophic works and thus learning how to "integrate theory with practice" and torealistic and scientific" approach to problems);o rectify their work-style (correcting the defects of "arrogance and complacency" and overcoming the tendency toward "one man rule" by respecting the collective leadership of civilian Partyo demonstrate their loyalty to Mao and their willingness to return to the correct Maoist line by engaging in self-criticism.
Since the road to power in the Cultural Revolution of both Lin Piao and the PLA had been one of "giving prominence tohe central charge in this campaignthat an overemphasis on politics had resulted in "Leftist deviationism" in the implementation of Mao's policy lineserved to undercut one of the mostjustifications for Lin's and the PLA's continued right to rule. The generally negative response of military authorities throughout China to this rectification campaign
indicated, moreover, that they were quite aware that it threatened their continued domination of the political structure. This response, in well-documented instances at the Military Region level the Canton MR) was to ignore the campaign's injunctions to change course, carry out self-criticism and obey the directives of the civilian Party apparatus. umber of regional and provincial military commanders continued, in the face of mounting evidence that both Lin and the Army's political role were under Maoist attack, openly to praise Lin Piao and glorify the Army. Although this was trueumber of provinces throughout the early months1. Shantung, Sinkiang, Kwangsi andt was most graphically illustrated in Fukien where, as late as1 in his Party Congress speech, the Foochow MR Commander Han Hsien-chu assigned almost as much prominence and praise to Lin Piao as he did to Mao.
This striking manifestation of resistance to the "criticize revisionism and rectify work-style" campaign confirmed what Mao already knewthat in Lin and his military supporters heowerful adversary against whom he would have to move cautiously both at tne center and in the provinces. Apparently feeling that the time had come, Mao in August and early1 conducted an inspection tour of the Canton and Nanking Military Regions aimed generally at "educating cadres, achieving unity and denouncing conspiracies and intrigues" and specifically at seeking assurances of support from these regional military leaders in an impending showdown with Lin and his group of military leaders. The struggle between Mao and Lin for control of the political-military apparatus (the issue of civilian versus military control) hadlashpoint, soon to explode in the bizarre sequence of events beginning with an abortive Lin-sponsored attempt to assassinate Mao and culminating in Lin's fiery deathlane crash in Mongolia.
The Issue of the Scale of the Purge
The other thing the Chairman [Mao] wae moot unhappy about [eonaerning the Cultural Revolution] wae the maltreatment of 'aaptivee 'Party members and others removed from power and subjected toMaltreatment of [these)ad slowed the rebuilding and transformation of the Party.Edgar Snow,onversation with Maon Life,
I was toldhinese official] that the first disagreement between the two hierarchies [the political andconcerned the scale of the purge within theThe supportersore radicalreamedure and hard Party, but they came up against Mao Tse-tungiehed to limit thend against Chou Sn-lai who was anxious not to break the tool [the Party].
Claude Julien, "The Lin Piaon Le Monde,
If it is true (as now alleged in Party documents) that Mao even before the Ninth Party Congress suspected Lin of opposing Party leadership ovor the Army, there is reason to believe that Mao sensed this opposition firstisagreement over "the scale of the purge within the Party." Beginning in the fall8 (when the task of
rebuilding the Party was first undertaken) andright up to the dramatic events ofhisispute not over the need to purify the old Party apparatusentral aim of the Culturalbut over the manner in which and the extent to which, this purge was to be carried out. The outcome of this struggle between two groups of "radicals" (including Lin Piao, Chen Po-ta and probably Kang Sheng as well) and "modoratos" (including on this issue Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai) within the top leadership would determine, of course, who would control the"new post-Cultural Revolution structure of power.
There is good evidence that Mao, who initiated the attack on high-ranking Party cadres at the outset of tbe Cultural Revolution, had become alarmed by reports of widespread violence and of the wholesale purge and replacement of old cadres in the nation-wideof class ranks" campaign carried out by the military-dominated apparatus in the fall Reacting to this early example of "maltreatment" of Party cadres, Mao directed that no further arrests be made without prior approval at the provincial Revolutionary Committee level and further instructed (in9 New Year's Day editorial) that In carrying out this campaign"tho target of attack must be narrowed and more people must be helpod through education." This new emphasis on raodorntlon in "class struggle" was extended at the Ninth Party Congress to provideayiberation" and "suitableven for "bourgeois reactionary academic authorities" and "capitalistin power." Intended to signal the end of the "destructive" phase of the Cultural Revolution, the new emphasis on unity and conciliation at the Party Congress alsoesire to get on with the final "constructive" phase of the Cultural Revolution in which the central task was reconstructing tho Chinese Communist Party.
Addressing the First Plenum of the new immediately following the close of the Congress,
Mao stressed tho need to "be careful and prudent"the Party, citing the previous "mistake" which
had resulted from "carelessness" ofoo many people." Asserting that It is "always better to unite more people" including even "those who opposeao then repeated an earlier instruction that it was tbe responsibility of the military to solve the widespread problem of factionalism, quarreling and disunity atand local levels of the new political structure. As the de facto government already held responsible for solving all other problems in their local areas, theapparatus was now informed that it was alsofornited civilian Party which would then replace it as the rightful ruler of China.
