Created: 6/1/1973

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible






The Soviet Approach to Summit II



The following intelligence organizotiont port,cipoted in the preparation elestimate:

the Control iMcll^gertcelha mVLganio orgonuetiorn of iScot Stole, Defenie. tho NSA, iho AFC. lh* FBI, and Treasury.


Ihe Doputy DireOor oi Canlrol InlefligonM

lha Director ol Inieliioanca ond ftawox f Slots

lha Dirocior, DefensoAaanry the Oiractor, Notional Security Agency

Iho Oirector, Dw-uon oltom* Eitoroy Coomiuion Iho Aiibtonl Oi'cttc FeaVal Bureauai'lijalio" Ihoc| Aublant loho heavily





Ihis paper dors not piesumc tocenario for thcSummit or to describe Soviet negotiating positions in detail. Its purpose is to describe the broad aims and calculations wliich will underlie thc Soviet, and Brezhnev's personal, appioach to thc occasion.

Some ol the principal observations made are as follows:

The present Soviet course of seeking normalization and detente in relations with the West is not conceivedrief tactical phase, Brezhnev's policy has strong backing at home and It is likely to endure for some time.

The policy springsalculationkillfully managed detente can enhance the USSR's relative power position,in Europe. It springs equally from recognition ofespecially economic weaknesses, which the Soviets believe coojieraiioii with the West can help to overcome.

Brezhnev's main purpose in Washington will lie to giveto the recent positive development ofrelations; he will be less concerned to achieve substantive agreements of major significance

He will give great emphasis to economic rclalions, especially pushing MFN. promoting investment in Soviet resourceon favorable terms, and facilitating ariaugements for acquiring US technology.

Thc occasion is unlikely to produce any mnjoi changes in Soviel positions on SALT or MBFR; Brezhnev might, however, join in some move to expedite negotiations.

On crisis areas like Indochina and the Middle Kast. the Soviets may convey willingness lo cooperate tacitly, but they areto enter upon joint, explicit ariaugements with the US which their friends would sec as "collusion".

Even if Summit II does not pioduce important and concrete results on many specific issues, the atmosplicric effects will almost certainly be positive and will confirm Brezhnev's Iselief that the present course of Soviet policy is the correct ooe.


Brezhnev comesoreml lent of In. position And policiei than he has been at any time in his yean ol power. He can approach Summit II with all thelie needs toential goal, one which lie sees as serving vital Soviet foieign policy and domestic requirements al this time: furthci progressodus uiveiull with Iho Wesl nnd,ajor part ol (his, the further development of Soviet-US bilateral relations.

Bosh Policy Determinants

2 The ptescirt Soviet policyhole proceeds fiom tlie Brezhnev leadership's con victioii thai the USSR currently hasto Improve its relative position,in Km ope, but also has serious vulnera-bilitics. Doth argue (or eased relations with (he West. On the optimistic side, the Soviet leaders believe that present international trends offer Ihehance to gain ground on tlie I'S in international powei. and ihey see in "peacefulynamicallyafe way of grasping the chance Tlic Soviets, having substantially achieved

strategic parity, now find the US to beits international commitments and troubled by various problems at home; they sec the Atlantic alliance as agitated by divisive trade and monetary issues, and seemingly un sure of its purposes and policies in thesphere By tbis kind of Soviet reckoning, thc West, including the US. it ready for detenie with themore likely now than previously lo make concessions to get it.

ut Moscow's confidence Is mixed with aruidies aboul other aspects of its interna-tiooal position and about obvious weaknesses in its domestic base. Because of this, there is reason to lielieve that Soviel policy is not now in one ol those purely tactical and transient phases of detente so familiar In the past. The Soviets haveout of weakness as wellenuine, albeit limited, accommodation with the US and its EuiOfiean allies

The Soviet leaders recognizeeasure of mutual confidence isII the costs and risks ol uncontrolled competition in strategic weapons between



superpowers are lo bo avoided.Ihey .ire uiulci pressure to devote resources in increasing quantity to do mestic non-mihtary purposes.

alva appreciate lhat some degree of understanding, and even cooperation, between thc superpowers could well be necessary lo prevent the intensification of regional conllicls into which both might bediawu.

ol thou fundamental andconcern svith China, the SovieU wanl to limit Si no-American rapprochement. They fear, apparently to an irrationallhal Ihe mutual hostility between themselves and China, combined with lheoves toward normalization of relations with llie US, Europe, and Japan, could one day lead lo lhe USSR's isola. lion in world politics

see coopeialien wiih thc US astu thc process of negotiation in Europe from which thoy hope to achieve stabilization of their sphere in Eastern Europe, gains in trade and technology, and eventually greater influence inEurope

