SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSES (EXCLUDES GLOSSARY AND TABLES OF CHARACTERISTICS) (NI

Created: 11/2/1972

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

NATIONAL

INTELLIGENCE

ESTIMATE

Gift ML REVIEW PRO6H1 RELEASE AS SAKIViZED

Soviet Strategic Defenses

THIS ESTIMATE IS SUBMITTED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND CONCURRED IN BY THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD.

Trie following infelrigonco organizations participated in lha preparation of the estimatei

The Cenlfol Intelligence Aoency ond the intelligence! o'oomto'ioni of ine Oepoi mmn't ol Stoic ond Detente,SA. ond the AtC.

ContW'iftji;

Tke Deputy Dweelor of Ce-HicJ IrifeAgente

The Dsrtetor of Intell-genee ond Research. Depafol Stole Iho Director. Defense Intelligence Agency The Director. National Security Agency

The Director, Division ol International Security Affairs, Atomic fnergy Commission Absfainingr

The Aniitantodefol Bureau* of Investigation, and the Special Assistant to the Secretory o< lhe Treotvry. the tvbjeti being eutude of tHair jurisdiction.

Thii material contains Information affectingDefense of the United Slalai within Ihe meaning ol theSC,, the trans-mistian or revelation olmonner to an unauthorisedrohibited.

m HISTORICAL-REVIEW PHOGRfiftj

NIEOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSES

CONTENTS

Page

SUMMARY AND 1

8

I. THE SOVIET APPROACH TO STRATECIC DEFENSE 8

II. STRATECIC AIR DEFENSE 8

Forces and Capabilities 9

Against Standoff ThreatsJA

Defense Against Short-Range AttackM

Against Low-Altitude Air AttackIS

to16

III. DEFENSE AGAINST BALLISTIC16

Capabilities: The Moscow Antiballistic Missile

Command end Control18

Construction at Moscow20

Large Antennas at Chekhoo20

Work at Previously Abandoned Try Add Complexes20

Missile Research and Development at Sary

Flight Testing21

Top Roost Radar Facility22

IV. STRATECIC DEFENSE AGAINST SUBMARINES22

A. Introduction

B- Protection of Soviet Ballistic Missile22

Page

Operations Against United Slates Ballistic

Present CfltHlWIiriea 23

FrobUmi of 23

Ocean SuroeiiAjnce by Fixed Undf-ncatex

Long-Term Submarine27

Search by Ships, Submarines, and Aircraft

Coordinated Operations . 30

OtAer Approaches to Submarine

31

Tracking, and Orbit

C Intercept

Orbital Intercept Test Program

The HianewtrabU Satellite

The Interceptor Satellite Test

Calibration Satellite

Antisatellite

tber Types of

of Direct Soviet35

CIVIL 36

FRAMEWORK OF FUTURE SOVIET STRATEGICPOLICY AND PLANNING

Strategic Defenses and the Arms Umitation

Future Threat to thc

and Bureaucratic Constraints ..

of Defense Effectiveness

AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW

Deferases

Air Surveillance end Control

Interceptors

Surface-to-Air Missiles

Missile Dclense

Page

6

7O4 58

C. Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare

O. AntisatelliteILLUSTRATIVE FUTURE FORCES

Force Models

ILLUSTRATIVE FORCE MODEL 1

ILLUSTRATIVE FORCE MODEL II

ILLUSTRATIVE FORCE MODEL Ul

ILLUSTRATIVE FORCE MODEL

Soviet Courses of Aciion

SUMMARY COMPARISON OF FORCEOF ILLUSTRATIVE FORCE MODELS FOR

TABIXS OF ILLUSTRATIVE FORCEthru 6S

hru 7fl

TABLES OF ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS AND

PERFORMANCE

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SPrTOED FOR RELEASE CIA HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM

SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSES

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

a sustained and costly effort over the past severalSoviet progress in dcvolopiiig strategic defenses lias notmade in offensive capabilities. The Soviet agreement toon thc Limitation of Antiballistic Missilesnrecognition of this situation. The Treaty will, ofa major impact on future Soviet defensive developments,wc point out below, wo do not expect the Soviets toor forces capable of overcoming the offensive lead.

defenses against ballistic missile attack areshow no prospect of becoming effectiveajorTreaty specifically limits missile defenses. There is nothe Soviets will in the next decade be able to negate theby Western nuclear-powered ballistic missileAnd Soviet air defenses, which already have problemswith low-altitude attacks, face the prospect of furtheras the US deploys new air-to-surface missiles (ASMs) onproposed aircraft.

Air Defensos

air defenses had, asomeradarsadar0 surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers at someond complexes. These defenses are deployed in barriers, across

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the main approach corridors, and around key centers. The defenses arc integrated into an air defense system which increasingly usestechniques for faster and more effective control.

integrated forcesormidable defenseand .large radar cross section aerodynamic ASMsmedium and high altitudes in all weather conditions. Thiscould, however, be degraded by use of electronicdefense suppression, and proper selection of penetrationaltitudes. Capabilities are extremely limitedect) penetrations and almost non-existent againsthigher velocity, low radar cross section ASMs like the USattack missile (SRAM).

against low-altitude attack is made difficult bythat the attacking aircraft or ASMs are hard to detect andagainst the background of ground clutter. Soviet airbeloweet is spotty at best. We expectto continue to improve their low-altitude radar coveragethe number of ground radar sites and by installingradars. In addition, we continue to believe thatdevelop an airborne warning and control system (AWACS)overland look-down radar in ther thereafter.

also believe that the Soviets could develop anall-weather interceptorook-down,by the. Such an aircraft would complementAWACS. But they may not wait until tlica new fighter. While unlikely, they could bring in afighter, based on an existing model, in the.

the present time the Soviets have no defensive systemreliably engage an ASM such as SRAM. Only the SA-5nuclear warhead couldery limited capability againstmeet this threat the Soviets may attempt further to improvealready deployed, although this does not appear to beeffective option for them. However, if attempted, it wouldbe done without giving the appearance that thc SAMs weretoallistic missile defense mission asthe Treaty. On the other hand, thc Soviels mightom-

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pletely new SAM system which would be capable of engaging both ASMs and aircraft penetrating at low altitudes. To be effective,eapon system would have to be widely deployed and wouldintegration with new. more efficient surveillance and command and control systems.

Ballistic Missile Defense

Soviets haveallistic missile earlyon the periphery of the USSR and an ABM system aroundThis ABM system would be susceptible to saturation andIt cannot discriminate between re-entry vehicles (RVs) andaids outside the atmosphere, and thc lack of highprevents it from waiting for atmospheric sorting afterobjects enter the atmosphere.

Moscow System'sautical mile (nm) rangean inherent capability to defend regions outside the Moscowonlyaunchers and no provision for rapid reload, thebe thin. Used to protect the immediate Moscowhoot-look-shoot technique, the system could probablyagainstVs andThus, the defense would at best be effective against anunauthorized launch ormall, third country attack.

J. The present limitations of the Moscow System and continuing ABM research programs at Sary Shagan suggest that the Soviets will want over the next decade to improve and fill out the Moscow defenses toaunchers allowed under the Treaty. If such improvement startsew exoatmospheric systemnderat Sary Shagan would be the most likely candidate. It wouldreater target handling and engagement capacity, but would, of course, still be of limited capability.

K. The Soviets are also developing another ABM systemt Sary Shagan. The first sites could be deployed rather quickly (on the orderear from start of construction toldiough widespread deployment mightears or more. This system could, without the addition of anlong-range acquisition radar,hin defense against RVs which exhibit large radar cross sections and re-enter the atmos-

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phete relatively slowly (such as Polaris or postulated Chineseefense against more sophisticated weaponsoseidon or Minute-man) would require an interceptor with much higher acceleration. Even so, if deployed in the near future, this system seems at present to be the best candidate for defense of an area containingballistic missiles as allowed under the Treaty.

Defense Against Ballistic Missile Submarines

L. The Soviets have demonstrated no capability to detect US SSBNs on patrol in thc open ocean. The USSR has no equivalent to the US sound surveillance system and thus cannot keep track ofSSBNs by this method. Further. Soviet submarines are not able to trail US SSBNs covertly (using passive sonars) because of the noise advantage enjoyed by thc US submarines. Thc Soviets have not attempted to maintain overt trail (using active sonars) on patrolling SSBNs, and we believe that if they did they probably could notit for extended periods. Nor is open ocean search by Soviet ships, submarines, and aircraft effective against SSBNs.

M. We do not anticipate that the Soviets will arrive at anysolution to detecting US SSBNs within the decade. The basic difficulty of detecting SSBNs on patrol in the open ocean will remain. We do, however, expect the Soviets to improve their acousticdevices, to install them on ships and submarines, and perhaps to deploy, in limited areas, some improved fixed acoustic arrays and moored buoys. Even though thc Soviets will reduce the noise levels of their submarines, the noise advantage enjoyed by US SSBNs is such that,orce, they will not be vulnerableesult of theseduring theear period of this Estimate.

N. We expect thc Soviets to improve their magnetic anomalycapability and to develop other non-acoustic detection methods. However, they would still face the problem of integrating the non-acoustic detection techniques into their antisubmarine warfare forces, and none of the better understood methods appears to offer ato the problem of submarine detection in the open ocean.

Antisatellite Defense

O.he Soviets have been conducting an active orbital intercept program. They have demonstrated on at least seven different

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occasions that they arc capable of engaging satellites in otbilm. On the basis of these tests, we believe the Soviets can conduct non-nuclear attack on satellites belowm. Useowerful enough launch vehicle might permit them in the future to engage satellites atm) altitudes. Another approach available to the Soviets would be to use thc Galosh ABM interceptor to conduct non-nuclear attacks on satellites upm and perhaps as highm, although at thisuclear warhead might be required.

P. Considering the importance of space reconnaissance to the viability of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks agreements, we continue to believe it highly unlikely that the Soviets wouldinterfere with US satellites. They have agreed in the Treaty to Limit ABMs and the Interim Agreement on Offensive Missiles not to interfere with national means of verification. They also would not wish to cause US retaliation against their own considerablereconnaissance program.

Future Force Development

Q. The development of the future Soviet strategic defense force structure will be heavily influenced by the Treaty on Limitation of ABMs and the Interim Agreement on Offensive Missiles. The ABM Treaty has the more immediate and direct impact, but the Interim Agreement on Offensive Missiles is particularly significant to this Estimate in that it does not limit aircraft or missiles delivered byThe agreements at one and the same time simplify andestimates of future Soviet strategic forces. They simplify by permitting force projections in line with the agreements, as in the case of ABMs. But they complicate by raising the question of under what conditions the agreements might be terminated, and what force deployments might occur afterreak. And future Sovietforces will not only bo affected by tlie interaction ofand constraints in the USSR on the development, production, and deployment of successive generations of new weapon systems. They will also be sensitive to thc course of negotiations with the US. Thc developing Chinese strategic threat to thc USSR is also afactor in assessing the future developments in Soviet strategic defenses

6

R. If the Soviets believed thc prognosis to be favorable for further agreements between the US and USSR lo limit strategic arms, they would probably build their strategic defenses more slowly than in the past. In fact, if they judged that the US would eventually reduce its forces, they might do little more than complete programs underway and 'continuectivities. More likely, they might feel impelled to coniinue to improve their defenses across the board within thc limits of the present agreements in order to enhance their securityis the US and thc People's Republic of China and to improve their bargaining position in the strategic arms limitation negotiations.

S. The Soviets might, of course, be prepared to stop negotiations and terminate existing agreements if they came to believe that their security or position of equality with the US were threatened. In this case, the Soviets might build up permitted systems while the Treaty was in effect and prepare to deploy additional systemsr negotiations might deteriorate to thc extent that they or tbc US would withdraw from the Treaty prior7 and embarkore intensive buildup.

T. We have, in Section IX of this Estimate, postulated four force models whichange of possible defensive deployments under differing conditions during thc remainder of theorcend II illustrate deployments the Soviets mightwithin the terms of the ABM Treaty.epresents aeffort in which little is done beyond completing programs already in progress. Force Model IIreater level of effort, but deployments are still within the limits of thc ABM Treaty. Force Models III and IV illustrate different postures the Soviets might adopt if the Treaty were terminated. Model HI is representative of aof the arms competition as it was before the limitationwhile Model IVaximum defensive effort short of actual war.

U. Forcend IVowigh level of effort, respectively; both are quite feasible under the assumptions given,

' Vice Adm. Vincent P. de Pod. USN, lhe Director, Detenu Intelligence Agency; Mef. Cen. Willtsm E. PotK, the Assistant Chief of Staff fee Intelligence, Department ol tlie Army; and Rear Adm. Rxl F. RecMnui. the Director of Naval Intelligence. Deportment of the Navy, aie in fundamental disagreement with several aipectt of Section IX. For Iheir views see their footnotes throughout that Section.

but we? consider them to be unlikely extremes. Wc believe that Force Model IIikely level of effort and technical progress. It assumes tliat the US and the USSH would continue present strategic arms limitation agreements and reach new ones, and that neither country would have to contendhird country threat so great as to cause withdrawal from the agreements. On the other hand, if further agreements are not reached, and the ABM Treaty were to be terminatedhc Soviets might build defenses roughly equivalent to those shown in Force Model III, But wc wish tothat these models are strictly illustrative, and not to be rogarded as confident estimates or as projections for defense planning. As one moves beyond theears or so, all projections becomeuncertain;ears they are highly speculative.

