Created: 10/26/1972

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Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack






Tho following Inielligence organizations participated in th* preparation ol lha astimatai

Tht Cn'itml lilBiliflencff Agency and Ihe intelligence organiiatiofli a' th* Depart menti ol Stale and Detente, the NSA, andC.


The Opvtr Director of Central InteQigcnce

The Director of tMetbgeiKm and Be^eoreh. Department of State Iho Director, Detente Intelligence Aoency The Director. Noiionol Security Agency

Ther, Division of Iniecnemonal Seeuciry Attain, Atomic Energy Comrto in ing <

ft in. r

The Asilitont Director. Federal Bureau of Invoglgotton, and lhe Special Auiiionl lo Ihe Secretory of the Trcaiury. rhe subject being outline of Iheir jur'adleHon







Thc Principal Types of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 3




Status of Operational

Characteristics and CapablJitiei of the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile


Possible Deactivation ofoft

Tlie New Deployment

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Research and Development

Coal] of New Missile Programs




Current Production Rita and Force30

Characteristics and Capabilities of the Ballistic Missile Submarine Force 32

Y-law Submarine*32


C-Class Submarines

New Programs 38


Current Forces- 39

Characteristics ond Capabilities of the39

The Backfire 40

Possible Follow-on Heavy Q




The Defense

Tho Military-Industrial45

The Military as an Interest 6

The Scientific

Other Influences

The Decision-Making Process 48


Introduction .

The Impact of lhe Limitation on Strategic

The Soviet Perception of the United States Strategic

System Characteristics and Deployment

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

nd 55

New fdirge

New Urge58

Nest; Small 57

N*u> Small





Solid-Propeltant Intercontinental Ballistic

Mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles .

Balh'soe Missile Submarines and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles

Sfofur of Y-lest

Size end Makeup of

iened BeHirMc Missiles




Alternate Fceee


Force 2

Force (


Likely Soviet Courses of








This NIE assesses (he strengths and capabilities of Soviet forces for intercontinental attack, discusses questions of policy with respect to those forces, and estimates their size and composition over the next several years.




A. An estimate on Soviet forces for Intercontinental attack isto some special difficulties this year. For one thing, the strategic arms limitation (SAL) agreements concluded in May have profoundboth political and military. Theyew milieu, and affect both the choices open to the Soviets and the way in which they will be exercised. In addition, the Soviet forces for intercontinental attack areind of interim phase technically, and there is muchabout the characteristics of new systems being developed. Thc issues involved are taken up in depth in the body of the paper.

ton sccrct 1

but only somebe resolved on present evidence. This summary sets) essential facts about present Soviet forces for mtercontinenUlonsiderations bearing on Soviet policy choicesome likely changes in the characteristics of these forces. It concludesrief description of thc illustrative future forces contained in the body of the paper and brief comments on the likely future shape of Soviet" forces.

the course of the past decade, the Soviets have engagedvigorous and costly buildup of the various elements of theirIntercontinental attack.esult of this effort, the2 anaunchers at Dcrazhnya and Pervomayskpossibly intended for use against European targets, arecapable of reaching thcubmarine-launched(SLBM) hunchers,eavy bombers and tankers.

large-scale deployment programs for ICBMsave now run their course, but the construction ofof silos and certain activity at the lesl ranges indicate thatprograms areew phase characterized byqualitative improvements. Thc new silos are found at thetest center and at several missile complexes. Two basiclarge and one small. The new silos probablyharder to disable than existing silos. There is evidence whichthat silos at operational ICBM complexes will bethc new configurations,

appears that two new liquid-propellant missile systemsdevelopment at Tyuratam which are to be used both inand in reconstructed silos, f"

smaller missile is in thclass, and we think it will be deployed in reconstructedilos. It may also be deployed Inew small silos at Derazhnya and Pervomaysk, but there is evidence that these silos will house thcodt least initially. Tbc larger missile is in thelass; the available evidence suggests that it could be either the size of ther somewhat larger. Wc expect this missile to be cle-

ployed in theew Urge silos located atomplexes and in reconstructedilos. In addition, flight tests have begun at the Plesetsk missile test centerolid-propellant missile which could be entirely newighly modified

E.lass submarines, each equipped withaunch tubes, are currently operational, and anre fitting out or conducting sea trials prior to entering service. Thc Soviets havelass submarine which differs from all previous units of that class. This submarine, which has been designatedlass. is longer thanlass and hasaunch tubes ratherc believe dint it will cany theissile, whichuch greater range than theissile carriedlass submarines.

" F. The Soviet force off intercontinental bombers and tankers consistsears.f which carry air-to-surface missiles, andisons, includingankers. The first unitsew strategicbecome operational byli but the Air Force continue to believe that it is best suited for use against Europe and Asia. Thc Air Force believes that it Is suitableariety of missions including mtcrcoutineiital attack.

Tho Principal Typos of Intercontinental Ballistic Theody far thc most numerous of Sovietestimated toircular error probable (CEP) atof ^is disagreement about itsut which-

ever view is correct, the missile is still suitable only for attacking soft targets,esting began on two new versions of theoth apparently developed to help penetrate antiballistic missileTesting on one version ceased in0 and thehas almost certainly been terminated. The other version, now called the Modas ihree re-entry vehicles (RVs) which are not independently targctable. There is disagreement about the yield of this weapon asut again it is clearly suitable only for attacking soft



targets. Testing of theontinues, and deployment is likely to begin later this year.

xists in four variants: Modhich carriesounds; Modhose RV weighs aboutModhich has been tested bothepressed(DICBM) andractional orbit bombardmentand ModhichVs.

is general agreement that theas developed tobetter accuracyarger payload than the olderor use against hardthe US MinutemanModarhead estimated toield

I appears reasonably well adapted for this purpose.however. Hie Soviets began to test thehich, withpayload, is estimated toield ofP

Thectually reached operational status before thestimatea" operationally deployed

re Mod 2s. But theas never actually demonstrated enough range to reach any Minuteman complex. We believe that its demonstrated range could be increased sufficiently to cover all of them by using up more of the available propellant, removing telemetryetc. It remains curious, however, that the Modlone among the ICBMs except theas never been tested to what we would presume to be its intended operational range.

J. The accuracy of theust be deduced^*

tainetT] In thc Intelligence Community, opinions as to the CEP of thendnder flight test conditions rangeowmighm; all are agreed that under operational conditions the CEP would be degrated somewhat. The significance of these differences is considerable, but the Soviets would in any event have to deploy several times the present number ofod Is and Mod 2s, with their present capabilities, beforeorce that woulderious threat to the Minuteman forcehole.1

* Set par* Rlu flit 13 Jinunnnli'icfinii vlcwimilor

Intuition ol thr atffitrt vlin .itTlrucy iiul

K. Asheodl would not have sufficient accuracy in eitherBM or FOBS mode to attack hard targets effectively; its apparent function is to attack soft strategic targets, negating ordetection by the US Ballistic Missile Early Warning System. (New US warning systems give promise of reducing or eliminating thisheppears to have limited capabilityOBS. It may be deployed in very small numbers; futureif any, will probably also be limited.

L. The Soviets have also developed theodhich carries three RVs. [_

"jFor several years, there has been controversy within the Intelligence Community about whether the three RVs could be targeted independently and there is still some disagreement on this point. Some agencies believe that thes and will remain are-entry vehicle (MRV) for use against soft targets; others believe that theould have represented either an MRVultiple-independcntly targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) with limitedflexibility but that the development program has been terminated; still others think it was intended toIRV and also believe that thc development program has beenhere is alsoabout thc probability that theas been deployed, but all agree that if now deployed, it is as an MRV and in small numbers.


M. The broader reasons for lhc USSR's energetic buildup of its forces for intercontinental attack are neither complex nor obscure. In thehe Soviet leaders, politically and ideologically hostile to the US. and thinking and behaving as rulersreat power,lhat in this particular respect their military forces wereinferior to those of their most dangerous rival, thc US.they set themselves lo rectify theachieveelation of rough parity. Parity in this sense cannot be objectively measured; it istate of mind. The evidence availablc, including Soviet statements at the SAL lalks. indicates that the Soviet leaders think that they have now generally achieved this position.




N. Many aspects of (he present force structure are also susceptible to simple and probably correct explanation. The Sovietsarge number of ICBMs in order tothen toof US ICBMs. and also to increase the probability that many would survive an initial US attack. They built missile-launching submarines which are' highly survivable when deployed, and theyanned bomber force as yet another option. The intercontinen(alforce is obviously capable of being used in war, but there is no reason to believe that the Soviet leaders intend deliberately to make nuclear war. The force is an attribute of power, an instrument topolicy,eterrent to the US.

O. Decisions about military policy and programs are probably centered on two keymilitary and military-industrial autliorities who formulate pew programs, and thc lop political leaders. The latter have'the final say. but ihey must operateontext of other forces and take them into account. Decision-making appears tu involve clusters of advisory and executive bodies which are likely, at times, to be in competition with one another. Bureaucratic pressures, conflicts, and constraints may be heavy on occasion. We think it(hat observed Soviet programs are the productarefully thought out strategic plan or rationale which is undeviatinglyIt is probably fair to say tha( the Soviet system givesweight to military claims and interests, and that it. is characterized by an inertia which favors large established bureaucratic interests in general and lends to work against sharp changes in direction.

P. Looking to the future, we have little basis in evidence forthe content of specific decisions on strategic policy or onweapon programs. Soviet strategic policy will of course beby the specific provisions of thc SAL agreements, and by the manner in which these agreements alter or appear to alter the strategic, political, and economic conditions and opportunities confronting the USSR. Decisions about future forces will also be influenced by Soviet perceptions of the US stra(egic threat, and by what weapons they are able to develop and the feasibility of procuring and deploying them.


Q. It seems clear that thc Soviet leaders intend to maintainnimum such forces as will continue to giveense of equal security with the US. The general attitudes and policies of the USSR



being what they are. it might seem obvious to infer that tliey will strive to exceed that minimum and to achieve marked superiority over the US in strategic weaponry. We do noi doubt that they would like to attainosition, but thc question is whether they considereasible objective, particularly in thc light of the arms limitation agreements. They might think it feasible totrategic posture that, while falling short of marked superiority, makes clear that tlie Soviets have advantages over the US in certain specific areas. Whether or not such advantages are significant militarily, they would help to dramatize the strategic power of the Soviet Union.

It. But even if the Soviet intention is to go no further than nvainte-nance of "equalheir arms programs are bound to beand demanding. This is in part because Soviet leaders must have an'eye not only to what forces the US has at present, but also to what it can have, or may have! in future years even within the framework of arms control agreements. In this respect, they are likely to beoverestimate rather than underestimate the US threat.thc weapons competition nowadays isechnological race; the USSR is impelled to press forward its research and development) lesl it be left behind. Soviet weapon programs also tend toomentum of their own; the immense apparatus ofinstallations, personnel, vested interests, and so on, tends to proceed in its endeavors unless checked by some decisive political authority.

S. In some respects, these tendencies will be reinforced now that the SAL agreements have been concluded. For military and political reasons, the Soviet leaders will wish at least to keep pace with the US. Also the leadershipersonal and political stake in insuring that thc USSR suffers no real or apparent erosion of its relative position. It will want totrong bargaining position for tho follow-on negotiations, and to develop new options in lhe event that future lalks break down.

T. On the other hand, there are constraints upon Soviet armsbeyond those imposed by the terms of the SAL agreements. The most obvious is economic: resources are not unbounded; thc civilian economy demands its share; one weapon competes with another for allocations; and intercontinental attack forces compete with strategic


defense and general purpose forces. Thc various bureaucracies with interests in one or another area compete partly with rational argument and partly in sheer political infighting. Soviet leaders must also consider how far they may wish to press their own programs lest they provoke countervailing programs in the US. And they must assess not only the present and future US threat, but also that from China, and elsewhere U. In the context of arms control, other pressures for moderation will be at work. The SAL agreements have been hailed in the USSRuccessful manifestation of the current Soviet policy of detente; consequently there will be incentives to avoid actions which, though not actually violating the agreements, might jeopardize them. Many of the top political leaders, and most notably Brezhnev, have identified themselves personally with thc accords, and would have much to lose politically if they came unstuck. Similarly, various groups in the USSR nowtake in the agreements,onsequenceong and difficult process of negotiation which undoubtedlyelicate balancing of individual interests. Any step which mighthreat to thc agreements would probably disturb this balance.

V. While the foregoing considerations probably govern the nature of Soviet decisions as to future weapon programs, ihey provide us with little or no basis on which to estimate what these programs will be and. in particular, their featuies in detail. We have never had solid evidence on these matters, and there is no reason to expect that we shall have such evidence in the future. Moreover, as the pastears have shown, technological advance can produce vigorous action and reaction between military programs of the USSR and lhe US.

W. Yet the possibilities are not unlimited, certainly in the next five years or so. For one thing, intercontinental weapon systems are of such complexity that their development, testing, and deploymentong time. We can therefore estimate with much confidence that the kinds of weapon systems deployed by thc Soviets during the next two years or so will be those already in operation or in the late stages of development. Even in thc period from Iwo to five years from now the force will be composed largely of existing kinds of delivery vehicles, but it could change substantially by the end of the period of this Estimate.


X.esult of the SAL accords, the main questions about the future of Soviet forces for intercontinental attack center more than ever on the pace and scope of technological change. Also as aof the accords, and of the opportunities and risks they present, future strategic programming decisions will probably be even more directly influenced than in the past by the Soviet leaderships sense of stability or change in its strategic relationship with the US. To be sure, as China moves closer toredible nuclear force, the need to counter Chinese capabilities will also affect Soviet plans. For many years to come, however, Soviet planning of strategic offensiveis likely to be concerned primarily with the US arsenal, in terms both of the strategic threat it poses and the diplomatic and political leverage it affords.

Y. .The next-few years should see significant qualitativein Soviet forces for intercontinental attack, as the USSR pushes ahead withnd exercises options open to it under the SAL accords. The most important of these improvements are likely to be in accuracy of missiles, in MIRVs for them, and in survivability.

e have for some time thought that the Soviets would incorporate greater accuracy in fallow-on missile systems, and wc now have some positive indications of this intent. The Soviets appear to be moving toward less blunt RVs for their missiles. Such RVs pass through the atmosphere more quickly, and are thus less subject to deflection white in the atmosphere. Improvements in the components of present Soviet guidance systemsontinuation of the recent trend to less blunt RVs could result in CEPs as low as5 nm for ICBMs. The Soviets could achieve significantly smaller CEPs but this would require, in addition, wholly newof guidance. It is too early to tell whit methods of guidance arc being employed in thc new ICBMs described

_ 3

C^lte J.on.heChief 0| Slttt. Intelligence USAF heiievca thbt

roe srxnrr

MIRVs. Wc continue to believe that the Soviets will develop MI RVs, including some with the yields and accuracies necessary to attack hard targets. Wc estimate that it would take at least two years of flight testing toIRV system, and at least an additional year if wholly new techniques of guidance, designed to achieve very high accuracies, were also involved.

Survivability. The USSR's concern about the survivability of its forces will surely continue strong as the US deploys increasingly large numbers of independently targetable RVs. In addition to theof active defenses, survivability can be achieved throughand mobility. The new silos under construction promise to be considerably harder than present types, and so do reconstructedndilos. The Soviets could also deploy mobile ICBMs, an option not actually baned by the SAL accords; wc continue to think thisthe more* so because of the unilateral US statement, opposing thisc do expect the Soviets to replace their older ICBMs with SLBMs as permitted by thc agreements, in part to achieve greater survivability.

e have little evidence concerning the qualitativeto be incorporated in thc three new ICBMs. We are fairly confident that the new large missile willeavier payload than thcnd thc new small liquid-propellanteavier pay-load than thelthough there is as yet no evidence on thc point, we believe that one or more of these missiles will carry MIRVs, in due course If not at first, and that all will incorporate at least some improvements in accuracy. More definitive judgments on these missiles cannot be made until more data become available.

AA. As to ballistic missile submarines, in two years or so the Soviets will have as many launchers on their Y-lass submarines as the US has in the Polaris force, and these launchers willub-stantiol portion of Soviet forces for intercontinental attack. Wc expect the current SSBN production program to continue for some time, with most if not all future units consisting oflass carrying thehere is no direct evidence of another new class of ballistic missile submarines, but we believe that one will appear in the next five

he Asstatnix ChiefStaff.SAF,''bh judxmcnt. Foi his -Wwi, (ec hit loomote to paragraphIn Seellen I.

years orew construction hall is being built at the Severodvinsk shipyard, which may beewew submarine with more launch tubes thanlass would permit the Soviets to come closer to the combination ofodern ballistic missile submarinesaunchers allowed by the SAL agreements.

