SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS (NIE 11-1-73)

Created: 12/20/1973

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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS.SANITIZED

intelligence; MrrMATEi

Space Programs'

OVIET SPACE PROGRAMS

CCRLT

CONTENTS

Page

PRfJCIS

THE ESTIMATE

RATIONALE AND EMPHASIS OF SOVIET SPACE

PROGRAMS

IN SUPPORT OF STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

alssance

Communications

Weapons Support .

Weapom

ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS

PRESTIGE PROGRAMS

Prohlcim lo be Overcome

Cooperation in Space Programs for PreiliRc Programs

Manned and Rrhied SpaceSbottte

Unmanned Lunar Exploration

Manned Lunar Landing

Planetary Exploration V. FUTURE PRIORITIES

SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS

PRECIS

The USSR will continue to undertake space program*ariety

of reasons:

Supporting strategic military objectives by using existingspace support systems, aod by developing new

Enhancing the image of Soviet scientific and technical prowess by undertaking prestige space endeavors, such as manned, lunar, planetary, and scientific programs.

ower priority, increasing the use of space for missions with more immediate economic benefits, such asrelay and earth resources surveys.

Currently, some three-fourths of Soviet activity in spire (asby number of launches) is in support of strategic-militaryThe strategic-military space programs have been generally successful, while some of the civilian prestige programs have run into major problems. Well overercent of the military missions have been successful over theears, but only someercent of the prestige missions have accomplished Ihcir objectives. Moreover, the

efforl devotedhe strategic-military programs has been growing relative to civilian programs.

Military space programs, which continues to rely heavily on proven military hardware, are extensive in scope. The major Soviet space effort in support of strategic objectives is the collection of intelligence data by photographic and other satellite reconnaissanceecond very important area is communications satellites. Otherinclude navigation, geodetic, and meteorological systems. The USSR hasatellite interceptorractional orbital bombardment system.

Perfoimanee of military space systems will improve as laterspacecraft become operational. These are likely to include tactical as well as strategic applications. New systems for warning, intelligence collection, and communications are being developed

By contrast, Soviet manned space and other prestige programsadvanced technology have run into disastrous problems, and the USSR has lost its coveted image of predominance in space. In the prestige programs, problems have cropped up throughout the cycle of development and in many technical areas. These problems do not result from inattention or inadequate effoit. Rather, they seem toonsequence of inadequate design, fabrication, instrumentation, ami quality control, and of attempting to cover up, rather than lo addiess and solve, fundamental problems. These are lailures of technology in the first instance, but they are more fundamentally failures ofin tin- .Soviet

In this situation, the Soviets have entered into more extensivewith the West lo enhance the image of Soviet prowess in space and to gain technological know-how Soviet participation in the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project {ASTPJ. which has been entered into also as one element of the broader policy of detente, will be handicapped by secrecy and bureaucratic lethargy, hut we believe that, as long as detente is attractive, the Soviets will find ways to keep ASTP alive. The USSR will continue and perhaps expand somewhat its program of politically-rewarding but relatively uncomplicated cooperativein space with countries other than the US.

We cxju-ct nioio manned Soyuzts,oiitimiaUon of Salyutin near earth orbit over tlie next few years We believe such

advanced space endeavors as ai lunar landingarge

pace station continue to be Soviet objectives, but progress toward ihcm will be slowed by the weaknesses in the USSR's technical ana managerial base, and they are unlikely to be achieved until. For the remainder of, the Soviets will alsovarious unmanned missions to the moon. Mars. Venus, andMercury. They couldupiter or Jupiter/Saturn fly-by as early nsore ambitious series of Jupiter missions in lhe.

eriod of rapid growth in, Soviet funding of space programs is estimated to have leveled off in, and will probably continue at approximately present levels for the next few years. As oilier elements of the Soviet economy make increasing claims on high-quality technical resources, spacethe prestigenot enjoy their past favored position infor these resources, But Soviet space programs almost certainly will not suffer significant long-term cuts in funding.

OXC WIE-

THE ESTIMATE

GENERAL RATIONALE AND EMPHASIS OF SOVIET SPACE

PROGRAMS

In the early years, Soviet space programs used hnidwarc already available and relied cnlirely on boosters developed as ballisticMissions were predominantly.inch as Ihe manned, lunar, and planetarycould be and were publicized-There were also scientific piogram* (orol space near the earth, (figurepposite, portrays tlie growththe major Soviet space programs as represented by (heir flight history. Current Soviet space launch (SL) vehicles are shown inn page WJ This approachcries ol space flights that simultaneously made headlines,igh probability of success, and held costs down. The clear inlcnl, (or the most part, was to enhance an image of Soviet scientific, technical, and military prowess, and the earlier missionsey element in Ihe growth of Soviel prestige.

