THE USSR AND THE CHANGING SCENE IN EUROPE (NIE 12-72)

Created: 10/26/1972

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NATIONAL

INTELLIGENCE

ESTIMATE

OA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL

The USSR and the Changing Scene in Europe

"

THIS ESTIMATE IS SUBMITTED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND CONCURRED IN BY THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the eitimate;

Ihei MoU otrce Agency ond Aeoroo-iiotK-ni ol 'he Depoo-menh ot Slote and Detente. Ihe TiFoiury. ond lhe NSA.

Concurring:

thto< olJtieUigone*

Iho Director ol Intelligence ond Reieofeh, Deportment ol Slate

Iho Director. Defemc Intelligence Agency

Tho Director, Notiono!Agen<y

Spocal AuinaMhe Secreloiy oi iho Treomry

Iho Director, Dlniion af Interal Securitytomic Energy Com minion Abstaining,

Tho Aaistont Director, Federol Bureaue inflation. Iho lubfoct being outiidc of hit jwrbdktlon.

or revelation of wt-

Tha material contolmtho Natjanpl Defon* of fhe Uniieduhin tho nooning ol the, lhe .ran..

my manner toctfTTJmwhc-lied per ton li prohibited.

ET

TV* cgh

tfat. iovieiof

Data

ax diligence Agency.

/pi hi

THE USSR AND THE CHANGING SCENE IN EUROPE

CONTENTS

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

DISCUSSION

I. INTRODUCTION I. THE SOVIETS IN WESTERN EUROPE

Thc Evolution ofEuropeanProblems of Detenle

SOVIETS IN EASTERN EUROPE

The Record of thche Beginningew Look Factors for Further Change

CHANCING EAST-WEST EUROPEAN ECONOMIC

RELATIONSHIP ..

V. THE EVOLVING MIX OF SOVIET POLICIES INthc East EuropeanContingencies

Poland

East Cermany

Romania

Other Considerations Posture Toward thc West

Ostpolitik

Thc American Aspect ..

MBFR

VI. THE GENERAL SHAPE OF FUTURE SOVIET POUCY

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THE USSR AND THE CHANGING SCENE IN EUROPE

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A. The USSR is embarked on an active and forward policy of detente in Europe. The basic aims of the Soviet lead crs are ambitious: tliey hopemaintaining their position in thecan wean the West Europeans away from their clow? relations with the US, at least slow further West European political and economic integration, and ultimately clear the way for the USSR's emergence as tbe dominant [wwer on the continenthole. At this stage, Soviet detente policies in the West haveong way towardmany ihat the Cold War is indeed over and have aroused an expectation of mutually beneficial dealings with Moscow. In the East, the Soviet approach has been markedrowing confidence and sophistication and the scene ihere. at least for tlie time being, is tranquil.

B Many West European governments (including, tacitly. Bonn itself) seem prepared to accept the division of Cermany and the Soviet role in Eastern Europe and to increase their East-West contacts largely on Soviet terms; they are not disposed to press tbe Russians for major reforms in Eastern Europe as the price of. for instance, advantageous economic arrangements with the West. And shouldeen to be producing special political, economic, or diplomatic gains for Bonn, other West European states will be encouraged to step up their own developing relations with tho East.

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does, however, impose certain burdens on theinvolve certain complications for their policies. Their generalmust seem to be in accordpirit of rapprochementnegotiating positions must at times appear to bemust try to act with relative restraint in Eastern Europe, lestto severe repression compromise their overtures lo thethough fear of the Russians has greatly diminished,persists so that most- West Europeans will want anguaranteeong time to come. Finally, theover the past decade in the political self-confidence andstrength of West European states, along with theirtoward closer cooperation among themselves, means thatsharp reduction of US influence would not necessarily lead to aincrease in thc influence of the Soviet Union.

Eastern as well as Weslern Europe, thc Soviets arean increasing deftness in dealing with difficult problems.been evident in their flexible response to, for Instance,in Poland. Hungarian political and economic reforms,continued apostasy. Most East Europeannow enjoy substantial organizational independence"socialist"freedom to formulatewhich, in fact, vary widely from country lo country. Onlhc Sovieis seem Lo be living reasonably comfortably withgeneration of East European leaders, most of whom giveto their own countries or iheir own brand of Communismdeferring to Soviet sensitivities.

positive faclor for the Soviets in Eastern Europe isawareness of lhe governments thereontinuingrelationship with the USSR is as vital to theirurther expansion of trade and financial transactions withEurope. Moscow hasumber of steps to makeattractive to them and will almost certainly takepooling of resources, further technological cooperation,investment deals, and multilateral banking arrangements.in addition, be willing to give the EastreaterCEMAeeling of fuller participation in Bloc political councils.

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Soviets arc nonetheless aware that they cannot betheir position in Eastern Europe. They are apprehensivewayward course of Romania and perceive (he possibilityn Poland. They arc presumably aware lhat thebetween East and West Germany has the potentialthem particularly delicate problems. And they aredetente and growing economic ties between East and WestArouse thc East European peoples and give the Easteven further room for maneuver. Moscow can bewhen it sees the necessity, to sanction repressive measuresBlocindeed to press them lo take suchThe Russians appreciate that each tentative step by onestate toward independent action may strengthen lheof others to proceed without reference to Moscow. Thewill seek to exercise control through political andbut will be prepared to use military forceast resort.

as the Soviets could be facedhoice betweenin Eastern and Western Europe, so there is potentialbetween their campaign to reduce the US presence on theand their simultaneous efforts tn improve their own relationsBut for the near term at least, Moscow will seek inlo avoid the issue. It has no wish to risk iiv immediatedetente in Western Europe for (he sake of long-term goalsUS role there, nor does i( wish to jeopardize its relationsSALT andthe sake of itsin Europe.

military aspects of Soviet detente policies alsoSovietsifficult calculation. They are attractedhcreducing their forward forces in Eastern Europe because theya generally favorable Western response, and because theyin MBFR an opportunity to induce thc US to instituteten troop withdrawals from Western Europe. At fhe sameaie concernededuction of Soviet forces in Haste: nsubtract from their overall security and might diminishon the East European regimes.

trends in Europe are of course not immutable.toward detente could beby some sturk new

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instance of Soviet repression in Eastern European, or perhapsby changes in the Soviet leadership. There will be enoughto provide ammunition to skeptics inside the Kremlin. But others as well as Brezhnev support (hc policy; the Soviet invest* ment in it is alreadyeasure of progress has now been shown and more seems in thc offing, ln short, there is likely to be enough motion during the nexl two or threein thc general area of East-West rapprochemenj and in that of US-European

4

DISCUSSION

INTRODUCTION

Tin- USSR i* before anythingiiuope.ni power. Its history. Its culture. Its general oul look, even its ideology are all predominantly European To be sure, theview China and thc US as their1nda- Europe lisrim Lp.ilpotentialthc competition between East and West. But Ihey also regard Europe, qua Europe, as an area of primary national concern; little is of greater moment to them than (he security of their position in Eastern Europe, the fate of theirwith Ostpolifil. iu Centra! Europe, andtisl.icIioti ol their ambitions in Western Europe.

