MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS
gia msmm review program
REL&SE AS SANITIZED
Soviet Strategic Defenses
- Top Soorct*
THIS MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS OF NIES SUBMITTED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND CONCURRED IN BY THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD.
Ihe following infel'igencs ofgoniiofiom patlicipolcd in Ih* prepoialion of Iho flitimo'ei
TW Ceiiio!Agency, lhe in**il*gee>c* organu-otMni of lheof Stale ondnd the MSA.
The Deputy Director of Central IntslfcgerK*
The Dof Intelligence and Research. Department of State In*DefenseAgency Ih* Director, National Security Agency
The Assistant Generol Manoger for Notionol Security. Atomic tnergy Commission Abstaining!
Ihe Assrtianl Director. Federalol Inve-tne/oilon, ond Special Asslitorrl la the Secretary of the Treaswry. Department ol the Treasury, the tJofott being oof lid* of thev jurisdiction.
conlalni Information affecting the national laeufiry ol the United St.in -it'i-l tho eipionogo.aw pianinos III tronsnVHiion or ihe lareJatian of bi contents in any mono*'unautl-fiied person, oi well as Hi os* in any manner pre|udiiiol to theInterest of ih* United Stares or for the benefit of ony foreign govwnrnent torSe^delruoenl of the United Slates. It ii to be soon only by personnelIndoNtooSwd ond auShoruutd to reewrr* information In the deiignotad control ehonn*M
APPROVEO FOR RELEASE CIA HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM
MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS OFOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSES
Forces end Capabilities S
ACAINST BALLISTIC 7
Moscow Anb'ballistjc Missile System
MImUo Deployment Beyond Moicow
New Optical Mount
ANTISATELLITE DEFENSE. 11
Operations Against United Stales Ballistic Missile Sub-
of Soviet Ballistic Missile Sursmartnea13
STRATEGIC DEFENSES; MILITARY LASER PPOCRAMS 13
APPROVED FOR RELEASE CIA HKTORICftL-REl'lEW PROGRAM
SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSES
Over the past year, Soviet strategic defenses have evolved generally as estimated in, and new evidence does not require thai any of the basic judgments be changed.
The Soviotsumber of major programs underway which arc designed to upgrade their existing strategic air defenses. Porthc range of theystem has been increased. Theyconsider that continuing improvement of existing air defense systems represents the most economical way to enhance their strategic defensive capabilities over the next five years or so.
For the last several years, there have been no new strategic fighter interceptors or surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems under flight test at any of the various research and development) ranges and testsituation which is unique in the post-World War II period. We do not believe, however, that strategic air defense is being downgraded. Rather, it may be that, over the longer term, the Soviets will await more fundamental changes based on new technology, suchook-down, shoot-down system, or different physical phenomena, such as an air defense laser, before undertaking any deployment of new systems.
The pace of Soviet antiballistic missileontinues unabated since the signing of the ABM Treaty. The most significant new development has been the appearance at the Sary Shagan ABM test centerew conical-shaped missile. Indicating the Soviets may now be developing the projected system to intercept reentry vehicles (RVs) within the atmosphere alter exoatmosphericaids have been stripped away. However, it probably will not have an acceleration comparable to that of the US Sprint and has yet to be flight tested.
There.continues to be no evidence of Soviet expansion of ABMat Moscow or construction of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) defenses as penrutted by the Treaty, bulto complete the ballistic missile early warning radar network around the European USSR.
We have detected no significant advances in Soviet antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities which increase the threat to the USmissile launching nuclear submarine force, althoughwork on new techniques is clearly being intensively pursued. Tbe most modem Soviet nuclear submarines are still far noisier than those of the US. As noted in. the Soviets continue toonsiderable and vigorous research effort in the area ofdetection by utilizing nonacoustic phenomona. In this area our information onontinues to be limited, and ourare great. However, none of the currently better understood nonacoustic detection techniques appear toasic solution to finding US ballistic missile submarines in the openhe Soviets
" Tb* Dwector of Ns-el Intelufrne*.of tbeI* concernedotntkl Sovsel ASW cinlililW appeare iindcrstated. He belie-ea lhat the Sovtcti in Ufchinf foi fundamental scfetions to their onen-oeesn deteetiim problem Further he betloeaheir Intensive effort! in rsenacoosbe dBarJlner mtrral the SovieU believe thev may he sUe to rope wiih this problem st scene time la tbe future, lo stMibOD lo Ih* advent ol new Sovicl longer range ASW weapons and ASW-capable nuclear submariner. Soviet Interest end research In nonacoustic ASW applicable technology Is large andtgniftcaM develoccnent could be manifested in any of the levers! nonacoiuQc dliciplinei.t"
"jt appears that Soviet technology may be ahead of the US In aipluiiruj or eiptoiung these approaches.