BB. We have judged for the past several years that as their ICBM and SLBM forces grew, the Soviets would come to rely less and less on their_ intercontinental bombers. Those missile forces have now reached significant proportions, but there has been no phase-out or appreciable attrition of the heavy bombers and tankers in Long Range Aviation for several years, or any significant reduction in their training activity. Thus, it appears that current Soviet leaders believe that the advantages afforded by an intercontinental bomber force, for the present at least, are worth the cost of retaining one. If they persist in this view, they must decide whether to put their rapidly aging aircraft through more difficult and costly rehabilitation programs than in the past, or, alternatively, to goew heavy bomber which would give them greater capabilities for intercontinental attack than their present force does.

CC. It is evident that there arc many uncertainties regarding the future makeup of Soviet forces for intercontinental attack. In order toange of possible developments, we present inf this Estimate five illustrative forces representing different levels of effort by the Soviets and different degrees or rates of technological advance within the constraints of the interim agreement on strategic offensivehree of them postulate that the Soviets do not introduce new and highly accurate guidance systems for thefr missiles within the period of this Estimate.epresents about the most the Soviets could achieve under this postulate; it assumes that newsystems reach initial operational capability in thc minimum possible time.llustrates what could happen if some difficulties andwere encountered during development.ostulates, inless ambitious technological goals than those ofndwo other forces postulate that the Soviets do introduce new and highly

"Vice Adm. Vincent P. "I* foil, the Director. Delenre Intelligence Agcnty, andCen. WilliamPcTO, tlie Assistant Chief of Staff lor Intelligence, Department of the Amty. aie in fundamental disagreement with several aspecu ol Section V. For their views im Iheir footnotes throughout that Section.



accurate guidance system* for their missiles, providing accuracies of tlie order5 run CEP.ostulates thc introduction of such accuracies and other improvements later in the decade. Forceimiting case, and.ense, an artificial one, illustrating what tlie Soviets could theoretically achieve under the interimif they have highly ambitious programs already well under way and encounter no significant setbacks or delays.*

DD. On the whole, we think the Soviets will probably head into the next round of SAL talks with something like the goals of Forcehey probably will be forced to settle for some slippages and delays of the sort illustrated on an across-the-board basis in Forcehe outcome would then be something betweennd Forcee wish to emphasize, however, that these and the other models are strictlyand not to be regarded as confident estimates. As one moves beyond the next two years or so. all projections become increasingly uncertain; beyond five years they are highly speculative.

"Mu On. Gcorf J- Kccpa. Jr, th* AssfcUttl Chief ef Stiff. loWDigroCT. USAF. behem lhatverstate the missile accursctn the SovieU couldin the time period) reflected In those models. For his reaioiw. see his footnote toph S* In Section I.


ron sccncT

With tho signing of thc strategic arms limitation (SAL) agreements in Moscow onhe Soviets achieved one ol the main objectives of their postwar foreign policy: world-wide recognitionosition of strategic parity with Ihe US. This goal was reached largely as the result of the massive buildup of intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missile forces which begann tbe wake of the Cuban missile crisis.

The interim offensive agreement is not comprehensive, and II leaves various options open to both sides. Tho way in which the signatories will apply it Ls not known. Thus, the effect it will have on specific Sovietor on the size and shape of Soviet forces for intercontinental attack is far from clear. The major effect of the agreement is to place limits on the aggregate total of Soviet strategic offensive mUsilcs. New construction of ICDM launchers is prohibited, and new construction oJ SI.MM launchersaunchers, and upotal) is

allowed only on the basis of one-for-ooeof older ICBM or SLBM launchers. The agreement leaves considerable latitude, however, for changing the existing mt* of weapons, especially on the Soviet side where lhe terms create an incentiveartial shift from land-based to sca-baied missiles. Qualitative improvements in mlultos arebut silo enlargement in excess ofercent ishe agreement does not cover mobile ICBMs. but the Soviets have been informednilateral statement that thc US would regard the deployment of land-mobile ICBMs as inconsistent with tbe objectives ol that agreement Moreover, the agreement places noorbombers, the third majorof forces for intercontinental attack.

ince the publication of NIEhree new Soviet ICBM test programs have been identified. Also now identified are the missiles intended for initial deployment in thc new small silos and the platform forof theaval missile. Many


which woe outstanding remainhowever. We still do not know the characteristics of thc new ICBMs. or whether the Soviets plan to develop another class of ballistic missileewbomber.obile ICBM. And all but the Air Force remain uncertain about tbe role of the hew Backfire strategic bomber.

neat three sections reviewrelated questions and provide whatto be the most likely answers.section discusses Sovietthe militaryinal lectionfactors which might influence theof Soviet forces forand sets forth several differentwhich these forces might develop overseveral years.


Status of Operational Systems

Ashe SovietsCBM launchers in service nt theirmissile complexes. {Seeheseaunchers at the Dcrazhnya and Pervomaysk complexes which, although possibly intended for use against European targets, are nevertheless capable of reaching thc US. There is stillwithin the Intelligence Community as to which of these two missions is the primary one.

In addition to their operational launchers at deployed complexes, the SovieU have aboutaunchers which are used for research and development) firings or for troop-training firings. Anotherr so launchers are used for training at operational complexes. At any given time, something over half of these launchers would be available for use

against the US. but wc do not believe that they are on constant alert and wc do not know how long il would take to prepare them for operational use.

The total number of ICBMs which could be targeted against the US Is summarized in Table I. It should be noted that these totals represent gross capabilities rather than an estimate of thc numbers which are in fact likely to be targeted against the US at any given lime. As indicated above, thereifference of opinion about the primaryof the SS-lls deployed at Derazhnya and Pervomaysk. In any case, all of the missiles nominally available almost certainly would not be used in an initial salvo against the US.

No additional launchers of thc types now in service are under construction, and no additional deployment of these types isA total ofaunchers of two new types Is under construction;re at five of theomplexes andre at Derazhnya and Pervomaysk. Allf these launchers may be completed under thc terms of the interim agreement. There Is no evidence ofof these or other types of launchers elsewhere. There is evidence, however, lhal tho Soviets plan to convert existingndilos into launchers of the new type. There is also some evidence that the Soviets may be deactivatingdeployed at soft sites.

Characteristics and Capabilities of tho Inlercontinental Ballistic Missile Force*

has been little evidence orover Ihe past year which would lead usour basic judgments aboutnd thelthough wesome of our judgments. Recent evi-

*ompanion of Bovid ICBM*.



Figure 1

Soviet Operational ICBM Launchers

etUence that Oeectlration al someofiitft htt begun See piregtepr, JJ.

ThH chart reflects estimate* of operational ICBM launchers as2 Atsuming that allndaunchers in still In ihe active force and in' eludingaunchers at Peivomaysk and Derathnya. the Sovietsperational ICBM launchers deployed in ihe field. Tne chart does notod 3's which may be operationally deployed ai ihe Tyuratam Missile Test Center.

has not helped much to resolveuncertainties about the characteristics and performance of these systems, and the payload weight and yield of theave become matters of disagreement. Thewhich follows is limited to thc high poinii of past material on thendnd to new evidence or analysis.

hehr SS-tf has been discussed extensively in the Estimates in this series for the past three yean. It is the only ICDM now in the Soviet inventory which could have thc necessary combination of yield ami accuracy Iu threaten US land-based ICDMs and other critical hard targets. Consequently, estimates of ils characteristic* and capabilities have as-





ICBM Soft SS-7"

ss-a* ..

SS-ll .


ICBM Hard..S-13 .


New Large New Small SS-lli el DeiMhnye aod Petvornaytk

Pnojrcrm Otdu- total when all




Training Launcher* ot Completes


Tesl Range sot) Training Launchers



a unique importance In our overall assessment of (lie Soviel ICBM force.of theeasedowever,evel well below lhal required to threaten thc survival of thc Minuteman force.

ithound re-entry vehicle (RV) of Ihcariant, theas been flownon-rotating earthangeautical milesnough to reach targets anywhere in thc US from any of theith0 pound pay-load of the more widely deployed Modowever, theas never been flown morem NRE. This is only enough to reach the extreme northwestern part of the US from thc closestomplex. We have, therefore, searched for ways to explain thislimitation in the capability of thc Modonsiderable analysis has been done with thc result that, by making certain logicaland extrapolating from theevidence, we have concluded that theodinimumaximum operational rangem. This would permit coverage of nil six Minuteman complexes, one Titan complex, and NORAD and Strategic Air Command (SAC) Headquarters from at least oneomplex. DIA believes, further, that aoperational rangem, providing full coverage of Minuteman fields from mostomplexes, should not be ruled oul.

"The actual rant* oi these firingsun, but Uiii figure included effects of the earth1!which in Ihii cue addedm. Missile ranges quoted in thb Estimate are expressed in terms of NflEanges achievable In operational firings northward to thc US from the USSH ore less affected by the earth's rotation than are Soviet test firings to Kamchatka or In the Pacific.esult of the earths rotation, Ihc ranges hi tome operational firings would be increated. and in some decreased, deiwndini! on launch point and target direction.

stimates of thc yield of tlie variousarheads aie

Thc most important clement in deter-mining the capabilityissile syslem against hard targets is the accuracy, orerror probablef the system. System CEP has been calculated byor estimating various factors that reduce accuracy, and subsequently combining these error contributions statistically. The primary factors involved arc inaccuracies in missile guidance and control, deflections of the RV due to atmospheric conditions, and geodetic and gravimetric (CfirC) errors. Taking into consideration these and other factors. CIA, NSA, State, and Air Force believe that the CEP of theangem and under flight test conditionsm; DIA, Army, and Navy believe that the CEP of ihese two variantsm but they favor the lower value. All the Agencies believe that handling and maintenance of deployed missiles bypersonnel would degrade accuracy somewhat.

The significance of these differences can be seen from the fact that,minglewould have[_ ^chance of disabling

a tingle Minuteman silo.EPm. thc same weapon would havef

" Seeor definition.



ofinuteman(or an esti-

mated force reliability factor olercent (that portion of the force which is expected to reach thc target area andt could bo expected that lomeercent o( tlicodhat the Soviets were able to target against Minuteman silos wouldtheir targets In the first case, and that less thanercent would do so in the second ease- For Minuteman launch control centers (LCCs) twoissiles would be required to achieve similar probabilities, and the probabilities fall off more sharply asaccuracy declines."

urning to the Modhis variant of tlieas been flight tested in two

'J'- 'he Assistant Chief of Stiff, Intelligence, USAF, believes thiscould be miite.dmg. With respect to lheof disabling Mlmiteman, he would note that the calculations do not represent the disablementof the enUreorce against the entire Minuteman force. By


eSwH 1st ions would (how that the probability of mi-abluig sB MutoleiiuD ilka would bear-cent avert ifodere targeted against them. He would further note that these probabilities have no bearing on Minuteman in Utiles alieady Ij'i itched.

Ai to the rrobabllliiet of disabling LCCs, he would nota lhat aoeiaing lhe imparl of disablingore com pi iin ted Ihan aliening that of launch silos because <il the ledundancy among the five (CCs within each Ml-uirsus nusdron and became of lhe eakltnee of the airborne launchit emny one of the LCCsquadron can bunch any onn of theinuteman missiles In thehich ii ceastinuoosly airborne, can launch any ol the Minuteman missiles Thru, lo pie-vent the launching of Minuteman by attacking the MlnutenUB command and control syslem. the LCCs aodS would al have to be twvtrafctrrdHe Irlirvci the prolnbilily of thil occur-rlriii ii essentially icrn.

ractional orbit bombardmentandepressed bajeetoryA large amount of data ison this system from the firingswe esU-

mate that thcarheadield "jWe abo estimate that the systemEPofm when firedICBMortherlyto the US; when launchedoutherly direction in ihe FOBS mode, the CEP would increase to ISm. These levels of accuracy make thencapable ofhard targets with any reasonable probability of success. The shape ofesire to deliver an attack with less time for the enemy to react. These factors suggest that tbeu designed to attack strategic time-urgent soft targets, such as SAC bomber bases and soft command and control facilities.

heu been flownangem in the DICBM mode, and can unquestionably provide full coverage of the US on northerly trajectories from anyite- The vehicle as tested In the FOBS mode is noi capable of inserting thc payload into an orbit that would permit an attack against any target in the US on the initial orbit, on either northerly or southerly

would provide coverage of thc eastern one-third of the US If thes fired south from the most favorably located complext appears questionable, however, thai the Soviets would havea FOBS system withimited capability Considerable attention has been devoted to insuring that our assessment of Ihe ModapabilitiesOBS Is not caused by incorrectly interpreted data or faulty methodology. Consequently, we are left with the following possible explanations ol why

the SovieU have iciled thcn the FOBS mode:

Theay he intended only (or useICBM and might have been tested in the FOBS mode merelyit wu desirable to test fully the capability of the launch vehicle while at the same time monitoring the re-entry phase at fully-Instrumented land impact areas In the USSR.

Alternatively, the Soviets may have taken advantage of the limited FOBS capability of thcnd deployed It asICBMOBS.

ast year wchirdlhat theight eventually be modified to provide the additional range required to attack targets throughout the US in the FOBS mode

"^virtuallythis possibility

IS. Theas three estimated toarheadas been

flight testedangem, but it is believed toaximum operational rangeflcient to cover most of the likely targets In thc US. The single shot kill probability agufmt hardened targets would be much leu than that of thcrecause the individual warheadsuch lower yield and thei lessthan either thcr the Mod 1.

here has been ootuideiable controversy within the Intelligence Community about whether thei or was intended toultipleargetable re-entry vehiclefter analyzing theCIA and State conclude that theultiple re-entry vehicle (MItV) for use against soft targets and fIml it piobably will

not be developedIHV capable of attacking hard targeti. DIA and the Air Force conclude that thoouldRVIRV system with limited largeting flexibility and that theprogram hasmulated. NSA. Army, and Navy believe that theof the system axe more applicable to the intended developmentIRV with limited targeting flexibility thanRV. but lhatQ

c Mod 4program has been terminated.

here is some uncertainty about bow many of the various Mods of there operationally deployed. Theorce is made up ofroups.^

Filings of theractional orbit or d? pressed trajectory version of thcndicate that this variant is operationally deployed at ^one group of sis: silos at Tyuratam. This group

ay not be ready for operational use at all timcs.f^


it re-;roups Mod

rather than with ther Mod 2.

here are also questions about how thc Soviets intend to target their force of SS-9s. Although Ihc high yield and telatlvcly high

top axfta-

thes suitable only for attacking soft targets. Toard target capability at intercontinental ranges, its accuracy^

would nave

lo be improved considerably.

n the summerhe Soviets began testing Iwo new versions of theoth of which were apparently intended to enhance the capability of thcoantiballistic missile (ABM) defenses. One version,

^called rhe Modarries whatare exoatmospheric penetration aids alongew BV. The other versIonF


Modarries three BVs which are separated in flight so that they will land either in sequence on or near tho same target oriles apart laterally. Thc three

jare not independently target-able. If sufficiently hardened, however, these RVs would present three separate aiming pointsefending ABM system. Testing of theeased In_

accuracyhaake them thc most effective mimics in the Soviet inventory for attacking hard targets, thc ox-tent to which theorce is, in fact,for use against such targets remains unclear, for thc available evidence is scanty and inconclusive.

uch evidence as we do have suggests that, at least initially, moitad US ICBM complexes as their primary targets There is some evidencehift inconcept may have taken placen balance, we believe lhat at least some, and perhaps the bulk, of thorc aimed at US ICBM installations, even though the Soviets have not deployedn sufficient numbers to provideof putting moremall portion of US launch facilities out of action

TTesting of thes con-llnuing. development of this system probably is nesting completion and deployment Is likely lo begin later this year, or early next, al the new silos at thc Dcrazhnya andcomplexes. Additional deployment of thes possible In standardilos.

he range of thosike the Modt has also been firededuced range ofm. possibly lo test Its capability lo perform in

heheurrently makes up someercent of the ICBM force. Alls currently deployed are believed loof thc initial version, tho Modhile the maximum demonstrated range of thesm. all Agencies agree that ft can be flown atm,to reach targets io almost all the US fromomplexes.

etermining tho size and payloadof theas always beenthan for any other Sovietrecently, all Agencies agreed lhat1 payload weight was

and that ilarhead

ll nxcept CIAthat this Estimate Is still valid. CIA

now believes that thes bigger

than previously estimated and that ils payload

isWhile the increase in

weight over previous estimates is significant

in absolute termsQ


is not sufficient to change the judgment that ]

a peripheral attack rolc^


This improvement in accuracy as compa with thes due to the higher ballistic coefficient (beta) of the three RVs. which reduces their susceptibility to atmospheric effects, lea, wind and density. Like the Modheould be effective only against soft targets.

here Is disagreement about tho weight of rhe three RVs for the ModIA. using tbe same type of analysis as it applied to tbe Mod I. believes that each RV weighsounds DIA. Army. Navy. Air Force, and NSA believe that each RV weighs about GOO pounds.


hesIRV as tested to dato and apparently is not intended to be one. |

The payload oi theas evidently^ designed to facilitate the penetration of ABM defenses by multiplying the number ofto be dealt withefender. Under certain circumstances thelsoreater capability to destroy targets lhan the single warhead variants of then thc case of area target* Such as cities or Industry, spacing between the RVs on the orderm or more provides up0 percent increase in the size of the area destroyed Impact patterns of this kind have been tested on several occasions, including one to lhc Pacific.

hao date, the Soviets have deployed only one solid-prupellanl ICBM. the three-stagel is found alingle com pica,otal ofilos. One version of the system, the Mod I, is deployedecond version, thc Modas been tested and may also be deployed. Less is known aboul thehan aboul any other operational Soviet ICBM. Detailed analysis of performance data now indicates that lhe RVs used on both versions weighounds,ounds more thanestimated.1'

he SS-13

is suitable for use only againit soft targets.

as been tested0 tun, sufficient to reach only thenortheastern portion of Ihe USone complex where the systemas flown tonm Pacific impact area. It appear*test demonstrated the maximumof the

[wouldaximum range ofm. This is sufficient to cover ihe northern half of the US from thewhere thes deployed

testing of thend development may haveInn time forin

"The IWs aie not identical, however. The one fur theifferent shape than the one for the

3 The2

change Ii) lhe shape of the RV gives tho slightly batter accuracy tlian thc Modut (he improvement is not significant In terms of the overall capability of the system.

heir is uncertainty aboul lhe rruni-mum range of the Modhich, tike theeen flownange ofm

"Two"'dheaximum range ofm. If, hnwever.f^

^ Ihe range would remainm, the same as for lhe Mod 1.

