Created: 9/10/1973

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Soviet Strategic Arms Programs and Detente: What Are They Up To?





The following intelligence organizations portxipoted in Iho preparation al the estimate.

Theend rhe -MeU^nce , - nf lhe report-

lolel He NSA. the AXC. ond rhe Treoiury.


Tho Deputy Oireetc* of Central Intelligence

etor li ond, Deportment ol Stole.weK^nc. Agencyee-riiy Aoency

omanege- fee Security. Atom* Energy Ce-rimeiion The Special Aiwioni to the Setrotory ol the Treatory


The Aunton! Director. Federal Bureau el Inv.nHootion, theeing ourud. o' hu |ur4dtcnon.

Th-linformoion edtecnng the national .ecurity of Ih. Unned

ade, Titl.Soctiom

nd 7vfl. Tho law prohibit! Hi tian.mi.von or thr, revelation cJ IH contend In any manner lo on ur-iirthorlrod por.on, ait. in any mannerlo, o. Int-rert of the United Stale, or fo. ih, benelil of any foreignlo Ihe detriment of the United









The Programs of Concern in Brief 5

Possible Motivations and Forces Behind thc ICBM

Where Do the Soviets Co From Here? 8






oviet authorities signed tu press an editorial in the CPSU journal KQMMUMST that may well rank as the most optimistic assessment of the prospects for US-Soviet relations printed in thc USSR in the last decade. The editorial reiterates that peaceful coexijtence does not meaneakening of the class struggle in the international arena" but actually promotes such Soviet interests as the "national liberation movement" and thc fight against "bourgeoistew note, however, in asserting that US-Soviet relations haveistoric and fundamental turning point for the better, that "considerable obstacles" already exist toeversion to Cold War relations, and that political detente involves militaryin "organic" combination.

On thc same day, the Sovietslight

testrue MIRV system on board tbeCBM

The purpose of this paper is to attempt to understand thcand motivations behind Soviet policy evidenced by recent events: on the one hand, the foreign policy apparently aimedar-reaching detente with the US and its allies; and. on thc other hand, the vigorous pursuit of weapons development programs that portend substantial improvements in Soviet strategic capability.



In tlic months since the strategic arms accords were signed inhe Soviet government has increasingly stressedolicy of detente with the US and thc West.umber of Soviet political interests ride on this policy, Brezhnevs own prestige is heavily tied to it, and its collapse would be veryto Soviet leaders. At the same time, the Soviets have beenigorous and wide-ranging program of strategic weapons development clearly aimedajor modernization of theirforces.

This Estimate assesses the relationship between these two strains of Soviet policy. Its principal judgments are:

Current Soviet development programs for ICBM forcewere well underway in2 and do not appear to have been altered by the Interim Agreement. The Soviets do not feel they arc constrained from proceeding with extensiveof iheir deployed ICBM force.

However, the Soviets have undertaken activities that raise serious questions for the US about the vcrifiability of the Interimand about Soviet willingness to respect US unilateralThese activities include: possible development of thcobile ICBM; continuation of concealmentfor this development; and construction of new large silos, beyond (he numerical limit established by the Interimwhich are probably intended as launch control facilities yet whose purpose cannot now be verified. Thc activities inalthough they certainly originated in normal Sovietimply ofe facto lesis of US resolve on the rules of SALT compliance. Whether these tests are intentional and howthey prove to be must await evidence on Soviel responses to whatever protests tbe US makes.


doubt that thc leadership hasetermination either to settle for strategic parity with the US or to strike out for superiority. Thc former would require abandonment ofloo firmly lodged in the Soviet system and pressed by Soviet military institutions to be entirely suppressed; the latter would require more optimismeclining US vitality and more faith in Soviet prowess than the leaders could confidently hold.

We believe the Soviet leadership is currently pursuing apolicy it regards as simultaneously prudent andaimed at assuring no less than thc continuedof comprehensive equality with thc US while at the same time seeking thc attainment of some degree of strategic advantage if US behavior permits. Tlie Soviets probably believe thatrestraints imposed on the US by its internal problems and skillful Soviet diplomacy offer some prospectilitarycan be acquired. To this end. they can be expected to exploit opportunities permitted them under the terms of SALT. At the same time, since they cannot be fully confident of such an outcome even as they probe its possibilities, they are probably also disposed to explore in SALT the terms on which stabilization of the strategic competition could be achieved.

It is quite likely that the Soviet leaders see no basic contradiction between their detente and arms policies. Indeed they havesaid as much on numerous occasions. Even if they don potential for conflict, they arc probably uncertain about how far thc US is prepared to insist on linking the two,'and benco are probably inclined to test what the traffic will bear.

