WARSAW PACT FORCES FOR OPERATIONS IN EURASIA (NIE 11-14-71)

Created: 8/10/1972

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS

NATIONAL

INTELLIGENCE

ESTIMATE

Warsaw Pact Forces For Operations in Eurasia

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED

03

THIS ESTIMATE IS SUBMITTED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND CONCURRED IN BY THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD.

Jhe following intelligence organizationshe preparation ol the eUimufe:

TbeAyeney ond ww o< ot ihe Oepo.'of UoH ond Detente, and the NSA.

Concun

Ilis DepwiyO< of Cenlrol lniellloenr.e

Ueclor of Intelligence ond Rcicoich, Depot tmenl of Stole The Director. Dulonio Intelligence Agency Theolionol Security Agency

The Director.o* ImemotionolAl'oit, Atonic Energy Cornmiiwon Ab training;

^SfLM*

Ihe Aiililoii Oxeclor. FeoVnl Buecov of Invewiqa'tan, and rhe Special Aimlonl ioecretory of the Treoiury, the tub)ect being ouhtde of the" jumdlction

MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS1

WARSAW PACT FORCES FOR OPERATIONS IN EURASIA

SCCRC-f-

CONTENTS

Page

I. NATURE OF

II. THE STATUS OF SOVIET FORCES ALONC TlIE SINO-SOVIET

Divisions

Fortified Areas

Logistic

Frontal

DEVELOPMENTS IN EQUIPMENT ANO

Ciound Foices

Nuclear Warhead Storage in Eastern

Low-Yield Tactical Nudear

SA4

Mon-PorwMe SAM

New Sooiet

Naval

Air-Associated Combatant

Possible Naval Missile: The KT-9

Frontal Aviation and Air

Tactical Air-to-Surface Missiles {ASMs)

ind

Passive Defense

ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE

SirCftSf

I. NATURE OF CHANGES

n Ihe short time which haj elapsed since NICas biucd. there have beendevelopments which should be biought to tho attention ol those holding thatThese developments include new orinformation on troop deployment, weapon systems, or force capabilities. InCIA and DIA have been carrying out joint research on Warsaw Pact logisticand their study to date provides more reliable data than wero available at the time thatas published Also, new analysis is available on the USSR'sfor antisubmarine warfare (ASW)In defense of Its own naval foices and merchant shipping. The result of this latter analysis is presented at Annex and summarized ia the text of this memorandum. The new information and reanalysis has not artered our basic Judgments inL We find those Judgments to be still valid.

WARSAW PACT FORCES FOR OPERATIONS IN EURASIA

II. THE' STATUS OF SOVIET FORCES AlONG THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER

ivisions. The size and disposition of Soviet forces along the border with China have remained generally unchanged sinceofe-cvatustlon of the Pacific Fleet area has Indicated that the naval infantry forces there are being organisedivision-like structure. No new divisions have been added in the iinrnediatc border area in the last yearalf, and the Soviets may now concentrate on filling out units already deployed there. They have, however, recently deployed major elementsotorized rifle division in the Siberian Military Districthe initial elements of the division arrived this spring andther divisions In the MD.

3 In ihe Central Allan MD, four garrison areas that had been thought to house two understrength and Incomplete divisions were found toingle and nearly full strength motorized rifle division. Conse-

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quunlly, thc estimated numhct of division!hit MD has been reduced from the seven cited in1 lo six.

A Fortified Aims The Sovielsefensive concept first used in the Soviet Far East in theo defend against Japanese incursions. As many asoviet combat unitsew type are deployed in Ihe Far East MO along, mafor avenues of approach from China. These units are noi identical inThey are about half thc size of arifle regiment and lack the infantry maneuver elements but have more fireThese new units probably are partefensive formation knownfortified area" (ukreplyennyy rayon) which thedefine as an area with prepared field fortificationsermanent garrison to man them.

ach fortified area typically hasdefensive positions, including artillery and anti-aircraft gun emplacements, lank revetments, trendies, and bunkers. Nearyby, in garrison areas, arc the now type units which would probably occupy the fieldin time of crisis. One other fortified area may be located io lhe Transbaykal MD. Additional fortified areas may exist elsewhere iu the border area.

e believe thai these fortified area unils provide (a) increased border securitythc KCB Border Cuard unitsalong thcreedom to commit ground divisions to other actions; andime delay factor to permitand reinforcement of existing general purpose forces along the border.

ogistic Support. Emphasis continues to bc placed on developing bolter logisticparticularly al higher ground forcefor Ihe combat forces abeady deployed along the border. Since publication of, new army and /Vont-lovel support

units havo Iwcn identified and others havo received additional equipment. Tins process is continuing By now. most divisions have their essential combat and combat support units. Heretofore, lhc bulk of rhe border units lacked cargo trucks and logistic supportNow, however, ihey are receiving these trucks and personnel, thereby reducing the shortages which in the past have llmllcd iheir ability lo carry out operaUons. Present Indications are that lhe Soviets do not intend to bring all their divisions in the border area lo full combat strength but insteada force which would be maintained al reduced strength and would require theof reservists nndcargothe civilian sector prior to operations. Nevertheless, because of their remoteness from major urban sources of manpower and equipment, the divisions along the Sino-Soviet border .probably will bo manned and equipped at higher levels than unils in the western USSR.