The Soviets havelose connection between Iheir position in Eastern and Central Europe and their policies in Western Europe throughout the postwar period. Thc policy of crisis andurope followed by Slalin, and with less consistency, bywas in large part intended to remove Western influence from Eastern Europe and tu prevent its reluru. TouRh policies toward Wesl Germany and harsh moves against the Wesl in Berlin reflected special Soviet con-

cern aboul the vulnctabilitli ot East Germany and also the strong Soviet conviction that thef lhc USSR's posilion in the CDR was essential (oi the survival of itsin Eastern Europehole.eme, once Soviet hegemony in the area had been established, and once lhe prospects for some dramatic Soviet advance intoEurope were thought to havesay by the earlypolicies in Europe had in the main become defensive in nature, ic, designed to thwart any West-em threat In the USSR's imperial andInleresls fn Eastern Europe,

he cuirent Soviet view ofundamentally differentthe situation on lhe continentthreat to Eastern Europe nonearly sothe Soviets, and

the USSR's abilities to lesbt whatever threat remains are thought to be greater. At the same lime, occupied by domestic economic problems and ambttioru and eietcised by serious concern over China. Moscow is moving to case tensions in lhe West For their part. Ihe West Europeans seem lo have become much more receptive to the idea of doing political and economic business with the

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All these factors, operating together with more skillful and effective Soviet tactics in Eastern Europe, have given thc Soviets thc Incentive and the confidence to abandon their defensive posture nnd to seek toariety of opportunities to moveinfluence forward into Western Europe

II. THE SOVIETS IN WESTERN EUROPE

The Evolutionenlghere lias been no major crisis between East and Wesl in Europe for someears. Though retaining much of the form (and much of tbe rhetoric) of the past, Soviet policy in Europe seemed for much ofo be lacking clear direction and purpose. The period following Khrushchev's removal4 was one of uncertainty and indeeisivenesi within the collective leadership concerning national priorities. Including priorities abroad There was growing apprehension about Chinaival power andhreat to Soviet security in the Far East. And there was. through most of thc decade, an apparently growinghe ability of the USSH to further its objectives in Europe throughand extortion, at least so long as tho US maintained its strong presence on thc continent.

s Soviet strategic power grew and as the confidence of the Soviet leaders seemed to revive, Moscow67 began In re-examine its policies and toore active and forward interest in Western Europe- Encouraged by growing European criticism of US policies, thc USSR dusted off thc old idea of an all-European securitywhich would probably exclude thcissued calls fur an end to the cold war in Europe- Then, relieved by the transience of tho Western response to the USSR's invasion of. Czechoslovakia, themoved quickly90 to meet the now, flexible Ostpolitik of Willy Brandt

They tended to look on thisorm of testimony to thc wisdom of the USSR's past refusal to discuss the fate of Eastern Europe with the West, and they also saw inlear reflection of thc West's growing stake in fhe reduction uf tensions on the continent. At the same lime, Leonid Brezhnev, emerging as the leading policy spokesman within the collective leadership, saw in thc detenteopportunities for successes in Soviet foreign policy and for thc advancement of his own domestic political interests as well He thus began increasingly to identifypersonallyolicy of detente in Europe.

In its current phasc, Soviet policy in Western Europepast measurements of Soviet attitudes andflexible, and evenegreePublic emphasis is on thc desirabilit> of building an all-European system of sccuntv and cooperation: on lhe potential piofitabih'U of greatly expanded East-West economic tics: nn the Cultivation of closer bilateral relations with various West European countries (tho developmenlew relationship wiih Bom:special" one with France constituting the most conspicuousndariety oflorfs In ease Western anxieties about ultimate Soviet intentions. In geneial, the Soviels are pushing the theme that, left to theh own devices, the people of Europe can live in harmony on their own continent.

Thc Russians believe that thesehave already helped themong way toward satisfying one of their prineipal postwar objectives, Western acceptance of the political division of Germany and of Euiope and recognition of the USSR's primacy in the East. And by the Soviet reckoning there are si.inc important tangible sign* that delenle policies are succeeding: tho tioary with lhe West Germans: the agreement on Berlin with

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the thtve Western Allies, Wesl Euiopcanc- ii eagerness, lo proceeduropean *ecuiity conference, and. above allthe Summit apccnv-nl with thc(which hai the effect, among Other( giving sanction to Ihc cuttingtoward detente In Europe),

Russians hope thatonsequence ol these developments,*role in Kuiope and the effect ivenesswill diminish and lliat the trendunits' in thc European Communitybe impeded and delayed. They hopeWest European Communist parriesleftist elements can contribute toagainst thc US, NATO, and thethey hope (howeverby helping to reduce lhc USby picventing thc emergence nf ansubstitute, the USSK canclear the wayominantthc continenthole.

The West Furopcon Response

detente overtures haveirceptisv aidicnce in Westerndislike *nd distrust of lhe Soi letwxh spread, the (ear whichthe Western view has grcaltyii u'vm duringol cm is. or II it were thought thatprotiitiun provided by lhe USto he withdrawn, ln lhehowever, the wearisomeon thc continent is over; thc Russiansthreaten Western Europe, notcharacter has been transformed, hutthey have belatedly come tothe assumptionenacingractical or productivethough ihe West Europeans can teecompetition between thethey feel that it doe* so mostlym thc Middle East or inAsia.

]0European views of the US too aremore complex and more ambivalent ihan thoy once were liter* are adverse viewstome US policiesn lei national economichere it uneasiness about the durahility of the US commitment to Europe, and there is some suspicion lhat the US is moving over thc heads of Western Europe to arrange international affairs in accordance wiih the interests of only the two superpowers. There isrowing feeling that Western Europe, now lhat It has the political and economic strength, should iho base the will to try to move ahead with less help and interference from Washington.

est European attitudes loward the US nuclear guarantee are changing as well. Many West Europeans are now Inclined to look on thisorl of disaster insurance,cbewhere and necessaiy for the peace of mind of prudent men. But thev- are convinced (hat lhe chances that disaster will actually strike are receding. And. though they would be horrified If the policy werethey tend increasingly both (othe Insurer's advice and to resent his premiums.

he West Europeans are nut disposed to let moral indignation over the fale ol the East Europeans barm their rapprochement with the Soviets. To be sure, most Westwould be delighted lo see the USSR rclai its hold on Eastern Europe and would welcome thr adoption of liberal policies by thc indigenous governments But the Weslgovernments do no* seemood to try tn hung pressure to bear on Moscow or on the Easi European regimes to move in these directions. They are by now well accustomed to thc Soviet presence in Eastern Europe; they feel that the East Europeans do notnearly to much as they once did under Soviet tutelage; and they do not give first attenlton lo the politic* of the East Europeans in any case

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The French Government professes great concern for the Easi Europeans and explains that some of its potk-iessed on (hu con-fern And. indeed. Paris sees opportunities to further French interests hyloc-lO'hloe approach in Europe and hy trying to appear the champion of small powers in both East and West. Hut the French are notto let their sentiments about Eastern Europe interfere with their policies toward the USSR. Barring some particularly unsettling went in the East or in East-West relations, the French, like the other West Europeans, will wish in the main to avoid disrupting theirwith die Russians or upsetting the spirit of EnslAVcst detente. Flist detente, fl'di perhaps the problem ol Eastern Europe, which- so the rationaleonly be solvederiod of general relaxation.