This view of the Soviets' stance implies that they cannot be persuaded to moderate their current weapons programs except on twohey arc persuaded that the unrestrained progress of those programs will provoke US reactions lhatboth their opportunistic and their minimum or prudential objectives,t the same time, they can conclude that, if their programs are restrained, reciprocal restraints will be placed on US strategic programs sufficient to assure attainment of Soviet prudential objectives.


The question is whether they will come to the view that theyhave both substantially improving strategic capabilities and continuing beneffts ofand indefinitely. The US is unlikely to obtain answers without further directand negotiation. The US will not get the Soviets to respond to specific concerns on SALT compliance without frankly stating them. And we have estimated above that they are not likely to curb new programs unless they are persuaded both that US reactions to such programs would jeopardize their minimum objectives and lhat Soviet restraint would be reciprocated. But precisely what price, in terms of strategic limitations, the Soviets will prove willing to pay for detente remains to be tested.'

' The AssuUnl Chwf ot Staff. Intelligence. USAP. belreve. ihii Estimate ttop. ihoit ot answering IheiiuciIMm. "Wlui me the Sooted uphe availsbW avUlcnceuaaz Soviet commitment to achieving both numerical anil qualitative strategic superiority over the US. They probably view detenteactic to that end. Whatever its other advantages, the Soviets need detente to brine,lowdown in US lithe shay. TWy need lo gain access to US rehsanceputei tcefcaology. to boy One lo redress Ihev current technology imbalance and to esplott vrljl ihey centkler loavorable opportunity toead during the nrilo IS years. The Soviets are no doubt aware of the impact delete is already having en NATO -nd US dc'envc outlays aod In gaining easier access lo US tohnosory. Acmcdlngly Ihryvie* rleteMerinnpal meani ol foicttalknf US iidtancn in defense lertmnhrjiy while enhancing tlx-lr own relative power poution

thp seem-.



Thc Programs of Concern in Brief

hc Soviet Union is engagedroad effortugment and modernize its strategic forces. Among other things, it has commenced deploymentew SLBM. thend isodification of thearrying multiple reentry vehicles. Ilctivity on ABM interceptors and radars. The source of principal concern to the US at present, however, is Ihe Soviet ICBM development effort*

incebe Soviets haveflight testing on four new ICBM designs of varying class and charactorislics, and even more advanced systems may be in early stages of development, lhc effort easily matches and may prove to exceed that

'Sonet ni'i.r- lorces wil br JMcwsaed inJthe IcetkeoM-ff. "Sense! forces farAttack."

xneduiril ln>ptrt koi in October *'r

nJeinl Ik*ii' Idtent necessary far PWPMM of tmnlrrini Snviel tlrntrs-ic policy nnd detente.

displayed in thehen (lieO (laterndCBMs were under development. Although the (our new ICBM designs, theS. and theJ Jhavelies to previous Soviet ocsigns. tbeyery extensive modernization effort. Thoy are evidently intended for aof new or highly modified silos; one may be Intended for mobile deployment. All demonstrate efforts to improve guidanceThend9 haveIRV capability. The6 has displayed post-boost vehicle (PBV) activity that makes Its association with MIRV probable. All four new Soviet ICBM designs can be traced back at least loeriod, prior to the commencement of SALT. About thc same time, or shortly after, work on currently emerging MIRV bus/PBVprobably begin

oviet interest in developing MIRVs and many othei aspects of thc new development programs were clearly portended al the time ol (he SAL accords and were generally ontiei-

pulifll in our earlieroreover, (he SovieU have lepcatcdly made dear in SALT thai they intended to proceed wllh modeirilra-tion of their forces as permit led under the SAL accords However, the overall scope of tbe activities we observe ami notably the number of individual programs under way at thr- same time,emarkably ambitious and eotscurrent effort

n addition to lueh activities, otheractivities have been observed whichinimum raise disturbing questions about Soviet willingness to cooperate in meeting US verification requirements under SALT. Tlir most serious of these is constructionilo adjacent to the launch control facilities at each of eight existingf them stalled since thc signing of tho SALTinhereumber of reasons for believing that these structures are intended to house improved and harder ICBM launch control facilities. But unless features are observed which would precludeissile in them, national technical means of verification will not be able conclusively lo rule out their possible use as ICBM launchers.

5 Another question arises al the Plesetsk test range where the Soviets are flight testing the solid-propellantenting cover associated with this program

^Trbjj missile appears to be underfor deployment both in silos andobile ICBM, perhaps using partially deactivated ICBM launch facilities for logistic and handling support.

ft '1 he new construction at Dcrazhnya and Pcrvomiiysk. und thc Plesetsk developments, although they certainly originated in normal Soviet planning, imply tie facto tvsls of US resolve on the rules uf SALT compliance.

