EXTREME LEFT IS COMPLETING ITS REORGANIZATION^ PHaSE and
tVPRNta [Oft REIEASE
wIII initiate hostile activities during the first half of march. as evidence to sack 'his est IMATEi! nts TC the fact
that isolated attacks on armed forces and carabinero patrols are already taking place, along with isolated cases of sabotage, other inoications cited as preparing the climate for terrorist activity included hostility toward the patrols during the curfeh hours and challenges to authority in such diverse sectors as business. health, industry and transportation,
2, flHpNOTES that the position OF THE lett is SElNG strengthened by several factors.
a. the noticeable deterioration of the (mage of the junta government among the low income sectorsesult of the price increases on essentialrtcces. and the general impatience of the masses.
8. unnecessary use of excessive exercise of authority
'"in'THE processes of restoring order in the country. when the
basic premise should BE firm,but
c. the arrival of foreigners, particularly argentines. at.the summer beach resorts. which has given the communist youth> THE opportunity to fortify their activity and TO increase
their campaign against the government by word op mouth and bydisseminationamphelts and flyers.
0. improvement in the communication system between chilean resistance groups in argentina and leftist leaders operating in clandestinity in chile.
e. sufficient evidence toloh return to chile of activists from argentina, estimated at no less
most OF HHoh are concentrated in the provinces QF aconcagua. these numbers can increase in direct proportion to THE success of their initial operations.
. es Fo-lOhInG as factors with|n THE armed forces and carabineros which are assisting THE cause OF the LEFTi
among the ENLiSTEO men with their
in the level of efficiency OF the army asof the transfer To positions in the government Opexperience and influence over their troops. andwith lesser-experienced officers, this has had
a particularly negative ErFECT on THE intelligence services. which require continuity to achieve efficiency.
INTERNAL SUBVERSION IS DECIDEDLY ON THE INCREASE AND THAIW
ARMED FORCES AND.CARABINEROS DO NOY HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO CONTAIN
URBAN GUERRILLA WARFARE IN THE PRINCIPAL CITIES OF THE COUNTRY.
THERE IS GENERAL RESENTMENT IN THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES AS
A RESULT OF THEIR INEFFICIENCY DUE YO SHORTAGES OF PERSONNEL *
MATERIEL. .ORGANIZATION ANO CENTRAL GUIDANCE. THE COUNTRY IS
TATE OF 'INTEWttLNAR, !BUT THE ADMINISTART!ON OF THE COUNTRY
IS NOT BEING maintained IN.ACCORDANCE'HiTHITUATION.
THE COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA ARE NOT RESPONDING TO THE MINIMUM
REQUIREMENTS OF WARTIME. [THERE ETERIORATION IN THE DISCIPLINE,
MORAL AND ESPJRIT DE CORPS OF THE ARMSD FORCES AND CARABINEROS.
THAT THE JUNTA PUT INTO EFFECT THE FCLLOHING
MEASURES WHICH CORRESPONDjTO THE STATE OF WAR WHICH THE COUNTRY IS. EXPERIENCING!
THE ACTIONS OF THE MINISTRIES TO THESECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF THE COHHANDER OF ThEAREA FOR INTERNAL SECURITY tCAJSI).
THE INTELLIGENCE GATHERING EFFORTS UNDER
THE DIRECTION, ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL OF THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL
the military and police strength to heet the
the comhunications media under military control.
THE economic situation op THE armed forces.
econohic measures which favor ThE lonerwill result in support for the junta.Original document.