This reminder to the military that itsrole was only temporary and transitionalmore pointed in accompanying editorials9 People's Dally editorialBo Good at Translating the Party's Policy Intotheointing out that "veteran Partybetter qualified, because of their "richerand better understanding of the Party'sundertake the complicated tasks of the newstage of the Cultural Revolution. Whereashad stressed simple political virtues (theof Mao thought, the earnest promotion ofideological work, and revolutionary zeal) asfor selecting new leaders during thestage of the Cultural Revolution, nowwas to be placed on professionalselecting Party leadership cadres. In terms ofMaoist dialectical formulation of theboth "red and expert"the pendulum was now
swinging back from the earlier Cultural Revolution extreme of excessive reliance on "rednoss"osition
in which "expertness" was now considered to be of at
least equal if not greater importance in the selection of new leaders.
The implications of this shift from revolutionary to professional criteriahift undoubtedly encouraged by Chou En-lai in the interest of administrativein the selection of new Party leaders were clearmost of these were to be old Party cadres who, having been properly educated and transformed, were to be "liberated" and returned to their former or similarof authority. hreat to their continued exercise of political power, both radical Ideologues and military leaders, not only In Peking but also at provincial levels, had reason to join forces to carry out what is now called an "ultra-leftist" cadre policy characterized either by wholesale purging of old Party cadres or "failing to liberate cadres on time."
The mechanism for carrying out this "ultra-leftist" cadre policy was theadre School, an Institution to which old Party cadres were sentefresher course In Mao Thought study and hard physical labor and where through faithful performance of these duties they could demonstrate anew their loyalty to Chairman Mao and Mao's revolutionary line. Byadres fromcentral political apparatus and some one million cadres at the provincial level had been sent down to those schools in the countryside for study and labor. The flaw in this arrangement was that thesey the PLA, with military leaders empowered to decide whether the old Party cadres had passed the test of political loyalty and were thus entitled to return to positions of authority in the new political apparatus. The charge that the Cultural Revolution Group radical Ideologues and the PLA abused this authority to prevent the rehabilitation of veteran Party cadres and thus perpetuate their own powera charge first intimated
by Mao to Snow in0 and now explicitly statedis both credible and supported by developments at the time.
Thereumber of indications, for oxample, that beginning in tbe fall9 Kao was turning to Chou En-lai for advice and assistance in dealing with this coalition of radical civilian and military leaders intent upon perpetuating the power structure and policies ol" the Cultural Revolution.
early as9 Chou had been entrusted with, full authority to prepare forational People's Congress (which would thenew Stateandew Central Government apparatus) and that one of the reasons why the Congress was postponed on several occasions in the ensuing year was that the continued practice of "military control" was considered incompatible with the NPC idea of rule by the people. civilian rule). Thus, If Chou was not yetosition to challenge military dominance in other areas (for example, at provincial and local levels of the new politicalhe could at least (with Mao's authorization) keep the military from moving*in"to dominate the slowly emerging Central Government structure.
Another development in the fall9 was the holding in Novemberational leadership meeting ateries of important policy decisions were made, two of which concerned this ongoing struggle for control of the post-Cultural Revolution political apparatus. First was the decision, apparently made at this time, to abolish the Cultural Revolution Group (which had been charged with carrying out most of the Leftist policies and programs of the Cultural Revolution) and to demote its head Chen Po-taosition of relative unimportance (there is no record of Chenpeech orrivaterelating to policy after.
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The second was the concurrent decision to initiate the campaign noted earlier against" group, the militant Red Guard organization active7 which now symbolized both the discredited policies of the Cultural Revolution and those who continued to promote these policies. entral charge in theroup campaign as it unfoldedas that it had been guilty of "ultra-leftism" In its attitude and behavior toward Party cadresspecifically, that it had "wrongly accusedhung up tho cases of cadres forand] wanted to exclude all veteran cadres." These charges would beear later to apply to Chen Po-ta (explicitly) and Kangmplicitly) and then further extended another year later to apply to Lin Piao and his supportersthe military apparatus.
As spelled out in Party documents explaining the Lin Piao affair, Lin's responsibility for the "ultra-leftist" cadre policy is traced back to the three criteria he had formulated in6 (with Mao's approval) foroyal Maoistcriteria which stressed the simplified study of Mao thought, the primacy ofand ideological work, and revolutionary zeal. These criteria, it is now charged, were used by his military apparatus following the Cultural Revolution to strike at and purge systematically without cause voteran Party cadres (employing the argument among others that "the older the cadres, the more outmoded theyn order to appoint frionds and proteges to positions of authority in the new political apparatus. To correct this unjust and corrupt use of power, there has been in recentampaign to rehabilitate veteranoercent at local evcls), including evon the much-maligned Commander of the Wuhan Military Region Chen Tsai-tao, who inad achieved notoriety for allegedlyutiny against Peking.
With tho fall of Lin Plao and his principalthe issue of the scale of the purge appears to have been largely resolved, with Chou En-lai on record as estimating that not more than one percent of the membership has been expelled from the Partyesult of the Cultural Revolution. In the struggle over thistruggle which began in the springao and Chou have emerged victorious, with the result that more experienced and expert civilian Party cadres are now beginning to take over from the Military cadres who, since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, have dominated the structure of power in China.
The Issue of Foreign Policy
/Lin rtao had stated.
that he was completely opposed to President Nixon's visit, and that he opposed it by virtue of the fact that he was Mao's sue-eessor and was director of thein's political philosophy was that of an 'ultra-leftist'hilosophy which if implemented wouldubjected the country to attack by 'imperialist' and 'socialist imperialist'in maintained that China should not havewith nor give economic aid to any country where Marxist-Leninist movements were strugglingost imperialist government, and that China had to develop all its reeouraes in preparation for war.