Whether these tests are intentional and how determined they prove to be must awailOn Soviel responses to whateverthe US makes.*

he scope of tbe Soviet ICHMprograms raises questions about what kind of deployment they portend, how far they will go, and what impact they willhave on the US-Soviet strategicaunch capability for the new silo-like structures cannot be conclusively ruled out, and the SovieU continue to emplace Ihem. the viability of2 Interimmight come into question, li thc Soviets deploy theobile missile, the strong US unilateral declaration of Mayhattep would violate the intent of the Interim Agreement could come into play. Should mobile ICBMs employ deactivated ICBM launch and support facilities, theof tho Protocol to the Interim Agreement as seen by the US would dearly be violated. Continued use of tenting at Plesetsk, ifby the US, would suggest anaccommodating Soviet attitudeSALT compliance and verification.

Possible AAotivoliom ond Forces Behind lhe ICBM Programs

8 The primary motivatloii driving Soviet stralcgic piograms liasesire toorce cf sufficient overall size and linprcs-liven ess to underwrite Soviet inrerrsairoriai political obfectioei. Soviet policymakersassert the view lhat their military posturerucial element of Soviet statusreat power and vital toorrelation of forces" in the world

'The que*tH>n of SALT dfKtisnil

In more detail- Amtcs.

ithin (hit broad context, certaincharacteristies arc derived Ironsmltltan/ doctrine. Since the, thc Soviet military hasiew of strategic requirements that links deterrence with thc ability actually to wage strategic war to thc point of some form' of victory Into surviving attack and retaliating against urban-induitrial targets, strategic forces,to Soviet military writings, must be able to attack tho enemy's strategic weapons, including hardened targets. The survivability requirement stivesationalearge ICBM force of increased hardness as well as mobile ICBMs. The military requirement for hard-target counterforce capability hasa rationale for the pursuit of higher throw-weight. MIRV, andccuracy for all or part of the modernized ICBMIRV capability, to which payload and guidance improvements contributed, was also dictated by the need to penetrate possible US ABM defenses of military or urban targets.

nother motivation for thc new design* is found in the imperatives of technology. Technical advances, making Ihe most ot* the developing state of the art. would lead to new guidance techniques, increased throw,IRVs. The natural desire of missileto improve their product would have been supported by military and politicalwho felt impelled to do as much its possible to improve Soviet capabilities.

II. These early decisions on the follow-on programs were probably influenced by very important irwfituliondf interests in tlie Soviet defense establishment. The Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces, the premier service, certainty had an interest in moving beyond existingThe three major missile design entities presumably pressed the opportunity toiin follow-on programs. Apparently lhc Soviel pallcm of partly cotnpetilivr design*

fiotn different design entitles wiis repealed in ihe new programs.

oviet determination lo carry theseforward was probably abo reinforced by Soviet perceptions of US weapons actioUu. In the near lerm, they could observe MIRVing and accuracy improvement for Minuteman and Poseidon and arming of US bombers with SRAM; in thc more distant future, the pros-peel of Tridcnl and. Sovietgenerally depict US strategic programs as dynamic, purposeful, and threatening The Sovieis certainly also recognize thc political hurdles these programs must surmount inand use various means of encouraging opposilion to them. Thc Soviets have,seen US programs proceed despiie vig-orous opposition in Congress, and they would thcrefoie consider it imprudent to assume that major US force improvement plans will not, in the end, be acted upon. Thus, thc Soviet mililnry probably has hadart of lis case for current programs that theyrudent investment against US force improvements.

Finally, although thc new ICBM .level opment programs were well under way by thc time SALT begannd ABM proved to be the main concern of the USSR during SALT ONE. the Soviets probably now see tome utility in their new ICBM programs as possible sources of leverage on the US.

Top-level Soviet decisionsest programthe culmination of SALT ONK and thc2 Summit.


commcncrd inf tbe Moscow Summit and its SALT agreements mfhienced or deflected the impending test programs, this ic noi discernible. Brezhnev firmly asserted lhc Soviet intent to press vigorouslyntl permUsiblr force modernization. There is

evidence that (he lop leaden were veryto obtain assurances that one of Ihe future ICBMi could be deployed wjihin the constrainterceni increase in lhe *ize of silos for small ICBMs.

Where Oo lhe Sovicls Go Fromhe Soviets certainly appear determined to press Iheir current ICBM lost programsto the point where they could deploy any or all models with MIRVs. It is difficult to project with confidence the kind offorce that will emerge from these programs, although possible force variants can be conjectured. What is dear is that thc Soviets intend theevelopment effort loajor modernization of their deployed forces. There is evidence lhat the Soviets are now planning to produce more of some types of new missiles than ret] uired purelyesting.


he Soviets have in SALT often spoken of mutuality of deterrence, but they have notoncept of parity in numbers ofdelivery vehicles. They referore general idea of "equal security" with the US as an objective. But Moscow has not regarded "equal security" as dictating equality in numbers. On the contrary, "equal security" has been Ihe basis of Soviet demands for larger numbers of Soviet intcrcontelivery vehicles, for example, asfor forward based systems. Qualilnlively, they no doubt consider that it requires thc attainment of techisologkal equality with the US, which, in the most immediate terms, menus Ihe freedom to develop ,md deploy

