MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
Director for Plans
Proposed CIA Response to Request for Information Which Have Been Received From the Senate Foreign Relationscornrnittee on Multinational Corporations
memorandum contains action recommendations in4 and 5.
n response to their request forMr. Maury, CIA Legislative Counsel, contactedLevinson and Jack Blum, staff members of the SenateSubcommittee on Multinational Corporations. ThisMr. Maury receiving five questions which the staff members Thej questions focus ontland ITT role in these elections. Mr. Maury took note of theand told the staff members he was not familiar with theissues which were involved in the inquiries. Mr. Mauryhowever, to refer the questions to appropriate CIAstudy. The staff members are, therefore, expectingA, which is for information purposes only, lists theand their correct answers.
It should be noted that in formulating the paragraph 4special note was taken of theebruary statement by Mr. Levinson to Mr. Maury that he felt there were significant discrepancies between3 testimony of Mr. Richard Helms before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on0 events in Chile and data which ITT had previously provided to the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations. In this context Mr. Levinsor. made the point that these contradictions might require the Sub cornrnittee to ask Mr. Helms to provide additional testimonyater date, even if this meant Mr. Helms would have to return to Washington from Iran. The
CIA debriefing of Mr. Helms onebruary did not identify any deviations in his testimony from the known facts. This debriefing, however, did not have the benefit of our being able to compare the transcript of Mr. Helms' testimony with his recollections of the salient points that were discussed with him by the Senate Committee. This was due to the fact that to date the staff members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have refused toopy of Mr. Helms' testimony to either CIA or the Department of State.
recommended CIA response to the staff members'is as follows:
"The testimony of Mr. Helms3 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee clearlythat CIA neither gave to nor received from ITT funds for use in Chile0 for the support of political parties. In addition, Mr. Helms' testimony brought out the fact that there were no joint action programs established between CIA and ITT for implementation in the context of0 political developments in Chile. CIA regards Mr. Helms' testimony on this topic to be accurate, thus no further elaboration is planned."
Subcommittee staff members will undoubtedly find4 response less than satisfactory. It is to bcthat they will refer the issue inherent in this answerSubcommittee in an attempt io set in motion action which wouldto produce what they would regardorefrom CIA. In the interim between forwarding the paragraphto the Subcommittee staff members and their reachingwith the Subcommittee on how to proceed on the basis ofit is recommended that CIA take the following actions!
a. The Legislative Counsel be authorized to sound out Senator Jackson on the prospects of CIA being able to obtain, either Senator Stennis or Senator Symington's assistance in arranging for the CIA Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee to consider the problems of how CIA sources and techniques could be protected before the Agency proceeds further with the Senate Foreign Relationson Multinational Corporations. In this connection it should be noted that Senator Jacksonroven record of
supporting CIA and in the past his advice on how CIA mightarticular piece of Congressional business has been sound. In addition. Senator Jackson is discreet and can be counted on not to comment further on. what he learns about CIA or ITT actions in Chile It must be noted, however, that for the discussion with Senator Jackson to be meaningful and for his advice to be sound, CIA would have to giveriefing on the nature of CIA's relations with ITT0 during the Chilean election period. Inisk would be taken for sensitive information would be surfacedenator with there being no guarantee he would be helpful. Thisisk which is worth taking, for the net gain from such action favors CIA if the desired results are obtained.
h. If Senator Jackson believes that it would be useful for the Agency to approach Senator Stennis or Senator Symington, then such an approach should be made. Perhaps SenatorJackson could pave the way forontact. In the discussion with either Senator Stennis or Symington, CIA should work toward the goal of having its testimony on eventshifted to the Senate Committee on CIA. Once that objective is ab'ulcivu, ihc DCI could spell out in Executive session to the Senate Committee on CIA that the Agency and ITT did not engage in joint action programs in Chile. The DCI would indicate, however, that CIA and ITT did exchange views on political and economic trends in Chile.
receivedriefingember of the'Senate Committee
on CIA, it is believed that Senator Stennis or Symington could
be persuaded to work out with the Senate Foreign Relations
cornmittee on Multinational Corporations an arrangement whereby,'
the DCI couldontrolled presentation before the latter
group. In such'aii'appearance the DCI would want to make
critical pointIA neither received from nor gave to ITT funds for the support of political parties in Chile Seeroposed statement that wouldd by the DCI inontrolled appearance before theon Multinational Corporations.
c. As it is anticipated that even though Senators Stennis or Symington might arrangeontrolled ippearancc by the
before the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, it is possible that at the time of the DCI's appearance, some Senator might choose to violate the understanding. Inase the DCI would have to fall back on Executive Privilege, and in so doing would have to avoid answering any questions that would compromise instructions which the Agency received from the President, Dr. Kissinger or theommittee. Since it may be necessary to invoke Executive Privilege, we note thatinstructions state that this should be coordinated with Justice but in this instance the DCI should discuss this line of strategy with tho White House first for basic policy guidance. 4
6. In considering theecommendations, it should be noted that all of this involves unilateral action by CIA. This ia due to the fact that while it would be desirable to have an agreed-upon interdepartmental coordination mechanism whereby CIA, the Department of State and the White House could jointly workovernmental strategy for Sealing with the various aspects of the Senate Torcign Relations Subcommittee Hearings on Multinational Corporations, the simple realities indicate that it has not beento date to establish such an arrangement. CIA has worked with the Department of State tooordinating group, but thishas noc been successiut, primarily because the Department of State has not received the guidance it requested from the White House. In snort, the lackoordinating mechanism forces CIA to respond to events on an ad hoc basis. In so doing CIA has to keep its options open so that flexibility can be preserved for as long as possible, pending resolution of the policy issue of how the hearings will be handled on an interdepartmental basis.
wc must protect intelligence sources and techniques whether we proceed to handle the Subcommittee Hearings on Multinationalunilaterally or via an interdepartmental coordinating mechanism.
8. rovides an overview of CIA's involvement in the Chile electoral situation This document is forwarded for information purposes only.
Questions and Answers B - Proposed Statement C - Overview
fa * ?Original document.