i, the uprising by the second armored battalion of'army on3 has an almost futile gesture on the part of action-oriented military officers without the'support of other elements of the armeddoomed' to failure. the uprisingighlywhich hasajor impact on
developments in chile. ffect it brought to
e t
the forefront and crystallized the aggregate of problems "which
REDUCTION OFHEY HAVE DEMONSTRATED THEIRRETURN the 8ULK of FACTORIES AND INDUSTRIES SEIZED INOF THEUNL' UPRISING AND HAVE OTHERWISE INDICATED concession WILL BE
5. THEUNE UPRISING HAS ALSO HAD AN IMPACT ON PRESIDENT ALLENDE ano HAS ADVERSELY AFrECTED HIS INFLUENCE WITHIN HIS OWN COALITION) HOWEVER. IT IS BELIEVED THATUNE SrRVED MORE TO CRYSTALLIZE AWHICH h'AO ALREADY BEGUN TO restrict the independence op the president. PRIOR TOune, HE PCCHEGUN TO CRITICIZE THE PRESIDENT FOR BEING *EAX AND VACILL TING. SUBSEQUENT TO THAT DATE,
)
THE PARTY POSITION.IN THIS REGARD HASD THAT THE PCCH CONSIDERS ALLENDE TO BE merely the executive^ INSTRUMENT THROUGH MHlCH. PARTIES NOW INTEND TO GOVERN, THUS, ALLE.OE. THE CONSUMMATE POLITICIAN WHO HASSBS THROUGH POLITICAL MANEUVERS AND COMPROMISE--AN ART IN- HIGH HENOW FIND THIS ABILITY TO REPEAT PAST SUCCE SES TO BE MUCH MORE LIMITED. THE PRESIDENT. HOWEVER,
DOESPEAR.TO BEITHER PROFESSIONALLY or
PSYCHOLOGICALLY. TO THE ROLEERE. fI GUREHSaD WITHIN HIS
S E
'a.'c HE CAN BE EXPECTED TO TRY TO REGAIN HIS LEADERSHIP POSITION. THEREFORE, WHILE if IS PROBABLY THAT ALLENDE HAS EMERGED FROM THEUNE UPRISINGEAKER POSITION, IT IS ALSO PROBABLY TRIE THAT THIS COULD WELLEMPORARY PHENOMENON. IN THE FINAL ANALYS.S. THE. GOVERNMENT COULD NOT EXIST WITHOUT ALLENTJE. AND HTS VIEWS AND DESIRES MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. LEADERS.. THE1 PRESIDENT HAS THO POTENT WEAPONS AT HIS DISPOSAL IN ANY SHOWDOWN WJTH THE .GOVERNMENT PARTIES) THREATEN TO CALL UPON THE MILITARY AND THE PDC TOEU CABINET AND GOVERN WITHOUT THE PARTICIPATION OFRTIES. OA HE CAN SERIOUSLY THREATEN TO RESIGNEANS CF FORCING . THE GOVERNMENT PARTIES INTO SUPPORTING HIS POLICIES. EITHER OF THESE TWO THREATS NOULD BE EXTREME MEASURES AND WOULD
PROBABLY ONLY BE FULFILLED IF THE PRESIDENT BECAME- CONVINCED
* PARTIES HERE LEADING HIS GOVERNMENT INTO ANAND
F. ALLENDE IS ABLE TORH CONTROL OVER HIS COALITION, OR IF HEABLE TO. LEASERS OF THE NEEDOMPROMISE IN ORDER TO REDUCE POLITICAL TENSIONS AND FORESTALL
WITH SIGNIFICANT NEST EUROPEAN INVESTMENTS'. THERE ISOSSIBILITY THAT SOME AGREEMENT CAN BE WORKED OUT REGARDING THE WEAPONS WHICH HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO THE WORKERS IN THE ACTORIES. ALTHOUGH IT IS BELIEVED THAT'. PARTIES WILL CONTINUE TMrJR PROGRAM OF ARMiNC AND TRAINING THEIRfrifcSE UNITS IRRESPECTIVE OF ANY AGREEHENT ON THIS MATTER. HE THIRD PDC CONDITION. THE PROMULGATION OF THE THREE AREAS BILL, AFFECTS BASIC GOVERNMENT POLICY. AND IT IS NOT BEL IEVED THAT THE PROMULGATION OF THIS BILL COULD BE ACCEPTED BY THE . PARTIES.