In lhe mid-lOtfOs. the Soviets broadenedarlier approach by launching, formilitary and economic uses, satellites that were ntcch more widely based in technology and objective* Some of these programs, such as those for communkalions and weatherwere no! amenable to extensiveSome could not be publicized atsuch as ihose for photographic and ELINT reconnaissance, radar calibration. Intercept*

i

port. These satellites continued to useboosters thai had been well-proven; well overercent of the missions have beenin the past six years. Since thehe majority ol Soviet space launches have been for satellites with militaiy- andmissions, with the result thai today some three-fourth* of Sovietin spax (as measured by number of launches) supports the USSR's strategicobjectives. These programs an; currenlly being supplemented by newer programs now in lheadar reconnaissance satellite and what mayigh altitude surveillance spacecraft.

n order to move beyond their earlier publicized successes in space, the Soviets had in ihi:o develop larger and mote complicated space boosters and spacecraft. This new hardware had serious performancend Soviet presiige program*did not move forward as expected. Only someercent ol the prestige missions have achieved their objectives in the past six yean. The US was at the same timein Us advar.ccdIhe result that the USSR lost its early image of predominance in space.

n addition In it* strategic mililaty and prestige aspecfj. the Soviet space effort has had economicutar lltcStiJouch lowci priority. The(hat provide economic benefits do SO for both military and civilian users.

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.'> .Sovid expenditures lot space |wt>gr,im< refleel these priorities and yean ol growth. ToCal .Wicr annual spending (or space Ulo have increased fiom the equivalent of0 million0 to the ciquivn-Icnl of aboutilhon' The growth of the military-strategic share from aboutercent of the total0 to abouter cent today reflects lhe growing importance of tliatcgic programs' For lhe molt part, strategic-military systems have used existing hardwaie and technology in standardized pay-

1t united Sonet spacea hewiW costs ol hid wore, lameh opeifUon*.ol lacilinei. traeftlrtf andration, and rearaicli and drvr locmirnlmilitary andogiams. These lo*Uthe tost of producing Similar srtl'rn* inGeneralised toil mmleb werehiehUS deveJopnenUl practice* andthe Sovart ivstasu TKm Dane

i in the absolute colli of therogum, and these values should be used wilh can-lion. Wo have lar more confidence in lb* overall trend*

Pcvawdat tho pare and liming of pracrami, nucomiated b. rhett

Kiiae major etnwoti ol lhe Soviet effort,t-lulleda aomowhat lower eitimate ol animalthan in the part The sfielchoul hainly partially balanced lay Soviet dovetopmenluino (ui'iirims geodetii. radar reconiuiuanca, and

relard) previously tlmatnl and

by hijhei launch ralei (two Salyut-chna svtcILm and lour Mars probe*he eMoaiaan appear highei. hiwur, because they arc2 dulUii. reptcsentinBinflation ol awoll an used previously.

'Then ii muchnd sharing offocditin, and outpuu.'ilaty and cmtaao rorr power Ii ol lb* Soviet space pntfiaen Al applicateoaacmliar. o* rnJwarrilitary bocxteii. buel. and penonnel Ttvr allneatHHi o* rewuirea In military ol rivilian piORiauii In till; tCitiinnrn Is based onusram in tho US would be runted under

tlieMf line el of DetVnie or NASA.i n (he

eiwr ol atolaryi andteJLm. whose coiti bandivided r> cnnVaa The

catawt ihiei not o Titian le juil hnw much

itiFs'ly luiiliit by thedy

loads and boosters and thus eosl less per launch (ban tlie publicized systems Many ol llieai Salynt andused hardware andlogv wtuch required heavy mveUmentresearch and development.'

G Annual Soviet space launches have leveled olf tl close1 levels of someear, and estimated annualhave remained close to thenf aboutillion By far (Ire largest annual outlays sinceS3have been bar man-related programs (civil and military) and the associated boosters. Salyut-class space stations have absorbed lhe greatest portion of this total. The next largest outlays were fur existing photographic and FLINT reconnaissance programs, which absorb about one-thifd as much, followed in order by planetary, lunar, and earth applications

II. PROGRAMS IN SUPPORT OF STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

7 The mayor Soviet space effort devoted to military and strategic objectives, involving someear, is Die collection of intelligence data from other nations and areas of lhe world through the useecond, veryarea is the continuing development and maintenance of reliable communications satellites Additional major strategic roles are navigation support for Soviet ships and the collection ol worldwide weather data.