Aoiation. Since NIEaircraft have been added to Frontalunils on the border, and there hasslight increase in numberso. There has beenincrease in numberso AAO.

III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EQUIPMENT AND ORGANIZATION

Ground Forces

Warhead Storage inIn1 we noted thatstorage facilities existed inThese were at fivein East Cermany. Hungary, andThere were also seven othersilos, whose subordination wasbut whose function might be theof nuclear warheads for tacticalmissiles and rockets. Subsequent to

scenet

approval ofhere have been no significant change* at these sites. Five moreintended to hold tactical nuclearbeenEvidence indicates lhat these sites arc operational, and they appear to be occupied by the Soviets.

Of thetorage sites apparentlytactical missile units, Iwo arc in East Germany, three in Poland, three inone in Hungary, and Ihree inMost of them are set off by themselves but arc withiniles of tactical missile units or support facilities, either Sovicl or EasiAll lhe sites were constructed6

The locations and size of the sitesthat each is designed to support one Scud missile brigade and the three to five FROC (free-rockct-ovcr-thc-ground) battalionsfound in an army area.his pattern is repeated throughout Eastern Europe, an additional eight to nine sites may be found there. The five storage silcs associated with Sovicl airfields in Eastern Europe may also be intended to hold warheads for tactical missiles. Thedentified sites coulduclear weapons, depending on storage arrangements.

We believe the Soviets are now storing nuclear weapons at nuclear storage sites in Eastern Europe. Soviet concepts of howwar in Europe is likely to evolvethc importance ofassive coordinated nuclear strike once il wasthat NATO would Introduce nuclear weapons. This concept would require asupply system structured to deliver warheads to thc missile units jwiflly andinimum chance of disruption.

Low-Yield Tactical Nudear Weapons. Ine noted lhat Warsaw Pact

forces hiid some capability lo exercise nuclear options shorttrategic nuclear strike and that their targeting doctrine called For use of nuclear weapons against maneuver anddements. We also noted tliat the Soviets had the technical capability lo developartillery rounds, but lhat there was nothat they had done so. We continue to receive imconfirmcd icpotts lhat lhc Soviets haveuclear artillery round, but wc still have no persuasive evidence lhat they have done so.

he mobileystem, designed to provide medium- to high-altitude defense for ground forces, is now extensively deployed in thc USSR and with the CSFC- II has now also appeared in limited numbers with the Soviet forces in Czecliotlovakia and Hungary. There it no firm evidence of deployment with Soviet forces in Poland.

eployment of Ibeobile low-altitude air defense missile system haa now been identified wtth Soviet ground force unils in East Cermany. Severalnits have been activeoviet training area in East Germany, bul their subordination cannot be determined.nits also arc deployed in five ground force division areas in the USSR. Thenit appears lo bc replacing thc divisional anti-aircraft artillery regiment. Il is not known whether this is also thc case with Ihenils in East Cermany.

Thenil in Soviet ground force division areas In the USSH apparently consistsaunch battalions, eachriplecquisition radar,racking aad guidance radars. Each battalion probablyiring unils. eachriple launchersracking and guidance radar.

Man-Portable SAM. Since publication ofo have acquired no new information regarding tlie deployment with Soviet foices of die man-portable, shoulder-

filedrail. We have, however, obtained COiUiderable information on itsuring (he North Vietnamesein the springhcas introduced into South Vietnam.issiles and launchers were captured by Southfoices, and preliminary examination of the captured equipment (manufacturedonfirms that our earlier assessment of theas generally sound. Thes believed to be effectiveaximum rangeautical miles (nm) and up to aaltitude ofeet. The missile speed is unknown at this time, but is likely to be supersonic.

The system intercept capability in any particular engagement is heavily dependent on the target speed, altitude, maneuvers, and infrared signature. In most cases thc target would be engagedail-on aspect The missilemall warheadounds and containingound of high explosive) andirect hit to be effective.

New Soviethere ts evidenceew type mediumow at least in limited series production- The plant which produces these tanks is not known.

Thc new tank is conventional in designs not appear toignificantImprovement overtto be armedun similar tom smoothbore armament ofccording to one source, it is lower, faster, aod quieter than present Soviet tanks and is equippedultilayered composite armor to reduce spading and provide belteragainst nuclear radiation.

he newill presumably be issued initially to Soviet units to replace the older tanks in the Inventory. If the new tank bat the same rate as the

illto comprise the bulk of thc Soviet force through.

new light amphibious tankut the state or extent of itscannot be determined. This tank bthend is armedun and an antitank guidedIt is air droppable.

