FpBo-'ing tht refermdinn einb-hthtnt arepublic Iml summer, the soldier was taken off this emblem; he hmm3wreePpeered.'m^| ond hostility Irom Europeanha challenge, however, theyloss talent than did the Popodooouiosn their efforts to satisfy rodtcal younger officers who pose the greatest threat to the regime, the presentikefy toore nationalistic stance toward the US. although it does not went to damsgs tiei in ony significant way.
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P.iwdopoulOf Wu Pushtd
Th* military coup onovtmbtrong period of dissatisfaction with Papadopoulos on lhe) port of soma army offict'i. Tho Immediate catalyst was tht student disorders .ofwhich. In tht offict'i' vltw,handed by weitmg to lo-ig to take decivve action thai substantial bloodshed resulted.
Bul thlt group hadn su.pieioui of Papadopoufoi' efforts to Mcurt hrs primacy. Thay Wtrt also concerned by hit moves to cloth* th*rtglm* In civilian garb through'and his tentative gestures to roiax pressure on th* ComrhunHU andt. At tht.iirrw ilmt, Papadopouloi, ewar* of th* plotting against him. hadtn*lr fears byiviliannkter Identified withld political world and by trying to transferolice chief .lotnnidri away from AtharrS. i, (
Papadopouloi had. In effect, destroyed his conitltueney In th* army withoutn*.tftorts toivilian governmtnt under Spirot Marktrinis and to woo th* adherents of th* old political partlti had not disslpjtad fears that tht tlactioni wouldpolitical figuresilling lo associate thermelves with the fapadopoulos government; Indead, h* had loon' it necessaryew days before tht coup to piece thre* moderate political leaders under house arrest. Thus, by tha lime he was ousted, Papadopoulos could count onSUppOrtars In tha Greek power itructure.
The New Regime
.Th* military group Installed Central Phaidon Giilkis. formerly commander offit Army, as president. Glrikis had been slated Iclast summer but managed to avoid being forced out. Not well-known, h* was ghran hrs pos' because he was the highestn
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whose loyalty th* new! junta could count ind because tha lupport of tha First Army was crucial to tho coup's success. Ho Ii not ahis own right, however, and seams unllkoly to oo ablo to uh tha powsr of hltloHicoto domlnits the re-
"jy Tha mlutsfy conspirators -vaht'toivilian fact to tho Mitifda world. As pflmr mlnh>broughtAdi.nandio* And'outiopoulos, tht longest serving minister In PiwdopoulM' governments, having boon minister of financa" and minister of h> torlor1 to April of thUawyer and tconomlit. ho hts.spont noarlyean In tho US. Although ho had loft tho Papadopoulos government, nil, reputation njffsrt from rumon that ho had boon Involved In corruption1 during hli asrvlcs In the cabinet, snd hrs toughpoliciestnatad businsii circles, i ,
^i'Tho .cabinet li'eo^sosOd of civilians, thrso wilh military backgrounds, all undistinguished. Two ministers were members of tho Notional Radicalhe party, that; rah Greece for morsecade, 'primarily under former prime minister Constantino Karamanlli. Their presence In [tho, government, however, does not Imply party support for the regime. They are only minor figures and, like other cabinet members.
were hastily recruiteduch: time for consultation. Naltheri they; ho* the Prime Minfs-ter; seems likely to wield much power on their
, Brlgadiar Generaley figure kt the1 old realms, Is clearly the architect ol tho now. Papadopoulos had boon afraid' ofJhh" growing power ond had tried unsuccessfully to ease him out of his hey post, whore he had boon responil* ble for some of tho old regime's harsher securityt wos loannidts who advisedthat tho recent student dernonstratlons must be halted, by force ifyihough it wes ine police and army acting together. thai actually put down tho disorders, killingons in tha proctts.f
loanntdH democ-'
.henslva aooui acynical.'about elections, toa
^believes that Greek, a'*yeUeady for d
'racy. Although he clalmii to accept tha ne
Vaventual elections, he belt**
Tproblems take priority;Soma i
the Papadopoulos junta
j too short.alln^toexperim"
. he stated Ithit It
to earryrciut; blprogram of
; political scan* of; *lyitam. There Is jnO Indlcalion that the, ieouphb, lmetabl*,fof-
, Problami Facing tha Regime
; Moit of the problems that plaguedremain to confront loennidfl and hisThe students and workers, whoselad directly to Papadopoulos*are not likely to ba any happier with tha, pment regime. Moil ol those arrestedesult ofraid-November demonstrations are bemoy loennidts, and he has opened the1 ;universities, Nevertheless, the itudenb and their j'labor luppoiten who joined tnons are unlikely to accept with good greet the light restrictions under which they must operate. Their, success In toppling Papadopoulos may. tmlxridtn them to risk anothtr confrontation
Report
Oectmbai
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"rl".LJ'JililfilKI HIith IheaUthorltlet; one* theythaiill ne! glv* tham th* hind o( government thay
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': Relations with political figure* from th* oldartiallio likely to La'troublesome,ldli hai life respect for (civilian politicians, thoughd Ilka at least lha acqu>*Kenc* of molt conservatives.released leadersby Papadopoulos, but ;h* would noteoun-
ri opening to th*
'INI Ifew constitutionowers of8 'constitution are curbed: Conut torv-makingot proved easy In Greece In the past,! and It Ii unlikely that the new regime willnterested Inraft that even attempts :to satlify tha diverse Interests of th* civilian nolilans. In anyhe old political worldreece it wary: of th* new; rulers and willrequirenot words, before puttingrust in lha government Already, leadingn the Canter Union and th* National Radical Union have cMiored the new regime.ent Ii likely to ns* rapidly as the rulers showaJlfih*JSIJNl^HjJrf. Hii
loanni
Ji'1 So far. the government has been offering ;posts to distinguished individuals ilkainisterwho refused) and other lesser lights, but has stayed away from theitrcal groups. It appearstoormer, prime minister Constantlne Karamanlis, whom loannidit thinks has bean too long out of with Greekr to King Constant ine, wno was formally deposed by plebiscite last turn-mt'. Thus far. neither the King nc Karamanlis
tha coup. While "
. Greece's economic problems would try the capacity of any government. Th* countryunaway Inflationumber of years of stable progress.nd especially since September, the balance of payment, position deterioratedapid rate. Wholesaleave Increased at an annual rata in excessnd rising prices have cut sharply into workers' real wages. These problems have been aggravated by the depreciation of th* drachma, which until recentlytied to th* US dollar. Greece must Imporl th* major portion of Its machinery and raw malaria's for Industry ai well at all of Its petroleum. This demand for Imports il inelastic and must conllnu* despite world-wide inflation and currency fluctuations.esult. Giaece'i Import bill has soared and there Is no short way out of tha dilemma.