)
7, WHILE PDC POLICY HAS NOT YET BEEN AGREED UPON. *'
THAT THE
PDC LEADERSHIP IS CONSIDERING THE IMPEACHMENT OF THE
CABINET IF* REFUSES TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY,-
THIS POC ACTION*HOUIO BE DBSIGNED TO BRING PRESSURE ON THE *'
PRESIDENT AND OPEN THE HAY FOR HILIfART PARTICIPATION IN THE '
CABINET.,WJTH SUFFICIENT POWER TO. POLICIES.
THE PDC JUSTIFICATION FOR THIS ACTION WOULD BE THAT THE
GOVERNMENT HAS VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTION BY BREAKING THE
ARMS CONTROL LAW, BY ESTABLISHING ARMED GROUPS IN THE COUNTRY,
BY NOT PROMULGATING THE THREE AREAS BILL , AND BY ILLEGALLY
IJMIT
SEIZING SHALL INDUSTRIES. THE OTHER OPPOSITION PARTIES, WHICH ARE MORE ADAMANTLY OPPOSED TO. THAN IS THE PDC, CAN BE EXPECTED TO SUPPORT THE PDC INITIATIVE DESCRIBED ABOVE AND ARE ALSO PROMOTING AN EFFORT TO DECLARE THE PRESIDENT 1 INCOMPETENT UNDER ARTICLEF THE CONSTITUTION.
8. WHILE PERHAPS NOT CRITICAL, THE SITUATION WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES REMAINS VERY SERIOUS AT THE PRESENT TIME. ALTHOUGH THERE WERE OFFICERS IN ALL THREE OF THE CHILEAN MILITARY SERVICES ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN PLOTTING PRIOR TO THEUNE UPRISING, THE ACT ITSELFADICAL CHANGE IN ATTITUDE AT THE FLAG LEVEL OF THE ARMED FORCES. THE UPRISING POINTED UP TO THE HIGH COMMAND THE PRESSURES AT THE LOWER LEVELS OF THE SERVICES FOR THE USE OF MILITARY POWER TOCHANCES IN GOVERNMENT POLICIES. TO REGAIN CONTROL OVER SUBORDINATES AND TO TRY TO PREVENT ANOTHER UNCOORDINATED INCIDENT, THE FLAG-LEVEL OFFICERS HAVE BEEN FORCED TOORE ACTIVE ROLB IN MAXING PLANS TO EITHER INFLUENCE OR OVERTHROW ALLENDE. ESULT, IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE AIR FORCE GENERAL STAFF WITH THE KNOWLEDGE OF ITS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, GENERAL CESAR
. SECRET
ruiz. IS prepared and hilling TO support AN ARHY-led COUP. the NAVY admirals, ALSO UlTH the TACIT knowledge > but without the support OF their commander-in-chief, admiral, ALSO seek ready TO hove against the government, both of these services continue TO AFriRn, however,,THaT THEY
cannot and will not move until the army is ready to participate inithin theome general officers are actively involveo in trying to plan andoup, and theyoordinating their activities with thc air force and navy, however. because of .the strong vertical command structure of the army institution, the plotters know that as long ascommander-in-chief. general carlost s, the commander of the santiago garrison, general harfond the commander of the army training institutes,arlos do not support theiroup move might not succeed. the problem pacing the army plotters is how'to circuhvent these three generals, until they solve this problem. it is doubtful whether th" arhynified
whole WILL be ready TO CARRYOUP. the plotting OfflCERS ARE NOW considering the means TO overcome THIS PRCSlEH, AND
GENERALS MIGHT REQUEST the retirement of general prats.