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I. THE SOVIET APPROACH TO STRATEGIC DEFENSE

L The policies which hive provided (he basis for the development of Soviel strategic defensor have been influenced over Iho pastears by three major factors: tho Soviet protection of relations between the US and the USSH; their assessment of all of tbc forces, inter continental and peripheral, which could conduct nuclear attacks on the Soviet Union; and tin; capacity of the Soviet economy and technology to produce the necessary defensive systems. As these factor* evolved, so have the composition and strength of the defenses.

n the immediate post-World War II period the major threat was from US and allied aircraft, the bulk of which would be directed against targets in the western USSR Thus, Soviet defenses were designed primarily to defeat the manned bomber. In thche nature of tho threat was changed in

a fundamental way with the introduction of long-range ballistic missiles. Thus, whilesgainst aircraft and aircraft-carried weapons were still necessary, new defense systems were required which would defeat ballistic missiles and other threats from space.

Soviet strategic defense policy wasinfluenced, alsoundamental way, by the eventual militarization of the Sino-Soviet dispute. No longer are thc Soviets able todefenses solely againit the North Atlantic Treaty OiganiuHonhey must now also be concerned with an inde-pendent Chinese threat from the south.

A number of developments, both political and military, are going lorofoundon the future of Soviet strategic defenses. Tbe agreement to limit strategic weaponwill influence the development andof defensiveballistic missile defenses. There will, however, stilleed to develop more effectivelo combat new alr-to-surface missiles

ircraft penetrating at low altitudes, and continually more sophisticatedand submarine launchednd (ho Soviet* must reckon with these latter threats eventrategic arms limitation environment The estimate which follows considers in some detail both thc present slate of Soviet strategic defenses and their future development The latter case is illustratederies of force models which take into consideration the initial constrainu imposed by agreements lo limit strategic arms.

II. STRATEGIC AIR DEFENSE

There hsvo been over rhe psil year no nn|or new developments in Soviet sir defense programs or forces; these defenses continue Io he Inv proved slowly but steadily. Our cttimstet of the capabilities of Soviet air defenses have thereforenot changed in any essentials since last year.

The discusttoc whichhighlights two problems facing Soviel iiicapabilities against low.altitude penetration and against small, high-speed ASMs such as short-range attack missilesSsrscCexBUcs and performance of Soviet air defense systems are given Ui. Definitions of some ofir defense, terms are given in the Glossary.

A. Current Forces and Capabilitieslthough the strength of the USbomber force has diminished by more than two-third' over the last decade, Its technical sophistication has greatlywith the addition of more effective decoys and electronic countermeaiures (ECM) and thc development of small, high-speed ASMs. The Soviets are also well aware of the nuclear threat posed by US tacticalstationed in Europe. Asia, and at sea and thc air threat posed by the rest of NATO in the west and China from the south.esult, the Soviet Union continues tothe world's largest air defense system.

he PVO Strany {Air Defense ol the Nation)ranch of the Soviet armed services equal In status to thc Cround Forces, the Air Forces, the Navy, and the Strategic Bockof Forces. It Is commanded by Marshal of thc Soviet Union P. F. Batitskiy, who iseputy Minuter of Defense. It is known to have three arms ofRadio-Technical Troops which operate tho radars and associated electronic systems, theMissile Troops who man the surface-to ju missile (SAM) units, and PVO Aviation (APVO) which operates IheA fourth arm, the PRO (theof antiballiitic missilessto exist.

lements of Ihe three identified PVO arms of service are assigned to each of their defense districts (ADDs) and, in turn, to thc air defense zonesach of the ADDs Is probably mannedVO Army or Okrughile each ADZ is mannedVO Corps or Division. Radio-Technical units operate the air surveillance radar stations which are subordinate to the various ADZs. All of these echelons are tied together by data and communications links which utilize radio, coaxial cable, open wire, and satellite equipment.

ir surveillance Is conducted byladars located atirradar stations located throughoutUnion. Each of these stations hasradar sets which not only servepurposesarly warning,Intercept, height finding, etc)provide redundancy and frequencyradar sites have also been

noted" recently. These have probably been constructed for deceptive purposes- Figureollowing shows the general locations of radar sites nnd the coverage provided againstpenetrating at various altitudes.

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Flour* I

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round-based radars arc supplementedimited extent by air and seaborneThe Soviets have developed an airborne warning and control system (AWACS) but have not deployed it extensively. Although it has the potential of extending airctuftrange byautical miles (nm) beyond that provided by land-based radars, the small number of AWACS'aircraftand their lackook-down radarfor use over land limits their present potential. Kadar surveillance ships subordinate to the Soviet Navy have been identified in the four fleet areas, and they probably have, oo occasion, provided tracking data to PVOShips of the Moskva and Kieila II

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classes are also particularly well equipped to provide air surveillance information.

PVO fighter-interceptors are deployed throughout the Soviet Union to protect the peripheries and appioaches to prime target areas. As shown in Figurehe force is most heavily concentrated in the area west of the Ural Mountains and in thc southern maritime area of the Soviet Far East. There areighters organized intof three squadrons each. In addition, there areighters in Soviet tactical avialion andn East Europeanof lhe Warsaw Pad; most of tlier so aircraft were designed as interceptors.

Figure 2

3

and aboul two-thirds of them are in fighter regiments having primary missions of air defense.

SOVIET AIR DEFENSE INTERCEPTOR AIRCRAFT AS2

NEWER MODELS

Fwhat

FUroti

Fiddler (Tu-?)

Firebar (Yafc-M)

OLDER MODELS

Fhhpot (Su-9)

Farmer

Flashlleht

Fresco

APVO forces are continuing lheprogram begundditional Flagon and Foxbat interceptors are beinglo the force while older modelare being withdrawnate ofer year. Production of thcong-range interceptor that was first deployed wiih APVOas terminaied in the second half

Thc Sovieis continue to expand andtheir SAM defenses butlower rate lhan in past years. The pattern of deployment has remained essentially thein peripheral areas supplemented by point or vllal area defense of major military, industrial, and governmental centers. At the present time there are0 SAM launchers deployed inperational sites and complexes throughout the USSR. (See

are

dummyndites spread throughout

the USS

Ia similar program has been

initiated atornplexcs.f_

^JAs in lhe

case of the dummy radar sites, we believe

these sites have been installed for deceptive purposes. While they might be of value in confusing low-altitude attaching aircraft, the full reasons behind their emplacement at this time remain obscure.

SOVIET SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE DEPLOYMENT AS2

SA-5

Operational

Compteio Under Construction

SA-3

Operational

Launchers

Sites Under

SA.B

Operational Site*

Launcher,

Sites Under Construction

SA-1

Operational Site.

Lauacnets

Sites Under Construction

ll o! Ihcscfighter-interceptors,ingle air defense system give theormidable capability against bombers and aerodynamic ASMs such as Hound Dogal medium and high altitudes. This capability could be degraded by use oF ECM. defense suppression by ballistic missiles and ASMs. and by proper selection of penetration routes. Defense against low-altitudeeet and below) penetration by bombers and ASMs and against new generation standoff weapons like thc SBAM pose special problems which the Soviets have not yet solved. These weaknesses arc of special concern to Soviel planners; what steps should be taken to over-come them probably constitute thc central issues which must be resolved In future air defense planning.

BEST COM AVAILABLE

Defense Against Standoff Threats

hen faced with aircraft carrying Athe defcniive forces have twocan engage the attackingbefore the ASMs are launched, or tliey can attempt to destroy the incoming misiiles. Tbe first requires long-rangeor SAMs capable of acquiring and engaging bombers beyond the range of their ASMs. Although seemingly much simpler than the second alternative, this task would be seriously complicated by aircraft approaching and launching ASMs from extremely lowDefense of peripheral targets would undoubtedly require the use of an AWACS. There wouldreater chance of engaging ASM carriers attacking interior targets, but low-allitude penetration and launch wouldomplicate the task.

The second alternative, the engagement of the ASMs after launch, it far less desirable.ery heavy volume of fire from both inlerceptors and SAMs could be directed at an ASM apprr>aching at medium and highduring the latter phase of its flight. And training by Soviet strategic defouve forces has Indicated some degree of success at engaging Hound Dog type ASMs.

SAMs would be heavily relied upon to destroy incoming ASMs. And SAM defense against high-speed, low cross section targets will be improved by thc continued introduc-tion of automated target-designation systems. The accelerated reaction times which these systems permit would oflsot, to some degree, tlic compressed engagement time available after detection of the incoming missile.

Defense Agains* Short-Range Alloc*:

Missiles

introduction of the USSRAM constitutes one of tbc mostthreats that the Soviet air defense system

has to face. SRAM can be launched from2 or anircraft flying at any of their normal operational altitudes. |

3

f the SHAM -quipped aircraft Isto launch its missiles, SAM systems are the only weapons In the current Soviet air defense inventory which can provide any measure of defense. And then, probably, only if tbe SAM interceptoruclearThend SA-3tbcy arc presentlybetoRAM successfully in either its low-allitude or scmiballistic attack modes. The primary limiting factor is the short range at which the incoming SRAM would beThis would aUow little time forsystem reaction. Even whensystem reaction times arc postulated, the time to complete tho engagement with any of these systems is marginal at beat The lack of evidence of deployment of nuclear warheads for these systems further argues against their being highly effective inSRAM.

heppears to be the onlydeployed air defense system which could haveery limited capability

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SHAM. This judgment is Used on tbc probability that the Square Pair engagement radar canmall target like SRAM at grcat.tr ranges than any of the otherWith reasonable reaction times, thcouldRAMcmiballisticranges sufficient lomall footprint including the launch complex itself. Ils capability toRAMow-altitude trajectory would be much more limited, and In many situations tho site would be unable to defend itself. This Is because radar horizon and ground clutter woulddetection ranges. Even where intercept is possible, effective ncutraiiiatioo ofSRAM warheads would probably require theouclear warhead: there is no evidence that they arc availableomplexes.

ho Soviets arc not likely to let the SRAM threat go unanswered. Their response could take several forms. They couldnew longer-range defense systems which would enhance their ability to engage ASM carriers bcfoie they can launch their missiles.ystem could, for example,ew, more capable AWACS operaling Inwith advanced fighter-Interceptors. They could also upgrade some existingto giveetter capability tothe SRAM after launch. This might in-crude wider use and more rapid introduction of automatic data transmission systems, higher performance engagement radars, and performance of the InterceptorOn tho other hand, they could introduce new systems, such as laser weapons,designed to combat SRAM and similar missiles.

C. Defense Agoinst low-Altitude Air Attack

ignificant weakness of Soviet air defenses is their limited ability to engage attackers flying at very low altitudes (say

eet orhc Soviets are. ol couisc. very much aware of iheir vulnerability to this; typo ol attack, and they realize that the US and its NATO allies plan to exploitny future war. They have gone to extraordinary lengths over the years to close this defensive gap. Measures taken havetower mounted radars, low-altitude interceptors, and massive0 battalions) of low-altitude SAMs. Whiledefenses against low-altilude attacks have improved, their basic vulnerability to such attacks will probably continue to constitute the Soviets' most serious air defense problem in the future.

the past year, the Sovietstheir efforts to preventthc USSR at low altitude, chiefly throughimprovenienli to all aspects ofair defense. Deployment ofSquat Eye radar, theirset.ew modelBack Net precision search radar, withfeed system probably intended toof low-altitude targets, has beenin limited numbers The Sovietsbeen noted testing their radarair targets flying at lowradar positions have beento obtain the best low-altitude

has been no increase inof the Soviel Moss AWACS aircraftindication of improvements to thcwould giveapability lo detectlow-flying targets over land. It isto be limited to use over waterhaveimited ability to performcontrol.

he Firebar continues to be the primary Soviet low-altitude interceptor. However, theas also conducted low-altitudeWe estimate that the Forhatsystem does not nowook-down.

-rep-orcRci

shoot-down capability. Further, there Is. aa yet, no evidence ot*ystem under development

he low-altitudeAM Is still being deployed, with new sites now appearing along the China bolder and in other areas of thc country where it had been previouslyExercises against taigets as low as SO meters have been noted in Egypt and East Germany. Unlike the simulated cases reported in the Memorandum to Holders ol, some of the excidies in Egypt have involved actual aircraft targets. Command and control communications have been improved with further deploymentrobablytarget designation system. Such awould make much more rapid assignment of targets to SAM units possible and thus lengthen the available reaction times.

D. Vulnerability foS experience in Vietnam clearlythat performance of Soviet air defense equipment can be degraded through the use of ECM, evasivend defensetechniques. For example, thc efti-ciency of theystem has been severely degraded by target evasive maneuvers, site suppression, low-altitude attacks, and byits target-tracking radar and its missile-tracking system. Further, thc use of chaff to interfere with air surveillance radars haselling effect upon the efficiency of the radar reporting neL Thc techniques used against North Vietnamese air defenses would not have so devastating an effect against the more modern air defense systemsin the Soviet Union- but their effect will be serious. In addition, more advanced US techniques and equipment such as-low-altitude penetration, the use of newer ASMs for defense suppression, and newer forms of ECM may balance outin tho more modern Soviet systems.

Though thc precise degree of degradation of Soviet air defense system performance under these conditions is difficult to predict, it will undoubtedly occur and willrucial factor in determining the outcomotrategic bomber attack.

EFENSE AGAINST BAIUSTIC MISSILES

There it oo evidence that the Soviets hive deployed ballistic missile defenses beyondThey are, however, continuing to develop new aatiballuUc mbtde (ABM) systems at Sary Stuaan.

Tliii Section licflniummaiyof the Moscow ABM System and the support-.'/ early -amine, ndar network. It then focuses on the research and developnieol (RAD) activtueat Sary Shagan and discutsej the Implications at* these progiami. Tables VI-VI1I, jive estimated characteristics and performance of Soviet ABM radars and mlisites. The definition* of technical ABM terms ara found In the Cksuary.