Possible Deactivation ofoft Sites

here is evidence which suggests thai some of iheoft sites arc at leasteduced state of readiness and are possibly being deactivated. All Agencies but the Air Force believe that the starl of deactivation is thc most likely explanation, but they cannot rule out Iwo olher possibilities; modernization or overhaul of tho ground suppoit system or changes in missile handling procedures. The Air Force acknowledges thai someoft sites arelato of reduced readiness but believes that the evidence is Insufficient at this time to Indicate that deactivation has begun.

The New Deployment Programs

asl year we fudged that construction of two, possibly three new types of silos was underway at thc test center at Tyuratam and at some complexes In the field. We said that

the purpose of these new silos was not clear and lhat ihey might be intended to house wholly new missiles, variants of presentor existing typesrogram aimed ai increased survivability. We said that some might not be intended for missiles at all.

We now believe lhat only two types of silos are involved, oneystem in thelass and onemall ICBM in thelass. Most of tho large silos are atomplexes whllo Iho small ones are at flip Dcrazhnya and Pervomaysk complexes. We arr confident that thc new silos will be harder to destroy than earlier types of Soviet silos, but we do not know what degree of hardness will be achieved.

In (he recently LuncUided lalks on the limitation of strategic arms, one of the main Soviet concerns wasaintain the right to "modernIre and replace' existing ICBM launchers. This concern, along withof bothndaunchers at Tyuratam to the new silo consign ml ions,tlmi the Soviets plan to modernize existingndaunchers in the field. We do not know how extensive lhe conversion program wil) be, or how rapidly it will he-accomplishrd

We believe thai llws to be deployed in thcow small silos now under construction at Dernzhnya andat least initially. If so, then the first of these silos probably will be operational late this year or early next If theew large silos presently under construction at theomplexes must await completion ofon the new Urge missiles, as also seems likely, then tbey will not be4 at the earliest, even though Ibe silos themselves may be completed well before that.

Intercontinantal Ballistic Missile Research and Development

he number of BAD flight tests of ICBMs declined sharply1 and so far this year as comparedhisIn the pace of testing reflects the completion, or near completion, of the major ICBM development programs for theodhcndnd (hehich have been under way In the USSR for the past threealf yean. But the SovieU are already embarked on other developmenla large missile for the new large silos; onemaller missile for tbc new small silos; and oneew solid-propellant ICBM.ighly modified

ew Missile for the Large Silos. There is evidence (hat the SovieU area new targe ICBM in tholass which can be deployed in the new large silos. ^


ased on what little data are available, we believe that the new large missile is about tho size of ther somewhat larger, f

judgeew launch technique is involved.op-up technique wherein the missile is ejected from the silo prior to ignition of the first stage.


eu> Missile for tht Small Silos. It was noted in the previous section that thcould probably be deployed in the new small silos at Deraxhnya and Per-vomaysk at least initially. There is alsohowever, that the Soviets areyet another new small ICBM which can be deployed in modifiedilos

uring the recently concluded SALin Helsinki, one of the Soviet officials asserted that thc USSR had one, perhaps two. missiles of different dimensions underas replacements for thee intimated that at least one of these missiles is somewhat larger than theiswere made in the context of ain which he expressed concern about US proposals to limit increases In missile and silo size. The SovieU subsequently agreed to limit increases in silo launcher dimensions tooercent, but beyond thc generalin Article II of the Interimwhich prohibiU the substitution of "heavy" missiles lor 'light"SovieU have nude no cumin it merit to limit the site of thr missllc* themselves.

here has recently been one full scslr lestew ICBM. Preliminary analysblhat it is in thelass, that it uses liquid

pa/load involved isingle RV. Detailed analysis ol thcand capabilities of the new missile

can noi be made until more data become


ew Solid-Propcllani ICBM? Thus fax. thc Soviets have developed only two solid-propellantCBM and theedium-range ballistic missile, which is made up uf the upper two stages of



he USSRarge and varied solid-propellant production capability,toew generation of solid-propellant ballisticheof itsacilities, moreover, suggests that it is pursuing an active development program.

There were firingsissile this year at Plesetsk which could have beenew missile orighly rnodificdhere were some similarities between it and thoncluding the use of solidut there were*differences as well; the mlisilo flewigher apogee than thend its RV apparentlyonsiderably higher ballistic coefficient.

A Mobile ICBM? For someho Soviets have boastedobile ICBMbut the now abandoned5 was the only mobile missile system wc detected which appeared tootential ICBM application. The Soviet refusal to ban mobile ICBM launchers in the interim agreement with the US limiting strategic offensive weapons indicates that the USSR remains interested in lhat mode of deployment, tn which it may fed it ba* an edge on tbe US.

All in all. ultimate Soviet intentions with tespect to both solid-propellant ICBMs and the mobile mode ol deployment are unclear. Thc sum of the evidence suggest* thai Ihe Soviets are committed to continue BAD on largerd-propellant motors, and wcthat they will gradually bring new models to thc flight test stage. Hie Soviets could have the solid-propellant missile now being tested ready for deployment by4ut they already have follow-on liquid-propellant programs for their twosilo baied ICBM systems. Although wc believe that the Soviets will deploy additional solid-propellant missiles, we doubt lhat they

will be quick to abandon someears of proven liquid-propellant technology in favor of solid-propellant system*.

respect to mobile ICBMs,may see both military andin developing one- But theytoo far in this direction unlesswilling to risk some sort ofthe US. which has asserted thatof land-mobile ICBMs would bewith the objectives of the interimIn addition, there are practicalin deploying and maintaining thecomplicated pieces of equipmentbe required, and increasedwhich mobile systems could provide,being provided by thc siloand the growth of the SLBM force."

Goals of New Missile Programs

We will notlear-cut picture of what the Soviets are trying to accomplish with Ihetr new ICBM systems until further data are available- Nevertheless, we do have some indications of their probable goals.

Survivability. The survivability of their ICBM forceirst strike orattack ha*ajor concern of Ihe Soviets and will unquestionably continue lo be. The new silos are beiog constructed so as to make ihem considerably harder than previous Soviet types. Conversion of existingndilos to the new configuration, which lhe Soviet* apparently contemplate, willonsiderable financial Invest-

"MaJ. Cen. CeonW J. Keegan,se Ai.litani Chlel ol Sutll. IntelUgence. USAF. beHevei that the SovieU would deploy nvAtle ICBMs if Iheytoadvantage.the Soviet'.to meloJ.ICBMs In the SAL Atyoe-taatSt, he believes It that Ihe unilateral USnut-le ICBMi will deter ihe Sovfcti Iiomitem.



in increased survivability as well at in improved missiles

oviet concern for survivability is also reflected in the provision of the interim agreement on strategic offensive weapons which permits the USSH to oonstructLBM launchers if equal numbers of older ICBMs or SLBMs are retired.of the vulnerability ofndhich are deployed on soft pads or insilos almost certainly contributed to Soviet interest in this provision.

ccuracy. Wc have long believed that the Soviets would incorporate greater accuracy in follow-on missile systems, if only through normal improvements In existing types of guidance components. We now liaveol an interest in improved accuracy in connection with two of the new missileunder development. The use of RVs with higher betas, as in some of the more recent ICBM modification programs, could also facilitate development of higherAs noted in past Estimates, Soviet BVs have normally had considerably lower betas than US RVs, thus making them slower-moving once they reach the atmosphere nnd more subject to atmospheric disturbances.

ow much improvement will actually be achieved in the new missile programs is hard to predict. Even detailed future analysis is noi expected toonfidentThe improvement might be onlyImprovements in ihe components of present Soviet guidance systems and thc use 'of higher betasSF) could, howevur, result in CEPs as low as5 nm. This would require at leasl Iwo years nf lesting. If the Soviets were willing to accept the necessary risks and etsnunltmeiits. they should be able lo achieve CEPs ap-

5 nm.Q

In addition, they would have to accept the necessity for at least three years ofif thedevelopedthecould be confidently deployed."


Dr. Bay S. dine, the Director. Bureau of Intetll-- nment of State; Lt. Cen.

would bt.*

required by thechieve verytheir new mlnOes. If UM SovieU hive decidedstnv* for such accuiaeiei hi (heir new ICBMi and uie only now Iwginrung Initial teiling of guidince syilemi capable of providing, such accuracy, they fare many problem! and like lhe US willabtiamial oumbti of flight tears and aalearning period lo solve those problemi

Dr. dine and Cen. Phillips believelightgiam of atears would be required toKP sJgrofiearitJy betterut. that jjor.gci period of (light testing wouW be neeessary.r_

S experience Cen. Keegan bcBeve*e Soviets would probably require five to seven yean i'l Hi*ht testing and analyiti lo understand, quantify, and translate these problems and their theoietieal toluiions Into an operational systemI' I'S nm. Since the SovieU may now be rntoin*it.ll flight Hit phaseew -feneration ofand technique) liVe those the US has been reluiiitg in flight leitlng for someearsll Inertial| computer and Inertialn additional learning period would be riprcied. Than, he believes that undercunt-iianeesKi wouldotal of sevenf llicht leitmg and concurrent analyslit Wile,5 nm.





ultiple Independently Torgetahie Be-entry Vehicles. Wc coniinue to believe, is wc have for some years, that the Soviets will develop MIRVs for their ICBMs. including some with accuraciesapability to attack hard targets. Increasing theof available RVs by means of MIRVs would also be useful for enhancing thecapabilities of ICBMs surviving aattack and for penetrating ABMThere have been various indications, some quite explicit, that the Soviets regard this as an important area of strategicIn which they have need, for political as well as military reasons, to catch up with the US.

he first indication of present Soviet intentions with respect to MIRV development may emerge once the Soviets begin down-range tests of their new large missile from Tyuratam to Ksunchatka. Our best present judgment is that thb program will involve MIRVs with unproved accuracy. The new small ICBM which thc USSR is dovclopin;

is less likely toard target capability, but we would expect it to incorporatein guidance system technology, and it may be equipped with MIRVs as welL We would expect to determine thc broadof new ICBM development programs soon aflcr the Soviels begin flight testing.

SI. Penetrating AntibaUlsHe MittUeThe Soviets have also been concerned by the problem of rJenetrating ABM defenses, although this concern has presumably abated now that an ABM Treaty has been concluded. In the past few years they have developed three missile systems which would complicate thc problems of anod A, thcodnd theods indicated earlier, thcrogram appears to have been terminated.

he three RVs of thend theould have to be hardened to withstand the nuclear effects of defensive weapons (and possibly also to avoidif they were to be effective/^

JThe Soviets are presumably well aware of the problem and have donehe area. Hence we believe that at least son*-degree of hardening has been rwovided for these syslemsP*

e do not know why the Soviets began testing these systems long before any US ABM

Fratricide Uses place whan an tnuMulai warhead put on! of action as (he result of then cailirr Incoming: wsihead.


could beosiiljlcis thai they may initially haveUS ADM deployment to begin well before it actually did. They may later have decided it would be desirable to complete development ol appropriate hardware inof any strategic arms limitationAs it has turned out, however, signature of the ABM Treaty lessens the pressure for developing penetration systemsedge.


In the, the Sovietsimited ballistic missile submarine capability by converting sir:lass attack submarines to carry two missiles each. Soon thereafter, production began on two new classesnd the nuclear-poweredof which carriedm ballistic missiles. Production of these two classes ended inith the completion oflasslass units. The decision to haltprobably was made in thcn connectionecision, evident inSoviet writings, to divest the Soviet Navy of responsibility for carrying out strikes deep in enemy territory.

Shortly after the Cuban missile crisis,probably in parteaction to thatreversal of course look place. Authorization was given totrategic counterpart to the US Polaris force, based onlass nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine. Construction on the first ofttibc units began at Severodvinskhis lead unit was launched6 but did not enter service until nearly two years laler.helais submarine was launchedecondin ihr Sovietst.

Soviets have launched aofass submarinesignilicantly from all previousthat class. Up until recently thisbeen referred to as the modifiedhas now been designatedt is abouteet longer thanhasather thanarger missile, thereater range than thelass. Because the extra length isthc missile bay. thc Soviets couldfhe extra space for suchIncreased habltability and anquieter power plant" Subsequentlaunch of this unit, thelass submarines, three atand two at Komsomol'sk, but it isthat fhe Soviets arelass and that few if anyunits will be produced.*1

Current Production Rates and Forco Levels

Thc present combined rate of D-lass production from Severodvinsk and Komsomolskear, down from the previous high of eight units In onehc switchover to productionlass units is now complete athowever, and the overall production rate probably will begin to increase somewhat.

Table II shows the estimated num. her and status ol Soviet ballistic missileashe number of missile Inunch tubes is shown inOf thelass units operational,re in Ihe Northern Fleetn the

C been oilier unifications oflnn. but the curlier "variants" differed from tho originnl in only minor ways, such al an Improved mnitr system.

" tt is iwlwhether Kunnoroofsk is pioduc-ii.i: the Dcl.iiv


figure 3

D-Class Submarine




ii ii.ll him .


dded rime





* '

unlit currently In com traction or convertion wilt be operational by4 or

unit probably It being convenedI type.

' The minlre intended (or tlie OllI nibmaiine hat not yet been determined.

II It not, -trictly speaVing, operational became it It being utcdirings of theee

' The range of figure* reflect! our uncertainty ni to whether the Komtomol'tV ihlpyard it producingelaii.


Pacificfnits on tlicre in the main yard at Severodvinsk,re at Komsomolsk. Allf these unitsore now fitting out or on sea trials probably will be operational by4 orringing tho operational forceotal ofnits.

and Capabilities of the Ballistic Missile Submarine Force

V-last Submarines

ne Soviets* most widely deployeda single-stage, liquid-propellant missileaximum range ofun. It is carriedlassWith thislass submarines could take station as muchiles off the cast and west coasts of the US and strike most major targets in the country; moving thecloser fn or placing some in the Culf of Mexico would permit virtually complete coverage of thelass submarines^

Tjnormally staym out (See


navigation inaccuracies probably wouldUie overall system

J makingombination useful primarily against soft targets.

"Two ot tlx Pacific Fleet units were built at Severodvinsk and Uantfcned from Ihenotherhe rest were built at KomsomoTsk.

c believe thatass will be equipped withUsiles. There is some doubt about thc maximum range of thef

^ would

resultaximum range of about


maximum operational range would be about


lielass submarine is now on sea trials and will probably not Join the operational ilectssuming that thes also ready by then. The missis development program was in its final stages earlier this yearf^

tanddown infor nearly three months, launchingsfrom the White Sea area in August^

eployment of theillimprove thc flexibility andol lhe Soviet SLBM force. With this missile, submarines could take stationiles off tlie coasts of the US and strike any target in thc country. This would greatly increase the ocean area from whichsubmarines rould strike the US. compared with the amount of ocean area associated withm standoff range of the closestY-class patrols. (Sec Figure

top sccrct

Potential Coverage of USlass withissile

^Jlf (lie Soviets were lo large* only the same installations lhat arc now within range of theissilelass submarines with tbe SS-

ould stay out as farm

further complicate the USH

D-class unit equipped withwill have fewer missiles thanBut such units would have shorterto and from patrol stations, andstay on station longer. Assuming that the

-.une target areas were to be covered in

cases, the Soviets could then maintain as

launchers on station with units fitted withissiles as they couldorce of the same size consisting of units equipped with theith all else equal, for everylass units equipped with thehat the Soviets could maintain on station within range of the US, they could maintainlass units on station equipped with theecause of the shorter transit limes. The number of missiles on station would be the same in either case, but USforces would have to cope with the presence of more submarines at greaterfrom Ihe US coasts in thc case of units equipped with the SS-NX-8.

addition to its greater range,is believed lo be more.