H Tne Brandt government in Westhas already explicitly rccogmml, in fact, that the way East is via Moscow. It was willing, for example, to delay negotiations with the East Germans, Poles, and others untilwere settled with the Soviets. Bonnthat the real point ol Ostpolitik is to set in motion an improvement in Ibeof lhe East Cerman people and.to bring about the reunification of Germany and lo encourage the liberalization ol the Soviet hold on Eastern Europehole. And there is liltie doubt lhat Brand! is in part moved by Ihese idr.il,ractical mutter, however, hc gives great weight to other considerations, flc is seeking through the accomplishments of Oslpolilik lo ensure SPD political successes at home. Beyond this. Brandt and Ihe SPD leaders believe that East-West tension in Europe Is dangerous and inhibits lhe satisfaction of their own principal ambitions: their longing for international slature and influence, their hope to use West German economic strength to expand lhe PRC's role in Ihe Easi; and Iheir urge lo

devutc more time, energy, and resources to problems of domestic development.

IV Most West European countries are now disposed lo occupy themselves primarily with domestic economic and political concerns Their international energies aie at the same limr increasingly expended on questionswiih the enlargement and furtherof the European Community and with the stale of economic relations wiih the US. To one degree or another, West Europeanare inclined lo look upon thcof national defense as subordinate to these other matters and believe it expedient to hold military expenditure*inimum. In such circumstances, as we have noted eW-wlierr, detenle has much appeal.'

lb. Detente ahoertain commercial Hppcal Sotne WesternIhose associated with the automotive, gas. oil. chemical, telecommunications,and certain consumer goods induv tries -foresee years of expanding andexchanges with thc USSR. Overall West European trade wiih thc USSR reached someillionp from8 billiona average annual increase of about nine percent. And though il will probably grow* more slowly. Soviet-West European trade is likely to continue lo expand in, long-term credits from the West will probably remain available and lhe Soviet ileliie for imports of capital goods is sure

Vttauciuon otl. Thcmi Europe".COKFlDLNTlAI.

mtwiiieiHr ol its ftinwiue tndehtedneii. KinMii(i.it:>hi to-calledntrra couniry provide! equip. nM and, piprlinf uaUiwI on Ur'rrr* tmal. thr USSR repay, by "scBinii" lhe pfodtKt of thethe einlitm

sejret

European Trade

9

BllKon us s

-1

h* lure of this larger economicwith thc USSR and thehus already substantial in Western Europe and is likely to grow, at least in the near term- The West European interests which stand tomost from thislargefirms, Such aslook askance at Western foielgn policies which seemed unnecessarily to Jeopardize the climate nf detente. And such interests, which are not without influence in Paris. Bonn. Rome, and elsewhere, are perhaps moreto see the USay-todayrival than as the ultimate protector of Western sovereignty.

The Prob/ems of Defonto

lb The kind of detente urged by llieis thus in general accord with themoods and politics and ecooomic de-sues of most West Europeans. And this has helped to convince the West Europeans that they should not make large demands on thc USSR. They nsk that it not do certain things

which would clearly disturbas resume strong pressures against WestBut they do not expect major Sovietin return lor their willingness, for cvtmpte, to recognize tho division of Europe into two political spheres and In effect to accept Soviet domination of one of them

he maintenanceetentein Europe also places certain burdens on the Soviet leaders and constraints on theirwhich should now seem In general to be in accord with thc spirit uf rapprochement. And there is reason for the Soviets to approach sonic mattersonciliatory fashion in order to achieve certain specific goals. This was the case during Ihe quadripartiteon Berlin. It MOM to be the case this fall as the Russians search forprugrcis in lhc negotiations between East and Westhelp Brandt win reIt may be the case this winter as the preliminaries of the CSCE get underway. And It could at any time be the case if the existing Soviet leadership felt the need lo show prog* rcss in the Wesl in order to compensate fot setbacks elsewhere, in the Middle East, for example, or on the homefront.

estern Europe Is not in any event an area when thc Russians arc likely to achieve lasting gains easily or quickly. There is no sure way for Ihe Soviets to turn thc general urge for peace and prosperity tu their ultimate advantage Western suspicions of Soviet intentions might be aroused by Soviet behavior elsewhere US-West Europeanwhile obviously changing, are likely toital factor in West Europeanof Iheir international interests; in particular, the West Europeans willecurity' guarantee from the USong time to come. Andeduction in US influence In Western Europe would notleadorresponding increase in the influence of tho Soviet Union.

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There arc. in (ncl. aspects ofiroiK-aii development wliich could greatly inhibit lite ability ul the Soviets to make their presence Mt and heeded, whatever thc course of US-European relations West Europeanself-confidence and economicve grown enormously in the past decade or so. Inter alia, this Is manifesting itselfreater area-wide sense of identity and anrosperous and effective (West) European Community. Aud these arewhich have little appeal in Moscow. On the contrary, they make it more difficult for the East to deal advantageously with the West in economic ul.itiuiis; attract the envv ;oid attention of lhe East Europeans, and hinder the Soviets" efforts to expand tbeir influence in individual West EuropeanAt the same lime, the emerging Western Community confronts Moscowariety of problems which II cannot even hope to solve mamly oo its own terms. Moscow surely cannot by itself stop the movenienl toward West European unity, nor can it seek to share in ils accomplishments by (oining in it.

'm ally, developments in Easterncould come toajor effect on the course ol Soviet detenle pobcy in Western Europe. Large-scale disruptions in any of the Bloc countries, followed by harsh acts ufby the regime involved or by the Soviets, for example, would stiT popularin Western Europe and tould move the West European governments away from their generally favorable attitudes toward Soviet-style detente. Blatant Soviet intervention in Yugoslaviahaotic situation alter Tito's death! would be taken by many West Emopeans as evidence of ominous Sovielkmu toward them as well Duruptions in the COB would be another contingency likely to cause trouble for the Russians in Ihe West. Bonn's Ostpolitik might not be able toin ii toward severe repression in Pankow.

Thc Soviets may be optimistic that, even should majorastern Europe occur, advene Western reactions can beBut they are sensitive to the climate of both public and official opinion in Western Europe and arr Certainly aware that in same circumstance* tlieir policies in tlie Wesl could become hostage to their actions in the East

III. THE SOVIETS IN EASTERN EUROPE

The ftetord of the Post

ticre hasolitical crisis inEurope every three or four years since thc end of World War II and. with one cx-ceptiiin. each ol these hasirect challenge tu Soviethese problems have inirigcd Oi exploded during difieieul periods find in diverse ciicu instance* and thc Russians for the most pait haveoftenthan anticipated They have had to resort to military force to hold in to ihice East European nates jEastHungary, andnd in instances where force was not used they have seen the departure from lhe Bloc ol two counlrici (Yugoslavia and Albania) and the partial departure of one morehe Russians seem lime and again to have unde'esiimaied the force of nationalism in Eastern Europe and lo have consistentlytheir own abilities to enforceand conformity through political,and ideological means. Thus, afterears or so of effort, they still find themselves searching (or more elfcctivc non-military ways

' Tli* CMMMlorm break with YiiBMlarM Inimtiri*vlloii In Fait Berlinitaihr emnal uproar Li Kolandib'i aecewkm in IOTA, theHiiraar* in lheyear, tbc dnWlirfioward indeprndrncr ofParty In the rally ItffcOt; theihr workern lhe

Baltic ciltei ot Polnnd. Only th" tut did noti-iliii |hp Soviets.