arc also working at reducing the vulnerability of their own ballistic missile launching nuclear submarines (SSBNs) by modifying patrol areas and by deploying SSBNsun missiles.
Past evidence regarding the existence of major Soviet militaryrograms has been reinforced. The Soviets arc now installing what mayaser radar at Sary Shagan. Ii (his in fact is the case, they could start testing the device bye estimateaser radar for use against satellites and ballistic missile RVs could be operationalhe Soviets are also believed to have atoaser weapon system. Air defense will probably be the earliest feasible strategic use ofystem. We continue toas stated in, that thc first demonstrations of an air defense laser weapon system'probably could not take placend first deployment could not be before the. Laser weapons for tbe destruction of satellites and ballistic missile RVswill not be available before the, although the Soviets now have some capability to interfere with photoreconnaissance satellites,
Since (lit publication ol, Soviet effort! to improve their strategic defenses have continued essentially as expected.orms tioo has been obtained In tho fields of air defense, ballistic missile defense, and strategic ASW which adds to our understanding of these elements. On the other hand, there It no new evidence which Inaeases. oor grasp of theand scope of Soviet anttjateuito or civil defense activity. None of the new Information, or lack thereof, bas altered the basic judgments of the Estimate nor have any of the dissenting agency views been changed. This Memorandum to Holders review* those recent developments which pertain lo the roa|or judgments In the Ei tun it e. and it assesses their significance.
I. STRATEGIC AIR DEFENSE
hc air threat, as perceived by theis both large and technicallyWhile the bomber forces of the US Strategic Air Command have continued to decline in numbers, developments Incountermeasures, alr-lc-surface missilesnd tactics have tended to increase their ability to penetrate strategic air defenses. In addition, the Soviets are faced with the nuclear threat posed by US tactical aircraft
and missiles stationed In Europe, Asia, and at sea and with the air threat posed by the rest of NATO in the west ind by China to the south. The Soviet effort to counter these threats continues as described in.
Although the overall tlx* of their figbter-interceptor force hu clecresssed, itsagainst air attacks from medium and high altitudes continues to be enhanced. This is being done by making greater use of the latest air defense data transmission systems, by extending litem into new areas, and bythc proportion of modern aircraft in Ihe interceptor inventory. The number of SAM launchers has remained essentially the same as last year.
Although the recent Middle East war showed that the Soviets have improved tactical low-altitude defenses, the weaknesses of the strategic air defenses against low-altitudeand against modern standoff threats such is Ihe US short-range attack nusstle (SRAM) remain. Soviet efforts to overcome thesehave continued, but no fundmental
to either of thc problems appears near. The employment of nuclear warheads in air defense systems would be an Important factor in meeting both of these threats. There is, however, still no conclusive evidence that nuclear warheads are available to the airforces.
supersonic speedsew radar withrange and possibly better Iow-alti-tudc capabilities. [
Current Forces and Capabilities
s of the end3 thereighter interceptors in the PVO StranyThis numberecline of some 3G0 aircraft since the publication ofnd results from the fact that aging(Fresco, Farmer, and Flashlight) arc being withdrawn faster than Flagon and Foxbat are being deployed. There has been littles if any change In the number of Fisbpor, Firebar and Fiddler aircraft assigned to PV& Strany during the period.
SOVIET AIB DEFENSE INTERCEPTOR AIRCRAFT AS OF THE END3
lashlight hat been phased out of PVO Strany during thc last year.
he capabilities of PVO'sforce have improved somewhat over the last year. Soviet exercises and practice ground-controlled intercepts reflect theireffort to insure interceptorPerhaps Ihe most striking improvements have been made In theew model of which has an increased combat radius at
he Soviet strategic SAM forces havethe same number of launchers as last year. While they have inactivated someattalions, tbey have added overattalions andperationalomplexes. As of the endhe Soviets soilotal of0 operational SAMof all types.