Novo! Forces

Coaibataid. TbeIn tlie process ofargeNikolaycv. It is reportedly aboutdisplacement of the McdWa-cAassship. We believe that the newIs designed to carry helicoptersaircraft It could be operationhip could be capablenumber ofASW,air defense, and poisibiyon the aircraft(including helicopters) and thesituation. It piobably will not beaircraft carrier in the Western sense.

ossible Naoal "

9 the Soviets have been-testing at shortallistic missile capable of maneuvering in flight to change the impact point of the re-entry vehicle (BV)f

3

about the ullimate objectives

weapon system, it will probably turn out0m) navalmissile. It appears suited to attacking movingcarriers and other major surface ships, for example. Dut it is also possible that it iseapon system in itself, butest bedQ

3

frontal Aviation and Air Defense

During thc past year there have been increasing indications lhal the Sovicls arcgreater .it tent ion to lhe giound attack role in Frontal Avialion. New aircraft such as Flogger androvide morefor use of air defense aircraft in the ground attack role. Fishbed units have also increased Ihcli ground attack training The newill provide improvedweapons delivery capability. Increased emphasis on aerial reconnaissance adds better target acquisition capability. EjcctroiUc coun-leimeasurc support to Frontal Aviation is also being improved lo provide active and passive countermeasures for an attacking force. These changes will provide Sovietreater flexibility in the use of Frontalto support ground forces is conventional or nuclear operations,

Deployment. The variable-geometry-wing fighters, Flogger andrcto be deployed willi operational unlls, butlow pace. Sinceas been delivered to two regiments and there are now aboutn service.

Flogger deliveries resumed In May of this yeariatus of someonths, (The Soviets had delivered about) Evidence suggests that al least one and pos-sibly two squadrons have been deployed with one regiment in thc western USSR. This could bring total Flogger in service to some SO to GO aircraft. During the gap in deliveries,continued at the two airframe plants involved, and the delay in deliveries may have been due to technical difficulties which have now been eliminated.

Deployment of thc reconnaissanceof thcoxbat to Frontal Aviation is still limited to one training unit, although thc number increased fromhe Soviets are continuing to deploy

c/ECftCT-

variants o( the Foxbat with thc air defense force, howewr. and (lie priority given to satisfying the initial needs of this force may account for (he slow deliveries to Frontal Aviation.

Soviets are continuing to

arge variable geomcliy-wirig fightcrf* ^Thts aircraftange and pay-loadfor conventionalIs considerably greater than any of thc aircraft now in Fiontal Aviation.

Jwlll probably be employed in Frontal Aviationightci-bomber aircraft.

3lt will likely beat tlie Novosibirsk aircraft plant, the current production site for the FlagonIt will probably enter production there when Flagon production draws to aprobably by the end of this year. If so. it will probably enter service with Frontal Aviation

34.

jli aximum range of aboutmpeed of about Mach iX

^it may be an antiradiation weapon like the US Shrike, but other possible guidance such as television or inertial command cannot be ruled out The missile could enter service

n addition, the Soviets may now bc equipping some of their Frontal Aviation forces in East Cermany with another tactical ASM. Lastissile that resembles the US liullpup was photographedovietighter in East Germany. It has been

designated Ihcerry. Theround target aboutm fromNo testing of this missile hasin llie USSB, however, and itbeen soen again in

Septemlier. It is not known, therefore, how widely Ihe missile is deployed or how its guidance system functions.

ind Helicopter. Tlie Soviets have developed and arcew assault helicopter, tlieind. It bdestined for service with FrontalProduction at Arsenyev in the Far East MD had reached an estimateds of thc end ofnitial deploymenl isthis year, probably to existingunits in the Far East and Transbaykal MDs.

The Hind isuns hip, in the sense that the US Huey Cobra and Cheyenneare guruhips, but is basically on armed transport, like oilier Soviet helicopters. Il can canyersons in addition to Ihe craw. There are, however, some important features which improve its capability for armed missions:

is more maneuverable, with itsmaximum speednots, somenots faster than theip,

has stub wings which carry armament and add lift and stability in cruising flight.

ow silhouette and narrow profile.

These features, together with Its rpeed, will makeore difficuli target fot ground fire.

ind's primary mission probably will be to provide armed support and transport for airmobile or helibomc operations; It probably will also be used for other combat support. The Soviets have used helicopters in anrole during exerciser, but few details are available. There ft no indication that theintend to employ large numbersrimary antitank weapon.