CHANCES OF THIS MANEUVER SUCCEEDING MUST be CONSIDERED DOUBTFUL.
SINCE PRATS SHOWS little INCLINATION TO BE FORCED OUT. JHE
ONLY OTHER HAY TO REMOVE PRATS, SEPULVEDA AND PICKERING WOULD
APPEAR TO DE BY ADDUCTION OR ASSASSINATION. WITH THE MEHORY
OF THE affair OF the former army commander, rene schneid
ever PRESENT IN THEIR MlNDS. IT. WILL be DIFFICULT FOR THE
PLOTTERS TO BRING THEMSELVES TO carrt OUT SUCH AN ACT.
ALTHOUGH THE plo'tting. OFFICERS ARE CONFIDENT that* MILITARY
HOVE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT WILL be FORTHCOMING, THEY CANNOT
set A* date until the'army plotters
PROBLEM,
9, IN THE INTERIM. THE FLAG-LEVEL OFFICERS OF THE THREE SERVICES-HAVEOMMITTEEOMPOSED OF FIVE GENERALS EACH FROH. THE [aRHY.and AIR FORCE ANO FIVE ADHlflALS, TOORUH CAPABLE OF UNIFYING ATTITUDES AS WELL AS FORMULATING JOINTFOR PRESENTATION TO THE COMMANDERS *
IN-CHIEF AND THROUGH THEM TO ALLENDE, THEy HOPE THAT THROUGH THIS HECHAMISH THE PRESSURES FROH BELOW XAN ASED
SUFFICIENTLY TO AVOID ISOUTEO INClTENTS SUCH AS THAT OFUNE. OR AN UNCOORDINATED AND. POORLY PLANNED COUP ATTEMPT.HVME TO FORCE THE COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF TO APPROVE THE FQRHULAT IQN ON AN'URGENT BASISLAN TO COUNTER INTERNAL HIS PLAN COULDITAL PART OF ANY FUTURE COUPI
IB. WHETHER OR NOT THE MILITARY MOULD BE MILLING TO IN THE GOVERNMENT. IF CALLED UPON BY ALLENDE TO MOULD DEPEND UPON THE CONDITIONS WHICH THEY MfiULD PLACE THE PRESIDENT-IN EXCHANGE FOR SUCH PART ICI PAT ION . EXAMPLE. THE PRESIDENT ACOUIESCED TO THEIR PREVIOUSTHEY ENTERED THE GOVERNMENT WITH REAL'D WITHOF ELIMINATING ILLEGAL GOVERNMENT ACTS JNDMARXIS- THRUST OF THE EXECUTIVE. THERE WOULD BeON THE ARMED FORCES TO ACCEPT. ESPECIALLY IF SUCHWERE TO BE FAVORED BY THE PDC. INI SLUDING THE PLOTTERS. MIGHT FEEL THATCIVIL CONFRONTATION COULD BEOLITICAL SOLUTION MAINTAINED*. THERE SUBSTANTIAL DISTRUST OF ITHlN IK6: .
THE STRIKERS. THEIR STRIKE IS DESIGNED TO PROVOKEILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE GOVERNMENTOUP. GUILD LEADERS REALIZE THAT THE GOVERNMENT
KILL TAKE STRONG COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST THE PLANNED STRIKES. AND THAT IF THE MILITART DOES NOT HOVE DURING THE PEAK STAGES OF THE STRIKEN. THE MOMENTUM COULD.NOT BE MAINTAINED FOR-MORE HORT PERIOD AND THE STRIKES HOULD BE BROKEN, ' IF THIS OCCURS, THE GUILD LEADERS ARE OF THE OPINION THAT THE ABILITY OF MOST OF THE GUILDS TO FUNCTION AS PRIVATE'" ENTERPRISE ENTITIES KILL HAVE BEENATAL BLOW. FOR THIS REASON. PLANNING FOR THE STRIKES INCLUDES IN SOKE CASES EXTREME MEASURES, INCLUDING USE OF VIOLENCE. TO HAKE THE IMPACT AS GREAT AS POSSIBLE. GUILD LEADERS HAVEILITARY AND OPPOSITION POLITICAL LEADERS OF THEIR INTENTIONS, BUT APPARENTLY THEY HAVE RECEIVED NO COMMITMENT THATtLITArV WOULD REACT TO THE STRIKES IN THE MANNER DESIRED..