SOVIET AIR DEFENSE SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE FORCES AS OF THE END3
Sites (Battalions) . .
launcheri have two or four launch rails.
c continue to believe thatomplexes will finally be deployed. Recentomplexes have, for the most part, been built containing only one or two sites instead of three. This suggests that the Soviets may have cut back the originalSome of the latest deploymentsalready existing coverage.
continuing construction ol newend the re-cqiiipoKnt of old reflectconcern over low-altitudethe past year the Soviets havefour-rail launcher to replace the typicallaunchen. So far the now rour-railhave appeared at about GO sites, latwo of the new launcher* haveolder ones, aod the ready missiles oneach site have remained the same. Atsites, however, four older launchersreplaced by three of the0 percent increase tnWhile It Is too early In the programfirm Judgments regarding thc changeconfiguration, we believe thatpurpose Is to increase the readyof theites.
B. Future Developments
Soviets are developing aradars which could enhance Soviet aircapabilities. The over-the-horizon(OHD) system being built nearbe able to provide early warningattacking from the Faeroes Capsuccessful in this role, the Kiev radarearly warning against alrcraltatltitude several hundred
miles from the Soviet border. At the same time, radars continue to bo developed at theYar Missile Test Center. In one areaew. large aperture, nodding height finder radar (Odd Pair) fcutaOedoot tower. If deployed la this manner, the radars horizon would be considerably ox-tended, and low-altitude aircraft would besooner. Several new. unidentified air surveillance radars are locatedecond area, but their potential role is not known at this lime.
lhe Soviets have had no new strategic fighter-interceptors or SAMs under test fet any of thcanges and test facilities' for severalsituation unique In tbe postwar period. As it usually takes some five years from our first identificationew system until its deployment, this means they probably will sot deploy any new models of aircraft or SAMs developed jpecilicaily for PVO Strany before the.
On the other hand, we haveontinuous cycle of improvements insystems, designed largely to improve performance against the low-altitude bomberotentially significant development involving elements of theystem isat Launch Complex G. Sary Shagan.
^may Indicate that some part of theystem is being modified and optirnixed totargets at greater ranges aod to engage them at lower altitudes. It li also possible thats being used toew strategic SAM, but until it receives more equipment, these activities will remain
n tbe past few years, tbe SovieU have added optical systems to tactically deployed
elevision iystcm ton tho field foices. These electro-optical aids, which can be used to perform some radar functions, counter to some degree the use of electronic count enneasures by attacking aircraft and, in certain cases, permit rnore effectiveof low-altitude targets. Tbc Soviets may also Introduce such systems Into strategic SAM defenses.
li It Is also possible that the SovieU will Integrate SAM systems, normally associated with the field forces, into strategic defenses. Systems such as thendave some capability against low-alo'tudc bombers, and, since they arc mobile, they could complicate US SAM avoidance and suppression tactics. Further, the Soviets could introduce Into PVO Strany new mterceptors based oa tactical fighters such as tbe Flogger, which has been deployed, or rhe Fencer, which is now being tested.
IS. We doubt that the Soviets will deploy, over the neat five years, anywhoUy new air defense weapon systems which provide merely increineutal improvements over presentThey probably consider that continuing improvement of elasting defense systemstlie most economical way to enhance their strategic defensive capabilities. It may be that the Soviets will await morechanges based on new technology, suchook-down, shoot-down system, orphysical phenomena, such as an airlaser, before undertaking anyof new systems. Both could bein the, as indicated In. They probably are working now on componentsaser system, as Indicated In Section VI of this Memorandum. Based on evidence to date, we continue to believe that the Soviets have not developed an Integrated look-down,ys-
tem incorporating compatible
missiles whichighter interceptor to engage targets well below its own altitude
there will probably be nostrategic air defense weapon systemsat least until late In the decade,urn ben of weapons will probablyare at least two factors whichany major pbaseout of presentThe fint ts the fact that thesea complicating element in USplanning. As long as tbey existbe avoided, degraded, orthis Is accomplished withby (ho penetrating air forces, or both,
' it meansortionS attack must be used to neutralizeecond factor Is tbe requirement for maintaining air defenses sufficiently strong that they could not be suppressed and penetratedarge scalehird country.