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contend with widespread East European hostility and with an enduring. East European urge lor independence.

The Beginningew Look

S. however, there have been indications that this search has been con-ducted with increasing skill and that, in some instances. Soviet policy in Eastern Europe has become more knowing, more patient, and more effective. In post-invasionfor example. Moscow sensiblyto mostonlyery deliberate pace to restore fiim political controls Over Prague and en-cournmvli'-'.n :inw al the same speed. Tn Poland, the Soviets (despite considerable concern over both the riots and Gierck's ability to take chnntc) wisely rcfiaincd from interfering in the Baltic riots ofor the most part kept out of the leadership shuffles which followed, and responded immediatelyhe new regimes pleas foi material and financial help. And in East Germany1 thc Soviets somehow saw to the early and gracefulof the increasingly inconvenient Waltermove that waswith icmarkably few tremors.

olicies in some other problemEastern Europe also seem to reflectdegree of Soviet restraint and.foresight The Hungarian experimentslow and careful yet perceptiblerealclosely watchedthc most part tolerated by Moscow.problem does not now publiclythc Soviets; on thc contrary,nnod to grant aid to the -low on

Yugoslav leader Even Romanian misbehavior im longer seemstrouble the Hussians as much as it once did, the veiled threat ofintervention, particularly obvious in the fall8 and revived during thc summer

as beenleast furnn*fade into (lie background.

n economic matters too, there has been appreciable change Iu thc Soviet altitudethe East European stales. Tnte. the Iradc of thc East Europeans with lhe USSR and with each olher remained at someercent of total trade throughout. (The range runs from aboul half in Ihe case of Romania to about three-quarters in the case ofnd the East Europeans are still almost wholly dependent on the USSR for their uupoits of such raw materials as crude nil and iron ore. and they continue to receive more Ihan halt uf their imports of coke and cotton from the same source. It is abo true, however,at least tacit SovietIrade with the Westrapidly during the same period

ne of Moscow's lines of approach to (he kinds ul problems raised hy growing East-West European trade (and by tho further development of the EC) has been to turn increasingly to CEMA. le, toward effoits to manage and coordinate Bloc economicincluding East European trade lies with the West. There has already beenSoviet emphasis on the need for more uitra-bloc economic coordination,and specialization under CEMAThere has al the same time been some increase insl European interest In aspects of the CEMA program This can probably he attributed in large part to the growing realization among East Europeans that trade and economic arrangements with advanced Westerner* can solve only some of their economic problems They understand that there are in any case major difficulties attending elforts to expand their markets in the industrialized West, and thai their hard-currency indebtedness to thc Westroblem in and of ilsclf.CEMA plans for resource-pooling, technological co-

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investment deals, and multilateral banking:becomes aand in some icspeds attractive outlet (or thee-depend cut East European*.

ot fwlhtr Change

2fi Moscow's more flexible approach to the wide range of political and economic problems it faces in Eastern Europe seems toenerally more sophisticated Soviet point of view. Thc post-Khrushchev leadership dearly has learned something Irom the troubledpast in Eastern Europe And in recent years, this leadership has beenrowing sell confidence in the management of foieign affaiis int is likely that this has conlribnled lo the formationomewhat more relaxed view ol threats to its position in Eastern Europe. It may also have encouraged llie evolutionomewhat more flexible definition of just what that position reus* be Yet. sshilever Moscow* docs, the roots of tlie CSSB's principal difficulties in Eastern Europe will remain nourished byOutbreaks off inner Party turmoil, renewed efforts to escape the directing Soviet hand seeminevitable over tune.

ft i,' I 1 ., i rr, , wjy M

manage its troublesome imperial affairs has not so far revealed any very coherent Soviet plan of proccdiiie or clearcul Soviet view of long-range objc-clives There baseumber of indications that thc presentleaders envisage, if rather vaguely, tbe eventual estabhshrnentommunity of national communist slates As broadly con.

'"Develoorienli ol inent jeangiven the USSR ifi.ieaiei!in lit -eiunly and itra'lit lo eiej-te ib adversaries on favorable teinvi. and in the pniipeeti for the lonil-tenn Biuwih of Hi intfrnatxinajromfS, "Soviel Foeelan Politiesthe (hitli-oknn-il.nn Rrlat'Kvis*'.ki:rf.t.

ceived and dlscimed dining the Khrushchev era. and never refuted implicitly or otherwise by the existing regime, the idea) wouldocialist CommonweaIlh in which thcof each state would beould build socialism in their own way under Party leaders ol theii own choosing Hut each state would also be subject to the will of the community, as expressed through international meetings and such institutions as CEMA and the Warsaw Pact, especially in thc area of foreign, defense, and internationalpolicies AH memhers of thewouldommon ideologicaland thus in theory share simitar orview* of thc svorld at laige. All the Kast European states would, moreover, fullythe siic. strength, and superiorcredentials ol the Soviet Union and voluntarily recognize its special interests and authority.

his model takenhole is of course highly unrealistic. Hut it it not withoutbecause imporlant parls ol it have been functiuning for some time. Most of the East Euiopean Cominutilit Parties now enjoy substantial organIzatioiialun then own innei Paity affairs and select their own leaders, subject perhaps to Soviet veto- And most of ihew same Paitiei have also assumed the"socialist"to formu'ate domestic policies in accordance with what they conceive to be their ownrequirements and tradition* Policies and practices and even plans thus varyfrom country to country. Agriculture is completely socialized in Bulgaria, hardly al all in Poland, rigid, eenttalircd economic planning, with emphisis on investment, is the rule in Komania butungary; the Partyry tight control of culturaliu the CDU, not so. again, in Hungary; etc.

he degree of Soviet Influence in East-un Europe alsoonsiderably. Soviet

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count hu iniicli more in I'ot Germany. Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria tlian in Poland and Hungaiy ami eonnt tha- least in Rumania. (Outside the lllnc. they count fot very little innd not at all inut lhe Sov litEast Europe-ait relationship isvastly dtH.-ient fiom lhat ofhe Russian pioconsiils are mostly cone, and even those East Euiopcan leaders who had been rrand and trained fai the USSR Aie all gone (Ulbrichtthen their places are men who may or may not wish to lullovv the Soviet lead anddoubt with someiheir first loyalties lo their own louuhlcs or lo their ownparticular biands of Communism When, for (sample.goes lo Moscow, he goesa Pole and lie usually goes lo represent Polish interests

hu sort of autonomy, of course, has more olteii been won by (lie East Europeans than granted by the Russians, 'llie piocess thusl the one envisaged by fhe Soviets isliiii they cuiilemplaleocialiston-wealth Each lime an individual Party, say the Hun in >i. putsew anddeveloped economic scheme, oi each time an East European leader, say

l Paily to piocred without rcferenci* to Moscow presumablyo be sure, the sprctie of armed Soviet intervention rctaidt the pace of the movement towardimits the interim goals of the movers,n general helps torrlain level nl East European sobriety. But part of the lesson of Czechoslovakia, as confirmed by theehavior of both Hungary and Romania, each in its own way, was not that East Europeans must cease iheir tanrcn for independence It was. rather, that the Bus.they can be provoked when

theyeal Ihical to their vitalprefer not to use force and thai this preference in fact provides the East Europeans with con-vulerablc room for maneuver. One area which appear* especially promising for the exercise uf this ability to maneuver i* in Ihewot Id ul economic relations with Western Europe.