Soviets now frankly recognize lhal ihey cannot by Ihcu own effortstheackwardness thai keeps Ihem Irom joining the fronl ranks ol ibe advanced industrial states. Failures in agikwlturc imply someon gi.iiu impoits for years to come. The Sovietstheirseemthey can develop broadri economic relationsthe West whach Can go far toward solving these problems

Internal Foclor*

4 There has lieen internal resistance to thc Current foreign policy hue: apparently at the

top political level (the demotion and eventual dismissal horn (he Politburo of Shclcst was piobably pailly due to ibisndless directly from defense inleresls,about die possible consequence* of arm* negotiations, and from dements in the party and polke bureaucracies, which fear theconsequenen uf wider contacts with the West And Soviet* al many levels willlo ask why their government, even while tightening internal discipline, diould movecordial relations wiih the old capitalist enemy. Such altitudes will help to reinforce certain instincts of Ihe Soviet leadenand will set limits on how far they svill waul to go iu East-West detente. Signs lhat this policy was having seriously unsettling cflccts within llieequally, inalmost certainly cause them to apply the brake*.

5eixoual ioie has been pivotal Although not the sole architect of current foieign policies, be ha* now made tbem his own. and lie has at least had primary responsibdity lor overcoming thc resistance lo these policies and foi shaping ihe political consensus which suppoil* Ihem. Obviously, then, lie has no small political investment in their success or failure, bothehicle foi projecting Soviet Influence abroad andevice foi extiaeling help for the Soviet economy. He cuuld be hurt politically, or might himself choose to shift direction, ifexpectation* wcie sefiousty disappointed. Moreover. Breihnev isnd many of hb principal colleagues ara even older; they cannotindefmilcly and new men will thus be moving mlo the lop positions

t follows that tlse bne Brezhnev now espouses is not ineveisible. But the chiefin tin* policy have been working their way to the surface throughout the post-Stalin period, iinpeutaiil aspects ol il aie likely to



limply because lo move in oilier-toward isolationism oi confrontationhardly seem Io be attractiveiven lhe USSR's domestic im-peiativft and the problem ol China. Thus Ihcro aie sliong incentives on tlie Soviet side to make Summituccess and lo conlinuc on the detente com ic

Brerbnev's Expectations for Summit II

rezlincv will be inteiestcd in the auia

thcwill generate as well as its sub-

stantive content. Heikely to viewII chiefly as an opportunity to reinforce the momentum established at Summit I. He has less need for specific accomplishments now than then, but the general picturehome, in tho US, and around theto the state of US-Soviet relations is important to him. He wants, for instance, to show Ibal US-Soviet relations arealt an equal pace with lheiu US-Chuicsc relations.

8 Breihnev wdl afsu bethis, his first >isit to tlie US and the hist visitoviel party chiefonciliatory attitude luward himself and Soviel aims on the part of the Americanwith liie accent probably on theof MosurtvS desire to see the Cold War endedewast-West relations opened Realizing lhal Congress will have an influential role wiih lespecl lo projects olinterest tu himrade and MFNe wdl piobably be attempting toavorable impression in that quarter. He will no doubt want, al the same time, to cultivate bis relalionship witb die President and to uulicaie that he values the President's sponsorshipcbaalion in US SovietHe will thin probably temper anyto extract negotiating advantage Irom current ixnitiovti sim in tbe US- He would

expect thatrwinanor could be more beneficial for the 'Itrelations with Ihe US over the longer run.

n his bargaining posture. Brezhnev will ii.itiu.tlly want to radiate confidence in Soviet strengthense ol equality. He will lake thc position that the Imther development of Soviet-American relations is no less In lhe US* interest lhan in the USSR's. US-madeesides icpn-scnting less than the best baigain as thc Soviets see it, abo suggest lo them lhal lhc US is aliempting lo usevulnerabilities in one area to cxtiactiu another, and this stirs old feelings of inferiority. Nonetheless. Brezhnev is surely realul niough to recognize lhat die US willeturn for helping him with hisdilficultics and not taking advantage of his China problem. He will piobablythat thc US will be asking him to show movement un such matters as force reductions in Europe (MBFR) and to exercise resliaml in the Middle Easi and Vietnam. In addition, he svill know that he will be asked to explain the Soviel position on Jewish emigration.