II. DEFENSE AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILES
A Eorly Warning
Soviets have startedthc Hon House ballistic missileradar located near SovaitopoLradar laces
Tjthus providing substantial coverage of potential Polaris/Poseidon launch areas in the Mcdstmanean Sea.
n thc past year, the Soviets have started constructionew Hen House radar in tbe vicinity of tho town of Mukacbovo near the Hungarian border. When the new radaroperational, possibly byt will eliminate thc last remaining gap in early warning coverage of the Mediterranean Sea and will further enhance warning againstmissiles launched from France. Com-
BEST COPT AVA/UBLF
iovict Large ASM and BMEW Radar Coverage
of Ihfi radar will provide the European portion of the USSR with cm on (tallyearly warning coverage againstmissiles. (See
The OHD radar near Kiev could be intended to detect submarine launchedmissfles (SLBMs) launched from the Norwegian Sea. If this is tho case. It could increase warning time of such an attack by One or two minutes. While tho OHD radar is oriented toward the central US. we do notit is intended to detect ICDMs. It would be required to look through the auroral zooe and.esult, the probability of detecting ICBMs would be less thanercent
Analysis of two satellites recently launched by the SovieUG in2 andn November
uggests that they were prototypesigh-altitude surveillance system designed to be placedemisynchronous orbit with apogee over the northern hemisphere The PVO Strany appears to be the authorityfor these vehicles. Based oo the limited data available aad our perception of Sovicl needs, early warning of missile launches seems to be thoir likely role
B. Tho Moscow Antiballistic Missile System
here is still no evidence that the Soviets plan to expand tbe present Moscow defenses as permitted under tbc Treaty to Limit ABM Systems. Construction at the three previously abandoned Try Add completes near Moscow still appears unrelated to ABM weapons de-
No launch areas are being built atnd tbe Soviets are continuing to imtallfoot parabolic dish antennas mentioned in. Possible functions to be served by thii site includevia satellites; satellite tracking; or com-maiid and control of. and data acquisition from, high-altitude SIGINT or ballistic missile early warning satellites.
There has been no evidence ofto the Moscow ABM System which would increase its capabilities over thosein tlie NIE. The Soviets havemade no move to Incorporateunder development at Complex D. Sary Shagan. into the Moscow defenses.
While Hen House coverage of theprovides early warning against SLBMs launched from that area, there Iserious deficiency in local acquisition andtracking capability. Neither the Dog House radar at Naro Fominsk nor tbe Chekhov
j Is oriented to provide the necessary co vera go. Thus, without additional Dog House or Chekhov radars, the Moscow ABM defense could still not cope with moreew SLBMs launched from the Mediterranean.more such radars arc permitted under the ABM Treaty, none are now underand It wouldears toew radar up to its initialcapability.
C. Antiballistic Missile Deployment Beyond Moscow
OA. There is no evidence that tho Soviets arc preparing to deploy ballistic missileoutside the Moscow area. Continuing analysis of activities in tbe vicinity of ICBM deployment areas fails to reveal anyfor their defense as permitted under the terms of the ABM Treaty.
D. Rosearcfi and Development
pace of Soviet BAD in the fieldmissile defense continuesthe signing of the ABM Treaty.
New Interceptor Missile
most significant newboon the appearance. Inconical-shaped missilof
^ Its conicalrobablyto enable it to withstand the severe aerodynamic stresses of high velocityin cndeatinospbcric flight Its relatively larger
^indicates it will notigh acceleration performance comparable to that of the US Sprint It may, however, represent an initial Soviet effort toigh acceleration, endoatmoipberfe ABM
Tbc new missile wiU require athree-year flight test program before being ready for operational use. No launches have taken place,irm assessment of missile performance will necessarily have to await the acquisition of flight test data.
Tbe missile may eventuallyomponent of the system under development atnd/or of the Moscow ABMNeither the ABM lb nor tboLspheric interceptor has the acceleration performance required toelay in their lauoch until atmospheric slowdown of lightweight penetration aids, such as chaff, reveals the incoming RV.ighinterceptor, the Soviets would have
Io consider every chaffalida tactic which would lead to the rapidof their interceptor foxec.
proceeding;elatively slow pace.missile hove
new phase of testing activity. Inew engagement radar/""
""jbardstand requiredonths to complete, and the radar itself was installed within, atweeks, thusto confirm the Judgment inhat ^Jpystem could be deployed
here are indications that the Soviets, have underway an active program to develop radar techniques for dealing with penetration
detect ItVs bidden In chaff, aad they will not haveapability for many yean.