MIRVs. More broadly, they speak ol thc need to insure against unexpectedbreakthroughs by the US.

n addition, they huvc been factoring requirements for peripheral atiack.against China, into operationalof central strategic forces, notably by deploying some SS-lls so as lo include full coverage of China. They have suggested at SALT that peripheral attack requirements should be gauged io estimating overall Soviet force requirements, but they have nothow these requirements are to bewith an equitable US-Soviet balance.

he experience of SALT ONEheightened thc Soviet appreciation of lhe leverage their programs could have on negotiations. The Soviets had dynamicfor the deployment of new launchers at the time, while the US did not. Soviet leaders may well perceive the qualitative momentum of present efforts as imposingpressure on the US similar to that gcncrited by their continuing ICBM and SLBM deployments during most ol SALT ONE.

ince the US Covernmeni also intends to press force modernization programs allowed under SALT, the need to hedge against US force Improvements probably continues totrong motivation behind current Soviet weapons development. Soviet leaders no doubt beheve that the Soviet effort to match the US qualitatively is shootingovingand that laxity on the Soviet part may COticede future advantages tu lhc US.

inally, Soviet political and mililnry leaders, or al least some of (hem. probably believeombination ofkillful detente diplomacy, andood mriisiirc of luck in thc form of

US laxity, could at some point delivereaningful strategic advantage. They would sec greater strength as improving their loreign policy positions and at least marginallywar outcomes for them if deterrence failed. Beyond this, how they might gauge such an advantage in operational terms is not obvious since (lie kind of superiority that the US once had over thc USSR would hardly appear feasible to them in the foreseeable future. But they could persuade themselves of the valueredible threat to Minuteman even if other components of the US Triad remain highly survivable.

s noted earlier, Soviet military writings of the lastearsear concern for war-fighting capabilities, including coun-tcrforcc capabilities. Some of these writings have refected the notion that the destructive, ness of nuclear weapons renders strategic war "unwlnnable" and thereby posit, in principle, that strategic superiority is essential. While the brood outlines of military doctrine are subject to top-level political approval, it is not clear to whnt extent individual Politburo members accept all thc precepts of thatparticularly as it bears on the "winna-bility" of nuclear war. The Soviet positions nt SALT suggest that, with regard tothe Soviel leadership accept tlic view that both thc US and USSR possess more than enough nuclear weapons to bringorld-wide catastrophe, that the side attacked first wouldetaliatory force that wouldar between the US and Ihe USSK disastrous for both. However, while the political leaders refer with apparentto thc futility of nuclear wnr. (hey accept the idea of maximizing thcof Ihe force they would use if deterrence Fails. Accordingly, there has been aSovicl iuet it in developments and

deployments that can best be explained as im effort to enhance their strategicincluding counterforcc missions.

Thc Soviet regime faces newearing on strategic choices. Thc missile build-up ofas attained for the USSR recognized status as an equal of tlie US in the strategic arms fidd. China has come toajor and permanent strategic military problem for Soviet planners. Thestage of thc SALT processloser dialogue between Soviet militaiy and political leaders on military and political goab. SALT tends to give thc "action-reaction" phenomenon in the arms competition more substance than it had in the past by pladng the arms decisions of both sidesego-tialiug context. Tlie ABM Treatyeappraisal of Soviet strategic doctrine in which extensive active defense was seenecessary partiable war-fighting posture.

In deciding on and implementingforce policy. Soviet leaders face aof specific choices. Diverse pressures bear upon them, particularly pressures from military claimants and weapons producers. But it is difficult to imagine these choices being madeeneral rationalethe kind of strategic relationship with thc US they desire. The range of policyopen to the Soviets could be stated as: (a) acceptance of strategic parity with thc US on the basis of explicit SALTand some clement of self-restraint, with the result that the strategic weapons competition substantially subsides; oruest for strategic superiority, in which they iry to use SALT to restrain US programs while Soviet weapons programs drive inexorably lor ward.



The tiouble with posing Soviet policy choice as one between parity and superiority, however, is that il dichotomizes too starkly what is for the Sovietuch more complex Ond conditional predicament. Positing strategic superiority asesire and an expectation requires the Soviets to be overly optimistic aboul the decline of the US*ivitality and about their own technological prowess. Although thc vigor and extent of Soviet weapons efforts conjure up thc imageingle-minded quest for superiority, wc do not believe they should as yet be construed to mean that. Present Soviet efforts to develop improved ICBMs can so far be heldwith the goal of narrowing the techno-logical gap between US and SovietSoviet diplomacy and SALT policy avow, indeed, an aim no more ambitious than "equal security."