A. Current CapobilitiesT The Moscow Antiballistic Missile System

he Soviets have deployed an ABM system only al Moscow. It consistsarget acquisition, tracking, and battle management radar (which we call Dog House) locatod southwest of Moscow; another radar withfunctions under construction near Chekhov somem south of Moscow; engagementwe call Tryfour com plciet to the north and west of Moscow, andalosh missile launchers deployed at each of these four complexes. (Seche full system can now be employed against in-lercontirtenlal ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and SLBMs launched from some directions. Some portions of the system can be used for defense against missiles launched from China.

he Moscow system is provided early warningetwork of largo array radars, called Hen Houses, all but one of which are

opcrational. (Secoverage against SLBMs will be enhanced by thc operation of thc new Hen House near Sevastopol and will be further improved by the acquisition radar under construction near Chekhov.of this latter radar will also provide additional coverage against missiles launched from the People's Republic of China (PRC).

hc Moscow System has significantmany that Its deterrent valueassive US attack can be considered insignificant. Assuming optimum conditions,hoot-look-shoot defense, ourindicate that the system withnterceptors could at best suocesjfullyaboutargets (re-entry vehicles [RVs] and decoys) before running out of interceptor missiles. Under the same conditions, theern could handle an equal number of SLBM targets if they arrived from sectors covered by thc large acquisition and tracking radars. When such coverage is not available, as in attacks from the western Mediterranean, the defenses would have to rely on engagement radars at the missile sites for target acquisition.esult tliey could be saturated by alight attack.

ests of the Calosh interceptor show that it can attack an incoming missile outside thc earths atmosphere at long ranges, and probably within the atmosphere at shorter ranges. The use of both capabilitiesingle target might permit the two-layer or shoot-look-shoot defense with improvedof success. But the System cannot discriminate belwccn RVs andaids outside the atmosphere. Moreover, since tht! interceptor docs not have very high acceleration (as does thc UShe system cannot wait for atmospheric filtering to discriminate between RVS and penetration aids before interceptor launch. Therefore, de-

coys and chaff puffs would have to beas separate targets, and thc supply of available interceptors would be rapidly

of IU long range, thehas an inherent capability tooutside the Moscow area, but Itsuch regions withhin,defense. This area defense wouldeffective against attacks by aor an accidental orbecause thc number of RVs wouldand several interceptor missilessent againsi one target.

Command ond Control

We believe that command and control communications for the Moscow ABM System have been operational for some time, and that the battle management center may be located near thc Dog House target acquisition and tracking radar at Naro Fominsk. However, we have not identified an ABM command and ocntrol communications network, and we do not know how operational data are being passed between thc various elements of the defense.

There is no firm evidenceeparate missile defense command has been established. In the, however. Sovietsuggested that their ABM forces mighteparate command within the PVO Strany called the PRO. Fromo the present, the name of Lt. Cen. of Artillery Y. V. Votintsev has appeared regularly with thc names of thc commanders of the threeidentified arms of the PVO Strany, suggesting that he heads an organizationomparable level. There auo is anthat Votintsev has an office at thecommand center, as do the olher three commanders of PVO Strany arms.

TOP GKfl^

B. New Construction al Moscow large Antennas of Chekhov

he new radar antennai under corwtruc-lion at Chekhov are similar to the original Chekhov antennas, and wc believe that they will have similar capabilities. If so.CT

coverage would allow detection of

nib vita launched toward Moscowarge portion of China. {Sec Figure) Ballistic missiles launched toward Moscow from Manchuria, however, would not bethis would require either additional radars or the electronic expansion of the Chekhov scan sector.

Work al Previously Abandoned Try Add Complexes

Work has been underway forear at three previously abandoned Try Add complexes. Theseoutheast;outhwest of Moscow. (See Figure) Activity3 has been limited. However, thc Urge quantity of construction material at this site suggestsajor effort will get underway in the near future.

as apparently abandonedowever,1 new constructionwas noted. It now consists of new buildings, several trearge paved excavation inuilding is apparently under construction One of the new buildings is an extensionreviously abandoned Try Add radar building. Two other buildings are probably being prepared for installationadar.

afor new construction activity was also noted1n ABM complex at which work was stoppedhe SovieU are constructing abouto*en

buildings in the area. Four of the buildings have large parabolic dish antennas beingalongside. Thus, it now appears that these lour buildings will support parabolic dish antennas. Additional buildings In various stages of construction will piobably besupport facilities.

The installation of dish antennas at what seemed toew ABM facility is surprising. Planar arrays, because of their better target handling capabilities, arc clearly preferableish. The new dishes being constructed1 arc probably larger than those at the Try Add complexes and arein several other respects as well. In addition, we have recently discovered open trenches which probably connect thc Chekhov radar1 and possibly with oilierin the Moscow area.

The purpose of the new construction is not at all clear. Our earlier judgment was thai this activity involved_ the augmentation of tlic Moscow defensej.[_

t now appears that, instead of functioning in an ASM weapon system, thc new dish antennas maypaceor satellite tracking function. Indeed, the new dishes are similar to those employed for deep space Hacking at other locations in the USSR.

C. Anllbollislic Missile Research and Development a! Sary Shagan

e have noted beforeide range of Sovietctivity was continuing and that, allhough tbe specific purpose of

71

of these developments wm uncertain, it was clear that the Soviets were tomrnittedroadrogram. This judgment remains valid despite lhe fact that thc ABM Treaty resulting from the strategic armsDestitutions will limit somewhat the direction of.

he present Sovietrogram is apparently directed toward development of two different ABM systems. One of thesetilizes components which are smaller than those used with the Moscow System. It may be designed to provideof ICBM silo launchers as is allowed by the AIIM Treaty. The other systemas been under development for several years and is believed toollow-on to the Moscow System.

e believe the Soviets started to install and test components of thet Sary Shagan at least two years ago. Components of the systemew type multiapcr-lure radar and missile launchers. The new radar is probably the engagement radar for tho system. Several postulations as to the use of the radars* various apertures are possible, but generally they include the usearge planar array mounted on the setarget track er.f"

^The missile launchers associated with thc system are apparently designed for thc vertical launch of interceptors about thc size of the Calosh. An important aspect of thes the suggestion in some of our evidence that it can be deployed much faster than the Moscow System.

omponents of thcave been under development at Sary Shagan for aof years. Thc radars for the system were builtreviously abandoned Try Add siteauncher area was constructed nearby. We do not believe that the Soviets have made much progress on the system, over the past year. We knowarge, flat octagonal antenna has boon installed on top of an old. large Tiy Add building. This isechanically steer able planar array radar which should have considerably better target handling capabilities than those of the large Try Add radars deployed aroundIt may be capable of simultaneously searching for. andumberelativelyo SO degrees.maller radar has also been Installed in the same area, but its type and function are unknown.

relatively slow pace of activitysuggests that thc Soviets aresome technical difficultiessystem or have reconsidered earliermake improvements to the Moscowbecause of the SALTthis system continues to becandidate for additional deployment

Flighl Usting

characteristics of ABM flightSary Shagan indicate that the Sovietswith both exoatmosphericintercepts of targets.^

1

-TOP SCCRCT

Recent Soviet ABM tests are ofinterest because tney differ from earlier tests and suggest that new interceptors are being developed. We cannot at this time, however, determine the ABM systems with which the new interceptors will be associated or the engagement modes which the Soviets might be developing.

Top Roost Radar Facility

he Top Roostis thefor thc Chekhov radar nearIs probably complete; itutatic system.

TV. STRATEGIC DEFENSE AGAINST SUBMARINES

Section iV covers II- Soviet capehllity to counter US nuclear.powered ballistic mIn lie tub-marlnaa (SSBNi) snd protect their own. Itimplified, hi (My ityllred eismple toramework (or the evidenceorts (he ley ludfmenti TablesV five esti-msted characteristics and performance of ASW ships, submarines, and aircraft and ef the ASW seniors and weapon! which they carry. Tlte definitions of technical ASW terms will be found in the Closiary.

A. Introduction

hiee developments have influenced the Soviet requirement for improved capabilities against submarines in the past decadealf. The establishment by the US of apatrolling fleet of ballistic missilehasoviet need for seeking out US SSBNs. The evolutionovielmissile submarine force hasequirement for protection of their own ballistic missile submarines. Finally, tbc growth of thc USSRaval power has brought withoviet requirement for im-

provements in traditional tactical ASW for protection of their general purpose naval forces and their merchant ships.

SW clearly enjoys high priority innaval planning and in the design of newer operating forces, but most Soviet ASWoperations and training are tactical in nature and directed toward defense ofsurface forces against submarine attack. Operations and training for defense of Soviet ballistic missile submarines against USare much less eitensive. While we have not detected any Soviet effortdirected to countering the strategic SLBM threat, they appear to be conductingcross the broad spectrum of ASW technology. The two strategic ASW missions will be discussed here. Tactical ASW is discussed in thc Memorandum to Holders ofWarsaw Pact Forces For Operations inatedECRET.

B. Protection of Soviet Ballistic Missile Submarines

oviet naval writer* have indicated that the Western attack submarine forceajor threat to Soviet balhstic missileand by implication to the credibility of the nnval portion of their strategicThey have had opportunities to learn of tbe capabilities of the US sound surveillance system (SOSUS) and the supporting ASW forces. They are probably most concerned that Western submarines will attempt to trail their SSBNs, and (hey may have reacted to Ihese threats by escorting some of thelass submarines.

rom0 andhc Soviels conducted at least five jointtransits of the Norwegian Sea. Inass SSBNs proceeded to missile stations accompanied by C-lass submarines.

sccae-*-

23

he SovieU could alio protect (heir SSBNi by reducing noise levels to those of US SSBNs. thereby eliminating the ASWcurrently enfoyed by the US. It is likely that the Soviets have embarkeduieting program with thelass SSBN. To achieve thc requiredong, costly effort, andto date suggests that the Sovietscould not Improve moreraction of their present force for atecade

he best explanation of these Jointis that thc Soviets were practicingtodetect possible Western trail of their SSBNs. L

^Although it isthe Soviets were practicing covertof their own SSBNs, their knownpractices make this unlikely. Tbey realize that use of attack submarines to protect thcir ballistic missile submarines could complicate the task of our surface and submarine ASW forces. It would have little effect, however, on airborne ASW.

he Soviets are more inclined than Western navies to operate submarines in groups. They have developed specialacoustic communications links which could facilitate coordinated1 operationssubmarines. But until more definitive evidencesome indication of the communications snd active sonar policy of tho submarines Inobjectives of the transits will still be open to some question.

C Offensivo Operalions Against United Stoles Ballistic Missiie Submarines

Presentp to the present time the Soviets have shown an ability to estimate reasonably accurately the number of US SSBNs on patrol, based largely upon their surveillance of SSBN bases. Their estimates of thc general locations of patrol areas have been accurate only in part But, most important of all, they have never shown an ability to detect or localize US SSBNs accurately enough for ASWFurther, there is no evidence thc Soviets have conducted trailing operations against US SSBNs.

Problems ofuccessful defense against US SSBNserious problem for the Soviets- Thc difficulty of detectingingle SSBN in the open ocean is very great, but to have an effective defense thc Soviets must be able to destroy orajor portion of US SSBNs on stationery short period of time. Allowing even one submarine to launch its missiles could bring as manyeapons down on thc USSB. As all submarines on station are capable of launching quickly on receipt of command, thc prolonged search and destroy methods utilized in the past are much loo slow againsi the SSBN threat of today.

QS33.

HOP

The primary factor* which preclude successful strategic ASW arc the size of the iirnas where US SSBNs operate and thequietness of their operations. About one-half of the US force is on station at any one lime, in the Norwegian Sea, the Pacific, the Mediterranean, and elsewhere. Keeping track of all US SSBNs at searerequisiteotally effective Soviet strategic ASWThe several approaches to this problem include ocean surveillance to detect, identify, and track al) submarines continuously andtrailing (overt and covert} of ballistic missile submarines by attack submarineshirdocean search by ships, aircraft, oronlydetection and does not afford theof contact required for timelyof the greater part of the SSBN force unless followed up by some sort of catling action. Present Soviet capabilities and fuiure potential In each of these approaches arc evaluated in the following paragraphs, and stylized and greatly simplified eiamplei arc included to Illustrate the magnitude of tbe problem.1

Ocean Surveillance by Fixed Under-walm Systems

he Soviets have not yet deployed any long-range fixed underwater systems for ocean surveillance. Moreover, environmentalon the Soviet littoral and the targetof US SSBNs do not favor tbeof long-range ocean surveillance

' It Quit be recognised, howeves, that tn practice, tho SovieU would employ teveral of these approacheslane outly and would use all availableintelligence.inimum, this effort mild le-rsoee the wide-area random search recutrrsacot char-acterUlie ot each of the (amplified eiamplei.esult, the numbers of specific tensors or plillnrmi required tohe probability of detection passu-latrd in tbe individual eumptci coald be lessened.

systems on thc scale uf the US SOSUS. Soviet surveillance systems cunesstiy moored inwaters and coastal areas would be of no value in detecting SSBNs in the open ocean. Deployment of current Soviet surveillance systems, such as lhe Cluster Sand.f^

Jin sufficient numbers would be jxcWbitivcTy expensive and perhapsimpossible. Even to cover theone-tenth of the current Polaris patrolof buoys or arrays would have lo be emplaced and connected by tens of thousands of miles of cable for the Soviets to obtaininimal capability.

tbe SovieU continue toimproved passive fixed detectionenhance their overall capabilities, wcthey arc unlikely lo exceed theof the better Western systems bydegree duringrobably will not even match them.patrolling US SSBNs they mustsurpass them.

of the detection rangesmoored buoys and bottom-laidhave been extrapolated to the latea basis for evaluating Soviet oceancapabilities

r

TOP SECRgf

--Ol'-SWf-F-

Figure 7

think i( unlikely the Soviets would be able loetection range of more than LS nm in deployed moored buoy systems by Uie. Soviet bottom-laid fixed 'acoustic arrays mightetection range ofm-T

To fflujtrate the difficulty of oceanwc havoreatly simplified model of one of the many Polaris operating areas, thc Norwegian Sea, and have made other assumptions favorable to Sovietto theasy access to this area by tlie Soviet's largest fleet should make this an optimum body of waler for Soviet ASW operations. Yet even in the Norwegian Sea. an area onlyercent of what the Soviets -must coverrerequisite for effective strategic operations, we believe the problem is too great to solve during.