IV. THE CHANGING EAST-WESTECONOMIC REIATIONSHIP

he volume of trade between West and East Euro|K' (excluding the USSH) has almost tripledlimbingotal of slightly less than S3 billion0 to aboutillionUS-EM European tradeotal of only0 millionurope ha* bought on credit billions of doi'irs worth ofigh quality finished goods, foodslnfts. and animal feed.onsequence. East European hard-currency Indebtedness had grown lo almostillion by lhe end1 Financial airangctiK'nU between East and West Europe hasT expandedthere are |Oint produclion ventures,on the Eurodollar marlet, Weslcni bank consortia loans, and even Eurodollar bond offerings in Ihc West (by the Hungarians, wiih the help of Soviet-owned banks in tin-West).

he Inom in East-West trade reflects in pait the reahration in Eastern Europe that economic progress requires much more lhaji the mere expansion of standard heavysueh as steel Indeed, it had become clear by lhehat East European growth rates would falter without fa-xler technological change, ic.estructuring of output in favor of newer industries, including the chemical, electronics, aluminum, and even

automotive industries. The West ol course offered the blueprint for Ihis change but the

USSR provided the main initial impetus by

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altering the pattern of its exports. Specifically, because of the changes in lhc Soviet economy, it began to supply Eastern Europe with more oi! and less of such traditional materials as coal, ferrous metals, cotton, and wood And this shift immediatelyeed inEurope for new (Western)particularly equipment for oil refining,and .synthetic fibers.

bviously, both East and Westhave found the growing volume of trade, to Iheir liking. What began in thcutually beneficial exchange of Western machinery for Eastern agricultural products and rasv materials has sincein addition,rowing two-way trade in semifinished goods (particularly metal products and chemical materials) and in consumer manufactures. But, though they haveung way in adapting to this

to its complex financialEast Europeans still has'p some complaints: they must pay regular prices for Western machinery but usually receiveprices for their own industrial cx-poits; nesv Western machinery and jointwith thc West have not as yet generated mucheturn in new exports, excepl to Ihe easier Bloc markets; agricultural products and crude materials still account for over half of all East European exports to the West; and East European industrial exports remain especially vulnerable to economic downturns in Western Europe.

oviet attitudes toward Easterngrowing economic tics with thc West arc equivocal-liadc has been encouraged, tolerated, and restrained at varying times. Moscow docs not want these tics to jeopardize its political predominance or weaken itspower in Eastern Europe. Xor does it wish to see thc East European statesin Western Europe as independent economic entities, to the detriment ofBloc policies and perhaps in direct competition with the USSH. On the other hand, the Russians would find it difficult to proceed in energetic fashion to develop their own economic ties svith the West and try at thc same time tu deny similarand privileges to the Ens! Europeans.

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the East Europeans to benefit from closer economic relations with the West and of course view this prospect with some favor. Thc economic strengthening of Easterncould help to enhance domestic political stability in thc area; might relieve thc USSR of certain economic burdens (such asemergency hard-currency credits tond could leadrowing East European contribution (without hard-currency costs) to the process of economic advancement in the USSR itself.

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ajor problem that has emerged in Eastern Europe since Ibes lhat of "integrating" the small economies of the area into the internationalrice of technological change in Western Europe has been the giving up of aspecls olpolitical sovereignty in order tothe movement of goods, labor, andand to harmoi-iw national economic policies- Even more elaborate and difficult intergovernmenlnl agreements arc proving necessary for Eastern Europe. This facilitates the USSR's drive lor tighter ties within CEMA. But it also moves the East European states toward closer iclations with the West. The East European countries now find itin liict, to become more integrated with one another, with the Soviet Union, and svith Weslern markets as well; all three areas are important to their conlinued economic development.

ast Europe's export pioblems,its rising indebtedness, will tendthe boom in trade with Westernin. But Easternthe advanced economies ofEasts finding Westerntechnology to be as vital to growthvja-

llie CEMA countries. At thc same time.Europe seems as eager as ever fo seek markets and profits in the East, to make credit arrangements more flexible, and even topromoteiopean sales in the West. Eastern Europe's trade with Western Europe Seems likely to grow about as fast as its total trade for lhe next severalustained boom in East-West trade over thc longer run probably would depend heavilyonsiderable expansion uf joint ventures and tic-in trade arrangements, both of which would be needed to provide growing export markets for the East Europeans and tu hold

Distribution of East European Trade

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the East European debt lo manageable limits, llie Soviets will almost certainly endorse some future expansion uf East-West Europeanrelations. They realize that this may require them to work out some bloc-to-bloc institutional arrangements (between the EC andut Ihey will try for as long as possible to use CEMA to coordinateapproaches to individual West European countries.

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IHE EVOLVING MIX OF SOVIET POUCIES IN EUROPE

3B. Given Ihc multiple inti'txvonnectloiis among Sin ul activities in lite West and Soviet itiii-ii-vts mi Hu- East, it isneat question svliHUci in tin- longUSSK will bc it'll- Inolicy of detente ini uf Europe. Butlso atht Soviet* of course hope Ihey will not have in face. And, indeed, they may not if the East Europeans decide to cooperate by behaving them selves, and if the Weslchuose Iu oblige by accepting the Soviet definition ul dclentc altogether Yet Moscow can nil. not afford to leave the maltcr to cltancc.