Areas for Discussion

co-omic flnrf Trades Brezhnev acknoxs'ledged during his recent visit to West Germany, ihe USSR is beginning to movo away from its traditional policy of autarky The Soviets are prepared toegree ot dependence on Ihe West in order to overcome their technological lag and pel help in developing then naturalThey have evidently gone some way toward convincingover-optimislically- that lliere is substantialfoi developing US-Soviet economic relations lo ihcn advantage. They have good pobtK.l1 as well as economic reasons for want ing to see this happen: among these is iheir



lo be acknowledgedreat power qualifiede treated ns an equal inav well as other dealings. And their economic motivation In itself is very strong. They wdl have tu have increased trade, aod especially substantial new credits, lo cover Ihc cost of imported technology and know-how. Much of tlte assistance they seek could be obtained from Western Europe and Japan. Bul they led that the US and Soviet economies aie more nearlycale, and theyigh regard fortechnology They probably reckon that Ihe opening up of US Soviet economicsvould, in any case, stimulate areaction on the pait of other Western nations.

iezhnev will piobably be pressing harder to pioduco signs ol progiess in this area than in any other lie has considerable personal knowledge of and irsterest in the USSR's agricultural problems. Even if ibe need for foreign wheal becomes less acute than it was last year, there will be aneed for substantial imports of feed grains, important foi the expansion of theong-teim US-Soviet grain deal could have advantage* for the USSR in termsuaranteed sou ice- of supply, assured prices, and fixed dclivciy schedules. Brezhnev will surely be intctcsted in learning what llie prospects nieeal nl the right price. He will expound on the potential of the Soviet market for American business, argue thc USSR's reliabilityrading partner, and stress lhat thc USSR could help the US with its energy problem In particular, be will want to stimulate official and private interest in joint US Soviet ventures lor theof Sovietgas being one obviousthe Soviets see this as tlic most feasible way for them toany very huge Increase in imports. At

thc same lime, he svill. as already noted, be lobbying, with an eye particularly on die US Congress, for long-term, low-interest credits and MFN treatment Without doubt, he will try to have Ihe final communique on his visit contain tlie strongest possible expression of tbe I'rcudciit's desire to see US-Sovietrelations grow.

ALT. Brezhnev will arrive fully briefed on thc issues underlying the present impasse al Geneva. Even if certain limited SALT agreements are ready for signatuie. he will undculand that Summitannot be cappedlrategic arms agreements asI was. He may be inclined simply ioositive attitude toward theand otherwise confine himself tolor give in tlie US position On certainnuclear-aimed systems stationed in Europe, forwill almosiicitciatc Ihe Soviel mammal posiUon, witlc>ni necessarily expecting this to have any specific result. Yet Brezhnev certainly does not want the Geneva negotiations to becometalled, he could consider thc Summit the right moment for decisions to be made al Ihe highest political level which would move the talks forward What he mightr accept in thb regard can only be crHifcctuied lie might be prepared to Joineclaiatinn setting general priorities for lhe present phase of SALT, or even perhaps In agiee to issue instructions lo bothto focuson the problem ofcontrols,IRVs/MRVs

re|wiu Security Issuer. Thc Soviets remain convinceduiopcan security conference (CSCE) could help them tothen political influence and economic tie* in Western Europe, as well as contribute to the uinsnlidation of their position In Eastern Euiope Moscow is less interested In theon MRFR, or al least less certain



lo whatrrclils might bo dcrix-ed dom thai nt-gptwrtion. Wlial Brezhnev would hke to obtain from thc US at this point arron the content and timing of CSCE-commitmcnt, in tho one case, nut to press hard on lhe issue of freedom of eommunica-lion between Eastern and Weslern Europe, and. in tlie otber. agreement to allow CSCE to be completed before MBFR is convened. He will be aware that this matter can stir trouble in US-allied relations As (or MBFR. Brezhnev will pioh.ihly >ec th- need heme in the US capital, toonstructive attitude, and also tlie advantage of playing on West European concerns about US-Soviet bilateralism. Hc might think he could do both by proposing lhat the reductions process begin with the US and tho USSR making token cuts or at mosl by carrying0 percent cut on either side