Under the astwn.ptiow stated, thewouldistributed system ofoored acoustic buoys having arange of IS nm. connected to tht nearest point in the USSR by at leastOO nm of cable. (Seehould they achievem detection ranges using bottom-laid arrays, they would stilt need atrrays connected to the nearest point in the USSR by at0 nm of cable.

' For this discussion it was uiunied that lhe witcr conditions critical to acoustical detection ranges ate the most favorable lhathe Norwegian Sea. In tad. seen condition* vary wtdot/ br aeacoo aod even by time of day andighlywithin hours. We luitlwr assumed lhat diewouldO percent probability of detect, ine one patrolling SSDN8 hour period. Given lour SSDNi So lhe Norweglaet Sea. this menu ihat then arc IS dunces out offat bast ooe. This ii almostowei reliability than Ibe SovieU would lie situ lied witb.

Number oti Anays and Mooted Buoys vs. Detection

S SS0*pMF*

tDCOi-

USO -

a S -i

?

0 igxuauaionnin

can thus be seen that, even withlevel of Soviet techno logy. Ideal sound propagationa minimal Soviet detectionSoviet task of installing abuoy systemottom-laidarrayurveillance capabilityiho Norwegian Sea is immense.conditions would require manyof which would have aindicated in theEven granting such surveillanceoperalions by ASW forces usingwould be required to localizesufficiently for engagement.

we estimate that effectivesurveillance systems probably willavailable to the Soviets for use againstduring the period of ihis Estimate.have to continue to rely ondirection-finding, intelligence

3

TOP SCOUT

near US SSBNnd othersources, which probably can give them somo idea o( the number of SSBNs on patrol but no reliable location information.

Long-Term Submarine Trailing

alternative to tbe establishmentocean surveillance system with itscost and complexity is the assignmentsubmarine force to trail US SSBNs.ports or from choke points alongroutes, either overtly or covertly.present time, however, the existingbetween US SSBNs and Sovietrenders this alternative unlikelySSBNs are extremely quiet whenal patrol speeds. This is the result ofof costly effort to reduce Ihenoise generated within theto minimize thc flow noise causedpassage through the water. By contrast.SSNs and SSBNs aro notS SSN canxtremely difficult if nota Soviet SSN toS SSBN.trying to trail face two problems.have sensors sufficiently sensitive toand, when necessary, to redetectSSBNs- And they >tnust operateigh level of "self noise"much quieter than they.

Ooevt. The almost endless variety of plausible measurc-countcrmcasuro scenarios which could be postulated makes it difficult to arriveuantitative measure of Soviet potential for overt trail using active sonars. Since it is. unlikely that trail could befor extended periods, even pnlndividual SSBNs, the pi aspect of having an active trail on all or nearly all of the SSBN force at the proper time to prevent the force fromits SLBMs is extremely unlikely.

Covert. Covert trailing involves the uie of passive devices by the trailing submarine.

To be effective, the trailing submarine must be very quiet and have good passive sonar. US SSNs have attempted during exercises to trail coveitly our own SSBNs, but generallyhas cither been lost or thc SSN wasdetected.^

noise

advantage of US submarines is importantways: our sonars operateessthereby improving their ownand tho Soviet submarine Lswith trying touieter"dvantage of US

submarines tesultselativeSoviet submarines of

mpirical

indicate

thai before tbey couldovert trailing threat even to current US SSBNs, the Soviets would require, assuming target motionequal to USubmarine quieter thanlass Q_

3

r

'Target motion analysis Is tbe proceit whereby tho course and speed of the target ere plotted aodso as to allow tiau to be maintained. It resultsomplex of equipment aod human operator) and cannot be limply translated into equivalent sonar improve menu.

TOP SCCRCT-

ased on our present knowledge of Soviet submarine sonars, the requiredcould probably be achieved by ahigh priority effort lasting several years. Submarine quieting of tbe magnitudeabove would be extraordinarily difficult to accomplish, however, and almost certainly could not be achieved through modifications to thelass"

-TS

29

by Shipt, Submarines, and Akcr all

Ships. While open ocean ASW search for SSBN! using ships, submarines, or ASW aircraft is technically feasible, limited sensoricr. and thc force levels available preclude any meaningful Soviet capability. Most of their major ASW surface ships have older sonars which provide little capability for making and maintaining contacts. Fewer than IS of their major surface ships arc equipped with newer active sonarseliable searchf up toards, and only the Moskva and the Leningrad haveranges of up0 yards under good conditions.

An ASW group consistingoskva-class helicopter carrier with its helicopters and two Kashin-class frigates is Ihe mostsubmarine detection force utilized by the Soviets. Assuming the best water{conveigence zone propagation where feasible, with no problems such as shallow water and reverberation) and possible future perfectionistatic search capability, thc Moskva task group might, at best,athm widepeed ofnots. Under the Ideal conditions posited (see footnotet would require floe Moskoa task groups mlnj; bistatic search toO percent probability ofon-evading US SSBN in the entire Norwegian Sea area ini would mean that there would he six chances outf detecting ell four target submarines within the time limit. Using presently demonstrated monostotic searchand estimates of current sonarIhr' path width and sweep speed would be so reduced that aboutuch

' Reliable range reicn lo direct ialh propagation; convergence lone propagation gives greater range, bui iho conditions favoring such propagabou vary with area, season, weather, etc, so that they cannots<dcied reliable.

Figure 9

Number of Moskva ASW Groups vsv-ScarchSu

iso

task groups would be required os shown in Figureo increase the probability offromercent toercent, the number of task groups would Itaoe to be doubled. Moreover, taking Into consideration thc large amount of shallow water wherezone propagation does not occur, additional ASW groups would be required. Thc equipment requirements alone thusan effective open ocean search capability in the Norwegian Sea. let alone Other open ocean patrol areas, in the time frame of this Estimate.

ub manner. Using submarines toan SSBN search is likewise not promising. Improvements as described under covertwould be lequired lo detect units on patrol, and these have been |udged to beHowovcr. detection of US SSDNs during the higher speed transit between base and the patrol area would be possible if the Soviets were lo match US attack submarines in quiet-

"tOP-SCCR CT

nor sccRcr -

sonar performance.iing active soruut equivalent to iht bett OS submarine mils (not yet demonstrated by thend assuming ideal sou mlconditionsweep width of about GO nmpeed of aboutwould be necessary to searcli the Norwegian Sea withinours. Such tactics would be subject to the degrading effects of US counlermeasutcs as described in overt trail. Under more realistic environmentalthe requirement would be aboutate model nuclear submarines to sweep the Norwegian Sea.

nother possible detection means would be linear hydrophone arrays towed byships or submarines, although we have no evidence that the Soviets have developed or deployed such arrays. Nevertheless, if they /iad arraysetection range equal to the bett achieved by US experimental arrays

would require atlatforms mooing at IS knots to starch the Norwegian Sea withinours. As is the case in otber Soviet hydroaoousfic systems, these towed arrays far exceed Soviet capabilities

today, and they probably wfll not be attained

during the period of this Estimate.

ircraft The major Soviet ASWishich carries sono-buoyi ond magnetic anomaly detection (MAD) equipment.ay aircraft are limitedadius ofm.ours on station,ull load of ASW stores- They therefore cannot reachUS SSBN patrol areas, except parts of the Norwegian Sea and parts of the Pacific. Most May training exercises involve efforts to localize the positionubmarineon tho basisontact report;ew sweeping operations have been noted. While MAD equipment is used in sweeping

operations, its short0 foet) precludes its applicability to open ocean search.

oviet MAD equipment might achieveetection range twice that now estimated for the May. With this range, it would requireour Stay sortiesours on station) to oooer the Norwegian Sea inoursandomly rrioofng SSBN. Tbe real conditions, involving an SSBN operational areaimes that of the Norwegian Sea example, preclude MADeans of open ocean airborne searches for US SSBNi in the period of this Estimate.

n the past few years the Soviets have deployed an ASW variant of the Bear, which has sufficient range to reach all Polaris op-crating areas. It carries sooobtsoyi whose detection range is rirnited to lessardsatrolling SSBN. but itdoes not carry MAD equipment.the ASW Bear can be used in localization efforts in the open ocean but not for broad open ocean search.

Coordinated Operations

e have also considered tho use of the above systems in coordinated efforts to detect US SSBNs. since this is what we would expect in actual operations- Tbe systems usedoint effort would complement each other. However, owing to the limited effectiveness of each individua] detection system, the forces available, and the magnitude of the SSBN patrol area, we bdievo that tho overallwould still be ineffective.

Oifier Approaches lo Submarine Detection

he Soviets almost certainly alsothat detection of US SSBNs is fax beyond their present capabilities using hydroacouslic and MAD equipment and techniques. They

have consequently been Investigating other non-acoustic approaches to then contrast, however, to our knowledge ofprogress in systems described above, wc have very Utile evidence of thcs taking in these other non-acoustic areas, and little knowledge of Soviet progress.

o far, with the exception of the use of radar to search limited areas for snorkel-ing diesel submarines, the Soviet Navy has employed non-acoustic methods only Inoperations. RotD on some non-acoustic detection techniques has now progressed to the point that some methods may offerdetection range and search capability to be of limited usefulness against submerged nuclear submarines. However, these non-acoustic methods are expected to continue to complement, rather than to replace, acoustic detection systems for at least die next decade.

V. ANTISATEUITE DEFENSE

The Soviets have continued to test an orbital antisatellite system. Thii Section diicusses the antisatellite program and some of the related activities which have been observed. Definitions of technical antisatellite terms ara given io tho Glossary.

A. Introduction

he use of earth satellite vehicles (ESV) for military support and other activi-

' Non-acoustic detection methods eiploit changes tn tin ocean environment caused by the pretence or motion of the submarine. These changes Includethermal, optical, chemical, and radioactiveas well aa water turbulence and wives. Among tbe potential detection rnethods ne those which ei-ploit thermal effects through the use of Infraredeniors, the detection of turbulent wakes to assist in trailing, tlte detection of nuclear and dumicalIn the submarine wake, and the use of radar to find exposed effects ficm deep-running submarines.

tics hasause of concern to the Soviets. This was reflected3 when they began toetwork of space surveillancedesigned to provide orbital data on non-cooperative ESVs. The Sovieis have deployed an ABM system which has thc potential to engage satellites in low-earth orbit and they have developed an orbital antisatellite syslem which has the capability of attacking targets ia higher orbit*.'

Tracking, and

he primary means of detectingand predicting the Orbits of US satellites is thc Hen House radar network (see Figure. These radars are capable of providing all of the data necessary forengagement The Hen House network could be supported by thc acquisition and tracking radars of the Moscow ABM System, variousadars, and deep-space cracking radars in thc Crimea.

Techniques

lwrc are two intercept techniques byarget satellite may bedirect ascent and coorbital In the direct-ascent mode the interceptor is launched and guided directly to the target in much the same wayAM or ABM. The orbital mode is more complex. It requires that the satellite interceptor be launched into an orbital plane wliich is thc same or nearly the same as lhat

'The technical problem! Involved In attacking satellites in near-earth orbft ore lest sevee than those of ballistic missile deferue. Satellites appear as much larger targets lo early witntnfi radars lhan do missile RVs. and the future posilion of non-maneuveringf tracked on successive orbits, can be predicted with precision. In addiuon. satellites arc essentially "toft" targets which aie vulnerableider variety of weapon effects.

GCCRCT

lhc target. The orbit of the interceptor ii then adjusted to bring it within engagement range of the target satellite.

hough wc have not seen it tested against satellites, the Calosh ABMcould be usedirect-ascent mode against ESVs in low-altitude orbits because of its ability to fly under power and guidance all the way to intercept. This would permit refinement of Ihc interceptor trajectory throughout the engagement Based onestimates of Try Add radar and Galosh missile performance, non-nuclear killcould be attained against satellites up tom altitude and at slant rangesew hundred nm. The Calosh could also be usedallistic intercept mode against satellites as highm. However, there would be some reduction in accuracy,uclear warhead might be required.

otwithstanding the inherentof the Calosh ABM interceptor toan antisatellite mission, tbe Soviets have developed an orbital system. Because it is undergoing an active test program and will probably constitute the USSR's primary anti-satellite capability, it is treated in detail here.

ho Orbital Intercept Testn Ihe past, we have estimated that three types of satelliles have been associated with thc orbital Intercept test program. Theseeries of heavy maneuverable satellites, the interceptor satellites, and some satelliles used for calibration and checkout. They arc all included in the discussion here because they provide considerable Insight into rheof tlie Soviet antisatellite effort.

The Heavy Manevveroble Satellite Program

n previous estimates we indicated that the heavy maneuverable satellites were related lo the antisatellite interceptor program. Tills

judgment was based on the fact tliat the heavy talellites, like the interceptor satellites, were launched by SL-II space boosters and had considerable orbital maneuver capability. New information regarding the operations of two heavy maneuverable satellites., has cast doubl upon these earlier estimates.

he heavy maneuverable satellitewas initiatedinceotal of eight have been launched, includinghich was placed io orbit from Tyuratam on2 Its orbit and estimated pay-load weightounds were similar to each of the previous heavy satellites.

3

emained in an initial tow orbit forays instead of maneuveringthe first dayear circular higher orbit as had all previoustayed In its low orbit for 32

-re^eerfirT-

I the heavy

maueuven.blci mayeconnaissance mission.

3

The Interceptor Salcllilo TestThe Soviets have conducted sevenintercept tests since the full

pound vehicles used in these tests were. like the heavy satellites, launched bypace boosters. Allapability to attack targetsariety of low-earth orbits The latest testith launches in November andasat much lower altitudes than ever before unil demonstrated thc ability to change thc plane of the orbit by some 5Vi degrees.