7

here ii no evidence that Hind machine gum. cannons, or other weapons will be con-Miin in an armament turret laired into the fuselage as on US gunships. Some Hind have (wo ordnance pylons under each stub wing while one has been seen with what appears toocket under tho wing. Mind'soptions probably are similar to those of older Soviet medium helicoptersound and MI-8can carry ma-chine guns, cannons, unguided rockets,guided missiles, and bombs.

assive Defense Measures. The Soviet Union, andesser extent Iter Warsaw Pact Allies, continue to implement theirprogram to increase thc survivability of essential military systems by liardening against nuclear and/or conventional weapons.Staff ond CSFC command, control, and communications facilities hava been provided bunkers and hardencd antennas. Construction of hangarettet has continued to the point that most Frontal Aviation airfields In Easternand the USSR possess such protection. Most of the SAM-associated electronic vans of the air defenses of thc front have also been protected by revetments.

IV. TACTICAL ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE '

ver the Last dozen years the Soviet Navy hasubstantial effort to build up (Lt capabilities for ASW. Soviet interest in the subject appears to have been greatly stimulated by the advent ol the nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine and the new strategic dimensions it provided. Inhowever, an overwhelming proportion of

'This section .irnnumn an evaluation o( SovietSW equipment epcrtupnt. and rapabdrlirt eoaUined ia en Armei to thb Urtaonnaurt to llolden

of MSI.

lhe Soviet ASW effort lo dale has beento the tactical aspect ofhe defense of Soviet naval forces and shipping against hostile submarines. This sec-lion is primarily concerned with the Soviet tactical ASW effort, though il necessarily con-siders equipment which can be used forASWgainst Polaris.

SW detection gear and weapons have been provided for all surface combatants, though they all have substantial armaments for other purposes. Much of Ihe coastal defense force, Ihe largest In the world, is designed for ASW operation. All Sovietpurpose submarines have some potential for ASWltliough more than half the nudear-propelled units are equipped with cruise missiles and are intended primarily for use against surface ships, and the remainder, based on iheir operations, an multipurpose attack submarines. Since the, tlie Soviets have introduced long- and medium-range ASW aircraft as well as 'unproved coastal types. The Soviet Navy also has both land-bated and shipborne ASW helicopters.

ach of the four flecl commandersariety of ASW-capable surface, air. and submarine units under bis command, and ASW exercises haveegular feature of fleet level training- Most of these involve short-range operations. Recently, however, thehave shown Increasing concern overASW protection in their sea approaches, suggesting that they Intend to extend their ASW defenses further lo sea. In thc major annual exercises conducted by the Northern and Pacific Fleets. ASW activity has grown to Include what aie probably combined ASW

'Soviet nuclear-powered balulac min Heabo cany torpedoes, but (heir ASW <ajmM*tai u< not considered bete.

and search operations off noilliASW operalion* were carried outtlie0 exerciselthough over thrcc-quntiers of the defending forces were principally engaged in anticarrier and nntishipping operations. The SovietSquadron has also practiced lheof combined ship and submarine barriers across ihe Sicilian Straits and soulh of Crete. ASW has received less attention in other out-of-area operations although some practice fn escorting convoys has taken place.

Despile thc sizeable effort tho Soviels have made with the tactical aspects of ASW. the results lo dale have not been impressive. Many Soviet ASW operations and exercises have failed to demonstrate the tacticaland proficiency needed to copeodern nuclear submarine. Most important of all. almost all Soviet sensor systems arc currently inadequate to the task of detecting and localizing enemy submarines before they are close enough to attack.

The older major Soviet surface ships have first or second generation sonars with effective ranges of no moreards even under the most favorableThe Moskva ASW helicopter carrier and possibly thc Krivak destroyer are equipped with the latest model sonars, which have direct path ranges ofirst convergence zone0 nm) are possible with thesen all, however, fewer thanajor Soviet ships have ranges approaching0 yards. Most Soviel sonar performance appears to be furtherby deficiencies in signal processing and signal structure which prevent full exploitation of the sonar's range potential.

' Directacoustic signal con directly to the target and bouncesto tho source.

' Convergent*rones ot soundmote thanilesonar, occurringmany deec-wntcr ooeaa iff.

Although there has been steady im. provement, Soviet capabilities in submarine sonars also remain inferior to those of thc US. Many sonan arc of older and less efficient types. Even the more modem ones havepassive ranges only about half those of modern US submarine sonars, in partof design limitations and because of tbe high level of noise generated by Soviet

Improvements in Soviet ASWand training are expected. Thc Soviets are probably continuing to experiment with low-frequency sonars lo extend thc detection range and Improve tlic accuracy ofn ASW is also going on in other areas. They will probably alto lake some steps lo reduce the liigh noise levels of tlteirImprovements can abo be expected io other areas of ASW technology, including weapon design.

Over thc next few years, however, the Soviet Navy will not have any significant capability for defending its seaborne forces from attack by Western submarines,nuclear. Even if new sonars and other modern detection gear nrc Introduced, their introduction in (he bulk of the surface fleet units wouldumber of years.lhc ASW task will lie complicated by US development and replacement programs.