GiiU'e/iricy fhe Eost Eu'OpCO" flunk

Ml Tlie Soviets understand that many East Eiiiiipcnns who mw detente favorably do so fm their own reasons,ec in the detente piocess nn opportunity lo move closer to the Wesl and larthei away from the Soviet Union. While i orth to merl the KHGs Ostpolitik. thc Russian* thus took pains to avoid misunderstandings on tbc part of their allies, ensuring that all thc Bloc stales (except Romania) were in step and to tlie rear Mos-oav can be expected in thc future lo reiletate its position lhat there can be no consistencev een lhc rival ideologies and to press tho East European government* Iu imiinlam clear limits and careful cunlroU on contacts between Iheir citizens andl thc West, ll will no doubt continue to insist on aBloc apptoach to Ihe Wesl and on tlic primacy of Soviet objectives over East Fuiopeau interests- It will unquestionably encounter setbacks in these areas of concern and thus can also be expected to revert from time to lime lo the use of tougher ami more direct foinis of pressure, on one or another Easi European slate.

oscow will, al the same lime, seek better ways and more effective forums for thc meshing of Soviet and Easi European policies and practices pmsibilitles include morehap* periodic. Blocand meetings of the top leaders, various schemes In strengthen Party andtics, the further development andof Warsaw Pact nnd CEMA machinery iu Moscow and in the individual Bloc capitals; and in.in extensive Integration of long-term economic plans, including trade plans.

be Soviets may give particular con-sideiation lo allowing tlie East Europeanarger voice in CEMA and within other Bloc councils. (Win tliey were still at thc peak of their powers, both Ulbricht and Gomulka were treated almost as ex officio numbers of the Sovietins need not lead to significant diminution of ultimate Soviet authority but might help to persuade one or another East European leader to think along less nationalistic lines Thc Soviets may also choose lo permit East European officials al lower levels toreater role and say-vo within lhc organs of CEMA and lhe Warsaw Pact

The Russians may. however, move very slowly and cautiously such matters. They have never been entirely comfortable with tlie institutional aspects uf Bloc life. Partly this is becrfuse some of the East European statessuccessfully -movement toward economic andintegration. Romania has been lhe most difficult and outspoken in this regard, but others from lime to lime seem tojs-en Bucharest some tacit support The Soviets often seem uncertain about precisely what to do in the face of such resistance. (Khrushchev once complained that Ihe boys in Eastern Europe had grown too large toor some in Moscow, the tesled practice of direct bilateral dealings with thi' East European

habit of thc past and still thc principal means ofthc most effective way o( governing the empire.

Beyond all this, the Russiansbelieveommon devotion to the principles of Marx ism-Leninism and afear of the ultimate intentions of the capitalist West will help to keep the East European regimes dependent on the USSR. It is true that most of them will remain suspicious of Westernnd that they could in somein the eventery rapidly growing Western cultural ami economicto see at least an indirect threat to their existence.

hough the possibility no doubt from tunc to time crosses Soviet minds in the.f Romania, none ol the problems Moscow faces seem likely in thc near term tothe it.se of military force in Eastern Europe None of the existing Bloc leaderships are in dinger of being overthrown, none of the I'aitics are presently disposed to experiment in radical fashion with domestic reform, and none Of these slates are anxious to stride off in bold new directions in foreign policy. Nevertheless, the military option is one which Moscow must continue to leave open since its position in Eastern Europe probably could not survive without it.

Some Contingencies

here will continue to be potentialities in Eastern Europe for various patterns of far-reaching change. Tn someno radical East European movement of. say,8 Ow-chSoviets could probably only channel and limit the process rather than halt or reverse it. The logic of thc evolution now underway in Soviet-East European relations, for instance, suggests lhat all or most of the East European states may ultimatelyegree of autonomy similai to that exercised today by Hungary

or Poland. Indeed Ihcir status might even coine to resemble in some ways that whichrelations between Finland and the USSR: nilntantial independence in domestic affairs (so long as. in the case of Finland, the government"friendly" and, in the case of Eastern Hut ope. the regimes are commu nisi) butimited degree of autonomy in foreign and defense affairs.

f and as they began to exercise greater independence of action, certain of theEastern European countries might do so at least as much nil/iin thc Bloc as outside it Their pride and nationalism could to some degree find expressionsocialistone still essentially dominated by thethey were persuaded that their views were respected and their voices heeded. There are already signs that some East Germans and Poles arc lieginning to view ihis sort ol development as both plausible and desirable; iheirot on the need for the GDR or Poland to gain independence hy fleeing Westward but on the possibilities of more vigorous atsertinni of their national interests within Bloc councils Their hope is that perhaps East Cermany (because it is the most advanced of all Blocr perhaps Poland (by virtue of its position as tbe second largest power within the Sovietould coma; toignificant influence on Bloc affairs.

Poland. Poland In particular mighl come Io wield some real leverageis Moscow. Polish fears of West Cermanyn emotion which has helped Io keep Poland dependent on the USSR, are diminishingonsequence of Oslpnlitik More important. Poland's stralegic Importance to tlie USSR could now work to some extent to Warsaw's advantage. Moscow.rying to protect its important interests in Poland, might in certain contingencies hnd it more prudent to appease Warsaw than to offend it.

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ermany Alreadyense ofill Get man but distinct (torn that of West"socialist" but differing Irom that of thc other members of iheCermany could eventually present lhe Sovietsroblem nfcomplexity. The imperatives of bothand Ostpolliik have already moved tt into closer contact wiih the FRC.ii of ihose inner-German ties is expected to be an integral part of the continuing detenlerowing rapprochement within Cermany svill in time probably ptovide the Easi Germans with thr opportunity andto begin to regard their interests in Europeeculiarly Pankowian (vice Muscotite) prospect. Thb is not to suggest thai Ihe CDR is likely to strike off in an independent direction in the near future. The Sonets (and the other East Europeans) will remain appiehensive about Ihe possibilitylu> mi between East and West Germans Moscow- will he especially sen si live to any sudden or mailed East German deviations from the accepted path and will presumably be able tn rein Pankow in should it stray too lar too fast.

But having charged the East Germans with the task of enteringewwith the capitalist FRC. tbe Soviets may face the prospect of watching thisgrow uncomfortably close And thiscould Imperil further integration of the GDR into the socialist community, sharpen already existing divergencies between Pankow- and the rest of the bloc, and more generally complicate Soviet detente policies toward West Germany and Europehole.

Romania. Romunla Ispecial case. Thisountry which has somehow managed lo assert ils {independence within the Warsaw Pact CEMA system while maintiuung good relations with China and following anonconformist path in foreign af-

fairs in general The Romanian leadershipto ihe Romanian peopleupport its eccentric posture abroad (and to tolerate its demanding policies at home) on the basishared dislike and distrust of Ihe USSR, while contriving at the same time toformally close and correct ties withIt seems moreover to be moved almost entirely hy calculations of nationalalfeded, of course, by an appreciation of the realities of geography and Soviet powrr As demonstrated most recently in itsthis fall for membership in thcMonetary Fund, Romania's overriding objective is to enlarge the aiea ol Romanian independence, in thc process consciouslySoviet displeasure hut trying to avoid strong Soviel reactions.

he Russians are understandablyThey are offended by Ihe dbloyalty of thc Romanian Parly, uneasy about lheof Romanian autonomy for the rest o( Eastern Europe, and apprehensive about what Romania's ability to ignore or defy Soviet guidance might do to the image nf Soviet power and Ihe course of Soviet policy. They are in conseqtience looking more or lessfor some device to compel Romanian conformity and to diminish RomanianBui, basically, while seeking loand Isolate Romania. Moscow appears to believe thai time and geopolitics will one day solve the problem. They may not

Other Con siaVrafions

ll Ihe countries of Eastern Europe could of course press hard to assert theirThey might try, for example, to exploit detente to develop much closerand political ties to the Westay to reduce then vulnerability to SovietThe grand vision that ultimately all Europe, from the Atlantic lo lhe Utah, will be unitedingle cooperative system of