- SFGHfcf-



During thc part year, (ho number of submarines continuously on station within missile range of thc US haa remained thein the Pacific and three in the Atlantic. Thus, the percentage of the force continuously on station has beenfrom nearlyercent last year to aboutercent now This compares with aboutercent continuously on station for the US Polaris-Poseidon fleet.

We do not know the reasons for this continuing low level of patrol activity. It is consistent, however, with the long-standing Soviet belief that hostilities with the US and its allies would occur only in the courseajor political crisis which would provide an opportunity (or bringing Soviet forces to peak teadiness. Inituation,f the force probably could put to sea and remain there foroays.

In time, tbe Soviets might increase the percentage of the force normally on station, particularly as units equipped with theecome available beginning late this year or early next. Evenizableorce, however, operational factors, such as the lack of forward bases and crew(the Soviets probably have only one crew for each missilerobably will prevent the Soviets from maintaining more thanercent of the forceon station within range of the US.**

This fifvrrtales into rounder ilkm the rr-sraeshesi of SSBNi. In she years to teniae, abuwl tV percent of the fercr neisaHy will be in Ihr ovvhstil process at nny onu lime, and thustivailnhlr Im patrol duty.



Y-lass fence appearsfor use againsi urban-industrial or soft military targetshe US. because its missiles lack the yield and accuracy to be effective against hard targets. Beyond this, we do not know how the Soviets intend to use thc force. They may regard it as primarily useful for retaliatory or follow-up strikes. Someercent of tbo force is always In port and vulnerableurprise attackotential enemy, however. This suggests that the Soviet plan would be to send more Y-lass units to sea in the eventajor political crisis inerious threat of nuclear war developed.

Tlie use of depressed trajectories with SLBMs would make them potentially more effective against time-urgent targets because warning rimes would be reduced.angem, for example, theiredrajectory with an apogee ofm would have an estimated flight lime of less thaninutes, as opposed toith the trajectory normally used in flight tests. There has been no evidence to date that any Soviet SLBMs have been tested ontrajectories. Depressed trajectories produce higher temperatures and greaterpressure on the missile which could cause structural failure. In addition, theangle of thc flight path degradesThus, some tests probably would be required to determine the effects of depressed trajectories on the missile involved. Wc would probably detectest program before its completion.

H-C'osj Submarinos

thcIassbuilt8 andhave been converted to carryissiles. These submarinesdesignatedI-class. Thean

be launched while the submarine is submerged and has more than twice the range of the surface-launchedhich it replaced. The ninth unit, designatedU, has been extensively remodeled to provide it with six launch tubes instead of thc original three. It has completed sea triab and now is being used for the initial firings at sea of (hehere Is no evidence that anylass units are being similarly converted, and. In view of the length of time since completion ofI unitt appears unlikely that any additional units will be.

lthough patrolslassin the western Atlantic continue.^"


gcsrjhg that tlie two units In the PacificTjcean Fleet now are assignederipheral attack rolc.C

lass units in the Northern Fleet, which are nowabout three patrols per year, probably are still intended for use against targets in thc US. These submarines may be relegatederipheral attack role when more Y-lass submarines are available.

G-Cfow Swbmorines

Of theass diesei-poweredbuilt81 have been converted to carry threeissiles instead of the originalwo more units are being similarly converted. Thc converted units have beenIs.lass units still carry threes.

The twolass units have been converted in two uniquely different ways. In onelass hasaised superstructure added aft of thc sail. Four missile tubesize suitable to houseissiles arc fitted in the superstate-


There ate no tubes in the sail. Work on this conversion appears complete but sea tnall and missile firings have not yet begun

he other conversion program involveslass submarino to carry thc SSn six missile tubes in an enlargedthe lines ofII. Thisshould be finished about the end of this year.

e do not toow why the Soviets would undertake tolass submarines to carry cither ther theoth types of missiles are already being installedlasslassThe first conversion may carry] missile now being tested at KapusTiii Yar. which is about the size of thes to the second, involving thehatever the Soviets had in mind may have beenby events at thc SAL talks and in therogram itself.

c coniinue to believe thatlass submarines are assignederipheral and some to an intercontinental attack role, but we do not know bow many, or which ones, are assigned to which mission.^

JA; present, it would appear that the1 class submarines In the Northern Fleet may Still be assigned to an Intercontinental attack role but that thelass units in the Pacific, and probably thelass units in the Northern Fleet, are intendedfor use against peripheral targets. |

New Programs

here is no direct, evidence of any new Soviet ballistic missile submarineBut the SAL agreement allows the USSR to build up toodem ballisticsubmarines and 9S0 SLBM launchers, not counting Ihe launchen for older types ofnow installed. The only way these totals can be approached or reached in combination from thc current baselass andlass submarines operaUonal and under construction is for the Soviets to revert to constiuction oflass units or to include unitsew class with more thanaunchersf the SovieU convertlass submarines to thelass configuration, this would further increase the requirementew class with more launchers per unit

he Soviets arearge new construct km hall adjacent to the mainconstruction hall at Severodvinsk. This building was begun In0 and probably will be ready for useut we do not know how the Soviets plan to use it. Oneisew ballistic missile submarine will be produced there. In this case, thecould complete the present program in the existing construction hallt about the time the new hall would be ready for the startew program. The old hall could then be turned over to the conversionlass and other types ofew missile or an improved version of thc

* If the Soviets Heptube uiriu soon, as il nppcait tliey will, nnd continuetube unlil until ifieyotal of G3 moderninlr Tubnuiincs. they wsO nave far lets thanLBM liunchen pet-milled under the agiremenl.


ould be developed and ready (or deployment8y which time the first submarine from the new construction hall could be reaching operational status.

ecause the interim agreement permits the LBMs and odern submarines and because of the existence of the new construction hall at Severodvinsk, we believe that tbe USSR will develop andew class of ballisticimilarly, because the interim agreement permits thc Soviets to replace old launchers on G- andiass submarines with new launchers on modern SSBNs. we believe It unlikely that anylass units will undergo furtheror conversion for strategic attack purposes.


Current Forces

he heavy bombers and tankers ofLong Range Aviation (LRA) comprise the third major component of Soviet forces for intercontinental attack. Currently this element is made upare air-to-surface missile (ASM) carriersre fittedisons, including 50

"LRA also hasadger and TU-El Blinder medium bomben based throughout Use Soviet Union. These autv-.ltanibilny for intercontinental atiack although tomlr could be uie-cl on one-way minion* if tho Sovieueed tu maiimtir an all-out nuclearalait North America. However, evidence continue* to suppori our iudgment thru Badger mid Blinder lorces ara equipped and trained primarily for peripheralhe deployment of large numbers of medium bomben

through Arctic hues would rail* lerioiii problem

Inarity ond logistics. The use of medium bombers In llw peripheral role is Jleeuand h* NIKI, 'Warsaw Face Forces for Opeaatbrts In


tankers. Delivery of these, aircraftA ceased in the; they are the only ones in the Soviet inventory whoso primary mission is mterconttnental attack. In naval exercises of recent years it has becornelhat Bears equipped with ASMs alsoission,econdary one, of carrying out strikes against naval forces, particularly aircraft carriers.

Characteristics and Capabilities of lhe Force

ears pose the most serious bomber threat lo the US because of their numbers and range; they can cover virtually any US target on two way missions. TheSM carriers,f which are equipped for aerial refueling, are fitted withmnd can launch their weapons while well out from Ihe target, thereby avoiding terminal defenses. Th* Bears equipped for aerial refueling can operate direclly from Ihcir homo bases, but thc non-refuclabteASM carriers andree-fallhave to stage through bases in the Arctic to obtaincoverage of the US. Whether refueled or staged, Ihe range of thc Bear aircraft gives il greater flexibility in routing and in choice of flight profile than other Soviet bombers.

heison bombers in Ihe force arc all capable of aerial refueling but even so they wiiill have lo resort to Arctic staging for extensive coverage of the US on two-wayNone of them carries ASMs. Theison tankers are used to refuel lhe Bison bombers, the refuelable Bears, and. in some Instances. Bears assigned to Naval Aviation."

" Deneis-ncd to Navaloiti are nothreal to theS since thev are used exclusively In naval nntiiubmnriiut warfare -crlvltici

The Backfire M

The Sovietsew twin-engine bomber under development which is fittedariable-geometry wing; we refer to it as the Backfire. The Backfire was first seen innd its test program is probably wellecision to produce thoserially has probably been made

An analysis undertaken during the past year suggests that the radius of action of tho aircraft whenigh altitude, subsonic mission, with wings fully extendedthe flight, would be nearm figure estimated in. Othermentionedtill suggests that the radius of action is less, perhaps much less for this profile. Unfortunately we are fn no better position toonfident estimate uf the aircraft's performance than we were last year. Wc may have to wait until theis assigned to operational units before this becomes possible-**

the view of all but the AirBackfire is best suitederipheral

ilhouette of the Backfire and. for purports of comparison, silhouettes of the Bear, Bison, and Badger.

"Msi. Cen. Ceoige f. Kcexan.he Assistant Chief of Staff. Inielligence. USAF. believes thlt we areetter posiUon toonfident estimate of Backfire's performancewe wete- last year. He believes that additional correlation and analysis ut* available evidence during the past yearore confident assessment of the capabilities of Backfire lo be made.

He would also note that the results of detailed engineering design analyses*^

3 indicate the

performance and characteristics of Backfire are within abouleieenl of those estimated In. These analyses show that Backfire lias nearly twice lhc radius of the Badger medium bomber and about Ihe same radius as the Bison heavy bomber.

attack role. The Air Force believes that the basic design of the aircraft indicates that the Soviets developed the Backfire toariety ol missions, including intercontinental attack. All believe that the Backfire will reach IOC late next year as an ASMree-fall bomber version may reach IOC about thc same time.

Tho suitability of the Backfire for an intercontinental role will be heavily dependent on the existenceuitable force of tankers. Several aircraft other than the Bison, such asClassic) orould be adapted to the ranker role,ew one could be developed.

Thc Backfire may have considerable growth potential. If. for example, the Soviets were to develop high efficiency turbofan engines for it. the range of the Backfire could be somewhat increased. Such Improvements in performance are not likely to appear hi deployed aircraft before the.

Possible Follow-on Heavy Bomber

or the past several years we have considered Soviet developmentew heavy bomber unlikely. This judgment was based in part on our belief that as their ICBM and SLBM forces grew, the Soviets would come to rely less and less on bomber aircraft. Those missile forces have now readied significant proportions, but there has been no phase-out or appreciable attrition of the heavy bombers in LRA for several years, or any significant reduction in their training activity. Thus. It appears that contrary to Khrushchev, whothe day of the manned bomber had passed, present Soviet leaders recognize the advantages of flexibility, recall, and follow-on attack affordedanned bomber force For the present, at least, they apparentlythat these advantages are worth the cost of retaining an iiitercontincntnl bomber capa-



Engines Gross weight Combal radius Cruiae speed Assumed bomb load

0 lbs

O0 nm OOO lbs

Enginos Gross weight Combal radius Cruise speed Assumed bomb load


is bs c


lo* iomc year* lo come. Other factors that may encourage them to do this are thc exclusion of bombers from the recently signed US-USSR interim agreement on strategicsystems, and the reduced state of US air defense.

If this is their view, and they persist in it, the Soviet leadership must sooner or later come to grips with the problem of the coin-position of their future forces. Their present bomber aircraft are aging rapidly and attrition will soon take its toll unless the Soviets arc willing to engage in rehabilitation programs more difficult and costly than those in the past. Such programs would serve merely to extend the life of the aircraft rather than to Improve the capabilities of the force to any significant degree. Alternatively, the Soviets may optew heavy bomber. Although its development would be more expensive than the rehabilitation of their present aircraft, it would give them greater capabilities forattack lhan iheir present force.

Wc have no evidenceew heavy bomber program is underway, butofomber would not present any particularly difficult technical problems lo thc Soviets. They now have the capability to develop long-range, fixed-wing aircraft filled with advanced tuiboprop or turbofan engines, and. based on their experience with the Backfire, variablc-guomclry wing aircraft with greater ranges than Backfire. If they do decide toeavy bomber, wc would expect to become aware of its existence four to five years prior to its reaching operational status.


IOC Certain distinctive and enduringof thc Soviet political system affect the way in which decisions are made on military

policies and programs. One of them is the primacy of the Party, particularly its central apparatus. The principle of dose anddetailed party supervision of miliiary affairs, in peace and in war. has from the beginning been an important elemenl ofpolitical doctrine, partlyonsequence of Ihc Party's persistent fear of Bonapartlsm. Thc miliiary has also been drawn Into the party systemumber of ways. The role of the Party is enhanced by the tendency of the Soviet bureaucracy to push decisionsthe top. This means that the top political leadership is more often involved with the details of military decision-making than is normally Ihe case in Western countries.

Thc process through which decisions on Soviet military policy and programs emerge is veiled in secrecy. Enough is known, how-ever, to show that the processomplex one in which many groups and individualsariety of advisory andfrom the military, theestablishment, and defenseforward Iheir views to the top political and military leadership, at times in competition with one another. This interplay of ootnpetinr'. policy positions and special interest groups serves in effect to impose checks and balance on thc power of the top leadership. As In olher countries, final decisions are the result of organizational and personal politics as well as of an objective consideration of strategic needs.

Soviet decision-making on military affairs has generally followed the trendin other areas of national policy over the past two decades. That is. there has been an increase in thc number of people who participate in the decision-making or who furnishradual diffusionovement toward what might be lermcd "piirticipatory bureaucracy'. Tho

has been roughlyne-man command system under Stalin,ystem under Khruslichevixture of personal and oligarchic procedures, to tho presentof rule by committee, which makes wide use of councils, commissions, and second-level advisors.

The top leaderships dependence onsubordinate organizations for information, technical judgment, and recommendations is in large part necessitated by tho detail and complexity of the issues with which thedeals. Limitations on the time andavailable to top officials virtually compel the inclusion of subordinate echelons in thc decision-making process.inimum, subordinate organizationsole inthe policy issues which come before thc top leadership, and hence in circumscribing policy options. In addition,omplex bureaucratic system, component organizations have their own institutional interests to protect and promote, and often have differing views on military requirements and goab.

At several key points in the system, thc varying views and pressures generated by thc groups discussed above come together and in one way or another are resolved,rejected, or forwarded to another organizational level. There arc presently four key institutions in the Soviet militarystiucture. These arc tho Politburo, the Defense Council, the Military-Industrialand the Ceneral Staff of tho Ministry of Defense.

The Politburo

ultimate decision-makingthe USSR on defense issues, as onof national policy, is the PolitburoCommunis! Party's Centralitsotingon-voting members.

There is no detailed Information available on the caact lesponiibilities of the Politburo in the military sphere, but it is believed to set broad requuements for the armed forces and to make final decisions on military strategy and doctrine, the allocation of resources to defense, and the structure and employment of the armed forces. It normally meets once each week.

Thc Politburo's operations have evolved as political conditions have changed. Under Stalin the Politburo wasenuinebody. It made significantto decision-making under. although il suffered fromheavy-handed dominance. Under the present regime, operating procedures havemore systematized, and the Politburo has adhered to orderly decision-makingThe regime has sought toollectivity of leadership, as reflected by its separation of the top party and government posts, and the effort made at Politburoto get full coordination of views and unanimity on important issues. Nonetheless, three officials, by virtue of their position,and knowledge, play leading roles in discussions on defense and militarypolicy; Patty Ceneral Secretary L. I. Brezhnev, Premiei A. N. Kosygin. and D. F.aity Secretaryandidate member of thc Politburo who ii the party's overseer for military-industrial affairs.