1

lie Soviets could use any of several trajectoties to engage satellites with anThe number of orbits to intercept in an operatirnal situation would depend uponthe desired timing and location of theThe Soviets have conducted most inler-ccpt attempts at altitudesm and over regions where they could be viewed by instruments in the Moscow area. The last,, was beyond Moscow(over West Cermany) but was observable from the western USSB. Although tbe Soviets probably could notS satellite without our knowledge, they could conduct an intercept attempt inashion as to deny thc US detailed information regarding the intercept operation.

3'

jWr do not know what type

of sensor Is used by the interceptor homing system It is mostiewby the fact that thc intercept tests have been conducted apparently withoutfor lighting conditions.

c are unable to determine, withwhether orarhead has been

carried by the interceptor. However, thc

guidance scheme used tesulls iu very small miss distances, and Hie non-nuclear warhead lechnology necessary to assure kill at these distances is well within Soviet reach.

Calibration Satellite Program "

calibration satellite programinnd there havetotal o(aunches sincearc clearly associated with dieprogram. Theound vehicle launched by thepurposes of the program arc still notWe have noted thatare launched prior to heavyand interceptor satellite tests.have confirmed that the calibrationalso have the high capacityon board, although wc have notit being used to controlesult, we believe thatof the program is to check outcapacity command system groundprior to the launch of heavyand interceptor spacecraft.

E. Resulting Antisotollite Capabilities

estimate that satellites whichthe USSR at altitudes below aboutare now vulnerable to non-nuclearorbital interceptor. In addition, thoInterceptor, appropriately equippednon-nuclear warhead, and possiblytooming system, wouldprovide an attractive direct-ascentcapability against targetsm. Although wc have nottesting against satellite targets, itfaster reaction, little susceptibility to

" Satellites ta lha program lie apparently used to check out end calibrate pound Instmmentation and support facilities. For convenience In the discussions which follow they will be referred to or calibration lateUita.

counter measures andetter chance for clandestine intercept than would beby an orbital system.

order to use the orbitaltargets at altitudes greater thannm. an improved launch vehiclerequired. The only operational Sovietsystem that could place thcinto synchronous orbit isas an engineering test ofof theourth stage tomaneuverseriod of severalil5 degree orbitalOne of the purposes of this testbeen to check out propulsion andsystems when they are used in ato that required to deliver athc geostationaryroughlyplane of the equator and afm. On tlie basis of thb flightthat thc Soviets can place theinterceptor' into geostationarythc accuracy required forHowever, to date, they havetests ofapability.

F. Olher Types of Interference

There are several means of Interfering with satellites and disrupting their missions which do not require that the target vehicle be intercepted by another vehicle. Tliesethe use of lasers, electronic Intrusion and active security programs.

Soviet capabilities in lasersar with those of the US. When coupled to suitable optics with appropriate pointing and tracking equipment, lasers now available coulddoud" onfilm that wouldmalltarget area. These lasers also have power potentials sufficient to produce physicalto thc film, fhe optical system, and other sensitive componentseconnaissance salel-

top sccncT

there is no evidence that the Soviets have attempted to utilize lasers against US satellites, they have thc components, and they couldystem at any time.the Soviets are probably developing laser weapon systems, but we believe their initial employment most likely would be (or airrather than countering satellites.

pportunities for electronic intrusion might include the jamming of satelliteand control links. This approach would depend upon an ability to monitor satellite traffic and to establish critical frequencies to be jammed. Insertion of false dataatellite control system not protected bysecurity equipment wouldupon knowledge of frequencies, coding, and operational procedures. Even in cases where communications securily equipment designed to prevent spoofing is used, jam-rning could deny use of the satellite.

Soviets are capable ofreceivers and could probablyInformation into an unprotectedcontrol system. Their ability tosecured satellite communications andis not known, but it Is probablyIn any case, we have nothe Soviets have ever jammed orto transmit false data to any

G. likelihood of Direct Soviet Interference

Soviet attitude towardsystems has undergonechange over the years. Initially,maintained that reconnaissancewas merely another form ofas such was illegal. However, bytlie Soviets themselves hadconsiderable satellite reconnaissanceand llieir attitude began to change.during the negotiations which led to

7 treaty governing (he peaceful uses of outer space, Ihc Soviets carefully avoided raising thc issue of satellite reconnaissance. Since then, they have come to acceptfrom spaceecessary national function in the nuclear age, and they have agreed that itital element in themeans for verification of lhe treaty to limit ABMs and tlte accompanying Interim Agreement on Offensive Missiles.

We have, for tho past several years, estimated that tho Soviets are unlikely to take any direct action against US satellites. This judgment was basedumber ofand military considerations, including the US reaction. Thc Soviets have launched abouteconnaissance satellites in the last year and are almost certainly heavily dependent oa this source of intelligence, particularly for information on Chinas flowing strategic nuclear capabilities. US retaliation couldjeopardize the effectiveness of these Soviet collection programs.

The signing of thc aRrrxmtvH to limit ABMs and the Interim Agreement onMissiles reinforces our judgments. The Soviets recognize that uny attempt to prevent tlie US from gathering intelligence on their strategic programs by taking direct action against our satellites would constitute soa violation of these agreements that it could only be justified by an attempt to change tbe established strategic relationship.thc Importance of spaceto the viability of the SALT agreements, we continue to believe itnlikely that the Soviets would actively interfere with US reconnaissance satellites.1*

"Pirairapnrticle Xll of the ADM Treaty,that each Party ncrees not to Interfere with thr rational means of verification of the other which are operating In accordance .with thc verificationol the Treaty. Thb provision would, forprohibit interference with an orbiting satellite uied for Treaty vciif seat ions.

-fS-eOrtttirSM

Their remain, otcr types of satellites not implicitly protected by the SALT agreement, including military support and scientific satellites, which the SovieU might find reasons to attack. Wc (ind no basis, however, for changing our eailicrabout the likdihood of the Sovietswith them Short ol preparation for' actual war or retaliation in response to what they believed was prior US action against ihcir satellites, wo believe it Is unlikely Ihc Soviets would interfere with those of thc US.

VI. SOVIET CIVIl DEFENSE

crmeriy, the Soviet civil dclensewas directedoint civil and military organization, headed by Marshal of lhe Soviet Union V. I. Chuykov and under the general direction of the Council of Ministers. USSR The chain of command followed civilchannels from Moscow through"blast, city, dty ward, and rural rayon government centers. Al each level olthe responsibility for the operational aspects of civil defense rested with IheStaff of the Civil Defense, although Ihe local chief executiveecond title of Chief of Civil Defense for that respective territory.

ecent organizational changes have apparently been made which directlythe civil defense organization to the Ministry of Defense. The new head of civil defense. Col. Cen. A. Allunin,eputyofilitary district aulhorilies probably will assume closer control over the civil defense aclivilles of local executive and party organisations. The relationship with thc industrial, agricultural, and otherat which the director or chairman of the local enterprise is the responsible authority, for civil defense, has not been determined. The fact that the new chief of civil defense iseputy minister ol defense suggests

an upgrading of the civil defense

tion. It remains to be seen, however, what

effect thc resubordination of civil defense to

Ihe Ministry of Defense will have on the

program.

resent Soviet civil defense policy relics on urban evacuation and Ihe use of fallc-ul shelters as the principle means for protecting most of the population of likely target areas This policy makescivil defense critically dependent ondays* warning time for maximumUnder the most favorableweather, sufficient transportation, accessible dispersal areas,ays would be required to evacuate the non-essential personnel from most Soviet cities It would almost certainly require more time to evacuate Moscow and Leningrad. If a decision lo evacuate were made, the Soviets would probablyto relocate about TO percent of the population of the large cities. The remainingercent would stay in thc immediateto man key industries. Blast shelters are being built for their protection.

UL Evacuation of major urban areas would create complications that would almost surely dolay the process beyondays mentioned above. In addition,requirements during any period ofwould undoubtedlyigherin the competition for transportation facilities. Because of their reliance on urban evacuation as the principal means formost of the population of likely Urget areas, the ability of Soviet civil defenseto reduce casualties substantially appears to be significantly limited. This is trueelatively large commitment0 full-lime personnel andexpendituresillionraflklcej rubles.

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eal of (he school age and adulthave undergone compultoiy training in the extensive civil defense training program. The chief objectives of the training are toeneral awareness of protectiveagainst effects of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons; to provide leaders andfor the civil defense organizations; and to prepare most ol the working population for rescue and recovery units. Besidesthe likelihood of panic and minimizing the probable number of casualties,onvenient vehicle for political indoctrination. Evidence at hand suggests, however, lhat this program is apathetically received by the Soviet population.

VII. THE FRAMEWORK OF FUTURE SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE POLICY AND PLANNING

A. Soviet Strategic Defenses and the Arms Umilolion Agreements

he Treaty'on the limitation of ABMs and tbe Interim Agreement on Offensivewill constitute two of the more important elements in Soviet strategic defensive planning for the nest several years. The ABM Treaty lias the moic immediate and direct impact on future Soviet strategic defenses, but the Interim Agreement is also significant in that It does not limit aircraft and aircraft-delivered weapons.

IH. If thc Soviets judge the prospects for further agreements between the US and thc USSB lo limit strategic offensive systems to be favorable, and we believe they do, thoy will probably move slowly In building their defenses. If they further believe that In the long run the US will reduce its forces, thoy might do little more than complete programs already under way and continuectivities.

owever, the Soviets ore facedrowing stiategie threat from the PRC. If they were not able to resolve theirwith the Chinese in the nexl few years, they might feet impelled to continue to improve their defenses across the board within the limits of the present agreements. Or they might see improved air defenses and major RorD programs on ballistic missileand ASW as important to their future securityis the US and to theirposition in thc SALT negotialions-

lic Soviets might be prepared to break off negotiations if they came tothat their present position of "equal security' with the US was threauned. And failure lo reach further agreements on olfen-sive weapons within theears would certainly cast doubt on the viability of thc ABM Treaty. Should such doubts beby the unconstrained growth of third country powers such as thc PRC, the Soviets mightituation In which one or both parties to thc ABM Treaty favored7 when it is due for review. Thus tho Soviels might deploy allowed new olr defenses and ASW systems while then effect but prepareiderof offensive and defensive systemsinally, it is possible thatIuermanent agreement on offensive systems would be accompanied by the deterioration of political rotations with the US lo the extent that the Soviets or the US might alitogtito the ABM Treaty prior7 and commence major new defensive efforts in addition to programs tn progress.

ithin the framework of thesemany varying courses of action are open to thc Soviets. The actual course theywill depend not only upon the future course of negotiations, bul altoom-

- -

plex ol continuing policy and planninghc foremost of which ii lhcview of thc future threat to their country.

he Future Three!he USSR

between US andto the SALT have underscoredthat Soviet planners cornice- anycapable of striking their territorypart of tlie strategic offensive threatthe US and NATO theaterbased aircraft, fightertactical missiles deployed in areaswell as ICDMs.submarine-launched missiles.

planners are well current US forces and aboulIn these forces over the nextTbe US strategic forces prcsendy(orill be able loattack withombermoreissile-deliveredThere will also be more thandeployed aboard US aircraftat bases fn forward areas. Otherwill haveircraftfew hundred missiles capable olattacks against Soviet targets.the Sovieis must be prepared lotechnically advanced, US offensivewhich would greatly complicateproblem and wliich could bedeployed in. TheseftVs, longer range SLBMs, SSBNsmissile carrying capacity,bomber, advanced air-launchedand decoys, and quieter, moresubmarine*.

n addition lo the threat from the West. Soviet planners must continue lo deploy forces to deal with the growing and imposing threal from China. China is deploying medium-range ballistic missiles and intermediate-

range ballistic missiles, and lhc Sovietsexpect this force to be substantiallyover the coming decade. In addition, the Chinese will probably reach Initialcapability with an ICBM in the. AH of these missile systems could have warheads in the megaton range China will increase Its capabilities for air attack along contiguous borders ol thc USSH and into some areas of the Soviet heartland. At least for most of the period of thb Estimate, however, this capability will consist of older model aircraft.

C. Technology

of the options open loin meeting these threats willupon the ability of the USSH topresent technology and to developfor strategic defense. Thisparticularly difficult in the past,offensive innovations sinceII have usually exceeded thc limitsdefensive capabilities. Moreover,complexity of defensivelonger planning lead times thanby offensive systems.

Soviet defensive planners havethese problems. They have maintained an extensive RAD program on strategicweapons which not only upgrades existing syslcms and readies for deployment newu til (ring present technologies, but broadly explores new technological

Sensor technology is perhaps the most difficult area to advance and accountsajor share of the bg in defenseSensors must provide timely information on the targets position and course. Without adequate data on thc target location, other elements of the defensive problem become more critical. Weapons technology and good

CCRCT

41

and control techniques can offset shortcomings in sensor technology to some degree. For example, system inaccuracies can be compensated (or by using nuclear devices with large lethal radii; (aster missiles andcan make up (or some delays in target acquisition; and prompt decision making can minimize the engagement delays.

D. Resource ond Bureaucratic Constraints

esource considerations and theof bureaucratic interests also esert an influence over lbc course of major defensive force development. Soviet policy makers must balance their concerns for strategic defense against other needs, both dvilian andand allocate money, manpower, and scarce technical resources accordingly. We' cannot place precise limits on the extent to which those resources will be devoted todefensive programs. Plant capabilities, for example,onstraint in some aircraft and submarineperhaps in some electronics products asthey can be expanded. Military expenditures can be. and have been, redirected within thebudget, and the defense budget itself has been increased. Even so, past weapon programs provide useful yardsticks for putting bounds on the likely pace and magnitude of future programs.

olicy decisions in tlie USSR today are Ihc productollective leadership in which each of thc principal leaders weighs theagainst his individual views and Inter-csts. Tliis policy environment is conducive to the interplay of conflicting bureaucraticamong which militaryman tn uniform, system design bureaus, and productionconsiderable weight. But little is known of tbe balance of competing elements within the Politburo or

lhe implications of live compelition for future defensive developments.u

li. Considerations ol Defenso Effectiveness

Soviet evaluation of tho effectiveness of current and planned defense systems will impact heavily upon their planning of the future defensive force structure. Thismust be done not only in the light of projections of enemy forces, theirand of development and deployment of new defensive systems, but also of thevulnerability, and relativeof critical target areas.