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stales is alive in Eastern Europe if not in France. Not many East European* viewystemractical goal hut theyin any movement touardIhe conveninguropean securitypossible step toward furtherfor themselves, an opportunity to fulfill their nationalist aspirationsroader European framework. They believe thatramework would give tliem added courage to ignore or defy the Russians because the more their countriesart of Europe the more constrained themight bc in seeking to enforce their hegemony. It is one thing, surely, for thetoountry which is clearly within lhcir own spheie. It wouldbe quite another to march inlo one which was no longerompletely dominated by themselves or isolated so effectively from lhe remainder of Europe.

ut while the trendundeniablyMoscow seems more disposed to confine it lo "healthy- channels than lo assault it beadmos-emenl ol tlie Eaststate* towardy no means inevitable. Changes in the Soviet leadership could, for example, lead tochanges of policy in both part* of Europe. Not all Russians arc persuaded that detenteise or practical course in the West orelaUvely relaxed approach will serve Soviet Interests in thereakdown of ibe USSR's detente policies in thewhether inspired in Moscow or thcof eventsobviously eliminate whatever degree of restraint thehave oxcrciscd in Eastern Europe out of their concern lo maintain Iheir benign image in Ihc Wort Depending on the nature andof thc difficulty and the means required to combatdismplioo* in Eastwould be especiallyround of xertoui trouble in Eastern Europe could also move the Russian* toward much

tougher policies. Even if subsequent severe Sovicl conntcrmovc* did not provoke strong and enduring Western reactions, tbe Soviets might deem it prudentrisis of thi* character lo reconstruct the barriers between East and West on their own There is certainly no question that in circumstances whichsaw asinal choice between holding on in Eastern Europe or maintaining its policies in Western Europe, Moscow would abandon lhc latter.

Posture Toward fhe Wesl

t this stage of llie game, despite the Soviets" manyandEastern Europe, they are giving particular priorityosemcnt of their relationships with the West. On thc level of functional policy, in fact, they seem so far tu have adjusted their approach in Eastern Europe more lo accord with their objectives in Western Eurnpe than vice versa Thus, for example, lhe Russian* were willing to remove Walter Ulbricht-feared and resisted thc USSR'* more oi less accommodating response to Willy Brandt'slor the *afcc of Soviet detente policy in the West.

5fi OslpotiUk. The interaction of WestOstpolitik. the t'SSR's detente policies, and the echoes of both in Eastern Europe are of special significance to Ihe movement of Fast-West relations in Europe. So far,emphasis on rapprochement and Bonn's determination to aetiv.tr its Eastern policies have been coinptemonlary. The immediate aims of the twofurther develop-ment of economicajor reduction of political tensions,ablishment ofbroad modus vivendl between ihe FRG and GDR, and, specifically, the signing of some sort of formal general treaty by the two parts ofcompatible. But in the longer term this may remain the case only so long as (a) the Wesl Germans do not threaten

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-t- .ind concerns in East Cermany and Eastern Europe, nnd (b) the Soviets do not put obvMMH ot heavy pressure on Bonn to *cvcr its ties with NATO and the EC and do not interfere in Westrelations with the US.

Other West European states, partic-ul .itFrance, ate inclined to resent and resist the fact, but in the aie* of policies toward the East the FRC now plays the key role. And progress inthe character so farbe crucial to Western attitudes and policieshole. If OstpolniL seems to beit can help topolitical gains for the Social Dernocratic government at home (suchictory in the forthcomingf il can be seen to lx-nefit tlse West Cerman economy, if it can apparently enhance the international standing of the Federal Republic, il it can seem to contribute Iu the settlement oi problems ul Europeanit is thought to be on the way to accomplishing most or all of this, then olher West Europeans will he encouraged to step up ami publicize their own contacts with thc East.ill not only interpret the FRCs successes as harbingers of good things to come; they wiU also wish tobeing left in Bonn's dust On the other hand, if Ostpolilik were seen lo be failing, and this were attributed in tlie mam to lhe Russians, the other West Europeans would regard thi-"opening to the East" with greater svarincss and hopes fur general East-West concord would dim.

The American Aspect. Clearly, thc kind of role in Europe which Moscow aspires to is one which can be achieved orsfy if the US presencepolitical, military, andgreatly reduced. In tbe nearer term, the Soviets hope to obtain from the US some clear aeknow'ledgnnent of the legitimacy of iheir hegemony in Eastern Europe without having toorresponding status quo

in Western Europe The Soviets, thoughthat the Vietnam issue can no longer be espb'iled very effectively for tlie purpose, will continue in various ways to promotewithin the Western Alliance, between the US and individual West Europeananil between tlie US and the EC Thus, while Moscow's pursuit of detenle In Eurupe andormalization" of Soviet-US relations are al present to some degree complementary, there are contradictions between Ihem and these promise lo become more obvious and more troublesome over time.

icvot circumstances would appear, in thc Siiviet view, In cull lor consideiablelexibilityareful balancing ofTo the cstcnt thai growing West European self-asstitivencsS causes difficulties in lel.itiuns with the US, and to lhe extent thai it encourages some West European conn-tries tu be more receptive to Soviet overtures. Moscow believes that this development works to its advantage Moscow- is also aware,that it does not do soor in allauseanifestation of this West European seH-assertlveuess, the widespread suspicion that lhe two suner-poweis wish Io settle European affairsthemselves over the heads ol thens, works against the Soviets ai well as thc US. And in some cases of US-Wnlin disagreement. Moscow might find itself more ot leu aligned with Wishing on The formationtrong and self-centered Wesl European commercial front within the dame work of the EC. for example, could cause troubles for rhe USSR as well as for the US-

here is, at the same time, reason to believe thai Moscow wouldradual and controlled reduction of tlie US military presence in Europehatp and abrupt reduction which could have destabilizing effects It is likely thai Moscow will weigh this consideration in formulating its positions

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llie next phase of SALT, especially where these touch on the issue of the deployment of US nucleai weapons in Euiope, and in MBFIt when (and if) that subject reaches the point of serious negotiation.

lic Soviets also presumably recognize that too much activity and pressure in West-em Europe could boomerang and slow the trendiminished US role byboth fhe US and the Europeans- Tlte Soviets arc not in any case now disposed to risk their immediate interests in detente and Ihe detente process in Western Europe for the sake of long term goals vis-avis the US role in Europe. (They thus accepted the idea lhat the US could participateuropean security confer once though they would have much preferred to have excludedor

s

thetheir negotiations svith thc US in the SALT forum andthe sake of their ultimate aims in Europe.

tfiifiKii an^ Balaiceil Farce Weductiom. Thc interrelationship of Soviet. European, and US policies is nowhere mure evident than in the attitudes of the various powersthc question of MBFR. Thc Soviet leaders are al once attracted and repelled by the idea, and it is not entirely clear that the* agree among themselves about how best to proceed. They arr attended because theycan sec some possible profit in the negotiations for MBFR, or at least .same loss if they refuse to enter into such negotiations; because they canenerallyWestern response if they agree to reduce ihe size of their military forces in Eastern and Central Europe;cause they can perceive in MBFR an opportunity to induce the US to institute or hasten troopfrom Western Europe They are. at Ihe samp time very uneasy about some of the implications andnscrjuenccs of MBFR. They arc concernededuction

ol Soviet lorces in East Europe (especially East Germany) might Mibtiact fmm their Qicmtl ses-iu,'. an* uncertain about what MBFR rm'glit do tu the militaiy balance with NATO: and may be anxious about the effectsoo-rapid withdrawal of US lorces from West Cermany. They arc no doubtiawdowu of their foices would diminish thc USSR's hold on lhe East European regimes.