HE ACTIONS BY CHILEAN EXTREMIST GROUPS OF BOTH THE* RIGHT flip THE LEFT COULD ALSO HAVE AN IMPACT ON DEVELOPMENTS IN CHILE OVER THE SHORT TERM. PIL WAS INVOLVED WITH SOME OF THE OFFICERS WHO CARRIED OUT THEUNE UPRISING AND. AS A
RESULT. ITS TOP LEADERSHIP HAS COKE INTO EXILE'. NEVERTHELESS. THE SECRETARY GENERAL OP THE MOVEMENT, ROBERTO ,
HAS IN ARGENTINA DURING THE
HAS NOW
CLANDESTINELY To CHILE AND VOWED TO INITIATE AIW3AK "UERRILLA WARFARE CAMPAIGN AIMED ATSfcVEWENT. HAS ALREADY CARRIED OUT SOME AND MAY BE CONSIDERING KIDNAPPING IT IS NOT BELIEVED THAT PiL IN AND BY ITSELF HAS THEFOR MORE THAN ISOLATED INCIDENTS OF THISNEVERTHELESS COULD CONSIDERABLY INCREASE THE TENSION IN THE ;
S
14. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CHILE TEND TO BEAR OUT THE POLITICAL LINE THE CHILEAN MIR HAS ALWAYSHAT CONFRONTATION IS INEVITABLE AND THAT, MUST PREPARE FOREVELOPMENT. HOWEVER, THE PCCH DOES NOT INTEND TO ALLOW THE HIR TO ASSUHE ANY DOMINANT jN UiP< POLICY, OESPITE THE CURRENT CLOSENESS OF THEIR TWO POLITICAL LINES'. HEIR RIVALRY IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE. ALSO. THE MIR, THE S EXTREME LEFTIST WING ANO OTHER CHILEAN ExTREHlST GROUPS-CAN EJE EXPECTED TO REACT ADVERSELY AND PERHAPS VIOLENTLY TO
PERIOD* THE HIR HAS DEVELOPED A COHERENT POLITICAL MAS EVIDENTLY APPEALED TO INCREASES NUK33RS OP AND EMPLOYEES. WHILE IT STILL MAY NOT HAVE TO AP >CT DEVELOPMENTS IN CHILE IN A DECISIVEDOES HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO CARRY OUT ACTS OP VIOLENCEAGITAT IN WHICH CAN ADD SIGNIFICANTLY TO THE
IS* WITH REG O THE ECONOMY, AND CONTRARY TO OPTIMISTIC STATEMENTS BY GO' 1RNMENT SPOKESMEN, THE COVERNHcNT ONLY MANAGED TO KEEP IE ECONOMY AFLOAT BY MEANS OF SHORT-TERM CREDITS AND OTHE FOREIGN ECONOHIC ASSISTANCE, AMOUNTING TO MORED MILLION IN THE FIRST SIX MONTHS3 ALONE. AND BY FI MANIPULATIONS SUCH AS DEFAULTING OR POSTPONiffc. PRIf IPAL AND INTEREST PAYMENTS ON OUTSTANDING LOANS. BOTH THC "SHORT-TERM LOANS AND THE EARNINGS FROMES.HAVE BEEN .ED TO PURCHASE ESSENTIAL IMPORTS INE OF STEADILY >ECLlNlwG PRODUCTION RATES. HOWEVER,ING CQNSLMPT <N OVER BADLY NEEDED INVESTMENT, THE
r
r
1
is trying to postpone drastic and unpopular
measures until irmly establishes both economic-
and political control. following theune uprising, the
u.p. accelerated its effort to gain total control over the
