U6JW ItTTERMTlQML ACTIVITIES IWWOl TO US ITmSTS Table of Contents
PART 1: Current Cuban International Activities Hostile
to the Uuited States
Overview of Geographical Scope and Methods Latin America Africa Kiddle Ear.t
Other International Actions
PART II: Possible Additional Cuban International Actions Hostile to US Interests
Africa and the Kiddle East
PART III: The Military Threat Posed by Cuban and Soviet Military Assets In Cuba
Tims mmcjiL to us inttjusts: sjwt
Tht likelihood of an accomodation with Castro Iw the next bag years
The Castro regimengagedroad range of activities designedradical change tr: undermine US Influence worldwide, froa thethe US 1s. and always will be. the principal threat. Heactions will continue at long as Fidel Castro and hlj guerrfllain power. Only the intensity varies, determined by the conditionscountry and Cuba's ability to exploit them. Six former usto negotiatetotil failed and virtually no prospect foron major Issues in tVears. This,
despite V* factodus vlvendi may continue on some secondary butly troublesome issues like air plracv.
part 1: Current Cuban International activities hostile to the its
In overview, Cuba has active subversive and military operations la latlo America, Africa, and the Kiddle East while also using diplomacy, propaganda, and covert action for anti-US purposes world-wide.
In latin America and the Caribbean
--Cuba is directly supporting active Insurgenciesl Salvador, . Guatemala, and Colombia andayingundworfconduras, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Chile. Hundreds of Latinfe'rnrists and guerrillas have been traineduba la recent years.
--Havanaeavily engagedhe consolidation of power In Nicaragua and Grenada.
ixture of diplomacy, propaganda, and non-violent ivert action to undercut US influence. '
guerrilla strategies are presently non-productive, Havana Is relyingixture of di covert action to undercut
now has0 military and civilian personnel propping up Angola and Ethiopia and working in moreozen other countries. 'Other African targets of Cuban-assisted subversive groups are South Africa, Namibia, Zaire, and Korocco. i
In the Kiddle East:
has aligned Itself closely with the PlO and the radical Arab States (Libya and South Yemen).
< C f U, / i
--Cub* usesnd economic Uctlcs to create and exploit differences beUeen Washington and its allies.
?: Possibleuban activities hostile to ITS Interests In
During theonths, these activities will continue and le certain areas, will expand. The very nature of the Castrorecludes anything but an adversary relationship between Havana and Washington, latin An erica will continue toriority target.
ubversion will continue apace, especially in but also in Colombia and Chile.
will try to encourage and take advantage of the leftist drift In SuHname and Bolivia.
--Concern over change in Panama's orientation could cause Havana to begin supporting subversive efforts there.
--If the Sandinistas are seriously threatened from without, Havana would almost certainly send additional conbat forcesdeterred by the credible threat of US ellitary forces.
Is not certain, however, that Cuba'* oromptlon of subversion will steadily increase In all cases. circumstances.
- Cactrc could be willing to reduce his revolutionary profile temporally if convincedould advance his overallf diminishing US Influence In the hemisphere.
tcan be expected to promote strongly the creationegional I organization that excludes the US. J
In Africa, Havana will maintain its military support for Angola and Ethiopia:
reluctance to withdraw troops from Angola, as long as the stability ofx1st-lenintst government is In doubt, willamibian settlement.
Military threat to Mozambique from Souti Africa could bring an Increased Cuban military presence there.
Elsewhere. Cuba Is likely to:
--Continue Its cooper it ion with the flO. Libya, and other radical Arab states.
Its efforts to create or exacerbate tensions Between the OS and Its European allies.
PAST 3: The military threat posed by Cuban and Soviet nil Uary-rtlited
assets in Cuba.
Cuba hasersons In Us amed forces, and an air force with
servesase for Soviet Intelligence gathering and propaganda activities in the Western Hemisphere. The largest Soviet signals intelligence collection facility outside of the USSP. Is !cCarets near Havana and is di-ectly primarily at 'JS government, convierclat, and ailitary communications links.
potential threatuban capability to harass or Interfere with sea and air routes in the Caribbean/Gulf of "exico/Stralts of Florida areas. This would be of pa-ticular concern because of the amount of US ccnr.ercearticularly oilthat passes through this region and when unhampered transit froa southern US ports and through Caribbean sea lanes would be required, such as for US reenforcement of WTO.