n the other hand, positing parityoviel strategic goal requires discounting power aspirations lhat are firmly lodged in thu Soviet systemhole and pressed by its various military institutions. The burden of historical and ideological tradition makes it very difficult for some Soviet political and military leaders to accept tho notion that an area of competition so vital to their security as thc strategic military competition with the US can be set aside by agreement. Thb Is eij>*cially so Insofar as the terms ofdictated by current nuclear realities, require explicit nnd Indefinite acceptanceondition of military vulnerability for their society. Several clandestine retsorts allege that Soviet political and military leaders see SALT and detente ns devices forear bieathing space--during which the Soviets and Iheir allies can build political, ecooomic. and military power lor fiituie lest* ol strength. In context, these

views probably it'Ilect an admixture ofbelief and policy justification, but some Soviets are no doubt disposed to accept the ideaong-term breathing spell as afor detente. Those who are may see some prospect for the USSIt's acquiringadvantage over the time period covering the life-cycle of newly appearing weapons systems.

e doubt that thc Soviet leadership has firmly settled on either of the courses described above. Rather, we believe ittrategic policy it regards as simultaneously prudent and opportunistic, aimed at assuring no less than the continued maintenance of comprehensive equality with the US while at the same time seeking the attainment of some degree of strategicif US behavior permits. The Soviets probably believe that unilateral restraintson the US by its internal problems and skillful Soviet diplomacy offer some prospectilitary advantage can bean advantage which could have politicalfor thc Soviets in normal diplomacy and possible crises. To this end. they can be expected lo exploit opportunities permitted them under the tnrms of SALT. At the same lime, since they cannot be fully confident of such an outcome even as they probe itsthey are probably also disposed to explore In SALT the terms on whichion of the strategic competition could be achieved.

he logic of this prudential-opporturns-tic mix fits well wiih Sovietncertainty about the vigor of US military competitiveness,o with the institutional and doctrinal forces pressing fiom within. Il appears fully consistent with Soviel foreign imllcy behavior and with their


top uaiu

at SALT. It implies that the Soviets cannot be persuaded to moderate their current weapons programs except on two conditions:

They are persuaded that thcprogress of those programs will provoke US reactions that jeopardize both their opportunistic and their minimum or prudential objectives;

At the same time, they can conclude that, if their programs are restrained,restraints will be placed on USprograms sufficient to assureof Soviet prudential objectives.


It is quite likely that the Soviet leaders see no basic contradiction between their detente and arms policies. Indeed they have publicly said as much on numerous occasions. Even if they dootential forthey arc probably uncertain about how far the US is prepared to insist on linking the two. and hence are probably inclined to test what the traffic will bear.

Thc question can then be raised of what price the Soviets would be willing to pay in thc coin of strategic activities and power aspirations to keep up the considerableof political detenle. if the issuethem in these terms. There can be little doubt that the Soviet leadershiponsiderable interest and invcslmcnt in that momentum. Brezhnev can and probably has argued persuasively to his colleagues that there is at present no truly viable alternative lo his detente policy on the political level.

The continuity of that policy is most pronounced Us European dimension, where

thcound thc Sovieis gropingore activist diplomacy that would serve thc multiple goals of consolidating Soviet hegemony in East Europe; responding to thc new assertiveness of West European states while attenuating their incentives to achieve political, economic, and military unity; and fostering (he decline of US presence andin Western Europe.

Documentary evidence as well as thc historical sequence of events indicates that the flare up of Sino-Soviet hostilities9 plus Ihe subsequent Peking-Washington moves toward rapprochement added an urgent new dimension to Soviet imperatives towardIn the face of these events, the Soviets drew the natural conclusion that their adopted course of strivingong-term military and political containment of China could not work successfully if Peking's relations with the West and with Japan were markedly better than Moscow's.

Finally, of course, there is thceconomic interest lhat the Soviets have in the momentum of detente. They certainly hope and some Soviet leaders surely expect that political detente will bring economicin lerms of access to advanced Western technology and capital investment lor thcof energy and raw materialand the modemization of Soviet

ariety of reasons, bearingon thc willingness and abilily of the West to provide such benefits and on Ihe abilily of Ihc Soviet economic system to absorb and exploit them effectively, there may be agap between the results achieved and Soviel expectations about them. But this is noi to deny the political strength of thc tatlcr in current Soviel calculations.

he economic burden ol defense dots not compel the Soviets to seek force limiting agt cements, even though the defense sectorarge share of some high-value resources. In fact, the Soviets can probablyteady, gradual incicase in military spending. Nevertheless, the economic and political benefits of detente at the very least

airly relaxed environment In which

conflicting military and civilian priorities can be reconciled and minimize the prospect that

military spending will have to be sharply


n sum, the Soviet interest andin political detente is considerable. And thc personal investment of key leaders, notably Brezhnev, is great. He and the regimewould be severely discomfitted by thc collapse of dctunte. Thc Soviet regime sees detente with thc US and its allies as acompetitive relationship. Moreover, as Soviet treatment of domestic dissidents ond East-West human contacts makes dear, thc Soviet conception of detente excludes the

close social and cultural relations that lhe West regardsormal part of international life. Nevertheless, the Soviel leadershipand evidently believes that political detente canseful and long-termBui the question is whether they will conic to Ihc view that they cannot have both substantially improving strategic capabilities and continuing benefits ofand indefinitely.