economy by illegally seiung additional factories. thethus far, has allowed these factories to remain undercontrol of these groups and apparently intends3 most of them into the public sector. as long as short-terhnd copper earnings are available in sufficient quantity to covrr the cost of essential imports, thell continue to postpone needeo drastic and unpopular economic heasures. but the ever-lncrevolume of imports and the rising costs of the imports areeavy financial Burden on the
16. according to government spokesmen, chile now.pproximatelyer cent of the food prooucts it consumes, agricultural production is expected to decline someoer cent ongricultural year ovep the" very loh yields ofrop year. agricultural ihpgrts alone are forecast at.illion, which is approximately
IS CONTINUING ITS PROGRAM OF FARM EXPROPRIATION DESPITE THE
LACK OP ADEQUATE FARM MANAGERS AND TECHNICIANS* HAS NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN EXPLOITING ITS AGRICULTURAL RESOURCES, AND IT
HAS LIMITED THE HILL AND INITIATIVE OF THEAND OWNERS TO INCREASE THEIR YIELDS. EVENTUALLY. THE GOVERNMENT PROBABLY HILL BEGIN TO UNDERTAKE MEASURES TO CONTROL THEGRICULTURAL BLACK MARKET AND. AS THIS OCCURS. PRIVATE FARMERS CANXPECTED TO REDUCE THEIR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND, THEREFORE,ROP YEAR IS LIKELY TO FROOUCE EVEN LONER DOMESTIC YIELDS, ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT MAS THUS FAR EVADED THE PREDICTED ACUTE SHORTAGES IN THE WINTER3 BY IMPORTING MORE FOOD PRODUCTS, QUEUES HAVE BECOME QUITE COMMON AT RETAIL FOOD OUTLETS AND TEMPORARY SHORTAGES OF BREAD, LI.QUID GAS AND OTHER ESSENTIAL PRODUCTS HAVE PLACJED EVERYONE, HOST OBSERVERS PREDICT MORE ACUTE AGRICULTURAL SHORTAGES EVEN THOUGH THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO SPEND ITS EARNINGS AND SHORT-TERM CREDITS ON IMPORTS, AND SOME FORM OF CENTRALIZED FOOD
t.
DISTRIBUTION OR RATIONING * SYSTEH HAY BE NECESSARY,
17. IN SUHMARY. NITHIN THE LAST FEN WEEKS AND HONTHS. THE FOLLOWING SIGNIFICANT TRENDS IN THE OVERALL POLITICAL AND -HILITARY SITUATION HAVE OCCURRED: A) THE COMMUNIST PARTY OP CHILE HAS OSITION ADVOCATING ACCELERATED REVOLUTIONARY ACTIONS SIMILAR TO THOSE OF PS AND THE MIR AND IT NO LONGER IS PLAYING THE CONCILIATORY AND HO DERATING ROLE OF THE PASTl S) THE ARMED FORCES HAVE SECOME INVOLVEDITH THE BULK OF THE INSTITUTION FAVORING ACTION TO CHANGE THE COURSE OF EVENTS EITHER THROUGH MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT OR. IF_ TH]S IS NOT POSSIBLE . THROUGH AN OVERTHROW OF THE REGIME* C) THE PDC. WHILE STILL DESIRING TO MAINTAIN THE DEMOCRATIC
I
INSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRY. HAS ALSO BECOME LESS CONCILIATORY .