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1 The coup has added to these difficulties. Political instability is likely to discourage invest-ment. both domestic and foreign. Tourism may also he hurt to som* extent, though th* new regim* wHI have time to reassure potential visitors before the main tourist season begins. And if Europeans become convinced of the unwillingness of th* new rules to go even as far asIn restoring democratic institutions, eco-ncfinc rotations with Western Europe willto suffer. Moreover, efforts by th* new government lo deal with price rises by increasing wages would bring Greek labor costs closer to
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rulers
i tat;tatesman and could provki* an Important id the
f haCOuld asm* to terms'
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those elsewhere In Western Europelmo when the country'i trod* deficit ls:aireedy mounting shir ply. With Itt available talent apparently ovon less than that ol the Papadopou'oi government, tho now regime ii not likely to bo able to make oarly pfogreu In overcoming theu aconomlc chal-
; Tentative Aueument of Prospects
T.ii'.'i'i-y'iiiRM-nrpti.
i Th* new regime Is still'In th* proceu of settling In. Relations between those in theand th* figureheads In office erequite fluid, loennkjis probably wasto carry out his coup by strong pressures from within the military, and he evidently has the support of th* younger officers. H* has already acknowledged, in fact, that h's coup came from th* lower ranks of th* officer corps, not th* top. Fragmentary information indicates that these Junior officers may be more extreme In their wish to purge suspected leftists and root out politicians of th* old regime than loannidis himself would bt. They may also be mon insistent on rapid action. Thus, it will probably besom* time before his relationship with thes* younger officers finally jells, j
erment within the armed forcesontinuing threat. The greatest danger probably comes from Impatient younger officers who will .ba carefully watching Ihe regime's actions. At tho same time, seniorh* army and air rorco, whoforced out beta use of th* coup.
Hi
may still have sympathiiers in ihaater date might be tempted tothe ^ovot.imont. it will not be easy forrulers to eliminate the danger ,
j'. relations with tha outsldt worldj : | W. .i'm * '
.the advent of the new government will not ease the strains in athen's relations with foreign states, nor, willi ft help reduce its sense of isolo-(ion. the soviets, the east europeans, and the west europeans already have less hope in the new government than the little they had in the old. the greeks thusontinuing cold shoulder in nato and the european communities. there is little prospect that the council of europe would re-admit them without some appearance ofnovoment toward, democratic procedures. coun-tries like tho uk, france, and italy may try to take more noncommittal approach than the scandinavian and benelux countries, but they too will feel pressure from'liberal elamants to speak out against the latest coup in
the change in government may alsoad effect on relations with cyprus. apprehensive of the strong left-wing element on the island, loannidis and his colleagues mayard line toward president makarios. for his part, makariosmay fear that the new athens regime is likely to sunport the grives dissidents on the island {whoonosls. union with greece) whom he has onry recently brought under control after several months of serious violence. many of tho officers in the new junta have served on cyorus. some have seen duty under makarios*arch-rival general grives. makarios apparently would like to put some distance between ihlmself and the new rt-gime in athens as he fears it will dreg greece deeperolitical morass.1 li -
tiow^withthowl
although loannidis and others in the new regime are personally well disposed towardtheir advent probably will complicate us-greek relations over the short term. the greek loaders are welt aware that us prtfcy has urged on orderly return to parliamentary life and thai lhhv has teen put forward in the strongest termsthe last six months. consequently, reminders of the us interest in developing representative government can be expected toold
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the new regime will probably make some minor adjustments after reesressmg itswith the us. athens may want, fur instance, to set up new ground rules lor bilateralduring crisi* limes in the middle east,in such matters as offers of safe haven for us personnel. they could also make new material demands. if the greeks are to meet their nato commitment.
al the same lime, however, the new leaders almost certainly do not want to damage ties with the us in any significant way. the strongetween the us and greece, with iheir founds* lion in cultural, economic, and military affairs, wouldadical shift in relations difficult yet. to demonstrate its independence, theay went to put its brand on important bilateral
arrangements,
greece might be forced to moveciowr lurimtancs. if the new regime felt the usundue pressure. the governmenthopes, however, thaturn ofnot come about in sum, there will bedifficulties in dealing wilh ihe presentbut there is no reason to believe thathostile to the west fs emerging andto doubt
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Original document.
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