hc US is unlikely to obtain answers without further direct exploration andThe US will not get tho Soviets to respond to specific concerns on SALTwithout frankly staring them. And we have estimated above that they are not likely to curb new programs unless they areboth thai US reactions to suchwould jeopardize theft minimumand that Soviet restraint would be reciprocated. But precisely what price. In terms of strategic limitations, the Sovicls wil! prove willing to pay for detente remains to be teslcd.




i foregoing Estimate has assessed tlie relationship between Soviet strategic armsand dclenle. Overall Soviul policy is, ofomplex matter with manyandwhich detente diplomacy and strategic arms policy ate only two.Soviet Foreign Policies awl the Outlook for Soviet-Americanatediscussed Soviet policy in broader context. The following excerpts from thatare relevant to the central questions of the present paper and offer useful perspective on them.

USSR's International Position: Purposes and Perceptions

I. TheJrrlyjif piniiitci of Soviet foreign polity remain intact despite Ihe changes which hunt affected Soviet society In tlte postwar period snd despite Ihc dramatic developments In the world situation during these years. The Soviet leaden continue to conceive ofas being In tbe service of Marxist-Lersmist ideology aid Rs promtte of eventual success foe communitm. And, whilo this body ol doctrine does not prescribe particular actions In specific sii us-tlom. Itet of mind which sometime! dfitorts Ihe perception of lhe Soviet policynuiken. I'ndi lo set limits on how far and how fait they can go inestablished positions, andonstant facto* in internal party DC talks- These pneonceptioni argueundamental reconciliation ol interesti between the USSB and the US is Impossible and that an eventual convergence of political, economic and socialut of lha question. Conflk' In lomc form Is seenermanent feature ol the irlallonihip. and Mo-cow ,unames lhal the governing motive on each side ti tood.ncj over the ether. Thai nieant lhat the USSR It cemnutted to efloeti loiti relative powerarietyyt Yet. since Ihu Soviet leader* evniider the outcome of thestruggle to be foreordained in favor of eom-munuin. they cm tibo (ind Wi their "Vnl'Violity of gmluslnsn ami low risk.

tW ihc USSR's list rrrss behavior Inlo praeinatKf na-

lional interest Uian tniu the Soviet tenders to acknowledge lhal ths is ji wiaild he tn rtucitiom nbont lhe lerjllmtntytheir

own rulf and lo lend credibility In Chuicw ilmer-i

ol betraral Thas helps lo repiaui why the Km-vii

to-itimn- Iii iluw the ilhiuun oli ti tinfi.iy o stniggl't nl

ing Communist diversity even while they incline Increasingly to the use of instruments other thanParties in their efforts to gain wider influence

Inlamal Dissent

* appearance and. even snore, tbe permteacc in remit reus ol aa utive political protest which has found some oi its most elfective advocates within thc USSR's privileged sclent If ic-technieal coenrnunity has attracted cosuideralile attention In tho Wen. Closely lelated to tbis li the growth In national eon-

KvTniimsi andmong oon.Creal Itutslan

Jews, UViamsans. the Baltic na-

hooabries and tbe MoslwnTarlUc peoples ef Central Asia. Th* rttjim bas itself shown lo,ivr teniitivity lo the Impact of these developments on iU inter-national linage. Bol whatever thetr potential as future piolilemi. lliese maulfcslalloni of internal teitiion and .'i.-i:or now have little lelevane* for Soviet foreign pobty; whnl relevance they do have items Urgelr Inssn the- inspectAto the cttrnt lhat Soviet iViuinnultii concern themselves wuh DpHiion outside then owe mull circle, whal counts morathe mood of the Soviet masici, with whom tlie intellectual life nil have fewn genrrnl. this broad papular opinion leinforcei the

i-iMi-i- in iii conduct of foreign jol'. Ih

f- hub- ilnuht lhal the ordinary Soviet

a*lr -c

in the USSR'a world posrtron. Iliili-ntero|ie

Nut cimcrdenlalty. the only policies lo which II":of lhe principal Soviet trailer haiattached, tbe "Isw-rhnev Peace CcJicy" and the 'Bnihrnr* Ooe-

rt lmiHi'J jrv.l> mainly tn 1i

by these le-rmt

tioicly ivtatcd. in detente iniewed hy Miuow b> pail of ihe piimi of itnrnglhcniop id position in boih Eastern Europe and WeslemTho Chinese problem, though pcobably not at ihis1ot. n. nevertheless, abo on important itund in Soviet European policy. And. where it concerns the security of the Soviet sphere In Eastern Europe and the future ol the two Cet-manies. this pokey iscattfbve Issue of iD'.emal patty politics acid thus may be aa am of policy more susceptible to tactical variation than other*

