ft!
DATE MA: ..
national
intelligence
estimate
Possible Changes in the Sino-Soviet Relationship
Sswet.
33
THIS ESTIMATE IS SUBMITTED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND CONCURRED IN BY THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD.
following inrefligenet orgonlxoffoni participated in tha preparation of Iht tndimottji
ThenUic.nt. Agency and theoNem of ih. Deport-manti of Stan oed Deknw.SA, me AtC, end the Trtenury.
Ce>rKurrinf-i
The Deputy Dwaor of Central
The Direefcsr of lefrftgiPce andDepeMerl of State
Theeieytaey
The Diradar, Nokonal SeewrHy Agency
The AiJijioftt General Manager (or Motional Seeurlry, AiomCCommhilon Ihe Spatial AnlUanl la (he Secretory of if* Treawry
Abstaining,
The Auiuont Director, Fad.ro! Bureau of Ifreetllgatton, (ho Mibjeet bang oufildo ef hta lurbdlcHoti.
3
CHANGES IN THE SINO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP
CONTENTS
Page
THE estimate
I. THE ROOTS OF CONFLICT
IL THE CONFLICT AS AN ELEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL
THE FUTURE OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
WORLD IMPLICATIONS OF POSSIBLE CHANCES IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP13
13
Bapprccbement14.
Limited Improvement in Relation!15
possible changes in the sino-soviet relationship
PRECIS
Significant Improvement in Sino-Soviet relations Is unlikely in the next year orif Maoentral element of the Impasse ai this stage is the absence of any visible inclination in Moscow to reduce its military forces along tbe Chinese border.
War between Moscow and Pekingossibility, but we rate the odds ashigherhina, clearly tbe weaker party, would not attack. The USSR would mainly be deterred by: China's strategic missile capability, however modest; the chance of becoming bogged downrotracted ground war; concern over the potential impact on its economic relations with the West; and, uncertainty as to the nature and scope of US reactions.
Mflftary action againsta disarming nuclearcontinue toertain appeal to some Soviet leaders, and argumentsisarming strike would probably gain strength if the US appeared to move toward an anti-Soviet alliance with the Chinese. Even in this contingency, however, the counter-arguments would seem far more tjompclling. Thus, it is likely that Moscow will holdore measured course, one which does not foreclose the possibility of some accommodation over tho longer term.
[DIA and Air Force would differentiate. i! iinvasionisarming strike, rating the likelihoodisarming strike ai markedly greater than that of an invasion.]
Indeed, the longer the Sino-Soviet peace is maintained, the better the chancereduction of tension tn the relationship. Mao's death, for one thing, should ease the way toward accommodation for both sides. Soviet or Chinese disappointments in dealing with the US might rsrovide other Incentives to boxy the hatchet. So would the growth of Chinese nuclear strength and overallealing with both superrxrwen. There are also the cumulative costs of years of tension and military preparedness, which may dispose both sides toward less risky, more conhoUed forms ofnewtn which differences are muted and third parties prevented from exploiting Slno-Sovlet cleavages.
But movement beyond limited accommodation,enuine aad durablecollaboration andewhighly unlikely, evenationaland basic clashes of Interest run too deep.
A long-term improvement In the tone of Sihc^Soviet relations would not necessarily mean communist tinwiOlngriess to do business with the West. There would ittTi be strong interestontinuingof trade and technology. But there would be adverse effects. The Chinese would be less interested in improving relations with the US and less tolerant of tbe US military presence In the Far East. The Soviets would be less concerned with detente tn Europe and more willing to compete with die US globally. Japan would have less room for maneuver between Moscow and Peking, both of which would oppose tbe growth of Japanese influence abroad.
The most significant result of any major reduction in Sino-Soviet strains might welleneral fear in the West and tn the Third World that something like full-scale rapprochement was in the wind. This would stimulate interest in regenerating alliances with the US and could, In certain circumstances, utcrease resistance to further detente efforts among Western leaden.
THE ESTIMATE
the roots of conflict
Background. The Sino-Soviet dispute owes as much to old national rivalries as to the Ideological battles of tlx last decide or so. Before Mao won control of (lie Party In the, however, the relationship of the Chinese communists with ihe Sovietsthat of pupil and teacher. But even then, the Chinese found Soviet adviceond often hazardous, and the efforts of Moscow to control the Chinese Communist Partyasting mlmusl andAfter the Chinese communists won their civil war,9 pilgrimage to Moscow was marked by lengthy aod tough ncgotu-lions over the Sino-Soviet Treaty ofAlliance, and Mutual Assurance. Stalin was concerned that Moo mightew Tito, and was quick lo take exception h) Chinese claims for Mao's doctrinai originality.
With this inauspicious beginning, it Is surprising that the Sino-Soviet honeymoon lasted as long as it did. During, the Korean War and its lingering effects onin Peking ond Washington, and China's urgent need to develop and modernise Us economy, lied Peking to Moscow. All the while, of course, Peking hoped to become self-reliant and feared lhat Soviet aid might freeze Chinaermanent state ofand inferiority.oorly executed attempt to achieve an economic breakthrough, Poking launched its Great Leapd commune systemhe Soviets saw it as an ideological challenge as wellisuse of their technical aid.
On yet another track, the death of Stalin3 encouraged Peking to promote Mao as tho top Ideologue and senior leader of the communist world. The Soviets mode little effort to conceal their contempt for thisthough it was after Khrushctiev'sh Congress of the CPSU Inthis facet of the dispute began to intensify. China's mtcrven-tium in the Polish and lluflfturianf that year confirmed Peking's new assertiveneas in competing with Moscow on mattersinternational communism.
Moscow's rcfusr'i to provide the kind of nuclear aid desnanded by China, coupled with Soviet reluctance to join China inme US In8 Taiwan Strait crisis, further aggravated tho deteriorating
relationship. Tho Soviet withdrawal of toch-nlclim from China0 brought tlwInto tbe open and marked the end of attempt! to develop coopcratioo in economic and technical fields. Aa the dispute wonened through the polemical exchanges ofas the Chinese subsequently coo-quded that the lai] of Khrushchev meant no sdftecing of Soviet policy towardihe tlage wai set for an escal.'UsbnHion. Indeed, the Peking meeting between Mao and Kosyfdn ii>5 left nelflter side in doubt alioai the depth and enduring nature of their coofhit Italio served lo give final impetusoviet decision to strengthen tlietr military forces along the Chinese border.
5 .'ftliforyhe military buildup along the Sino-Soviet borderar-bcukrly on the Soviet side, remains the most dramatic and convincing evidence of tho deep hostility between the two powers. Sovietnear the border9 numberedow there areombat divisions which could be used in the early stagesajor conflict with China. In tbe same period, Soviet radical air strength near the border has grown from lessircraft to. The buildup has boon relatively fast though it appears toong-range plan for methodical growth. While someSoviet military personnel and some air units have been drawn from the western USSR, no ground units opposite the NATO central region have been used In the buildup. Soviet deployment of new forces to tbe Sino-Soviet border area appears to have tapered off.
or their part, the Chinese made no effort to concentrate additional troops close to the border, though aware- of the Soviet
he Slac-Sovhtt JVUtJoraliip The Miliaryated
1ruiMaaaims of lubfct buildup shortly .iflcr it began. In the, China was deeply enmeshed in tho Cultural Revolution, which involved theparticipation of the People'sArmy. Peking was also sensitive to the threat posed by US forces In Indochina. China's relative military weakness required that it ofler no serious provocation to cither the USSR or the US. Tin chosen strategy was to bold Chinese forces well bock from thewhere they might easily be cut off by the superior mobility nnd firepower of enemyorder to maintain balancedof vital centers age ind all potential thread.
Chinese fear of Soviet attack reached its peak, Mewing tho Soviet show of force in response to Chinese-incited border incidents along the Ussuri River. Peking'scounter was to impose greaterover its frontier units, to agree to border talks with Moscow, to shift some army units northward (though still far back from livend to intensify tho construction of underground shelters and facilities- Chinese concern over Soviet military fntcntions was also used at this time to justify phasing out those aspects of the Cultural Revolution that had become increasingly anarchic and"Red Guard Diplomacy" was replacedew image of rcspccbibility andin lhe West Peking'! confidencetho Soviets rose dramatically1 with ili entry into the UN and theof its relatioas with the US. While Chinese fears of Soviet attack are real and ever-present, these diplomaticwith China's progress In theof strategicreduced their Intensity relative to the peaks.
CnrroB Laeelt of Contact- Apparently as the resulteliberate Soviet decision to intensify the propaganda battle, exchanges
"State.
between Moscow and Peking have recently reached the highest level of acrimonyoviet moves in this latest aoriei ofexchanges imve Included another offeron-aggression Irca'y lo Pekiug In ]unu (which according to Brezhnev. *CIunn did not even eloign tond an Initiative at the Crimean Conference of the Warsaw Pact party lenders in ]uly Iu provoke discussion ofhese actions were followed In August by two authoritative Prsvdn articles which seemed to argue that China had by Its own actions aod policies removed itsdf from tho socialist community. The Soviets have been moved in aU this by their concern over Chinese meddling fn both East and West Europe in the midst of MBFK and CSCE negotiations, by their hope to Influence intro-Party debate in China, aud by their desire to llmlr China's appeal to the non-aligned states (especially during the non-aligned oonfeience in Algiers inhe Soviet campaign may also reflect someby Mcacowis the Sinophilio Romanians and perhaps some preliminary efforts to set the stage for an InternaQaaal communal conference which would denounce the Chinese.
be Chinese, reacting to these Soviet efforts to condemn them In the eyes of Eastern Europe, to isolate them pollf-cally from the socialist world, and possibly to meddle In Chinese internal affairs, responded withvehemence. In his defimtivc state--nent at the Party Congress in August, Chou En-lnl left to doubt that Peking considers the Soviets as its number-one enemy. He eluuged that the "new cms* have restored capitalism,fascistnd used military force to back their foreign policies; ho Stated that China should remain on guardsurprise attack" by the Soviets. For all his bill of rMrticulars against the Soviet leadership, Chou was careful not to rule out improvedat least net to leave China vulnerableharge olcompromise. As Chou put It, The Sino-Soviet controversy on matter* ofshould not hinder tho normalization of relations between the two states on tbe basis of tire five principles of peacefulespite this gesture on Chou's part, the net effect of these exchanges has been to further poison tbe atmosphere in the bilateral
part from these well-known rwlcmics, there Is little evidence on the structure and functioning of the current Sioo-SovieJOn Ibe govenunenta) level, trade and diplomatic matters (Including border talks at tbe vice-ministerial level) arecorrectly though coldly. And thesechannels api>ear to be theif not thelines of contact between tbe two countries. There Is no indication ol any regular liaison between the twoparties; indeed, it would be remaik. able if any direct party link had survived the years of acrimony. However, the diplomatic mechanism is always available for quick and secure contacts. And if tbe situation should warrant, new channels could be hastily staffed for closer liaison. So long as fundamentalpersists, however, both sides are likely to continue to air their differences in public as well as In their private exchanges.
H the conflict as an element in international politics
IL Tbe rupture of tbe Slno-Sovlethas helped establish the preconditions for new patterns of relations among tbe powers. The rivalry between Moscow and Peking now affects virtually every aspect of their foreign policies and, on balance, haseavy price from each of them in their dealings with other nations. Theirand resources have been diverted from
othereal with whM hmigh priority (ortheof tbo otter. The Soviet! fcor theboott in cronomie tad military strength vrkech Chins could achieve over tttne from the unrestricted import of US and other Western technology. The Chinese fear the isolation aod vaiMrabihty that would result from US-SsvUt "cojhraloo to achieve world begeinony" PeaAg and Moscow are sensitive, of course,ihe efforts of other powers,the US, to eoplolt Ibair rivalry; tod ens maker eeleukttoee of balance andamong the majorJapan and WesternAll Chlnesa and IVassitn poller,must now be vraighed In the Kght of how they might affect the balance of their rlraby.
Itew third parties, the Smo-SovScte^rt^ bej^it oiatJf4irfiJ complete* itact and dsadvtntagrt. North Vietnam was aisle, dssriatj tha crucialo phy rVklag and Mceeow to Ms own advantage. Hanoi, however, would have preferred the resolute bstdttiignited oomreunist hloc during thil period. And now, Hanoi finds the separate and comparing arsprrechut of the Soviets and Chinese to Washington distinctly harmful to IB more parochial interests In Sooth Vietnam. For Northegree ofbetween Moaeow and Peking was for many years welcome it provided Kim fleeing the opportunity te eteart hit todepvodcoer of both cbeti powerful ashes. Bat the tatgnaty of theosapwts and its raretound effect cm Sosic^ .rxi Colore, rwatxre with the US have saved to farecfaaa asternal rapport for any North Korean military approach to the unification :suir
or mott of the world, the preterit status of tbe Slno-Sovlet rclatlontlupreater sense of opportunity and teeusity. Japan now finds tlw two communtit powen far less hen-tile as they ccunpetc,egree, for its favor. Peking It even prepared to accept, at leas; at thisceMntung US military presence kt Japan. Chinese lean of tnc USSR arcajor factor In Pratng'i more atodcratc pcature toward localin Scastb-east Asia and In ta rerriot wilhngness tnontinued US rjrcsenro fas lhat region. These changer in Peking's posture have by no assent meant asanranon ofrestraints on North Vietnam, or Chinese collaboration with tha US to achieve asettlement In Cambodia, or Cliinese dis-engagement from the active communisttn Thailand and Burma. But the shift has opened the possibilityeas disruptive Chinese role la iha area in tha future, and even of nana couaboratlve efforts with the US and tha Ideal anUeeanmuaitt states, all designed In serve China's broaderbe USSR
Moscow's push far eetrnf* In Europe it ta part motivatedesire to improve its ability to deal with thn problem of China, Reooepeiing this. Piking hat activelythe nation* of Wntom Europe to Isjnore Soviet blandishments and to ttrengtbea their ttet with Washlngtoa. Parings esscour-agemcnttronger NATOhield against Soviet pressures is helpful lo US policy. The Chinese positkoo on MBFR,is opposed tn tint of the US; andarguments about US-Sot let 'collusion* tend to reinforce tnsptctont of tbe tame in places ha* Pans. China'e relative lack ofin Enropr. though beets the impart of its view^ on ongceng eofaslantivecccscernsag that area.
Chtoa'i effort tn shake Mcoco'sover the conmonot partial and the states of Eastern Europe probably represents more of on irritanthreat to tha Soviet posi-
"SKa^T
there. But tbe Sino-Soviet conflict hu complicated Moscow's dealings with itsct allies, introducing anotherissue and giving some ofegree of lev-wage against the USSR. It has altoa natural tendency among some East European states to seek asoreign policy as possible without Inciting Moscow's ire. Romania's ostentatiouswith Peking and refusal to cooperate in Soviet propaganda against Peking Isfrustrating to Moscow.
Chinas admission to the UN brought the Sino-Soviet conflict directly into that body, further complicating internatiaaai efforts to achieve consensus on majorarms control and the Law of the Sea. While Peking continues to oppose US positions in the UN, its most biting attacks there have beenat the Soviet Union and the "social-Imperialist" threat Tho US has not been able to take direct advantage of the Sino-Soviet dispute ia tbe UN to secure favorable votes, but Peking's attacks on the Soviets have taken some of the international heat off Washington, long the favorite target for Third World rhetoric, Moreover, with the Soviets andfrequently pulling their clients indirections, anti-US force* at the UN have had mere tactical difficulty mustering support for their positions.
Peking has regularly tried to rally Third World countries against the US as well as the USSIl, however, and has attempted to warn newly independent nations of the "threat" which close relations with cither powerCurrently, for example, Peking is busily denouncing the US and the USSR for per-petuating tensions In tho Middle East at the expense of the Arab cause.
Tbe Sino-Soviet rivalry has also caused Peking to greatly reduce Us ravohemcnts In most revolutionary and guerrilla movements in recent years, and to devote attention to cs> mating ties with eats tint; power structures almost every" here ha the Third World. This has contributedowering of tension in various boublespots and to better relations between Pe'ung and many non-cororrnraist states important to Washington. China has cL-arnaiicalty unproved relation* with Iran, for example, hoping to help block the furtherof Soviet Influencehe Persian Culf region. In Africa, the Chinese have been aggressively expanding staro-to-stato relations,ew casesomalia) In direct corn-petition with the Soviets and virtuallywith an eye toward wruikening iheof the superpowers. In Latin America, where Chinese interests are still limited, there has been far lets maneuvering between the two communist powers for influence.
eking and Moscow have backed up their oosnpettOon for influence In the Third World with trade and aid. Tbe USSR provides by far the greater amount and la engagedroad based contest for influencethe Third World, against the US as well as China. Peking has perforce been more selective with its old; and its lubstanUaufyaid programs appear designed for tbe most part to counter the Soviets. China has moved aggressively lo edge out lhe Soviets when targets of opportunityby offeringaid to Sudan after Its serious rift with Moscow. Peking has altogenerous aid often to states with which it had little previous contact, as In Zaire, despite the dlspleaiuie such initiatives raised in other, lass kfaeraUy treated, client states like Congo Brazzaville. Tht CaJnssw have not absuvdoned the* eatatxVancd aloes, of course, aadvirtue af their huge aidojoy ful terrier? tJutti the Soviets tn states like Pakistan and Tan-jama. La fact, sn moat oases oo* or the other of the communist powers Islearly more
Influential positionis (ho other, to thai despite the workl-wkle Slnc-Soviel compcti-bon, there bos notild bidding war between Moscow aod Puking (or economic in -Dnence fa the Tmrd World.
eking aad Moaeow mil compete for tbe favor nf aelecteil national liberation and subversive orgaiuutioni world-wide, but the fervor of In ear competition hot dimmedto recent yean. Tho scriomncii of the Sfoc-Soviot competition hu focusedand Soviet attention on mote crucial areasurope and thei well astbeen to deal with existing governments. In ooly throe areas Is thereignificant conspefMoa for trfkance with natsncal libore-tioo groups. Is laoxxfrina, both Mosenw aad Peking, while peyiog proper deference to llanoTs lending rale, still compete forwith the Urxiobon forces In Laos and Cambodia. In the two otherthe Arab fedaycen and the revolutionaries of southerncompetition between tho two has boon low-keyed, with the Sovietsholding tbe upper hand without serious challenge. Since the CMncsc appear unwilling to commit the reseeutnt to oust the Soviets from thai aVinUrtut position, and tbe Soviets equally urrwilljnsr to up the ante tn make the hberarsoo group* more serious threats, the con-teat for influence seems likely to stay within
HE FUTURE Of SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
he fundamental suae* and baskaterett which srparate the two powers appear to profound aa to ensure the prciongetiemoaepseafce and aoVsrsern rtletionihtp.istory and cultural daHtreoces aadcnean of Insults, threats, and ideological disputes, have grown deep and strong. Shifts in both Soviet and Chinese iotctgn policies tn recent years have addod new dimension to their conflict. In particular, tbe efforts of each country to cultivate better rotations with Washington Kive fed mutual distrust aad helped fun) the rivalry. So have the efforts of each to expandriot with the West. And neither devesoprnent seemsnert-firm proposition, the firstelief ia both Moaeow aad Peking that easing tensions with Washington serves theiriterals and strengthens their rrtfer-oational position, and the second is In both cues the result of basic and probably ihnjtMff economic needs, especially for proteinand advanced technology. Thecompetition in contiguous arras has also heightened the level of dutrust andChioeaa efforts to encourage Eastto loosen their ties with tha USSR provoke Moscow's ire.efforts toIts Asian Collrctive Security concept bore intensified tke CTilnia cosrviction that the USSR is efarraratnod to isolate China sod check its InfSronce rtsroughoul Iu
ha sum, the Sino-Soviet dispute has by now gained such momentum and has sothe netsonal prestige of thepartieu lorry on tha Chinese side, that any significant amelioration teems unlikely in the near term. Thus, for tbe nest year orparticularly If Maoseems most likely that the present level oi tension will lenttt. This it not intended to imply thatoviet relations are fixed for the immediate hihire. Tho tone of thawill surely vary from time tn rime. Border frietKois,oUboal needs, or unusual troop deployments could contribute at any thne to eruptions tn the rerntionseap. The Jsenl of propaganda Invective will vary in any case. The possibility of war, of course, will remain.
Tbe Sonets have shown no indtnanori h) respond to Chlneso demands that they puH back their forces along the bonier. Moscow
dearly feels ttiil coocctn about security in Soviet territory bordering Cliinn andt iiroooWy considers tin; minS-mum forte wnnblo of handling anyon its frontiers- But tltc Chinese dearly see thisisnrooortionatc and unjustified display of strength, nntl arc dismclined to make enrtcesstoas under what they choose to Interpretoviet show of force. At this point, it is doubtful that citlicr side would retrace rrdlltaiy forces along the border for fear that this would signal irresoluhoii or lack of staying power to tho other side.
ffaoiig't we rale the odd* of war as tote, It It necessarylee serious atteotha to this poutbltlHj. Because of Chineseof Soviet military superiority, the chances arc remote that Peking would deliberately take oeJidiu kndiiig to war. But variousarc conceivable for major Sovietactions against China. In the Improbable event that China engaged in persistent bonier hatnssoKiits, the Soviets might move beyond local reprisal* and cross the border instrength In an effort to halt such provocations. Larger military operations,penetrations of several hundred miles into Manchuria and Sinldang, might beto wert pressure on the Chinesein some other contest as well. Deeper penetrations, wluch would retroire rocee ex-tensive rnobulzalion of Soviet forces, would have tho purpose of solving the morn basic "Chinan opportunity for such net Ion might occurhe unlikely contingencyhina sharply divided by an internal struggle forn this case, the Soviets
'The sdri Ihil Cfcfcxi mighter deep latrtaal (HvlMoe*nvee weakening ol central nmhortljcurrency ouOfcie Chin* during th* Cultural Resolution. In letrospret, we can we that there view serious strilm; bet thr mote significant fact was (he continuing reipeslvencss to central nulhr'Hy ilnplte deep ekwvaats within the lendenhtp nt nil larch.
might intervene with tho aim of supporting oraction more favorably disposed toward coopwntloa with tho USSR.
hatever (he circumstancesoviet move into rhino, Soviet leaders would almost certainly cipect Chinese rcalatance to develop and to be stubborn. They would hove nothat the war could beo an cad on Moscow's karma nor that Soviet forces would not got bugged downrotracted and costly struggle. Moscow rcaght foresee being confronted eventuallyhoke between withdrawal or the use of nuclear weaponsan effort to end the coo flirt The use of nuclearven if successful, could have far-reaching adverse repcrcusions for the USSR's position In theoacow would fear that the US would rum hostile, move close to China, aadto tally world opinion In favoreneral policy of condemning nnd isolating the USSR. In any event, Moscow's general policy of detente with the West, particularly Hi effort to fosterties with the advanced Westernwould bo Imperiled. Thus.major ground attack on China, especially one io-volvlog nuclear weapons, would involve not only accepting aerknts now tIlls, butan established policy that has reduced conflict on the border with China and promised poliucal and eeonosnic benefits ehewhere to the world
tt. While Soviet phaasanri probably recoil at the thought of bicoralni bogged down In ground actions to Cheat, there no doubt re-rnaina the temptation so deal with tbe mora critical aspects of the Chinese threat before it Is tooto bsot* out China's Hill modest but growing strategic capability with
'Tha ah.iui Ctwrf ol Stari,i, usaf, brieve* thai lha an of sasttrsr wipow itatmt Chinaalio baIr, SovWtihaving mbk- raparcvaloaa, rithai of aor rauteBtt' polltkal nature.
a disarming nuclear strike Argiuncnts for Ihb tnurso as the mil) means oftulc anil unfavorable shift In tbo world itrn-regie balance would probably gain strength U, in Soviet eyes. Ihe USto inovc from an even-handed porrmc betweenand Peking Inward an anti-Soviet alliance with the Chinew. In thil event, il could bo argued in Moscow that detente had failed andisplay of naked fovea winch destroyed Chinese strategic capabilities nnd imtitiod on abiding fear among the peoples andof Asia, Europe, and tbe Middle East would bring gains that more than offset the damage to the Soviet Image.
The cemater-ary?imeoU seem far more coenpeUinjj, The Soviets amid not be certain that some Chtneac missiles would not survive tbe blow ot that (he Chinese would refrain from bunching them against Soviet cities. Nor could Moscow be certain that China would not attempt to engage Soviet generalicesrotracted struggle. As In tbo caseround invasion, there would be much cooccm about hostile US rcsctsons. As for cbs-tounting these reactions and shirting belliE-ercottyeneral posturr ocsigned to exploit fear of Soviet rulhleaaneat and power, ssost Soviet leaders would probably view this as bringing with it all the disabilities of the Stalin era.
Our Jtsdgment, bated em weighing all these ond other considerations, it that the chancesremeditated large-scale Snviet attack oncertainly stilt such as to demandquite low, say on the oldernhile Moscow itto punish the Chinese at any point on thewhose tha Chrneae might act forcibly to assert ttrrnortai eUrrns, the mans Soviet poky to counter China is cer.tered on diplomatic rfforts and on activities within the world communist mnverstent. These efforts will not cause the USSB'iproblem"
o away; ond militury action,isarming nuclear strike, nsayertain appealoviet leaders. But when considered in light of the calculable' and incnlculoblo risks of militaryore measured course which hoULs open the possibility of some accormrtodaticHi and even rccoocilsnticm over the longer term arc far more likely to prevail within tho top Soviet leadership.
Mast participants in this Estimalc feel that tho judgment above applies toarge-scale Soviet invasionisarming nuclear strike. While tho latter coarserates more serious coissloor.ition byplanners, the chances still seem low thatourse would actually Ik: approved and implemented- DIA and Air Force, however, would differentiatearge-scat in-vsuaonisarming strike, ratingisarming strike as markedly greater than that of on invasion.
If war does not intrude over tho neat few years, tbe odds on this contingency will decline as the Chinese deterrent grows. In the meantime, other factors may emerge toa trend Uncord reduced level*ore controlled competition. An unpredictable yet potentially crucial factor affecting tne future of Sino-Soviet relations is tbo post-Mao leadership situation In China. Given hit personal involvement in the whole process of the defederation of the Sino-Soviet relationship. Moo's passing will present an opportunity for both sides to reassess their postures.
oubtful that any single successor to Mao, even Chou, will be able to command tin- power and authority lhat Moo haseriod of persistent pulling and haulinglikely; there are bound to be disputes on matters of authority, style, pace, andand those disputes will leave casualties. Rivalries might becomentense
il Crawl ifataild prnkcvusc Moo. And Ifandwere In leave lhe some at about lhe ittfTK lirrte, Chinese pohltci might hcccanc seriously mutable and Peking's tttlirna'koalthe course ot relations wiih the
arioustkr< conk) bein the poat-Manhere couldreakdown In central fMhorWy.utilcivtt-Ing fact bona Kt Peking fornied alhinen with regional leaden; tn lhaa event, China might ccnae lo ploy an active International role until aaaty haul beenecond poasibllity ll the emergence In Pekingactionor waho.it covert Sovietmove China back into close nllionce with tho USSR.
changes of thli son arcin tho light of piwmtthe history of Ihe ChineseTheretrang commitment loChina within the armed servicesParty, and it Is likely that Ihea regionally based ctollange lowould serve to unllo Otherfactions sn del erne ofpro-Sovietoreldanrr tor the esaatence of aaytn the Chinese Communist Partyleast theb, much kenlo Indicate any ilgnilicant Soviet tato rrardpuiatc OUssete leaders'
brief sfaacusssson dote notaltcrranvei- Bat lhe most likely comof the leadership after Mao and Chou
' Dctpile aDettitsani conccnting Lin Pino and Peng Te-hunl, their problem* wllh Mw almoit certainly now from dterwitic paHij and po-er luues. foreign policy, induing the proper bnlinee o( Chineseoes wBh th* US and tha USSR, may hive become lnvol>ed tn tnler ita an of both affairs; bul even If Ihi* li lhehera ii no evidence Idhat eillier Lin irclna minpuUlod by the USSR or were conscioasly awtlng to advance Soviet will be seme combination of the military leaders, party cadre, and experienced csvinan bureoucratj now visible on the scene atand regional levels. VVhlla Ihese menange of views, tin? political balance appears somewhat to the right of theactivists who reached their high point during the Cultural Revolution. Wbilo these lenders would undoubtedly offer lip service to the revolutionary ideals of Mao, andcertainly would persevere inocialist China, they wcUd nevertheless tend to bo more pragmatic than idealistic, more moderate than radical, and mote concerned with Chinas material future than with the worlds ideological struggles.
eadership drawn from this group would probably retain an interest inrelations wiih the US and tho West. But it might oho be disposed lo place relations with the USSRore businesslike basisariety of strategic, political, and economic
On Ibe Soviet side, leadership changes do not seem likely lo result in mipr shifts in Soviet attitudes or policies toward Peking. While differences undoubtedly exist oa how besl to handle Moscow's China problem,ot possible lo discern precisely bow these differences will affect decisions on the lone and pace of Moscow's approaches to China. What does seem clear is that the USSR would, at least over tho longer term,ess tense and more businesslike relationship with Peking.
Should Moscow senseeadership similarly dbposed hod emerged In Peking, II istt would take Ihe initiative to explore the opportunitiesore relaxed relationship. The Russians might offer to make certain political gestures. Tbey might suggestvbit to Peking by the USSR's current leader, or extend token con-ceseions indicating respect for Chinese indc-
"srertET,
iukI doctrinal originality, (There ato precedents foi lotli tho* actions in Soviet rolaHons withhe Soviets might also offer to expand trade and to resumeand, perhaps, military aid. They might even offer to reduce their competition wllh Peking for Influence in Southeast AsSa infor similar Chinese restraint inEurope and tho Middle East. Moscow would hope that Peking would reciprocate by suspending its nnli-Sovic! politicking at the UN and in diplomaticith third nations, or at least quieting its nnti-Sovict propaganda, restraining Hi missionaryIn the communist world, and tacitlythe status quo on the territorial issue.
any genuine reduction ottension Is difficult to foreseesort of concurrent move towardof the longstanding border Issue.could be negotiated if ChinaKa present posit loo that theas defined in the "unequal treaties"ovist era is an acceptable basis forIn such Otue, the borderessentially one of agreement on certainadjustments, In the Pamir regionImportantly, along theManchuria. It Is Just suchthe strategically important islandthe Soviet military center ofibat Peking is prone toit claims that the Soviets arcbeyond that obtainedhus, theasualty of thetenor ofaSms ratherresult of intrinsically irrcconcuabio
set of factors of possiblesignificance concerns Peking'sof the Soviet threat. The viewhe principal militarymuch of China's currentThe Soviets ore seen as being In aa aggressive, expansionist phase while the US is described as beingtate of decline As the development and deployment of China's strategic uoopons progress, China's concern with the immediate military tltreat sltould decline. Further, tho mere passage of time without an actual attack sltould of itself be reassuring to the Chinese. Asotnewhat less antagonistic relationship with the Soviets may appearsuited to China's fntcrcsls In the eyes of IIS leaders.
rends ln the compJc' Si no-Soviet-American political triangle may also contribute to tbe amelioration of the Sim* Soviet relationship. Indeed, both Moscow and Peking may one day conclude that the US has gained excessive advantage fromintramural conflicts Moreover, in the case ofesire for better relations with China might bo encouraged by serious setbacks in US-Sovietas might flow from difficulties iu arms negotiations, trouble in trade relations, or problems grw-ing out of third-party conflicts. In the Middles for Peking, an inciinaaon to move csoser to the Soviets might be en* couraged by, say, certain developments in US relations with Taiwan or Japan.
ess dramatically, China and rijust conclude IrdependeuHy that. In any ease, they had gotten all tbey could out of detente with the West, that there was not much more mileage to be gained bywith one another fot Washington'shift of this type in China's attitude wouldogical outgrowth of increasing Chinese nuclear strength; as tho deterrent grew,sHf-coofidence would increase, andto US positions would appear less
he main theoretical lino in China's current foreignto
powerreflects Peking'sand Ideological rcaxavalioiB about leaning ta one side and IU long-run Intention to undercut both Soviet and US influence. At present Chinas preoccupation with the Soviet threat predominates ond dictate* the need to lean towards tho US. However, as China grows In strength and coiifukxicc,leader! may find If possible, evento oppose US ond Soviet influence Internationallynoro equal basis, wiillc not necessarily sacrificing other productive aspects of its relations with the US.
n turn, it appears lhal Ihe Slno-Sovlet relationship,ill continue Io mow through varying degrees of (enjiun, If more likely to mote toward lessened tension than toward tear. In time, the cumulative cost of years of tension nnd military preparedness arc hkely to predispose the leaders in both Peking and Moscow toward less risky, more control led forms of competition. The basic national on-tagorUsni is likely to remain as deep as ever, but rather than remain poised indefinitely on the brink ol military confrontation, both parties arc more likely toewin which the differences arc muted, the virulent debates withdrawn from International forums, and third parties prevented Iron)their conflict Peking and Moscow have had many years to assess the potent risk of their rivalry. After Mao, both parties will probably seek to cut the costs and reduce tbe risks by moving the competition into safer realms.
oos beyondenuine ami durableIn which thereenewal of broad collaboration ind perhapsof theout of theIn the near term and highly unlikely in this decade. This is so not only become of all the factors which argue for continued contention, but because any major amelioration of the contest (with its attendant implications of thrcttt for the non-communist world) would fcupardlzo each side's policies and investments in tbo West.
fundamental change from thewould be likely only if there,dramatic turtsovcr in leadership inPeking (which is highlyrparly OT both came to see newthreats from tfxIt is difficult at tins time ton threat of such proportions as tocoormurast adversaries to set asidePresumably, it would have toa threatrsrdng move by the US andits allies er the emergence of aaggressive Japan. The US actionto be seen In Moaeow andarlike; the souring of thewould not likely serve as
iv. world implications of possible changes in
siNO-sovifrr relationship
Wor
War Lvtween tha USSR and China would, of course, have global repercussions. Assuming the Soviets were the aggressor, initial world reaction would be one of awe at Soviet boldness and ruthless"ess, and fearrocess had been set in train which might soon result In severe instability and dbniption throughout Europe, the Middle East, andnot In tonehird Work! War. The attrsrttoo of the nations,nd in concert, would be focused oo bmiting the arena of conflict and,discouraging any Soviet effort tomaximum goalsis China.
In the caseoviet disarming nuclear strike, it would be irnpossible to restoreresembling the status quo ante, lience
difficult lo foresee any vrininjrrstss on tho Chinese sale to art aside their outrage andettW-iriif Trnas, (hoe would bo the rarcapect Ihal military action al some krvd wooid cootfeuc fcXowlrtg the irdttat rrisdcar
Vbtually every nation would look to tho US os the only potslbtc leader in any effort lo restrain llie Russians, mollify tin" Chinese, ond halt tW shooting war. While China would lutvo tho syittpathy of much of the world, there would be little sentiment favoring US rnllitory inrrrvrotion on tVjkinge behalf. But nc'therosture of rigorous neutrality on lhe part of the US raieet approval Bather, the US wosddy-ref ed toirm hne agaliul the aggressor, provideto Other notions against possible Soviet (nrireldalton. and take the lead Inworld efforts to contain and end the conflict. Few nations outride of NATO would ooro to Join tho US Inonspicuous posture in opposition to Soviet ambitions: communist lenders la Eastern Europe and East Asia would be especially reticent.
If Washington wereeace effort, much goodwill aad rrsrpect would accrue to the US. On th* cthnr band, evennded oansddy, tha Stan-Soviet coofhet woulderiod of generalized fear and dis-nrptkm. dearly reversing the present trend tuward detente ssnong the powers andwith econuinlc growth and social change among the smaller nations The arms race would be given Impetus nil along tho SlnoSovlet periphery. Japan, India, and Israel, among cithers, would think more seriously about achieving nuclear deterrent capabilities. US allies in East Asia and Western Europe would escpeod more fundi oa weaponry and draw csoser to catssMtsfaed eJbancrs with the US- The US would com* under heavy pressure from friends ond alia* to eipand Its own rrsUi-tary programs.
Ra ppr ochernan I
5tt Cidbal reaction to tholno-Soviet recoitcllialion would be heavify roahngrnt on its canae. If rrvunCUationome aboutommunist response to US pceicses or actions (aofttatrd perhaps in coQabaratloo with the Japanese) whichto tnenace Russian and Chinesethe new Sino-Soviet maty wouldbe seen as cucnlinUy defensive and probably of limited durabilityubject to rapid erosion once ihe presumed US threat hadat. la the la tor ton. most world leaders would focus on pencekwping elsorts and would try to avoid giving offense to csthcr side, especially If events sermed loangerous great-power con-frootatjocv.
F. If the reconciliation had crnerged, tnde-petJenth/ of actions by othermainlyeavaeoueoca of arraogrrnectsMoacow andconcerns wouldt ffrnant focus. Tbe geiaussssnfcal realitynified communis! bloc,llie Eurasian landmass and far stronger than before, would berf accompanied by bloc protestations of peaceful and Ixnefices* intenl.
o- The world would probably returnorm of bipolarity. The US would be viewed as the only poisiblo lendereconstituted military and political counterweight lopower, though Western Europe and Japan, far stronger thanears ago, would be much more Important components of any rebuilt security structure.ew Third World countries might seek security from anticipated .Sino-Sovietffirrru-flons of neotiility. many mote would novo closer to Ibe US and seek lb protection. There would be deep concern, especially in Asia and the Middle East, that the US might not be as responsive to Ihe security needs of small
Mid remotu stalls as It was during the cold war.
whether the world woukieriod ol tcriiloni nndof the cold wur at its worstnot only on tho power and purposereaaaccnt communist alliance but aboneedsnly tomo of the Sovietlredcrs, no longer (ortOraioedown rivalries, would be drawnharsh and npensioniit foreignwould wish to uae the bet of the*colaborillop end tke Image ofcarnrnanutrstortfrom other powers. enpecraOythe bloc's pertplwry. Bul there wouldsobering second thoughts In bothThe actual afroraitc balance betweenopposing sides. East and West,necessarily be altered apprsxiaWy byof Soviel and ChineseThis would depend essentiallythe joining tookwill bebefore the Chinese can deploy anrorcc in any If catthe level of opposing Westernto be at lhal lime. Moreover,the IntperaHvsi which hava broughtand Peking Into postures ofIhe ir-juirement forimports from theeven eosnplrta Slno Sovieteven in the beat ofreccrvdhahon would coterase mutual distrust or eliminatefear In both capitals that thewas perhaps destined to be
limited fmprovemen' in fftJcmoni
limited Improvement inof itself, would not imply aunwillingness lo do Witness withPortieularly tn tho economic sphere.
Moscow and Peking would remain interestedontinuing inlcrchaiigo of trade andwith Ihe US, Western Europe, and Japan.ituation in which the twopowers ware giving less priority to scoring points against the other, it might bi-possibte to conduct debate and negotiations on certain international issues without thoeffects of Sino-Sovlct polemics.
There would be adverse effects. The US might find the Chinese, even if not anxious Io reverse courses of action alreadyless eager to improve the relationship and less prone to accept the maintenance of the US nuntary presence in the Far East. Il might alto find tbe Soviets, reassured about their Chinese ilonk, more willing to compete with tho US and less concerned aboutinfreer, perhaps, to raise their price or perhaps to jettison this policy altogether if It were not producing the desired gains.
Other powers might find some of tbe underlying assumptions of their policies tuh-|ect to erosion as well. Japan would find its room for maneuver between the USSR and China much more limited, and its activities In South Korea, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia opposed by both countries. India and Pakistan would face reduced support from theircommunist patrons. Hanoi and Pyongyang would find it more difficult lo play Moaeow and Peking off against one another. In short, the premises behind the present alignrncnt of major powers might have to he revised.the most significant result of any irapor-tant reduction of the Sino-Soviet gap might bo the apprehensions gCTVcratcd mternatioisaliy that something approaching fan-scale Sino-Sorict rapprochement was in the wind Such concerns would stimulate interest hi regeo crating alliances with the US and could, in certain circumstances, ln< tease resistance to further detente efforts among Western kaders.
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