PART I: Current Cuban International Activities Hostile ta the OS
Overview of Geographical Scope ana Hethods
uban activities hostile to the United States run the eaaat froa universally accepted diplomatic, commercial, military, and cultural practices and behavior to covertation, disinformation, terrorise, and guerrilla warfare!. Tactics ere chosen according to the possibilities seenach country, eat the fundamental goal In each case Is the same./
Subversion, encompassing anything froa espionage mdromctior of coups to the training, funding, advising, and arming of paramilitary forces, is employed against governments that refuse to support Cuba's anti-US policies.' t of targets of Cuban subversion Includes governments friendly to the US aad s. countries where there are important US commercial Interests. (Ta target countries where Insurgency Is not yet practical. Cabals working behind the scenes to unify the leftist forces, help them develop broad links to the population, give them International exposure and support, and provide them with political and paramilitary training to enable them to create and take advantage of political opportunities.'
Havana Is also using, diplomacy to Increase Cuban Influence 9 umber of countrles/and convince governments that _ confrontation rather than accommodation Is the appropriate way te
dtalhis diplomatic approacholstered by r strong doses of propaganda designed to exploit frictions between
the US and Us alliesdistrust of US Intentions. Where 3 possible, trade Is used fto undercut the US or US businesses or to ^. provide Cuba with entr* into political circles where anti-US policies can be promoted.j1
'Havana places especially heavy emphasis on cultural activitieseans of creating good will tovard Cuba aad establishing contacts with cultural, Intelltctual, academic, and sports figures who can then be eaplolted In an ant1-US fashion. The Cuban leadership has consistently given high priority to maintaining and expanding the already-established, broad body of literature thatostile, highly ideological interpretation on history and current events with the Intention of promoting popular elsconceptlons about the US and thus poisoning US relations for many decades.
If ctreamstancesavana Isabovenandfi atsame timena
for eiaaple, recognizes that tha Cubait act co-Mitheory te improving formal ties=evert channelscovert support for-. an,
fovernments. however, have not Wr't: that tha tiisteneerelationstha Castro regime 1s
Tha scope of these activities hostile to tha US Is ml Haltedew countries or even to one generalitorldwide. Only the Intensity varies, determined by the conditionsach country, Cuba's ability to eiplottaa* Soviet support-.1 Although Cuba has forty thousand troops aad other personnelfrica,-tfct sain focus of Its attentloa will continue to be Latin America^
In Latin America and the Caribbean. tCuba Is directly supporting active Insurgencies in three countries (tl Salvador, Colombia, and Guatemala] and working with varying degrees of Intensity to create the organizations and political conditions propitious for Insurgency in four otherse, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, and Chile].! While Inyestlnc heavily la the consolidatlon of the regiae's Inubans In country] andO" Cubansountry)avana Iso three other countries (Uruguay,"firaguay, and HaltijfSut apparently recognizes thatn presently ae done to Initiate successful araed struggle there, 'Elsewhere In the region, Havanaepending primarily on oTpToaacy andaeans to convince governaentspfo"support Cuba's effort to Isolate the US.j
In Africa. Cuba-now hasnd civilian personnel propping upt regimesngola and Ethiopia and workingoreozen other countries. JOther African targets of Cuban-assisted subversive groups are South Africa, Namibia. Zaire, and Morocco. Reluctant to withdraw troops fTon,Angola, the Cubansey obstacleaaiblan settlement.j
In the Middle East. Cuba has aligned Itself closely with the PLO and the radical governments of the region, which Is
lementederv aggressive Cuban policy against Israel,
In West Europe, Cuba sees great opportunities to cribetween the US and Us allies
cles for Cuba's position on such issues"as'the" consolidation of Sandinista rule in Nicaragua and the provision of international recognition and juridical status
to tht SalWdoranuban effectiveness,bvto.renegotiateIndebtednessumber/of these CO
Cube's Impending loss of the chairmanship ef tbe NostHgnedCastro's obvious pro-Soviet bias daMaethree-year stint In thelunting Its efforts le portions of the Third World. fHTvana, nevertheless, will ceatlaee to try to use the movement to generate anti-US sentimentIs certain to take advantage of the seventh summit.In India earlyyearaunching platform for anti-USHavaaa continues to try to embarrass the US In the Unitedee tee Issue of Puerto Rican Independence and can be expected too eatract advantage from Nicaragua's success Ineat on the Security Council.