New Optical Mount
possibly related development Uoptical mount which bas beenat Complex D. Sary Shagan,past year. Tbe size, configuration/^
indicate that it mayaser radar. If^ this is In fact the case, it could be in operation by the endhere are several possible uses ofystem which Include satellite tracking or imaging and RV discrimination and tracking. However It Is not yet possible to assess the specific (unction intended. It could be part ofrogram to investigatepotential applications.enera! discussion of lasers, see Section VI below.)
III. ANHSATEUITE DEFENSE
the past year the Sovietsno anosatcllile systems,egarding Sovietcapabilities and intentionsThere is now strong evidence"heavy maneuverable" satellites area program leadingystem foeas suggested in thc NIE.longer believe they are associated withprogram.*
cver, we still do not believe thc Sovietsadar capability to
IV. CIVIL DEFENSE
here have been no developments In Soviet civil defense which cause us to revise our judgments regarding Its missions or
1iscussion of the potential use of Liters In Uie sntiiatellite role, sec Section VI.
further discussion see. "Soviet Space Programs" dated SOOP SECRET ALL SOURCE.
STRATEGIC DEFENSE AGAINST SUBMARINES
udgment! regarding Soviel strategic ASW capabilities remain essentially as stated in
n tliii connection, data collected against units of the latest Soviet nuclear submarine,lass. indicate that its noiseare similar to those of otberlass submarines. We believe that if new quieting techniques were available, they would have been used onlass.
A. Offensive Operations Againsi United States Ballistic Missile Submarines
ver the last year we have obtained evidence that Uie Soviets have conducted area searches in the Mediterranean Sealass nuclear-powered attackThe Soviets probably hope that this tactic wiU eventually enable them to detect andol iris submarine- -something which they have thus far not been able to accomplish. Because Soviet attack submarines arc handicapped by their relatively highnoise levels and poor passive sonars, their chances of even randomlyolaris submarine are small, and their ability toovert acoustic trail remainsnon-existent.
dvances In Soviet ASW-equipment in-elude two new ASW capable nuclearand several longer-range ASWThe now submarinesengthened variant oflass SSN. which has been designatedlass,onger variant of
throf the Ducctoi of Nival lowUi-gro.ee.ol the Nsvy, tra his footnote on psge 2.
lass. Both submarines arc someeet longer than thoir predecessors, but the reason for the increased length has not been determined. It could be for improved sensors, weapons, habitability, or some combination of factors. Preliminary evidence suggests that the noise level ofs about the same as that oflass.las? probablya towable VLF communications buoy. These new submarines represent an Improved ASW capability insofar as they incorporate enhanced Soviet capabilities to communicate with submarines on ASW patrol and carry weapon systems that can' engage enemyat somewhat longer ranges.
ecently identified ASW weaponrocket with apayload. It mayaximumgroat asm, and at this rangeuclear warhead. Nohas been identified, but itsis coincident with the ioQoducton ofV; and .
Soviets have also testedndl
2)lhat appear to be for ASW. Thea surface ship launched cruiseorpedo payload torange of aboutun. It couldoperational on the Kresta IIbmergedunched
rocket, carries aa hominga maximum range of perhaps as much asimilar rocket-boostedtorpedo, but surface launched, may have begun tests in the Black Sea this year.
new classes of surface shipssince the previous estimate ofASW capabilities was published.the Soviets have started constructionsecond unit of thc Kuril class aucraft car-
Inrogramquip Kashin daw frigates with variable-depth sonars bas been identified.
ew information has been obtained on three Soviet sonobuoysheapparently haveow frequency defection capability to their olderecondtbca short-range acoustic direction finding capability. This sonobuoy has been used with tbcnd May aircraftarrier line of omri(directionalhird type of sonobuoy is being developed, but we do not yetits capabilities.