A highly dramatic and visible issue, the role of foreign policy in domestic political conflict in general and in the Lin Plao affair in particular must bewith great care. In addition to the usualof attempting to ascertain the positions adopted by leaders of opposing factions or interest groups on the domestic political scene, there is the complicating factor that the actions undertaken by foreign governmentsignificant Impact oh the development and outcome of the internal leadership debate on foreign policy. There is the further complicating factor that Chinese
officials have, in briefing non-Communist Westerners, tended to exaggerate the importance of foreign policy outesire to minimize the still potentially explosive central issue in the Lin Piao affair of civilian versus military control in China. Finally, theretrong temptation toriori the foreign policy issue in termsispute concerning the triangular relationship between China, the Soviet Union and the United States, with one groupapprochement with the Soviet Union and the other with the United States. In fact, it appears that Mao, Lin, Chou and the top PLA leaders were all agreed that the Soviet Union constituted the gravest military threat to China and that policy differencesis the USSR, if any, were confined to questions of degree and emphasis.
The evidence, as illustrated by the quotation cited above, indicates that the role of foreign policy in the Lin Piao affair was more tactical than causative or fundamental in nature. The dispute, moreover,not so much which of the two great powers, Russia or America, China should conciliate, but whether China should switch from the confrontationist and isolationist foreign policy posture of the Cultural Revolutionore flexible and pragmatic approach. An intensive review of the record indicates, furthermore, that the impact of developments abroad upon this internal policy debate, while significant, was not decisive. The effect of these developments, principally those in Southeast Asia, would be one of slowing down but not reversing the trend toward moderation in China's relations with the outside world.
In contrast with other policy issues, Lin Piao is clearly on record as one of the principal architects of*what might be called the "revolutionary model" of foreign policy which dominated China's foreign relations during the Cultural Revolution. In his famous treatise
on people's war publishedinthe need to promote revolution abroad patterned after the Chinese revolutionaryodel featuring rural-based armed struggle which would then surround and finally capture the cities. In his speech commemoratingh anniversary of the October Revolutionin depicted this model (which Chairman Mao "with genius" had created)great new develop*-ment" in both the Marxist-Leninist theory and practice of revolution and, as such, having general validity throughout the world. And in the accompanying Joint People's Dally, Red Flag and Liberation Army Dallyon this occasion. Chairman Mao was hailed as "the greatest teacher and most outstanding leader of the proletariat in tbe present era" and China was declared to be "the center of world revolution."
In practice, as Is now well known, this effort to propagate Mao's thought and thus promote revolution abroad embroiled China In controversy with nearly every Important government of the world. The realization that,esult of the provocative and self-defeating foreign policy of the Cultural Revolution, China stood Isolated in the faceajor threat to its national security thenurn to the Rightore pragmatic and moderate foreignrocess which beganin the fall7 and has proceeded through several fairly well-defined stages up to the present. Since Chou En-lai personified this turn toward what might benationalist model" of foreign policy, as Lin Piao had personified tho preceding "revolutionaryhe dispute over the Issue of foreign policyeal sense hasispute between these two leaders each striving to enlist support for his views. The record shows, moreover, that Chairman Mao backed Chou
throughout most of this struggle, providing decisive
support in the final showdown
/to oppose the
proposed visit OT president Nixoninn.
The first stage in this protracted process offrom Left"revolutionaryo Right (the "nationalistn foreign policy extended from the fall7 through the summer8 and was marked by the return of Premier Chou En-laiominant role in foreign affairs. Speaking to workers In this field inhou reminded his listeners that like it or not Peking had no choice but to deal with otherprimarily as sovereign states and governments and quoted Mao as stating that China during the preceding summer had been guilty of "great-power chauvinism." Alsoew awareness of the nationalist sensibilities of Communist Parties and other governments throughout the world, the Chinese leadershipentral Committeein8 directed that Chinese propaganda intended for foreign nudluncos would no longer refer to China as "the center of world revolution" or to Mao Tse-tung as "the leader of the peoples of the world"views which Chou En-lai would subsequently (inharacterize as "ultra-leftist." That Mao8 was alreadyhimself from these "ultra-leftist" views was Indicated by his instruction in Septemberapanese revolutionary group that, instead of blindly imitating China:'emodel, it should "integrate the universal truths of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of its own revolution."
The second stage in this slow process of moving toward the Right in foreign policy lasted from the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in8eries of border clashes with the Soviet Union9 and the Cambodia military campaign in the spring0 to the Second Plenum in Within this stage two distinct and contradictory trends appear. The first was in the extromo ideological and confrontationist tradition of the Cultural Revolution, consisting of on Intensified attack on tho Soviet leadership (now excoriated as "social-imperialist" andolemn declaration
(subsequently identified as Maoist) of the arrivalnew historical stage of opposition to United States imperialism and Sovietnd the launchingassive "war preparations" campaign in which (as Lin Piao put it) "all work" was to be "observed, examined and approached from the standpoint of war." This "war preparations" campaign justified: n politics, the continued domination by the military of the political apparatus; n economics, the priority development of military industry;n ideology, the continued primacy of Lin Piao's interpretation of Mao's thought in which "redness" (revolutionary zeal; austerity and sacrifice) outweighed "expertness" (professionalas the most important element in Maoism. Directed against the Soviet Union (designatedhis campaignefinite asset to Lin Piao In the struggle already underway for control of the political apparatus in China.