OI/HCIIort in Weairm Luieyt. Beyond ukete ae-curlly concemi in Eaitem Europe, tlie USSR's own economic wealoeitei and grow lug preoccupation willi the Chlnete fronl have turned it away from the politic* of ciiii* and confrontation In Europe. At tlie same time, Ihe changing in Item of US-Westrelationship! ami trends within Western Europe itselfinding-down of the prolonged East-Wot confrontation hove evidently convinced Moscow lhat longstanding aimi have become more lealirahfe than ever before. It aeeaheir circumstances Op-portuciees to weakenecure the permanent division of Cerosiny. to reduce the preieace andof the US. and to advance Ms longer-ton aim el cataMnlwf the USSR ai the preoornmant political and miliiary power on the continent- These motive* have, during lhe last several years. gmneJ added force Irom two significant developments, one positive from lhe Soviel point of view, the other negative, the lecaillng and leinvigocatioo of West Cerouny't OitpoJllil. and developmenu within the EEC

The Future Selling of Soviet-Americau Rciatloat

he piecedlng paiagiapht have suicceiledumber of ways In which Ihe bioad letting of US-Soviel relation* hai been altered mi recent years. The Soviet! evidently belwve thatonsequence ol these ibarce* their internaUMul position irbtive to tint of UVr US lus been tUeaetheneit. thoacfctbsa-Uon of considerable fkii. Tke comiraiHic cnerrleUng necessity of aveadwe nariaai war witb the US will for *omr time to same remain an important comtraiptSoviet behavior, andn, deminmc lioni tlie shilling pattern of international alignments may act an inhibition on ihem Al the same tune, ha hum- of the USSRurge lo rnlargi IH worldls rclatiomliip with the US willharpi-ilt'o.

he USSR hat mm pelleasons for wanting lo keep Its relation! with lhe US in reasonably goodertain level of amityClient ill in tbe first place to the inamtcrunce of ccanmunataborts oo Bvaes affect ine: the bilateral strategic relationship-lso useful lo Moscow lo have openfor tbe discussion of sac* bwea of common concern to tbe niperpowen ai nuclear pon-proli(nation and for crisis management In those casei where conflictseen other partici contain the threat ol escalation to generalorsening ol relations, conversely, could create complication! foi Moscow in theof Itsnd toward China. Rising teniion willi Ihe US would abo naveinternal consequencei for the Soviet leaders lo Ihe extent thai it generated military reuuilemenU which would o economic strains, ft nuy be lhal in the present phase the Soviel leaders regard normal and continuing contact, perhaps includingmeetings al lhe highest level, as essentia!areful management of the multifaceted Soviet-Ansertcan iclationship.

ut continued political rivalry mvoKing someofmplicit in Ibe philosophicalbetween tha US aad the USSR over (he cede nog of International lelstloai and lbc USSR't refusal to underwrite slabtlrfy, auaal in Faitein Europe and lhe USSR Itself. It ii also owing lo the fact that the laiget world role lo which lhe USSR tnpirct ii unrealirable cacepl at the expense of the US. Tension with die US, nt the tame lime, hasbeen uied by Die regime lo molxiliae and control the Soviet poiHiliiUun and to sanction in monopoly ol power.

hether, within lliese broad limits, the USSR will in purtkubr citeuiiiiU neat lean toward sharper .oinprlition or broader ceopcrnlion willi tha US will

i '!.tm tlw mi!-in>mi>ariable

Cmmllinn will be Moomw'scntuHis. ami. parlkaln. the ciMat to-ill be abb- to overcome ihe saphiob mataaaei at using ceavilianaa as anand adeeaaracolSoviet

sphere. Civen then pteieol ri of lon^iarativt

f urn Ihe otber hand, be ibUiui

in winch Ihe Sovirti will liir US

ign of weakness.




81. Tbrle obicrvalioiil are rwl nie.irit In( Uill

wo ire the US facingSoviet Union wliichpermanentlyenl and unfulfilled InnmbltWni. To lay thru ilm Sovieta forwaitl phaie Ii not lothat

It will remain to. There ii much tint is tentative and eiperlmental about thti policy ami II can behow long II can be luslalned before Moscow would be la danger of ovar-rxir mini As noted earlier, developments In Germany or Eastern Europe could cause Motcow'i detente policy la Europe to founder Conversely, became of Its economic needs aod the pressures generated by the Chineae problem, the USSR may cons* to regard detente Indopentablr and worth the conceasSons required to maintain K. Tbe SovieU might. In (he same way. come to see tbe need for mote fkiible fonw of political, economic, and mflitary cooperation la Eastern Europe andowering of lhe banters to ccenoiurticabon between the ititei of Eastern and Western Europe.