V. WARSAW PACT LOGISTIC SUPPORT

Tlie assessment of Warsaw Pact logistic support contained inf1 reported some significant analytical problems. These are still under study. Significanthas been made in thc areas which are discussed below.

Planning Factori. We now have good evidence on the planning factors used toWarsaw Pact ammunition requirements.

iCCREfr

.iltltyuj-li wo mutt still make somein applying (hem. To determine thc po-tcntial tequircmcnts. Warsaw Pad planners use estimated expenditure rates calciibted in accordance with the type of combat expected. Consumption is expected to bo morein the attack phase than in thc exploitation phaseampaign oreriod of passiveThese estimated cipvudrhiic rates are Ciilculatcd for each weapon and unit and an* expressed in terms of so many units (or partial units) of fire, each unit of fireiled number of rounds per weapoo.

Use of such factorsar more precise and meaningful calculation andof Warsaw Pact logistic requirements and capabilities than our previous use ofeasure as "days ofhe "day of supply" standard made no allowance for the fact that daily expenditures vary greatlyon Uie specific dally combatencountered during the course of aAlthoughterm "days of supply" has been used in Soviet logistic writings, it has appeared In genera! contexts without anyof what specific expenditures itp resent.

o determine the effect of different combat situations on thc logisticof the three Warsaw Pact frontswould engage NATO forces in the Cen-tral Region, two conventional war scenarios were developed. Bothday period of mobilization.day advance to the Rhine under conditionsrelatively low ammunition expenditures after the initial days of attack Scenario Bmuch heavier fighting and ammunition expenditure, with the Pact forces forced to halt short of thc Rhine afterays of much slower advances.

scenarios do not encompass therange of ways inarsaw Pact-

NATO battle might develop, but they arc faithful to Pact plans as we understand them

They necessarily lack elements of realism, as they exclude important but unquantillable factors. Some factors, such as Interdiction,and bad weather would reduce (he capabilities of the logistics systems. Other factors, such iu the quality of commandan abilitylter plans and practiceseet unfoiesccn sltua-tions -could either enhance or reduce the capabilities of the system.

ire of Ammunition Stocks. The study has resulted in estimates of ammunition stocks in the CSFC as follows:

ditnsional itocks. Eachestimatedble to carry at leasttons and possibly as much astons of ammunition loaded onvehicles, in the hands of troops,with crew-served weapons.number reflects the tentativebasedestudy of the motorbattalions ol four CSFC divisions,number of vehicles in ammunitioncompanies might be higher thanestimated-

depots. Divisionaldopols in the CSFC haveto store atnd possibly as muchoviet army and front-levelstorage facilities in East CermanyanThe high side of the rangeeffect o( adding suspected storageto those confirmed as being for

OLOL (petrol, oil lubricants) stores of the CSFC ground forces areatetric tons. East Cer-

man army ground forces POL is estimatedNumber* ol Logistic Vehicles. There

0 metric tons. Croundeneral purpose cargo vehicles

stores could be supplementedOL vehicles in army and

from thc civilian stocks of POL availablemotor transport units iu tlie CSFC

Eastsupport logistic transport requirements.

TACTICAL ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE

NiHe: This Annex evaluates the Soviet Navt/'s ei,ulpmerd, operations, ami vaiHibilitics for tactical antisubmarine warfarethe defense of Soviet naval surface fortes and shipping against hostile submarines.

SOVIET TACTICAL ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE FORCES

Thc Sovicl Navy has tradilionally been most concerned with preventing hostile naval forces, whether surface ships or submarines, from operating in Its home waters and their approaches. To this end it has long maintained thc largest coastal defense force in thc world, much of it designed for antisubmarineWith the expanding scope of Soviet naval high sea operations, however, defense offorces has become moreactor.

Most of the principal components of the Soviet Navy now have some capability forwarfarehc offshoreforces arc charged with coastal ASW and protection of intracoastal shipping. Aerial ASW support is provided by naval aviation units to each fleet in coastal areas, in the open ocean, and in the Mediterranean. The larger Soviet multipurpose surface ships from escort size on up, while performing their primary missions, arc responsible for their own defense against submarines and are responsible for escorting some convoy groups and occasionally assisting in coastal defense. The submarinerole in ASW is small bulbeen observed, albeitconducting submarine versusexercises in barriers.

The ASW-capabtc forces are distributed by fleets approximately as shown in the Table. Thc basic characteristics of these forces are outlined below.

Major Surface Forces. The major surface forces are intended primarily for generaloperations. The current forceliips (excluding those deployed In the Caspian Sea)SW helicopter carriers,ruisers.estroyer escorts (or oceanhe Soviets designate some of their never cruisers and destroyers as "large ASWut all of these ships have multipurpose capabilities. While these ships carry improved ASW systems, they also have strengthened air defense armaments; most of thc newer units cany cruise missiles for anti-ship missions. The bulk of the ASW-cquipped ships arc of thc destroyer escort type and are used by the Soviets for operations conducted withinautical miles (nm) of tbe USSR or in the Mediterranean Sea.