After the ouster of the Somoza governmenticaragua Im O atin America againajor focus of attention Im
Cuban foreign policyavana tried quickly to duplicate 2* the success elsewhere in CentraTAmerica but setbacks there aad
In Colombia In1 dashed the Cubans' hopes for quick ^ victory and caused then to shiftedium-term strategy (two
to three years). At the same time, Latin American reaction to
the events In the Falkland Islands convinced the Cubans that the O time was ripe to mobilize the region's governments to create a
multilateral organization excluding the US andeath blow to the Organization of American States and the ftio Treaty^j
In Central America, Nicaragua remains the key. The Castro regime sees the consolidation^ the Marxist-Leninist Directorate there as Important enoughecret military pact which commits Cuba to Nicaragua's defense. Anuban Civilians anduban military personnel currently in Nicaragua^are evidence of the Castro regime's readiness to back fne Sandinista government.
Nicaragua Is also seen by Havana as an invaluableFplatfore* from which to support Insurgency in El Salvador and Guatemala and as an Important transportation center through which Central American leftists, insurgents and supporters of the extreme left can travel to and from Havana withoutespite Cuban callsnegotiated political solution" Tn Central America, Havana's efforts to train and supply Salvadoran and Guatemalan 'insurgents have shown little sign of abating. Cuban and Nicaraguan efforts to organize the Honduran far left and prepare it for eventual guerrilla warfare are also continuing as are Havana's plans to destabilize the Monge government in Costa Rica. Cuban speeches at the International Theoretical Conference
In HavanaApril Indicate eleerlj that the Cettreft firmly wedded te tht eraed Itraafle doctrine la Central Aaerica. The call for negotiations itloy developed totlae for the guerrillas and mislead Vestera opUlaa or taetition of Influence froacan eventually take power.
After ihe deithr Torrljos, Parana* Wc policy shifted away froa its Support of the eitreae left In Central Aaerica. Cuba's loss of influence is of considerable concern In Navaaa, and has led to Cuban and Aicereguan actions te help the far left step up Its organizational and political work. The Castro re|lae will probably Increase subversive operations in Panama iferceives that the Par-araM aniltfroa the extreae left in the regioncontinue.'
Cuba highly values its close dlploaatlc ties alth Meilco and professes to understand that the Mexican eovernafwt.aet tolerate JjTte.rference In Internal politics.
While the Cubans are still confident about their close ties to the Mexican government, thay probably are wary that Mexico's economic problem could, hajie far-reachingepercussions
In the Caribbean, Havana Isto take advantage of opportunities as they arise but, except for Surlname, does not for the aoment have good prospectsramatic expansion In Cuban influence. The Cuba-Grenada alliance, and the alaralng Cuban-sponsored military buildup there, has raited sensitivities in the Caribbean ainistates, and Havana will probably find local
'fears of Cuban nedd ing difficult to overcome. Be vertl the ;Cubans tontlnut their efforts to expand thtlr contacts mill leftists and intellectual, la thttiL ta ast ledlo Free Srtnada to blanket th! area .Hi aatl-DS propaganda.
rtubelso working vigorously to Ingratiate Itself'"terse government in Surlnaae. and tht Cabaa prtseac.is likely to increase.
The cooTTng^ iat
S" KJV*Its liageCaJacH
by shiftingore neutral position In theover the Esseguibo
. -AI"remains the target of occasional
Infiltrations by Cuban-trained terrorists but eventhat conditionsuccessful Insurgency InUruguay anddo not eaist. is working to develop the Infrastructure necessaryopposition once conditions Improve. At the sameIs wooing Bolivia, Argentina, and Venezuela with an evethe dealse of the OAS and replacing It with anAmerican organization through which the region ectlne ascan confront the US and force its demands on in Bogota hasillingness
to downplay Havana's blatant intervention with the in The Cubans probably now viewthe sace fashion they view Argentina, Bolivia, andwhere ewphasis on diplomacy, at least for theaore likely to produce dividends than an aggressive.