Reconnaissance

S The Sovieli have several types offor the collection of photographic and

"Scleral recent preilipe cllcalieen quite eipeaHH irai'Cj, luiuical atliillici

Tho Sjlyut.eillmale-l

loKi on the order ol TD iiinl? ni much tier Launch aiilioioreciinnaciaiKe iilrllile

electronic data, -mdm workingew riidni miii'IIiU: system. TheUic..vi/Ki-riu art usttl lo keep track of iiiroij'.ii iiuhtaiy IoilvS and installations, as well as lor close monitoring nl crii.it situation* such as liic I'ak is tan/Indian conflirl1

lilcs inays. Sinceatellites haveshort life times, ahoiitie launched each year. Sucli frequent launcheside flexibility, because the immon targeting can be optimized lor specific targets, and acan be recoveredhort periodgiving up coverage. But the relatively small amount ol film carried tn each mission limits coverage and the rapidity with which previously unknownelopmcnts can be identified Moreover, the resolution of th?on the high-resolutionmay limit the usefulness ol the imagery for detailed technical intelligence. Sovietieconnaissancc satellites arc expected to improve in resolution, and pcrhapt in film recovery liability, in order in modlo cover Communist China, crisisweaponsand compliance in strategic arms

INT satellites are more clearly understood than in previous yean. Second generation BUNT satellites now monitorocean and coastal areas. ThirdELINTinnow used mostly over land areas, but are expected to be used mostly over ocean areas in the future. Theseappear to be able to contribute directly tn detecting and. in the case of the most modem system, locating forrign naval stupt-Moreover, they monitor variouswarning ridan. Majoradvance* includecovnagc and refinement of thedala thai they collect mi radai taip.ets

so asmpiiivi! iilenlifktflion nwt technical .iiii lysis

lie Soviet, in tlie past few years have been ii itctet recotitaummec satellite The spacecr.iflide-looking ladar that canaigc surface ships, iwch ascairiers. Tins systemotential (nr providing (nigcling darn to combatants at sea. The combination ofurnystem with data from other sources, such as ELINT satellite data.e highly useful in targeting antiship nussitei The flight tests of the radar satellite to date moic than likely represent developmental work, as opposed to_ qualification of an operational system.

"jBut the Soviets probably will attempt toersion of tins satellite that could be used opera tiona'.ly lo obtain information on small ocean areas, and may be able to do so byhe Soviets choose toore capable radarsatelliteadar surveillance satellite for broad continuing ocean coverage, it probably could not appear until later

Surveillance *

he characteristicsatellite launched in2 and of another launched early Inuggesl Ihe Soviets may now be workingigh altitude,type satellite. The most logical choice ofon our peiccplion of Soviet needs and the probability that the Soviets have conducted missdrystem for

unvilUnM satellitexoad.ami cetitl"tiiO'it lienueii-eovii'MW A' atheuielllte, im thelimitedof o

the rntli. anili.ijiiOntly.

ditfinn of missilelluwrvcr. until we better iindcisland llui prni>iarn. wc are not able tortic illusion. iK sign ill carter. or its lime schedule In any case, we ItciHrve that tin- Soviets will develop and in troduceelhtcs Other areas oi possible Sovietinclude ocean sur-veillance (with greater coverage and longer mission times (ban (he railai reconnaissance system now underetection nf nuclear dctomitions, and SICINT surveillance. The latlei two lypes of satellites would work liest in high alhtude orbil*

c*n

Soviets have in the past fewexpanded, in space and on theuse of satellite systems lor Ihe relayTbe uto of the Moh .altitude system hat expandedoscow-Washington

atellite has acapability,ug*satellites is required lu fulfill thein addition lo glowing civilrequirements We believe2 satellites, now in tlie earlysinger, will eventually take overof Soviet civil and military satelliteand provide orders ofin satellite lelay capacity withinTactical applications mighteriod When theStat lienor becomes operational,by> will furnishlevel of ciiminunicalions support.

Soviets now have also deployed Of-

If '. In jiiuM-Uv

kiu unilinear (on* until they .iretnpeeific urmiiinif

Weapons Support

IS Other lypeaovietipped ileployed weapons iyUi-iin

C

3

The Soviets have relied, at least in part.

on the mapping capabilities of theirreconnaissance cameras for ffodetic data for targeting missiles- Over the last few years, the Sonets have deployed optical sites at vaiious local torn in the USSR, and at research tiles in Antarctica. One puipote ol these ulesaccurate tradingeries of satellitesdeveloped for grudrlic purposes

satellites are also used as targets, probably for (Ik- calibifl/ion|_

3

Weelhfin the Meteormeteorologicalpresumably from allhe world. The irlutinat'oiiprobably firstby military Mitlallaiiom, hot Ihed mi Meteorological Service now receives weather data foi civil use

Weopons

Id. The USSR hasatellite in tciccptoiractional orbitalt system (die

he number ol launches per ycji in support ul strategic goals his leveled off in.apid growth inhile these systems willo enjoy the same priorities as live militarysystems, the general level of launch activity isetted to pick up inn fact, the prospects are that, as satellites grow Iu capability (more tunc in orbit and more film time per reconnaissance mhsion, for ex<he number of military space bunches may decline while the number ol active satel lites in orbit will grow. New military ap-plications and systems will continue to be developed, however, in the areas ofsurveillance, communications, ami tveapons support. These are likely to include tactical applications. The total effort in termi of resources expended is likely to remain about the same

III. ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS

lthough Soviet activities in space have had relatively little influence on the Soviet economy, the potential economic benefits have grown It is probable that current eco-norme applications will continue and that new ones will be introduced. Tho future extent and value of these applications of spacehowever, are not dear. The Soviets are likely to utilize satellites eveneusivclyeans for improving communi-ca'ioin. I- weather, and studying earth resources The Soviets may try toconomicearththeir relattortr with less developed nations.

initially most rewarding areathe use of satellites lo conduct studies of the

surface and its rutlural resourcess already been doneertain extent In the manned program, and may have been done asa very limiteda special series of photographic relatedSuch studies have application for. among Other objectives, locating new mineralunderstanding earthquake phenomena, andreas and the effectslution They also can be used to survey forests, arable land, crops, water resources, and to upgrade estimates of nationalThe Soviets probably have also used photorcconnatvsancc satellites to provideof the breakup of ice in the northern sea routes

Satellites used in support of strategic also play an importart eeoooauc role.

observations based on satellite data are more comprehensive and timely, and cover greater geographical areas, than ground facilities. Satellite data arc especially useful to agriculture and shipping as well as in warning of severe storms The Soviets clearly* are following the Wctl'i lead in this area and willto use weather infoimaticn from non-Soviet sources as well as their own.

satellitesuch less expensive means of relaying long distanceommunitatinns in all forms, and are particularly attractive

within the USSR, where the distances between settledcast of thegreat.l the country is north of tho US-Ca-iadian botder. and in many areas severe >viiiicr weather precludes the use of most ground-based relay systems The Sos'iets have been using relav satellites lor ye. -f

^Wc expect the volume uf data In increase in theears,

StTCflf-t

ooperation nidi other nations grow

ant evidenei ofof Soviet space torlinology into iheThere is growing emphasis onofwell as spaceilleconomy, but the one examplefar (some medical applications) n. notTlie Soviets rleaily

every see some cxamplrs of the utilization ol space technology in the civilian economy over the nextears, hut the secrecy surrounding the space program wdl limit this proceis more than in the West.

IV. PRESTIGE PROGRAMS

lthough (he strategic, economic, and scientific applications programs contribute to the image of the USSRodern andadvanced nation, this reputation rests largely on the highly publicizedin their early manned space, lunar, and planetary progiams Soviet accomplish-rnents in these areas, however, relative to the US. have been steadily leu impressive sinceAl the same lime the US successes inthe Apollo and Slcylab programs--have enhanced the USery poor Soviet record hasto the decline of theirs. Sovietin space is no longer the accepted public judgment, as it once was. even in the USSR

he USSR thus isifficult position. Given Ihe earliert cannot afford to allow lhe US to appear to become pre-dominanl In all areas of space endeavor, yet it cannol now compete with the US because of severe, technical and managerial limitations.

be Snvicts hnvo attempted to maintain an aura ot success al>out their space program by exaggeratinguccess of their ventures and by |slaying down ot ignonng their failures. Even internally, ihey haveendency

to tiy to leapfrog failures in outer lo push on Only in the most obvious of cases, inch at theleaths in Soyuz II, have they admitted difficulties. In oidci to enhance this image of success, the Soviets use tho Couism name lo cover most aspects ol their space programs Where the mission is not obvious, the spacecraft Isumber, and the announcement provides little ot noo its mission This system ol nomenclature has been used to cover not only military-tela tedut alsoas well. It has created an image ol an active, successful piogram. when in fact there are many problems. Even in programs which aie npen. and where it would seem desirable, or at least harmless, for the Soviets to release technical information, they have beenreluctant to do io. ThlJ leluclance stems partb from tlie Soviel practice of security and compartment at ion. and partlye-urn lo hide then limitations.

Problems to behe problem! plaguing Soviet manned space, lunar, and planetary programs during (he past few years have appeared largely in |uit those progrimi which were trying tothe Soviet image and to advance the frontiers by using new space launch vehicles and spacecraft. (See Figurelie problems crop up throughout the cycle olplanning, design,production test, andin general program management

hat these problem aieai are sois. in generalresult of lhe fact that So viet technology Ugs tire West, in most of the areas rehti-lspace activities, by some five years.itular. tlie problems stem from the manner in which Soviet sjucn programsarly Soviet successes, nung large cryocfiiic boosters, which were built to carry uiiniiiiiaiiirued nuclear weapons.