The newest of the major combatants is die Kaia-dass missile cruiser now entering service. The appearance ofon vessel may be accompanied by an end to the Kresta II program after the seventh unit fs completed. Construction of thc new Krivak-

'This numberrupnyyfldtn now being converted to new dassu.

SOViKT FOflCES CAPABLE OF ANTtSUBMAIUNIi2

Xinnni.ii'. Baltic lluAtx I'-umi" Flirt Si* run Flot Total

13

I 40

0 si

7

40

4

59

Ma|or Su'incv Fortvi

(Cruises, Destroyer Escorts)

First Line*

Hi Frequency

is

10

30

Second Line* .

?l

38

47

SS

(High Frequency Sonar) Cnnilal Defense Forces

Patrol Craft.

(Ciiilia, Poll, Sl-nla. Other) Fleet Air Fore**

long- ami Medium-Ran is

(May and Bear)

Coailal

(Mail)

Helicopter* ..

21

21

(Hormone and Hound) Ceneral Purpose Submarine Force*

t7

Si

Current Generation (V. C, A, andarly Centra tMn

Nuclearl, and N)

Diesel (F, Ft, aod IJ

"First line major surface forces, in ASW torms as delWd here, include those ihlps equippedHi or lower miuk. These In dude tbe MoiWa, Kreita H. Krivjlt. Kara and Kanhihip* wiih hichor frequency MiumIncluded a* leeond line. Ships deployed In the Caspian Sea are eccluded.

missile destroyer continues, and istoate of three or four units per year. Construction of the older Kashin-class appears to have ended with theof the twentieth unit

activity also plays anrole in the conlinued upgradingmajor surface forces. Krupnyy-classdestroyers are being converted tomissile-armed Kanin-class.program will probably bcthe Kildln-class destroyers.

Defense Forces. Smallerpatrol craft provide surface shipin coastal areas. Io contrast to tbe

major surface forces, many of Ihese units are equipped mainly for ASW tasks, although they also perform general patrol duties.

Thc most important new minorof ASW interest is the Crisba-dass. This unit is considerably larger than earlier patrol craft, and fallsategory somewherethe ocean escorts and coastal patrol craft. Construction is estimated at five to six units per year.

Fleet Air Forces. Most of the ASW air-craft currently deployed arc suitable only for operations to coastal areas. In the past few years, however, the Soviets have deployed aboutedium-range (May) and about 10

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(Bear P) ASW aircrafl- In addition, each of tlie two helicopter carrien can tup-port up toSW helicopters,ew other major surface combatant! can carry one or iwo helicopters.

ay aircraft entered service8 and continues in productiona rare of about one aircraft per month. In90 tht* Soviets also began making an ASW version of theear heavy bomber, the Bear F. Production of tlieayow rate, although there is no evidence to confirm any increase in tlie force sinceho Soviets are continuing low-rate production of thcormone helicopter andail amphibian ASW aircraft.

Submarine Forcer. All Soviet general purpose submarines havo some potential for ASWf theuclear-powered submarines in service, however.rt) armed with cruise missiles andrimary anti-ship mission. The remainder, termedby the Soviets, tacrdse In antlshlpplng and ASW roles. All Soviet submarinesto be handicapped by their noisiness in comparison to US units, but the late model nuclear submarinespeed advantage.

Thelaxs attackworld's fastest operationalin productionate of two units per yoar. The nucleailais cruise-missile submarine also Is being builtate ol two per year. Tlie Soviets have also built single units of two otber new nuclear-powered submarines, thc A-lasses, but it is not known whether scries pro-

In addition there amucleai-powered tiaDUtle nuaOe mbmarinesSW potentialthey are Mattery lo be IsmwIIn other than their ttracegic atfacfc rale.

ductlon is intended.lassruise missile type, and is believed to have new mis-tiles. The mission oflassouldind research vehicle or thc piotolypcew ASW submarino cW

II. ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE WEAPONSSW weapons in use In lbc Soviet Navy consist of acoustic homing torpedoes, standard depth charges, small, rocket- propelled charges (lhe multlbarrel unit) fired in salvos from surface ships,ew rocket-propelled depth charge (probablyuclearon the Moskva -diss. Although these weapons apparently work In simple exercises, their capabilities against evasive Western tactics and counlermeasures are not known. In addition to these ASW weapens. thealso have mines which are believed to have ASW application, including aluminium and rising mines which apparently wereto combat Western nudear submarines.

III. THE SENSOR PROBLEM

Environmental conditions limit theof sensors inubmarine and pose one of the greatest obstacles to the development of an effective ASW capability. To be effeclive, the sonar, the most widely used sensor, must discriminate thc noise of the target submarine (or thc returning echo) from its own Internal noise, the platform's nolso, and the ambient noise of the sea. In tho activeonar's capabilities are degraded by sound energy reflecting from tbe ocean surface and from the bottom, by sound energy being scattered within thc ocean, and by sound energy absorption in the ocean.

The adverse effects of some natural phenomena can be reduced by using sonar

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SLCiifT

operates at lower frequencies (usuallyower-ficqucncy signalin less absorption of sound in lite ocean than higher-frequencyarge acoustic nrray is required, however, to obtainaccuracy and high-power levels at lower frequencies,

ensors. There is nothat the Soviets have produced acoustic Or non-acoustic detection devices useful for long-rangem) detection ofsubmarines. The Soviels have nota large-scale acoustic underseasystem such as the US SOSUSthe Soviet fixed acoustic detection devices are passive systemsange of aboutm against quiet nuclear submarines and up toi;norkeling diesel

Surface Ship Sonars. The presentof the Soviets' ASWa major factor limiting their ASW capabilities. Aboutercent of themajor ASW surface ships have old modeloHz) whichetectionf onlyards, even under the most favorableercent of the ships are equipped with sonars of thcoHz rangee-lection range oFards. These sftiiars are not of low enough frequency and high enough power to provide long-rangecapability.

IB. Fewer thanajor Soviet ships are equipped with thc latest sonarsHz) with range potentials similar to those ofoperational Western sonars.Hz hull-mounted sonar is installed on the Kanin and Kresta II destroyers and probably on the Krivak.Hz variable depth sonar (VDS) is installed on some Pelya escort ships, the Moskva helicopter carrier, and thc Krivak

* Ranges given here are for oiitial detection (raiber than rcdetectiori or tracking) under good cotidlooos.

destroyer. The VDS enables thc Soviets to fill gaps in sonar coverage resulting from layers of varying water temperatures. Ini-tial detection range under good conditions would bc0 yards. Other new sonars employing frequendes InHz range and with sufficient power to achieve substantial improvements Inranges are installed on the Moskva hdi-copter carrier and possibly the KrivakDirect path ranges of00 yards and first convergence zoneom) are possible with these sonars.

2

Submarine Sonars. Despite steadySoviet capabilities with submarine sonars remain inferior to those ol the US. Aboutercent of thc Soviet generalsubmarine forceasscs) arc equipped with old model sonars which are relatively ineffective as their power levels arc low and they use highonotherercent of the general purpose submarine forcelasses) are outfitted withsonars which feature improved active and passive operation,nd greater power. These second-genera lion 'sonars are estimated to achieve passive detection ranges less than one-half those of modern US submarines.

Soviet submarines which have become operationalercent of live altack andsubmarine forces

SEC PIT

OCCRCT-

. aiulequipped wiih nciivc sonars of the third generationi/ frequency. Thii frequency provides potentially long detection ranges. Soviet passive ranges arc nowIu be one-half those of modern OS nuclear submarines. Some of this difference in capability prubably results from the high level of noise generated by Soviet submarines and iMxvvrbly from pour signal processing.

Dippingipping sonar,by thcormone helicopter, oper-atcs in active or passive modes. In the active mode the dipping sonar can probably obtain detections at ranges ofards. In thc passive mode it piobably obtains detection upards. This sonar has also been observedew small surface ships.

Sonobuous. The Soviets have beenpassive sonobuoys since atmproved electronics and acoustic systemobserved in imodels, have not substantially increased sonobuoycapabilities. For example, there is noof Soviet development of low frequency analyzing and recording sonobuoys, despite Soviet recovery of low frequency USand Iheir understanding of lowacoustic propagation as evidenced by their publications. Soviet failure to exploit this technology may reflect shortcomings In signal processing,aulty assessment of USquieting efforts. It is beheved they haveew sonobuoyirec-lio.ial capability.

Magnetic Anomaly Detection, Soviet ASW aircraft, except possibly the Bear F. aod some Hormones, use magnetic anomaly(MAD) equipment for target locauza-tioa and for limited area search. SinceMAD equipment inlie Soviets have developed several systems. Tbe

ay and at least someail are piobably equippedew MAD system. The May aircraft operate their MAD at higher altitudes than earlier patrol aircraft, andevidence from helicopter operationsthat the new MAD system hasombined path through water and air, about twice that of thc earlier systems. This improved radius is estimated toenough lo justify small area searches by MAD equipped aircraft. Higher operating altitudes and similar area searches have also been noted during recent Mail aircraft MAD operations, suggesting that some of these older aircraft may have been refitted with the new equip-ment

Infrared Wdke Sensor. There is some rircumstantial evidenceewnd somes well as possibly the Bear Fmay be equipped with an experiments! detection device, possibly an infrared wake sensor. These aircraft have conducted searches at altitudes beyond the ranges of the most recent MAD systems. At the present lime, however. Soviet technology has probably not advanced sufficiently to support more than thc developmentasic mfrareddevice.