Cuba remains activefrica but clearly does not view the area as having the same political potential that It had inhen Havana was Involvedajor effort to expand foraal ties In the Third Worldeans of reducing the Castro reglae's diplomatic Isolation. Entrenched In Angola, Cuba has reason to act with restraint wheno embark on large-scale military operations elsewhere, .'he remarkably successful drive during the last decade to expand Cuban Influence has slowed markedly as Havana's attention has shifted to Latin America and Cuba's chairmanship of the "onallgned Movement draws to an end. Nevertheless, the Castro regime's revolutionary commitments In Africa, Us allltary dependence on the Soviet Union and, therefore. Its need to support Soviet policy. Its need to export labor, and Us desire not to alienate African allies, all point to Havana's continued strong Interest In the region and probably an Increase In the Cuban civilian presence there.
In 'Angola, Havana will probably not risk tht expulslooforces by acquiescing in serious negotiations for anor solutionhe Cubans hivethat they Intend to keep theiroIn country as long is the Harils't-Lenlnlst reT^ue thereby South Africen.backed guerrillas. (ThTcubensto have modestly Increased their forces In lateveteran reinforcements froa Cuba and no- seen to be taklaapert in the actual fighting against Angolancivilian presence In Angola reaainsoo. tveanow has formed diplomatic ties ulthubanspresumably continue to support Insurgentsp honein Zaire'* Shaba
In Ethiopia, the Cubans have Halted themselves largely to garrison duty, having been withdrawn froa tonjh.at afte- the defeat of Somali forces in the Ogaden campaign. pThere are now an00 Cuban military personnel Inivilians aiding the Henglstu governaent la various capacities such as public health, construction, end education.. The Cuban forces servetrategic reserve to deter*renev,ed Sonali adventurism and to protect the Henglstu regime. [Kith Soviet logistical help, they also would be capable of rapid deployment elsewhere In Africa and Southwest Asia.*
/In Hozaablque, Cuba now has an estiaated eooilitary personnel withiviliansolitical anddv.sory positions. The current threat to the Hachel government posed by South African backed guerrillas raises the possibility that Maputo aay ask for Cuban coabat troops. Ue believe Havana's response would depend largely on Soviet wishes. The Cubans clearlyistaste for taking casualties in coabat, but they would probablyarge number of troops at Moscow's urging and with the proviso that the Soviets assured logistical support, i
As for Namibia, Cuba continues to support SWAPO. Cube would undoubtedlyHAP0-dom1nated Namibia with favor. Should SUAPO come into control in Naaibia, Cuba along with the Soviets
Cuban efforts to expand Its Influence In the Middle Easteasure of success until the var between Iran and Iraa forced the Castro regime, as chairman of the Nonallgncd Movement Into the role of mediator. 'gelations between Havana and laqhd soured as the Iraqisuban tilt toward Iran.
rue to protect its TnterestT In the Middle East and. to
earn hard currency, will try to increase Its non.diplomatic presence there.
The presence of *flmmmmmmmmmm? Cuban i Libya, nalnlythe fields of constructpublic health, suggestsin bilateral ties that Is deceiving. Castro'segos have clashed on more than one occasion andto place much trust In the other.Cuba
Is anxious to develop access to Libya's weTTTh and. In addition to Increasing the number of Cuban workers In Libya, Castro may be willing to provide Cuban support for Libyan adventurismeans of Ingratiating himself with Qadhafl. The relationship has already paid off for Cuba in terms of Libyan financial support for Havana's allies In Grenada and Nicaragua.)
apparently were incensed at Moscow't Tal lure to help the PLO in the recent debacle in Lebanon, but Havana itself was In no position to provide more than propaganda support and backing in International forums. Cooperation with the PLO enhances Havana's ability to engage in subversion worldwide and increases the likelihood that Cuba's clandestine resources will be used selectively to help achieve PLO goals. However, the PLO Isonolithic organization. Itoalition of several disparate groupings, with variations in Ideology, ranging from moderate to Marxist-Leninist, some of which are well-disposed to the Cuban connection^)
-. Cuba also has provided training for Pollsarlo forces and /continues toedical team ofubansPollsarlo camp in Algeria. Ve suspect there mayandful of Cuban military advisers there, but Algeria's reluctance to permit Havana to increase its assistance means that Cuba's support will be limited mainly to propaganda and backing in the UN and Ronallgned Movement J The Castro regime, nevertheless,trongly committeri to backing the Pollsarlo in its war against Morocco.