Thc attitude* ul the West Europeans are also complex Many iccin attracted hy lhe notion thai force rcdmlions by thewould leadessening uf tension un Ihe continent; others seem conceined mainlyiatiir US withdrawal would leadessening ol US interest in Europe andithering assay of the US enm-mitment. The French Government forexcv* only llie grimmer prospects and refuses hi sanction MBFR. Tbe gosrmment in Boou does not look forward to any American troop rccrMtiom in Wesl Germany and hopes that protracted dclibrr.ilx ms in the MBFR process might in (act delay such reductions Most of lhc other West European gnsenimntls srem persuadedhandled properly and if not completely dominated by thenegotiations areesirable (or al least inevitable) aspect of detente

Strategic Arms Limitations Talks. In tbc Soviet view. SALT isilateral concern But the West European* find that their interests are also very much engaged They recognize that this it indeed an area of paramount concern f> the US and USSR, and they are in general accord with the idea that the bilateral negotiation of limitations on strategic armsorthy endeavor. They we. liowx-ver. concerned that in the processnterest will not receive adequateIn particular, they are worried that the issue of American forward ban- systems

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and tin- question of thcand mlerrnediatc-rangemissiles targeted againsi Westernbe discussed and resolvedannertheir liking. They are. in addition,about Ihe implications nf SALTstrategic policy and thc US nuclearMany in Western Europe arethat thc wider interests of thethe USSR and other areas ofinevitably lead it lo neglectof its European allies and thatpreoccupation with its ownmuvc the US away from its retaliate against Soviet aggression in

onference on Security andnn jn Emmie. The Soviet* are convincedrand East-West conlerence on European security {and no less so the variousstages which are likely to lead up to it) will help them to sustain the momentum of detente The Russians believe that this con-Terence mid its preliminaries offer anpromising way to try to exploit Western desires for amity and tu manage andlhe policies of the East European participants. Despite the presence of the US and Canada, they will hope lhat the CSCE svill cricomagc West European movement away from the Atlantic Alliance and will nourish the seedlings of US-West European discord. More specifically, Ihey hope topcimanenl pan-European bodies which might serve in thc West as counleratlraclwns lo NATO (and the EC as well) and which might provide Moscow with thc institutional means to interfere in and inllucnccnd in general, theSCE is to serveroad sanctioning of the status quo in Eastern Europe and further recognition of the division of Germany.

he China Problem. Thc three-sidedbelween the USSR, the US. and China complicates Soviet objectives and twists Soviet policies There is no way to measure the impact of Moscow's long struggle with China on particular Soviet positions, but it hasbeen one of the factorsthe Soviets to move toward detente in their relations with both Western Europe and the US. It has forced Moscow to proceed along various carefully chosen ways to head off the bleakest of all prospects for the Kremlin, the combination against thc USSR of thc other (wo powers.

VI. THE GENERAL SHAPE OF FUTURE SOVIET POLICY

Though still partly formed andined by an omniscient doctrine, tlie USSR's policies in Europe, like its policies world-wide, are primarily the cieatures of Soviet national interests, as pragmatically perceived by the leaders of the Soviet Communist Party. The Soviets are certainly well awaie of the many problems their policies face in thc two parts of Europe. They understand that then present objectives in Weslern Europe will for some time require them to remain mostly on theirbehavior. Ihey are persuaded (am! noi unu-asonably so) that they cannot expect tn achieve these objectives unless the Soviet position in Eastern Europe is seC.uie, and lliev no doubt unhappilytho contrary implications of officialthat events could conspire to frustrate their plans in the West and to shake Iheir security in the East.

Yet thc mood of thc Soviet leaders is at this ltine faiily confident. The Kremlin is of coiuse tiouhled by recent developments in Egypt, is chronically concerned about thc problem of China, and is sometimes put off and puzzled by turns in lhe pulkics of thc US. ll isite apprehensive about llie current

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and shortcomings in SovietBul cares and concerns such as these do not seem to outweigh the Sense of relative well-being induced by the leadership'sthat the USSB has finally arriveduperpower and is entitled throughout dieof courseall the rights and privileges that estate is thought to endow.

he Brezhnev leadership docs not,show any inclination to rush heedlessly into foreign adventures or to fling challenges at its principal adveisaries. At the same lime, its growing self-confidence does not guarantee skillful handling of all its problems or thc far-sightcd adjustment of ils major policies. The leadership can be guilty of heavy-handed behavior, as was apparently the case in Egypt; it can respond tlrongly and emotionally tocriticism of its actions, as itdid in response to the West European outcry against political trials inand as it does regularly in response to one ur another jibe from Peking; and it can cling tightly lo seemingly self-defeating or'i'V.T'in. .isi', furapan. The Soviel slate rests on the world's most elaborate bureaucratic structure; it is perhaps small wonder then that Sovieteven in their present forward phase, only infrequentlyapacity for rapid

he detente approach to Europe (and indeed to the US) seems in these generallikely to persist for quite some time as Moscosv's peiferred policy. Thewhich persuaded thc present leadership to move in ihisKhrushchevvi! iniv1 to go roughly the sameecade or sonot seem of

themselves tu be highly perishable (though, as stressed elsewhere in this paper, they can certainly be spoiled by externalTlie Russians will surely encounter individual setbacks, but they will continue to see opportunities In Western Europe which will look more susceptibleoil Soviet sellard. Even should the CDU return to power in Bonn and modify Ostpolitik inways, theafter an initial period of recrimination andare more likely to try to win the new gos-ern-ment over ihan to return to ways which would lend to confirm theeep suspicions of Russian inuns

Bolh Ihe West Europeans and the Americans will in nil piobabilily continue to disappoint Soviet hopes concerning the speed and scope of any decline in Ihe US role in Europe Foi all their iinhappincss andand despite likely economic frictionthe EC and the US, the West European members of NATO will almost certainly wish to maintain thc partnership and will continue In rely on US strategic power as the ultimate guarantor of West European security At thc same time, the EC will almosi certainly remain an important West European force and one wHich will confront thc USSR (and odaHS) with considerable economic power.

The obstacles lo rapid or enduring Soviet gains thus are lonntdabkr. Yet there is likely to be enough motion during the next two or th ice years in the general area of East-West rapprochement and US-Europeanperhaps stimulated in part hy thc CSCE process and MBFRpraiidc the Russians wiih adequate reasons for pressing ahead vigorously with anbul recugni table, policy of detente

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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