Since World War II, Soviet forces and defense-related industries have been dispersed throughout the USSR making them lessto attack. To protect tbcm thc Soviets hrve deployed widespread defended strong pointseries of defensive barriers. Most PVO Strany forces are concentrated in the USSR west of the Ural Mountains, along thc Trans-Siberian Railroad to Irkutsk, and in the region of Vladivostok.

In their writings and in theirpatterns, Soviet planners havethc protection of the ISO or so political and administrative centers upon whichcontrol of the couniry depends. Defenses jic also situated to protect military command

'and control centers. Defenses (or Sovietstrike forces emphasize the protection of "reuseable" military bases; these are thc bases housing weapons and military supplies which Soviet military thinkers see either as decisive at the outsetuclear war. or as needed toontinuing war-making capability. The amount o( protection accorded defense industrial centers supporting the mili-

" Tlie framework within which decutuoa araeuised in. "Soviel Forces for Inter. toMioeMalated toOP SECRET. RESTRICTED DATA.

-rep

potential of thetransportation, andozen types ofwith theof the center and the engagement effectiveness of the defensive systems.

uch of the effectiveness of thoforces depends upon thc tacticsAnd these are constantlytate of flux in response to offensive tactics. Inthe tactical interplay normally develops rather slowly. US bomber strike forces, for example, adopted tactics to neutralize key SAM sites andorridor to inlandIn response, Soviet air defense forces employed long-range interceptors to attack bombers before they reached Soviet frontiers, and they set up dummy and alternative SAM sites to complicate effective offensive

n wartime the tactical interplaymuch more rapidly. When forces go into combat theyariety ofsituations, and tactics must be developed to meet them. ECM and electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) tactics, inare important to strategic defensive force effectiveness. But tactics are limited to what the weapon system can achieve, and theoptions open to future Soviet strategicforcesirect reflection of thc capabilities of new defensive syslenrs.

VIII. DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS

he extent ofacilities and tho succession of now systems deployedto the steady, high level of the Soviet ReVD effort in support of strategic defense. Major advances in weapons technology must be anticipated over the next decade. Some advances will result in significant upgrading of current systems, while others will bein new systems The thrust of currentlyrograms, and tho problems

they are intended to overcome have been described in relevant sections above- This Section summarizes the nature and pace of these developments andasis for the postulations of new weapon systems projected in the illustrative force models.

A. Air Defenses

he key air defense requirements, highlighted in the discussion of currentarc better radar surveillance at altitudeseet, and all-weather weapons which can engage attackers effectively at low altitudes. These requirements are made critical by thc threat posed by such systems as the SRAM, now being deployed, and thearmed decoy planned for future deployment New ASMs will not only present extremely difficult targets to current Soviet air defense weapon systems, but will abo tend to saturate Soviet early warning and command and control systems.

Air Surveillance and. Low-attitude air surveillance can be enhanced by the improvement of ground-based radar networks and by the introduction of an airborne radar system which can detect targetsand background.to the ground-based network are likely to be the continued deployment of mast-mounted Squat Eye radars, the introduction of new height finders, and perhaps an increase in fixed radar sites In scene areas. In addition, we continue to believe the Soviets will develop an overland AWACS. They have notthe required technology as fast as we anticipated, however, and we do not expect the introduction of the required overland look-down radar before the.

inrnrecprors

n advanced long-range, all-weather Interceptor, with look-down,ombat radiusrn

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be available In the. If the Soviels should not wish to wail for thisthey could bringew. low-altitude fighter in the. Alternatively, thc Soviets couldersion of the Flogger. which is now being deployed to Frontal

he Foxbat could also be improvedew fire-control system. Although we have little Information regarding the Foxbat's present system, and no signals have beenfrom its air intercept radar, we do not believe that it nowook-down, shoot-down capability. However, the developmentulse doppler air intercept radarompatible "shoot-down" air-to-air missile (AAM) could lead to the addition of this capability sometime in the future. DIAhowever, as to the present air Intercept radar technology on the Foxbat, andin their judgments of the speed withook-down, shoot-down capability is likely to be incorporated into the FoxbaL

believes that the present Foxbatew air Intercept radar,ulse radar with continuous wave mi actionirst generation pulse dopplcr-L

sidering all of these factors they believe the Foxbat could beook-down, shoot-down capability by the.

NSA, State, Army, Navy and Air Force do not believe that the presentair intercept radarulse doppler device.

^jThcy also point out that the availability ol Western literature and components, while helpful, would not necessarily resultook-down, shoot-down capability, and that Westernin this area are still limited despite years of research. For these reasons they arc led to believe that Soviet developmentomplete overland look-down, shoot-down system is unlikely before the.

DIA further believes that the general level of Soviet engineering competence, the availability of Western technical literature on puke doppler radar development, and the possible availability of Western pulse doppler radars forhas given the Soviets the capacity for developing tlie necessary techniques. Con-

-Swrtoee-fo-Air Mlttilot

The Soviets will continue to improve the capabilities of deployed SAMs foragainst low-altitude targets and against targets using ECM. These improvements will probably result from continuous modification programs to existing equipment but may also involve deployment of new equipment atsites,

The introduction of high-speed, air-launched missiles with small radar cross

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44

like the US SHAM is sohreatew strategic SAM may be required to cope with II.he new system might employ pulse doppler acquisition radars,wave fire-control radars,igh acceleration missile possibly equipped with semiactive homing guidance. Unless testing were to begin immediatelyystem probably could not be deployed

AM system capable of dealing with the SHAM, whether an entirely new SAM Or an extensively modified existing system, wouldigh data-rate surveillance system able to update target position information at least once perompatible data link system to convey this information to the site engagement radar would also be required.

B. Ballistic Missile. 'lhe Soviets have agreed to limitof ABM components and systems to the Moscow area and to one ICBM deploy-menthey alsorohibition

"Arucsc III el rise ABM Treaty resell K* part "Each party undertakes mm Io employ ABM system, or

thee COTpoouUthat,

(A) Wjtfain one ABM rystem denluvnieeit ares Mmradiusilometers and centered on the pjrly'i nations! capital.party may deploy: fl) No moreBM launchers nnd no moreDM interceptor missiles at bunch sites,ud within no more than six ABM radar vomplesiu. the area of each con-pie. being circular andiameter of no more than three kilometers, andhm one ABM system deploymentadresilometers and cootaiahv, ICBM mIoty mayo moreBM benchers and no moreBMmm.le. at bunchwo large phased-unay ABM radars comparable in potential lo eorrei-ponding ABM indari operational or under cOfiHructlon on lhe dale of -uvuLin- of the treaty in an ABM ays-teni deployment area containing ICBM silo bunehen.o mote thanBM radars eachotential teas than the potential of the smaller olabove mentioned two brge phased-erray ABM radars"-

oti the development and testing of sea-based, air-based, spacc-basod, and mobile land-based ABM systems. Tims ABM development will probably be directed primarily towardtho Moscow defenses and developing new fixed systems for deploymenl in defense of ICBM fields.

Improvements to the Moscow defenses would probably include additional acquis if ion and tracking radars, stecrablc phased-array engagement radars, and improved missiles. Deployment of these elements would resultystem with greater surveillance and target handling capability and more flexibility.

the Soviets suggested they intended toew system for defense of ICBM ribs, and that It maysuch characteristics as hardening, high acceleration missiles, and smaller radars which have not yet been developed. There Is no indication yet of tho development ofard point defense system. If ICBM defenses are deployed in thc near future, they would probablyissile tracking radar,ong-range mbsile (thb we refer to ashey might eventuallyew. high acceleration terminal interceptor andit with the system. Large acquisition and tracking rndan would probably be deployedart of the ICBM defenses.

If the Treaty to limit ABMs were to be Abrogated and the Soviets were to deploy ABMs widely in art attempt loational defense, they mightop Roost type radar and some of the components mentioned above Thb follow-on ABMis postulated to cover uncertaintiesthe nature of Ihe Top Roost at Sary Shagan. The presenceeparate face at one end of the receiver antenna rabes athat large radars of the Top Roost type could function as both acquisition and engage-

fSTOP SCCRCT

radars. If so, the number ol interceptors associated with an ABM cornplea could varyup tothey could be located as far asm from the largemaller engagement radar would beto control terminal interceptors from these locations.

C. Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare

IA Fixed Acoustic Amur Initial detection will continue to be the critical ASW problem Fixed acoustic arrays for large ateawill probably be developed.ixed acoustic array system which coulddetect US ballistic missile submarines on station at ranges on tlie order il amiles is not likely even with greater than expected improvements in Soviet sensorin the criming decade

Non-acoustic Detection Ouron Soviet research on non-acousticIs extremely Limited, and our uncertain, ties are greater Ihan for any other systemIn this Estimate. Wo feel reasonably certain that the Soviets areon. sidcrablc effort in this area. And to the extent that they are successful, the result mightignificantly improved system for search of the open ocean- However, none of the better understood methodsasic solution to the problem of finding US SSBNs in the open ocean. Even if the Soviets were to develop Improved sensors, there would still remain the problem of incorporating these techniques into an integrated system toan effective counter to the US SSBN force. We believe we would recognize the deployment of new detection systems as well as the development of anti-SSBN forcestfaem.

Submariner. Further technical progress is expected In thc development of submarines and their sensorigorous quieting program could enable the Soviets nearly to

match present US quieting achicvensenrsend of theetermined effortboth sonar design andby the, also result inimproved capabilities Someand sonar improvements could beax early as fhen aattack submarine. Even withprojected for the endew Sovietnotigure of meritPolaris

maintaining covert trail for an catendedof patrol. -

Surface Forces. Thc Sovietsuild more advanced surface ships. The new Kara-class cruiser and Krivak-class destroyer will probably be evaluated in the ASW role, and they may be followed in they new ASW cruiser and ASWclanea. The new aircraft carrier under construction at Nikolaev will probably be operational by the. This ship could be capableumber olASW. reconnaissance, air defense, andupon the finalof thc ship, the aircraft supplied, and the operational situation. We believe ils ASW capabilities would be at least equal to those of the Moskva-class, and that It will probably be fitted with the most advanced sonar suit ava^lablc-,,

In addition to advanced sonars, oilier developments in the surface forces will yield marginal Improvements in strategic ASWASW missiles with ranges up tom will probably emerge in tlieo give surface forces an improved attackCoordinated ASW helicopter operations could further extend search and attack ranges.

-See Memorandum to HolJers ofWins* Pset Forces for Operations inatedECRET,iscussion ol

this .hip.

we do not expect, even by lhe, any significant ability on the part of open-ocean ASW task groups to delect evading nuclear submarines.

Although we cannot, alpredict specific airborne sensorSoviet activity In this field is ofscopendicate continuedASW aircraft over the next decade. Theof the ASW Bear indicates thatwill concentrate on area coveragepayload. Late in thc decade thcmayore advanced ASWsystem.

Vse of Satellites inSatellites may constitute integralof some ASW systems by the latemost significant developments to beare the use of satellite relay systemsmoored sonobuoys or possiblysystems and to providefor ASW forces. The usein low-earth orbit inolebutarge number ofwere employed, they would beonly sporadic monitoring.(including those inwith very large antennas would,other hand,eans for thosurveillance of many sensors wiih areturn of data and continuousThe Soviets have yet to oi hit asatellite, however. Systemsuse of satellites to search ocean areassubmarines with radar, laser,sensors might be under development,operational, within ihe nextears.

D. Antisatellito Systems

he Soviets will almost certainlytheir present non-nuclear capability to engage satellites at altitudes belowm. Ax their orbital Interceptor program

develops, they will probably improve their bunch vehicles sufficiently to engage targets at altitudesm. and they areby theo be capable ofsatellites in orbits up to geostationaryt.SCCnm;.

IX. ILLUSTRATIVE FUTURE. Alternate Force Models

he four alternative force modelsin this section are intended to illustrate, in gerseral terms, how differing outcomes of the SALT. US and Chinese force and politicaland Soviet strategic goals and levels of effort might impact on thc structure of future defensive forces. Other assumptions areof course, and differing judgments of weapons technology and force levels could be projected. Nevertheless, we believe the models chosen are representativeange of possible Soviet courses of action. It should be emphasised, however, that we consider no one of the force rraodeb to be an estimate that

" Vice Adm. Vincent p. de Poix, USN. the Dim-tor, Defense Intelligence Agency,an. Williamhe AnSstant Chlel of Staff forrtment of the Army; and Rear Adas. Earl F. Itrrumis, the Director ot Naval intelligence.of tho Navy, ara In fundamental disagreement with rcveral iipe'U of thii Section. They believe the force levels istra ao oonaluticilry low as to ba of little uie to planners, particularly la the com ol SAMs. aircraft interceptors, and the absence ol strategic ASW lorces. Thay further believe that the key asaoinptioni In Force Models III and IV concern-tog the ABM Treaty being terminated/abrogated are not adequate base* upon which lo pio>cct future forces unless more detailed amimptloni are given with respect lo lhe time of the decisions, lhe reason, which stde acta first and the events whleh lead tn terminiaod/or abrogation. They believe lhal the Defense Intelligence Projections for Planning (DII'P)ora useful portrayal of the opUona avull-ible lo thc Soviet] for future itrateeic weapons de-ployaneni than do lhe ilhistrative Force ModelsIn this Section. For further ripreulon of i ice their footnotes throughout ihll Section.

Soviet strategic defense forces will becomposed of the particular weapon systems in the numbers listed.