Heartened by the emergence of variousocialist parties as leading forcesuaber of countries of Vest Europe, Havana sees great opportunities to exacerbate frictions betneen Washington and its Western allies. The Castro regime for exavple, would like to generate West Europeanressure.cn Washington to cease its military support for the government in El Salvador; the Cubans believe that mlthout US arms, the government mould succumb to the insurgents. Havana
or aould also like toepetition of rrench military sales to Nicaragua or similar actions that embarrass Washington and damage OS prestige,-' The Cubans are finding, however, that their ability to exploit frictions is being hampered by Havana's necessity of renegotiating outstanding loansumber of creditors In
_ Europe and Japan.
ontinuing Its program of long standing to
Influence both public and private opinionhe US. fA key
3 aspect of this effort is to help create opposition to continued
_ .US military assistance to the government of El Salvador. Toward, the Cest'O regimen concert with the Soviet lineIs promoting the conceptegotiated political solution In Central America. Kncwing it has great appeal for the US media,
3 It Is alsoomparison with the US military experience In Vietnameans of souring US public opinion on additionalaid to the Salvadoran government^
In the NonaHgned Movement, Cuba continues to reflect Soviet Interests and Is working to activate pro-Soviet attitudes and to alienate the Third World from the US. Cuba's effectiveness, however, has been reduced markedly by Its blatant, repeated abuse of Its role as chairman over the past three years.
Cubaast, well organized Infrastructure, built up over the yttrt with Soviet encouragement and support, for expanding Us influence abroadariety of vayt, legal and illegal. JTnT"Cuban CommunistCentral Committee's America Department, for example, determines what approacho be usedarticulartimes, Havana utilizes both the diplomatic approach and subversionthen becomes directly Involved in policy execution. ecision 1$
the Central Committee's Department of Special Operatloas provides logistical support, easarlag that tae appropriate facilities of the Cuban araed forces aad security services are prepared far eay task froa training foreign recralts to shipping Buaittons secretly.|
The party, la coordination with Moscow, periodically holds
International Theoretical Conferences to establish tht
Ideological lines it expects revolutionary groups to fallow, 'ihe Cuban Iattrlor Ministry uses its elite Special Troops to train foreign recruits In any skills needed for clandestine or Insurgent activity, be It frogaan training, paratroop training, 'guerrilla tactics, hand-to-hand coabat, weapons faal11arizetlon, communications, or use of deaolition charges.^
Cuba also has an outstanding propagandaavana, Prensa Lattna, newspapers, magazines, covert publications and radios, journalists- organizations,table of foreign writers andwhtch Is used to help shape public opinion around Ihe world, give international exposurerestige to insurgent groups, and undercut US credibility. The Interior Ministry-also has an efficient Intelligence collection apparatus,, and an Internal security force, the DSE, which penetrates exile communities abroad to proaote friction and discredit refugees.
Any Cuban ministry or governaental entity can be, and has used to support insurgent operations when necessary.
ng industry anderchant Marine and Ports provide facilities for shipping aras clandestinely at does Cubanaranch of the Transportation Ministry.Cuba's mass organ1zat1ons--forstudents, peasants, union aeobers, and the population In generaloperate schools where foreigners are trained la Ideology and techniques for organizing and proaotlng mass organizations In their own countries. -
The Cuban experienceubversive operations dates froa the time the current leadership was carrying out the Cuban revolution la. The Castro reglae, therefore,arge number of experienced cadres ready to train foreign insurgents In the skills of the trade or take the field with thea to carry out the revolution.
PABT II:' Possible additional Cuban Iatermatloaalto US Interests in
The eery mature of the Castro regime precludes anvtblaa but an adversary relationship between Havana and Washington. Castro needs this adversary relationship:
I To guarantee Soviet aid Indispensable to Ms survival(In the present clleate of US-Soviet relations.ould hardly eipect the Soviets to take kindlyapprochement with Washington that threatened Soviet interests In Cuba). (
To Justify and excuse continued austerity et hoee (he uses the US as the standard whipping boy wnenevereedcapegoat).