s important as these developmcnU axe to the general Soviet ASW program, tbey will have little impact upon the Soviet Unions ability lo conduct strategic ASW as long as the open ocean detection problem remainsDuring the past year ihere has been no new Information which indicates anyimprovement in Soviet open ocean detection capabilities by acoustic means. Our information on Soviet research in non-acousb'c detection is extremely limited, and ourare greater than for any other technology discussed in. As wc said in that Estimate, we feel reasonablythat the Sovtcls are mounting aeflort ia thU area. And to the extent that they are successful, the result might be aimproved system for search of the open ocean. However, none of tbe currently better understood methodsasicto the problem of finding US SSBNs in the open ocean. Eveo If the Soviets were to develop improved sensors, there would still remain the problemorpora ting these techniques into an integrated system toan effective counter to the US SSBN force. We believe we would recCfgnize theof new detection systems as well as the development of anti-SSBN forcesthem.
B. Protection of Soviet Ballistic Missile Submarines
here are indications lhat the Sovieu may be showing rnore concern over theof their ballistic missile submarine fleet. At an informal arms control seminar boldS university ineorgly A. Arbatov, Director of the Institute of USA, was most cmpliatic about tlw necessity of ASW limitations io conjunction with otheron strategic armaments. Arbatovparticular concern that Sovietwere forced by geography to negotiate relatively narrow and restricted passages in order to gain access to their open ocean patrol areas. Specifically, ho mentioned the area around Spitsbergen as an example of what tlie SovieU face in this regard.
t Is, of course, not possible towhether Arbatov was presenting official concerns or his own private assessment.the SovieU are undoubtedly aware of our ASW activities io and around egress routes used by their SSBNs. They have made some' attempt to protect their SSBNs through changes in operational procedures andpatterns-
3lo the case oflass SSBN. theallistic missile with0 nm range willast increase in potential patrol areas. In addition,!
ermitlass to operateeduced number of contacts with external navigation aids, thus potentially increasing SSBN security.
VI. FUTURE STRATEGIC DEFENSES. MILITARY LASER PROGRAMS
ver the past year there haveumber ol Important developments that re-
force previous evidence of major Soviet military-relatedrograms. We have received an increasing number of indications that their high energy laser research effort is expanding.
The types of lasers and the power sources" being developed by the Soviets suggest that these programs are related to the development of laser weapon systems. However, theof laser radars is apparently also among Soviet objectives.
A. Laser Radars
s Indicated inanalysis indicates that the Soviets may now be in the process ofaser radar for use in conjunction with an antimissile or antisatellite system, y
hile laser radars will not replaceradars, their development couldtheumber of attractiveMost laser radar advantages overradars stem from their higher resolution, whichesult of the short laser wavelengths. Laser radars offer the capability for highly accurate measurements of target range, angle, and velocity, with accuracies at least an order of magnitude better than conventional radars. Because of their small angular beamwidths. laser radar beams scattered from targets can
be used to guide horning type weapons to their targets more precisely. Theirinclude lack of an all weather capability and inability to search large volumes of space because of their small beamwidths. Precision tracking conventional radars must be used to provide target acquisition by the laser.
laser radars could be used forantisatellite, and ABMthe. As part of an airthey could be used to illuminateto provide precision tracking and aguido semi-active homing-type missiles.antisatellite role they could provideephemeris data, "photographic"for satellite identification, and alsotooming interceptor to atarget. Possible applications to ABMinclude precise measurements ofshapes, velocities, and movements ofobjects to permit tracking andof RVs. The laser couldarget illuminator foron scattered target radiationthe target.
B. Laser Weapon Systems
use of lasers to project energyto destroy targets Is also possibleappears to be the earliestuse ofaser weaponsystem could be used to combataircraft and to providetwo most serious afrproblems faced by the Soviets. Tbelaser weapons would still require acommand aod control system andradar carry warning and targetnetwork. The laser's "zero" timehowever, would considerably relieveconstraints which inhibit currentand air-to-air missile systems. We still
lhat the first weapon systemtests are unlikelydeployable laser air defense systemcould not bo available until the
he first laser weapon systems forof satellites and ballistic missile RVs
probably could not be available before tho nuoMSSOs. On the otheraser system capable of interfering with photoreconnais-sance satellites by damaging film or optical train components is presently within Soviet capabilities and could become operational at any time.
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