Brezhnev is the da facto chairman of the Politburo and its most influential member. His prerogatives include thc right to convene and chair Politburo meetings, to compose the agenda, to sum up the issues underto circulate or withhold variousand proposals, and to enlarge or restrict attendance at meetings, including the right to exclude candidate members. As party leader. Brezhnevost which tradi-



mfails leadership over miliiary affairs, andnown to be chairman of thcCouncil (seehe USSR's closest counterpart to tho US National Security Council. His authority in the defense field is also reflected in his overall supervision of the Central Committee's Administrative Organs Department (which oversees the miliiary.and judicial establishments on behalf of tho Central Committee) and the ChiefDirectorate of the Muiistry of Defense, which functionsentral Committeefor ensuring the political reliability of the armed forces.

osygin also has certainin thc defense and military-industrial field. As chairrnan of the Council of Ministers, he has constitutional authority over theof Defense and the eight ministrieswith defense industry. In addition, lhc Military-Industrial Commission or VPK (seehichie various ministries and agencies involved In defenseis formally attached to the Council of Ministers.

apparently has directauthority over the VPK and overof advanced weaponsVPK chairrnan. I. V. Srrurnov. isreport lo Ustinov, who thus serves aslink between thc VPK and theCouncil and the Politburo. Il islhat thc Politburo monitors theindustrial sector. In addition,contacts with at least two departmentsCentral Commiltee that deal withmateriel and personnel matter.

questions relating toare discussed and decided by theoften in considerable detail This small

elite group is occupiedide range of interests and issues, however, and devotesimited amount of attention to military affairs. To facilitate its decision-making tasks, tho Politburo delegates some of its authority lo other bodies and rolles upon variousand commissions, either permanent or ad hoc, to ciamine particular policy areas.

Tho Defense Council

he highest level body in the USSR dealing primarily with military affairs is the Defense Council. Itoliu'cal-military body, chaired by Brezhnev, which servesefense advisory committee to the Politburo. The Council's high-levelat least the top three political leaders (Brezhnev, Kosygin, andhcMinisternd probably the Parly authority on military-industrialecommendation by lhe Defense Council would seldomopposition within the Politburo.

US. The Council's permanent membership seems designed to ensure that meetings are attended by at least one representative from the Parly. Ihe government, defense industries, and theariety of other top civilian and militaryas the chairman of Ihe KCB. the Chief of the General Staff, thc Commander in Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forcesnd lhe commanderhief of- the Warsawalso invited lo participate on occasion.onsultative forum, the Defense Council provides thcleadership and defense industry with direct Inslitutionalired access lo at least the top three political leaders, and hence with an opportunity to present advice and fakeon the issues under ronsideralion.the Council provides the poliUcal


leadershipomul means of effecting the controlled participation of senior military leaders in the consideration of military policy.

hc Defense Council is evidentlywith virtually all major military policy questions. Issues reported to have hernby tho Council, or which clearly fall within its area of responsibility, include ABM development and deployment, revision of the military conscription law, national rnobiliza-tion plans, military doctrine, civil defensemilitary intelligence activities, high-level military appointments, military aid, tho SAL talks and various crisis situations throughout the world. There is little evidence on how tne Council operates, and it is not known what form the discussions take, how dif-leiences are resolved, or whetherist of options orouncil position as such. Brezhnev as its chairman,entral role in theoperation. He has authority to initiate Council meetings at his own discretion, to determine when and where the Council will meet, to establish the purpose and iigendaiven meeting, and to enlarge or restrict attendance. He presumably exerts considerable influence on the course of Council discussions and on any decisions or positions arrived at.argo extent. Brezhnev probablythe Defense Council's actual role within the Soviet policy-making system.

Tho Militory-Indus!rialecond high-level body which pro-.vidos dclcnsc policy support to thc Politburo is the secretitpraministcrialstaff formally attached to the Presidium of tbe Council of Ministers. The VPK over sees tbe various ministnes and agenciesin defense production, andigh-level fomm for thc discussion ol pro-

grams and problems relevant to thc defense industries. Itupervisory role inactivities in the defense industries and serves to facilitate negotiations with the defense industries' major customer, thcof Defense.

a governmental body, chairedPremier L. Smbnov, the VPK issubordinate to Premier Kcsygin. Onimportant matters of decision-makingsphere of defense-related research,and production, Smimov into the PartyParty Secretarythusto Ceneral Secretary Brezhnev.provides the VPKersonal link to theond thc Politburo.

VPKermanent staff ofproduction esperts. headed byand his three deputiesnd L.he staff worksdirectors of defense plants,leading officials of the eightresponsible for defenseheads of these ministries are almostmembers of the VPK. The deputyand several other senior officiaU ofministries, together withofficials of certain scientific researchand the USSR Academy ofattend VPK meetings onort of associate

efense Ministerlsowith the VPK, and appears to have some authority to request services and studies from technical specialists attached to it. Tbe authonly may derive bom his membership on thc Delonsc Council.

- SrKZfifT--


extent to which the VPK isinvolved jn defense decision-makingIt may have only limitedinitiate and approve decisions itself,to recommend and coordinate onby other groups. Certain VPKprobably are forwardedCouncil of Ministers, and receiveapproval at thatecondthrough which VPK viewsthe Politburo is the DefenseUstinov would beosition toand present VPK views. At times,business is taken up directly by

The Military os on Interest Group

No piofessiount military officer has served On the Politburo since the ouster of former Defense Minister Zhukovut senior military leaders and top defense experts do attend Politburu sessions upon invitation, and presumably nro able on those occasions tu present their views and recommendations. In addition, the military is represented in formal deliberative bodies such as the Defense Council and the VPK.

All available evidence indicates that the Soviet hierarchy leans heavily on theleadership for recommendations andon professional military matters, and that the leadershipigh regard for Marshal Crechko Moreover, present political leaders, unlike Khrushchev, have preferred to avoid direct conflict with the military In the area of their pmfevuoual competence. Although thc exigencies ol SAL. talks may have led to some relax at ion, Soviet security practice effectively prevents most civilian titcmenti of theuven including thc Ministry of Foreigniom having nuy influence over, or nven knowledge of, strategic military matters.

While the staff directly serving members of the Politburo probably plays an important role tn screening and evaluating recommendations, it is highly unlikely that it has or would claim to have any expertise in military matters.

s successful products of the Soviet system, the military almost certainly perceive thc nation's destiny in much the same terms as the lop civilian leaders. While they do notisaffected element, they doa powerful pressure group withand bureaucratic interests of Its own. These interests may conflict with those of other groups, including at times even tho top political leadership. Khrushchev said that it took every bit of his power, and certain sops as well, tu push through the large cuts in military personnel which took place in thc.

hc miliiary leadership is not. of course, always of one mind. There is ample evidence of rivalries in the past. Theseacule. for example, when Khrushchev was tiying to build up Ihe strategic forces al thc expense of thc general purpose forces, but they have been evident on other occasions and over other issues as well. These conflicts almost certainly continue, although theyto have become muted. The combined arms tradition is strong, and since the time of Khrushchev, ihc services appear to have been generally successful in composing theirandnited front. Part of Ihe reason, perhaps, is that under theleadership total military spending has been increasing, which may have made the competition within thc military less keen than if spending were constant or diminishing. With one exception, thc estimated shares spent for the individual services appear, in recent years, to have been remarkably steady. Tho


is tho SIIF, wliosc shaic hasas major deployment programs were broughtonclusion.

he Ministry of Defense is anwhich reflects thc interests of military professionals almost exclusively. Unlike its counterparts in Western countries; theis almostilitary organization. Its top positions are held by professionalofficers, and it has few civilians injobs. It enjoys considerablein operational matters and seems to be highly compartmentalized, both within itself andis outside organizations.

ithin the Ministry of Defense, by far thc most influential component is the General Staff, which is directly responsible for the day-to-day management of the armed forces, for controlling them in operational situations, and for planning their future. As such, it frames and elaborates the Defense Ministry's position on such issues as weapon programs, force levels, employment concepts, and arms control In all of these matters the political leadership has the final authority, but thc Cenetal Staffs recommendations are believed to carry considerable wi'ight since theythc consensus of expert military opinion. This is probably especially true when com-pies technical questions are at issue. TheStaffs involvement in preparing theposition at thc SAL talks is an illustration of how the political leadership relics upon it for discerning what is militarily necessary to maintain thc sort of strategic relationship with th<- US which the leadership deems desirable.

trcoinmciidations on how the defense budget slimild be apportioned among the services and competing programs wouldemanate from lire Ceneral Staff. Rach of

lhc services undoubtedly has its uwn goals

with respect to resource allocations and future programs. Presumably each submits proposals justifying ils requirements and setting forth its interpretation of the threat posed byadversaries of the Soviet Union. The ex officio status of tlic chiefs of the individual services as Deputy Ministers ol Defensefurther opportunity for them to press their special claims. However, (he topin the Ministry of Defense wouldlook in the first instance to the Ceneral Staff for studies and recommendations. The Ceneral Stall would almosi certainly play an important role in the eventajor inter-service conflict, soy between thc SRF and the Navy about thc question of retiring older ICBMs in lavor of additional SLBMs.

n dealing with the conflictingUiterests of tbe military services, the General Staff appears to have some degree of immunity from the influence of individual service rivalries. Its senior officers are men with long experience in combined-armsand operations. Assignment to theStaff is usually permanent, and some officers spend much of their military careers there. Presumably they progress within aCeneral Staff career ladder rather than through their parent services. In addition, Ihey are trained at the General Staffs own academy. With that kind of career pattern. Ceneral Staff oflicers probably tend tomore with the larger concerns of the military izstablishment than with the parochial interestsingle service.

lic General Staff has traditionallytrung hand in coordinating Soviet military HAD. Although an organizational change raises sunw question about its present role in ibis area, the Ceneral Staff probably retains some responsibility fur recommending what development proginnwi should be pursued-


The Scientific Establishment

he scientific and technical elements In the defense establishment appear to have less leeway for innovation than their Western counterparts. Indications at the SAL talks and elsewhere arc that scientists and, technicians tend to be regarded more as skilled aides rather than as partners of the military. By end large, they are apparently told only enough about thc task at hand to handle theexplicitly levied upon them.

till, die influence of scientists and technicians is almost certainly felt in ways which are important, if indirect. For one thing, Soviet military and political leaden have their options at least partially defined for them by those responsible for BAD. To put It another way, new technology, and thus thc nature of thc weapon systems developed, ts probably influenced as much from below as from above. To thc extent that this is so, the result would notesponse to some Integrated design,eflection of the interests of individual services, particular design bureaus, and Iho like.

Olher Influences

ther individuals and groups alsoole in decision-making on militarybut wc do not know in detail how ihey operate, or their exact relationship to the top political and military leadership Departments of the Central Committee deal with poliiical affairs, personnel, and materiel. Theremall but growing body of military academic specialists who concern themselves with questions of strategic doctrine and policy, and who have prepared studies on foreign military establishments. For example, studies and testimony by such officials as Yuriyhead of the Institute of the USA in the Academy ol Sciences, have apparently been used by members of the Defense Council.

The top State economic planning organization, Cosplan. coordinates and integratesrogram, including thcrogram.

The Decision-AAoklng Process

lie preceding discussion provides an incomplete picture of the way in whichabout military foices are permits the following Inferences and generalizations:

appears that lhe Sovietprocess involves clusters ofexecutive bodies, which are likelyto be in competition with oneThese clusters funnel their viewslop leadership, political and military,number of ways.

and his colleagues onand the Defense Council workcontext of bureaucratic pressures,and constraints, which may betimes, and which serve, in practice,the freedom of action of the topand miliiary leadership. Thisreinforced by the collective nature ofand the consequent need tovarying interests in ordera consensus.

c. In the case of military programs, the decision-making process is probablyon Iwo keymilitary and miliiary-indusiria] authorities whoand propose new programs, and the top political leaders who make the finalparticularly those who serve on both Ihe Politburo and the Defense Council. Other individuals and interest groupsole, but almostesser one.

d. Thc system of decision-makingabove tends lo have certain built

in biases. For one thing, it gives consider-

able weight to military claims and interests, in part because of lite nature and objectives of (ho political system itself. Other reasons are the lack of open discussion and thecompartmenlalization ofparticularly of the kind ofneeded to make decisions .on military policy. There is also considerable Inertia In the system: it favors large, established bureaucratic interests, and works against sharp changes in direction, in spite of the concentration of political power at tbe top.

hus, we can describeroad way how the Institutions of Soviet decision-making work and what thc characteristic biases of live system may be. What we cannot do. given our present state of knowledge, is to weigh the forces that may bear on particularand, thus, beosition to predictprogram choices. The capability ofin this matter Is unlikely to Improve very much unless and until the Soviet system becomes much more open than it Is now.



oviet decisions on military policy springomplex of considerations, stra-'egic. political, and economic, which change

"Vice Adm.e Poll, the Director. Deleiue Intelligence Agency, and- Wlllbm E. Pons, lhe Assistantf Stall for latebaaee. Department of the Army, are Inv-ilh several aipecls oi Section They believe that tbe influence ot US Ml loot on theof future Soviet itraieglcnduly am-phairted. They believe thai llie Soviets will press their strategic tvesporuigorously, regardless of lhe US level of effort, aad eonsMSrr that the teat falls to put tulficwnt rmpliaiu on thii highly significant IMlnt. They disagree with certain assumptionsvarious weapon lyitenu for these roaioro they believe Out the Defrnir Intelligence Profeeueers tm[DIPI'J provide auselnl portrayal of lhe option* available to the SovieU for future strategic waaponi deployment than do thc Illustrative

Feeie Koaleli orl-nore Ar-

tallnl eipicinon of ihrii newi tee their (oolnolei throughout this Section.

over time and are often in conflict with one another. Programs and goals thai once appropriate may subsequently be viewedore jaundiced an incremental process, worked out year by year as choices and requirements change. Thus, many decision* aboul tbe makeup of Soviet forces for intercontinental atiack will be altered, some more lhan once, during the period of this Estimate. Under these circumstances, and with our lack of direct and reliable evidence on Soviet planning for Ihe future of their forces for toterconlinentaljudgments about thc future are subject to great uncertainty.

evertheless, it is possibleough way the range of choices available in lhe light of certain major factors lhat Soviet planners and policy makers will have to lake into account. Soviet strategic planning will obviously be affected both by lhc specific provisions of the SALand by the expectations andgenerated in Moscow in the course ol reaching them. Policy will also be greolly influenced by Soviet perception* of USand objectives In thc newcreated by thein particular, by the US buildup of It* ownforces and lhc stress the US appears to be placing on it. Finally. Soviet militarymust work within the context of thechokes available to ihem in terms of the weapons that can be made available and the feasibility of procuring and deploying ihem."

View Adm. Vincent P. de floor, lhe Director.Intelligence Agency, while agreeing with theHanoiparagraph, beistvei lhal the nam ol lhc reference! in tint and subsequent paraxial

", to ,hB relationship belweenUS^acS

"veritMing theS action, nn lhc structure of future Soviet rtrategfc


SWIfaM discusses tliesc threeIt theneries of forceillustrating various ways in which(orental attach mightin the next five to eight years.

Tho Impact of tho Limitation on Strategic Arms

accords signed in Moscow into limit strategic arms introduced aset of constraints and politicalwill influence future Sovietstrategic forces. The provisions ofthey prohibit and whatfoiectose tome options andmore attractive. Perhaps of evenare the commitments,consensus that must havethc Soviet leadership over thcfrom thc talks.

learly, there were divergent views within the leadership and its advisory bodies about the positions to be taken, and even over the questions of whether negotiations were desirable. Some groups, such al those concerned with economic development orthe supply of consumer goods,ear self-interest in successful negotiations. Otheis, such as the military services, almost certainly hadnd may haveconcessions which made thepalatable to them. We do not know what specific bargains were struck during the evolution of the Soviet position, but tho proponents of arms control wore able to hammer out com promises and achieve enoughonsensus to make the initial agreements possible Thc consensus no doubt embodies thc views of many separate interest groups with dispiir.itc motivations and attitudes.

owever fierce the infighting may have been, the top Soviet leaders now find themselves committed to the success of the accords. They will have personal andincentives to insure that the accords are not abrogated, and to avoid theof the arms competition and thcin US-Soviet relations that would result At the same time, they will need to show that the agreements are beneficial to the Soviet Union. These concerns will tend to colorabout future Soviet strategicThey will also cause the top leaders to involve themselves more deeply than ever in thc details of strategic planning.

ore now than In the past, (he main questions about the future of Soviet forces for intercontinental attack center on the pace and scope o( technological improvements. Theoffensive agreement places certainlimitations on ICBMs. SLBMs. and modem mimic-carrying Submarines butqualitative improvements and it places no restrictions on strategic bombers. Thus, itroom for new programs in all majorof the Soviet forces for intercontinental attack.

n planning for their forthcomingweaponry. Soviel leaders will have strong incentives lo, exercise thc options open to them under lhe SAL accords. They will want to avoid any deterioration of thc Soviet Union's relative position as the US pushes ahead with lhe deployment of MIRV* and works on follow-on systems such asomber and ULMS. They will also wish to maintainstrong bargaining position for the follow-on SAL negotiations, and to develop new options which could be exercised if thc follow-on talks break down. These incentives will beby pressures from individuals and groups whicharochial inlerest inspecific weapon programs.


side (torn the miliiary considerations involved, thc top political leaden have astake in insuring that tbe Soviet Union suffers no real or apparent erosion of ItsTheir pronouncements about the SAL talks have consistently emphasized the theme of "equal security" and it it likely that thethey forged to approve the accords is based on assurances to skeptical elements that the Soviet Union would not fall behind again. Indications that the US was pulling ahead would make Brezhnev and his supportersto criticism and prompt them tocon ntermeasu res.

t the same time, there will be other pressures working to restrain the Soviet One of them is economic. Soviet spokesmen and Soviet literature continue to emphasize the high cost o' the strategic arms race. This probablyenuineby political leaders to realize some savings from the arms limitationin tho high-quality, specialized resources that are needed to modernize the civilian economy and boostrainln editorial inor example, noted that thc SAL accords will help curb the arms race, which has diverted "huge funds frompurposes" Another articleournalfor tlte political indoctrination ofilitary personnel described militaryin general as non-productive and asdeductions from national income, and argued lhat "in peacetime the militarymust not be too burdensome to thc nationaludging from statements of various high-ranking Soviet military leaders in icccnt years, however, this viewpoint iswithin theubsequentof the very sAinr journal placed military needs first

n the political side, there will also be sliong incentives lui the leadership lo resisl

courses of action which might jeopardize the agreements, even though not actuallythem. Tlie agreements play an important part in thc current policy of detente with the West, and they have been hailed as amanifestation of that policy. The topleaders, and Brezhnev personally, have identified themselves with thc agreements and would have much to lose politically if they fail. II they in fact consider an unrestrained arms competition neither necessary northey would also wish to stop short of actions which threatened to undercut the follow-on SAL negotiations.

elow the top leadership there will be similar forces al work. The consensus lhat was developed through compromise andduring the period of negotiation andis likely toureaucratic momentum of its own. Thatide variety of important pressure groups in tbe Soviet military and civilian bureaucracies nowommitment to,lake in, the SAL agreementsesultong and difficult procesi whichelicate balancing of individual interests. Any attempt to shift policyirection that might endanger the agreements would require another lengthy and difficult set of negotiations andamong the Interested bureaucratic groups Furthermore, the agreements have received laudatory publicity in Sovieland broadcasts; they are portrayedalutary result of Soviet policy and an important step in reducing the dangers of nuclear war. Thc Council of Ministersormal directive ordering compliance with the agreements, and Ihe necessity for strict implementation has been stressed in public media. The fact that compliance with flic agreements if being monitored by both side* has liecn iml kisown in the Soviet press.



This ii not to say. liowcvcr. trust tlie Sovieu would be inhibited from pursuing any permitted options they considered necessary in order to maintain their relative status and thcit bargaining position during the next phase of negotiations or even that they wouldfrom steps inviting or leading toof tho agreements should their vital interests appear to require them. Nor would they. In so doing, be particularly sensitive to charges that their programs represented an escalation of tbe arms race or wereThe Soviet leaders almost certainlyto regard the USrafty antagonist which is still ahead of tbe USSR in someaspects of strangle power and which might well seel: to achieve some furtherof advantage under the agreements.

oviet public media have already said that Increased US spending on strategicand any effort to attach conditioni to the SAL agreements would in effectejection of the principle of 'equal security" as the basis for the US-USSR strategicand undermine the spirit of mutual restraint evident in the agreements. The point was most authoriutively put by Politburo member M. A. Suslov. who stressed that the USSR would closely follow thc efforts ofUS circles" lo distort the "spirit andof the agreements. To some extent such statements can probably be discounted as part of the rhetorical jockeying for position which has gone on intermit lently since before the SAL negotiations began. Nevertheless. Itiey almost certainly reflect an important point: that decisions about Soviet forces will be greatly influenced by Soviet perceptions of Ihe US altitudes towards thc SAL agreements as well as by specific US decisioni on its strategic forces.

esull of the opportunities ond risks associated with the SAL agreements, future programming decisions will probably be even more directly influenced than in the past by lhe Soviet leadership's sense of liability or change in its strategicwith the US. To be sure, as China moves closer toredibleforce, thc need to counter Chinesewill abo affect Soviet plans. For many years to come, however, the Soviets arc likely lo be concerned primarily with thc US arsenal, in terms both of the strategic threat il poses and Ihe diplomatic and politicalit affords.

The Soviet Perception of iho Uniled Stales Strategic Threal

IM. Thc Soviets are both well Informed and sophisticated in their understanding of US strategic weapon programs. We know, for example, lhat the Soviet military conductsanalyses of the relative capabilities of US and Soviet strategic forces, using much Ihc same kinds of measures as US analysts. It is also clear that the Soviets have accurate information about US strategic forces, both current and programmed, through aof open literature, satellite photography, and other intelligence sources.

ow this Information and analysis arc used ts not known.inimum, the military services and the Cen era! Staff probably die it in buttressing their arguments for specific programs and budgetary allocations. It might also be used for high-level and relativelyevaluations, although the Sovietsdo not have any non-militarytohorough anil independent review of military programs and requirements.


ttemptsorrelate specific Soviet strategic weapon programs within US strategic forces have notconclusive results. It does appear,that Soviet strategic force planners have wmetimes reacted to US strategic programs that were only in the planning stages when the key Soviet decisions were made. As anikely explanation for theof the multiple warhead versions of IhcndCBMs Ls that they wereto penetrate the Countrywide areaABM system which was Initiallyfor the US prior to thc decision toon defense of Minuteman fields.

e have no direct evidence on how Soviet planners project US strategic forces for the remainder of the decade.inimum, however, they would certainly assume that the improvements presentlyand made public through congressionaland pressbe carried out. These improvements include the retrofit of over half of the Minuteman silos and three-quarters ol tlie Polaris submarines with MIRV-carrying missiles; hardening of missile silos; deploymentew class of missile (Trident) with long-range. MIRV-carrying missileseplacement of2 bomberss; deployment ofo surface missiles (SRAM andeployment of Safeguard ABMs at two sites; and improvements in theof command and control systems.

15S. In addition, the Soviets wouldconsider it prudent to allow for the posii-bllily that toward the end of the decade the US will press beyond current forcefor example, by retrofitling all Minuteman silos, replacing Poseidon missiles with ULMS. and retaining most of. Soviet planners would abn need to consider reported USand proposab fot tbe development of

new strategic weaponry, such as hard-target MIRVs and strategic cruise missiles, and the effect these systems would have on the US-Soviet strategic relationship if they were deployed.

here will be those in the Sovietwho will argue that the US has for some time been striving for strategic superiority. Their position is articulated in Firstook published last year. It seeks tothe thesis tint the US has historically tried loecisive first-strikeagainst the USSR and has been frustrated only by thc growing capabilities of Soviet forces.inimum, the element of themilitary advocating development andof counterfofce weapons such as hard-target MIRVs will probably scire onof US work in this field to press their case in policy-making councils. On the other hand, advocates of arms control might cite such reports as demonstrating thc need for negotiating limitations on qualitativein strategic weaponry. In any case, the prospect of improved counter force capabilities for the US strategic arsenal is likely to boin Soviet planning.

he foDowing table flltutrslcs howplanners might view the futureof US strategic forces. The first two columns show the improvements currently programmed forwhen the interim agreement on limiting strategic offensive weapons eipires) and forhe third columnossible Soviet projectionworst case" threat at the end of the decade, in which US deployment roils are raised and thc results ofre incorporated into US forces. Thcshown in all three cases assume that the current SAL agreements continue in effect0 lhe Soviets may also plan for tbe possibility that the interim agreement will not be renewed or replaced when it expires.


-JO!'- SEeRC-?-

mpact ol new program* iniliated7 would no! be felt appreciably until

n addition to thc major threat posed by thc US. thc Soviets must consider tlieCreat Britain. France, and China when structuring -their forces. Great Britain now has four Polaris submarines inservice. France has operationalRBMs and one Polaris-type submarine. Thc French plan tootal of five ballistic missile submarines, andotal ofRBMs in hardened silos. Both Creat Britain and France have bomber air-

craft capable of attacking the Soviet Union. At thc last round of the SAL negotiations tbc Soviets attempted to gam compensation for these units and made the unilateral statement that any increase in NATO's "modemforce would entitle the Soviel Union to equivalent increases. Duringhin3 will probably buildissile force capable of attacking targets throughout the USSR. These weapons could have warheads in thc megaton range. In the same period, China may also increase its capabilities for air attack along contiguous borders of the USSR and into key areas of thc Soviet heartland.



Mntoteman III retrofitted to Minuteman III retrofitted to Hard-target MlflV* in ICBM and SLBM


Moil Minuteman alios AUMInuiemansilosIurilened. Minuteman III or moreICBM retrofitted to

all Minuteman silos.

Poseidonetrofitted tu Pusckloii mlullcs retrofitted First few Trident SSBNs31entering force.

Plot few Trident SSBN, Poseidon missile* lejslaeed with with ULMS enterinu fore*-. ULMS.

1'orslbly some sea-launched ttrate|ric cruise missile* bc-eni-iiing operational.

Preient 2 and ombers in- etained alone, with bomber force maintained. troduccd In plnce of equlv- ns.

alent number ofb.

Safeguard ABM deployed al Safeguard ABM deployed nl Forks ABM with hard-site de-


System Characteristics ond Deployment Palforns "

his Section presents the judgments and assumptions about Soviet strategicsystems which underlie thc laterof Soviet forces for intercontinental attack. It briefly reiterates earlier estimates of thc structuie of present forces andlikely characteristics, readiness dates, and deployment rates for possible newSome of the assumptions differ for various projected forces and those differences are spelled out here and in the discussion of each projected force.

Intercontinental Ballistic Mlssllos

nd SS-S

he Interim agreement permits the re placement of the old andnd SS-Ss by modernith deactivation to occur by the time tbc submarines carrying these SLBMs begin sea trials We assume thatndissiles will be deactivated on this basis, in whole or in part.


ItH. The present force ofSS Uat deployed complexes is assumed to be equipped

Vke Adiu Vukvbi P. de Poll ihrIntelligence Agency.llli many ofand niiuiupliuiis presented in thisIn aitditlfm tin his major dlffeieoi.esfootnoted below, he has leisei different*!not been foafiiiilrd. He would note,when taken toother, snail difference! on such

. as lhv .iitruc- rate ol pnsferied new

SSDN. thr rumber ufvehicles ea a

niitlil*. and ths kind uf a partKular

kindt to undercn can mult in ugnoVanily different prorrt ttnnt cen iVaxigh there It general "grerment on inoie fundament si pmtiilalUina.


e have assumed that at me standardilos will beto the new harder silo configuration andew large missile will be deployed in these silos.

New forge Missile

n some forces we postulate earlyof flight testing of Ihe new large missile under development at Tyuratamighly successful flight test program, withbeginning two year* after fhe start of flight testing if present guidance technology is utilized, or Ihreo yean alter if the missile mi ploys entiroly now guidance techniques

^The new missile thus appears initially in the operational listings inrwo other proiections allow for the possibility that testing might start Uter. take longer to complete, ur both. In theseIhc initial appearance of the new large

missile in the operational listings is delayed a

year to

e postulate that the new large mb-rilc will be more accurate than thend will carry MIBVs.^J

" These figures tin not Include the iiiidiilisilei believed to be operntiinally deployed alim nor do they reflect the pnnlbility thatf"iisilo are deployed in tin- field. Sri'

"Vice Attn. Vincent f. dehe Director. Defense Intelligence Agency, believes the likelihood that llie Soviels are nowew large inli-rileEP on the orderil tu be mi remoterojection of the deployment of iuchystem Inltould not be made.ullernut kin of hi*on this subjett. *ee his faal-aoie lo Force S.


he throw weigh! for the newis assumed to

We have postulated thatissile woultl appear, alternatively, with three different-MIRVne with three RVs. another with six RVs. and one withVs,(_

^The missile would be capable of carrying more RVs. however,arger number cannoi be ruled out, particularly if thc Soviets are concerned about survivability.

he assumptions about MIRVs andused in lhe illustrative forces, as well at the combinations of these two variables shown, arc intended to be rnpresenfative of what lite Soviets could achieve during. Certainly, other combinations are



/Vow large Silos

c postulate that die new largewill initially be deployed in theew large silos under con il ruction at SS-9In addition, we postulate that the Soviets will retrofit the new large missile into lecoiivlructcdilos.

long il would take the Sovietsallajor portion of theirloew rrnssilc wouldon the lime required per silo and onsilos were under conversion at alatter, in turn, would depend thc Soviets were to get theon the one hand and on whatoperational missiles they desired toduring the conversion period on the other.

SovieU might have as manylauncha lime if the program were givenThis would permit the entire forceconverted to Ihe new missile in aboutbut reduce thc number offor large missiles byhis period. Alternatively, ifconsidered lhat all ofnow operational were neededlurgcting requirements, they mightsilos for conversion only as newaboutt athis rate it would take overearsihe entire SSS force. In practice,Soviet targeting requiremenls arcto produce lhat much inflexibility.ofIRV missile Innew nlos now under construction, forwould enable the Soviets to coverasargets now assigned to(which could thenhe number depending on how

much redundancy ol targeting was required because of the smaller MIRV warheads. If the Soviets were content to maintain only about the present number of independently target-able warheads, targeting requirements would place no effective restrictions on the rate of retrofit except atutset.

these factors, wefour ratesear. We assume thatof each silo wouldn one illustrative force where wethat it would takeonths.


; De-

Thc SS-II force now consistsissiles at regular ICBM complexesissiles at Deraxhnya and Pervomaysk. We postulate that the GO new small silos at Dcrazhnya and Pervomaysk will become operational in3 and will be equipped wllh thee further postulate that thc six new large silos at Dcrazhnya and Pervomaysk will notissile equippeduclear payload.

Although there are differences ofas to whether thc SS-lls at Dcrazhnya and Pervomayskrimary role in peripheral or intercontinental attack, we have included

" Vice Adm. Vincent P. do Pole, lhe lenie Inicllicencc Agency, believes

that deployment will likely be broader than In Justsuch iilin nt Dcraihnya and Hated id Ihe test, under certain circumstances thes capable of greater coverage of urban aieai ihan is theodn hts view, the DIPP pioiec-lion of thc deploymentod 3s, beller represents probable Soviet plant for deploymenl of the system.

them in the illuslrative forces because tliey are subject to the restrictions of the Interim agree-ment.

Now Small Miuila

Soviets apparently arenew small liquid-propellant missile butavailable does not yet permit aassessment of its characteristics.that the new missile will havecharacteristics than theystem with three MIRVsthe illustrative forces. In one case,the new small missile Is Initiallya single RV and only later fitted withpayload. The new small missileto incorporate either

ew guidance system

new small missile with adesigned to achieve accuracies of

wouldinimum of two years of flight testing before it could be deployed. Thus, il flight testing has now started,ofissile could be completed by4 at thc earliest, Accordingly, the firstew small missile appears in the illustrative forces ist least three years of testing would be requiredew guidance system with an accuracy^

^^Thut. the first yearissile appears in the illustrative" In either case the test program could

"Vice Adm. Vincent P. de Pols, theIntelligence Agency, believes thelhe Sovtcii sie nowew smallwithrojection of lha deptoyrnenTof suchinhould not be made. For aof hit views on thu lub/eet. see histo Force 5

ear or mute longer than (he minimum time* given here, and two projections take Ihis into account.

Small Silos

n all (he illustrative lorces wethat the Soviets will retrofit the new small missile into reconstructedilos.of an existingilo to theof tho new small silos would he much more difficult than In the case of thcilos, but it could be accomplished tn about one year. Accordingly, we assume that it would requireonths per silo tor this conversion in all but one illustrative lorce, where we postulate it would take an average ofonths. We have not illustrated (he possibility lhat theilos might be only partially reconstructed to accommodate the new small missile

he factors that affect the rates of reconstruct ion ofilos andew large missile are also applicable to the deployment programew small missile If the Soviets wish to maintain the present levelype operational launchers, then only someaunchers would be in conversion a( any one time. If. however, the Soviets were content to maintain theof independently targetablc warheads, then deploymentIRV system would permit retrofit of upilos in thefter theew small silos at Pervomaysk and Dcravhnyfl become operational, and, there-aftcr, there would be no restrictions on the rale of retrofit.

e haveaximumstart rateear for one force- and rates.year for the other illustrative foices.