To allow hla toajor role on the world state (portraying the US as hostile peralts hla to assuee the hero's roleavid vs. Goliath draaa).
This adversary relationship will not change as longIs In power. The guerrilla elite that dominatesleadership developed Its political beliefs duringstruggle against forwer dictator Batista. and the Initial years of power
consolidation created an unswerving coaalteent to the philosophyarmed struggle andvisceral distrust of US Intentions, j
From their perspective, the US Isand always will be the principal threat. /Promoting revolution Is seeneans of defending Cuba from the US threathe US has United resources and cannot make war en Cuba,t Is busyuaber of suall wars elsewhere). It also provides allies such as llcaragua and Grenada. I
; The future holds no change tn the Castro regime's anti-US orientation. Strategy and tactics Bay change to tult the opportunity, but the general policy goaN-to reduce USemain the saee. Havana's efforts are likely to be directed In several different areas./
rlatin America will be the priority target probably for the reaalnder of the decade. Subversion will continue apace, especially In Central America, and Cuban support for Nicaragua willery nigh priority.; *
In the eventar between Nicaragua and Honduras orserious threat to Sandinista control posed by araed exile groups, Cuba woulo probably increase Its military support to Nicaragua. The Cuban Air Force and Cubana Airlines have the capability to fly several thousand combat troops with their personal weapons Into the Managua area within about two weeks. Control of the airfieldsicaraguaritical to the performance of this operation.
( Cuban Air Force fighters could fly directly to the Managua are'a and operate from there If fuel and ordnance are preposItloned. Inserting MIG fighters directly from Cuba wouldery difficult and risky operation, however, unless the runway at PueiLueft. iha Atlantic coast Is lengthened toefueling stop.
Cuba has the ability to airlift upattalion of ground troops or paratroopers to several smaller airfieldsicaragua, and could even air drop them If necessary. Cuba lacks the capability to airlift bulk cargo, however, and would have to send any tanks, artillery, helicopters, and large radars by ship. Most heavy equipment would have to transit the Panama Canal because Nicaragua's Atlantic coast ports lack the facilities to unload them.v'
i Cuban merchant vesselsodest seallft capability, butew small draft vessels can use the Atlantic coast
osts. The Soviets have recently delivered one amphibious andlng ship toa second Istheir capacity Is small.
Panama Is obviouslyerious concern In Havana, and an effortikely to be made to convince the Panamanian extreme left that resorting to armed struggle will eventually be necessary to achieve true Independence. Cuba will urge the far left to send recruits to Cuba for trainingontingency, should the Castro regime's efforts to improve relations with the Panamanian government fail and the Cuban presenceanama be threatened,,,
Havana will watch events In Mexico carefully to guard Its Interests there and tata. advantage of any opportunity to sabotage US-Hextcan relations. JCuba will try to expand Its influence In Suriname and will devote considerable effort to consolidating the revolution In Grenada. It Is reasonable to expect Havana to use Grenadaase from which to propagandize the eastern Caribbean and to conduct liaison with leftists in that area,.
. Cuba's greatest potential for military Intervention In the eastern Caribbean will be realized when the neu airfield In Grenadaompleted next year. Althoughs not scheduled to open it could be ready for military operations befqre then once the runway is complete and fuel storage is provided,..
Grenada could then icrvetaging bate for Cuban around aad air operationsupport of 1tt friendsha area. Grenada. Surlnaae, and possibly Guyana would find this potential for tvlftsupport comforting, vtille others like Venezuela aad Trinidad and Tobogo alght find it 1ntlaldat1ag. The airfieldalso giveonvenient stopover for troops en route to Africa. 1
. Havana-Is certain to expand Its efforts to destroy or at least ueaken the OAS and, through aoolng new governmentsuaber of Latin Aaerlcan countries, toam regional organization that excludes Washington. Thisajor preoccupation of the Castro regime, and It may be milling to .reduce Its subversive profile In certain countries If convinced such temporary retrenchment uould contribute significantly touard that
Africa and the Middle East
The Cuban presence in Angola, military and civilian, mill continue at high levels; as long as Luanda needs and requests Havana's support to stave off collapse. It also,serves both Soviet and Cut an foreign policy objectives. (Although the Cubans are reluctant to becoae aore deeply Involved In coabat In Angola or elsewhere Inasmill do to If necessary to remainoscow's good graces. Cubaimply too dependent on Soviet economic assistance to say noajor justification. r
Asamibian settlement, Havana will work to scuttle It If Moscow so desires. Without such pressure, however, Havana would probably want to avoid the onus of such meddling so longettlement meant nothing moreoken withdrawal of Cuban troops. On the other hand.otal Cuban troop withdrawalonditionettlement, Havana and Luanda would not comply, no matter what the outcome for SWAPO. In any event, Cuban supportngola for SWAPO and the African National Congress will continue.
