Created: 4/26/1974

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> day,i Cut rem intelligence, reports and anelym flgnir-leant CeveJoarnentsthe week through noon oh Thursday.quentiy tAdudes *natWia! coed In* lad Wrtn of prepared by the O'lic*Research, tM.Otfkt -it Strategic Research,irectorate of Science and Technologywer*etment and tbeaaiort fxjniKl-eJ veoeratev fil Sr*clar Report* art IK law In>

f Warding Notice -Sensitive Intalligence ScWces and Methods Involved

f 'Unauthorized DisclosureCriminal Sanctions


The WEEKLY SUMMARY MUST NOT BE^BELEASEDTC FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS and must be hanaJed within the framework 7of specific diiiemtnatWn control VwWons of

Conimlntl qmrln cn II* contlnti O* IMi

ma adiloriwSummiry.


By mon onissidents calling themselves the "Armed Forces Movement" announced the formationrovisionaland claimto have captured theLeyion headquarters, major radio stations, the Ministry Vmy headquarters in Lisbon,ew military Installations outside the capital.lso reported that President Thomaz. Prime Minister Caetano. and some other ministers were surrounded by rebel forces at NationalGuard headquarters, and that they had been given an ultimatum to surrender.

The rebels reportedly called on Generals Costa Gomes and Spinola to join them, but there is no confirmation that either has responded. Both men were fired last month from their jobs as chief and deputy chief of the armed forces,in the wakeurorook published by Spinola calling for changes inAf';can policy.

Earlier this month in the wake of theunrest over Portugal's overseas policy, the government arrested nearlyeftists anddetermined to discourage politicalespecially on May Day. Lisbon also cracked down on some clergymen who we"ess repressive overseas policy.

So far. there has been no response from Portugal's African territories, although the mili-tarv there will be watching the situation very closJy. Support for Spinola and Costa Gomes is sizable in the territories, particularly among junior officers, but It has beon held in check by strong conservative elements in the military,and security structures. The Rhodesian and South African governments also are watching the situation closely since events in Lisbon willtrong bearing on their support for Portuguese counter-insurgency efforts in Mozambique, where fighting has been on an upswing sinco the first of the year.

The outcome of tho curront situation will depend primarily on themost choose to remain loyal to the Caet.no gov-

Portuguese Africa:


The popular image uf the Portuguese African insurgencies as struggles of native blackshite minority government has tended to obscure the fact that significant numbers of black*re fighting for Lisbon. Some of theseare better armed, better trained, and bettsr paid than rank-and-file white Portuguese troops.

Africans in all th'ee Portuguese territories are subject to conscription into the regular army. They receive the same pay and allowances as soldiers from Portugal, although very few have risen above the enlisted ranks. At present,hird ofegular Portuguese Army




in Angola, Mozambique, and Porturjuese Guinea ire Africans.

The regular army units ocerate from fixed positions in cleared areas and alongroutes of communication. In addition, tho Portuguese have developed two special counter-guerrilla forces that work effectively in theoth are made up almost exclusively of African volunteers.

First in the field were the "Fiechas"of the Directorate General of Security. Created5orps of bodyguards for agents of the security service, thes later expandedaracommando force led byofficers and directedegional security agent. The security service began to use the

Fiechas in military operations when the army fa'led to act on intelligence the service provided.

Many Fiechas are recruited from tribes hn$-tile to the insurgents, but at least half art rebel defectors whose guerrilla expertise has been ably exploited by the service They enjoy an elite reputation and are paid almost twice as much as regular soldiers. At present, there areiechas in Angola andn Mozambique.

The other bush force is the army's Special Group, which numbersen, most of whom are in Angola. It also includes many former insurgents, although the army has not exploited their potential as well. Because Special Group units are attached to tho army, they have less ficxibi ity than the Fiechas. Specie1 Group troops are assigned topecific locality, where they also engage in civic action projects.

Aoditional tens of thousands of Africans serve in militia units in all three territories. These unitsore limited role; probably no morehird of the militiamen have evenmilitary training or modern weapons. They are charged with defending their villages, serve as guides and sourcas of intelligence for the regulars, and perform local administrative duties.

Lisbon believes that the benefits of using African troops outweigh the potential dangers. Through their securitvarge number of A'rkans have acquired an interest in preserving the status quo in the territories, for theyosition they could not attain through the limited economic and educational openings available to them. Moreover, Lisbon is able to advertise the African hoops as evidence of the multi-racialism of -usitanian society.

Many whiti settlers In the territories are not enthusiastic, however. Thoy fear that the Africans whom Portugal has armed and trained may eventually turn agains* them. Thehortage of arms for civilian use ir, the te<which makes it difficult for whites to defend themselves against



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