ISS. Summary tables follow the discussion of the force models. The first summarizes the key differences between the forces. The second compares force levelsbc7 represents die end of the near-term period ofears for which we are able to project with someIt aboimeexpiration of the Interim Agreement onto negotiate aoffensive agreement could lead to withdrawn! from the ABM agreement. The .subsequent tables illustrate possible year-by-ycar changes in key weapon systems for each of the force alternatives. They are carried2 so as to show more clearly the different trends resulting from major qualitativeand alternative force planning assumptions; many of these do not become significant until

ILLUSTRATIVE FORCEoy Assumptions

his force modelinimum Soviet response to low levels of strategicarms development in the US and in China, and Soviet reliance primarily upon retaliatory forces to deter nuclear attack. In this force model:

Soviets would abide by the ABM Treaty, which continues, the Interimon Offensive Missiles would resultennanent agreement and improved US-Soviet relations; the US force developments would he less than presently programmed; Chinese strategic forces would grow slowly; and Soviet relations with China would not worsen.

Soviets would recognize theof strategic air defenses in the faceuclear missile attack and in thc absence of nation-wide ballistic missileAir defenses would therefore be maintained af levels sufficient toonventional attackmall, third country nuclearonsequently, some savings in resources devoted todefenses would be realized whento recent years.

Force Rationale and Composition Ballistic Missile Defense

ssumed that ABM defenses st Moscow would be built up to the limits of the Treatynder the assumptions in thb model, if the US deploys at only onethe Soviets would limit theirtoould not deploy at an ICBM complex.'* PAD efforts would betoward the qualitative improvement of the Moscow defenses to cope with the threat of accidental, unauthorized, or provocative third country attack.

Vire Adm. Vincent P. de Pott. USN. the Director. Defense Intelligence Agency, Ma| Ceo. William E.li* Assistant Chief of Staff foe InteUigence, Department of the Army; and Hear Adm. Earl F. Reclanus, the Dlieclor of Navel Intelligence.ol the Navy, do not believe ihat Soviet air dcfeiuei would be based upon theseIn thearthis *iuiei jot change inSoviet defensehich ihey believe wttely

"Vice Admde Pots. DSN. the Director.

Defense Intelligence Aaency: Maj. Cen. William E_ Potla. ihe Aasuiant Chief of Staff tor Intelligence, Department of the Army; Heir Adm. Earl F. Hcctanui, the Diteetor of Naval lotelllRence, Depaitmenl of the Navy, and Maj. Cen.eegsn.ho AstUlint Chief of Staff. Intelligence, USAF. consider that Ihe assumptions in thii iubiect*ao regarding bal-liatic muule defenses be Soviet ADMopfooi much too closely lo USa ABM de-

48

top

Tho following improvements would uke place under Force Model I:

the Moscow defenses. Iwo or Ihree additional acquisition and tracking radar complexes would be constructed to give full coverage, slecrable phased array radars would supplement thc large Try Adds as the engagement radars for' the Moscowand an impioved long-range missile would replace the present interceptor in the Moscow system. These defenses would be completed

the US did not limit its deployment to one area, ibe USSR would deploy ICBM defenses in the same manner as in Force Model II.

Air Defenses

his force modelradual de-emphasis on strategic air defense. Some of the more difficult technological problemswith low-alllludc defense and do-fense against advanced ASMs would not be addressed, and no new model Interceptors would be deployed. Soviet air defenses would, however, continue to be adequate IO protect the USSR from accidental, unauthoriied, or third country air attacks which were notby significant ballistic rnissile attacks.

s adequate warning would beevenmall attack, air surveillance capabilities would be maintained, andagainst low-altitude penetrations. This improvement would take the formlightly expanded number of early warning siteson approaches to key target areas,emplacement of new radars atsites, and improvements in the rapidity of reporting. This force model would notan AWACS with look-down capability over land.

1S& Older Fresco. Farmer, and Flashbght interceptors would be phased outnd numbers of Fishpot and Firebar would decline in the mid- and. By, Fiddler, Flagon, and Foxbat, would be the mainstay of the interceptor force. No new interceptors would be deployed, butwould be rctrofittodook-down, shoot-down system al the end of.

AM defenses would also bo reduced substantially.ould be phased out by thc end of. Older Fanodels of theould also be phased out, but Fanodels would bo retained andumber of cases suppiementec* with an additional radar. Deployment ofndould be completed at about currentlow-paced program to extend Uie range of theould be ursdertaken. In this force model there would be no new SAM system.

Antisubmarine Warfare

esearch on ASW technology would continue at current rates, and focus on ASW more useful for defense of Soviet forces at sea than for detection of SSBNs on patrol. Fixed acoustic arraysange of aboul SO nm would be installed near the major naval bases of the Northern and Pacific Fleets, but these installations would have no direct application to the anli-SSBN mission.

rocurement of new ASW ships and aircraft would proceededuced pace. Forces would continue to be Improved for thc coastal defense and self defense ASW missions, butoviets would not assemble any forces for the specific purpose ofSSBNs at sea. The aircraft carrier under construction is. in class model, assumed to haveelf defense ASW capability.

Implications for StrategicThe key problems of strategicmissile attack. low-altitudeOrnot becomposition of the Soviet forces andcapabilities would have changedThe combined strategicreceive fewer resources in theas increasing reliance would bestrategic arms limitationeansthc strategic

orceorce in which current programs arc completed, but few new ones arc introduced. Itough lower limit on possible Soviet defense choices, and would be at variance with Soviet behavior in the past when large defenses have beennecessary, even if not totally cffcctivc-

ILLUSTRATTVE FORCE MODEL II Key Assumptions

his force model assumes that thewould rely primarily upon mutualunder strategic arms agreements as the basis for their strategic relations, but that they would also continue to maintainair defenses. This model assumesthe ooeitinuation of the Soviet approach of the past few years under detente and SALT.

under Force Model I, the Soviets would abidermdouing ABMand subscribe to an agreement on offensive weapons. This force model,assumes that US forces wouldto develop generally as nowand that Chinese strategic forces would grow toissilesimilar number of bombers in tlie.

traditional Soviet attitude oftechnical progress would govern their attitude to air defenses. Air defenses would consequently be maintained and im-

proved as new developments becomein an attempt to deal within US strategic air attack. Tlte effort expended for iliategic delense wouldat approximately present levels.

BAD would emphasizecapabilities against air-launched missiles and SSBNs.

Force Rationale and Composition

fin//ist icife Defense

16S. In this model, the ADM Treaty would limit ABM defensesational Command Authority defense and one ICBM defensive area. Moscow ABM defenses would beas in Force Model I. but they would be improved and upgradedreaterIn the ICBM defenses, acquisition and tracking radars would be Installed as would engagement radars and long-rangeerminal interceptor would replace sorne long-range missiles startingould continue in the ABM field, but tlie results would not be so promising as to induce the Soviets to abaruJoo the ABM Treaty for additional deploymenton-sidcrably improved ABM system.

Air Defenses

n this model. Soviet air defenses would continue to bo maintained and upgraded throughout the next decade. Creater emphasis would be placed on more effective defenses againit low-altitude attack by both aircraft and advanced ASMs.

n addition lo thc impfOvemcnU in land.based radars during the, noted in Force Modelew AWACS capable of detecting low flying targets over land would be deployed in thes an effective and economical substitute for the further of land-based radars- Sufficient

fXCRBT-

aircraft would be deployed by to support about eight on cor.tinuoui petrol, in periods of crisis, over the Baltic and northern approaches to Moscow, and possibly themaritime provinces

lder model alrcralt would be re-tained In the force longer than in Force Model I. and newer model aircraft would be deployed in greater numbors. Foxbatwould continue into tbe, and would be retrofittedook-down, shoot-down system at the ond of. In addition, tbe Sovietsheringew advanced all-weather interceptor with look-down, shoot-down capa-bihties to work with the new AWACS.

ld SAMs would be phased out as in Korea Model I. batlower pace, and someties would receive new equipment. Deployment ofndould soon be completed. But programs to upgrade these systems would be more vigorous than in Force Model I. Tho main difference from Forceould be the introduction in theew longer-range, low altitude SAM, which would be deployed in limited numbers around key locations.

Antisubmarine Warfare

hc Soviets would continue to press for an ocean surveillance or trailing capability through increased attention to acoustic and. They would installfixed detection systems In the Northern and Pacific Fleet coastal areas of the USSK But improvements In submarine quieting would be Insufficient to provide an effective trailing capability.

aval construcuon programs would continue at their current rate. New ASW light cruisers, destroyers, and patrol aircraft would be introduced inThe new large aircraft carryingwould have about the same ASW capa-

bility bj the Moskva-class and enter the fleetate of oneears. But Soviet capabilities to employ genera! purpose ASW forces for operations against Polaris would remain very low.

Implicalions for the Strategic Defenses

key problems of strategicmissile attack, low-altitudeandnot besome advances would be made. Theof thc Soviet forces and theirbill lies would have changed, butwould remain vulnerableSmissile strike.

weapon systems for thewhich promise enhancedlow-altitude ah attack, would bebut this is the only critical areaprogress would be discernible.thc air defenses would be subjectby missile attack. Thoof the soategic defensesto grow in the, evenforce levels would decline.

ILLUSTRATIVE FORCE MODEL III Key Assumptions

his force model differs fromnd II In that If assumes that discussions regarding an offensive systems treaty would break down afterears, and the ABM Agreement would bet Isthat:

strategic competition between the US. and the USSR would return to the pre-

" For the views of Vice Adm,e Poic USN. (he Director, Defense Intelligence Agency! Msi. Cen. William E. Potts, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Department of the Army; and Rear Adm. Earl F. Recl.nus. the Director of Naval intelligence. Department of the Navy, see their foot-note

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SALT tempo; boih countries would deploy additional strategic offensive weapons,'0 and both countries must alsohina which is rapidlyICDMs and additional medium bombers.

pace oi military HAD would step up, with emphasis upon improved systems which could berapidly.

initial sitesational ABM defense would become operationalnd uTipfoved air and submarine defenses would move forwardaster pace than innd II, but not so rapidly as to cause expenditures for strategic defensive forces to grow faster than thc gross national product

Force Rationale and Composition

Ballitlic Missila Doransa

Even with the termination of the ABM Treaty, ABM defenses would be built at an ICBM area as fn Force Model II. But into Force Model II, additional deployment would lake place startinghe nature of this additional deployment would depend on the Soviet view of tbe defense requirement and the performance of lhe ABM system.

The Soviets might establish aredoubt in the northwesternan integrated syslem including the defenses at Leningrad, Moscow, andwith improved ASW,eans of limiting damage fo tlie key administrative and control centers of Ihe USSHrice of leaving the rest of the country unprotected. They would probably see the needigh

"Fee the US. rht.ahi0 deter ham the profracirned lo.ee in thai Minuteman III would be retrofitted to all idea,missiles ienlaced by ULMS. andla retained Ul the force.

J

acceleration ABM inefense andit along with an improved long-range missile

Ihe other hand, thc Sovietsthat such an ABM syslem,of its lack of hardness, is notthis task, and deployarger region in thewith launch complexes atYaroslavl, Corkiy.Kiev. Minsk and other keya defense would be lesswould provide scene protection againstatiack or accidental launch, butgreater expansion of the largeand control radar network than woulddefenseedoubt area.

Air Defenses

Intensive Soviet programs for airwould continue throughout the decade. As in Force Model II, defenses against bombers flying at low altitudes and armed with advanced ASMs would bereater effort would be made to counter the electronic warfare capabilities of potentialIn general. Force Model III wouldigorous air defense program; both BAD and deployment would be somewhat more extensive than in Force Model II.

Thc same efforts would be made in air surveillance and warning as in Force Model II. but theso would be supplemented by larger numbers of new radars designed to operate more effectively in an ECM environment. Deployment of an overland AWACS would reach numbers sufficient to support continuous patrol overreas for short periods, thereby covering major approach routes mere

The Soviets would retire older model interceptorsempo slower than in Force Model II. They would continue to deploy Fox-

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and Flagon interceptors into then advanced all-weather interceptor would be deployed earlieresultorefiort toook-down radar, and would consequently reach higher numbers by the.

in Force Model II. Fan Songwould be replaced by neweraodould be improved, and aSAM would be deployed. Butlorce model, the pace and extent ofration and new deployment would begreater

Anff'sub marine Wa tiara

this force model we assume thewoultt assign certain ASW forcesto deal with the SSBN threat Wecollective forcesreater degree of Successnew, quieter submarines andsurveillance ASW systems wouldthe Soviets to deploy either atrailing forceorce of ASWprosecute contacts from the new oceansystem. Thus two options arein this force model representingassumptions about the area of techno-

" Vice Adm. Vincent P. -I- Pob, USN. the Direcior. Defenie Intelligence Agency: Ma| Cen William E. Potu. the Annual CW et Stall for Intelligence. Department ol thend Rear Adm. Earl P. Rectanui. the Director ol Na-al Intelligence,of the Navy, do not agree with the way in which ASW force* are idee tiffed and categorised In any of rhe illustrative force models. They believe It ia inappropriate to identity ipcciffc platform! as "dedicated strategic ASW is done in Illuitrative Models III andmany of these units could engage in othec Ihan ar.li-SSPN operaliont. They further believe that it is equally Inappropriate to eidiide from each of the IllutUative foiceumber of platforms.c, Kotlin-clan destroyers. Echoass wbeaarveea. whaeh have been noted in ASW rirrcises and could logically beas 'other ASW forces".

logicalailing option in which the production ofncreasedbeginning innd an ocean surveillance option in which the productionew ASW alrcralt Is initialed6 and proceeds rapidly.

ithin the projectedear period, these forces could harass US SSBN units in some instances, and possibly deny certain small patrol areas lo them. But neitheris likely to alter substantially theof the SSBN force during this time. Allhough naval construction programs inof tactical ASW would increase, they would provide only negligible strategic ASW

Implications for the Strategic Defenses

orces projected in Force Model HI wouldigher level of defense against ballistic missile attack andpenetration by bombers with ASMs. However, the improved forces would remain vulnerable to US retaliatory missile strikes using multiple warheads and advancedaids.

he ABM deployment which occurred would provide only limited defense against missile attack Because the ABM defenses would have limited capabilities, the airwould still be subject to disruption by missile attack. Moreover, ABM deploymentignificant scale together with continued growth of air defense programs would require that Ihe overall level of efforl be increased.