Radar. Soviet airborne surface search radars arc capable of delecting surfacedat ranges of up tom and exposed masts and periscopes of submerged submarines up to aboutm. None of thc Soviet radsrs is capable of reliably detecting wake effects from, or trailing wire antennas on, submerged submarines. Aircraft carrying the latest Soviet airborne radar, the Wctcyc. apparently make some limited area searches,ewand radar isflight testing in the Northern Fleet area.

19

r.rcRCT

ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

In terms ol measurable operational and exercise activity, tactical ASW accounts for the bulk of all Soviet ASW activity.

Coastal OfKrotiont. Most Soviet naval exercises involve short-range forces and occur near fleet bases. Approximatelyercent of the ASW exercises in the Northern andFleet coastal waters include offshoreforces and other short-range forcesof long-range deployment. These exercises usually involve coastal foicesby ASW aircraft, both helicopter and fixed wing, as well as major surface forces.

Major Exercises. Almost every year the Pacific and Northern Fleets eachajor exercise dubbedDefense of the Homeland" exercise. The ASW aspect of these exercises has grown to include what probably arc combined ASW barrier and searchoff north Norway.

Although the Soviets apparentlysome exercise time in0 exercise "Okean" to ASW defense In the oceanto thc USSR, over three-fourths of the defending forces were principallyin anticarrier and antishipping

In major Northern Fleet exercisesbout half of the defending surface forces performed ASW activities in the area of their submarine barriers. Also, ASW patrol aircraftthe first time in anhour on-the-seene coverage.

At Sea Ship Defense. The five foldin Soviet operations to distant areas such as the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean5 has increased navalfor fleet defense from submarineSoviet ships operate most of the time

cither in small groupships orand must rely on their owncapabilities. Combatants generally do not use ASW screens defensively {screen lype fonnations arc used lo broaden the width of offensive ASWllhough the Soviets do practice escorting of merchant and amphib-tous group convoys,

In the Mediterranean, for example, where there arc normally about ISombatants, the Soviels generally do not employ ASW screening forces even during exercises. They have, however, practiced forming smface ship and submarine barriers across thc Sicilian Straits and to the south of Crete to seal off Ihe central and easternfrom submarine attack.

Thc four Soviet ASW aircraft previously stationed in Egypt had practiced fleetroles against their own submarines both in airborne ASW barrier operations and In general reconnaissance missions. In addition, they participated in limited joint ASWwith Soviet surface ships in the eastern Mediterranean,

and Control Procedures..

ISovict navaland eontiol is capable of providing the communications and command structureto pei form ASW tasks.Q

3

J

(iic'ical problem* ol on-sccneof distant ASW operation', differ onlycomplexity front coastal and seaASW operations. In lheand control of (hose taskthe responsibility ol tbe commander ofMediterranean Squadron, exceptcommander of the Black Sea Fleetthere. In cither event theof the Mediterraneanalso he involved in directingolher naval operations.

V. TACTICAl ANTISUBMARINE WAWAREs CAPABILITIES ANO OUTIOOK

tactical ASW is simpler inlimn strategic ASW. the Soviets stillgenerally effective defense for theirWestern nuclear submarines.weapons have effective rangesthe potential direct path rangesall Soviet sonars (low frequency lhe exception).f

1

the future, the Soviets haveand probably are continuing towith low frequency sonarsextend the possible detection rangeof Iheir systems. Theseottom bounce and/.one capability. Variableto aid in detecting deep running sub-

marines, arc believed to be under furtherThe Soviets also continue to wotk on hydro acouitic devices, and they may haveew or modified sonobuoy into (heir invcutoiy.

The Soviets are improving theof tlie sliipbornconnonc ASW helicopter. Anticipated continued effort on perfecting lhe autuhovur system of thewould allow an all-weather and night airborne ASW capability which has not been noted up to now.

Although better detection capabilities continue torimary consideration of naval research and development, Ihe Soviets abo are aware of the high noise levels of their submarines, and they will attempt to improve on the engineering aspects of this problem. The Soviets are continuing to experiment with new weapon system'* as well asdeployment of existing systems. Thc ASW weapon system associated with (he Moskva-class helicopterbe deployed in the future on other combatants. The Soviets probably will continue to improve lhe performance of ihcir ASW torpedoes as wdl.

Despite these continuing elforti to build ships which can defend them selves against submarines, state-of-the-art limitations remain, and thc Soviets have little chance foran effective fleet defense over tbe next five years or so. At leosl during this period, improvements in submarine weapons and the development of even quieter Westernwill probably continue the advantage of the submarine even iu lhe face of expected improvements In Soviet ASW tactics, weapons, and acoustic sensors.

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