iliil nut lori'c (lie on ill' development ol iiii proved bomlett ivitli high energy np|Wamilics>mii'H size Icvhuiltugy thai the USvl uped 'Hiesc advances in propulsion, electronics, and inatcriaL. whichS pingraim. now furnish ihe basis for tin- US lead ui prestige programs

asters and spacecraft, sensors,nd data processing

Limitations at each stage in the de vetofjancnt cyde. and in many technologies, compound the problems of (be Soviel prestige space progiaiiis. but ileiign limitations arc certainly fundamental Tliese aie bestby prohlemi in Soviet spacecraft From the beginning iheu spacecraft designs have been oversimplified, and they havr failed lo develop separate redundant systems to provide alternatives for inflightSoviet spaced aft are crudelyhave liuuteil inilrii.nentatlon. and. for manned vehicles, reflect little concern for crew comfort. Even after many yean, the Soviets still use outmoded technology, arc! their techniques and materials have become inadequate for (lie complea tasks now being attempted

But tlie dcMgncrs have lo use theand uiateti-ilt avaibliJe. In this con text, flight haiduaie must be differentia tec from lahoratoty tip up-item. Soviet scientists and engineersigh degree ofin dvs-clo-niiy. advancedleim in the labmaloiy, bul production itemsl the quality of original single-pieceik nl quality conirgl innops up specifically inclesvlupni.-iil of ihiiM'logic* svluch

nnuisvare inut lu ji.li liVnlii ih coriiinniiiesiliiiuS.

thai allmv the causes id Iniluiet lo lie

2tt 'Ihe Soviets' relative lack of refined in-st rut in1ion to dntiiiuinr (he cause nfwilh inadequate qualitythe prune reasons lhat eomplvx new flight test programs have had repeated failures before successes are achieved Thepace booster, used for the Salyut bunches and the Marsentcries of failures before it became reliable Itthat giouml testing lias tended to be moreo/im go alfau with potentialremaining undiscovered until actual flight. This results in an 'onioneffect, in wlndi the solution ol one problem only reveals another. The Soviets are now attempt ing to CM tad this situation with iwpios-cd lelcmchy systems and procuieinenl of mon simulation eqnipmcnr, but they arc late in doing: io

n addition to tho problem! ol design, fabrication, and test imiiiimcnfalion,show up in the management and control of the spaceflight itself. These aie mostinnbecause or their tome and complexity and ibeuot ipnck resolution of problems

l :iiin;ii'c

imitatioiis an- aho found far back up the program nunacement laddei fromnpcrafium II it veiv difficult in the USSH tonew type* ol production ct radicallyinatcnals into existinghot this li.nl in U' dune if the Soviet space indii'tiy wiie to espand Isryond the lawcilitns with tlie top choice of rugiiii-ers andiiililnii. siip|HUling iiKhistncs adi*-quale III prnviili llie kpucial equipment, parts, and .kIv.iiiii'iI lei IiiuimI kiui'sate in rcli livelysupply ui the L'S.SIl Sovieli in. Ih laid, iu part. In (lieu utagc, ui the piesdge Spaci'

failure In Idle lull piogi.lniv. nf ami

SCCRTT

concepts and techniques used in lhe West.

ore fgndamciilally, (hey have failedake (he Soviel space progiam work as well as il should because (hey had lo work wiihin tli- Soviet system. For example, Soviet management is often done by committee. Members arc from various parts ol die Soviet power structure, they appear to each other as approximate equals, and there is no apparent mechanism for the enforcement of solutionsioblcnt is recognized and resolved.

he Soviets are certainly aware of the damage that failure lo solve these problems docs to their national image. There is evidence that extensive basic research supports the space effort. Manned space, knar, andprograms receive the best support from the technical institutes, and they have been generously funded. The failures ihus have not comeesult of inattention or inadi-quatc effort Rather they seem to have been aof attempting early on to continue to achieve success with minimum effort, and to cover up, rather than adequately to address and solve, fundamental problems. Theseare failures, in the first place, ofbut more fundamentally they areof management inherent in the Soviet System.

Cooperation in Space Programs

he problems the Soviets havein their manned space programs have caused them tn be increasingly more open in their approach to space efforts that do nottrategic impact and to look more favorably on cooperation with other countries. With the example of the US before them, the Soviets have released pictures, models, and actual hardware at an increasing rate- This trend hasunction ofnumbers of cooperative progiams, of the need felt by Soviet scientists to demonstrate

their competence, and of the growing sophi-li-cation of the average parson regarding space matters.

The first US-USSR agreement onin space was for exchange of weather daia and was arrived atut the US received little Soviet data until the launch of theatellitectual exchange of information has also lagged .in other areas covered by agreements, such asong over-due joint review of space biology andand in erratic cooperation in theand use of outer space The thaw in Fast-West relations over the past lew years has. however, reduced the political barriers to

The US-USSR agreement onin space, signed at the Moscowoest docking mission in earth orbit inew level of potential cooperation. As theest Project (ASTP) is nowS-designed docking mechanism willocking module which will also serve as an airlock and transfer corridor be-twecn the US and Soviet spacecraft. During the docking period, which may hut as long as two days, the crews will visit each others' spacecraft andew experiments.

uch cooperative activilies in space must appear attractive to Moscowariety of reasons:

art of the broader policy of detente, the ASTP and other cooperativeare indications of easing East-West tension.