IUUSTRATIVE FORCE MODEt IV Koy Assumptions

ike Force Model III. thb modeltbe breakdown of arms limitations talks, but assumes that it takes place more rapidly and in an atmosphere of greater mu-

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distrust. Moreover thc threat of the rapid growth of Chinatrategic power appears greater.ssumed that: "

ABM Agreement wouldew years, and the armswith the US and China would step up tolevel above thatrior to SALT- Although the actual threat would not exceed the levels assumed In Force III. US and Chinese RAD efforts wouldSoviet conclusions that the arms race is about to resume.

allocated to military RAD would be increased sharply, with acutback in civilianould not only develop new systems for deployment, but also allocateresources to develop new technologies which permit in the latter part of the decade deployment of substantially improved ABM, ASW. and air defense systems.

of strategic defense forces would Increase to thc point that, even though achievable without major newin pioductive capacities, they strain these capacities, and resources mutt beto the extent that the rate of growth of the civilian economy is threatened.

Force Rationale and Composition SafTisfJc Missile Defense

his force model postulates still more extensive ABM deployment thioughout the Soviet Union than does Force Model IU. Wc assume thatrogram, when completed, would emphasize protection of aboutrin-

- To,dm. Vincent P. de Poo. USN. the Director, Defense Intetlitteoof Af*acv: UaJ. Ceo WtDism E. Potts, thehiel mt Stair tee In'rllifi" Ocpaitoeo! of the Armr; aad rtcer Adas, East P. rVectaiws. the Director of Nsvsl Inte'.-Iiger>ce. Depsilinent of the Nsvy. ree their

cipal Soviet target areas and wouldignificant portion of the Soviet strategic offensive force.

he paceational deployment program would depend upon the timing of needed technological advances. If significant advances have been made in the development of new ABM components and if the Soviels decide within the next few years toystem utilizing these advances, they mayystem, whicharge phased-array radareparate pulsed radarinto the receiver, to perform all rhe acquisition and engagement tasks required of thc system. This would permit more rapid and less expensive deployment of improved long-range missiles and high-accelerationinterceptors. Deployment of such acould start immediately after termination of the ABM Treaty. The lint complexes would become operational8 and the entire system completed in the.

Air Defense

s the prospects for an effectiveABM system grow, air defense programs in general would be pursued more vigorously. As before, emphasis would be placed onagainst bombers attacking at lowand on countering offensive electronic warfare capabilities. The achievements of this program would be somewhat above those of Force Model III.

Sufficient AWACS aircraft would be deployed0 to support aboutn patrol continuously for short periods. Major AW ACS operating areas would include tho Baltic and Barents Seas coastal areas, and possibly the southwestern areas, the Bering Straits, and the far eastern maritime provinces.

In this loico model older fighters would be phased out more slowly, and an

SECRCt-

. low-altitude Interceptor would beeduced An advanced all-weather fighter would be extensively deployed and would give thii forceotal of moreircraftook-down, shool-downility

AM forces would be considerablycompared toarginal increase in Force Model III. This would beby maintaining the SA-xsonstant force level, increasing deployments ofndnd deploying large numbers of the new low-altilude SAM. Existing SAM systems

would be upgraded more extensively than in

the other force models.

Anfisubmorino War. In thb force model we assume the Soviets would assign certain ASW forcesto deal with the SSBN threat We call these collective forces "dedicatedASWe assume that there would be deployments of new submarines or an ocean surveillance system based on improvements in sensor technology, as in Force Model UL Forward basing rights would be required to support cither of these options. Soviet capabilities to harass US SSBNs would be somewhat improved, but not sulficiently to affect the security of the entire US force. Soviet trailing capabilities would still betouture Soviet ocean surveillance system would be ofcapability against transiting SSBN units and of no value in delecting palrolbng

Ir-Wlittoee Agency. Ml Cen Wfltoa E. Potts, the AsslsUnl ChieTof Staff S'"^pof tho Army;Beari F.ava, ^

Implicotions for lhe Strategic. Significant technical improvements in ABM sensors, and tlie deployment ofABM defenses would give impetus to the increased deployment of other defensiveResource constraints would require thatprograms be scheduled more slowly than technically feasible. Even so. substantialin defense against ICBM attack,air attack, and submarine-launchedattack would be made.

19S. Ihe strategic defenses posited in this alternative are expensive, but possible. Thc simultaneous acquisition of the aboveand of large strategic offensive forces, would require the extensive redirection of existing civilian priorities and possiblyprograms. Consumer programs and civilian space programs would probably be hit hardest

B. Likely Soviet Courses of Action

e do rot consider either Ihe low or the high Illustrative casesnd IV) to be likely Soviet courses of action. It seems improbable that, if the US went ahead with something like Its programmed forces, the Soviets would accept the deterioration in their strategic position implicit in Force Model I.

n the other hand, we consider it unlikely lhat the Soviets will wish to make the effort represented by the Force Model IV. except possiblyonviction lhat an agreement would not be reached andassive buildup in US forces well beyond currently proposed forces would occur. Inase, the Soviets would almost certainly wish lo parallel the high effort inarallel effort in strategic offense. We think the Soviets would consider thecoals of high strategic offensive and

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dclcnsive programs loo heavy (or peace lime, and the requisite disruption of other programs too great

IDS. If the ADM Treaty Is continuedc think the level of effort and technical progress generally represented by Force Model II would be the most likely. It would permit maintaining, and in some areasSoviet capabilities (or strategicunder conditions in which the threat did not grow appreciably, and do thisost- not much different from the current level ol effort.

e think thattrategicapreement not be reached and the ABM Treaty was terminatedomething like the level of effort and technical progress represented by Force Model III wouldikely Soviet course of act ion. This force would maintain, and in some areas improve. Soviel capabilities against their probable view of the likely threat. It would require resources over the next decade almost one-half more than what they have expended in the past decade, but is certainly within Soviel capa-

bilities should they determine that theirposition required it-

hese force models are necessarily Illustrative. They represent different SALT outcomes, Soviet reactions to US force levels, and levels of effort. Ihey show in general our view of what the Soviets might do with regard to developments in specific weapon systems and forces under those differing conditions. They are presented as illustrative courses of action, In the full awareness that ourIn the protections decline as they move further into the future, and that the Soviets are certain in the course of therears to embark on some strategic programs of which we presently have little or no Inkling. As in lhe past, the Soviets will doubtless make strategic program decisionsear-to-year basis. Their forces will grow and change in gradual Increments in response to their view at thc time of thc balance between the threat, technologicalin weapon systems, resource andconstraints, and the general national policy aims of the leadership.

SUMMARY" COMPARISON OF FORCE MODELS'

MODEL II

deterrence is tho basis. ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement on Offensive Missiles ore in effect. Gradual decline in strategic defense after current programs ere completed.

Mutual deterrence is the basis. ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement on Offensive Missilea are In effect. SovieU seeto improve air defense against limited offensive forces.

development In ABM technology to make it effective against heavy attack, NCA defense filled out to Treaty limit and retrofitted with new components under development. If the US were not to deploy an NCA defense, the USSR would not add defense for an ICHM ares.

No development in ABM technology to make it effective against heavy attack. NCA defense end one ICBM defense retrofitted with new components under development. High acceleration terminal interceptorsew long-range interceptor in Uiet high valuo targets.

No overland AWACS capability developed.

Moss AWACS kept nl current levels.

Look-down air intercept radar developed8 with complementary shout-down missile system. Retrofitted into allquadrons of Foxbat deployed along key approach routes.

No new interceptors deployed, but Foxbat does get retrofit of new weapons systemome older aircraft would be phased out rapidly.

Many existing SAM systems would be modified and their performanceSome older units would be phased out by tbe end of.

AWACS with capability to look-down over land operational0 covers about eicht patrol areas in Baltic and Barents Seas in the west, and Berinc Strait end maritime provinces in the east.

Look-down/shool-dowo capability developedS. Retrofitted into all IS squadrons uf Foxbat deployed along key approach routes.

An advanced all-weather interceptor ia introduced

Cuircnl SAMs modified throughout decade lor improved peilormnnce and improved ECCM. New low-altitude SAM developed

effort to create anti-SSBN sy-iemj. Minimal effort to maintain it tactical ASW capability for general purpose naval

ffnri* underway tu establish on onti-SSBN capability. Progress islo deploy tiny dedicated forces. Emphasis on building stronger tactical ASW capabilities continues.

For the views of Vice Adm. Vincent P. deSN. the Director. Defense Intelligence Agency;Gen. William E.blnnl Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Deportment of the Army; and Rear Adm. Earl F. Itectonus, the Director of Naval Intelligence. Department of the Navy, see their,

57

SUMMARY COMPARISON OF FORCE MODELS*

MODEL III

Strategic competition with tha US continues7 alter teraUnalMo ol Iho ABM Titaly and the Agreement on Oflensiv* Missiles. Vigorout KAD programsluee nyntams sucia'ul enough lo warrant widespread deploy meni

ADM technology develops tiilficicntly to warrant further deploymentsing high accelerationew long-rangt interceptor, in either light defense uf weslern USSR or heavier defense for Moscow Leningrtd-

(iorkiy arr.

AWACS with capability to look-down over Innd operationalovers aboutatrol eteaa in Bailie and IU rents Seas in the ceil, and Bering Strait and maritime provinces in the east.

hoot-downetrofitted into allquadron* of Foxbat deployed along forward approach routes.

FORCE MODEL IV

Arms race reeumed arilh vigor afterof die AIIM Treaty and Ihe Agreement onissilesprogramsew systems which warrant widespread deployment.

Large, new phased-array radar used aa ABM acquisition and engagement radar. High aceeleration terminalew long-range interceptor in thet high value target*deployment covers the populated of the USSR.

New AWACS with capability lo look-down over land opertlonaly th*, coven aboutatrol anas in Baltic and Barrnta Seas in th* west, and llering Stinit and eastern maritime provinces in th? east.orks with Foxbat and new interceptor.

Look-down/sboot-down eapalMlily deralcpedetrofitted iatoquodron* of Foibat deployed along forward ap-routea particularly in Hi* north-

advanced all-weather interceptor is introduced

Current SAMs modified throughout decade for improved performance. Improved kill in presence of electronic jamming ia ail areas of SAM coverage. New low-allltiide SAM developed

Some Improvements In aeoooUes prompt the Soviets to deploy cither nn ocean surveillance system in theSea. and the North AlianOc by the end of tbe decade or to introducetrailing capabilityeel of quid, new

An advanced all-weather interceptor la introducednlet in iow-alLVi.ee interceptor could be available3 II adoptedurrent desirn like Floggor. o* by IMA it bued on design* currently being mud. Aboutquadrons could cover forward areas and key approaches to th* Soviet heartland.

Current SAMs modified throughout decade (or improved performance. Improved kill in prraence ol electronic Jamming in all areas of SAM coverage.ystem iaaarwvod, but kept dee* to rarreetew low-altitude SAM developed

Soma improvements in acoustic sensors prompt the SovieU to deploy either an oceane* irUca in theSea and North Atlantic by the and of (he decade or torailing capabilityleet ol quiet, new SSNs.

The Illustrative Force Models presented in this Section represent possible directions that Soviet strategic defense forces could take. It should be emphasized that wc consider no one of them an estimate that Soviet strategic defense forces will be composed of the particular weapon systems in the precise numbers listed. They are intended only to be illustr.irive models of possible trends and differing emphases, and are developed primarily for broad policy use at tlie national level. They are not intended for defense planning purposes; projections developed for phnning in the Department of Defense are included in the Defense Intelligence Projections for Planning (DIPP).

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COMPARISON OK ILLUSTRATIVE FORCE MODELS FOR

MODEI-S

Hen House Radars

Missile Early Warning

Satellite Trackinr.

ABM Systems NCA Defense:

Regional Kadar Completes

Try Add Engagement Radars

New Engagement Radar Complexes.

ong Range

ICBM Field Defense:

Regional Radars

EngBgcmenl Radars

iig Range

SAM System. (Operolionol Sues)

SA-l

SA-2

SA-3

SA-5

Follow-on SAM

Interceptor Systems

Fresco

Fishpot

Firjbar

Fiddler

'

Foxbat

Interim Low-Altitude Interceptor

Advanced All-Weather Interceptor

Air Surveillance Radar Systems

E.isUng Type*

New Types

Total Radars

Total Sites

Airborne Weening and Control Radar* Flat Jack (Moss AWACS)

Number of Radons

Improved Overland Radar

Number of Radars

ASW Force-

ll-M

ASW Rear

V-Class SSN

A-Closs/Ncw Claw

See footnotes at end of table.

I

II

.1

X

t

"i

12

too

56

5

25

Purpose

l

COMPARISON OF ILLUSTRATIVE FORCE MODELS FORConiiriutJ}

MODELS

Alternative Option*

Trailing Option

lass/New

Surveillance. Opuon

ASW Aircraft (Medium Range)..

Other Force*

Moskva CHG

;

2

Claa* Aircraft Carrier"

I.GM

7

CLGM/Kollow-on

4

8

DDGSP

11

27

DLG

5

8

SSGN

11

ID

Claw SSGN

1

S

For the views of Vice Adm. Vincent P. de Foil, OSN, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; Maj. Gen.otts, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department ol the Army; and Rear Adm. Earl F. Recuinus, the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy, sec their footnote 1C,

* Assumes it is for ASW.

I

J

1

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A. The title of rhii documentdr> the Mat ihould be etas-

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