The same trend was manifested, moreover, in tho revolutionary manifesto Issued by Chairman Mao onntitled "People of the World, Unite and Defeat the US Aggressors and All Their Runningeacting to the combined South Vietnamese and United States military intervention in Cambodia three weeks earlier, the Chinese leaderin what would subsequently be referred to as "Mao's new evaluation of thescene"declared in effect that the United States had now displaced the Soviet Union as China's number one cnomy. The personal insults and hostile rhetoric formerly reserved for the Soviet Union and the Soviet leadership were now heaped on the United States government (engaged in "fascistnd on President Nixon (tbe perpetrator of "fascist atrocities"). This new hostile and confrontationist posture toward the United States was revealed even more clearly50 joint editorial entitled 'People of Asia, Unite and Drive. Aggressors Out ofn
which it was stated unequivocally that "'one's attitude to the United States is the principal criterion forrue or sham revolutionary."
The otherand contradictorytrend throughout this period was one clearly associated with Chou En-lai which sought to substitute negotiation for confrontation and toore flexible foreign policy stanceime of national danger. This flexible approach was to be applied towards both superpowers, first toward the United States in the tentative invitation in8 (later withdrawn) to resume the Warsaw talks, and then toward the Soviet Union in theo negotiate the Sino-Soviet border dispute. It was in keeping with this flexible strategy of playing the United States and the Soviet Union against each other that Chairman Mao, on the day following the United States military intervention in Cambodia in the springstentatiously sought out the chief Soviet negotiator on the reviewing stand at May Dayriendly chat, Including an injunction to get on with the border talks.
Keeping in mind that Chairman Mao (as well as Premier Chou) is renownedaster oflose reading of the ensuingay statement suggests, moreover, that it was intended not only for use in the struggle against China's enemies abroad but also for use in the continuing struggle for control of theapparatus at home. For it was by virtue of the much-quoted dictum contained in this statement"The dangerew world war stillutis the main trend in the world today'1hat Mao then set about de-emphasizlng the "war preparations" campaign within China and thus deprived Lin Piao and his military supportersajor justification for the continued dominance of the military. While appearing
to defer to the Lin Piao strategy of espousingstruggle abroad, it appears in retrospect that an equally important if not more importa nt objective of Mao's in issuing thisay statement was to undercut Lin's and tho military's right to rule at home.
This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that Peking, following the issuance of this statement, did not in fact significantly step-up material support for revolutionary armed struggle throughout the wbrld. In authoritative explanations of thisay statement.'In Julyhou En-lai and Rang Kheng were quite explicit in pointing out that revolutionaryabroad would havo to rely on their own resources and that, since in most areas of the world "no revolutionary possibilitieshina, rather than providing political, military and financial support to revolutionary groups abroad, would seek to promote the Interests of world revolution thereafter by relying primarily onrelations. Underlining the need (In accordance with Mao's teachings) to "combine Marxism-Leninism with reality in eachhese officials criticized the mistakes of "left-extremism" and "great-nation chauvinism" in China's foreignduring the Cultural Revolution, citing as one example the mistake of claiming universal validity for China's revolutionary model . Since Lin Piao was tho only prominent Chinese leader on record as havingthis mistake, It appears that Mao'say far frometurn to the "ultra-leftist" foreign policy line of thp Culturalwas being usedactical weapon In thestruggle between tbe proponents of civilian (Maoist) versus military (Lin Piao) control over the political apparatus within China.
It Ih in this larger frameworktruggle for power, then, that the last stage of turning to the Right in foreign policya stage represented by the dramatic debate within Peking's top leadership over President Nixon's visitmust be understood. Although the terms of this debate are now fairly well known, the timing and occasion can only be deduced on the basis of related developments. It is of crucial importance, into ascertain when the debate took place, to know, when the proposalisit reached China's top This, according to Edgar Snow, had taken place "by late autumnhen "several urgent and authentically documented inquiries reaching China had indicated that the President wished to know whether he or his representative would be received in Peking." This suggests that the debate took place no earlier than the Second Plenumnd probably at an expanded Politburo meeting held in November to sum up and criticize the errors committed by Chen po-ta. That the debate (characterized as one between Lin and Chou. with Mao coming down on the side of Ch6u) was held no later than November is suggested by Mao's assurances to Snow (In their conversation ofhat President Nixon "would be welcome"that "he could just getlane and come." The actual invitation would not be tendered, however, until sometime thespring, only after the new crisis in Sino-Amcrican relations occasioned by the South Vietnamese invasion of Laos had been resolved.
As Indicated in tbe quotation cited at the beginning of this discussion, Lin based his opposition to President Nixon's visit not so much on considerations of power as of ideology, portraying negotiations with the United Statesetrayal of the Chinese and world revolutions. This was probably dictated by tactical considerations, since it was difficult to deny that the Soviet Union with moreillion armed men posed on the Sino-Soviet
borderraver threat to China's national security. It seems fairly clear, moreover, thatLin used the Soviet Unionounter in his argument against the Nixon visit, he did ho moreesire to score debating points (he is reported to have said, for example, "If Mao can invite Nixon, whynviter to strengthen hisargument (the USSR depictedsocialist" country and therefore deserving at least equal if not favored treatment comparedcapitalist" country) than from any prior understanding with the Soviet What does Beem clear is that the ex post facto charge against Lin of collusion with the Soviet Union in plotting the anti-Mao coup is fabricated. tandard charge against all Chinese leaders Indicted as "classhe charge that Lin Piao carried on "Illicit relations with foreign countries" is supported by no other evidence than thatast desperate effort he sought to escape to the Soviet Union rather than await disgrace and imprisonment, if not death, in China.