East The USSR accepts asthat il and Ihe US have ain avoiding direct cnnfionlalionMiddle East After its experienceis also generally uneasy aboutwith the radical Arab statesits lack of levorage in the euntextAi.ib Israeli conflict. At Ihe sameUSSR is undoubtedly under pressurefrustrated Egyptian clients to get lheexert pressures on luael Thushope, whether through an initiativeown or through his responseSto have thc Summit pioduce someof Ihe delcimination ol llwto renew effortsoliticalIf hc does have his own proposabnone are likely to be new, theyheavy stress on the need for the USIsrael to commit Itself to vacatingtcrntories.

sees lhe Middle East notIhe arena of Arab-Israeli stmggle but also

iniw lliealrr ol Soviet American com petitiiHi. This places Strict limits on liow farould be wdling to go at theMi any explicit, joint undertakings with tin- US aimed at reducing the likelihood ot conflict If, in (act, conflict or thc clear threat of it xverc to develop, Moscow wouldenter duect commonicalions with the US in an attempt to eaercisc some form of "crisis management" The Soviets do not see the piesent situation as requinng measures of thiscould make them vol Titrable lo charges ol "collusion" Itear certainty thai lhe Russians will conlinuc to insist that thoy svill notiddle East arms control agreement except as partomprehensive selllemenl of Ihe Arab-Israeli issue

iet nam The Soviets would bealso in the ease of Vietnam lest they expose themselves to allegations of "collusion" with thc US They svould probably beon Ihis account lo engage overtly wiih thc US in measures aimed al preserving die cease Inc. other than to reaffirm tbe validity of the Paris Agreements. They would be strongly aveisv to committing llsemselsesto limiting the delivery of arms to Noitb VMnam, Yet the Soviets almost cer- -lamly believe that tlieir interests on the tvholc would not lie well servedeheating of theand Brerhnev may be prepared to go at least as far as to convey Ihis attitude to Ihr US He might perhaps, in addition,implicitly Ins readiness to eiercisein anus supplies, at least as long as (be cease-fin; is in effect.

hina. Tbe problem of China will ho very much on Brezhnev's mind thioughout the Summit, even il it is not directly discussed. While Brezhnev may believe lhat exposing Soviet anxieties about China would weaken his negotiating hand, his interest in tho sub-

jcct is bound Id emerge in some way He will, nl least, be seeking lo find clues as to where the US is planning to go in its relations with Peking and to get across thc idea thaiertain point the US would be purchasing improved relations wiih thc Chinese at the expense ol its relations with thc USSH-Although it would soil him to do so, he will recognize lhat he would have little chance of succeeding in an attempt to insinuate anti-Chinese Overtones into the US-Soviet Summit. * *

ven if Summit II does not produce imporlant and concrete results on manyissues, Brezhnev is likely lo go away

pleased. He will be persuaded that theitself has added to his statureorld statesman and increased his authority at home. Although, as noted above, llie present course of Soviet policy is not irreversible, thc forces workingoic restrained powerwill no doubt be further strengthened. Nothing will have changed Moscow's view that Ihc Soviel-American relationship retains at bottom au adversary character. Butis likely to be confirmed in his belief lhat the present course of Soviet policy,the aspect of dealing with thc US at thc Summit in an atmosphere of relativeis the correct one.





I. Thii document woi diueminoled by ibe Cenlrol Inlelligence Agency. Ihii copy It for 'he information ond use of lha recipient and of persons under hit jurisdictioneed-to-lmow boili. Additional essential dhieminotton may bo outhoriied by lhe follow-

ol Intelligence and Research, for the Deportmenl of Slate

Deform Intelligence Agancy, lor lhef Ihe Secretory of

Defense and the organization of tbe Joint Chiefs ofssistant Chief of Stat! for Intelligence, Deportment of the Army, for tho Deportmenl of the Army

of Naral Inlelligence, for tho Department ol the Novy

Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, lor the Deportment of tho Air


Oro'iion of Inierrtanonol Security Attain, for iho Atomic Energy


Director, FBI, for Iho Federal Bureau of Investigation

of NSA, lor the Notional Security Agency

I. Special Assistant to iho Secretary of the Treasury, lor the Department of tho Treasury

j. Direclor of Central Reference Service, CIA, for ony or her Deportment or

This document may be retained, or destroyed by burning In accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned lo the Cenlrol Intelligence Agency by arrangement with the Central Referenc* Service, CIA.

When thiiinominated overseas, rhe oversea) recipients may retain iteriod not In excen of one yeor. At the end ol this period, tho document ihould either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, orshould be requeued of lhe forwarding agency lo retain it in accordance with2

titlo of thii document when vied separately from the text ihould be clot-


Original document.

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic: