CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL
Soviet and East European Attitudes Toward MBFR
THIS ESTIMATE IS SUBMITTED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND CONCURRED IN BY THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD.
The following infolfigence orgoniialioni participated in the preparation' oi the estimate:
'he Cenlfol Intelligence Agency and lhe intelligence orgon.iutions of Ine Di-porl ments of State and Detente, the NSA. the AtC. and the Iteotuiy.
The Deputy Deed or of Cennal Intelligence
The DireciorIntelligence ond Research, Deportment of State The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency The Direcior, Nalional Securily Agency
ThoGeneral Manager for Nolionol Security.nergy Commmio" The Special Assiston! to lhe Secretary of lhe Treasury
The Aitiuant Director, Federa1 bureau of Inves'iOQiion. ih-oemg ouxiCe of his jurisdiction.
dzcr^iz hzs:'J CorHISS'ORICiVi
the Central Intelligence Agency.
SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARD MBFR
PRINCIPAL IUrX.MEr.TS .
Soviet Premise* and Aims in Detente
llie General Soviet Approach to MBFR
The Course ol Negotiations
US and Soviet Foice Reductions
Verification and Inspection
MBFR PhaseCommon Ceilinr;
The Role of the East Europeans
A Soviet Conception of the Outcome
SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARD MBFR
The USSR's engagement in MBFR negotiations has conic uj aof its broader detente policies, and lhe Soviet leaders view MBFR itselfehicle for furthering ihese policies. They perceive that the US Government is under various pressures to achieve fairly rapid results, and they hope this will giveegotiating edge.
Neither in MBFR. nor in their broader detente policies for that matter, are the Soviets workingundamental reconciliation between East and West nor arc they interested in underwriting West Europe's stability and security. They have no intention of allowing East-West relaxation to lead to an attenuation of Soviet authority or Communist Party control in Eastern Europe. The Soviets would see much greater disadvantages than potential gains in an agreement which substantially altered present force levels or combat capabilities on either the NATO or Warsaw Pactentral and recurring theme in negotiations will be the claim that the Warsaw Pact does notignificant military edge over NATO in Europe and cannot agree therefore lo making unequal culs in its forces. The Soviets will hold hard to the position thai the existing relationship of forces shouldessentially unchanged.
The Soviets wouldecidedly negative first reactionestern proposal calling for them lo withdraw one of their tank armies, with men and equipment, while the US would have flexibility as to thc kinds of units towithdrawn and the disposition of equipment. The Soviets would also refuse to accept the propositionommon ceiling for Warsaw Pact and NATO ground forces should be the goal of follow-on negotiations. Thc Soviets might even question whether proposals of this kind were Isofia fide. And they might, in anticipation of such proposals or in response tn them, attempt to alter theframework by bringing foi ward their own counterproposals.
However they play ihese issues, ihey will not want the negotiations to break down or become indefinitely stalemated. Perhaps their tactic would be to attempt io force thc Western side lo scale down its overall requirements and to make concessions with respect to tlie separateof Us proposals. They could, for example,uid pro quo in US armored forces in return for any reduction in their tankThey would also want to explore the possibility of trade-offs involving US tactical nuclear forcesrope.
It will be the aim of the Soviets toinimum of collateral constraints attachedeductions agreement. They would, inoppose measures which could effectively restrict their ability to move forces into or within Eastern Europe. They are sure tothat the requirements of verification should be met to the fullest extent possible by "national technical means."
Although the Soviets believe thai they aretrong bargaining position in MBFR, they will want to appear reasonable and to keep the negotiations progressing. How much or how little "give" there will be in their negotiating position will depend partly on theirof the urgency of thc US need to achieve early agreement. The USSR is likely to recognise, at the same time, that the US and its European allies will regard its position in negotiationsest of the genuineness of its interest in detente. And as negotiations proceed, the Soviet position will probably be influenced by "linkages'" which will be set up between MDFH and other matters, such as SALT and East-West trade.
The outcome of the first phase of negotiations will, of course, be :. incd by the interaction of thc positions of the two sides in the
negotiating process. In thc end. however, the Soviets would probably be prepared lo accept an agreement based on the following ingredients;
reductions limited to US and Soviet forces in Central Europe
an oidcr of magnitude ofoercent applying toof ground forces
some asymmetry in terms of larger numerical Soviet troop reductions than US troop reductions, with compensating US withdrawal of some tactical nuclear elements
minimum of collateral restraints and verification provisions. They would also see advantages in agreeing to follow-on negotiations, especially because of their desire to secure reductions in West German forces. But they would not agree to having the goalsurther phaseommon ceiling) laid out in advance.
Soviel authorities now refer ro (lie "great importance" of the forthcoming MBFR talks, but their overriding interest is in detente not in force reductions perOnly when Moscow became convinced that this major effort to adjust political and economic relations with the US and Western Europe could be set backefusal to negotiate on MBFR did it agree to negotiate and toirst, tentative link between detente and thenfiopean security Issues. The USSR's approach to force reductions will depend heavily on what it wants from detente
Soviet Premises and Aims in Detente
he Soviet leadership has evidentlyconvincedlimate of cased East-West relations and certain forms ofapart from reducing the dangers of war. provide the most favorable setting for thc USSR to improve its internationaln, especially its position In Europe. Broadly speaking, the USSR hopes through detente to achieve many of the objectives it had long soughterman peace treaty. In addition, it evidently hopes that detente will leadessening of US influence in Europe and an erosion of NATO solidarity. At the same time.
the USSR hopes that detente will help to counter the Chinese challenge and to repair weaknesses in Hi position in Eastern Europeiome.olicy proceeds from an assessment that the West for its parteriod of relaxation and Is prepared toertain price to get it. More specifically:
Soviet leaders consider detente nee-eisury to generate the broader economic relations with the West which they are counting on to help them to overcome thc USSR's technological shortcomings and to compensate for agriculturalAnd. if detente in its various aspects induced Western countries to ease Iheir defense efforts, thc Soviets couldgain greater flexibility in theof their resources between theand civilian sectors.
Moscow expects detente to give tacit sanction to Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. It probably supposes, at the same time, that in an almosphere of cased Fast-West relations the US and the West Europeans will have greater difficulty 1st settling their trade and monetarytho West Europeans' confi-
In the US commitment to their defense wdl erode, and llie USSK will be bettei able lo influence Mu evolution of polilical. economic, and unlit.ny tela-ttonships among the West European states at well at Iheir policies toward the USSR and Eastern Europe.
The Soviet leaden say, and seem lothat (be "correlation of international forces* has shifled in the USSR's favor and hence that the US* world influence lias begun to recede. Meanwhile,Ihey are coneeined to insure that Ihe USSR's relative position in strategic weapons is maintained or improved: tlivy would think that to thc extente-in US suspicions aboutentions diminishes US competitiveness In military matteis thiswill be advanced At Ihe same time, theyear the prospect of increased collaboia-tion between their chief rivals, the US and China, and regard the offer ofUS-Sov*et relationseans of limiting $ino"American They also see that in certainsome increase of cooperation be-the US and the USSR may be essential lo prevent conflicts in tlie Thltd World from getting out of conirol. with dangerous consequences for both.
etente has now come to occupy aplace in Soviet policy. Soviel leaders have chosen this course because it seems to Ihem to be thc one that works best in the given circumstances. They almost certainly do not consider themselves bound to it foi thefuture; they might even believe that Western power will eventually declineoint which would automatically confer such ascendancy on thc USSH as to obviate the need for conciliatory policies. Yet as amailer, it would be impossible for the Soviet leaders to formulaic policy cogently or
realistically on the basisimetable whichirm date for turning off the detente lap Tlic Soviet leaders, whoever they may be, wdl In fact haveasoru for wanting lo preserve the main features of the preseni line as long as it is not thought to be having dismptivo effects In thc USSR and Easlern Europe and as long as the US refuses to con-cedeecisive lead In strategic power, China icmains hostile and its sttengthto grow. Western Euiopetrong defense connection with the US and continues movement toward unification, and the Soviet economy remains afflicted with stiious defects.
lthough Ihere can be doubt about how Soviet leaders thiuk about the duration of detente,ittle question about the Umtts they intend to apply to its scope They are determined not to permit delente to open the USSRangerous influx of Westernand ideas. They have no intention ofing East-West relaxation to lead to an attenuation of Soviet authority orParty control in Easternthry seek an opposite result. Equally, the Soviet leaders do not aimundamentalbetween East and West nor are they inlcrested in undciwrifing Western Europe'sand security. Thus there is much which will argue in Moscow- for gieathc management of its detente policy. This will accord also with the instincts of Brezhnev himveif. who is no gambler and knows that by taking the lead in this policy he isto political recrlminatiooj if it Isnot lo be yielding Ihe desired results or is priced too high. There is no reason to think thatow threatened introng andolid Politburo consensus for his present course. But the consrnsus will need to be constantly tended and confirmed He will especially want to assure himself of
continuing assent of those members ofwith proprietary responsibilitiesParty machinery, the secu-
rity apparatus, and the defense and heavy industry establishments, for whom detente raises queitions of particular concern.
The General Soviet Approach to MBFR
Soviets recognize that the very act of engagement in negotiations will makedemands onhelp* to account forwarinessith which they have moved intooscow's altitude toward MBFR had not been conditions) by tlie broader requirements of its policy toward thc West, it might have concluded that it stood to gain more if there were noat all. It could have supposed that the US would lie obliged before too much time had rone by to reduce its foices in Fuiopehereegotiated agreement or not. West Germany's Ostpolitik and lheSoviet treaty which emerged from it were big sleps in establishing the legttitnaey of the Soviet position in Eastern Europe. Moscow expected further gains in this respect from the projected conference on European securityt was not interestedewsecurity structure for its own sake. It also Iwheved thatonference would help to establish its rightarger andvoice in West Europe's affairs, and lhat, having been given evidence of the USSR's devotion to the principles of security inthe West would be encouraged toits economic relations wiih the USSR The success of the US and its European allies in convincing the Soviets that engagement in MRFR was an essentia) conditionSCE was undoubtedly important in obtaining So-siet agreement to negotiate
is not the whole explanation,Il is very likely that Moscow had come to believe not only that it could not easily
avoir! negotiations but that engagement incould be advantageous to ils broad objectives, piovidcd thc outcome promised:
to maintain or improve the Soviet/ Warsaw Pact margin of advantage in force levels and combat capabilities In Central Europe
to provide additional Western sanction for the status quo in Eastern Europe,izable Soviet militarythere
ramework in which thcof US forces in Europe would be assuied but controlled inay as to preclude undesirable political and miliiary reactions in Western Europe
to enable the USSR lo exert someinfluence on West Europe'sarrangements.
t follows thai the Soviets would consider disadvantageous any MBFR terms which did not meet the foregoing criteria Or even pointed in the opposite direction, that is to say. terms which:
significantly altered thc existing relative strengths of Soviet-US or Waisaw Pact-NATO forces iu the West's favor
calledhange in die composition or posture of Warsaw Pact forces which might appreciably diminish theircapabilities or constrain theirof action
mpaired the political-seemity function of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe or limited the ability of Soviet forcesntervene in Ihe countries of Eastern Europe in an emergency
thc basis for lhc USpresence in Europe
hc proportionate wcighl in NATO of WW Cernian forces
gave tlie West Europeans an incentive lo move toward comprehensive military
8 Thc Soviets will recognize lhat anmeeting all ol their criteria it scarcely obtainable,alancing of considerations of this kind will, wc believe, go far towardiming the goals thc Soviels will set themselves in negolinliuus. Tliey ate likely lo believe lhat the best agiecment they could actually obtain il one which left thc overall relationship of East-West forces in Central Europe essentially unchanged.
he Soviets do not consider thatan adequate polluteis NATO icquiics Ihem lo keep llseir duces in Central Europe at precisely their prevent levels, even though for planning purposes they mayon "woisl case" assumptions about NATO capabilities Nos are they likely to believe tliat the reqiiiicmenls of stability in Eastern Europeeduction of the levels of Soviet stationed foiccs But they almostare unwilling lo contemplate massive oils, al any rate in any initial accord. Tills would not necessarily be because they would have concluded that large mutual reductions, even if larger on thetr side, would in allbe militarily disadvantageous. Rut Soviet polilical leaders and their militarywould instinctively think in terms uf incremental changes rather than moreones which would mean tampering with Ihe basic force structure They might fear, in addition, thai far reaching changes ol thb kind would be politically destabilizing in both Eastern and Western Europe- And they are familiar with Western disarrriament hleialure which has related requirements for control or veiification to tin' size ofand tliey would picsunubly expect lhat
inase of sizable cuts the West would requlic extensive verification mcasuics and collaterala kind whichould regard as excessively icitiictivo andoffset thc USSR's favurablcposition. Nor, as we have previouslyhere reason to believe that the USSR's interna! economic problems or lhe need to augment Soviet lorces on lhe border with China are great enough lo move it in this direction.1
The Vienna Exploratory Talks. Six mouths of initial East-West talks in Vienna revealed little aboul Soviet positions on MRFR thai was not already foreshadowed or fore-m- .it'll- The Soviets indicated lhal they felt thenuefves under uo lime pressure lo proceed lo actual negotiations and were moreoverlo insure that CSCE wat wcll-himchcd before they committed themselves lo an opening date for MBFR negotiations. Infunnnl ilatcments by Soviet representatives sliengtheiied thc supposition that Moscow will al the outset of negotiations reject thc assertion that the relationship of forces in Centralreatly in its favor, and will contend that this relationship has to be viewed tn llie context of tbe forcei tbe West could readily using lo bear from all sourcesa crisis or conflict situation. The Soviets will nigue on this basis that reductions in Genital Europe which were substantially asymmetrical would violate the principle of "undiminished security" on which anywould have to rest The Soviets also indicated their aversioo to extensive collateral constraints and verification measures
The only real issue of tubttance on which there was direct engagement in Vienna, however, was the bsuc of whether Hungary
1 Inhe Soviet Approach to Puree Reductions inated IIJ.ENSITIVE,
Ik- includedotential reductions urea. Il Is probable llioloviets li.nl noiin advance lo engage on thc issue al that stage. Hot they were obliged lo by tbe Western side's efforts to designate which ei mit's "in- Io be full partici pants in the vsploialiny talks and Ihus to anticipate tbc reductions area for negotiations. The Soviets, by refusing to accept thisthey were no doubt cncouiagcd to do by llieir belief lliat lhe Western side was not prepared to stick on thethat in the negotiations proper tlicy will start Irom Ihe picsiimp!ion that Hungary is not to be part of tlie reductions wea. They would go on to argue that, if Hungaiy is to be included in any iiductions ut constraints provisioiiv, NATO willo provide appio|iriate cn-lajirrmcnt of the area on its side."
The Course of Nagotialions
onet .Vegotauring Style end Tarries To atlopt the practice of repeated orstonewalling would probably be seen by (be Soviets as not serving their interestsis the Wesl. They well apprecinlc that the US. and perhaps even more the West Europeans, because of tbeir concern for the effect of MBFR on their seeurity. will regard Ihe USSR's behaviorest of the gemnm*-ncss of lis deiente posture. Bui ihey will want lhe Western side to have the impression that there aie no pressures on them to come lo early agreement, and Ihey will take as long as they Ihink ncccssaiy on the issues Ihey decide lo contest.
ho Sovieis will renew their efforts topecial Soviet-US workingin MBFR. They will do this because they will see themselves and the US as the Ley
' WiihiftVvl. ll* pmumetl rcdiwtnm* arm xniiiwlies West and Kail Oruianv, tlseiniiK'i. Poland, amihinlovakia.
|Milicipiuits behind whom Ibr otlieis will have to fall into line and because they know thatuggestion of superpower bilateralism amuses anxieties among the WM Euro|ieaiis that can be useful to the USSR wiihln and bevond the MBFR contest. As they would on any oilieras astuteSovieis will also be looking for tbe baigaiiiuig advantages which tbe opportunity lo play on differencesultinational op]Kisinj; team naturally offers, They will, for example, know about, or discover through the negotiating process, differences which are likely lo persisl between thc US and some ol its allies witb respect, among otherto. thc desirability of pie-reductionmeasures, the geographical extentossible post-reduction constraints area; the ligorousuess of verification requirements; and tlie phasing of national force reductions And, probably more lhan on anything else, die Soviets will be looking for ways to capitalizethe USairly rapid first-phase reductions as against the concern of most US allies Iuegotiation more extended in tune and scope.
ssuming thai the opening round of negotiations is concerned with establishing tht premises for negotiations, thc Soviets in their presentations will aim at elicitingwhich will enable them tosubsequent Western negotiating positions and tactics, but thev- will also be attempting to shape thc terms of reference forBeyond giving their view of theimposed by the principle olsecurity, they may want to engage in snmc further fencing on the question of wb.it exactly will comprise the area ofThey will probably also contend Ibal ihc negotiations should concentrate first of all un reductions, therefore, otherg. collateral constraints, the phasing ofndbe properly
unlit ihere is preliminaryen the nature and extent ol reductions. Thc Soviets arc likely to indicate, in' liny expect thc negotiation of nrmtin Europe lorotruded process and thai the process will be facilitated if thestrive initiallyimited and simple agreement.
he Soviets would be more inclined' to give thc lead in negotiations lo llie West, rather than taking it themselves, letting the other side come lo them willi its pioposals. But thoy will probablyood idea of what Western proposals will look like, and tbey might sec tactical advantages inroposal of their own on dieand before Western parliaments and publicthe Western side does. In this event, the Soviets could proposewhich were equal in absolute site. An alfcinalive Sovietwhich miglit be rnore persuasive before Western public opinion -could be one calling for equalreductions of all NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, stationed and indigenous. In tbe reductions area. Tbe Soviets would argue ttiatroposal would not dirriinisb theof any of the participants and that it would preserve the ratios between Easi and West and between loreign and national forces winch make up the balance of power in Europe.
hatever the order of tbc proceedings, it is assumed that the pivotal element in the initial stage of negotiations willeslern proposal along the lines of the US proposal now under consideration in NATO This in-volves (a) certaui "stabilizing" measures to lie carried out prior to reductions, and (b) ihc presentationiamework for reductions calling for.
a lirst-phasc reductionoviet tank army,eduction of hii equal pei-
ercent) of US manpower with the form of the US (eduction un-specified*
the Sovicls to withdrawanks) as wdl asthc US being left widi its options in Ihis regard open
commitmenturther phase ofin which thi; goal would be lo bring NATO (US and non-US) and Warsaw Pact (Soviet and non-Soviet) ground forces in the reductions area down lo equal ceilings, the Russians being given to understand that the West ist levcb ofen on each side.'
he Soviets would not at the oulset acceptasis for negotiations in whole oi in part. They miglit treat tbe Western proposaU as an inflated opening bargaining position- Although they might raise questions inside and outside the negotiations aboul the seriousness ol the Weslern approach, they uould probably take care not to overplay this lineay which would leave thestalled at an early stage. If they had notroad proposal of theirthe kind already referredcould do so at this point. In general, they would be most likely tooderate stance while attempting to show that the West was making exorbitant demands on them. Promosilion they couldto push and pull on Ihe various elements in the Western proposals, Seeking lo discover
' Ihu would mUJ. according to the dala currentlyeduction of0 USn lha Soviet udo.
' Iu iracheiling, llie Warsaw Pact miuMlo reduce lben, wkneaa NATO CirU -ouM be on the cider0 (once again, ac-cardinecurrrntly available data).
tliere wasI, al lhe mine lime, testing the degree ul Allied resolve andcohesion.
i.wj.he Russian* understand (hat collaleral controls in some form will have to figure In anyngreemen! reached, hut, if Ihey have their way, these will have few teeth In them, no matter at what stage they might be applied. From their point of view, the disadvantages of extensive control* on Ihc disposition of forces would almosi certainly outweigh the bencfits. Advantages could accrue to them from measures of tins kind. if. asresult, they got thc right to intrude more deeply in SATO military affairs and pcihapshance to Inhibit the elaboration of any new West European defense arrangements. Out offsetting this. Soviet political leaders, strongly seconded by mihtarv leaders, would see in suchwould deny them full freedom in thc operational control of their forces on the N'ATO fiont and restrict the movement of Soviet forces within and into Easternpotential for extremely undesirable military effects and political
et the Soviels would probably find it hard to reject proposals for prereduction measutes out of hand In fact, if they foresaw that agreement on reductions was likely to be slow in coming, they might see utility inoken agreement on constraintsay of showing progress and fadlitating movement in Ihe negotiations. In this case,
e seeking Irom DM-part from rediituoni. agreementariety of collateral armi cuntrol meaiurci iluilKited to facilitate reductions try enhancing mutuallubwi^ralfy. to murh the reductions apccm-iM aod to assist venbrMion These fall Moprnrt al rareeorln -ihosr that
hal tfOyU elUtc*
accompanye rffnd afli'r ihem.first rate-gory is distuned here, lhe second in paragraphi.
they would be trying to pure Westerndowninimum,o thosefor the preof. oi anof observers at, maucuveis in thearea (assuming that agreement had not been reached to negotiate measures of ihis sort in ihe CSCEhe USSR would not agree to having constraints applied to its Western Military Districts nor accept any constraints which were not strictly reciprocal Soviet negotiators would reply to Western proposals for prereduction measures which were fairly ambitious inought to place limits on rhe movement of forces in the reductions area, with the argument that such decisions could not be taken until the nature of thc reductions themselves had been agreed on.
lic Soviets, lor their part, could have in slock some proposals of their own. more political and declaratory in nature, which could be put forward as confidence-building measures, fot example:
declaration on the non use of nuclear weapons tiedenunciation of force generally
it convention on Ihc prevention of nuclear war along the lines of the US-Soviet agreement al Summit II*
n mutual understanding to forego during the period of negotiations steps which
her prorotoo ol uus aereeeacM (Arridb IV)II at any lime relation* between tlse Parties or oetn*en eiUier Party and othrtr eountrki appearinvolve the rUk ot nuclear conflict, or if relations between countries no) piroej toAgreementlo unobr the nak of aaieiaar waruW L'ruled Stales of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or between either Party and other counmei, the Uniied Slates and tbe Soviet Union, actaag in accordancethe proviiloos of thisrival acnrdiatch eater Into urgentthere evciy effort tn amidt."
substantially alter the relationship of forces in Central Europe
a dcclai iIihj restriction on.peci-ficd percentage reduction in, military budgets.
US and Soviet Force Reductions
ertain lines of argument which thc USSR will take in Ihe face of the Western proposal for first-phase US and Sovielare predictable- In trying to setargaining posilion. the Soviets will contend that, all factors considered,nbalance between Eastern andmiliiary strengths in Centrala balance which Ihey have repeatedly asserted has kept ihe peace in Europe for morehat thb svould be upset by unequal Soviet reductions unless other aspecls of the balance wcie adjusted as well. This, thc Soviets would argue, wouldnd difficult task, and they could point to some of the factors tliat vvould have to be taken into account inalculation: lhe eapabililies of US and olher NATO forces which could readily be deployed to Central Europe from elsewhere. French forces avail-aide in or near lhe icductions area; airlift and scalifl capabilities enabling the US to return withdrawn foices rapidly; asymmetries in weapons and equipment favoring the Wesl with respect, for instance, lo tactical aircrafl, tactical nuclear weapons, and antitankand West Ccrmanys mobilization
he Soviets would most likely focus their attack on Ihe provisions ol the first-phase reduction proposal on two issues: (a) thai lhe application of equal percentage cuts only to US and Soviet ground forces would call for inequitably .larger Soviel reductions, and (b) lhat the proposal was imfaii in calling for Soviet reductions in terms of orgauiza-
timial structure and equipment,anpower cut oo the US side- We believe, however, that the Russians will accept Ihe propositionirst-phase reduction con-lined to llieir forces and tlsose of the US. altlMMigh not without first exploring the chances of having some West Cerman forces included. And after vigorous insistence on the need forutative equilibrium. Ihe Soviets could be brought to acceptreductions of Soviet and US man-power piovided they obtained sufficient com-pcnuiioti in the other terms of an agreement. As llie negotiations proceed, the Sovietwill be attempting to discover, through the bargaining process and in constantwith Moscow, winch Western pro posak or teims can be altered lo the USSR's .nU .ullage. They may, for example, examine whether smaller cuts are obtainable and
he Soviets will still insist on tbe West's altering its proposals with regard to theto lie withdrawn. Tbey would not agree lo take thru cuts almost entirely in combal. tanks, if the US indicated ittoarge part of ils reduction! through thinning-out or lhe withdrawal of iiuo-combat or support units. Nor would Ihey agree to terms more restrictive for themselves lhan for the US with respect to theof equipment or the disposition of tbe withdrawn forces. They will find serioustoank army. One objection would be that, since in Sovietan army is assigned responsibibtyeographical sector, Ihe removal ol one army would require extensive changes in Iheof Ihe remaining armies. Another would lie that the withdrawal of an entire army formation, men and equipment, would entail Ibe removal of specialized combat units, in-cludmg some with tactical nuclear weapons, and of combat service suppori units. The
would, moreover, not want to get into discussion with NATO on exactly what the make-up ot* its tank army is. They would argue that, since the term "army"ommand structure ol varied composition, it is not suited to servenit forand that, if there is to be discussion of particular kinds of components, NATO should state its proposals in terms of such Soviet units as divisions.
here aie some reasons why thc Soviets svould prefer reductions to be carried out by svilhdrawal of complete ground force units lather than by thinning-out, or by someof these methods. The first method would have the advantage from their point of view of leaving readiness levelsIt would, at the same time, create fewer verification problems for thc West and might thus result in the Soviets' beingto fewer demands in this regard. There is, however, no good indication of whatSoviet thinking is on this question, nor are the precedents instructive. Soviet unilateral withdrawals from East Germany7 were in the form of complete units. Bul subsequent withdrawals from East Germanyere accomplished by thinning-out. In the present case, the thinning-outthe Soviets could persuade the West to acceptwould have the advantage for them of being almost impossible to verify and ofapid return to pre-reduction strength. The approach they actually take on this issue will, of course, depend on the state of play of the negotiations more generally. On balance, we think it likely that lhe Soviets, in seekingflexibility and in weighingof negotiability, will choose in favor of an agreement combining both uniland personnel reductions.
or the sake .of equity, thc Soviets would want sonic payment iu US aimor for any reduction of their tank
asking price couldS Army Corps. Bul they will also want to discover what kind of mi xed-pack age offers the West may have Intank-lacnuke" deal could has'O many attractions for them. Tliey would beeduction of US nuclear-capable aircraft Ihan in nuclear warheads In par ticulai. tlie withdrawal as part ofeal of UScome under the Soviet heading of forward-based systemswould reduce what they regardotential threat to Ihe western USSR. They could also expect to achieve by thc removal of theseand other US nuclear systems ahigher reduction of US combat capability (or an equivalent manpowerthanould be subject to themselves because manpower requirements for moilunits are less than for tank units
l Ihe same time, the Soviets would look lo the possible political effectsS ti.ide off in nuclear systems. They know that tho nwio suggestion that thc US is prepared to negotiate over its forward-based nuclear fortes causes uneasiness among Westand they could hope lo prod! from this There would indeed be concern in NATO over the impact ofove on deterrence and ovoi its implications for Allied paitieipa-lion in NATO nuclear arrangement*.
he Soviets svould not, however, want to pay what they would regard as ahigh price in tanks or oilier In. ei elements for the withdrawal of relatively snail numbers of US nuclear weapons There couldariety of reasons for thbit would be evident to the Sovietsubstantial portion of US nuclear elements would remain; they would have difficully in verifying which elements had in fact been withdrawn; and they would reckon lhat thc withdrawn elements, aiicraft and vvurhends, could lapidly be returned to the theater.
seems likely lo happen, then, ti that the Soviets,eslern "tacuiike" oiler bcfuic them. will attempt to got die US tu raise its offer in nuelcais. and that. failing this.cy will try lomaller slice in iheir tanks than lbc West asks for.
seems unlikely thai Ihe Sovietsto go beyond this nnd make aof theater nuclear forces iu thephase of MBFR negotiations.to do so will be tlterr. but byto it the Soviets would open tliea wide-ranging discussion ol nilforces in which Soviet LHAand some ICBMs wouldcome inlo question. And wherewere concerned, the Soviets mighttheir bargaining opportunities wereSALT. or. at least, that this MMfurther explored.
of thc ancillaiy aimswhich will be proposed to thewill raise issues for them as crucialrelated to Ibe reductionsaisd large, they will regard suchserving lhe interests of the Wesl moreown and Uiey will aim at keepinga minimum. They svould be leastthe kind of provisions whichinherently susceptible of flesibleand discretionary' implementation.protsably acknowledge, forthe two sides would need to pledgeiu some form not lo take stepssignificantly change the forcestructures which would result fromThey would, however, wantundertaking to be largely declaratoryThey would be more likely logiving notification of major movement*Info the reductions area lhan ol major
movements within the area, but in either casewould try to insure that they were left latitude regarding tlie tuning of notification. They might proposeurther step lhc creationtanding ooitsultativcwith general responsibility for cheeking on Ihe implementation of the reductions agreement
USSR would, on the otheroppose constraints lhatils ability to rearrange its forces inEurope after reductions or loif it should consider it necessary toto deal with an "intemaT securityllirse reasons, the Soviets would wantthe rigorousnoss of constraints onof foices into the reductionsmovements across nationaltlie area. In addition, the Sovietstlie position that such constraio's asngieed to would hive lo apply to bothand in no case could be extendedlhe western USSR. They svouldindicate that Western insistence onand complicated constraints wouldserious obstacleeductions agreement.
Verification and Inspection
concerning verificationwill be among ihe mostwill arise in the negotiations. ThePad side will argue strongly lhalof verification andbe met to the fullest extent"national technicalheycontend that the first-phaseagreement under considerationfact, be verifiedigh degreeby those means. There isthat they would agree to certainim-asures: to tin- establishment nlposts in the reductions ansa toduring the period that with-
wore being earned out, or, less likely, to giving Western militaty liaison missions periodic access to certain entry points lor Soviet men and equipment such as Frankfurt/ Oder. The Soviets would, of course, claim reciprocal rights in the Western reductions area They would not allow the West to check in the USSR itself on the location aod status of withdrawn forces
MBFR Phaseommon Ceiling
he Soviets probably expect that there willecond phase of negotiations if the first is successful, and they would agree to it nt that point. Indeed, if they had already demanded West German reductions in the first phase and had failed to get them, diey would insistecond phase. Tliey would, in any event, want to show that theyontinuing process of disarmament in Europe. They would, in addition, want follow, on ncgotianoiu in order lo stimulate furrJiei US cuts and to enable them to keep their band in on European security questions. But for tactical reasons and because theestablishment in Moscow will not svish to move deeper Into MBFR esccptautious and deliberate pace, thc Soviets would not agree lo establishing specific goals for thc next phase In advance. They willthat such goals will have to be worked uut in the subsequent phase itself.
nless the Soviet assessment of therelationship of forces between thePact and NATO is quite different from our own, it is difficult to see bow ihe Soviet government could be brought to accept tbe conceptommon ceiling for ground forces. This would suppose that Moscow wasto goosition with which it has no reason to lie dissatisfieduile different One which could contain many political and military uncertainties. The Soviet political and
military bureaucracies would at least want much tunc to consider thc concept and its poteniial effects before deciding whether to discuss it seriously with the West.
t the point at which the proposalommon ceiling on ground lorces is raised in the forthcoming negotiations, Ihe Soviets will rehearse their objections to unequal(secnhey could counterroposal to include air force manpowereiling Or they could reject Ihe concept itself, alluding to the great complications with respect to data bases,and thc ratios of national forces that would have to be overcome before such an agreement could he reached. They would argue thai such tin agreement could only bewithin the framework of an even more compiclicnsive agreementuch broader area than Central Europe. They could repeat theii proposal for equal percentage cuts, on Ihe order ofercent, of all forces in Cential Europe. In any case, the Soviets svould almost certainly suggest lhal in present circumstances the ideaommon ceilingandicap to negotiations and that it should be Set aside in the interest of progress on leu ambitious but more realizable goals.
The Role of the Eosf Europeanst Is clear enough that thc Romanians dislike the MBFR conference, objecting that itloc-to-bloc undertaking. Dut Iheyintend to play asole in it as they can. arguing for broader participation, direct hnkage to CSCE, and such pet projects of theirs as Balkan regional disarmament. The other East European countries generally favor MBFR, hut they do not consider themselvesosition toubstantial part in negotiations at this juncture. None of theleaderships, not even the East Cermans and Ciechs, would feel great unease at thc
of limited Soviet reductions. One issue wiiicli could forcsccably arise between thc Russians and iheir allies, evenairly simple agreement,verification and constraints.
Thc East Europeans' interests andwould be greater in the case of MBFR agreements which went beyond fairly simple US and Soviet reductions, and here there wouldroom for divergences between them and the Russians. There are few leaders of thesethe most loyal and dutiful ofdo not hope to one or another degree eventually to gain increased fieedom Irom the USSR in lite conduct of their affairs. Sonic of them certainly aiethat MBFR could, to thc extent that it underwrote the status quo in Eastern Europe, help to disappoint these hopes. Many of them will, on Ihe contrary, favorwhich svould limit thc ability of Soviel military foices to move within Or Onto their territories. The East Europeans will also want to have Iheir say when the time comes on the more particular question of indigenous force curs, since there is interest among them in reducing their own forces and expenditures and, conversely, in insuring that Sovietdo not require them to strengthen theirs.
Moscow's anticipation that problem* of Ihis kind might eventually arise would giveurther reason for wanting to proceed carefully into the more complicated areas of negotiations. But at this stage East European views count for little with Moscow; extensive multilateral consultations on MBFR issues such as have taken place in NATO have not occurred within the Warsaw Pact. For now, thc East Europeans seem little able toSoviel positions in MBFR. Thctalks gave no sign that ihey will exercise effective leverage: the Hungarians
appear to have resented being obliged by the Russiansn-.n- observers Iu therather than direct participants buttheir resentment The Poles, morein disarniament questions than the Other East Europeans, are likely to remain active on the fringes of the talks, takinginterest tn matters pertaining toand West Cerman forces. But they will not depart substantially from thc Soviet line The Romanians unit continue to seeas defenders of the rights of the smaller European stales But tbe Romanians mayto be as ineffective in their defiance of Ihe Soviel line on MBFR as they were in the exploratory stage and might only succeed in disposing the other East Europeans to keep their lieads down.
A Soviet Conception of the Outcome
If Ihc way the talks wete going was not to lhe Soviets* liking, Ihey would look foi devices lo bring pressure on the West. It could be argued lhat many of ihe political advantages (hat lhc Soviets might seek in MBFR could be achieved by "mutual example" rather thanegotiated agreernent Thc possibilityoviet unilateral cut coupled with an invitation lo the West to follow suit cannot be ruled out.ove appears unlikely, however: Moscow has had ample opportunity to play this card In recent years but has not chosen lo do so. The Soviets would evidentlyegotiated agreement
The Soviets plainly see themselvestrong bargaining position in MBFR, Thc amount of "give" in their position onas swell as on the question of follow-on negotiationshinge in good part on how strong ihey think the pressures are on tlie US Government toairly rapid first-phase agreement. The Soviets will probably have obtained svhatcver they are going to get
doinSCE before MBFR negotiations arc very far along and llie Weil will have lent this source oi* leverage. Nevertheless, Moscow cannot afford to bargain solely on the basil of what it thinks the US wants or will give; il will also have to lake into account concerns in Western Europe if its larger aims there are to be advanced- Furthermore, lhe Soviet leadership has, iH-cause it has allowed MBFR to lie put on the list of major East-Westan incentive to see that it produces some results. (Brezhnev could, for example, thinkust phase MBFR agreement would at some pointuitable centerpieceS-Soviet Summilnd what actually results from MBFR talks, and when, could very well become linked incalculations to what it happening in SALT and how the USSR's economic relations with ihe West arc developing: Moscow might consider it necevsary to show itselfin MBFR in order lo secure movement in Ihose olher areas, but the Soviets will also be looking for thc chance loii vrveolding out lhe prospect of Soviet concessions in MBFR in return for US concessions outside MBFR.
c conclude lhat the Soviets arc likely lo regard as an acceptable outcome to the first phase of MBFR negotiations anbased on the following ingicdienli:
reductions limited to US and Soviet lorces in Central Europe
order of magnitude ofpplying lo reductions of ground forces
some asymmetry in terms of largerSoviet troop reductions than US troop reductions, with compensating US withdrawal of some tactical nuclear
a minimum of collateral constraints and verification provisions.
c estimate that tho Soviets will also be prepared to moveecond phaso of negotiations. In part this will be because they want to maintain lhe momentuin of detente, but they will be Interested, in addition, inreductions in West Cerman forces and in investigating the possibility of further cuts in Western nuclear forces. The Soviets will not, however, be proceeding on tbe premise that MBFR should lead onomprehensive Fuiopcan arms control agreement or to East-West miliiary parity in Central Europe They are not at this stage persuaded that theyhave both detenteargin ofsuperiority in Europe. Thus they areto move very far or very rapidly in any further talks; the main conditioning elements in the longer run will not be the interaction of the negotiating positions themselves nearly so much as certain broadhe overall course of Soviet relations with the West and with China and the condition of the Soviet economy.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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