Just as Mao and Chou had earlier attacked policies with which Lin was directly associated asLin ar.rf .his military supporters were nowthe Mao-Chou policy of negotiations with the United States as in effect Rightist. In fact, the charge that Mao's foreign policy was "too Rightist" in its betrayal of North Vietnam and the lofty Marxism-Leninism principle of "proletarian Internationalism" is made explicitly inoup plot document allegedly drafted by Lin's group. The evidence strongly suggests, then, that the issue of foreign policy wasactical weapon for use in,undamental cause of, the politicalwhich would lead to the fall of Lin Piao.
tEX. m
Tho Issue of Economic Policy
Thar* are two ways to construct our country. One ie the Russian way, giving emphasis to materials, machines, tte'ahnni-zation, and so-called materialhe other way ie our way led by Chairman Mao in which revolution leads In comparison, man ie more important than machines.
Lin Piao, Address at the ChinoseParty Central Committee Work Conference,
The emergence of the situation of great leap forward ie the inevitable result of the development in depth of the Great Proletarian CulturalA new Leap Forward in industrial and agricultural production ie bound to appear after every great political campaign... This is 'spirit being turned into material, '
Canton Radio,
One of the most distinctive elements of Mao's thought is reliance on political indoctrination to motivate and control human thought and behavior. The ultimate expression of this political indoctrination, "mass-line" approach to economic development was the Great Leap Forward. central purpose of the Cultural Revolution, as indicated in the quotations cited above.
was to arouse tlie revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses preparatoryew Leap Forward in economic development.
The central charge now leveled against Lin Piao with respect to economic policy is that, whereas Liu Shao-chi (following the Soviet revisionist example) had committed the Rightist error in thes ofthe material factor, Lin and his colleagues are guilty of the "ultra-leftist" error ofthe human, spiritual factor in the production process. In ideological terms, this overemphasis of the subjective factor is said to derive from the "bourgeois worldof idealism and metaphysics." Although Lin, Chen Po-ta and other of their supporters at the top are held primarily responsible, leading cadres at intermediate and lower levels of the apparatus are also heldfor having implemented this "ultra-leftist" economic policy line.
Although grossly exaggerated and distorted, there Is an element of truth in this indictment of the military-dominated apparatus for having handled poorly the complicat task of rebuilding the economy following the disruption Of the Cultural Revolution. In much the same way as it performed badly its task (assigned at the Ninth Party Congress) of rebuilding the political system, the end result of radical ideologues and military leaderscontrolling the formulation and implementation of economic policy in the period following the Ninth Party Congress was an "ultra-leftist" tendency to go beyond Mao's policyendency expressed first in setting unrealistic goals and tnen In resorting to coercion in an attempt to achieve these goals.
Mao's policy guidelines were first outlined in an unpublished speech by Premier Chou En-lal9 and then discussed at greater length in9 Red Flag article entitled "China's
Road of Socialist Industrialization." Althoughby Chou as "Chairman Mao's new economict was in many ways reminiscent of the economic strategy which had produced the Great Leap Forward, only this time presentedore reasoned and moderate vein in an apparent effort to take account of earlier mistakes. Vague and contradictory and perhaps inherently unworkable as these guidelines were, it Is not surprising that those leaders at both central and local levels responsible for interpreting and implementing them eventually came to grief.
As spelled out in Chou's speech and the Red Flag article, Mao in his new economic line called for ahigh rate of economic development (as opposed to the low projections of economic growth which he attributed to Liu Shao-chi) by asserting that "we have unlimited possibilities for developing our economy unceasingly andery rapid pace without parallel in capitalist economies." This was to bo achieved in the modernsector by rejecting Liu Shao-chi's doctrine of "trailing behind foreign countriesnail's pace" and instead (as Mao had put it five years earlier) "making maximum use of advanced techniques so that our country can be builtocialist modern powerot long historical period."
This was to be achieved primarily In thevnon-modern sector, however, by mobilizing China's huge underemployed labor force to carry out Leap Forwards in agriculture and medium-and-small-scale industry. To make this approach more appealing to tne peasants (who were expected, under the doctrine of self-reliance and local self-sufficiency, to finance this local Industrial effort), the rapidof local industry, It was stated, would bring about agricultural mechanization quickly and would, furthermore.
ECRET
by reducing the differences between town and country, facilitate the advance to Communism. In this effort to undertake parallel Leap Forwards in industry (in both the small-scale and locally-financed and the large-scale centrally-financed industrial sectors) and simultaneous Leap Forwards in both Industry andthe entire undertaking to rely heavily on political indoctrination and ideological incentives there was ample room for controversy In the allocation of blame when the effort began to founder.
Another feature of this "now economic line"the decentralization of administrative and economic power so that China, as Mao told Snow, could stimulate "regional and local initiatives"would also create difficulties In Its implementation. One difficulty was the divergence which began to develop among provinces in9 and0 in the understanding and execution of Mao's vague policy pronouncements. Aligned on one sldo were zealots in such provinces as Bellungklang and Kiangsi stressing revolutionary courage and daringrime requisite for promoting Leap Forwards in industry and agriculture and criticizing "rightist conservative cadres who failed to see the revolutionary zeal of the masses imbued with Mao Thought." On the other side were more moderate leaders In such provinces as Llaoning and Klrin who stressed the needractical and realistic work-style, warned against the setting of unrealistic goals and pointed out the danger, in criticizing Liu Shao-chi's Rightist revisionist economic line, of going to the opposite Leftist extreme of neglecting production and equalizing the distribution of Income.
The problem of drafting China's Fourth Five Year Plan in accordance with the vague and contradictoryof Mao's "new economic line" was furtherby the fact that at the time It was being drafted
hina was in the gripspreparations against war" campaign in which all work, including economic work, was, according to Lin'Piao's injunction, to be "observed, examined and approached from the start: point of war." This provided an opportunity forleaders at tbe Center to call for greater emphasis on the development of advanced weapons and military Industry in the drafting of the Five Year Plan* That this opportunity was exploited is suggested by the criticism, explicit and implicit, leveled against the first draft of this Plan after it was changed at (orfter) the Second Plenum in
The new draft of China's Fourth Five Year Plan.
asic decision to reject the Great Leap Forward approach in favorore realistic economic strategy; to shift investment resources away from the development of technologically advanced and military industry toward basic industryore balanced development of the national economyhole; and, at provincial and local levels, to place greater emphasis on the development of agriculture as opposed to local industry and,esult, to stretch out the timetable for achieving agricultural mechanization. Mao's endorsement of this decision was indicated in remarks he made
in0 concerning Pakistan's upcoming Four Five Year Plan. In what was probably an implicit reference to Chen Po-ta and other radical economic planners in China, Mao cautioned against those who promised spectacular development in the economic field
hort period and urged_
explaining the true status of the economy1 New Year's Day editorial repeated
an old Mao statement that it would take "several decades to overcome China's economic backwardness, indicating
publicly both tho shift awayreat Leap Forward approach in the drafting of China's Fourth Five Year Plan and Mao's endorsement of this change in plan.
Among the reasons for this shiftore realistic strategy of economic development, the basic reason was that the attempto carrypractical" Leap Forward had failed. Despite periodic injunctions (for example, in February and March and again ino "leave enough leeway" in the drawing up of production plans, the practice ofproduction targets to demonstrate revolutionary zeal (for example, the goal of doubling grain productionumber of provinces within five years) had become widespread.
Another reason for the change was the need tothe trend toward decentralization of economic and administrative power and re-establish centralized control over the economy. What had happened was that the provinces (and the administrative subdivisions within the provinces) had abused the power entrusted to them, It was charged, to overemphasize the development of local industry at the expense of agriculture. Klangsi Provincease in point. Whereas only eight months earlier Klangsi had been hailedational model and pace-setter, theleadership in Kiangsl admittedong0 editorial of self-criticism that it had been guilty of "blind development, departmentalism and excessive decentralization" in its development of local Industry. In this admission of "blind development" of local industry, there was evidence that still another mistake of the earlier Great Leap Forward periodthe diversion of scarce human, financial and material resources from the agricultural to the industrial sectorhad been repeated. This admission was then made explicitubsequentDally discussion of "leftist" error* oomitted
in carrying out agricultural mechanization, errorsof an excessive accumulation of funds from China's peasants and the allocation of excessive amounts of labor from agriculture to the development of local industry.
A third reason, revealed by Chou En-lai ina dispute within the leadership ovor "guns versus butter" which he claimed hadentral issuecritical policy debate" preceding the fall of Lin Piao, was the difficulty which provincial officials had experienced in attempting to "persuade workers, peasants and soldiers to accept directives fromequiring them to rely on their own initiative in the financing of local development." Although thisomewhat disingenuous explanation of tho Lin Piao affair (Chou was after all referringebate which had taken place moreear before Lin'st is likely that Chou was alluding to an important aspect of the economic policy issuethe extent to which the burden for the development of China's agriculture and local industry could be shifted to the provincial level, leaving the lion's share of the central budget for the developmentechnically advanced modern industrial sector oriented toward national defense.
In this debate over the age-old question of "guns versus butter" (which would be discussed in the press as the question of whether industry should be developed with "electronics" or "steel" at the center), thereatural basis for alliance between the radical planners (symbolized by Chen Po-ta) and the military (represented in this case not only by Lin Piaoolitical-military leader but also by Lin's Chief-of-Staff Huang Yung-shengrofessional military leader). For to the extent that the idoological view of Chinese man (as willing to subordinate individual material interests to collective
or national goals) prevailed, there would be more funds available in the central budget for the development of advancod weapons and military industry.* That such an alliance, whothcr tacit or overt, did in fact exist Is suggested, moreover, by tho content of tho publicof this Issue. The charge that those favoring the development of China's Industry with "electronics at the center"gifted theoretician" and "political swindlers who advocate laying hold oftechnology" in order to speed up entry into Communist society suggests strongly the radical ideologue Chen Po-ta. The charge that those who supported the "electronics industry" also claimed it would "promote development of the national defense industry as well as the national economyhole" suggests ato the military leaders Lin and Huang.
In sum, it appears that tbe dispute over economic policy, like that over foreign policy, was not acause of the purge of Lin Piao, Rather, the issue of economic policy provided another weapon with which the contestants could joust and maneuver for position in conducting the larger struggle for control of theapparatus in China.
"In the absence of hard data on budgetary allocations, there is no way to estimate the amount of funds involved in this dispute* It is likely, in view of collateral evidenceontinued high rate of investment in the military sector, that the amount, although significantymbolic sense, was not large in abeoluts terms.
Tho Issue of Rural Policy
Premier Chou En-lai pointedhat China ie reviewing the portion of the Conetitution v'nioh deale with the peasantry... orreal policy toward the peasantry... is one of the most important problems to be solved.
Chou En-lai's Remarksapanese Student Delegation,
After the great proletarianrevolution... the handful of classhanged their tactics and said... that the Party'e basic poliay toward the rural people's eommunee wae 'incompatible' with the requirements for accelerating rural socialietnd should be 'ahanged' in order to 'realise Communiem' right now.Hsiang Hui, "Conscientiously Implement the Party's Economic Policies for Ruraln Red Flag. No.
The undertaking following the Cultural Revolution to reform China's rural communes was an integral part of the Great Leap Forward approach to economic development. Intended to generate new resources and thus "accelerate rural socialisthese reforms constituted an attempt toumber of the original features of China's commune system. This time, however, in much the
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same way that an effort was made to apply the Leap Forward strategyore roalistic and practical way, thCHc radical reforms were not to be imposed from above by administrative flat, but rather were to be accepted "voluntarily"easantry whose Ideologicalhad been raisedesult of the Cultural
The vehicle for the "voluntary" introduction of these reformsation-wide campaign initiated in the fall8 of learning from and emulating the model Tachai agricultural production brigade. This collective farm, located in Shansl Province, was so advanced that it had eliminated private plots, merged production teams andystem of income distribution combining both socialist (distribution according to work) and(distribution according to political attitude) features. As the merger of production teams penalized tbe more productive teams, so did the new distribution system and the abolition of private plots serve to penalize the more productive peasant households by reducing their income. Simply put, the problem facing the "leading comrades" at all levels In carrying out the "learn from Tachai" campaign was how to persuade China's peasants "voluntarily" to produce more and consume less in order to accelerate economic development.
That this campaign was basedtopian view of human nature was demonstrated by reports of rising peasant discontent. Confronted with these reports andhreatened decrease in production, the Maoist leadership first of all acknowledged (in editorials in March andhat mistakes had been made in the "learn from Tachai" campaignspecifically the mistake of not realizing that "commune members' privatere currently necessary for solving their problems of food and manure and at present still cannot be abolished."
The next step was to allude publicly to policy problems (including references for the first time to an "ultra-left" trend) which had arisen and to repeat earlier warnings against the use of coercion or command ism In carrying out the "learn from Tachai" campaign. Another step, perhapsompromise In thecontroversy over rural policy,entraldirective dated9 which stipulated that Implementation of the Tuchai distribution system could be postponed if the ldoological level of the peasantseople's commune or production brigade was not high enough.
It is not surprising that provincial leaders, exercising the discretion authorized by this ambiguous directive, proceeded to carry out the "learn from Tachai" campaign in the spring and summer0 in quiteways. Some, notably In Kiangsl. Fukien and Hellungklang, called for stepping up politicalin order to vigorously extend the Tachai system which "integrated the socialist principle of 'to each according to his work1 with the Communist revolutionary spirit." Others, as in Liaoning and Klrln, warned of the consequences of carrying this campaign to extreme, the consequences for example of declining production and equalltarianlsm In the distribution of Income.
As was the case with most of the other policydiscussed above, the issue of rural policy was largely resolved at the Second Plenum inhe draft State Constitution approved at that Plenum was, in terms of ruralotably conservative document. In declaring its approval"at tbe present stage"of the peasants' private plots and of the production team as the commune's basic accounting unit, it returned to the rural institutional system to which China had retreated after the collapse of the Great Leap Forward
in thes. Moreover, its blunt declaration that "those who do not work shall not eat" suggests that the quantity and quality of work are now much morethan political attitude in determiningand indeed seems to preclude at least at present further experimentation with the Tachai distribution system.
It remained only to explain how this nation-wide "learn from Tachai" campaign, which clearly had theof Chairman Mao at the outset, had gone so badly awry. At the top, the responsibility for failure was assigned primarily to Chen po-ta, attacked obliquely but unmistakably in Red Flag and other regime publications1sham Marxist" who following the Cultural Revolution "had put forward proposals to change the Party's basic policiesthe socialist system ofealize Communismt the provincial level, Chen in some cases. Heilung-kiang and Shansl) had been assisted by "agents" who had also "distorted" the Party's rural policies with the evil intent of "dampening the socialist enthusiasm of the cadres and masses." ore common charge leveled at "leading cadres" Xi-e. the PLA representatives serving in the Revolutionary Committee structure) atand lower levels of the political apparatus, however, was the lesser offense of "blindly following" Tachai's methods of distribution and management "without regard for the level of consciousness of people's commune members or for local conditions."
The basic charge against Chen Po-ta (representing the civilian radicals) and Lin Piao (representing the military apparatus) concerning rural policy is not that they opposed Chairman Mao, as was the case in foreign policy, but rather that they encouragedwith evil intentthe "overzealous implementation" of Mao's rural policy guidelines. Since these guidelines were
initially advanced or at least endorsed by Mao himself, it seems clear that the issue of rural policy should also be viewed as partarger struggle for control of the political apparatus which wouldlimax in the destruction of Lin Piao.
Conclusions
The New China iVews Agenay official explained that Chen Po-ta'e fall from power, rather than resulting from juet one or two aote by Chen, had anbaeie... He implied that Chen had been left behind ae the ideological struggle paesedew level.
China News Agency Officialon the Purge of Chen Po-ta,
At the beginning of the Cultural Revolution... it wae necessary to enable the broad masses of the people to grasp Chairman Mao Tse-tung's thought[through the etudy the quotations of Chairman Mao. And in thisomrade Lin Piaout by now the Culturalhasnd the time has come for us to etudyeeper way Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought,
En-lai, Conversation with the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars Friendship Delegation,
If the Cultural Revolution, featuring "classand Mao Tse-tung's well-known "mass line" approach to the solution of political, economic and social problemsharp swing to the Left in Maoist ideology, the political struggle leading up to the purge of Lin Piao was accompanied by an almost equally sharp swing back to the Right in Communist China's basic ideological
and political lino. In the early "destructive" phase of the Cultural Revolution, both Chen Po-ta (symbolizing; the Red Guards) and Lin Piao (symbolizing the power of the Army) had, as indicated In the quotations cited above,great contribution" in bringing down Mao'sentrenched within the old Party and government apparatus. But when the Cultural Revolution moved into its "constructive" phase ofew political apparatus and specifying post-Cultural Revolution programs and policies, Chen (now symbolizing the discredited policies of the Cultural Revolution) and Lin (nowthe military apparatus charged with implementing these policies) discovered that they were being "left behind."
To Lin, being "left behind" meant at minimum losing the succession and probably in addition undergoing, with Chen, tho distinctive Maoist process of to be characterized subsequently inoup plot document as "bleeding to death" and "nothing but scapegoats." To other top military leaders being "left behind" meant that the Army would lose its dominant role in the post-Cultural Revolution political apparatus. It is for these reasons then, quite credible, as secret Party documents explaining the Lin Piao affair now allege, that Lin, Chen, and the top military command should have banded together "to prepare andurprise attack" at the Second Plenum in0 in an attempt totheir Impending downfall.
Although admittedly difficult to document, it Is important to try to ascertain at what point in time Mao and Lin began to view one another with suspicion and distrust. As noted earlier, there is good evidence of Mao's mounting disillusionment with tho performancein and the military apparatuseriod of time dating back at least as far as the Ninth Party Congress in The record also suggests that by the fall
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9 Mao and Lin already held different viewsthe loyalty and efficacy of the Army-dominatedapparatus, with Mao criticizing and Lin defending the post-Cultural Revolution power structure. This if true, supports the view that other policy issues which did not comeead0hat is, the issues of the scale of the purge, of foreign policy, of economic policy and of rural policywere less important as causes of the political struggle which would lead to the destruction of Lin Piao than they were as tactical weapons for use in that struggle.
Although these policy issues appear now to be largely settled, the central policy Issue in the Lin Piao affairtho issue of civilian versus military control over China's political systemhas yet to be resolved. As the Party documents concerning the Lin affair make clear, Mao and Chou are quite aware that the task of regaining control over an Army-dominated political apparatus is much more formidable than the earlier task undertaken in the Cultural Revolution of regaining controlarty-dominated political As noted above, Mao is relying once againectification/purge campaign to accomplishampaign which Mao discussed at length in talks with military leaders at the regional andlevel during an inspection tour In late August and early
According to these talks (compiled and Issuedpp secret Central Committee document in, Mao even before Lin's abortive coup attempt informed these regional military leaders that the time had come for the PLA to give up the political role It had played during the Cultural Revolution and return to its,roleyou should concern yourselves withaffairs." Tho time had come, Mao pointed out, for
the Party alone to exercise political power In China
"local Partyhould exercise centralized leadership." The Army was being deprived of Its leading, exemplary role in China's political life for twoecause "big shots" at the top (the top command of the PLA) had "committed big mistakes of principle, line andecause senior*'cadres atand local levels of the military apparatus had been deceived by their superiors into disobeying orders, acting arrogantly andwarlord style of work." Since Lin Piao and the other "big shots" in Peking were primarily responsible for the errors committed by their subordinates in the provinces, Mao then offered these military leaders at the regional and provincialhance to redeem themselvesan opportunity "to examine and correct their mistakes."
The amount of progress achieved during the past year in returning political power to civilian Party leadership in Communist China is difficult to determine. Party documents indicate that more thanentral and regional military leaders have been purged as mombers of Lin Piao's "conspiratorial clique" and many more military leaders are missing. Nearly all of tho key military region commands have, as Mao directed, made self-criticisms (some, as in the cases of the Nanking and Shenyang Military Region Commands, have made public self-criticisms) for having committed such "mistakes" as following the wrong "line" and being "arrogant and complacent" and have expressed their determination"to respect, support and observe" civilian Party leadership. Several well-documented meetings of central and provincial leaders in Peking in recent months, together with the rehabilitationumber of Party figures, also suggest that progress is being made in the clvllianlzatlon of China's political structure.
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such time as the identity of those holding the top positions in the new party and governmentis known, it would be prudent to reserve final judgment on the outcome of this effort to return china to civilian rule. it would also be prudent, however, to recognize'-that hao tse-tung has demonstratedhis ability in the face of great odds to rectify and purge, if not finally to control, the political apparatus in china.
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Original document.
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