Tlieroject contributes to the pub. lie image of Soviet technological equality wilh ihe US by suggesting that, despite lhe absence of manned lunar expeditions.

-'!,ii

par with tin: US in its spate programs

OCCgilT

1

rograms in general arcsubject ol tvoild-wKle popular mlricsi. ami cn-opcintive activitiesa favorable image ui the USSItgeneral

The US it tbe smtrce Irom which lliecanieal ileal in terms al scientific, leehnulogical, and managerialso that they can attempt to close the gap between the spaceof ihe two countries The USSR also lags beliind other Western countries in nvosi of these areas.

evertheless, tlie Soviel decision toinas contested, and approved only when it could lie demon-stiated that it held more advantages for the USSR There were certainly strong arguments in the Kremlin against such an undertaking, as well as the usual extensive bureaucratic problems of icsolving policy questions among divergent scientific, industrial, military, and political interests. Cooperative activities must appear unattractive for al least some of the following reasons;

The USSR remains sensitive aboutmust of the details of lis space programs, winch lemaui classified in the USSR, largely because of tho closebetween the military and civilian space efforts.

Tliey are aware of their technicalreluctant to ciposc them, and reluctant to risk public failure in such undertakings

If the ventureuccess, credit will have In be shared with poiiinnemies.

hese bureaucratic problems have not been disposed of. they have merely been iiiin the luckground Moreover, the (eclmic.il and managerial problems eipert-enccd by (be Soviets in their spate programs in general, ami in the Salyut mission in par-

(iciiku. will nol be .solved easily. Al) these piobleuis will crop up to present imiehcal obn achieving agreement, and in meeting schedules and grab. Hut we believe ASTP stems fiotn ilctcnfc. and as long as detente is attractive, the Soviets will Imd ways lo keeplive. Tlie specific problems will have to Ih' woikrd through, and (he Sovietwill certainly sec lo il lh.nl ASTP gets the nreessary priorities in terms of technical and immagciial talent.

Moreover, even though there Hill are problems with the Soyux spacecraft. Soyui technologyo longer al Ihe forefront of Soviet space research II is tlie Salyut ami related programs which arc most in trouble in the USSR, not Soyuz. 'Ines now uvei sU years old, and2 rctestcd some of tlie old approaches. In addition, the ASTP mission plan and hardware development have been steadily changed to lake technical and managerial pressure off ihe Soviets The most important new hardware development in ASTP is die docking module, and this is the responsibility of the US. The Soviets thus are taking minimum risk to achieve maximum gain

If Soviet-US cooperation goes beyond ASTP to more advanced projects, (he Soviets will be pressed closer to the limits of their technical and managerial talents II is likely, howevei, that the Soviets will learn from Ihe US as they go, keep the projects within thei: capabililies (or alter them asnd continuu ut houcfil as much as possible front US know-how and world publicity whilea minimum in return. Until (hey can under lakenew protects vtcccsilully on theirtheir technology to do this is now al least five years behind thai of ihethe StwicttS cooperation program lo help bulstei their technology and prestige, and toll continue in promote such cooperation.

1

n addilMm to its dealing* with lite US, the USSIt has inst Miiir.iu. .mil continues to seek, space cooperation witlton-communisl* slates:

es'enslve Franco Soviet program, in-dudiug pUccmentrench laserlot on the moon, is one such effort Again. political as well as scientificwere int'ioftant.

USSIt has been similarly engaged

in cultivating scientific and (kolilircil ties withorthcoming Soviet protect to launch an Indian scientific satellitel serve to further that end.

Soviets also are beginningprograms with the European Space Rescaich Organizationest Germany, and Sweden. These- efforts are still small but are likely to grow It is quite possible that coopeiative efforts with srdl more nations will begui in the future

The USSR's cooperation in space has also included ventures with (he Warsaw Pact nations. beginning in the. Theses technically tiivial efloits al public relations, but recently have grown and have embraced other Socialist nations as well The Overall effort now is to the point lhat specific satellites named In the Inteiiosmosare launched in cooperativeEleven ot these launches have occurred This effort, too, has political, as svcll as technical andlelalroie. aspects, although there is less potential Soviet gain in cooperation with Pact nations than with the West Nonetheless, we eipeit the effort to continue for thefuture at about the current level

'I In- outlook lor cooperation in general is aInitial ion of the trend (hat has seen the Sovu-ls licnne iniicastngly open wilh rcstK'cl to space, activities, including thenl (Inn own space program and their

dealings wilh Other nations. Cooperative dluils withli ii< (lie US. as well as with the US. willnut ci-I.i %ome degree in the future We do not believe, however, that (hel try to iindcrlake truly complex space programs with connlrim other than (he US. lite cost alone ofcc efforts luniis (he paiikipanls. and Ihe US is the only nationna|oi space prugta'n of potential use to the USSR.