he USSR's effort! loIts ptetrncc andIn the Third World will come up againit nationalist resistance ami will Inevlliblyertain number of setbacks Limitations cm Sovietwill also liavebearing on Soviel activity In the Third World, especiallyseenu possible,theie in coming years yield diminishing political returns. Certain other dovelopmenli ol an es. senttally unpredictablesevere worsening of the Sino-Soviet conflict,otivuUlM In (ho Sovielhiivn an even more liicnifioant im-pnet on lhe direction of Soviet foreign policy. But

whetheroreot, It cnnnol suit (he USSR, because of the compleiity of its intoresls, to have in uncontrolled international environment. Chances are lhal with lime and wider involvement, lhc USSR will discover rootc fiequcntly thanommon interest with the US in contain!tic row of the causes ol international tension and in seeking the bases for limited accommodations.

hether the future willoremodification of the Soviel international outlook and behavior seems likely tn the end to depend on the USSR's Internal evolution. And bete the most crucial question may be how the Soviet leaders deal with tlie problems of adaptive change in iheirparticularly with (be problem of economic modem i. ration: by minima) measures or by serious reform. The entrenched and self-perpetuating bureaucratic oligarchy now Inilitant to change. Among Iho men In the Politburo who now seem mou likely to take over from lhe aging Brexncv. Kosygin. and PodgOmy, there may be some who will eventually reveal reformist inclinations. But such tendencies. If ihey exist, are not now in evidence. The presentIs, by and large, an Old Guard presiding over the preservationyslem which mutt teem lo Itstn have served ibo Soviet Union's and their own personal interests well. They ate disposed to change it as little as possible and they will attempt toeconomic growth and technological piogiesi by resorting lo traditional method* of discipline andsupplemented by modest modification! of the economic structure and such technical assistanceroad as they can obtain.




The new silo conslnjctlou at Dcra/hnya and Pervomayslc and continued disturbing activity involving therogram at Plesetsk are related to the larger question of how the SovieU see the terms of their strategic relations with the US.

he eight new holes observed atand Pervomaysk since Aprilbelieved

to bo for launch control. If so, it is likely Dial they will turn out to be copies ofilo facilities already present at thosecomplexes and at theomplex at Dombarovsky.

^Unfortunately, theilobe conclusively proved not to be an ICBM silo. (Even if such structures arc in fact used as launch control centers, wc- cannot ns yet

rule out the possibility that the silo might later be used toissile )

he more immediate question, however, is how the Sovieu expect the US to abide this emerging uncertainty in view of itsand precedent-setting potential. There is no reason to suspect thai tho SovieUIhis program with thc intent to face the US with the ambiguities appearing today. They should, however, have had some clue from US stalemcoU since2 that Ihc US counted the sixilos at Deraxhnya and Pervomaysk and the fiveilos we believe to bo under construction at SS-9as ICBM silos since they were included in the total figure of Soviet ICBMs thai lhe US. They could have raised and begun to clarify the problemtep would have requiredof very stringent Soviet inhibitions against volunteering information aboul Iheir own military programs.

here is some evidence lhat in2 Ihc SovieU believed the US would count onlyew-type silo launchers as being under construction at Derazhnya andrather thanbtained by adding theilos there. Hence, they wouldno impropriety in proceeding Willi further conslmction olrililics. Om-

tinuation ol such activity in thc face ofUS protests, however, wouldlear test of US resolve in pressing for rigorous modalities of SALT compliance/^

ctivity at Plesetsklearer challenge to expressed US interests than thcevelopment The unilateral US declaration against mobile missileis not contravened by Sovietand testing ofissile, and the Soviets refused to agree to prohibition on


conflict of intent is

oviet employment of tent cover for probableelated activity at Plesetsk antedates the signing of (he SALT ONEf*^

Whatever Ihe intent, continued employment oT such practices would appear to the Soviets not

to violate SALT prohibitions. The Sovieis no doubt take the view that tenting, as anpractice, is not forbidden under thc article of the Interim Agreement on verification, andobile system does not fall under thc Agreement in any case. But il is hard to imagine them unaware that US anxieties would be aroused by ihese practices.

vidence that mobileay be usingoft sites and facilities at Plesetsk for support and handling presents thethat deactivated soft ICBM launchers will be traded in for an equal number of SLBMs and replaced by an even largerof mobile ICBMs. None of this would violate the letter of the Interim Agreement, but it would clearly conflict with the USthat deactivated sites would have no further strategic utility.f"

3 Tbey

may have in mind some non-strategic use for these areas, but if they are prepared to risk US displeasure, (hey would presumably see no restriction in the terms of tlie agreement on the use of these sites for mobile missiles.



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