SoUd-Propellant Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles M

he Soviets appear to have begunew solid-propellant ICDM from Plesetsk thise postulate In all but one forceew solid-propellant ICDM will be developed and deployed and that it will have an accuracy^

andingle RV. We further postulateinimum of aboul two years of flight testing will be required. Thus, the new solid -

- Vic* AoW VnccM P. deW Director. Orfeme Intelligencefrm wtth the pro jettedflint ICBMs Mithei already optratlonal tot low aad medium level ol effort foice projection! Me believes, however, that iheie It sufficient evident* to luggest that liigii level of effort loroe projectioni should reflect the potilbdUy of Greater solid-propellant ICBM

bellevei an appropriate way to portray this Judgment would be to project the development of two jaftd-fMOpellant tCDMi. one lor deployment in thelui beginning3 and another larger ore fee depleyeaent tm sen* SS-II sue* begin-maghe DIM" projects deployment offne.

* ll reinnini possible that thii vehicleighly niudlfiedee para urn phi 4iA9.

ICBM first appears ia the illustra-live forces4 Because the Soviels have relatively little experience withmissiles and because of tbe extended period it took to develop then twoforces we have allowed one and two additional years for thc flight test program. Tbc new missile initially appears in these forces5

purposes of these projections,postulated deployment of the newmissilo onlyilo-launchedas replacement forimited deployment program mightsimply by dissatisfactionesire to advanceand make use of some ofextensive solid-propellantAlternatively, the Soviets mighta new solid-propellant missilebackup to or in competition with aliquid-propellantwhichlimited deployment we haverepresent victory for the other system.

Mobile Intercontinental So/Its*ic Missiles

possible mmewprogram is thc development ofICBM, eitherAL bargainingfor actual deployment. Because of theUS statement during SALdeployment of mobile ICBMs wouldinconsistent with the objectivesinterim agreement, we have notin any of the forces,the Soviets would not want to risk awith thc US on thisn addi-

"Mai. Cen. Assistant Chief ef Suff. fntcllicence, USAF, believe* that there is sufficient -itity that the Soviets would deploy mobile ICBMi Hist he would include them in thr focco tnblca.

tion, the Soviets would probably hesitateof the practical difficulties ofand maintaining mobile ICBMs.that testing has started,olid-propellant mobile ICBM could be ready for deployment as early

Ballistic Missile Submarines andBallistic Missiles

Status of Y-lass Submarines

projections reflect the estimateII above that asctoberwere-lass submarinesorlass unitsere ofD-class. with the configuration ofunder construction at KomsomolskThe Severodvinsk yardshifted over entirety tolass,assume that the four unitsat Komsomolsk and all unitsproduced there will also be of

Size and Makeup of Forces

achieve the force ofodern ballisticsubmarines permitted them underagreement" and in all but oneforce, that they will seek toclose as possible to the total oflaunchers the agreement alsois apparent that if Ihey wish to achievegoal they will sooner or later haveconstruction oflass submarineof one with more launch tubes andlonger production oflass is con-

" Vice Adm. Vincent p. de PoU. the Director. Defense Intelligence Agency, agrees with thisin medium nnd high level of effott prelections. Heiowever. that thc possibilityoviet goal lo deploy fewer thanodern SSBNi should he il Initio lei)ow level of effort projection.



thc more launchers ihe new submarine would have Io carry in order for the USSR to approachimit. Iflasswere built from now on the Soviets would havelass andlassthey reached the level ofnodem ballisticsubmarines iii the.

illustrate how thc Sovietsto build up the number ofto the maximum numberhave projected for alt but one ofew nuclear-poweredmissilea furtheroflass or an entirety newcitherrubes. Awith fewer thanr moretubes is also possible and otherof submarine types could result,if the Soviets convert olderto thctubc SS-NX-8

Submorme-launched Ballistic Missiles "

postulate that theillonly inlass submarine and

"Vice Adm. Vincent P. deie Director. Defense Intelligence Agency, notes that in each of the UluXiative force models it is postulated that theof SLBMs in general lags behind Ihoof ICBMi. He bellevesf^

jjthtt pcetulauon may be in error. Moreover, he believes it is possthle *at lhe Soviets will have greater incentive lo develop MIRVs for SI.BMs than for ICBMs. particularly if tliey continue to maintainew ballistic missile submarines on station al any given time. Theof MlltVs on the SLBMs carried on thesemighlesirable way to increase the weightetaliatory itrike. He therefore believesostutation of al lean equal prtoitty for SLBM development should underlie protections 'hut are judged to be more hVely origher level of effort.

thatlass will utilize thee postulate the introduction in due course of one or more of thc following missiles for retrofit into Y-lass submarinesew SSBN:

new small missileange of atm which would replace thet would incorporate improvements in accuracy and in some cases would have MIRVs as well.m range this missile would nearly quadruple theon-slation operating area oflass submarine with itsm missile This missile appears in allforces,

improved version of theor useew submarine and eventual retrofit intolass is included in all but one illustrative force. Weange ofIRV pay-load, and improved accuracy for this

one Illustrative force weew large SLBM in thelass with very highIRV pay-load,angeun. The missile would be available bothewand for retrofitting intolass.

n all projections we assume that MIRVs will be deployed on ICBMs before Ihey are on SLBMs and that there willimilar lug in any achievement of highpart because of our sense of probable Soviet priorities/^

jJAs with ICBMs, theolaccuracies would require improved guidance systems and RVs either with higher betas or terminal guidance.




We postulate that (he production ratelass submarines will average about seven units afrom theassembly hall at Severodvinsk and two-three from the facility ate further postulate that the introductionew submarine wouldalling off in total production, because it would probably take longer to produce the new submarine thanlass.

Constructionew submarine might begin in tbe csisting main assembly hall at Severodvinsk, conceivably byf so, tho lead units would be available for deployment byroduction could later take place at tho new assembly hall now under construction as well. But It appears morewe soof ft new submarino will take place only in the new hall, which we postulate to be completed inith the first units of the new class showing up in the operational tables Ine postulate construction rates of three or four units of the newear.

Waiting for the new construction hall to become available would in tnost casesalt in startslass units sir to nine months before assembly of the new subrrsartne could begin, if the Soviets desire to maximize the number of SLBM launchers ooodem submarines As spaceavailable in eiistlng constructionat Severodvinsk, the ways concerned could be used for overhaul or retrofit of existing submarines or for other purposes. We make no specific assumptions on this point, beyond assuming that the ways would not be used for thc construction of ballistic missile sub-

lau Submarines

submarines which arethe calling in the SAL agreementin thc illustrative forces.II.lassall but two illustrative forces, all of theunits and thelass submarinetheissile areas new SSBNs enter the force.

assume that the Soviets willthe small Bear and Bison heavyin service for, althoughattrition is indicated In theprofectiorts.

new bomber foruse isonly in fhe high forces.

Backfireot included inHowever, it almost certainlyproduced in substantial numbers and,proves to have adequate range and iftanker Is developed, might be

"The otherlass submarineestnot In-

cluded Id the projections.

"Vite Adm. Vincent P. do PoU. the Direcior. Defense Intel licence Accncy, believes the possibility of the Soviet's deploying the Backfireuitable tanker force lo augment or eventually replace the Bear/Bisc* force Is sufficiently high to warrarjt its-inclusion in fuiure protections as an alternative to the der^loymenlew heavy bomber.

en. Ceorge J. Keegan. Jr, the Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence, USAP. noting thai bomber inventories are not affected by lhe SAL agreement, wouldew bomber in nil of the force tables. Moreover, he believes that tbe basic design of the Baekfue indicate! that ihe Soviets developed thai airciafr toariety of missions, including intercontinental .iltict. He would, therefore, include Backfire in Ihc projections.

used (or intercontinenlal miwious. Wcthat backfire will begin to enteruniu inhe table below il-Instralei the growth of the operational Back-lire force niiuming two different production rates for livelikely and the other high.

Alternate Force. With thc signing of the interimagreement, the Soviets arr faced with important decisions involving trade-offs among different systems, rates of depkrymcnt or retrofit, and the degree of risk to be taken in development programs. The more ambitious rhe development programs for new ICBMs, the higher the risk of delays or possible failure.echnologically ambitioustakes longer to complete and delays the introduction of new systems. The more rapid the rale nf retrofitew missile, the sooner the program is completed. But during the period of rapid retrofit, more delivery vehicles are offline andime total capability may be reduced. The continued production oflass would provideodern SSBNs in the shortest possible time. To approach the limitLBMs. on thc other hand, would require going back to production oflassew SSBN with more thanubes. The freedom to substitute new SLBMs for older SLHMs or ICBMs adds another variable to lhe force planner's problem.

he allrrnative furor devettifwieiiu.i this section represent possible directions Soviet strategic policy could Like. Many other models could lie postulated

Likely Production

Hiuli Production Effort 15

.ind fur one modelarticular force planning philosophy and level oftechnology, many other force levels could be projected in general or in detail.e! ess, we believe the models chosenpossible directions Soviet Intercontinental attack forces could take. It should belhal we consider no one of litem anthat Soviel intercontinental atiack forces will be composed of the particular weaponin Ihe precise numbers listed. They are intended only lo be illustrative models oftrends and differing emphases, and arr developed primarily for broad policy use at thr national level. They are not Intended for defense planning purposes; projectionsfur planning in the Department ofure included in the Defense Intelligence Projections for PlanningP).

c prrwnl five illustrative forces representing different levels of effort by tbe SovieU and different degrees or rate* ofadvance. AH assume that the Soviet* adhere to the SAL agreements and, so as to illustrate more fully what the Soviet* might do under ihr interim agreement on strategic offensiveurther assume that it is eatendeddditionalthai would be open lo the Soviet* if lhc ink-rim agreements were not extended beyondre discussed in. No uttempt is mode lo indicate thc possible impactermanent treaty which repl.tcvs the interim agtrrmcnt. sinceck any good basis for prejudging the content nr liming ofreaty.

Postulated Crowth of Uackfire pone

IW. In constructing thc illustrative force models, we have assumed In all buthat thc Soviets push ahead with qualitative improvements as rapidly as their technology perm its. subject to thc limitation! of the interim agreement on offensive forces. It is possible, however, that they will not, for fear of jeopardizing the follow-on negotiations or ofS response Abo. they may wish, in the. follow-on negotiations, totechnological possibilities, in an effort to further stabilize thc US-Soviet itralegic relationship. If so. they may resist theto take immediate advantage of all that technology may offer. Thus, they may choose, for example, not fo develop MIRVs for any of their missile systems

ll five of the Illustrative forces umiine that MIRVs will be used in one or more of the new missile systems now under development. Three of them postulate that the Soviets do not introduce new and highly accurateof guidance for their missiles within the period of this Estimate.epresents about the most thc SovieU could be expected to achieve under this postulate: it assumes that testing of new missile systems begins soon and proceeds without significant difficulty or delay, permitting IOC* to be achieved in minimum times.llustrates what could happen if, for One reason or another, new weapon programs were not carried out as promptly as postulated for Forceostulates, in addition, leu ambitiousgoals than those ofnd 2.

wo other lorces postulate that within the period of this Estfmale the Soviets Honew and improved guidance systems for their strategic missiles which produceof the order5 nm CEP.ostulates the introduction of new guidance mid other impiovemcnts Liter in the deendu,

and henwtep upward Irom Forceostulates that new. highly accurate guidance systems, along with other improvements, are incorporated in the weapon systems now under development, that the earliest possible IOCs are achieved, and that deployment or retrofit proceeds thereafter at about the highest rates achieved in thc past. It thusossible caseighly artificial one. It is designed to show thethat the Soviets could theoretically

achieve under the present SAL agreements if they have highly ambitious new weapon

programs already well underway und ore able

arry them out without appreciable set-

backs or delays.

he inclusion in two forces of missiles: with an accuracy on the order5 nm CEPeparture from the projections of previous yeats. [


ndnd loextent Forceorrespond to1 Of. which illustratedattempt totrongthroughout the decade, andcorresponds to SALT Forcehicha maximum Soviel effortostulated agreementweapons. The two sets ofhowever, in many particulars,diverse factors as


between the terms of tbc aejecment actually signed and those postulated for last year's protections, thc delay in fall-range testing of the new missiles under development, which necessitated changes in postulatednd various indications that Soviet qualitative goal* may be somewhat higher than wc thought last year.

thc discussion lhat follows,tables show lhe status of thcforces as ofhcrepresents the end of theof about five years for which weto project with some confidence.these forces, however, we haveextended tbe projectionsriefly lummarized these exteisdedand their rationales in the textthe projections for these threeyears, we arc able to depict moretrends effected by major qualitativeaccurate MIRVs andSLBMs, fordoservice until thcnd arein significant numbers until tlie

Force 3

2<M.ostulates that the Soviet* do not introduce highly accurate new systems of guidance during thc period of this Estimate.ostulatesew generation of missiles Incorporates MIRVs 3nd the greatest accuracy attainable through improvement In present systems. It further postulates that testingwithout significant difficulties or delays, permitting thc earliest possible IOCs, and that deployment of new systems is carried out at about the average rate at which comparable systems were deployed during Ihe buildup of the mid- and.

he new large missile ins


iliated to have six MIRVs and an accuracyt would initially be oyed in lhcew silos now underrod ion atomplexes beginning ino lhat it would first appear in theperational totals. Thereafter, it would be retrofitted into reconstructedilosale of seven launchyear. At this rate, deployment of thc new large missile would not be completed until tho.

f is postulatedew smallwith three MIRV* and an accuracybc deployed In recon-

stiuctedilosate of aboutaunchyear starting inhowing up Initially in theperational totals.0 about one-hall of theorce would be converted to the new harder silos with the new small missile.

t is postulated that constructionlass SSBNs stop* atnits andotal oflass units would be completed byonstructionew class SSBN withaunch tubes is assumed to start In Iho new hall nl Severodvinsk4 with tho



lift" unil appearing in the operational totabhis new class SSBN wouldIRVed variant of thehis missile would also be retrofitted intolass latethe decade. Ten of the new SSBNs would be deployed byringing tbe total of modern submarines and missiles to, respectively. Three more SSBNs would become operationalringing thc force

up to totals ofodern submarinesodemew small SLBMange of atm, on which flight testing is postulated to begin in the neat few months, would be retrofitted inloLus submarine starting

hcndCUMs would be phased out of services required by the interim agreement, under the conditions






od m

New Lea* Mwlk


New Small Miisile


New Solid Mbvle







J 54


Bear ASM Caertw

Bear Bomber

Bison Homber

'll ihould he noted thai some Agencies have liken bsue wiih ceriain of Ihe assumption* on which tliii table ii based. Their differences are noted at Appropriate points earlier in the


ew iolId-propellant ICBM would replace the'tattinghe exist iut! heavy bombersomeassuraed to remain operational lor the remainder ol tho decade.

his illustrative force would provide the Soviets with strong strategic capabilities throughout thc decade. The large Soviet SLBM force and the low level of ABMin Ihe US would ensure the Soviets an excellent retaliatory capability. In addition, the deployment of accurate MIBVs oo ICBMs would considerably improve Soviet counter-force capabilities.

hc Soviets might build something litisf Ihey wished to carry out vigorous development and deployment programsIhe constraints of the agreement but> nccJ to lake chances with advancedor to make an all-out effort to deploy their new weapon systems rapidly. They might well consider something likes nn appropriate level of effort for maintaining rough parity if they view US forces asalong the tines of programmed forces and wanted totrong deterrent against something like the postulated US augmented force. They might abo seeesirable "bargaining chip" during the follow-on SAL ncgotrations.

force 7

Ell.ostulates that thc Soviets undertake the same programs as inut take longer to develop and deploy thc new weaponbecause flight testing begins later, difficulties or delays are encountered, or both. In all other respects, the forces are identical, because tbey reflect the same objectives and goals. Although the discussion proceeds on this basis, the force-could alsoesser sense of urgency than Force 3.

n Ihc case of the new large and new small liquid-propellant ICBMs. both of which appear to bo al or close lo thc flight test stage.ostulates that three years of testing takes place before IOC. or one year more than in Forcehe new solid-propel-lant missile, though probably already in flight test, appears two years later lhan In Forceeflecting the possibility that the Soviets, who have had less experience and success with thii lypc of technology lhan with liquld-propel-lant systems, could encounter difficulties and delays of thc sort experienced in olher solid-propellant programs.lso depicts IOC dates for the new SSBN and new large SLBM which are two years later than those of Forceeflecting the possibility that the newhall at Severodvinsk may not beas soon as wc expect, that the first of live new submarines is not as far along inor will lake longer to construct andthan is postulated in Forcer that Ihere may be similar delays in the new SLBM program. Only one year's delay is postulated, however, for IOC of lhe new small SLBM. because the technical problems involved arc potentially less formidable.

he postulates regarding IOC are purely illustrative and ihcii application Is to some extent arbitrary. It is unlikely lhat all new systems would take longer fo reach IOC than what we consider the minimumlime.ewbeing applied in more lhan one piogram, however, delays lo several might be involved. In any event, wc cannot determine in advance which programs might lag, or by how much; some might lake even longer lo complete tlian depicted here.llustrates the general point that manydevelopment programs do not progress as rapidly and smoothly as is postulated in Force 3.






od 1


,, *- J


New Smill Miuilo


New Solid





Y/NewV.I J



Bear ASM

Ben Borobe*

Bison Bomber

iliould be noted that tome Agencies haw taken Hiue with certain of the assumption, on which this lable is bated. Their differences arc noted ot appropriatearlier In the paper-

strategic capabilities of Forcecomparable to those of Forceinceforces reflect the same objectivesthe comments made in the lastthe reasons for adopting Force 3its strategic capabilities also apply here.

Foreo f

major difference betweenandrc thatmstulatcs

more modest technological goaUlower rate of deployment for new systems. Init lacks lhc new solid-propellant ICBM and the new SSBN provided lor in Force 2.

ne-postulate that flight testsew large ICBMew small ICBM arc not completed until5 or0 because the Soviets encounter problems In the final development of these systems or because flight testing does not





New Large Militia


Mod 1

Mod 3

New Smajl Mlulle






Bear ASM Can-let

Beat Bomber

Bison Bomber

*I( should be noted that some Agencies have taken Issue with certain ol the assumptions on which thii table it based. Their differences are noted at appropriate points earlier in tho paper.

soon or both. Accordingly, as In Forcehc first lime ihey appear in the tables is

he new large ICBM which is Initially deployed inould carry only three MIRVsEPC

^|This missile would be deployed in thcew large silos bynd subse-quendy deployed in reconstructedilos. Continued development results in the Intro-duclionew payload for the missile with more MIRVs (six) and better accuracyT

Jinboul fiveroups are retrofitted each year0

when about one-half of the presentorce would have been retrofitted with new silos and new missiles.

To take account of the possibility thai thc Soviets do not develop MIRVs for their small ICBMs, we postulate developmentew small ICBM with one RV whichomewhat better accuracy than theodis introduced in5 and first appears in the operational totals inbout sixaunchconverted each year.

Productionlassis postulated lo cease with thc launching



thet unit. Consttuctlon oflass submarine is postulated to continue at both Severodvinsk and Komsomol'sk untilnits have been completed. Thc new hall atis assumed to be used either for construction of general purpose submarines or for overhaul of nuclear submarines.

This program would allow thc Soviets toleet ofodem ballistic missile submarinesotalodern SLBMs byhe number of SLBMs in thc force falls short of tbe ceilingut would permit retention of someardndhoice that could be proposed by the SftP.

A new missile about; the size of theith atm range is assumed to be retrofitted intolass units. Deployment of this missile would beginnother new missile of about thc same size and range as theut MIRVed would be retrofitted intolasswith thc first units becoming operational

Thendoft sites areas SLBMs enter service but theard sites are retained in the force.lasses are decommissionedhc existing bombersomemaintained throughout thc decade.

ould give theood retaliatory capability because of the increased number of sea-based missiles and hardened ICBM silos. Hard target capabilities would be enhanced at the end of the decade by the improved accuracy and additional MIRVs on the new large missile.

Tho Soviets might build something likef they decide lo pursue development programs with low risks and if some of their FeVD is not as far along as postulated in Force

lie Soviets might consider something likes an appropriate level of effort toredible deterrent againstUS forces.

Force 4

ostulates. like Forcehat: (a) the Soviets will soon begin flightew generation of missiles whichMIRVs and thc level of accuracythrough improvements in presentand(b) teeing proceeds withoutdifficulties or delays, so that thepossible IOCs arc achieved. It differs fromn postulating the introduction later in the decade of new missile systems with" also postulates that new missile systems will be deployedigher rate than In Force 3.

The new large missile underis postulated loIRVand, initially, improvements In existing guidance sysiems, resulting in a

^}This missile would beew large silos byndIn reconstructedilosatea year. Flight testingewwould begin5 and bethree years. This missileand a

would enter the force in8 and beat the same rate as thc earlier syslem. It first appears in thc operational totals in

new small missile with three MIRVs

and at0

be available int is deployed inilos reconstructed to the newdescribed earlier. It first appears in theperationalollow-onprogram would involve- new and highly











Large Missile

Mod 1



Sm.II Mlstile


Solid Missile 1






ASM Carrier











ihould be noted that tome on which thii table Is bated. Their paper.

have laVen issue with certain ol the assumptions are noted at appropriate point) earlier In thc

techniques of guidance. Mightwould beginhe system would be available for deployment in9 andIn the tablese project arate ofear for both systems.

t is postulated that conitructionlass SSBNs stops atnits andotal oflass units would be completed


he submarine building program lors postulated toew SSBN withaunch tubes. Construction of the new SSBN would start4 in tbe new hall at Severodvinsk. Bybe Soviets would havelass.lass andew classtotal ofodem submarinesodern SLBMs.


3-MIRV variant of theis-silo withwould bofor the new SSBN and alio retrofitted toew longer0 nm) missile with three MIRVs anilystemould bo developed to replace thcn

Thendissiles andhut submarines would be phased out as the new SSBNs areewICBM replaces thctartinghe current bomber force would be reduced somewhat throughewbomber would be introduced8 and deployedate of.eur.

The deployment ofould provide Ihe Soviets with excellent strategic capabilities by theven wbenwith the augmented US force. The sea-based component wouldignificant deterrent capability by itself. The largeof accurate warheads in the ICBM force would give theubstantial capability to destroy hardened targets.

ecision lo press uhead vigorously with thc moderntxatfon of strategic forces without undertaking the all-out and highly successful effort to advance technology portrayed in Forceither for specific purposes of counterforce targeting or outeneral desire fo catch up to the US. the Soviets may already have decided that they must have highly accurate MIRVs and other force improvement* as soon as possible. Alternatively,ouldater decision by the Soviets to step up their own offorts in response to new US(hey could not under these circumilances meet the deployment time tables called for inn the systems with highly accurate MIRVs were already underway

force 5"

llustralcs what Ihe Soviets might be able to accomplish if they decided to push the limit* of their state-of-the-art In the development ol new weapon systems, andto deploy (or retrofit) these systems at thc highest rates achieved in the past. Itspecifically lhat the new generation of missiles now at or near the flight test stage Is equipped with new guidance systems pro^ viding accuracy

that new SLBMs are well along. thai lhe Soviets encounter no significantor delays in any of their flight testIt thus assumes thai the basic decisions to undertake such ambitious programs were initially made several years ago. and that the Soviets enjoy an unprecedented degree of success in meeting successive program goals.

" Directo. ofe aaal Research. Dep.rlmeM of Stale. Vice Adm Vincent P. de Pois.irector, Defense Irvtelueence Arency-Lt. Cen. Samuel C. PJidllpt. the Director.ecurity Agency, Maj. Cen. William E. Pons, the

rector i



of the Atniy; Rear Adm Earl F. Reclanus. llKnval Intelligence. Department of the and Maj. Cen. Cee.gc J. Kee

aval Intelligence.en. George J. Kee^nn.lx Annum Chief of Still, Intelligence. USAF. contider the chances of Sovietl-ing xiyo be so rrmotr (hat Ir .hnuld not be included In oV Estimate, f

J (For thef Slaw. NSA. and Am Force on truuie accarary set their footnote to)

3 yean see. to solve llw to the development nl of lucli accuracy In con-ol MIRVedhose problem.

Adm. deai. Cen. Polls, and Rearcianui lurlhrrhe Soviets almost ceit.inl)

notosition 2<

lyitrmi expat rncllon -Ilh the 1


Jd have beenearsermit Ihc initiation of tcating ihuuch testma In turnrssc for first .taployrnent of thc system, no earlier than latey believe thai theIPPetter represcBUiion of minun SovietMM tcchnolog-al capabiW throuifh



New Uw MU>de



New Sm.ll MtaiOe

New SoJid MUiiie










C-ji ASM

Beai Bomber


( it postulatedew large missileighlyMIRV warhead Vvjll be ready for de-^oyment in lheew large silos in5car test program, and Ihe missile first appears in the table inilos would be converted to the new harder configuration and fitted out wllh tlie new missileateear.

he developmentighly accurate new small missileEPf"

IRV payload would also be completed by5 and the missile would be deployed inilos that had been reconstructed to the new configurationearlier. The deployment rate would bear year.

he submarine building program would be planned to meet thc constraints posed by

Atencies do not believe lhalhould be Included In ihit Estimate. See iheir footnote lo ihe dttcuiUon of Force 3


interim agreement and tlie completion of tho new construction hall it Severodvinsk. All submarine starts at Komsomofik andwould be oflass.ew SSDN withunch lubes would be built in Ihc now hall at Severodvinsk beginningith the first unit appearing In the operational totalsew huge SLBMIRV warheadholly new guidance system would be developed for this submarine; it would also be retrofitted into Ihelass submarines startingew small3-MIRVs and ^would be retro-Tiltedlass units starlingyhc Soviets would havess.lass. andew SSBNs.otal ofodern submarinesodern SLBMs.

Thendissiles and allIats and thclass submarines would bo phased out as lhc now SSBNs begin seaew lolid-propellant ICBM would replace lhetartinghebomber force would be reducedthroughew modern inter-continental bomber would be developed and deployed in the.

Forceike Forceould provide the USSR with excellent retaliatory capabilities throughven when compared with the augmented US force. The Soviets could use their accurate SLBMs toarge

- number of military targets as well as toan assured destruction capability. Thc counterforoe capabilities ofre greater than those ofecause of the larger number of accurate MIRVs on ICBMs.

5 is designed to show thcthai we believe thc Soviets couldthe SAL agreement, il reflectsthnical progress In allcomponents of tbe Soviet forces for

Intercontinental attack. The rate and extent of progress in development and deployment could not be achieved unless die Soviets were making an all-out effort,ighlyone. It is,imiting case, and,ense, an artificial one.

s indicativedirection in which Soviet planningIt Is probable that at least somebeen urging for some time lhat themust move rapidly to achievehigh accuracies for atart offorce, to keep pace within the US strategic posturesustain the USSR's bargaining positiontalks. Soviet inclinations to movegoals ofould have beenif they bad become convinced thatfor its part, would make an all-oul effortits position under Iheif the Soviets saw sufficient' significantly improving their positionthe possibility of an adverse USAny demonstrable progress inIhe advanced technology called for5 would probably strengthen thcthose who favored the use of the new tech-


likely Soviel Courses of Aciion

Il bears repeating thai we consider none of our projections an estimate thatforces for intercontinental attack will be composed of the particular weapon systems listed In the precise numbers shown. The projections are intended to be illustrative of possible trends and differing emphases-thc paths actually adopted by thc Sovieis will inevitably differ from those we have depicted, not only in matters of detail but in bioader aspects as welt.

Much will depend on thc outcome of Ihc follow-on SALermanent treaty replacing thc interim offensive agreement


contain new and more restrictive piu-virions governing fhe site and characteristics of the strategic attack forces of both sides. This would reduce both opportunity andfor the Soviets to continue their force buildup as originally planned

ven in the absence of significantly greater restrictions than those of the interim agreement, the Soviets may consider it un-necessary, now or later, to do most or all of thc things permitted them under tho interim agreement, as we have generally postulated. For example, they might not retrofit all of theirndilos to the new and harder silo configuration, or get as close as possible to tho SSDN/SLBM totals permitted under the interim agreement. Alio, it has not been feasible in constructing the illustrative projections to take full account of tlieof slippage in meeting program target dates. The projections do not take account of the possibility that, as in the past, tome development piograms will be cancelled bo-fore completion or result in only limited

iven these limitations andour best judgment is that the Soviets' will probably head Into the resumed SAL talks with something like the goab of Forcencorporating into their new systems the best technology which can be exploitedundue risk of delay or failure, and moving promptly forward with deployment. They probably will be forced, however, to settle for some slippages of the type illustrated on an across-the-boards basis in Forcehewould thus be something betweennd Force 2.

2-IS. Other possibilities must also be taken into account We may be wrong about how close the Soviets are toorkable MIRV system, and may be attributing to thc

first MIRVs belter characteristics than they in fact will have. We could even bein our long-held belief that the Soviets place great store on having MIRVs. Themight conclude that limited MIRVand more modest technical goab. of the kind portrayed in Forceere adequate for their needs, at least initially. They might also believe that the US has moro to gain than the USSRontinuing technological race, andolicy of restraint along the lines ofould facilitate theof desirable restrictions on technological

lternately, the Soviets could have in-coiporaled now techniques of guidance in weapon systems now under development. This couldesire to have at least the option of developing something likeoing ahead initially with risore conserva-tive design goals but laying the groundwork for achieving very high accuracies later in the decade. The eitent of foUow-through would dependumber of factors: the progress of the developmrnt programs involved; the degree of bureaucratic momentum ihey had generated; and. above all. the prospects for SAL and the eaten! to which the competitive siluationis the US apjieared to require the effort-

n the light of the work now going on in guidance technology, we cannot rule out tbe possibility that the Soviets arc even now seeking to achieve thc high accuracies and other technological advances depicted in Forcend that theswell along. We consider this highly unlikely however. For one thing.echnological leap greater than those of the past and one which aof the Soviets. Even if they were willing to make thc necessary effort, they an- unlikely to be as consistently successful



the projections inndicate. Aside from iucli considerations, (lie .Soviets would have to recognize that Ihe kind of buildup depicted inould almost certainly be viewed with great alarm in the US andtrong reaction,

As we have Indicated, all of thepostulate that the interim agreement will be extended at leastow much moreoviet buildup might take place if the interim agreement were allowed to lapse ins hard to determine. Much would depend on what programs the Soviets were pursuing on how much preparation had been made in aniicipatiun of termination, and on the slate uf thc US-Soviet strategic rivalry at thc lime.

In general, the most significant changes that thc Soviets could effect would be in their ICBM forces. The SLUM forces shown in the tables would probably be affected veryhe near lerm because in most of the forces we postulate lhat the Soviets would be fully occupied up through the end of tbe decade in building up to tho SSBN/SLBM levelsby the Interim agreement The arms limitation agreement! Impose no constraints on bombers.

Lifting ihc ban on the construction of additional ICBM silos would not only enable thc Soviets to increase the number of ICBMs,

but also to install newer missiles without faking sizable numbers of existing silos off line for retrofit. Assuming sufficient advance preparation and thc availability of Ihe missiles for deployment, ihey might be able lo add as manyew large ICBMs, upew small ICBMs, and upobile ICBMs to the force byn the basiswo year construction time for each new silo and deployment at the highest rale achieved in thc past. The achievement of these numbers would require them to forego the retrofit of existing silos unless they were willing and able to deploy at rates higher than those achieved in the past

n sum. we areoint of particular uncertainty about Soviet capabilities andTbe provisions of the interimand thc evidence of developmentnow under wayasis for assessing the general course of current Soviet programs. But ll is still unclear what levels of technology the Soviets are seeking and how far and how fast they will deploy. In the course of thc next five toears thc Soviets are almost certain to embark on some strategic programs of which wc now have little inkling. As in thc past, thc Soviets will doubtlesslo make strategic program decisions which wc will find hard to explain in terms of clear-cut military or political goals,



I Ihliniomirotsd byCanlrol Intelligence Agency Thiiorltec.pent ond olmeed So know bovH Aod*onoi eivervtolmay be ui-i'-icJ by lh* tollow-ing olfiooii within ibairkportniBntii

a. Director ol Intelligence and Research, (or Ihe Depailmeni of Stale b Director. Defense Intelligence Agency, lor the Office o' the Secretary ol Defense ond the orgeeUiaiion of rhe ioint CWfi ol Stall

Chitf ol Shrfl for InSellroence, Deparrmmi ol the Army, lot ihe

Department ol the Army d Atlisioit Chief of Naval Operationsor iho Department ol tha Ma-y

CWll. Wvligence.ororNncrat ol ike Air


I. OneOor of Intelligence, AIC, lor Ihe Atomic Energy ComTiistion g. Anbiont Direclor, FEU, lor the Federal Bureau of Investigation k. Director ol NSA. for the National Security Agency

ctce ofOA. to*epoatmeriieency

document moy bo retained, or doiltoyed by burning in accordancesecurity regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agencythe Oflice ol Nolionol Cslimorai, CIA.

this docueaeat 4 duvrivuroled Crntneos. the cuvroi recipe Ml may

reMt" Iteriod not ki exeti of one year. At lhe end ol tha per od. lhe doevment should oil her be destroyed, returned to iho forwarding agency, or pOr-misiion ihould be requosldd a' the lorwardlng agency to retain il in accordance with2

4 The life ot thiram *n should be elos siUd- ,fce**eT

OlSIfilBUIiON While Home

National Security Council Deportment of Stoic Department of Defense AtomicCommit lion federal Bureau of In-eiligolon


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