Prospects for Prestige Programs

s has been noted above, the Soviets arc hmoVred by the fact thai the USSR has not ctealed Ihe necessary technical andb-se to keep up with the US in the pinstige pingraim These limitations willdelay schedules for manned spacemanned lunar landings, ami planctaiy explore lion

Manned and Related* Space Sloiiom

ie disastroushich endedhe death nf ihree cosmo-naiiH, and live tlviec successive failures of other Salyut type ipacccrafl base set the Salyut program hack at least two yean Invesliga.ued onncluded earthsuiveys, .studies, medical and biological studies, atmospheiic andinvestigations,ther scientific esperimenls These were designed to test the feasiUhty of the stationariety ol usesas different from Salyutadf

a larger area Ol solar inlays. While Ihe Soviets couldand nperslr separate civil andspace stations, as might be suggested byndt seems equally hkely that the lomiietition lor space resources might eventually result in an amalgamation of missiiHis

uccessful ASTP will shore up thecc image lo aoinc oatpnt, it

-SCCRCT-

iwil in fad demon*Irate Soviet technical purity widiS in manned space, flight. Tin- Snynvemnant fmm the curly loiivlel technology. Whileeing mollified sis well as possible, il iscompared to Apollo. Anil although (he Soviets tooted SitlyMt as the doorway lo manned orbital spaceflight in, it is technically fai behind the US Skylab, and has yet tnholly successful mission. Wcto see continuing Salyut missions, toSoviet problem* in manned spaceover the next couple of years. We also eipect lo sec more manned Soyuz space flights wirh specific, limited objectives that can be used to demonstrate an on-going Sovietbefore ASTP- Thereafter Salyut will probably be the focus of Sovid manned space Ilij'hl untilnd perhaps longer.

ersistent theme in Soviet public statements and literature has been that inter-mediate (Salyut) size orbital stations willed toarger station by linking modules in orbit. Out before this can be done, there are severe technical problems to bewhich require additional developmental advances and substantial overallin systems reliability. With optimum speed and success in resolving these problems,

I : :! r ir inc. 1

ulcs. maintaining successivean crews ior several monthsime, could beoviet performance to date does net, however, engender confidence that thesell be resolved soon enough to meet that date.

Space Shuttle

Some Soviet 'pace officials haveinterestS-type iciisablen: li i'.-i- tii'In: mi.

program. Hut the USSH is many yeaiS from achieving such afar in fact thai..Miiiol piodiclcusnble shuttle ul

tlie US type might appear. The electronics, matiti ials, :uid system test problems arcSoviet capabilities now. Any attempts toeusable shuttle would be plagued by problems Between now and, the Sos-icls will continue lo use ferry spacecraft and existing launch vehicles. But lhe Soviets also may introduce, spacecraft and/oi booster components that are reusableashion, call thespacend claim another spaceesire to reduce the cost per launch and (lie Soviet commitmentanned space station program may make developmentruly reusable shuttleto the Suvids during.

Unmanned lunar Exploration

he Soviet unmanned lunaralmost completely preempted by the Apollo program prior to itsexpected to continue at its current low level for several years. "Ihe success of the tsvo lunar rovers.ndight prompt theto try more ambitious unmanned lunar vendues.overample returnmight occur in thesing twouch lunar missions as the Soviets attempt will allow more complex missions andin scientific exploration, as well asto demonstrate technicalThe low level effort svill grow as the Soviets make progress Iowa id their own manned lunar landing.

Manned lunar landing

t still appears that Ihe Soviets willeflort lo laud men on the moon andlint the failures, long slippage, andlow piioiity connected wilh themaVe. it unlikelyhe tuningaimed lunaron lhe success ofIf Ihe

^ inches over the next few years are

1 f>

sccncr

I ul, and the Soviets all-ich aenu On-anned lunarcould Still lake place by the end of Hut any major failures

will almost certainly push rile mission into. The present priorities appear tothe development of manned space stations.

Plo notary Exploration

he impact ol the planetary and lunar efforts in the early space program were enormous. They intensified the feelings that the Soviets win; ihp dominant space power in thend. As the US program developed, however, Soviel deep space (cats had relatively less impact on the worldong scries of failures and pai lial failures, the Soviets,inallynding on Venuspacecraft which transmitted multiple measurements that could be read and interpreted.

ew spacecraft were launched toward Mars in July and3 by theaunch vehicle. The higher energyof3 Mars window compounded the weight problems, and the Sos'iels decided to split the missions and use separate landers and orbiters. this lour vehicles were stmt on their way to Mars, rather rhan two as5 launch window to Mais involves still greater launch eru'igy requirements andvelocities 'ban thoseecause Of this, tin; Soviets may loiegout will piobably use7 window, which will have less stringent energythan5 window.

he SI.-Gaud Venus spacecraft can be used throughoutoariety ol Venus missions. It is more likely, hosves-er. that tho-Soviets will use thehe Soviets have discussed Venus upper atmosphere probes using balloons. These might In: within the ptcsii" Soviel capability and might occur

during live launch windows over theil theublic relations typea Vemu nvrng-hv with llshy nr impactcould Ih- yeai

Aicjiim scientific venture lo obtain seien-lific data prohibit- will not occur before6 bunch window

lie Soviets luve shown some interest In exploration of the outer planets. Rut apayloadoie capable launch vehicle, such asTheith high energy upperhas not been flown successfully and an upgradedas yet to ho lunched Attemptsupiter or Jupitcr'Soium flyby uting one or more high eueigy stages on theould start. assuming eaily and successful testing o: lueh stages. Hie Soviets might be ready toeries of Jupiter missions in the

V. FUTURE PRIORITIES

e eapect MV Soviets to continue their prestige related programs at about theirrate. These programs will continue to be constrained by Sowrt technical andlimitations, but the Soviets willlo try to work around ihese problem areas, borrosv from ihe Weil,Iry to leapfrog them. We also expect the Soviets "'ill continue to develop newand programs to support military-strategic objectives We do not export Soviet limitations to lie as serious In ihis area because they use technology closer to the state ol the ait. Further, we believe lliat the Soviets will introduce satellites that wdl be much more useful in tlie economic area, so that by thendhis demem of ihe program will become mirth larger than il is totlav. The prospect is thus lor ahigh effort in the military programs, wilh improvedontinuation of presenthe prestige space pro-

OCCRCT'

ltlimigh proh.ihly with greaterand mine shifting ol rewHiieci towilh iimni- i, .iiuMii- ictuiii.

* pingrnm objective*ll lienrech oology. Michhighpriipnkinn and unclear power uhiiiCi. fiu nearly allareas.i* advancedwill In*first in Mtpporl of militaryUfffm aindnalinin. Significant ie*ult* ofechnology <iill include pitlcmitMi oflife and development of moreif unciTlie improved performance inherent in these changes may leadnduction in the annual nuinliei of Soviet space launches.

here is little doubt lhal there has been1 continue to be eronomic pressureite lesouicoi put into tome aspects ofacee liave evidence iSat tlien- is some disillinioriment with ihe Soviet manned space progiam. Andbeen heard tliat spacedefamed tlw military of much-neededTtse new Five Year Plan0 called lor greater emphasis on spacenavigation, and earth resourcesusedemonstrable economicHut perhaps even more importantly, thelan relied he.uily on the application throughout the Soviel economy ofimprovements In productivity to keep the economy growing And thisuch gieatcr input lo lhe economy of Ihe sophisticated ixjuipment and human talent thai herclofiMc were being devoured by lhe spaceatuial consequence of iIkh- dvK'limiiHvuti ivj*und* for some program* were tut as easily available as in lheand some progiam* were strelcl-ed out. We lielirve. however, that economicbate not seriously affected the scope and tuning nf the tpacc progianu; these have

Ikvii and will he much more subject to lech, meal and miiiagcufll comltninls.

lli'i on currently ubveivalile program* and the aiMiiiiplimi that thete aie program* ui liar early stages of dcwlfipiitctil lhat arc unknown to in. wr believe lhat spending for Soviet space programs will continueevel Tlseieaftri the Soviel* can snpfsort an active andace effutt, andseveral new prugram* each year, wirh-nul exceeding lhe cut rent level* ufOnly il theiiteinpLitc very expensiveanned Marseconomic conskleiations be likely toecisive role. Bul sucharc unlikely, primarily for technical reasons

On tlie other hand. Sovietoil certainly will not sufferling-term cut* in funding. The Sovietseep, wide-ranging commitment to the exploration and use of space. Sovietfrom Secretary Brezhnev to Academy of Sciences Piesidenlrepeatedly stressed the importance of space from both an economiccientific standpoint. The long term nature of tlie commitment ii evi. dent from 'he broad nature ol tlieprograms- both economic andand Irom lhe high priority accorded space research facilities And *pacc activities are consistently among tlmse majorwinch the Soviets like to recite onoccasions as demon*trathe of socialist success In nun, the Soviets have ideological, national, and strategic ce-nn-itments to space aclisit) that transcend lhe economicentilie rationale* tliey often cite.it is likely that the totalmilitary amicontinue nt about the .ii' level

The space industiy has lost some ol" ifs favored positionis other claimants in the economy who atn now In closerfor budget allocations Thehe space programs that each yeararge share of the technical resources ol the

USSR will not take ashare in the future Sonic of the incremental icsouiccn previously devoted to the space programs each year, during theii period of iapid growth, can increasingly be used elsewhere in the economy.

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Original document.

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