IN ITS POSTUREIS . AND IS MORE WILLING TO THE RISKS OF CONTRIBUTING TO THE DOWNFALL OF THE PRESENT
GOVERNMENT| D> PRESIDENT ALLENDE'S ROOH FOR POLITICAL MANEUVER J HAS BECOME MUCii MORE CIRCUMSCRIBED! AND E) IN THE ECONOMIC
AREA THE COUNTRY REMAINSOWNWARD SPIRAL BUT STILL REHAINS
VIABLE. OVER TH" SHORT TERH. . CONTINUES TO GIVE
HIGHER PRIORITY TO OBTAINING POLITICAL CONTROL OVER
TO IMPROVING ITS PERFORMANCE.
ACES
- IN THE FOREFRONT AGAIN ANOITH ANOTKcR OPPORTUNITY
I
TO CCHE TO TERMS WITH THE ARMED FORCES CONCERNING REENJRANCE .
INTO THE GOVERNMENT AND ARRANGE OLITICAL TRUCE.
WHETHER He WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL. HOWEVER. REMAINS Gl.'Z'l IHE HIGH DEGREE OF POLITICAL TENSION, THE
POSSIBILITY OF EXTREME ACTS BY EITHER PiI OR THE KIR, AND
THE RIGIDITY In THE POSITIONS OF THE VARIOUS POWE* GROUPS,
IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO ESTIMATE WITH ANY DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE AT THIS TIME WHICH OF THE FOREGOING FOUR POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES
IS THF. MOST LIKELY IN NEXT THREE-TO-SIX MONTH PERIOO.
WHILE THE HISTORY OF PAST PERIODS or HIGH TENSION WOULD TEND
TO INOICATE THAT THIS CRISIS COULD ALSO PASS WITHOUT A
SIGNIFICANT SHIFT HE BALANCE OF POKER BE TWEEf* THE THO
OPPCSING FORCES IN CHILE, WE ARE NOT AS CONFIDENT OF THIS
OUTCOME AS WE HAVE BEEN IN THE PAST, UNLESS THE ATMEO FORCES
VIGOROUSLY PURSUE .THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARHS CONTROL LAW
AND THE NATIONAL POLICE ARE GIVEN AUTHORITYO ILLEGAL
TAKEOVERS OF FACTORIES AND FARMS.
13, THE HIGH DEGREE or UNCERTAINTY IN THE PRESENT
SITUATION AND THE STRONG POLITICAL CROSS-CURRENTS LEAD ONE TO CONSIDCR SCfC LESS LIKELY POSSIBILITIES OTHER THAN THE MORE
OBVIOUS ONESVE. GIVEN PRESlDEwT ALLENDE'S STRONG DESIRE TO REMAIN IN POWER, HIS PREDISPOSITION TO LEAD RATHER THAN TO BE LED. CONSIDERING TH'E AMBITIONS OF" GENERAL CARLOS PRATS. THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARHY. AS HELL AS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN . .
IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT ALLENDE AND *"
E T
HiTH THE SUPPORT OF THE ARMED FORCES COULD ATTEMPT TO SETOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. ITS POLITICAL BASE WOULD BE THE PDC AND THE MODERATE SECTORS OF. IN ADDITION. THE IDEA THAT THE CONFLICT BETWEEN. ANO THE OPPOSITION COULD LEADIVIL WAR MAT NOT BE AS'AS IT ONCE WAS. THE CONSTANTLY RISING DEGREE OF HOSTILITY BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS. THE ARMING OP CIVILIANS OF BOTH SIDES. IS PROBABLYETTER JOB OFHE DIVISION WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES. THE REALIZATIONARGE SECTOR OF THE OPPOSITION THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF'A POLITICAL..OR MILITARY SOLUTION JS INCREASINGLYND THE RIGIDITY OF THE POSITIONS OF THE OPPOSING COUPS. TEND TO GIVE WEIGHT TO THIS IDEA, STILL. AT THE PRESEN1 TIME* THESE TWO CONCEIVABLE DEVELOPMENTS - SEGM TC OE FAIRLY
Original document.
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