The Cuban combat forcesngola and Ethiopia areto defending Marxist-Leninist regimes In thosefrom their foreign and domestic enemies. military advisors and Instructors to these orregimesell within Cuba's currenttroops to Mozambique or any other nationmuch more difficult unless the troops could be takenalready in Africa. Calling up additional reservistscombat duty would raise the domestic costsCastro regime, and would require another large airliftoperation. Considerable Soviet assistance toequipment and to provide logistical support would also
In the Middle Cast Havana mill try to Increase the number of vlllan workersow hasoae of the Arab countries and ms acquire hard currency. Cuba will atteapt to send workers toto participate In large scale construction projects, (though the Algerian reaction Is likely to continue to be rgatlve. Cuba nay becoae aore closely linked to radical Middle ast groups, supporting their effortsatin Aaericaofltlng froa their contacts and facilities in other parts of
There art'* other areas wheree' inderminlng US policy and Influence. High priority will continuee'given to efforts to Influence public opinion *nd private nterests .in the US UscM. fj
Is'lUely to;"retaliate, hostire^actlons^froa the^US
Havana will, continue to pay considerable- -attentionultivating European countries, espeelallytpain and France, look in, tor- political support on Issues such as consolidating the Sandlnlsta's position In Nicaragua, justifying the Cuban allltary presencengola, and gaining International juridical standing for Insurgents In El Salvador and Guatemala.
PART 3: The Ml^Itary Threat Posed by CubanKllU.r, <tstts in
Cuba servesase for Soviet 'intelligence, ejtherlng and! propaganda activitieshe Western henisphere. The largestSoviet signals Intelligence collection facility outside of the USSR Is located near Havana and Is directed primarily at US government, coamerclal, and allltary communications 1
t naval maritime reconnaissance aircraft operating Troa Cub 'almost continuously for the past year carry out regular surveillance of US naval vesels exercising In the Caribbean or transiting the Atlantic Ocean.
ajor world war, Cuba's primary concern wouldand defense of the Island. The sizeable andCuban military would bejjLHrcted to offldefense of the homeland.
a aueber af
US targets would be vulnerable to Cuba's lecreasing offensive
IHtary capabilities. ore serious potential threat is Cabaa capability to barest or interfere alth sea and air routes In tbe Caribbean/Gulf of Mexico/Straits of Florida areas. This noald be of particular concern because of the aaount of US coaaerceparticularly oil that passes through this region and when anhaapered transit froa southern US ports and through Caribbean tea lanes aoold be required, such as for US reenforceaent of
ato. The presence of Cuban FOITROT-Class subearlnes Intensified this threat. Use of air bases In Nicaragua and possiblyrenada uould put Cuban fighter aircraft althln range to threaten the Panaaa Canal and sea lines of coaaunication in the Caribbean. The Soviets would likely continue to use Cubaarase for intelligence collection against US allltary operations* They night also use the Island to recover Soviet coabat aircraft or naval ships.
Trends In the Acquisition of Military Equipment
The Soviet Union has provided Cuba an Increasing aaount ef technologically sophisticated allltary equipment over the past two years,land the scale of eras deliveries is not slackening. Fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missilesnd new radars to improve Cuba's air defenses have been at the top of the list. Further deliveries of, SAMS, and possiblyS Foxbat Interceptors can be expected in the next few years- ,
Recent construction of naval support facilities^ in the CleatwtflwS area suggests the Cuban navy will also be expanding significantly. At least four aore submarines, soae larger surface combatants, and aore amphibious landing ships are expected. While these laproveaents will not greatly alter the alniaal direct threat Cuba poses to the continental US, they will serve to further intialdate US friendshe Caribbean.